ENS 43940
ENS Event | |
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00:43 Jan 29, 2008 | |
Title | High Pressure Core Injection (Hpci) Inoperable |
Event Description | On 1/28/08 at 1843 CST, Browns Ferry Unit 1 was performing 1-SR-3.3.5.1.3(D) HPCI System Condensate Header Low Level Switch Calibration and Functional Test when 1-LS-73-56A failed to actuate. Per TS 3.3.5.1, 1-LS-73-56A is inoperable. 1-SR-3.3.5.1.3(D) defeats the logic relay normally actuated by 73-56A & B. This causes HPCI to be inoperable per TS 3.3.5.1.D if the relay is defeated for greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Failure of the 73-56A switch prevented restoration of the relay within the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> time frame.
This event is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the Safety Function of structures or systems that are needed to: Remove Residual Heat' and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the Safety Function of structures or systems that are needed to: mitigate the consequences of an accident.' This event also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). The defeated relay was restored to normal and the HPCI system returned to operable status at 2330 CST on 1/28/08. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On January 28, 2008, Browns Ferry Unit 1 entered an LCO to perform a planned maintenance activity, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Condensate Header Low Level Switch Calibration and Functional Test, 1-SR-3.5.5.1.3(D). During the calibration of 1-LS-073-0056A and 1-LS-073- 0056B, 1-LS-073-0056A was found inoperable. The removal of both level switches from service (and as a result the HPCI transfer on low condensate header level function) was a planned maintenance activity, performed in accordance with an approved procedure and in accordance with the plants TSs. During this time no condition was discovered that could have prevented HPCI from performing its intended function because 1-LS-073-056B was considered OPERABLE. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) or 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO(Lesser) notified. |
Where | |
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Browns Ferry Alabama (NRC Region 2) | |
Reporting | |
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+0.13 h0.00542 days <br />7.738095e-4 weeks <br />1.78074e-4 months <br />) | |
Opened: | Ricky Givens 00:51 Jan 29, 2008 |
NRC Officer: | Mark Abramovitz |
Last Updated: | Mar 17, 2008 |
43940 - NRC Website
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Unit 1 | |
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Reactor critical | Critical |
Scram | No |
Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
After | Power Operation (100 %) |