05000458/FIN-2008006-06: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.14 | | CCA = H.14 | ||
| INPO aspect = DM.2 | | INPO aspect = DM.2 | ||
| description = The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for failure to promptly identify magnesium-rotor motor-operated valve degradation. Specifically, the licensee did not identify magnesium-rotor degradation in May 2007 after failure of Valve B21-MOV-FO65A, Reactor Inlet Heater A Outboard Motor Operated Isolation Valve, until after failure of Valve B21-MOV-FO98C, Main Steam Shutoff Valve, in September 2007. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-RBS-2008-3713 and CR-RBS-2008-3766. This finding was more than minor because Valve B21-MOV-FO98C was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that the physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have any actual safety consequences or potential for impacting the NRCs regulatory function, and was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements. Inspection Manual chapter 0609 Appendix H, "Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process," Table 4.1, indicated that the Main Steam Shutoff Valves do not impact large early release frequency. Based on the results of the Appendix H analysis, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance. This finding had crosscutting aspects associated with decision-making in the human performance area in that the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in decision-making regarding the likelihood of magnesium-rotor degradation in motor-operated valves. [H.1 (b)] (Section 4OA2.b.2 | | description = The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, \"Corrective Action,\" for failure to promptly identify magnesium-rotor motor-operated valve degradation. Specifically, the licensee did not identify magnesium-rotor degradation in May 2007 after failure of Valve B21-MOV-FO65A, Reactor Inlet Heater A Outboard Motor Operated Isolation Valve, until after failure of Valve B21-MOV-FO98C, Main Steam Shutoff Valve, in September 2007. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-RBS-2008-3713 and CR-RBS-2008-3766. This finding was more than minor because Valve B21-MOV-FO98C was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that the physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have any actual safety consequences or potential for impacting the NRCs regulatory function, and was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements. Inspection Manual chapter 0609 Appendix H, \"Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process,\" Table 4.1, indicated that the Main Steam Shutoff Valves do not impact large early release frequency. Based on the results of the Appendix H analysis, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance. This finding had crosscutting aspects associated with decision-making in the human performance area in that the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in decision-making regarding the likelihood of magnesium-rotor degradation in motor-operated valves. [H.1 (b)] (Section 4OA2.b.2 | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:36, 20 February 2018
| Site: | River Bend  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000458/2008006 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2008 (2008Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Henderson R Kopriva D Loveless S Graves P Gage R Bywater H Campbell G Nicely |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
| ' | |