ENS 53750: Difference between revisions
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| emergency class = Non Emergency | | emergency class = Non Emergency | ||
| notification date = 11/22/2018 03:56 | | notification date = 11/22/2018 03:56 | ||
| retracted = Yes | |||
| notification by = Angel Yarbrough | | notification by = Angel Yarbrough | ||
| NRC officer = | | NRC officer = Dan Livermore | ||
| event date = 11/21/2018 00:00 CST | | event date = 11/21/2018 00:00 CST | ||
| last update date = | | last update date = 12/28/2018 | ||
| title = | | title = En Revision Imported Date 12/31/2018 | ||
| event text = At 2125 [CST] on 11/21/2018, it was discovered that U1 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. | | event text = EN Revision Text: HPCI UNEXPECTEDLY TRANSFERRED TO ALTERNATE SUCTION SOURCE DURING TESTING | ||
At 2125 [CST] on 11/21/2018, it was discovered that U1 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. | |||
During performance of a routine surveillance, HPCI automatically transferred from its normal suction source to the alternate suction source. The control room operator then manually tripped the HPCI turbine. HPCI was already inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operability (LCO) 3.5.1, ECCS Operating, Condition C during performance of the surveillance. However, this condition was not expected nor induced by the testing. | During performance of a routine surveillance, HPCI automatically transferred from its normal suction source to the alternate suction source. The control room operator then manually tripped the HPCI turbine. HPCI was already inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operability (LCO) 3.5.1, ECCS Operating, Condition C during performance of the surveillance. However, this condition was not expected nor induced by the testing. | ||
There was no impact to the safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | There was no impact to the safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
CR 1469109 documents this condition in the Corrective Action Program. | CR 1469109 documents this condition in the Corrective Action Program. | ||
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2018/ | * * * RETRACTION ON 12/28/18 AT 1300 EST FROM MARK MOEBES TO JEFFREY WHITED * * * | ||
ENS Event Number 53750, made on November 22, 2018, is being retracted. | |||
NRC notification 53750 was made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) were met when the licensee discovered an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. | |||
During performance of a routine surveillance, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically transferred from its normal suction source to the alternate suction source. As a result, Unit 1 HPCI was declared inoperable. | |||
On December 20, 2018, a Past Operability Evaluation was completed which determined that the HPCI System remained operable. The evaluation determined that the HPCI System could have performed its specified safety function of vessel injection throughout the time that the suction path was aligned to the torus. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). | |||
TVA's evaluation of this event is documented in the Corrective Action Program in Condition Report 1469109. | |||
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |||
Notified R2DO (Desai). | |||
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2018/20181231en.html#en53750 | |||
}}{{unit info | }}{{unit info | ||
| Unit = 1 | | Unit = 1 | ||
Latest revision as of 07:30, 31 December 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Browns Ferry  Alabama (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+21.93 h0.914 days <br />0.131 weeks <br />0.03 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Angel Yarbrough 03:56 Nov 22, 2018 |
| NRC Officer: | Dan Livermore |
| Last Updated: | Dec 28, 2018 |
| 53750 - NRC Website
| |
Browns Ferry with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |