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| number = ML18318A064
| number = ML18318A064
| issue date = 11/08/2018
| issue date = 11/08/2018
| title = Station; Public Meeting Slides with Extra Content
| title = Public Meeting Slides with Extra Content
| author name =  
| author name =  
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV
Line 15: Line 15:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:San OnofreSpecial Inspection WebinarNovember 8, 2018NRC Region IV, Arlington, TX Logistics*Webinar Format
{{#Wiki_filter:San Onofre Special Inspection Webinar November 8, 2018 NRC Region IV, Arlington, TX
*Back-up Bridge Line(888) 469-1677, Passcode 2471451
 
*Questions and Answers 2
Logistics
NRC Staff*Eric Simpson, Special Inspection Team LeaderRegion IV Fuel Cycle and Decommissioning Branch
* Webinar Format
*Patricia Silva, Branch ChiefDivision of Spent Fuel Management
* Back-up Bridge Line (888) 469-1677, Passcode 2471451
*Troy Pruett, DirectorRegion IV Division of Nuclear Materials Safety 3
* Questions and Answers 2
 
NRC Staff
* Eric Simpson, Special Inspection Team Leader Region IV Fuel Cycle and Decommissioning Branch
* Patricia Silva, Branch Chief Division of Spent Fuel Management
* Troy Pruett, Director Region IV Division of Nuclear Materials Safety 3
 
Webinar Agenda
Webinar Agenda
*Background
* Background
*Canister Downloading Operations
* Canister Downloading Operations
*Inspection Team Findings
* Inspection Team Findings
*Current Status
* Current Status
*Summary*Questions & Answers 4
* Summary
ISFSI Layout 5TN NUHOMSDesignHoltecUMAXDesign TransnuclearNUHOMS 6 Holtec UMAX 7
* Questions & Answers 4
Vertically Ventilated Module (Vault) 8 Spent Fuel Canister 9Holtec MPCTransfer Cask Downloading: Shield Cone 10 Downloading: Transporter 11 Downloading: Vault Door 12 Downloading: Alignment 13 Downloading: Attaching Slings 14 Downloading: Attaching Slings 15 Downloading Preparations 16 17What Happened on August 3rd?Low Dose AreaLow Dose Area What Happened on August 3 rd?18 What Happened on August 3 rd?19 What Happened on August 3rd?
 
20 21What Happened on August 3 rd?
ISFSI Layout TN NUHOMS Design Holtec UMAX Design 5
 
Transnuclear NUHOMS 6
 
Holtec UMAX 7
 
Vertically Ventilated Module (Vault) 8
 
Spent Fuel Canister Holtec MPC Transfer Cask 9
 
Downloading: Shield Cone 10
 
Downloading: Transporter 11
 
Downloading: Vault Door 12
 
Downloading:
Alignment 13
 
Downloading:
Attaching Slings 14
 
Downloading:
Attaching Slings 15
 
Downloading Preparations 16
 
What Happened on August 3rd?
Low Dose Area Low Dose Area 17
 
What Happened on August 3rd?
18
 
What Happened on August 3rd?
19
 
What Happened on August 3rd?
20
 
What Happened on August 3rd?
21
 
Post Event Actions
Post Event Actions
*Spent Fuel Handling Activities Suspended
* Spent Fuel Handling Activities Suspended
*NRC Inspection Activities
* NRC Inspection Activities
*San Onofre Notification to NRC
* San Onofre Notification to NRC
*Causal Evaluations
* Causal Evaluations
*Corrective Actions 22 Spent Fuel Handling Activities Suspended 23*MPC 29 lowered into vault
* Corrective Actions 22
*San Onofre suspends fuel loading
 
*MPC 30 -Inside Transfer Cask
Spent Fuel Handling Activities Suspended
-Seismically Restrained in Fuel Building NRC Inspection Activities 24*August 6 th: NRC Region IV informally notified of Misalignment Event and initiates daily oversight communications
* MPC 29 lowered into vault
*August 7 th: San Onofrecommits to NRC review before resuming operations
* San Onofre suspends fuel loading
*August 17 th: NRC decides to conduct Special Inspection
* MPC 30
*September 10
    - Inside Transfer Cask
-14: NRC Special Inspection Team onsite
    - Seismically Restrained in Fuel Building 23
*NRC to perform inspection prior to resumption of fuel loading NRC Inspection Activities 25*2 Preliminary Escalated Findings  
 
-Failure to provide redundant drop protection
NRC Inspection Activities
-Failure to report  
* August 6th: NRC Region IV informally notified of Misalignment Event and initiates daily oversight communications
*3 Preliminary Severity Level IV Violations
* August 7th: San Onofre commits to NRC review before resuming operations
-Procedures
* August 17th: NRC decides to conduct Special Inspection
-Corrective actions
* September 10-14: NRC Special Inspection Team onsite
-Training*Management Oversight Weaknesses Causal Evaluations 26*San OnofreApparent Cause Evaluation
* NRC to perform inspection prior to resumption of fuel loading 24
*Holtec Root Cause Analysis
 
*Common Cause Evaluation Root Causes
NRC Inspection Activities
*San OnofreManagement failed to provide-Adequate procedures  
* 2 Preliminary Escalated Findings
-Adequate training to support procedure-Adequate oversight 27 Corrective Actions
  - Failure to provide redundant drop protection
*Training Requirements
  - Failure to report
*Procedure Enhancements
* 3 Preliminary Severity Level IV Violations
*Equipment Enhancements
  - Procedures
*Oversight Improvements 28 Event Significance
  - Corrective actions
*No Actual Drop of Canister*No Radiological Release
  - Training
*Load Drop Analysis (if canister fell) 29 Next Steps
* Management Oversight Weaknesses 25
*Issue NRC Inspection Report
 
*NRC Inspection of Causal Analyses
Causal Evaluations
*NRC Inspection of Corrective Actions 30 Summary*Could have been prevented
* San Onofre Apparent Cause Evaluation
*Weaknesses in management oversight
* Holtec Root Cause Analysis
*Multiple failed barriers
* Common Cause Evaluation 26
*Increased NRC oversight 31 Questions 32 Shims 33 ShimsDesign Change:  Standoffs PinsOriginal Design:
 
Machined Slots 34 35Radiation Levels on the ISFSI PadTS limit on Lid = 0.4 mR/hrTS limit on Outlet Vent = 1.8 mR/hrCanister #29 levels in GammaLid: 0.015 mR/hrOutlet Vent:  0.12 mR/hrLids: 0.015
Root Causes
-0.018 mR/hrOutlet Vents:  0.12
* San Onofre Management failed to provide
-0.24 mR/hrSurvey Results found by the NRC:Closure Lid Aging Management Plan
  - Adequate procedures
*Required upon license renewal
  - Adequate training to support procedure
*Tracks Degradation of Structures, Systems, and Components
  - Adequate oversight 27
-Concrete-Steel-Stainless Steel
 
*Some licensees have performed Aging Management Inspections
Corrective Actions
-No breaches of the canisters have been identified
* Training Requirements
-No chloride induced stress corrosion cracking has been identified
* Procedure Enhancements
*California Costal Commission Commitment 36 Canister Drop analysis*San Onofreprovided preliminary analysis  
* Equipment Enhancements
*Analysis under NRC review
* Oversight Improvements 28
*San Onofrepreliminary results: no loss of containment 37 Unresolved Item
 
*Last NRC Inspection report (2017
Event Significance
-001) documented an Unresolved Item  
* No Actual Drop of Canister
*Licensee has modified loading operations to address NRC concern 38 Seismic and Flooding
* No Radiological Release
*Both ISFSI systems at San Onofreare evaluated for:
* Load Drop Analysis (if canister fell) 29
-Design Base Earthquake
 
-Maximum flood height and flood velocity (Tsunami) 39}}
Next Steps
* Issue NRC Inspection Report
* NRC Inspection of Causal Analyses
* NRC Inspection of Corrective Actions 30
 
Summary
* Could have been prevented
* Weaknesses in management oversight
* Multiple failed barriers
* Increased NRC oversight 31
 
Questions 32
 
Shims 33
 
Shims Original Design: Machined Slots Design Change: Standoffs Pins 34
 
Radiation Levels on the ISFSI Pad Survey Results found by the NRC:
Lids: 0.015 - 0.018 mR/hr Outlet Vents: 0.12 - 0.24 mR/hr Closure Lid Canister #29 levels in Gamma Lid: 0.015 mR/hr TS limit on Lid = 0.4 mR/hr            Outlet Vent: 0.12 mR/hr TS limit on Outlet Vent = 1.8 mR/hr 35
 
Aging Management Plan
* Required upon license renewal
* Tracks Degradation of Structures, Systems, and Components
  - Concrete
  - Steel
  - Stainless Steel
* Some licensees have performed Aging Management Inspections
  - No breaches of the canisters have been identified
  - No chloride induced stress corrosion cracking has been identified
* California Costal Commission Commitment 36
 
Canister Drop analysis
* San Onofre provided preliminary analysis
* Analysis under NRC review
* San Onofre preliminary results: no loss of containment 37
 
Unresolved Item
* Last NRC Inspection report (2017-001) documented an Unresolved Item
* Licensee has modified loading operations to address NRC concern 38
 
Seismic and Flooding
* Both ISFSI systems at San Onofre are evaluated for:
  - Design Base Earthquake
  - Maximum flood height and flood velocity (Tsunami) 39}}

Latest revision as of 11:39, 20 October 2019

Public Meeting Slides with Extra Content
ML18318A064
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 11/08/2018
From:
NRC Region 4
To:
References
Download: ML18318A064 (39)


Text

San Onofre Special Inspection Webinar November 8, 2018 NRC Region IV, Arlington, TX

Logistics

  • Webinar Format
  • Back-up Bridge Line (888) 469-1677, Passcode 2471451
  • Questions and Answers 2

NRC Staff

  • Eric Simpson, Special Inspection Team Leader Region IV Fuel Cycle and Decommissioning Branch
  • Troy Pruett, Director Region IV Division of Nuclear Materials Safety 3

Webinar Agenda

  • Background
  • Canister Downloading Operations
  • Inspection Team Findings
  • Current Status
  • Summary
  • Questions & Answers 4

ISFSI Layout TN NUHOMS Design Holtec UMAX Design 5

Transnuclear NUHOMS 6

Holtec UMAX 7

Vertically Ventilated Module (Vault) 8

Spent Fuel Canister Holtec MPC Transfer Cask 9

Downloading: Shield Cone 10

Downloading: Transporter 11

Downloading: Vault Door 12

Downloading:

Alignment 13

Downloading:

Attaching Slings 14

Downloading:

Attaching Slings 15

Downloading Preparations 16

What Happened on August 3rd?

Low Dose Area Low Dose Area 17

What Happened on August 3rd?

18

What Happened on August 3rd?

19

What Happened on August 3rd?

20

What Happened on August 3rd?

21

Post Event Actions

  • Spent Fuel Handling Activities Suspended
  • NRC Inspection Activities
  • San Onofre Notification to NRC
  • Causal Evaluations
  • Corrective Actions 22

Spent Fuel Handling Activities Suspended

  • MPC 29 lowered into vault
  • San Onofre suspends fuel loading

- Inside Transfer Cask

- Seismically Restrained in Fuel Building 23

NRC Inspection Activities

  • August 6th: NRC Region IV informally notified of Misalignment Event and initiates daily oversight communications
  • August 7th: San Onofre commits to NRC review before resuming operations
  • August 17th: NRC decides to conduct Special Inspection
  • September 10-14: NRC Special Inspection Team onsite
  • NRC to perform inspection prior to resumption of fuel loading 24

NRC Inspection Activities

  • 2 Preliminary Escalated Findings

- Failure to provide redundant drop protection

- Failure to report

- Procedures

- Corrective actions

- Training

  • Management Oversight Weaknesses 25

Causal Evaluations

  • San Onofre Apparent Cause Evaluation
  • Holtec Root Cause Analysis
  • Common Cause Evaluation 26

Root Causes

  • San Onofre Management failed to provide

- Adequate procedures

- Adequate training to support procedure

- Adequate oversight 27

Corrective Actions

  • Training Requirements
  • Procedure Enhancements
  • Equipment Enhancements
  • Oversight Improvements 28

Event Significance

  • No Actual Drop of Canister
  • No Radiological Release
  • Load Drop Analysis (if canister fell) 29

Next Steps

  • Issue NRC Inspection Report
  • NRC Inspection of Causal Analyses
  • NRC Inspection of Corrective Actions 30

Summary

  • Could have been prevented
  • Weaknesses in management oversight
  • Multiple failed barriers
  • Increased NRC oversight 31

Questions 32

Shims 33

Shims Original Design: Machined Slots Design Change: Standoffs Pins 34

Radiation Levels on the ISFSI Pad Survey Results found by the NRC:

Lids: 0.015 - 0.018 mR/hr Outlet Vents: 0.12 - 0.24 mR/hr Closure Lid Canister #29 levels in Gamma Lid: 0.015 mR/hr TS limit on Lid = 0.4 mR/hr Outlet Vent: 0.12 mR/hr TS limit on Outlet Vent = 1.8 mR/hr 35

Aging Management Plan

  • Tracks Degradation of Structures, Systems, and Components

- Concrete

- Steel

- Stainless Steel

- No breaches of the canisters have been identified

- No chloride induced stress corrosion cracking has been identified

Canister Drop analysis

  • San Onofre provided preliminary analysis
  • Analysis under NRC review
  • San Onofre preliminary results: no loss of containment 37

Unresolved Item

  • Last NRC Inspection report (2017-001) documented an Unresolved Item
  • Licensee has modified loading operations to address NRC concern 38

Seismic and Flooding

  • Both ISFSI systems at San Onofre are evaluated for:

- Design Base Earthquake

- Maximum flood height and flood velocity (Tsunami) 39