ML16187A029: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:ML16187A029 From: Paul Sent: Tuesday, June 28, 2016 9:23 AM To: William Huston Cc: Paul Blanch; DENTEL, GLENN T <Glenn.Dentel@nrc.gov>; HAAGENSEN, BRIAN C
<Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>
==Subject:==
[External_Sender] Re: Paul, do you know what's going on at Fitzpatrick?
This LER is intentionally vague and I suspect there is more going on that isnt being discussed. I am copying Glen Dental of the NRC to see if he is willing to provide any more information and look into the possible radiation from this event. Unlikely but I am asking anyway.
Paul Blanch MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMPS DEGRADATION "At 1215 [EDT] on 6/24/2016, James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) was at 100% power when Breaker 710340 tripped and power was lost to L-gears L13, L23, L33, and L43. These provide non-vital power to Reactor Building Ventilation (RBV), portions of Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling (RBCLC), and 'A' Recirculation pump lube oil systems. Off-site AC power remains available to vital systems and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) are available.
"Due to the loss of RBV, Secondary Containment differential pressure increased. At 1215
[EDT], Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specifications (TS)
Surveillance Requirement SR-3.6.4.1.1 of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge. The Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system was manually initiated and Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored by 1219 [EDT].
"The 'A' Recirculation pump tripped at 1215 [EDT] and reactor power decreased to approximately 50%. 'B' Recirculation pump temperature began to rise due to the degraded RBCLC system. At 1236 [EDT], a manual scram was initiated. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level shrink during the scram resulted in a successful Group 2 isolation. All control rods have been inserted. The RPV water level is being maintained with the Feedwater System and pressure is being maintained by main steam line bypass valves. A cooldown is in progress and JAF will proceed to cold shutdown (Mode 4). Due to complete loss of RBCLC system, the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) cooling capability is degraded but the Decay Heat Removal system remains available. SFP temperature is slowly rising and it is being monitored. The time [duration] to 200 degrees is approximately 117 hours.
"The initiation of reactor protection systems (RPS) due to the manual scram at critical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The general containment Group 2 isolations are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). In addition, the temporary differential pressure change in Secondary Containment is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York.}}

Latest revision as of 18:03, 30 October 2019

P. Blanch Email FitzPatrick Scram Event
ML16187A029
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/28/2016
From: Blanch P
- No Known Affiliation
To: Huston W
- No Known Affiliation, Division Reactor Projects I
References
Download: ML16187A029 (1)


Text

ML16187A029 From: Paul Sent: Tuesday, June 28, 2016 9:23 AM To: William Huston Cc: Paul Blanch; DENTEL, GLENN T <Glenn.Dentel@nrc.gov>; HAAGENSEN, BRIAN C

<Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

[External_Sender] Re: Paul, do you know what's going on at Fitzpatrick?

This LER is intentionally vague and I suspect there is more going on that isnt being discussed. I am copying Glen Dental of the NRC to see if he is willing to provide any more information and look into the possible radiation from this event. Unlikely but I am asking anyway.

Paul Blanch MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMPS DEGRADATION "At 1215 [EDT] on 6/24/2016, James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) was at 100% power when Breaker 710340 tripped and power was lost to L-gears L13, L23, L33, and L43. These provide non-vital power to Reactor Building Ventilation (RBV), portions of Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling (RBCLC), and 'A' Recirculation pump lube oil systems. Off-site AC power remains available to vital systems and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) are available.

"Due to the loss of RBV, Secondary Containment differential pressure increased. At 1215

[EDT], Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specifications (TS)

Surveillance Requirement SR-3.6.4.1.1 of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge. The Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system was manually initiated and Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored by 1219 [EDT].

"The 'A' Recirculation pump tripped at 1215 [EDT] and reactor power decreased to approximately 50%. 'B' Recirculation pump temperature began to rise due to the degraded RBCLC system. At 1236 [EDT], a manual scram was initiated. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level shrink during the scram resulted in a successful Group 2 isolation. All control rods have been inserted. The RPV water level is being maintained with the Feedwater System and pressure is being maintained by main steam line bypass valves. A cooldown is in progress and JAF will proceed to cold shutdown (Mode 4). Due to complete loss of RBCLC system, the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) cooling capability is degraded but the Decay Heat Removal system remains available. SFP temperature is slowly rising and it is being monitored. The time [duration] to 200 degrees is approximately 117 hours0.00135 days <br />0.0325 hours <br />1.934524e-4 weeks <br />4.45185e-5 months <br />.

"The initiation of reactor protection systems (RPS) due to the manual scram at critical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The general containment Group 2 isolations are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). In addition, the temporary differential pressure change in Secondary Containment is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York.