ML17289A375

LER 92-004-00:on 920227,noted Scram Discharge Vol Level Switches Not Tested Post Scram as Required.Caused by Testing Not Being Performed.Corrective Actions Were Not Required. W/920227 Ltr

ML17289A375
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	02/27/1992
From:	John Baker, Swank D WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GO2-92-052, GO2-92-52, LER-92-004, LER-92-4, NUDOCS 9203060223
Download: ML17289A375 (6)

Text

ACCELERATED ITRIBUTION DEMON+<"CATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9203060223

-DOC.DATE: 92/02/27 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET¹FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SWANK,D.A.

Washington Public Power Supply System BAKER,J.W.

Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 92-004-00:on 920227,scram discharge volume level switches not tested post scram as required.Caused by testing not being performed.

Corrective actions were not required.W/920227 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PDS LA ENG,P.L.COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD.COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 NRR/DOEA/OEAB NRR/DST/SELB 8D N~RJ)5T/SPLB8Dl G~02 GN5 FILE'1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ACRS AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DET/EMEB 7E NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E RES/DSIR/EIB' 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 EXTERNAL: EGEG BRYCE,J.H NRC PDR NSIC POOREiW~3 3 1 1 1 1 L ST LOBBY WARD NSIC MURPHY,G.A NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 1 1 1 1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT.20079)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 32 ENCL 32 4 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O.Box 968~3000 George II'ashington IVay~Richland, IVashington 99352 February 27, 1992 G02-92-052 Docket No.50-397 Document Control Desk U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555

SUBJECT:

NUCLEAR PLANT WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.92-004 C Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.92-004 for the WNP-2 Plant.This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Sincerely, J.W.Baker WNP-2 Plant Manager (Mail Drop 927M)Enclosure CC: Mr.John B.Martin, NRC-Region V Mr.C.Sorensen, NRC Resident Inspector (Mail Drop 901A, 2 Copies)INPO Records Center-Atlanta, GA Ms.Dottie Sherman, ANI Mr.D.L.Williams, BPA (Mail Drop 399)t.t 8 J<!'-:<~o 5gwlt i l 9203060223 920227 PDR ADOCK 05000397 8 PDR FACILITY NAME (I)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)ashington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TITLE (4)DOCKET NUMB R ()PAGE (3)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 I OF 4 SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME LEVEL SWITCHES NOT TESTED POST SCRAM AS REQUIRED EVENT DATE 5 MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR LER NUMBER SEQUENTIAL NUHBER 6 REPORT DATE 7 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 EVI 5 ION.;NUHBER OOCKE HONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAHES NUMB R (5)0 1 3 I 9 2 9 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 2 2 7 9 2 0 5 0 0 0 05000 OPERATING MODE (9)THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following)

(11)POWER LEVEL (10)20.402(b)20.405(a)(1)(i) 20.405(a)(i)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 20.405(C)50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v)

'0.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 77.71(b)73.73(c)THER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)NAME LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)D.A.'Swank, Compliance Engineer TELEPHONE NUMBER REA CODE 5 0 9 3 7 7-4 4 5 1 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT'13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER EPORTABLE TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORT'ABLE TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)X NO AHSTRACf (l6)EXPECTED SUBMISSION MONTH DAY YEAR ATE (15)On January 31, 1992 a Reportability Evaluation was completed and it was concluded that the post scram testing performed for the scram discharge volume scram and control rod block level instrumentation after each scram from a pressurized condition did not meet the Technical Specification requirements.

No immediate corrective action was required.A CFT of the scram discharge volume scram and control rod block level instrumentation had been performed on January 15 and 16, 1992 to satisfy the quarterly testing requirements for these switches.This quarterly testing is equivalent to the testing required after each scram from a pressurized condition.

The root cause of this event was the required testing was not performed due to procedures which were less than adequate.Further corrective actions include development of new procedures to perform the CFT post scram and ongoing activities by a Quality Action Team authorized to address potential improve-ments in Technical Specification compliance at WNP-2.This event had no safety significance.

The scram discharge volume level switches are redundant, were checked post scram to verify they reset, and are tested quarterly by a CFT to ensure operability.

This event posed no threat to health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY HAHE (I)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 LER HUHBER (8)Year Number Rev.Ho.92 004 00 PAGE (3)2 OF 4.TITLE (4)SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME LEVEL SWITCHES NOT TESTED POST SCRAM AS REQUIRED Plan ndii n Power Level-100%Plant Mode-1 Event Descri tion On January 31, 1992 a Reportability Evaluation was completed and it was concluded that the procedures used to perform a Channel Functional Test (CFT)of the scram discharge volume scram and control rod block level instrumentation after each scram from a pressurized condition did not meet the Technical Specification definition of a CFT.The procedure did not include"the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions" as required for a CFT and as included in the quarterly CFT for these switches.Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3~1.4.b requires that this CFT be performed after each scram from a pressurized condition.

On January 15, 1992, during the biennial review of a Plant procedure, it was found that the procedure did not perform the testing of the scram discharge volume levels switches called for in the FSAR.A detailed review of this concern led to the conclusion on January 31 that, in addition to the FSAR requirements, the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements had also not been met.Immediate Corrective Acti n No immediate corrective action was required, A CFT of the scram discharge volume scram and control rod block level instrumentation, performed quarterly in addition to after each scram from a pressurized condition, had been performed on January 15 and 16, 1992.Since this was after the last Plant scram, the requirement to test the switches after the last scram was satisfied and no further testing was required.F rther Evalua i n and orrective Ac ion A.Further Evaluati n The scram discharge volume is a set of two pipes used to contain the water discharged from the control rod drives mechanisms (CRDM)during a scram.These volumes are provided with redundant level switches which supply a trip signal to the Reactor Protection System, and a rod block trip to the control rod drive manual control system, when the levels are too high.The level switches and associated level indications ensure that there is sufficient space available in the volumes to accept the water from the CRDMs should a scram occur.The Technical Specification requirement to perform a CFT of the scram discharge volume scram and control rod block level instrumentation after each scram from a pressurized condition was not performed in a manner that satisfied the Technical Specification definition of a CFT.The procedures required a LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (I)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 LER NUMBER (8)Year Number ev.No.92 004 00 PAGE (3)3 F 4 1'ITLE (4)SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME LEVEL SWITCHES NOT TESTED POST SCRAM AS REQUIRED check to verify that, the level switches reset when the scram discharge volumes were drained.The procedures did not, however, include the injection of a simulated signal as close as practicable to the sensor or a check of the trip function.Not satisfying the Surveillance Requirement is a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications and is reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

As described in LER 91-013, the Supply System, using contract engineers, performed an extensive'urveillance Procedure verification effort in 1991 to identify potential areas of noncompliance.

That effort identified the problem described by this LER.Plant Staff review at that time, however, incorrectly concluded that although the procedures needed to be modified for greater clarity, Technical Specification compliance was achieved by the procedures as written.The root cause of this event was the required testing was not performed due to procedures which were less than adequate.The subject procedures did not require that a complete CFT as defined in the Technical Specifications be performed following each scram from a pressurized condition.

No structures, systems, or components were inoperable prior to the start of this event that contributed to the event.B." her orrective Acti n New Plant procedures are being developed to test the scram discharge volume scram and control rod block level instrumentation after each scram from a pressurized condition.

Until these procedures are approved for use, should a scram occur, the procedures used for quarterly testing of the level switches will be used to satisfy the Technical Specification requirements.

2.As documented in WNP-2 LER 91-013-02, a Quality Action Team has been authorized to address potential improvements in Technical Specification compliance.

~f'N~Channel Functional Testing of the scram discharge volume scram and control rod block level instrumentation after each scram from a pressurized condition was included in the Technical Specifications to ensure the level switches were functional following effects of a scram transient on the scram discharge volume level switches.Functionality of these switches was verified to some degree by the fact that the switches tripped on a scram and reset when the scram discharge volume was drained.In addition, a CFT of the switches and logic was also performed on a quarterly basis.This testing, combined with the redundancy of the switches, provides a high degree of confidence that the scram discharge volume level switches were capable of performing their intended safety functions.

This event is deemed to have had no safety significance.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (I)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 OOCKET NUMBER (2)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 LER NUMBER (B)Year Number Rev.No;92 004 00 PAGE (3)4 OF 4 TITLE (4)SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME LEVEL SWITCHES NOT TESTED POST SCRAM AS REQUIRED Simil r Event LER 91-013 documented several instances of failures to meet the surveillance requirements.

Subsequent failures to meet the Technical Specifications were documented in LERs91-018, 91-019,91-028, 91-036, and 92-002.Specific corrective actions to address these problems were identified ih the LERs.In addition, a Quality Action Team was authorized to address potential improvements in Technical Specification compliance at WNP-2.The work of this team is progressing.

EIIS Informati n Text Reference EIIS Reference~sstem~om onen Scram Discharge Volume Control Rod Drive Mechanism Reactor Protection System Main Steam Leakage Control P AA AA JC SB TK DRIV