05000528/FIN-2009005-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Maintain Containment Closure Capability |
| Description | A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, was identified for the failure of maintenance personnel to maintain containment closure capability as required by Procedure 70DP-0RA01, Shutdown Risk Assessments. Specifically, on October 8, 2009 maintenance personnel designated for emergency closure of the containment equipment hatch left containment to attend a safety briefing for more than four hours before they returned to perform their required duties. This issue was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as PVAR 3389284. The performance deficiency associated with this finding involved the failure of maintenance personnel to follow the requirements of Procedure 70DP-0RA01, Shutdown Risk Assessments, and ensure a containment closure team was in containment and capable of closing the containment equipment hatch within 30 minutes. The finding was more than minor because it affected the configuration control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to be a type B finding because it affected only large early release frequency, not core damage frequency, at shutdown. A phase 2 analysis using Table 6.4, Phase 2 Risk Significance-Type B Findings at Shutdown, was performed with the following considerations: the plant was in cold shutdown with the reactor coolant system vented, steam generators not available, and within eight days of shutdown, the condition existed for less than eight hours, and there was mitigation equipment out of service. The senior reactor analyst determined that that the finding has very low safety significance (Green) based on the short time period that the condition existed, the low probability of a loss of cooling event during this period with two fully-functional trains available, and the time it would have taken to close the hatch was well less than the time until the core would have become uncovered. This finding was determined to have a cross cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work control because the licensee failed to appropriately coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address plant conditions that may affect work activities H.3(b) (Section 1R20) |
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2009005 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Lantz R Treadway B Henderson L Carson M Young B Larson J Bashore M Catts M Baquera T Farina |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000528/2009005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2009Q4
Self-Identified List (Palo Verde)
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