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| issue date = 09/15/2011
| issue date = 09/15/2011
| title = Comment (8) of William R. Harris on Environmental Risk Management & Mitigation Issues That Are Essential for NRC to Analyze in the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for Relicensing of Seabrook Station Unit 1
| title = Comment (8) of William R. Harris on Environmental Risk Management & Mitigation Issues That Are Essential for NRC to Analyze in the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for Relicensing of Seabrook Station Unit 1
| author name = Harris W R
| author name = Harris W
| author affiliation = - No Known Affiliation
| author affiliation = - No Known Affiliation
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:}}
{{#Wiki_filter:I ,
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND MITIGATION ISSUES THAT ARE ESSENTIAL FOR NRC TO ANALYZE IN THE FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR RELICENSING OF SEABROOK STATION NO. 1 Submitted by William R. Harris at a Public Hearing of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 15, 2011 Hampton, NH 03842 DD 652~/~e9J ~Z-Ž~ //                              Ti1 F]                      C-)
C/:)
C-)1
                                                                                                      .,t.
                                                                          "E    7_D)5 ::-/4. Z - -/        -
L~5Y5 William R. Harris Summary of Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Requiring NRC Analysis within Final SEIS to NUREG-1437 Supplement 46 of Seabrook Station No. 1 Relicensing, September 15, 2011
 
2 ENVIRONMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND MITIGATION ISSUES RISK MANAGEMENT/                  ENVIRONMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE        REFERENCE DOCUMENTS MITIGATION ISSUES
: 1. On-site backup power for      Solar geomagnetic disturbances      Thomas Popik, Foundation for spent fuel pool cooling in event  constitute highest risk of          Resilient Societies, NRC of LOOP during & after solar      common mode failures:              Proposed Rulemaking March geomagnetic disturbances          extended LOOP; on site              14, 2011, including electromagnetic pulse. transformer fire; dysfunction of backup diesel generators to        William R. Harris Comments on Mitigation measures are highly    electro- magnetic pulse (EMP).      Proposed Rulemaking, July 20 cost-effective. PRA Type III                                          2011.
analysis indicates Benefit-to-    Site specific risks to Seabrook cost ratio of about 110.          Station No. 1 are 2 orders of magnitude greater than all          NUREG-1437 Supplement 46, other SAMA risks analyzed in        Seabrook Station Draft SEIS Draft SEIS. Long term LOOP probability 2011-2030: 17.4%
Probab. Water boil off 8.7%
Probab. Zirconium fire 4.3%.
With 20 year license renewal,      See Harris Comments on Popik Probability of zirconium fire(s)    Proposed Rulemaking, July 20, at Seabrook Station No. 1 about    2011.
1 in 12 (period 2011 - 2050).
East-West 345kV transmission lines + end of line at plant +
ocean proximity + geology of New Hampshire result in above average EMP vulnerabilities requiring site specific
: 2. Retrofit for on-site backup    Reduce dependence on outside      Calvert Cliffs MD reactor is a AC power for Seabrook reactor      power, especially during events    prototype for generation of control & emergency functions      triggering common mode            station power onsite. Also during long term LOOP -            failures, such as solar coronal    review European nuclear power including options to retrofit      mass ejections causing risks to    plants designed to generate heat exchangers to convert        the U.S. transmission grid and    power from on-site thermal reactor-related thermal energy    station power from onsite          energy in event of loss of into backup AC power for          backup sources.                    outside power (LOOP).
station power.
: 3. On-site backup diesel          Reduce risks of zirconium fires if NRC Miller Task Force Report generator operability extension    backup onsite generators fail      July 11, 2011 from 7 days to longer              and spent fuel pools are not (parametric) periods,              continuously cooled                Harris Comments of July 20, 2011.
William R. Harris Summary of Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Requiring NRC Analysis within Final SEIS to NUREG-1437 Supplement 46 of Seabrook Station No. 1 Relicensing, September 15, 2011
 
I . . , 0 .
3
: 4. Reduce reactor trip and fire  Reduce risks of fires dispersing    Thomas Popik, Presentation to risk due to solar geomagnetic    sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), 2300    North American Electric disturbance damage to            times C02 impacts on global        Reliability Corp. Atlanta, GA Generator Step Up transformer. warming                            August 30-31, 2011.
Reduction can be accomplished                                        Credible Reports of with neutral current blocking    Reduce risk of loss of onsite      Geomagnetic Disturbance device,                          power                              Impacts
: 5. Installation of remote        Allow remote command &              NRC Miller Task Force Report of readout & SCADA system            triage to restore backup power      July 12, 2011.
command capabilities, including  in event of station blackout.      Harris Rulemaking Comments protection of satellite relays                                        July 20, 2011 from system generated            Marginal cost per nuclear power electromagnetic pulse during      plant reduced if nationwide adverse solar weather            access to EMP-protected Comsat and commo links
: 6. Extend coverage & duration    Existing 22 regional sensor sites  C-10 Foundation for C-10 Foundation regional (n  (northeast Massachusetts only)
            = 22) radiation monitors &        utilize back-up batteries with remote readouts by (a) adding    short duration. Extended
            -30 sites in Southeast New        reporting capacity would enable Hampshire; and (b) extending      better-staged evacuation of battery life for monitoring sites radiation hot spots, reduce loss to > 14 days.                    of life.
: 7. Utilize U.S. Dept. of Transportation modeling systems to plan staged            Avert evacuation congestion, contraflow evacuations with &    e.g., region of Three Mile Island w/o upgrades to MA Route 110      (1979), when randomized 2 lane on-ramps & off-ramps at    evacuation impaired evacuation 1-95 and 1-495, and other        flow rates.
evacuation route connectors.
: 8. Deploy "intelligent" remote    Reduce energy consumption &        U.S. Department of SCADA controlled signal system's  air pollution in day to day use;    Transportation Emergency for unmanned evacuation signal    protect emergency personnel        Evacuation DOT websites.
management for relevant traffic  from radiation exposure in corridors,                        event of spent fuel zirconium fires'
: 9. Shelter on-site AC Battery    Reduce risks of loss of on-site    Appendix F at page F-41 to Chargers & Diesel Generator to    capability to cool spent fuel      NUREG 1437 Supp. 46, July recharge on station batteries,    pools. Avert zirconium fires.      2011.
Variant of SAMA 157                                                  See EMP Commission Report on Critical Infrastructure, April 2008, for vulnerabilities of
                                                          *_battery                      chargers and switches.
William R. Harris Summary of Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Requiring NRC Analysis within Final SEIS to NUREG-1437 Supplement 46 of Seabrook Station No. 1 Relicensing, September 15, 2011
 
                                                                                                /
Probability of Zirconium Fire at Spent Fuel Pools Estimates Over Remaining Reactor Operation Probability of No Outside Assistance                  50%
Probability of Spontaneous Zirconium Ignition          50%
Within Area of Probable                                        Years Power                                            Remaining  Long-Term  Probability Zirconium System                                          in Reactor  LOOP        of Water    Fire Collapse  State            Plant              Operation    Probability Boil-Off    Probability yes        Illinois        Clinton                      15    14.0%        7.0%        3.5%
yes        Illinois        Dresden 2                    18    16.5%        8.3%        4.1%
yes        Illinois        Dresden 3                    20      18.2%        9.1%        4.6%
yes        Illinois        La Salle 1                    11    10.5%        5.2%        2.6%
yes        Illinois        La Salle 2                    12      11.4%        5.7%        2.8%
no        Illinois        Quad Cities 1                21        0.0%        0.0%        0.0%
no        Illinois        Quad Cities 2                21        0.0%        0.0%        0.0%
no        Iowa            Duane Arnold                  3      0.0%        0.0%        0.0%
no        Kansas          Wolf Creek                  34        0.0%        0.0%        0.0%
no        Louisiana        River Bend                  14        0.0%        0.0%        0.0%
no        Louisiana        Waterford                    13        0.0%        0.0%        0.0%
yes        Maryland        Calvert Cliffs 1            23      20.6%        10.3%        5.2%
yes        Maryland        Calvert Cliffs 2            25      22.2%        11.1%        5.6%
yes        Massachusetts    Pilgrim                        1      1.0%        0.5%        0.3%
yes        Michigan        Cook 1                      23      20.6%        10.3%        5.2%
yes        Michigan        Cook 2                      26      23.0%        11.5%        5.7%
yes        Michigan        Enrico Fermi 2              14      13.1%        6.6%        3.3%
yes        Michigan        Palisades                    20      18.2%        9.1%        4.6%
no        Minnesota        Monticello                  19        0.0%        0.0%        0.0%
no        Minnesota        Prairie Island 1              2      0.0%        0.0%        0.0%
no        Minnesota        Prairie Island 2              3      0.0%        0.0%        0.0%
no        Mississippi      Grand Gulf                    13      0.0%        0.0%        0.0%
no        Missouri        Callaway                      13      0.0%        0.0%        0.0%
no        Nebraska        Cooper                        3      0.0%        0.0%        0.0%
no        Nebraska        Fort Calhoun                22        0.0%        0.0%        0.0%
yes        New Hampshire    Seabrook                    19      17.4%        8.7%        4.3%
yes        New Jersey      Hope Creek                  15      14.0%        7.0%        3.5%
yes        New Jersey      Oyster Creek                18      16.5%        8.3%        4.1%
yes        New Jersey      Salem 1                        5      4.9%        2.5%        1.2%
yes        New Jersey      Salem 2                        9      8.6%        4.3%        2.2%
 
Probability of Zirconium Fire at Spent Fuel Pools Estimates Over Remaining Reactor Operation Probability of No Outside Assistance                  50%
Probability of Spontaneous Zirconium Ignition          50%
Within Area of Probable                                        Years Power                                            Remaining  Long-Term  Probability Zirconium System                                          in Reactor  LOOP        of Water    Fire Collapse  State            Plant                Operation  Probability Boil-Off    Probability yes        New York        FitzPatrick                  23      20.6%        10.3%        5.2%
yes        New York        Ginna                        18      16.5%        8.3%        4.1%
yes        New York        Indian Point 2                2      2.0%        1.0%        0.5%
yes        New York        Indian Point 3                4        3.9%        2.0%        1.0%
yes        New York        Nine Mile Point 1            18      16.5%        8.3%        4.1%
yes        New York        Nine Mile Point 2            35      29.7%        14.8%        7.4%
yes        North Carolina  Brunswick 1                  25      22.2%        11.1%        5.6%
yes        North Carolina  Brunswick 2                  23      20.6%        10.3%        5.2%
yes        North Carolina  Harris                      35      29.7%        14.8%        7.4%
yes        North Carolina  McGuire 1                    30      26.0%        13.0%        6.5%
yes        North Carolina  McGuire 2                    32      27.5%        13.8%        6.9%
yes        Ohio            Davis-Bessie                  6      5.9%        2.9%        1.5%
yes        Ohio            Perry                        15      14.0%        7.0%        3.5%
yes        Pennsylvania    Beaver Valley 1              5        4.9%        2.5%        1.2%
yes        Pennsylvania    Beaver Valley 2              16      14.9%        7.4%        3.7%
yes        Pennsylvania    Limerick 1                  13      12.2%        6.1%        3.1%
yes        Pennsylvania    Limerick 2                  18      16.5%        8.3%        4.1%
yes        Pennsylvania    Peach Bottom 2              22      19.8%        9.9%        5.0%
yes        Pennsylvania    Peach Bottom 3              23      20.6%        10.3%        5.2%
yes        Pennsylvania    Susquehanna 1                11      10.5%        5.2%        2.6%
yes        Pennsylvania    Susquehanna 2                13      12.2%        6.1%        3.1%
yes        Pennsylvania    Three Mile Island            23      20.6%        10.3%        5.2%
yes        South Carolina  Catawba 1                    32      27.5%        13.8%        6.9%
yes        South Carolina  Catawba 2                    32      27.5%        13.8%        6.9%
yes        South Carolina  Oconee 1                    22      19.8%        9.9%        5.0%
yes        South Carolina  Oconee 2                    22      19.8%        9.9%        5.0%
yes        South Carolina  Oconee 3                    23      20.6%        10.3%        5.2%
yes        South Carolina  Robinson                    19      17.4%        8.7%        4.3%
yes        South Carolina  Summer                      31      26.8%        13.4%        6.7%
 
3 Probability of Zirconium Fire at Spent Fuel Pools Estimates Over Remaining Reactor Operation Probability of No Outside Assistance                  50%
Probability of Spontaneous Zirconium Ignition          50%
Within Area of Probable                                        Years Power                                            Remaining  Long-Term  Probability Zirconium Sysem                                            in Reactor  LOOP        of Water    Fire Collapse  State            Plant              Operation    Probability Boil-Off    Probability yes        Tennessee        Sequoyah 1                    9      8.6%        4.3%        2.2%
yes        Tennessee        Sequoyah 2                  10        9.6%        4.8%        2.4%
yes        Tennessee        Watts Bar                    24      21.4%      10.7%        5.4%
no        Texas            Comanche Peak 1              19        0.0%        0.0%        0.0%
no        Texas            Comanche Peak 2              22        0.0%        0.0%        0.0%
no        Texas            South Texas 1                16        0.0%        0.0%        0.0%
no        Texas            South Texas 2                17        0.0%        0.0%        0.0%
yes        Vermont          Vermont Yankee                1      1.0%        0.5%        0.3%
yes        Virginia        North Anna 1                27      23.8%        11.9%        5.9%
yes        Virginia        North Anna 2                29      25.3%        12.6%        6.3%
yes        Virginia        Surry 1                      21      19.0%        9.5%        4.8%
yes        Virginia        Surry 2                      22      19.8%        9.9%        5.0%
yes        Washington      Columbia                    12      11.4%        5.7%        2.8%
yes        Wisconsin        Kewaunee                      2      2.0%        1.0%        0.5%
yes        Wisconsin        Point Beach 1                19      17.4%        8.7%        4.3%
yes        Wisconsin        Point Beach 2                22      19.8%        9.9%        5.0%}}

Latest revision as of 14:47, 12 November 2019

Comment (8) of William R. Harris on Environmental Risk Management & Mitigation Issues That Are Essential for NRC to Analyze in the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for Relicensing of Seabrook Station Unit 1
ML11279A119
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/15/2011
From: Harris W
- No Known Affiliation
To:
Rulemaking, Directives, and Editing Branch
References
76FR47612 00008
Download: ML11279A119 (6)
v • d • e


Text

I ,

ENVIRONMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND MITIGATION ISSUES THAT ARE ESSENTIAL FOR NRC TO ANALYZE IN THE FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR RELICENSING OF SEABROOK STATION NO. 1 Submitted by William R. Harris at a Public Hearing of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 15, 2011 Hampton, NH 03842 DD 652~/~e9J ~Z-Ž~ // Ti1 F] C-)

C/:)

C-)1

.,t.

"E 7_D)5 ::-/4. Z - -/ -

L~5Y5 William R. Harris Summary of Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Requiring NRC Analysis within Final SEIS to NUREG-1437 Supplement 46 of Seabrook Station No. 1 Relicensing, September 15, 2011

2 ENVIRONMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND MITIGATION ISSUES RISK MANAGEMENT/ ENVIRONMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE REFERENCE DOCUMENTS MITIGATION ISSUES

1. On-site backup power for Solar geomagnetic disturbances Thomas Popik, Foundation for spent fuel pool cooling in event constitute highest risk of Resilient Societies, NRC of LOOP during & after solar common mode failures: Proposed Rulemaking March geomagnetic disturbances extended LOOP; on site 14, 2011, including electromagnetic pulse. transformer fire; dysfunction of backup diesel generators to William R. Harris Comments on Mitigation measures are highly electro- magnetic pulse (EMP). Proposed Rulemaking, July 20 cost-effective. PRA Type III 2011.

analysis indicates Benefit-to- Site specific risks to Seabrook cost ratio of about 110. Station No. 1 are 2 orders of magnitude greater than all NUREG-1437 Supplement 46, other SAMA risks analyzed in Seabrook Station Draft SEIS Draft SEIS. Long term LOOP probability 2011-2030: 17.4%

Probab. Water boil off 8.7%

Probab. Zirconium fire 4.3%.

With 20 year license renewal, See Harris Comments on Popik Probability of zirconium fire(s) Proposed Rulemaking, July 20, at Seabrook Station No. 1 about 2011.

1 in 12 (period 2011 - 2050).

East-West 345kV transmission lines + end of line at plant +

ocean proximity + geology of New Hampshire result in above average EMP vulnerabilities requiring site specific

2. Retrofit for on-site backup Reduce dependence on outside Calvert Cliffs MD reactor is a AC power for Seabrook reactor power, especially during events prototype for generation of control & emergency functions triggering common mode station power onsite. Also during long term LOOP - failures, such as solar coronal review European nuclear power including options to retrofit mass ejections causing risks to plants designed to generate heat exchangers to convert the U.S. transmission grid and power from on-site thermal reactor-related thermal energy station power from onsite energy in event of loss of into backup AC power for backup sources. outside power (LOOP).

station power.

3. On-site backup diesel Reduce risks of zirconium fires if NRC Miller Task Force Report generator operability extension backup onsite generators fail July 11, 2011 from 7 days to longer and spent fuel pools are not (parametric) periods, continuously cooled Harris Comments of July 20, 2011.

William R. Harris Summary of Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Requiring NRC Analysis within Final SEIS to NUREG-1437 Supplement 46 of Seabrook Station No. 1 Relicensing, September 15, 2011

I . . , 0 .

3

4. Reduce reactor trip and fire Reduce risks of fires dispersing Thomas Popik, Presentation to risk due to solar geomagnetic sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), 2300 North American Electric disturbance damage to times C02 impacts on global Reliability Corp. Atlanta, GA Generator Step Up transformer. warming August 30-31, 2011.

Reduction can be accomplished Credible Reports of with neutral current blocking Reduce risk of loss of onsite Geomagnetic Disturbance device, power Impacts

5. Installation of remote Allow remote command & NRC Miller Task Force Report of readout & SCADA system triage to restore backup power July 12, 2011.

command capabilities, including in event of station blackout. Harris Rulemaking Comments protection of satellite relays July 20, 2011 from system generated Marginal cost per nuclear power electromagnetic pulse during plant reduced if nationwide adverse solar weather access to EMP-protected Comsat and commo links

6. Extend coverage & duration Existing 22 regional sensor sites C-10 Foundation for C-10 Foundation regional (n (northeast Massachusetts only)

= 22) radiation monitors & utilize back-up batteries with remote readouts by (a) adding short duration. Extended

-30 sites in Southeast New reporting capacity would enable Hampshire; and (b) extending better-staged evacuation of battery life for monitoring sites radiation hot spots, reduce loss to > 14 days. of life.

7. Utilize U.S. Dept. of Transportation modeling systems to plan staged Avert evacuation congestion, contraflow evacuations with & e.g., region of Three Mile Island w/o upgrades to MA Route 110 (1979), when randomized 2 lane on-ramps & off-ramps at evacuation impaired evacuation 1-95 and 1-495, and other flow rates.

evacuation route connectors.

8. Deploy "intelligent" remote Reduce energy consumption & U.S. Department of SCADA controlled signal system's air pollution in day to day use; Transportation Emergency for unmanned evacuation signal protect emergency personnel Evacuation DOT websites.

management for relevant traffic from radiation exposure in corridors, event of spent fuel zirconium fires'

9. Shelter on-site AC Battery Reduce risks of loss of on-site Appendix F at page F-41 to Chargers & Diesel Generator to capability to cool spent fuel NUREG 1437 Supp. 46, July recharge on station batteries, pools. Avert zirconium fires. 2011.

Variant of SAMA 157 See EMP Commission Report on Critical Infrastructure, April 2008, for vulnerabilities of

  • _battery chargers and switches.

William R. Harris Summary of Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Requiring NRC Analysis within Final SEIS to NUREG-1437 Supplement 46 of Seabrook Station No. 1 Relicensing, September 15, 2011

/

Probability of Zirconium Fire at Spent Fuel Pools Estimates Over Remaining Reactor Operation Probability of No Outside Assistance 50%

Probability of Spontaneous Zirconium Ignition 50%

Within Area of Probable Years Power Remaining Long-Term Probability Zirconium System in Reactor LOOP of Water Fire Collapse State Plant Operation Probability Boil-Off Probability yes Illinois Clinton 15 14.0% 7.0% 3.5%

yes Illinois Dresden 2 18 16.5% 8.3% 4.1%

yes Illinois Dresden 3 20 18.2% 9.1% 4.6%

yes Illinois La Salle 1 11 10.5% 5.2% 2.6%

yes Illinois La Salle 2 12 11.4% 5.7% 2.8%

no Illinois Quad Cities 1 21 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

no Illinois Quad Cities 2 21 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

no Iowa Duane Arnold 3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

no Kansas Wolf Creek 34 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

no Louisiana River Bend 14 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

no Louisiana Waterford 13 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

yes Maryland Calvert Cliffs 1 23 20.6% 10.3% 5.2%

yes Maryland Calvert Cliffs 2 25 22.2% 11.1% 5.6%

yes Massachusetts Pilgrim 1 1.0% 0.5% 0.3%

yes Michigan Cook 1 23 20.6% 10.3% 5.2%

yes Michigan Cook 2 26 23.0% 11.5% 5.7%

yes Michigan Enrico Fermi 2 14 13.1% 6.6% 3.3%

yes Michigan Palisades 20 18.2% 9.1% 4.6%

no Minnesota Monticello 19 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

no Minnesota Prairie Island 1 2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

no Minnesota Prairie Island 2 3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

no Mississippi Grand Gulf 13 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

no Missouri Callaway 13 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

no Nebraska Cooper 3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

no Nebraska Fort Calhoun 22 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

yes New Hampshire Seabrook 19 17.4% 8.7% 4.3%

yes New Jersey Hope Creek 15 14.0% 7.0% 3.5%

yes New Jersey Oyster Creek 18 16.5% 8.3% 4.1%

yes New Jersey Salem 1 5 4.9% 2.5% 1.2%

yes New Jersey Salem 2 9 8.6% 4.3% 2.2%

Probability of Zirconium Fire at Spent Fuel Pools Estimates Over Remaining Reactor Operation Probability of No Outside Assistance 50%

Probability of Spontaneous Zirconium Ignition 50%

Within Area of Probable Years Power Remaining Long-Term Probability Zirconium System in Reactor LOOP of Water Fire Collapse State Plant Operation Probability Boil-Off Probability yes New York FitzPatrick 23 20.6% 10.3% 5.2%

yes New York Ginna 18 16.5% 8.3% 4.1%

yes New York Indian Point 2 2 2.0% 1.0% 0.5%

yes New York Indian Point 3 4 3.9% 2.0% 1.0%

yes New York Nine Mile Point 1 18 16.5% 8.3% 4.1%

yes New York Nine Mile Point 2 35 29.7% 14.8% 7.4%

yes North Carolina Brunswick 1 25 22.2% 11.1% 5.6%

yes North Carolina Brunswick 2 23 20.6% 10.3% 5.2%

yes North Carolina Harris 35 29.7% 14.8% 7.4%

yes North Carolina McGuire 1 30 26.0% 13.0% 6.5%

yes North Carolina McGuire 2 32 27.5% 13.8% 6.9%

yes Ohio Davis-Bessie 6 5.9% 2.9% 1.5%

yes Ohio Perry 15 14.0% 7.0% 3.5%

yes Pennsylvania Beaver Valley 1 5 4.9% 2.5% 1.2%

yes Pennsylvania Beaver Valley 2 16 14.9% 7.4% 3.7%

yes Pennsylvania Limerick 1 13 12.2% 6.1% 3.1%

yes Pennsylvania Limerick 2 18 16.5% 8.3% 4.1%

yes Pennsylvania Peach Bottom 2 22 19.8% 9.9% 5.0%

yes Pennsylvania Peach Bottom 3 23 20.6% 10.3% 5.2%

yes Pennsylvania Susquehanna 1 11 10.5% 5.2% 2.6%

yes Pennsylvania Susquehanna 2 13 12.2% 6.1% 3.1%

yes Pennsylvania Three Mile Island 23 20.6% 10.3% 5.2%

yes South Carolina Catawba 1 32 27.5% 13.8% 6.9%

yes South Carolina Catawba 2 32 27.5% 13.8% 6.9%

yes South Carolina Oconee 1 22 19.8% 9.9% 5.0%

yes South Carolina Oconee 2 22 19.8% 9.9% 5.0%

yes South Carolina Oconee 3 23 20.6% 10.3% 5.2%

yes South Carolina Robinson 19 17.4% 8.7% 4.3%

yes South Carolina Summer 31 26.8% 13.4% 6.7%

3 Probability of Zirconium Fire at Spent Fuel Pools Estimates Over Remaining Reactor Operation Probability of No Outside Assistance 50%

Probability of Spontaneous Zirconium Ignition 50%

Within Area of Probable Years Power Remaining Long-Term Probability Zirconium Sysem in Reactor LOOP of Water Fire Collapse State Plant Operation Probability Boil-Off Probability yes Tennessee Sequoyah 1 9 8.6% 4.3% 2.2%

yes Tennessee Sequoyah 2 10 9.6% 4.8% 2.4%

yes Tennessee Watts Bar 24 21.4% 10.7% 5.4%

no Texas Comanche Peak 1 19 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

no Texas Comanche Peak 2 22 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

no Texas South Texas 1 16 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

no Texas South Texas 2 17 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

yes Vermont Vermont Yankee 1 1.0% 0.5% 0.3%

yes Virginia North Anna 1 27 23.8% 11.9% 5.9%

yes Virginia North Anna 2 29 25.3% 12.6% 6.3%

yes Virginia Surry 1 21 19.0% 9.5% 4.8%

yes Virginia Surry 2 22 19.8% 9.9% 5.0%

yes Washington Columbia 12 11.4% 5.7% 2.8%

yes Wisconsin Kewaunee 2 2.0% 1.0% 0.5%

yes Wisconsin Point Beach 1 19 17.4% 8.7% 4.3%

yes Wisconsin Point Beach 2 22 19.8% 9.9% 5.0%

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