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{{#Wiki_filter:-I j~- I- *~Salem/Hope Creek Allegation Background/Chronology I Issue/Event Date Description Spring 2001 Spring 2002 Sept. 2 4 1h 2002 Fall 2002 Nov. 2002 March 17h, 2003 In the Spring 2001 outage a Salem Unit 1 reactor trip was caused by a main generator current transformer failure. Th-" h "1 9 d operations that they needed to get the reactor started up by a particul" date or their C performance indicator was going to 'go white.'
{{#Wiki_filter:-I j~- I- *~
harassed operations daily by asking day "when are you going to start the p ant'. perations then tol hey would start up when they thought they were within a day of putting steam into the main turbine. Althougli insisted that operations should start up the reactor with the MSIVs shut, operations refued to do so because it was contrary to their safety analysis.Salem grassing approach (i.e heroic efforts) deviated from expected approach Ilessons learned from 1994 grassing -' This concern relates to a decision to keep one of the Salem unit's on during a period of heavy grassing.
Salem/Hope Creek Allegation Background/Chronology                                                           I Issue/Event Date       Description Spring 2001         In the Spring 2001 outage a Salem Unit 1 reactor trip was caused by a main generator current transformer failure. Th-"   h       "1         9 d operations that they needed to get the reactor started up by a particul" date or their         C performance indicator was going to 'go white.'
Interviews have suggested that this may have been done for one day, but when it occurred on a second day the unit was taken off-line.Based on the size and location of a significant steam leak (20' to 40' plume from the bonnet of a Feed Water Pump steam admission valve), th-agreed with the shift operators that the plant shoulT'e shutdown to a ect reDairs'left to ,speak with 'upper management " and, upon his return, su uentlW Wnhich isolated the steam leak avoiding a shut down. V- ECP confidential report substantiates allegation, Third Step Grievan ce without regard to his own personal safety, without a Nuclear quipment Operator (NEO), and without the permission/knowledge of control room personnel).
                                          ,Ileue**dly harassed operations daily by asking day "when are you going to start the p ant'. perations then tol                 hey would start up when they thought they were within a day of putting steam into the main turbine. Althougli                 insisted that operations should start up the reactor with the MSIVs shut, operations refued to do so because it was contrary to their safety analysis.
Manager- -- -irected a -C to NA a startup checklist step.led to have ired but was unsuccess
Spring 2002        Salem grassing approach (i.e heroic efforts) deviated from expected approach Ilessons learned from 1994 grassing -'                 This concern relates to a decision to keep one of the Salem unit's on during a period of heavy grassing. Interviews have suggested that this may have been done for one day, but when itoccurred on a second day the unit was taken off-line.
: u. Information received indicates this A eged activity may ave actually occurred whe"NA" a surveillance step for the Reactor Vessel Vent valves when a single valve in icated dual indication during this routine stroking evolution. was allegedly told by the Operation Crew that they would not "NA" the step. Earlier information from interviews suggested that the concern involved "NA-ing" a second verification containment walkdown to be done by a .evel person step. This step was ad d SU procedure as a lessons learned n fromr e Davis-Besse issue. According t this walkdown was actually done by himself and nd startup was delaye by a ay because of leaks that they found from some SG wet layup level indication valves. So, the step was actually.completed contrary to the alleger's assertion.
Sept. 2 4 1h2002    Based on the size and location of a significant steam leak (20' to 40' plume from the bonnet of a Feed Water Pump steam admission valve), th-agreed with the shift operators that the plant shoulT'e shutdown to a ect reDairs' left to ,speak with 'upper management " and, upon his return, su             uentlW Wnhich isolated the steam leak avoiding a shut down.                                         ECP V-confidential report substantiates allegation, Third Step Grievan ce without regard to his own personal safety, without a Nuclear quipment Operator (NEO),
Higher Tritium sample concentration In Spring 2003 -"a serious Issue that had to be handled with kid gloves to keep us [PSEG] out of troubleW 1. Hope Creek Reactivity Event -Manipulation of Electro Hydraulic Control (EHC)system. caused an unanticipated rise in reactor power 6 1h % to 13 % ... not discovered until Wednesday (3/19/03).
and without the permission/knowledge of control room personnel).
: 2. Entering a planned shutdown to repair 3 technical/mechanical failures (late Sunday/ early Monday morning).3. Monday morning (0800) Turbine Myq lve (TBV) stuck o enL47%). closed fully during subsequent testing. /a rgued wit and kabout whether or not a shut down was required.
Fall 2002        Manager-                 --         - irected a -C               to NA a startup checklist step.
The concern here was twee and his department heads. He apparently "harassed" (from interviews wit Sthem for 4 hours on why a shutdown to repair the TBV was necessary when all of the department heads believed that shutting down was a "no brainer".
led to have             ired but was unsuccess u. Information received indicates this A eged activity may ave actually occurred whe "NA" a surveillance step for the Reactor Vessel Vent valves when a single valve in icated dual indication during this routine stroking evolution.
Although non-conservative decision making is a possible root cause, there was no TS violation.
* was allegedly told by the Operation Crew that they would not "NA" the step. Earlier information from interviews suggested that the concern involved "NA-ing" a second verification containment walkdown to be done by a           .     evel person step. This step was ad d             SU procedure as a lessons learned fromrn e Davis-Besse issue. According t                         this walkdown was actually done by himself and                   nd startup was delaye by a ay because of leaks that they found from some SG wet layup level indication valves. So, the step was actually
: 4. Heated discussions about the duration of the forced outage.G:\BRANCH3IAllegation SCWE\Salem-HC-Background-Chronology.wpd Information in this record was deleted in accordance with theFreedom of Infokmation Act, exemptions 2C, FOlA, 4.- q / -\i Page 1 of 2
                            .completed contrary to the alleger's assertion.
* i Salemn/Hope Creek Allegation Background/Chronology I (. Issue/Event Date June 170, 2003 Sept. 3rd&4V, 2003 Sept. 5"', 2003 Sept. 91h, 2003 Sept./Oct.
Nov. 2002          Higher Tritium sample concentration In Spring 2003 - "a serious Issue that had to be handled with kid gloves to keep us [PSEG] out of troubleW March 17h, 2003      1.       Hope Creek Reactivity Event - Manipulation of Electro Hydraulic Control (EHC) system. caused an unanticipated rise in reactor power 6 1h % to 13 % ... not discovered until Wednesday (3/19/03).
2003 Sept. 29th, 2003 Sept. 30th, 2003 Oct. 2 nd 2003 Oct. 9 uh, 2003 Oct. 11"', 2003 Oct. 161h, 2003 Oct. 28t, 2003 Nov. 71h, 2003 Not Specified Not Specified Not Specified Not Specified Description Hope Creek -EDG leakaqge exceeds LCO time; pressure to avoid shutdownW directed operator.
: 2.       Entering a planned shutdown to repair 3 technical/mechanical failures (late Sunday
to not shutdown; shutdown commenced within accep-able tim'e frame and met regulations.
                                        / early Monday morning).
There was time pressure to delay the shutdown as long as possible to allow engineering time to come up with an adequate operability justification.
: 3.       Monday morning (0800) Turbine Myq               lve (TBV) stuck o enL47%).         closed fully during subsequent testing.           /a rgued wit                 and     kabout whether or not a shut down was required. The concern here was twee and his department heads. He apparently "harassed" (from interviews wit Sthem for 4 hours on why a shutdown to repair the TBV was necessary when all of the department heads believed that shutting down was a "no brainer". Although non-conservative decision making is a possible root cause, there was no TS violation.
Although non-conservative decision making was a possible root cause, there was no TS violation.
: 4.       Heated discussions about the duration of the forced outage.
The HC Ris were fully engaged with the issue as it unfolded.Initial allegation contact between RI-2003-A-01 10 alleger & Dave Vito.Alleger Informed of right to file a discrimination complaint with the Dept. of Labor (DOL).Initial recorded Interview with alleger & 1" Allegation Review Board (ARB).PSEG decision making process relative to #14 Steam Generator (SG) Feed Regulating Valve (FRV) believed to be stuck at 74% open. This concern related primarily to the timing of a decision to enter TS 3.0.3. An NEO and RO have asserted that it should not have taken 12 hours to enter 3.0.3. However, once the licensee's troubleshooting plan showed that FRV was stuck they immediately entered the LCO and followed the SD requirements.
G:\BRANCH3IAllegation SCWE\Salem-HC-Background-Chronology.wpd Information in this record was deleted                                                                           \i    Page 1 of 2 inaccordance with theFreedom of Infokmation Act, exemptions 2C, FOlA,           _V* 4.- / q -
Although non-conservative decision making was a possible root cause, there was no TS violation.
 
Alleger filed civil discrimination law suit against PSEG in Morris County, N.J.Alleger sends a letter ii toth RC, Region I, Regional Administrator indicating that the forme1 -,,hought that Issues at the site "aren't going to be brought up ... just like Davis-Besse." 2nd ARB More email received from alleger.More email received from alleger.Certified acknowledgment letter sent.3'd ARB 4'h ARB Excessive use of temporary tags Salem 2 In-service Inspection (ISI) relief request re: piping UT (coverup?)
  *i                   Salemn/Hope Creek Allegation Background/Chronology                                                     I Description
Hope Creek offgas issue afteTtook over. Rad safety concerns expressed but not resolved Hope Creek employee allegedly asked to modify a Notification re: "in-leakage" G:\BRANCH3\Aiegation SCWE\Salem-HC-Background-Chronology.wpdPae2o2 Page 2 of 2}}
(. Issue/Event Date Hope Creek - EDG leakaqge exceeds LCO time; pressure to avoid shutdownW June 170, 2003 directed operator.             to not shutdown; shutdown commenced within accep-able tim'e frame and met regulations. There was time pressure to delay the shutdown as long as possible to allow engineering time to come up with an adequate operability justification.
Although non-conservative decision making was a possible root cause, there was no TS violation. The HC Ris were fully engaged with the issue as it unfolded.
Sept. 3rd&4V, 2003    Initial allegation contact between RI-2003-A-01 10 alleger & Dave Vito.
Sept. 5 "',2003    Alleger Informed of right to file a discrimination complaint with the Dept. of Labor (DOL).
Sept. 91h, 2003    Initial recorded Interview with alleger & 1" Allegation Review Board (ARB).
Sept./Oct. 2003    PSEG decision making process relative to #14 Steam Generator (SG) Feed Regulating Valve (FRV) believed to be stuck at 74% open. This concern related primarily to the timing of a decision to enter TS 3.0.3. An NEO and RO have asserted that it should not have taken 12 hours to enter 3.0.3. However, once the licensee's troubleshooting plan showed that FRV was stuck they immediately entered the LCO and followed the SD requirements. Although non-conservative decision making was a possible root cause, there was no TS violation.
Sept. 29th, 2003    Alleger filed civil discrimination law suit against PSEG in Morris County, N.J.
Sept. 30th, 2003    Alleger sends a letter           ii toth RC, Region I, Regional Administrator indicating that the forme1                                   -,,hought that Issues at the site "aren't going to be brought up ... just like Davis-Besse."
Oct. 2 nd 2003    2nd ARB Oct. 9 uh,2003    More email received from alleger.
Oct. 11"', 2003    More email received from alleger.
Oct. 161h, 2003    Certified acknowledgment letter sent.
Oct. 28t, 2003      3'd ARB Nov. 71h, 2003    4'h ARB Not Specified      Excessive use of temporary tags Not Specified      Salem 2 In-service Inspection (ISI) relief request re: piping UT (coverup?)
Not Specified      Hope Creek offgas issue afteTtook                 over. Rad safety concerns expressed but not resolved Not Specified      Hope Creek employee allegedly asked to modify a Notification re: "in-leakage" G:\BRANCH3\Aiegation SCWE\Salem-HC-Background-Chronology.wpdPae2o2                                             Page 2 of 2}}

Revision as of 16:31, 23 November 2019

Salem/Hope Creek Allegation Background/Chronology
ML062160234
Person / Time
Site: Salem, Hope Creek  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 08/02/2006
From:
- No Known Affiliation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2005-0194
Download: ML062160234 (2)


Text

-I j~- I- *~

Salem/Hope Creek Allegation Background/Chronology I Issue/Event Date Description Spring 2001 In the Spring 2001 outage a Salem Unit 1 reactor trip was caused by a main generator current transformer failure. Th-" h "1 9 d operations that they needed to get the reactor started up by a particul" date or their C performance indicator was going to 'go white.'

,Ileue**dly harassed operations daily by asking day "when are you going to start the p ant'. perations then tol hey would start up when they thought they were within a day of putting steam into the main turbine. Althougli insisted that operations should start up the reactor with the MSIVs shut, operations refued to do so because it was contrary to their safety analysis.

Spring 2002 Salem grassing approach (i.e heroic efforts) deviated from expected approach Ilessons learned from 1994 grassing -' This concern relates to a decision to keep one of the Salem unit's on during a period of heavy grassing. Interviews have suggested that this may have been done for one day, but when itoccurred on a second day the unit was taken off-line.

Sept. 2 4 1h2002 Based on the size and location of a significant steam leak (20' to 40' plume from the bonnet of a Feed Water Pump steam admission valve), th-agreed with the shift operators that the plant shoulT'e shutdown to a ect reDairs' left to ,speak with 'upper management " and, upon his return, su uentlW Wnhich isolated the steam leak avoiding a shut down. ECP V-confidential report substantiates allegation, Third Step Grievan ce without regard to his own personal safety, without a Nuclear quipment Operator (NEO),

and without the permission/knowledge of control room personnel).

Fall 2002 Manager- -- - irected a -C to NA a startup checklist step.

led to have ired but was unsuccess u. Information received indicates this A eged activity may ave actually occurred whe "NA" a surveillance step for the Reactor Vessel Vent valves when a single valve in icated dual indication during this routine stroking evolution.

  • was allegedly told by the Operation Crew that they would not "NA" the step. Earlier information from interviews suggested that the concern involved "NA-ing" a second verification containment walkdown to be done by a . evel person step. This step was ad d SU procedure as a lessons learned fromrn e Davis-Besse issue. According t this walkdown was actually done by himself and nd startup was delaye by a ay because of leaks that they found from some SG wet layup level indication valves. So, the step was actually

.completed contrary to the alleger's assertion.

Nov. 2002 Higher Tritium sample concentration In Spring 2003 - "a serious Issue that had to be handled with kid gloves to keep us [PSEG] out of troubleW March 17h, 2003 1. Hope Creek Reactivity Event - Manipulation of Electro Hydraulic Control (EHC) system. caused an unanticipated rise in reactor power 6 1h % to 13 % ... not discovered until Wednesday (3/19/03).

2. Entering a planned shutdown to repair 3 technical/mechanical failures (late Sunday

/ early Monday morning).

3. Monday morning (0800) Turbine Myq lve (TBV) stuck o enL47%). closed fully during subsequent testing. /a rgued wit and kabout whether or not a shut down was required. The concern here was twee and his department heads. He apparently "harassed" (from interviews wit Sthem for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> on why a shutdown to repair the TBV was necessary when all of the department heads believed that shutting down was a "no brainer". Although non-conservative decision making is a possible root cause, there was no TS violation.
4. Heated discussions about the duration of the forced outage.

G:\BRANCH3IAllegation SCWE\Salem-HC-Background-Chronology.wpd Information in this record was deleted \i Page 1 of 2 inaccordance with theFreedom of Infokmation Act, exemptions 2C, FOlA, _V* 4.- / q -

  • i Salemn/Hope Creek Allegation Background/Chronology I Description

(. Issue/Event Date Hope Creek - EDG leakaqge exceeds LCO time; pressure to avoid shutdownW June 170, 2003 directed operator. to not shutdown; shutdown commenced within accep-able tim'e frame and met regulations. There was time pressure to delay the shutdown as long as possible to allow engineering time to come up with an adequate operability justification.

Although non-conservative decision making was a possible root cause, there was no TS violation. The HC Ris were fully engaged with the issue as it unfolded.

Sept. 3rd&4V, 2003 Initial allegation contact between RI-2003-A-01 10 alleger & Dave Vito.

Sept. 5 "',2003 Alleger Informed of right to file a discrimination complaint with the Dept. of Labor (DOL).

Sept. 91h, 2003 Initial recorded Interview with alleger & 1" Allegation Review Board (ARB).

Sept./Oct. 2003 PSEG decision making process relative to #14 Steam Generator (SG) Feed Regulating Valve (FRV) believed to be stuck at 74% open. This concern related primarily to the timing of a decision to enter TS 3.0.3. An NEO and RO have asserted that it should not have taken 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to enter 3.0.3. However, once the licensee's troubleshooting plan showed that FRV was stuck they immediately entered the LCO and followed the SD requirements. Although non-conservative decision making was a possible root cause, there was no TS violation.

Sept. 29th, 2003 Alleger filed civil discrimination law suit against PSEG in Morris County, N.J.

Sept. 30th, 2003 Alleger sends a letter ii toth RC, Region I, Regional Administrator indicating that the forme1 -,,hought that Issues at the site "aren't going to be brought up ... just like Davis-Besse."

Oct. 2 nd 2003 2nd ARB Oct. 9 uh,2003 More email received from alleger.

Oct. 11"', 2003 More email received from alleger.

Oct. 161h, 2003 Certified acknowledgment letter sent.

Oct. 28t, 2003 3'd ARB Nov. 71h, 2003 4'h ARB Not Specified Excessive use of temporary tags Not Specified Salem 2 In-service Inspection (ISI) relief request re: piping UT (coverup?)

Not Specified Hope Creek offgas issue afteTtook over. Rad safety concerns expressed but not resolved Not Specified Hope Creek employee allegedly asked to modify a Notification re: "in-leakage" G:\BRANCH3\Aiegation SCWE\Salem-HC-Background-Chronology.wpdPae2o2 Page 2 of 2