05000528/FIN-2009008-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Perform an Adequate Operability Evaluation for the Condensate Storage Tank |
| Description | The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to perform an adequate operability evaluation for the condensate storage tank as required by site procedures. Specifically, upon discovery of the condition, the licensee performed an immediate operability determination evaluation based on concerns with the capability of the loop seal to provide protection from vacuum conditions. Subsequently, the licensee performed additional assessments of their overall program which included the specified operability evaluation in a component design bases review and closure of a confirmatory action letter and failed to identify the inadequacy. During the inspection, the team reviewed the operability determination and identified that the licensee failed to consider or identify concerns with the ability of the condensate storage tank pressure relief valves to operate after a design basis earthquake. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Palo Verde Action Request 3353683. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the protection against external events (seismic) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The risk significance of this finding was determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) since the finding did not result in a loss of operability, a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or an actual loss of safety function for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program since the licensee failed to properly evaluate for operability P.1(c) |
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2009008 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Baron G Skinner S Alferink M Young M Runyan R Kellar S Makor |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000528/2009008 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2009Q3
Self-Identified List (Palo Verde)
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