05000461/FIN-2011003-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | ||
| Inspector = S Mischke, A Dunlop, B Kemker, C Brown, D Lords, J Cassidy, M Jones, M Ring, R Winterb, | | Inspector = S Mischke, A Dunlop, B Kemker, C Brown, D Lords, J Cassidy, M Jones, M Ring, R Winterb, Kemkerc Brown, D Lords, D Szwarc, J Bozga, J Cassidy, M Ring, R Orlikowski, S Bell, S Mischke | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (TSSR) 3.4.6.1. The licensee failed to correctly incorporate the required test pressure limits of the TSSR into the surveillance test procedure and subsequently tested multiple reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure isolation valves (PIVs) at pressures greater than the maximum test pressure of 1025 pounds per square inch gauge, invalidating the testing. The licensee performed a risk assessment of the missed surveillance in accordance with TSSR 3.0.3, which determined that completion of the surveillance could be delayed up to the 24-month surveillance interval without a significant increase in plant risk. The licensee also completed an operability evaluation for the TS nonconformance and concluded that there was reasonable assurance that the affected RCS PIVs were operable based on engineering judgment. The finding was of more than minor significance because it affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone and was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute. Specifically, the licensee did not correctly incorporate the required test pressure limits of TSSR 3.4.6.1 into the surveillance test procedure. This resulted in testing multiple RCS PIVs at pressures greater than the maximum test pressure of 1025 psig. The finding was determined to be a licensee performance deficiency of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the TS limit for RCS leakage and would not have likely affected mitigation systems resulting in a loss of safety function. The inspectors concluded that because the licensees missed opportunity to correct the test pressure discrepancy in its surveillance test procedure occurred in January 2005 and no other more recent opportunities reasonably existed to identify and correct the problem, this issue would not be reflective of current licensee performance and no cross-cutting aspect was identified. | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (TSSR) 3.4.6.1. The licensee failed to correctly incorporate the required test pressure limits of the TSSR into the surveillance test procedure and subsequently tested multiple reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure isolation valves (PIVs) at pressures greater than the maximum test pressure of 1025 pounds per square inch gauge, invalidating the testing. The licensee performed a risk assessment of the missed surveillance in accordance with TSSR 3.0.3, which determined that completion of the surveillance could be delayed up to the 24-month surveillance interval without a significant increase in plant risk. The licensee also completed an operability evaluation for the TS nonconformance and concluded that there was reasonable assurance that the affected RCS PIVs were operable based on engineering judgment. The finding was of more than minor significance because it affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone and was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute. Specifically, the licensee did not correctly incorporate the required test pressure limits of TSSR 3.4.6.1 into the surveillance test procedure. This resulted in testing multiple RCS PIVs at pressures greater than the maximum test pressure of 1025 psig. The finding was determined to be a licensee performance deficiency of very low safety significance because the finding would not result in exceeding the TS limit for RCS leakage and would not have likely affected mitigation systems resulting in a loss of safety function. The inspectors concluded that because the licensees missed opportunity to correct the test pressure discrepancy in its surveillance test procedure occurred in January 2005 and no other more recent opportunities reasonably existed to identify and correct the problem, this issue would not be reflective of current licensee performance and no cross-cutting aspect was identified. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:42, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Clinton  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000461/2011003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Mischke A Dunlop B Kemker C Brown D Lords J Cassidy M Jones M Ring R Winterb Kemkerc Brown D Lords D Szwarc J Bozga J Cassidy M Ring R Orlikowski S Bell S Mischke |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |