05000266/FIN-2011004-04: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = B Jose, D Reeser, B Palagi, M Phalen, M Kunowski, S Burton, K Barclay, E Sanchez | | Inspector = B Jose, D Reeser, B Palagi, M Phalen, M Kunowski, S Burton, K Barclay, E Sanchez-Santiago, M Thorpe-Kavanaugh, J Beavers, D Oliver | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion II requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that the design basis, for those SSCs that mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents ar correctly translated into procedures. Contrary to the above, PBAPS did not ensure that the CS system required flow of 6,874 gallons per minute (gpm) was correctly translated into Emergency Operating Procedure T-111, Level Restoration, to ensure long term core cooling following a loss of coolant accident. The 6,874 gpm power rate was determined by engineering analysis to account for the 624 gpm leakage through the CS sparger headers and into the reactor vessel annulus region, thereby bypassing long-term cooling of the fuel in the core shroud region. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 -Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Mitigating Systems cornerstone. because the finding did not result in the actual loss of safety function. PBAPS engineering review of quarterly surveillance tests for the last three years determined that the CS pumps have mor than sufficient margin to account for the leakage. The inspectors verified the determination through an independent inspection sampling of surveillance test data. This finding has been documented in the CAP under IR 1245207. | | description = 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion II requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that the design basis, for those SSCs that mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents ar correctly translated into procedures. Contrary to the above, PBAPS did not ensure that the CS system required flow of 6,874 gallons per minute (gpm) was correctly translated into Emergency Operating Procedure T-111, Level Restoration, to ensure long term core cooling following a loss of coolant accident. The 6,874 gpm power rate was determined by engineering analysis to account for the 624 gpm leakage through the CS sparger headers and into the reactor vessel annulus region, thereby bypassing long-term cooling of the fuel in the core shroud region. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 -Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Mitigating Systems cornerstone. because the finding did not result in the actual loss of safety function. PBAPS engineering review of quarterly surveillance tests for the last three years determined that the CS pumps have mor than sufficient margin to account for the leakage. The inspectors verified the determination through an independent inspection sampling of surveillance test data. This finding has been documented in the CAP under IR 1245207. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 20:43, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2011004 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Jose D Reeser B Palagi M Phalen M Kunowski S Burton K Barclay E Sanchez-Santiago M Thorpe-Kavanaugh J Beavers D Oliver |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |