05000528/FIN-2010003-02: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.9 | | CCA = H.9 | ||
| INPO aspect = CL.4 | | INPO aspect = CL.4 | ||
| description = A self-revealing finding was identified for the failure of maintenance personnel to provide adequate procedures and ensure work was performed properly for installation of the ducting for the 13.8 kV bus to ensure it was weather tight. Specifically, on March 7, 2010, the 1E-NAN-A03 electrical bus catastrophically failed due to water intrusion from heavy rains due to improper installation of the ducting in November 2007. The licensee has implemented corrective actions to provide adequate instruction for this maintenance activity and training for maintenance personnel, and has entered this issue into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report Disposition Request 344792. The finding was more than minor because it affected the configuration control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and mitigating equipment or functions not being available. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because the licensee failed to ensure training of personnel was adequate to assure nuclear safety [H.2.(b)] | | description = A self-revealing finding was identified for the failure of maintenance personnel to provide adequate procedures and ensure work was performed properly for installation of the ducting for the 13.8 kV bus to ensure it was weather tight. Specifically, on March 7, 2010, the 1E-NAN-A03 electrical bus catastrophically failed due to water intrusion from heavy rains due to improper installation of the ducting in November 2007. The licensee has implemented corrective actions to provide adequate instruction for this maintenance activity and training for maintenance personnel, and has entered this issue into the licensee\'s corrective action program as Condition Report Disposition Request 344792. The finding was more than minor because it affected the configuration control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, \"Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings,\" the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and mitigating equipment or functions not being available. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because the licensee failed to ensure training of personnel was adequate to assure nuclear safety [H.2.(b)] | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:39, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2010003 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson R Lantz R Treadway L Carson J Bashore S Makor M Catts M Baquera I Anchondo |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
| ' | |