05000255/FIN-2011009-04: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = A Dunlop, B Jose, C Brown, J Gilliam, M Jones, N Della, | | Inspector = A Dunlop, B Jose, C Brown, J Gilliam, M Jones, N Della, Grecan Feliz-Adorno, N Hansing, R Baker, S Spiegelman | ||
| CCA = H.2 | | CCA = H.2 | ||
| INPO aspect = LA.2 | | INPO aspect = LA.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to develop conservative void size acceptance criteria. Specifically, the void size acceptance criteria was based on an incorrect safety injection and refueling water base tank elevation and a 10 percent degradation of the design rated flowrates of the pumps. When the correct base tank elevation and lower allowable pump flowrates were considered, the void acceptance criteria were non-conservative. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating System Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability. Specifically, a review of recent periodic gas monitoring results determined that no voids were present at the suction side of the affected pumps. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because the licensee did not ensure supervisory oversight of work activities associated with actions related to Generic Letter 2008-01 such that nuclear safety is supported. Specifically, oversight did not ensure that the contractors development of void acceptance criteria relied on limiting design values. | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to develop conservative void size acceptance criteria. Specifically, the void size acceptance criteria was based on an incorrect safety injection and refueling water base tank elevation and a 10 percent degradation of the design rated flowrates of the pumps. When the correct base tank elevation and lower allowable pump flowrates were considered, the void acceptance criteria were non-conservative. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating System Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability. Specifically, a review of recent periodic gas monitoring results determined that no voids were present at the suction side of the affected pumps. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because the licensee did not ensure supervisory oversight of work activities associated with actions related to Generic Letter 2008-01 such that nuclear safety is supported. Specifically, oversight did not ensure that the contractors development of void acceptance criteria relied on limiting design values. | ||
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Latest revision as of 19:44, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Palisades  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000255/2011009 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dunlop B Jose C Brown J Gilliam M Jones N Della Grecan Feliz-Adorno N Hansing R Baker S Spiegelman |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
| ' | |