05000440/FIN-2008002-10: Difference between revisions

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| CCA = P.1
| CCA = P.1
| INPO aspect = PI.1
| INPO aspect = PI.1
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, \"Procedures,\" during a review of the licensees treatment of the safety-related reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems failure to perform its safety function when called upon during an event. On November 28, 2007, the licensee experienced an unplanned scram with complications that included a failure of the feedwater system affecting all feed pumps. During the event, RCIC failed to function as designed when aligned to the suppression pool and when re-aligned to the condensate storage tank. Licensee personnel failed to identify the RCIC failures as a significant condition adverse to quality within their corrective action program. As part of their immediate corrective actions, licensee personnel reclassified the condition as a significant condition adverse to quality. The finding was considered more than minor because the failure to identify significant conditions adverse to quality would become a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance after management review. The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution as defined in Inspection Manual Chapter IMC 0305 P.1(a), because the licensee failed to identify the issue completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance. (Section 4OA3.5
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, \\\"Procedures,\\\" during a review of the licensees treatment of the safety-related reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems failure to perform its safety function when called upon during an event. On November 28, 2007, the licensee experienced an unplanned scram with complications that included a failure of the feedwater system affecting all feed pumps. During the event, RCIC failed to function as designed when aligned to the suppression pool and when re-aligned to the condensate storage tank. Licensee personnel failed to identify the RCIC failures as a significant condition adverse to quality within their corrective action program. As part of their immediate corrective actions, licensee personnel reclassified the condition as a significant condition adverse to quality. The finding was considered more than minor because the failure to identify significant conditions adverse to quality would become a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance after management review. The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution as defined in Inspection Manual Chapter IMC 0305 P.1(a), because the licensee failed to identify the issue completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance. (Section 4OA3.5


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Latest revision as of 20:34, 20 February 2018

10
Site: Perry FirstEnergy icon.png
Report IR 05000440/2008002 Section 4OA3
Date counted Mar 31, 2008 (2008Q1)
Type: NCV: Green
cornerstone Mitigating Systems
Identified by: NRC identified
Inspection Procedure: IP 71153
Inspectors (proximate) M Wilk
A Dahbur
G Wright
M Franke
J Cameron
CCA P.1, Identification
INPO aspect PI.1
'