Text

Requests Review of Encl Exceptions from 10CFR50,App R Technical Requirements for Reactor Auxiliary Bldg,Per Ser. Generic Ltr 83-33 Used to Reevaluate Compliance W/Technical Requirements
	ML20087M854
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	03/26/1984
From:	Cook K; LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Knighton G; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	GL-83-33, W3P84-0709, W3P84-709, NUDOCS 8404020067
	Download: ML20087M854 (147)
	v • d • e

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l Louisiama 2 O W E R & t i G H T ! N.W OF%.EANS LOUISLANA

, .. oe-c~e. e. 1 . m eoxecee 70174-6000 . (504)388-.34S MIDDLE SOUTH UTIUTIES SYSTEM March 26, 1984 W3P84-0709 Q-3-P43 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. G. W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit 3 Docket No. 50-382 Request for Relief from Certain Technical Requirements of Appendix R to 10CFR50 ENCLOSURES: 1. Exceptions from the Technical Requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R for the Reactor Auxiliary Building

2. Demonstration of Equivalency of Reactor Containment Building to Technical Requirements of Sections III.G.2, III.L, and III.0 of Appendix R to 10CFR50

3. Fire Damper Installation Exceptions

4. Previously Requested Exceptions to Appendix R and Miscellaneous Items Associated with Fire Protection

': 9

5. Fire Door. Installation Exceptions

Dear Sir:

At the suggestion of the Waterford 3 SES fire protection reviewer, Mr. Kubicki (NRC), LP&L initiated a study to identify and document any outstanding exceptions to the technical requirements of Appendix R.

Generic Letter 83-33 and other interpretive documents were used to reevaluate our compliance with the technical requirements associated with the rule. The above listed enclosures document the results of our study in the form of relief requests from a portion of the technical requirements of Appendix R associated with selected areas of the plant.

1 I I

, 8404020067 840326

, PDR ADOCK 05000382 E PDR

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - ]

E 1 a... ' Previous supplements.to1the " Safety Evaluation Report Related to the

,0peration of Waterford SES Unit No. 3"-(SER) have found our? plant to be in compliance with Appendix R!to -10CFR50 ~and Appendix A to Branch Technical (Position 9.5.1. : . However, as constructively pointed out by Mr. _ Kubicki,

the41ackLof specificity in the SER supplements requires that previously negotiated positions with-his predecessor be revisited _as'regards exceptions ~to the

' fire' protection requirements. Therefore,:your review of the enclosures is

considered necessary toLdocument the more detailed level of review not covered in the broader scope of your previous ~ safety evaluations in order to avoid-ypr'oblems simila'r to -those encountered in recent NRC inspections of nuclear power facilities- (i.e. IE Information Notice 84-09).

iIn. view of the nearness of_our fuel load date,-your expeditious review of'

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the enclosures.is respectfully _ requested. Please direct any questions you may' have on:the ' content of this 'information to our fire protection licensing engineer,;Kevin-Curley at (504) 363-8950.

LYours/very truly;,

- K.,W.~ Cook Nuclear Support:and Licensing-Manager

.KWC/KNC/pjl

-Enclosures.

cc: E. L. Blake, W. M.-Stevenson, D. M. Crutchfield, J. Wilson,

--D. J. Kubicki, J.~Weirmiel, G. L. Constable, J. Collins r .

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-ENCLOSURE 1-EXCEPTIONS FROM THE-TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS OF-10CFR50,'. APPENDIX R

.FOR THE REACTOR-AUXILIARY BUILDING de-

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.RAB 1* CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE

' A .' ^ EXCEPTION:'

1.- < Relief-from the technical requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R,

.Section III.G.3:is requested in this fire area, specifically:

la. LThe:need to' install smoke detection and an automatic fixed Lfire suppression system in the area under consideration for alternative. shutdown capability.

22 . Relief from the technical requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R.

'Section III.G.2 is requested in'this area, specifically: .

The' enclosure of.-redundant cable' tray and/or conduit in the

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_ _ .same11-hour rated fire wrap.-

-- B . ' FIRE HAZARD' ANALYSIS (FHA);

El.- See FSAR Se'ction 9.5.1, Table VIII-2, RAB 1A, 1B IC and 1D; and Figure X-6.

12.- 1 Comb'stible u Material Loading-a.- Fire: Zone 1A

,, -Fire Severity-

) Material (Minutes)

- . CableLI nsulation' 1

'Other-Solids. 7

. ' Total 8 Lb.s Fire ZoneLIB

. . . Fire Severity Ma terial' '- (Minutes)

' Cable 2 Insulation 16 Other Solids 13 1

' Total c..;5 Fire [ Zone'lC i

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Fire Severity.

(Minutes)

LCable Insulation 5 37 0ther-. Solids ^ 5 Totalo 10

^*RABJarea designations-cited'in-this enclosure may be found in the

, iWaterford 3 FSAR Section 9.5;1--

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- , i d. . Fire' Zone'1D-Fire Severity Material' :(Minutes)

Cable. Insulation 1 -14 Other Solids. 10 LTotal 24

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C.: SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS (SSA)'

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1.. LSee FSAR SectiSnL9.5;1, Table 9.5A-4, RAB 1A,-IB, 1C and ID; and Figure 9.5A-26f

. D. : BASIS FOR EXCEPTIONS

1. , 7 Exception;from the requirement-to' install a fixed suppression system'in'the Control Room Proper (RAB 1A):

r' , a . - -- Low: combustible: loading' consisting of' cable insulation

-: -within control cabinets and conduit and Class A combustibles g -

.' .-in steel filing cabinets'and fully enclosed. bookshelves.

>b. Continuous manning _makes introduction of unnoticed large

. amount ofLtransient combustibles into'the. Control Room unlikely.and;provides for: rapid response and. suppression of transient l exposure fires.

c? sIonization detectors.reduceipossibility of smolderingLtype-

' fires going; unchecked.-

'd. : Remote Shutdown. Pan'el (LCP-43)-provides-alternate shutdown capability.which is electrically independent of the Control-s ' Room.

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,2.- Absence:of.an' automatic: fixed suppression-system and complete

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l area wide' smoke detection for the Control Room Emergency Living

--J . Quarters l(RAB IC):

a.; No safe-~ shutdown. equipment in this zone'.

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1b.- ) Detection in: adjacent living quarters would detect a 7 , Lpostulated' fire in-the~ corridor spa ~ce.(where detection is Labsent);and assure appropriate response,by nearby plant g ,

jpersonne1Lin'a timely' manner.-

ILow-combustibleloading.

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13.-- ' Absence of complete fixed ~ suppression coverage.for the computer

' Room (RAB ID):-

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- ;a. : Plant: computer not-required for safe shutdown.

b. < . Low combustible' loading.'

e'c.: .Halon 1301 fixed suppression is provided for the~ entire Lunder. floor area in the-Computer Room which is used for-

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cable runs.

'4 . . Enclosure of essential: redundant. conduit in the same 1-hour wrap for! Battery Room.(A,.A/B & B) Ventilation Exhaust Systems in the Control RM H&V Room (RAB IB):

a. Reg. Guide 1.75 separation. criteria prevents an_ internal tray or. conduit fire from propagating to redundant tray conduit.

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-(1) This separation between one: cable tray and a redundant

' cable tray or:conduitLwithin the same fire wrap is -

accomplished by providing_the subject cable tray with

~either a metal: tray cover or a inch B&B blanket cover (i.e. 30_ minute: fire rating). Where' access and spatial separation between' cable trays allows,1a-1 inch B&B

-blanket tray _ cover (i.e. 1-hour' fire: rating):is preferred over a inch blanket.-

b._ ho~ur wrap provides sufficient protection to redundant cabling,until actuation of automatic suppression system or

'arrivalaof~ fire brigade.

. c '.- Ventilation supply to the battery rooms.is not affected-by

.g .. loss of battery room exhaust systems. Ventilation exhaust can she effected.by. opening doors to. battery rooms or use of portable equipment'if necessary..

-d. Automatic fixedEsuppression and' smoke detection are provided throughout the Control'RM H&V fire zone.

I 5.: ;

Additional considerations applicable'to the above deviations:

a .' The-subject fire. zones are separated from each other by

2-hour' rated fire walls and~ class B fire doors with the Jexception of safety-related duct penetrations and'the corridor' access in the north wall of the Control Room proper.

J b.1 IPiesence:of portable' fire' extinguishers and nearby standpipe hose stations ensure the' ability to. extinguish any conceivable firefin this area.

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RAB 1 Enclosure 1 Page 4

' c.' -Ventilation exhaust system has sufficient capacity to further-limit damage and assure habitability by removal of heat -smoke, and products of combustion.

11 . -Administrative controls restrict introduction of significant

. amount of combustibles into the area.

- 6. 'The.above mitigating features show protection which is at least equivalent to the rule ensuring that at least one train of safe

. shutdown equipment remains free of fire damage and therefore the above stated exceptions:from the technical requirements of Appendix R should be granted.

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~RAB 2 - H&V MECHANICAL ROOM x [Ai .EXCEPTIONSh

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1. . eRelief.from the technical requirements'of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section:III.G.2'is requested in this, area, specifically:

ia.: :The need for; total area _ wide coverage of smoke detection and

! automatic. fixed' suppression' systems, b.. : The need for' a complete,- 1-hour barrier between redundant-

. , : safe shutdown, equipment.

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p: < Lc.- ;The' existence of:14 hour fireidampers in the fire area boundaries.

> jd. ;The enclosure of:re'dundant cable tray.and conduit in the

, same 1-hour rated fire wrap.

7- -e. .-Protection of a steel maintenance hatch to'a fire resistance s : equivalent.to the floor boundary it' forms a part of.

-B.- FIRE. HAZARDS: ANALYSIS:(FHA)-

.1. .See.FSAR Section 9.5.1,' Table.VIII-2,;RAB 2 and Figures X-6, X-7,

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? : X--9,iX-10 and X-15.

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2. : Combustible' Material Loading:

Fire Severity

. ' ! . Material (Minutes)'

Cable: Insulation

Power ..

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Control 5-cCharcoalf(Enclosed within HVAC Units)- 44

. Total -

54

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g jC. SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS-(SSA).

II., See FSAR ; Section 9.5.1, Table 9.5A- 4, _ RAB 2- and Figures 9.5A-24 and 9.5A-37.-

g ; D. ; ; BASIS FOR-EXCEPTIONS

[1. . / Absence.ofdetectionand'automaticfixedsuppressionfor:

1 ai ;H&V 1.(for' H.M. Shop) Room -- EL. +46.00 f t, between column

- lines 1L', N,l1A:and~2Af

j. 1) No ' safe-shutdown equipment.-

n 2) . Smoke detection provided.

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, -I3); Lov combustible ~ loading.

4): ESeparated from remainder of fire. area by a.12-in'ch

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reinforced concrete wall with' unrated = penetrations' .

' ~ . z Smoke' detection and automatic fixed. suppression in

-adjacent Jzone will, check propagation of '_ hot gases.'

- --" through these penetrations until' arrival of the fire

. -brigade.

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b.- Plant Stack-& Rad Monitor Equipment Room - EL.~+46.0 ft, L

. _between column lines L, M, 5A and 9A:.

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1) Noisafe-shutdown equipment..

. 2) . Low combustible loading'.'

3)" Separated from remainder of. fire area by a 36-inch

, -reinforc~ed concrete ~ wall with unrated penetrations.

-Smokeldetectionfand automatic; fixed ~ suppression in adjacent zone lwill check propagation of hot gases

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_through~these-penetrations until' arrival of:the fire brigade..

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cc, .SBVS Filter Laydown Area;- EL. 46.0 ft, between column

. lines J,'H,-'3A &-5A:

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1) -NoLsafe shutdown. equipment.

.2): =Little or no_'combustibleJloading.

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3): ; Smoke deteetion and automatic? fixed suppression coverage in the corridor < immediately adjacent to .this

..open space ensures that'a_ postulated fire would be

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detected:in a: timely' manner and its propagation checked until. arrival of'the fire brigade.

Ld. ' Roof Exhaust. Penthouses -'EL._+69.0 ft, between column lines v _

'3A,'2A, J_& K and SA,,6A, J.&_K:

1)j ; No safe shutdownjequipment.:

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2)) Separated'from remainder of fire. area by a 27-inch ureinforced concrete floor with unrated exhaust duct

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penetrations. Smoke' detection-and' L automatic fixed suppression in ~ adjacent zone will check propagationL of

. hot gases'through:these penetrations until: arrival of

,.the fire brigade.

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1" RAB 2 Enclosure 1

'k Page 7 J 3) ' INo com'ustible' b loading.-

, 4).. A transient exposure fire is not credible since access-

, can only be gained through a roof entrance.

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1) Damage by fire to Component. Cooling Surge Tank and HVAC Expansion Tank.is not credible.

2). .Little~or no combustible. loading.

-3) :A transient exposure fire is not credible since access

can only be gained from a roof entrance after climbing a: ladder.

- 4 2. Partle' h'ight'l-hour, walls constructed between' redundant water chillers,-chilled water pumps, and air handlers (AH-13 SA & SB):

a.- Detection and automatic suppression protection provided for-

'all' redundant' equipment.

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'b. Complete hour barrier isolation is' not' practical and would severely-limit access for damage control purposes.

c._ 'One train of redundant cabling and conduit enclosed in a 1-hour; rated' wrap.

Td. . -The 4-feet heightil-hour' barrier extends approximately 1-foot ~above redundant chilled water pumpsLand provides.

adequate. protection from the radiative effects of a fire postulated on'eitherfside. . Adequate interference from

~ chilled water heat exchangers exist to preclude negative

. impact _from a' fire at either end of the wall.

ChilledLwater heat exchangers extend 1-foot above part height

-barrier land'are less than 20' feet apart, however damage to-these water filled components by fire'is not deemed credible.

e.- Redundant chilled waterJinstrumentation cabinets extend-approximately 1 foot above part-height barrier. However, a 24

foot ~ separation exists.between-the furthest distanced cabinets.. This'plus' existing' smoke: detection and automatic

, suppression ~ ensure;that at least one of the three chilled 1 water (systems will remain free of' fire damage.-

v = f.; (A 1-hour barrier.is provided-along the base of AH-13 (SB)

-which is mounted approximately 8cfeet above the EL..+46.0 floor'. -- ~A'l-hour' protective' coating on the west side of AH-13 (SB) extending 'back' to- a reinforced ' concrete ' wall

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I(south end) separates AH-13!(SB) from'its redundant air 1

- handler, AH-13,(SA). 'A postulated fire at the north end of 1,

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RAB 2 Enclosure 1 Fage 8

~this. barrier could expose both units to radiative effects of mc la single. fire. However,-interference of piping, conduit and chilled. water' equipment make the accumulation of a significant

' amount of combustibles in.this location unlikely. In addition, the sound proof casing and. exhaust ~ air flow provide-moreEthan adequate protection from the radiative or convective effects of a fire until actuation of'the automatic fixed suppression system.or arrival of the fire brigade.

3. Existence of a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months fire damper,in the following fire area

>Z boundaries:

. . Duct ' Duct

Penetration. TSize. Fire Adjacent Adjacent Fire Location (Inches) . Damper Fire Area Severity (Minutes App)

Floor- 42D- Yes 6 47

< Floor 18D Yes(FD-49) 8B. 20 East Wall. 6D. Yes(FD-50)- 6 47 Ja . Detection and suppression exist on'both sides of each damper.

b. Fire severity of areas adjacent to each damper are less than fire- rating of the subject damper.

" 4~.'E" Enclosure of essential redundant cable tray and conduit in the

'same.1-hour wrap 1for the following system:

Chilled Water System

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La.- . Reg. Guide 1.75; criteria. prevent an internal tray fire from

, - propagating.to redundant-tray or conduit.

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'1): This. separation between one cable tray and a redundant Lcable tray or conduit within the same fire wrap is

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~ accomplished by providing-the subject cable tray with either_a metal tray cover or a . inch B&B blanket cover

-(i.~e.'30 minute' fire ~ rating). Where access and spatial

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t . . separation-between cable trays allows, a 1 inch B&B blanket tray cover-(i.e. 1-hour fire rating) is

. preferred'over;a inch blanket.

! b. . :1-hour wrap provides. sufficient protection to redundant cabling until1 actuation of automatic' suppression system or

, arrival of fire brigade.

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i' RAB 2 Enclosure 1 Page 9 E5. Lack of' equivalent fire resistance on floor boundary side of steel equipment hatch between. fire areas RAB 2 and RAB 23 located

along column line J between column lines 4A and SA

a. .A 3-hour fire protective coating will be applied to che RAB

' 23 (ceiling) side of the equipment hatch.

b.- Probability of a flammable liquid spill in vicinity of hatch is lessened due to administrative controls and low traffic levels through this area,

c. .There are no credible sources of ignition in this hatch space.

d. The design of the hatch is such that only minor seepage of a

. liquid past the hatch to floor fitting can occur and thus act as a flame : arrestor.

e.. Smoke detection.and automatic fixed suppression coverage below the hatch provide adequate compensation for any fire hazard associated with seepage by the hatch fitting.

6.- -Additional considerations applicable to the above deviations:

a. , Presence of portable fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stations ensure the ability to extinguish an exposure fire

. in this. area'in a timely manner.

b. Detection and automatic fixed suppression provide coverage

-over all redundant safe shutdown equipment in the area.

.c. Administrative controls and low traffic volume limit the

+ introduction of significant amounts of combustible materials.

.d. Ventilation exhaust system has' sufficient capacity to allow adequate accessibility for' damage control.

e. Low combustible loading in the fire area.

7. The above mitigating features ensure that at least one train of

safe' shutdown equipment will remain free of fire damage and

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therefore the'previously stated exceptions from the technical

-requirements.of Appendix R should be granted, e .-. . . . . -

RAB 3 - HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM

- A.- EXCEPTIONS

~1. . Relief from theitechnical requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R,

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Section III.G.2 is requested in this area, specifically:

La. 'The need for a complete 1-hour barrier between redundant safe shutdown' equipment.

~b. .The need for total. area wide. coverage of smoke detection automatic fixed suppression systems.

.B. FIRE HAZARDS' ANALYSIS (FHA)-

1;. See FSAR.Section 9.5.1, Table-VIII-2, RAB-3. and Figures X-6 and

, 'X-21 2.. -Combustible;NWterial Loading:

Fire Severity Material 2 (Minutes)

' Cable Insulation-

. Low-Level. 2

. C. 1 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS-(SSA) 1.: 'See FSAR Section 9.5.1, Table'9.5A-4, RAB 3 and Figures 9.5A-23

'and'9.5A-26.-

D.. BASIS FOR EXCEPTIONS'

' 1. - .Part height 1-hour wall constructed between redundant air

. handlers AH-25 (SA &'SB).

-a.. ' Wall extends the entire width of fire-area and constitutes a complete 11-hour separation (including doors and penetrations)

. upg tofthe height of the: wall.

I

b. Since part height' wall adjoins 3-hour boundary walls on both Lsides of the fire area,.a postulated fire at either end of cthe wall ~which'could! radiate both air-handlers is not possible.- This precludes. damage'to at least.one fan unit from.the radiative' effects of a fire in this area where redundant conduit / cable trays are routed in the overhead

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onLthe'same side of the part height wall; at least one train is provided with a 1-hour wrap-to prevent damage to both essential l trains from the build up of convective hot gases

'which~may' occur-before actuation of sprinkler heads or arrival'of-the fire' brigade.

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.c RAB 3 Enclosure.1 Page 11

-:The' air handler casings extend approximately 3 feet above E

the height of 7the' top of the 8 foot high wall. The fan

' units,inside these casings.are below the wall height'and are

, impproximately 15 ft.1from the part height wall on each side

(i.e.itotallof.30. feet-of separation). .These fan units and their associated control & power cabling are the only parts of the

,, : air = handlers considered' susceptible'to damage by fire.

f c ~. 'In the unforeseen event that both AH-25 air handlers are damaged forfsome reason other than a fire, ventilation to the Cable Vault Relay. rooms and Electrical Penetration areas would be lost. Upon=1oss of. ventilation,. temperatures in s

these rooms would;take at leasts 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months before reaching.

c140*F. Cable.in this room is qualified'for in-containment.

.g design environmental condition's.

-2. Absence of smoke. detection and' automatic fixed suppression at the

+35.00 EL. H&V' duct space located between column lines G & K along column.line 12A: )

' a'. 'The following Safe. Shutdown; Cable Trays and conduits.are, located within this chase:

' Trays: L205-NB' 4

L201D - SA:

C2052. 'NA:

LConduits: (31079A-SB-1 )l

'(31075A-SA-1 )

b'.- ! Exposed cable (i.e. Cable Tray L205-NB) are- protected by 1-hour wrap. The above'noted' conduits are

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separated.by approximately:32'-0"~with negligible and

.discontinuousgintervening combustibles (i.e.' cable

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trays noted'above).

_ .,, 3 tc.- . Negligible Fire Load..

J d.. 'Normally Inaccessible.

2 - e.: ~ Smoke-detection .and suppression of; adjoining spaces will

, jq ensure;;that any postulated fire-in this area will be~

p? > ~ detected. inia ~ timely manner and that its propagation will be checked until~ arrival of the fire brigade.

~

'3.- Additionaliconsiderations-applicable to the'above deviations:

, ga., _ Presence of; portable fire extinguishers and standpipe hose

- stations'ensureithe ability.to extinguish an exposure fire

- < ?in this' area in a: timely' manner.

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F RAB 3 Enclosure 1 Page 12

b. Detection and automatic' fixed suppression is provided throughout this area except as noted above.

c.- Administrative controls and low traffic volume limit the introduction of significant amounts of combustible materials.

d. -Ventilation exhaust system has sufficient capacity to allow adequate accessibility.for damage control.

.e. Lew combustible loading in the' fire area.

. 4. 'The above mitigating features ensure that at least one train of safe shutdown equipment will remain free of fire damage and therefore the-previously stated exceptions from the technical requirements of Appendix R should be granted.

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RAB'3A -~H&V, ELEVATOR MACHINE ROOM AND ELEVATOR SHAFT E dL .

EXCEPTIONS'

1. Relief'from,the technical requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R

Section II.G.2 is requested cin this area, specifically:

-a." ~ The -need for a comp'lete 1-hour barrier or 20 ' feet free' of intervening combustibles'between redundant safe shutdown

equipment.

li. .The need for total area' wide coverage:of smoke detection and' automatic fixed suppression systems.

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TB. FIRE HAZARDS' ANALYSIS (FHA)

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- 1. See FSAR Section-9.5.1,_ Table VIII-2, RAB 3A and Figures X-4, X-5,

-X-6, X-10-and X-21.

- 2 .' Combustible Material Loading - Negligible.

10.~ ;

SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS'(SSA)'.

1; See~FSAR Section~9.5.1, Table 9.5A'-4, RAB 3A and Figures 9.5A-18, 9.5A-20,-9.5A-23.and 9.5A-25'.

.D._ BASIS FOR EXCEPTIONS

1 ~. tLack of: separation between redundant exhaust fansLE-29 (A&B),

'E-30 (A&B);and E-31 (A&B) by~either a-1-hour barrier'or 20 feet freeaof intervening-combustibles.

a. .These? fans provide exhaust for the battery rooms.

fVentilation.of-the battery roomsLis not adversely affected

" - by loss of these exhaust fans. Procedures exist to effect:

, ~9 ,

ventilation of_these_ rooms by.openingfdoors to the battery rooms with-continued operation of the. unaffected supply

- "' ' fans. Portable equipment to augment exhaust through access

-doors is"available if needed.

~2. : Absence of smoke detection and automatic fixed suppression 4 - coverage for the HVAC duct space'and elevator shaft forming part

~of RAB 3A:

The spaces open-into-theI floor of RAB'3A at EL.- +69.0 ft.

, :a.

'They contain no safe shutdown equipment except HVAC Lducting whose penetrations into'the' shaft-are sealed and Tprovided with fire dampers' equivalent to the barrier rating.

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.F, RAB 3A Enclosure 1 Page 14

-b. The: shafts are separated from each other (except at the top) ,

and-from the adjoining stairwell-and vestibule by a 2-hour

. rated fire boundry.' ' Where they adjoin other fire

j. . areas a.3-hour rated-fire boundary exists.

L c. The accumulation of. transient combustibles in these shafts a is not credible.

Ld. If a fire should occur-smoke detection in the HVAC room at the top of the open shafts would provide _ prompt detection and !

allow timely. response and suppression from fire brigade f

." : members before damage to. safe shutdown equipment could be

, caused.

a.. 3. Additional' considerations; applicable to the above deviations: :

la. Presence of portable fire extinguishers and nearby standpipe t

- hose station ensure the ability'.to extinguish exposure fire: !

in thistarea.in a timely macaer..

Detection and automatic _: fixed suppression coverage overall'

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b.. .

r'edundant safe shutdown equipment in area.

c. Administrative' controls and low traffic. volume limit the

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- , introduction:of dignificant. amounts of combustible materials.

.d. , Low 1combustib1': e loading in^the' fire. area.

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14. . -The above mitigating. features ensure that at'least one train of

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safe: shutdown equipment will remain' free of fire- damage and

, therefore the previouslyLstated'e'zceptions from'the technica1L

^ - _ 1: requirements of' Appendix lR:should be granted ~

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-RAB 6 - ELECTRICAL. PENETRATION AREA "A"

[A. EXCEPTION

'1.. Relief from the technical requirments.of.10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.G.2'is requested in this area, specifically:

a.- Thelexistence-of th hour' fire dampers in 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months rated fire boundaries.

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FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS'(FHA)

I.I [See FSAR Section 9.5.1 Table VIII-2, RAB 6 and Figure X-21.

-2.' Combustible Material Loading:-

' Fire Severity

'$%; , . Material- (Minutes)

CableMinsulation-Power 11 Cantrol- 23 Low-Level 15 Total 49

-; C. ' SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS'(SSA)

'1. jSee FSARiSection 9.5.1, Table 9.5A-4, RAB 6 and Figure 9.5A-23.

-D..- 4 BASIS FOR EXCEPTION

-1. The. existence of the'below listed th hour round fire; dampers in

-fire area boundaries:-

Duct' Duct-

.. m m Penetration. Size" Fire. Adjacent. . Adjacent Fire 7I '

Location- (Inches) . Damper -Fire' Area Severity (Minutes West Wall 6D Yes(FD-47) -Pipe' chase Negligible

+ 4 Floor 14 D ~

'Yes(FD-46) RAB 25 2 East Wall: L6 D :Yes(FD-50) RAB 2 54 s

-Ceiling. 42.D Yes .RAB 2 54 4

' Floor- ~~42 D Yes RAB 2 54

' South Wall. 12 D Yes(FD-48). Pipe chase Negligible W a.. . Smoke Detection exists on both sides of each damper except

. - where ' pipe chases ~are involved.-

4 lb.i ' Fire neverity of adjacent areas 'is less than. the fire rating

.'of'each damper. .

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. .8 RAB 6 Enclosure 1

.Page 16 2; Additional considerations applicable to the above deviation:

- a. _ Presence of portable fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stations ensure the ability to extinguish exposure fire in this area in a timely manner.

b. Detection and automatic fixed _ suppression is provided throughout this area including dedicated automatic fixed suppression for each cable tray.

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c. -Administrative controls and low traffic volume limit the introduction of significant amounts of. combustible caterials, d.. Ventilation exhaust system has sufficient capacity to allow

.s . adequate accessibility for damage control.

e. ' Low combustible loading in-the fire. area.

3.

The above mitigating features' ensure that at least one train of safe shutdown equipment will remain free of fire damage and

- therefore the previously stated. exceptions from_the technical requirements of Appendix R should be granted.

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RAB 7 - RELAY ROOM

,. .A. EXCEPTIONS'

1. Relief from the= technical requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 is requested in this area, specifically:

a. The need for a' complete 1-hour barrier between redundant oefe shutdown equipment.

b. The enclosure of redundant cable tray-and conduit in the same 1-hour rated fire wrap.

B. FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS (FHA)

1. See FSAR Section 9.5.1. Table VIII-2, RAB 7, and Figure X-21.

L 2. Combustible Material Loading:

Fire Severity Material (Minutes)

Cable Insulation.

Control 19 i Low-Level. 7 Total' 26 C. ~ SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS (SSA)

1. See FSAR Section'9.5.1. Table 9.5A-4,- RAB 7 and Figure 9.5A-23.

D.' BASIS FOR EXCEPTIONS

1. Part height 1-hour rated walls with class B fire doors constructed to. isolate:

Auxiliary Panel 3 (A/B) from Auxiliary Panel 2(SB)

Auxiliary Panel 3 (A/B) from Auxiliary Panel 1(SA)

- Auxiliary Panel 4 (A/B) from Isolation Panel and Auxiliary Panel 3 (A/B)

- SA portion of the Isolation Panel from the SB portion-of'the Isolation Panel

a. Walls constitute a complete 1-hour barrier separation (including doors and seals)_up to the height of the wall which extends well above the height of the safe shutdown equipment.

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s RAB 7 Enclosure 1 Page 18

b. Detection and automatic suppression protection provided throughout the area for all redundant equipment.- An~

ionization detection system is provided for each cubicle of

- the Isolation: Panel with individual indication shown at the Master Remote Console Panel.

- c.. Overhead interference makes construction of complete 1-hour.

wall _not feasible..

d. ' Since. part height walls adjoin. 3-hour boundary walls on both

-sides:of the fire area, thereLis no postulated fire capable

'of radiating two r.d eu ndant au iliary x r l_ e ay panels. simul-taneously with_the exception of the cabinet tops which

- -protrude approximately 1 foot above the: top of the walls.

- -- The relays of concern are inside these' cabinets and are therefore not exposed lto the direct radiative affects of a

- fire.- Due-to restricted access in'this area it is not postulated-that a significant-accumulation of combustibles-would occur =to support a fire of sufficient magnitude to

. necessitate'further protection of such-a small exposure

, , surface (i.e. cabinet tops). 'At least one safe shutdown cable / conduit. train is provided with a 1-hour wrap where

- essential redundant trains occur in each sub zone of RAB 7.

This is to prevent damageLto both essential safe shutdown trains from the. build up of convective hot' gases'before actuation'of the. automatic detectionfand suppression system

. or arrival'of fire brigade.--

. The essential redundant train.A and' train B portions.of the.

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Isolation Panel'are separated.by.1-hour;part height walls on the outside of the singular' cabinet housing and.by a sheet

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, metal wall' sandwiched'by 1/16 in.f thick inorganic fiber insulation boards on1the cabinet's.inside. A single-

'; postulated fire will be limited'to: damage in.only.one sub zone ~

by the 1-hour.part height wall cubicles outside the. Isolation

, Panel's cabinet.and by IEEE-383-74 and Reg. Guide-1.75 .

'J < separation' criteria.inside the cabinet. Thus at-least one train of safe shutdown components of the Isolation Panel will' remain free of fire damage, g

12.: , Enclosure of: essential redundant' cable tray and. conduit in the oc .

same 1-hour wrap for the followingl systems controlled from the Remote Shutdown Panel.(LCP-43):

~

cShutdown Cooling System

< Chemical 1and Volume Control System 4.. .

a. . Reg. Guide 1.75 criteria prevent-internal tray and conduit.

fire from' propagating'to redundant tray or conduit.

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.I RAB 7 Enclosure 1 Page 19

1) This separation between one cable tray and a redundant cable tray or conduit within the same fire wrap is accomplished by providing the subject cable tray with either a metal tray cover or a inch B&B blanket cover (i.e. 30 minute fire rating). Where access and spatial separation between cable trays allows, a 1 inch B&B blanket tray cover (i.e.-1-hour fire rating is pre-ferred over a inch blanket.

b.- 1-hour' wrap provides sufficient protection to redundant cabling until actuation of automatic suppression system or arrival of fire brigade.

3. : Additional considerations applicable to the above deviations:

a. Presence of portable fire. extinguishers and standpipe hose stations ensure the ability to. extinguish.an exposure fire s' .in this area in a timely manner.

b. ' Detection and automatic fixed suppression are provided throughout the entire area, including the it.,ernal compartments of the isolation panel.

c. Administrative controls and low traffic volume limit the introduction of significant amounts of combustible materials.

d.- Ventilation exhaust system has sufficient capacity to allow adequate accessibility for damage control.

e., : Low combustible loading in the fire area.

4 .1 .The above mitigating features ensure'that at least one train of safe ~ shutdown equipment'will remain free of fire damage and therefore the.previously stated exceptions to the technical requirements of. Appendix R should be granted.

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'RAB 8'- SWITCHGEAR, COMPUTER BATTERY AND.

CEA M/G' SET ROOMS A. ' EXCEPTIONS l' . Relief from the technical requirements of 10CFR50,. Appendix R,

.Section III.G.2 is requested in this area,'specifically:

a. .The need for total ~ area wide coverage of automatic fixed suppression systems.;

=b. -The need for a complete 1-hour barrier between redundant safe shutdown equipment.

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c. The' existence of I hour' fire dampers and in two cases, the lack-thereof in~the fire area boundaries.

d. .Thel enclosure of redundant cable tray and conduit in the sameil -hour rated' fire wrap.

. B. ~ FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS (FHA) 1.. :See FSAR Section 9.5.1, Table VIII-2, RAB 8 RAB 8A, RAB 8B, RAB.

'8C,sRAB 8D, RAB.8E, RAB 8F and Figures X-5 and X-14.

N , 2.. Combustible Material Loadings:

a. Fire Zone 8A Fire' Severity

' Material (Minutes)

. Cable Insulation Power 7

' Control 12' Low-Level- 2

. Total 21

'b. Fire Zone'8B Fire Severity Material (Minutes)

. Cable Insulation-Power' 7

Control 12 Low-Level' 2 Total' 21.

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C RAB 8 Enclosure 1 Page 21

c. Fire Zone 8C Fire Severity Material (Minutes)

Cable Insulation Power 10 Control. 14 Low-Level 3 Total 27

d. Fire Zones 8D, 8E & 8F:

Combustible Material Loading - Negligible.

C. SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS (SSA)

1. See FSAR Section 9.5.1, Table 9.5A-4, RAB 8, RAB 8A, RAB 8B, RAB 8C, RAB 8D, RAB 8E and RAB 8F and Figures 9.5A-20, 9.5A-22 and 9.5A-33.

D. BASIS FOR EXCEPTIONS

1. Absence of automatic fixed suppression for Fire Zones 8D, 8E and 8F:

a. No safe shutdown equipment.

b. Separated from remainder of fire area by 3-hour rated wall with unrated penetrations and absence of dampers in duct penetrations. Smoke detection and automatic fixed suppression in adjoining fire zones will check propagation of hot gases through these penetrations until arrival of the fire brigade,

c. ' Negligible combustible loading.

d. Smoke d'etection provided in these. zones will insure prompt discovery of ~ any fire and its early suppression by fire brigade members before flames can spread to zones containing safe shutdown equipment.

2. Part height 1-hour walls-constructed between redundant switchgear rooms RAB 8A, 8B and 8C; and within 8C at the pressurizer heater switchgear:

a. Detection and automatic suppression protection provided for-all redundant equipment.

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3.

RAB 8 Enclosure 1 Page 27 b.. Overhead interference makes construction of complete 1-hour wall not feasible.

c. Complete 1-hour wall would severely limit access for damage control purposes.

d. One train of redundant cable trays and conduit has been provided with a 1-hour rated fire wrap,

e. Part height walls extend approximately 1 foot above the height of safe shutdown switchgear and adjoin 3-hour boundary walls on both sides of the fire area. This presents a single postulated fire from radiating two trains of redundant switchgear simultaneously. To provide protection from convective effects of a fire, at least one train of cable / conduit is provided with a 1-hour wrap throughout each zone where two redundant safe shutdown trains occur. This will insure that at least one train of safe shutdown equipment will remain free of fire damage until actuation of automatic smoke detection and suppression or arrival of the fire brigade.

3. Existence of 1 fire dampers located in the following area boundaries:

Duct Duct Penetration Size Fire Adjacent Adjacent Fire Location (Inches) Damper Fire Area Severity (Minutes Floor (8A) 16 D ~ Yes(FD-25) RAB 27B 17 Floor (8A) 16 D Yes(FD-26) RAB 27B 17 Floor (8A) 16 D Yes(FD-27) RAB 27B 17 Floor (8A) 16 D Yes(FD-28) RAB 27B 17 Ceiling (8A) 16 D- _Yes(FD-29) RAE 27B 17 Floor (8B) 18 D Yes(FD-31) RAB 27B 17 Ceiling (8B)- 18 D Yes(FD-49) RAB 32 5 West Wall (8B) 8D Yes RAB 25 2

a. Detection and suppression exist on both sides of damper.

b. Fire severity of areas adjacent to each damper are less than the fire rating of subject damper.

4.. The non-existence of fire dampers for the following duct penetrations in 3-hour rated fire boundaries:

Duct Duct Adjacent Area Penetration Size Fire Adjacent Fire Severity Location (Inches) Damper Area (Min. Approx.)

East Wall (8B) 24 X 16 No Corridor Negligible North Wall (8C) 24 X 16 No Corridor Negligible

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RAB 8 Enclosure 1 Page 23 c a. There-is negligible fire loading in the ' adjacent corridor.

, . b.. LDetection and suppression systems exist on both sides of-duct penetrations.

c.~ Fire severity of areas adjacent to each damper are less than

.the fire rating of subject damper. i

-- 5. Enclosure of-essential redundant cable. tray / conduit in the same 1-hour wrap for the following systems:

Standby Emergency Diesel Generator System Component Cooling Water System

'-i ! Component Cooling Water Makeup System

-Emergency,Feedwater System la . . : Reg.. Guide:1.75 criteria. prevents an internal tray fire from Tpropagating to a redundant: tray or conduit.

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cable tray or conduit within the same fire. wrap is accomplished by providing the subject cable tray with

~'either a metal tray cover or a h' inch B&B blanket cover.

4 L(i'e. 30 minute fire rating). .Where access and spatial

-separationLbetween cable trays allows, a 1h inch B&B

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_ . blanket tray-cover.(i.e. 1-hour fire rating) is preferred over a inch blanket.

b.- il-hour wrap'provides: sufficient procection to redundant cabling until actuation of automatic suppression system or arrival of1 fire' brigade.

. 6. ;AdditionalEc'onsiderations applicable to the above deviations:

is. ; Presence of portable fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stations ensure the ability to extinguish' exposure fire in

[ .'this : area in a timely manner.

l b. . LDetection and automatic fixed suppression extend at least 20

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1 ~ feet beyond all redundant safe shutdown equipment in the-

, area.-

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c.: < Administrative controls and low traffic volume limit the c > ? introduction.of~significant? amounts of combustible materials.

d.- . Ventilation. exhaust system has' sufficient capacity to allow

< adequate: accessibility for damage control.

r. te. Low combustible loading in'the fire area.

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RAB 8 Enclosure 1 Page 24

':7. _ The above mitigating' features ensure that at least one train of

.,": , safe. shutdown' equipment will remain free of fire damage and therefore the previously stated exceptions to the technical requirements of Appendix R should be granted.

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RAB 23 - CORRIDOR AREA AND COMMON PASSAGEWAYS.

A .' EXCEPTIONS'

' 1' . 5 Relief'from the technical requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R,

.Section III.G.2.is. requested in this area, specifically:

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- a. -The need for total area wide coverage of smoke detection.and automatic fixed suppression systems.

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b. ' Separation of individual fire areas by complete 3-hour rated boundaries.

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cc.. The existence of a 1 -hourcfire damper in the fire area boundary. . ,

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d. The enclosure'of. redundant cable tray and' conduit in the same 1-hour rated fire wrap.

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.e. Protection-of a steel maintenance hatch to a fire resistance equivalent to the fire rating of the floor boundary it forms

. a part of.

Separation of redundant' diesel' fuel. oil piping _by less than-

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e- '20 feet. free of intervening combustibles.

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B. FIRE. HAZARDS ANALYSIS (FHA)

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1.- .

See FSAR Section.9.5.1, Table VIII-2, RAB 23 and Figures X-3 throughLX-6.

2. Combustible'Haterial Loading:

Fire Severity

Material ,

(Minuies)

Cable Insulation

, ~

. Power? 7

. . Control- 7 cLow-Level 4 Total 18

~ :. . SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS (SSA);

112 iSee FSAR Section 9.5.1, Table 9.5A-4, RAB 23 and Figures 9.5A-13,

-9.5A-16, 9.5A-17, 9.5A-19,'9.5A-20 and'9.5A-21.

Wg? fDi { BASIS-FOR-EXCEPTIONS

cl.; lAbsencefofismoke-detection and automatic, fixed suppression for Boric Acid / Waste Concentrator rooms, Hold Up Tank rooms, Waste

, M . Condensate' Storage Tank. rooms-and: connecting corridor:

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l RAB 23 Enclosure 1

_Page 26 Ja. .No safe shutdown; equipment.

b. ' No ' combustible; loading'.-

..c.- Rooms are separated from each other and the remainder of the fire ~ area by. discontinuous reinforced concrete walls with unrated penetrations.:

'd. zSmoke detection and. suppression of adjoining spaces will ensure that any postulated fire in these. rooms will be

- detectedjin a timely manner and that propagation of hot gases through unrated penetrations will be checked until arrival of 1

.the fire brigade.

2. ' Absence of automatic. fixed suppression system for pipe chase

< adjoining; north: wall'of RAB 23:

a.- Safe shutdown equipment consists of redundant diesel fuel oil piping separated by-23 feet.

b .' Smoke detection'provided will ensure'early notification and

' rapid suppression of any fire by' fire brigade members.

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. -Remote location precludes' possibility of' transient

' combustible accumulation.-

yd.; 'No sou'rce oflign'ition and negligible-fire loading.

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e2- Access.will'be provided to-enhance manualEfire suppression activities.

3. Separation bet' ween Fire Area RAB 23 and Fire: Area RAB 15 by a

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--removable section in the south wall oflthe Diesel Generator 3BS-Room (RAB 15) of a rating less~than-3 hours asidescribed in

-letter W3P83-3180 to Director of,NRR,' dated October 3,:1983:

a.- JThe' removable section: consists of:two 4-inch t' hick acoustic

-panels?(with a 4-inch,airJgap in between)' rated by

-Underwriters-Laboratory Inc., at 45 minutes for each. panel from'the RAB-23 side and 90 minutes for each panel from

.the.3BS Diesel Generator side.

Lb. Smoke detection?and automatic suppression coverage are

. provided on both sidesLof the removable section.

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c.. . Fire rating-.on one removable panel is greater than the area fire severity.on either side:of the' removable section.

1 id; LThe removable section.is required'for infrequent removal of

.the 3BS Liesel generator components.

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, RAB 23 Enclosure 1 Page 27

4. . Existence of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ' damper in the following area boundary:

LDuct Duct

, Penetration- . Size . . Fire ' Adjacent Adjacent Fire

-Location (Inches)' Damper Fire Area Severity (Minutes)

Floor ' 18D Yes(FD-15) RAB 31 22 t

i a.- Detection and suppression exist on both sides of damper.

b.- Less than'30 minute fire. severity exists in fire areas on

^ both sides of-damper.

.5. Enclosure of essential'.. redundant. cable tray and/or conduit in the same 1-hour wrap:for the following system:

' -~ -Standby Emergency Diesel Generator System

a. Reg.-Guide 1.75 criteria prevents internal tray fire from propagating to redundant tray or conduit.

11) 'This separation between one cable tray and a redundant-

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cable-tray.or conduit within-the same fire wrap is

-accomplished 2by providing the. subject cable tray with either.a metal-tray cover or a'h inch'B&B blanket cover (i.e. 30 minute-fire rating). -Where access and. spatial

, separation between c'able trays allows, a 1 inch B&B-blanket tray cover'(i.e. 1-hour fire rating) is pre-4:, ferred'overla inch blanket.-

b .' :1-hour wrap provides sufficient protection to redundant

cabling until actuation of automatic suppression system or arrival of fire brigade.

'6. Lack of equivalent fire. resistance on floor boundary side of

steel equipment; hatch'between-fire areas RAB 23.and'RAB 31' glocated along column line J.between column lines 4A and 5A.

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a.1 A.3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months fire protective' coating will be~ applied to the RAB x 31..(ceiling)Jsidefof.the equipment hatch.

b.. ~

Prote'ction of floor side (RAB 23) of hatch is accomplished

., lby. area wide. smoke detection and automatic ~ fixed--

, suppression;0 additional modifications 1would be physi ally 1cumbersomp to traffic-. flow during maintenance outages.

c.~ flow! probability of'a flammable' liquid spill-in vicinity of

-hatch'due to' strict administrative controls.

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RAB 23 Enclosure 1 Page 28

d. There are no credible sources of ignition in the hatch vicinity.

-e. The-design of the_ hatch is such that only limited seepage of a liquid past the hatch-to-floor fitting can occur, thus acting as a flame arrester.

f. Smoke detection and automatic fixed suppression coverage below the hatch provide adequate compensation for any fire hazard. associated with seepage past the hatch fitting.

5. Enclosure of_ essential redundant cable _ tray and/or conduit in the same^1-hour wrap for the following system:

Standby Emergency Diesel Generator System

a. Reg. Guide 1.75 criteria prevents internal tray fire from

, propagating to redundant tray or conduit.

1) This separation between one cable tray and a redundant cable tray or conduit within the same fire wrap is accomplished by .providing the subject cable tray with .

either a metal. tray cover or a h inch B&B blanket cover

-(i.e.:30 minute fire rating). Where access and spatial separation between cable trays allows, a 1 . inch B&B

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blanket tray cover (i.e. 1-hour fire rating) is -

preferred over h. inch blanket.-

b. 1-hour. wrap provides. sufficient ~ protection to redundant cabling until actuation of automatic suppression system or arrival of fire brigade.

6. Lack of equivalent fire resistance on floor boundary side of steel equipment hatch between fire areas RAB 23 and'RAB 31-located along column line J between column lines 4A and 5A.

.- a .- A 3-hour fire protective coating will be applied to the RAB 31 (ceiling side of the equipment hatch).

b. Protection of floor side (RAB 23) of hatch is accomplished by area wide smoke detection and automatic-fixed suppression; additiona1' modifications would be physically cumbersome to traffic flow during maintenance outages.

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RAB 23 Enclosure 1 l Page 29

7. Exception from 20' separation for redundant diesel fuel oil storage and day tank piping:

a. Subject piping is located in corridor south of diesel generator rooms (RAB 15 & 16) with a minimum separation of approximately 7 feet.

b. Negligible combustible loading in corridor,

c. Smoke detection and automatic fixed suppression in this corridor.

d. Piping meets Siesmic Category 1 and Safety Class 3 design and construction criteria.

e. Construction criteria and heat dissipating capability of Schedule 80 pipe filled with liquid provide adequate protection from radiative and convective effects of a postulated fire until actuation of smoke detection and automatic fixed suppression or arrival of the fire brigade.

8. Additional considerations applicable to the above deviations:

a. Presence of pertable fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stations ensure the ability to extinguish exposure fire in this area in a timely manner.

b. Detection and automatic fixed suppression extend at least 20 feet beyond all redundant safe shutdown equipment in the area.

c. Administrative controls and low traffic volume limit the introduction of significant amounts of combustible materials.

d. Ventilation exhaust system has sufficient capacity to allow adequate accessibility for damage control.

e. Low combustible loading in the fire area.

-9. The above mitigating features ensure that at least one train of safe shutdown equipment will remain free of fire damage and therefore the previously stated exceptions from the technical requirements of Appendix R should be granted.

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, RAB 25 - EQUIPMENT ACCESS AREA.

/A._ EXCEPTIONSf 1.. Relief from^the technical requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 is requested in this area specifically:

^

_ 'a . The existence of th-hour fire. dampers in fire area boundaries.

'b. Protection of a steel maintenance hatch to a fire. resistance i equivalent to the' floor boundary it= forms a part of.

B.- - FIRE HAZARDS: ANALYSIS (FHA)

11. .See FSAR Section 9.5.1,-Table'VIII-2, RAB.25 and Figure X-14. ,

[2. ' Combustible Material Loading:

Fire Severity Material (Minutes)

Cable Insulation 2

[C.: . SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS'(SSA)

1. -See FSAR Section 9.5.1, TableL9.5A-4,.RAB'25 and Figure 9.5A-32.

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D.- : BASIS.FOR EXCEPTIONS

'1. Existence ofilh hour fire dampers in fire boundaries.as listed in

'the below table:

Duct. Duct Penetration Size ,

Fire. Adjacent Adjacent Fire-Location -(Inches)- Damper' Fire' Area. Severity (Minutes)

, s Ceiling 42 D .Yes RAB 32' '5' Floor -14 D :Yes(FD-30) RAB 32 5

. Ceiling 1

14 D- .Yes(FD-46)'RAB 6 47 7 Wall- .-8 D --Yes RAB 8B 21

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Ea . i Ionization detection. coverage is provided on-both sides of the damper.

.b. ' Fire severity.iniareas on both sides of each damper is less

~-than'the fire rating of the damper.

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2. Lack of equivalent fireLresistance on floor boundary side of steel equipment-hatch between fire areas.RAB 25 and RAB 32

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, 1 located'.along column line 3A between; column lines N and Q:

La. : 'A~3 hour' fire protective coating will be applied to the RAB

' 32. (ceiling) side of- the equipment hatch.

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RAB 25 Enclosure 1 -

'Page 31-4

'b. IProtection ofifloor side of hatch would be physically cumbersome to traffic flow'during maintenance outages.

c.

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Tant probability of .a flammable liquid spill in vicinity of

. hatch due-to strict administrative controls.

Td. "There-are no credibleLsources of ignition in the hatch s cvicinity.

e2; 'The design'oflthe'h'atch is.such that only limited seepage of-

, -a' liquid past'the hatch-to-flo'or fitting can occur, thus l.y

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Lacting as,a-flame. arrester.

-f.: Smoke detection' coverage.above'and below the hatch provides

adequate compensation.for'any fire' hazard associated with 9 - seepage past-the. hatch. fitting.L In event a fire does occur

prompt detection and. suppression by the fire brigade is

' expected.before any. damage is caused to. safety' shutdown l equipment (located away from the immediate hatch' vicinity).

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3. Additional-considerations related-to the above deviations:

a. ' Presence of:portabletfire; extinguishers and~ standpipe hose

' stations ensure the ability.to extinguish an exposure fire in this area'in-'a timely manner.

(b.: LAdministrative control's and low traffic volume. limit the introduction of;significant amount of combustible materials.

c.'; TVentilation' exhaust system h'as sufficient capacity to allow

' adequate accessibility for damage 1 control..

[d. JLow comb'ustible~ loading in.the fire area.

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14. -The above mitigating features ~ ensure that atJ1eastione train of

' - . = safe shutdown equipment will remain free of fire damage.and Ltherefore the previously stated; exceptions from the technical

, requirements.of Appendix R should be granted.

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RAB 27 - HVAC, HEALTH PHYSICS, I&C AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT ROOMS A. EXCEPTIONS-L 1._ Relief.from the technical. requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R,

-Section III.G.2'is requested in this area, specifically:-

a. The need for total area wide coverage of automatic fixed suppression systems,

b. The existence of a lh-hour fire damr.gr in the fire area boundaries.

c. The enclosure of redundant cable tray and conduit in the same 1-hour rated fire wrap.

.B.. FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS (FHA)

1. See FSAR Section 9.5.1, Table VIII-2, RAB 27, RAB 27A, RAB 27B, RAB 27C and RAB 27D and Figure X-10.

~2. ' Combustible Material Loading:

a. Fire Zone RAB 27A Fire Severity k Material ~ (Minutes)

-Cable Insulation Power' 4 Control 14 Low-Level. 8 Total 26

b. Fire Zone RAB 27B Fire Severity

. Material (Minutes) g Cable Insulation.

Power 2 L: Control 7 hL Low-Level 8 t

Total 17

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4 RAB 27 Enclosure 1 Page 33-

.c. LFire Zone RAB 27C Fire Severity 7 . Material- -(Minutes)

' Cable Insulation

' Control. 19

' Low-Level 7 Other Solids. 2

. Total- 28 d .' Fire Zone RAB'27D-3 Fire Severity.

Material (Minutes)-

[ Cable Insulation 9

C/ ! SAFE' SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS'(SSA)

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1. See FSAR Section 9.5.1 Table;9.5A-4; RAB 27, RAB-27A, RAB 27B, RAB 27C and RAB 27D: and Figure 9.5A--18.

1 D. - 1 BASIS'FOR EXCEPTIONS ~

.1. ' Absence' of -automatic fixed suppression' for Fire Zone 27D:

a. No safe. shutdown equipment.

b.- Separated from remainder of fire area by 3-hour rated J

, wall with unrated. penetrations and undampered duct Smoke detection and automatic fixed

~

penetrations suppression in adjoining fire zones will check

? propagation of hot gases through these penetrations

1- - until arrival of the fire brigade.

4 Ec. .Negligib'le~ combustible loading.

d. < Smoke detection provided in these: zones will insure prompt discovery-of any postulated fire and its l(fn extinguishment by fire brigade members before flames can spread to zones'containing safe shutdown equipment.

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RAB 27 Enclosure 1 Page 34 2.. Existence of I hour fire dampers located in the following area boundaries:

Duct Duct Penetration- Size .

Fire Adjacent Adjacent Fire Location (Inches)' Damper Fire Area (Severity (Minutes)

Ceiling 16 D Yes(FD-29) RAB 8A 20 Ceiling 16 D Yes(FD-25) RAB 8A - 20 Ceiling 16 D Yes(FD-26) RAB 8A 20 Ceiling- 16 D Yes(FD-27) RAB 8A 20 b Ceiling l16 D Yes(FD-28) RAB 8A 20

, Ceiling 18 D- .Yes(FD-31) RAB 8A 20

a. , Detection and Suppression exist on both sides of damper.

b. Fire. severity in adjacent areas less than the fire rating of

.the damper.

' 3. Enclosure of essential redundant cable tray and/or conduit in the

same 1-hour wrap for the following systems:

Standby Emergency Diesel-Generator System

. Chemical and Volume Control System Switchgear Area and Cable Vault Ventilation System Pressurizer Heater Bank a .' Reg. Guide 1.75. criteria prevents internal tray fire from propagating to redundant tray or conduit.

1) This separation between one cable tray and a redundant cable tray or conduit within the same fire wrap is accomplished.by-providing the subject cable tray with either a metal tray cover or a inch B&B blanket cover (i.e. 30 minute fire rating). Where access and spatial separation between cable trays allows, a 1 inch B&B blanket tray cover-(i.e. 1-hour fire rating) is preferred over a inch blanket.

b. 1-hour wrap provides sufficient' protection to redundant cabling until actuation of automatic suppression system or arrival of fire brigade.

4. .AdditionalLeonsiderations applicable to the above deviations:

a. Presence of protable fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stations ensure the ability to extinguish exposure fire in this area'in a timely manner.

b. Detection and automatic fixed' suppression coverage over all redundant safe shutdown equipment in the area.

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1 RAB 27 Enclosure 1 Page 35

c. ' Administrative controls and low traffic volume limit the introduction of significant amounts.of combustible materials.

d. Ventilation exhaust system has sufficient capacity to allow adequate accessibility for damage control.

e. Low combustible loading in the fire area.

- 5. The above mitigating features ensure that at least one train of safe shutdown equipment will remain free of fire damage and therefore the previously stated exceptions from the requirements of Appendix R should be granted.

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RAB 31 - CORRIDOR &'PASSACEWAYS AT EL. -4.00 FT.

A. EXCEPTIONS 1.- Relief from the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 is requested in this area, specifically:

a. The need for total area wide coverage of smoke detection and automatic fixed suppression systems.

~

b. .The. existence of 1h-hour fire dampers in 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months rated fire boundaries..

c. Protection of steel maintenance hatch to a fire resistance equivalent to the floor boundary it forms a part of.

d. 20 feet _ separation free of intervening combustibles

- B. FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS (FRA) .

L 1.- 'See FSAR.Section 9.~5.1', Table VIII-2, RAB 31'and Figure X-4. I

. 2. . Combustible Material Loading:

Fire Severity Material (Minutes)

Cable Insulation Power 7 Control 10 Low-Level' 6

' Lubricating 011- 1

, Total 24 C.- ' SAFE SHUTDOWN ANAL SIS (SSA) 1._ See FSAR Section 9.5.1,' Table 9.5A-4, RAB 31 and Figures 9.5A-14

.. through.9.5A-17.-

D. . BASIS FOR EXCEPTIONS

't.: . Absence of smoke detection and autcmatic fixed suppression for pipe chase,' CVCS rooms and Blowdown HX rooms to the west of

-column _line 6A and between column lines K & L:

, , _ a. Rooms are separated from remainder of' fire area by

discontinuous reinforced concrete walls with wire mesh

_~ doors.

. $b.-_ :No safe shutdown equipment.-

c. . Low combustible loading.

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RAB 31 Enclosure 1 Page 37

d. Presence of smoke detection and automatic fixed suppression in spaces adjacent to these rooms ensures that any postulated fire will be detected in a timely manner and that propagation of hot gases through the wire mesh doors will be checked until arrival of the fire brigade.

2. The' existence of the below listed I hour round fire dampers in fire area boundaries:

Duct Duct Penetration Size Fire Adjacent Adjacent Fire Location (Inches) Damper Fire Area (Severity (Minutes)

Floor 18 D Yes(FD-12) RAB 39 13 Ceiling 18 D Yes(FD-15) RAB 23 17 North Wall 30 D Yes Pipe Chase Negligible

a. Detection and suppression exist on both eides of each damper,

b. Fire severity of adjacent areas is less than the fire rating of each damper.

3. Lack of equivalent fire resistance on floor boundary side of steel equipment hatch between fire areas RAB 31 and RAB 39 located along column line J between column lines 4A and SA:

a. A.3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months fire protective coating will be applied to the RAB 39 (ceiling) side of the equipment hatch,

b. . Protection of floor side (RAB 31) of hatch would be physically cumbersome to traffic flow during maintenance outages.

c. Low probability of a flammable liquid spill in vicinity of hatch due to strict administrative controls.

d. There are no credible sources of ignition in the hatch vicinity.

e. The design of the hatch is such that only limited seepage of a liquid past the hatch-to-floor fitting can occur, thus acting as a flame arrester.

f. Smoke detection coverage above and below the hatch provides adequate compensation for any fire hazard associated with seepage past the hatch fitting.

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RAB 31 Enclosure 1 Page 38

4. Lack of 20 feet separation free of intervening combustibles between Boric Acid Heat Tracing Panels:

a. Smoke detection and automatic fixed suppression coverage are provided,

b. Panels are separated by approximately 40 feet and from a direct line-of-sight configuration by the 3-hour boundary of RAB 39's Boric Acid Hake Up Tank room. Consequently, the direct radiative effects of a transient combustible fire involving the intervening combustibles are considered negligible.

c. Intervening combustibles consist of a single bank of cable trays running directly overhead the panels, five trays of which provide a complete continuous cable tray run between panels. The existing separation of redundant panels provide a low probability for flame propagation along the flame retardant (IEEE-383) cable runs involving both panels.

d. The 7 foot vertical separation of the cable trays above the panels minimize the convective effects of a fire involving the intervening combustibles such that at least one train of safe shutdown equipment will remain free of fire damage until actuation of the smoke detection and automatic fixed suppression system or arrival of the fire brigade.

5. Additional considerations applicable to the above deviatiens:

a. Presence of portable fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stations ensure the ability to extinguish exposure fire in this area in a timely manner.

b. Detection and automatic fixed suppression coverage overall redundant safe shutdown equipment in the area.

c. Administrative controls and low traffic volume limit the introduction of significant amounts of combustible materials.

d. Ventilation exhaust system has sufficient capacity to allow adequate accessibility for damage control.

e. Low combustible loading in the fire area.

6. The above mitigating features ensure that at least one train of safe shutdown equipment will remain free of fire damage and therefore the previously stated exceptions from the technical requirements of Appendix R should be granted.

RAB 32 - PIPE PENETRA" IONS: AUXILIARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMPS PUMPS EL. -35.00 and -4.00 FT.

A.- EXCEPTIONS

1. Relief from-the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section

~I11.G.2 is requested in this area, specifically:

a. The need for total area wide coverage of automatic fixed suppression systems.

b.. The existence of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months fire dampers in the fire area boundaries.

B. FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS (FHA)

1. See FSAR Section 9.5.1, Table VIII-2, RAB 32 and Figure X-13.

'2. Combustible Material Loading:

Fire Severity Material (Minutes)

' Cable Insulation Power 1 Control. 3

~ Low-Level 1 Lubricating 011 1 Total 6

.C. - SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS (SSA) 1;. .See FSAR Section 9.5.1, Table 9.5A-4, RAB 32 and Figures 9.5A-27 through'9.5A-30.

, 9. BASIS FOR EXCEPTIONS 1.: LAbsence of automatic fixed suppression other than. area bounded by column lines'L, M, 2AZ and 11AZ at EL. -35.0 ft:

a. Redundant Auxiliary CCW Pumps.(hot shutdown) are separated' by 172' feet (horizontally) and the southern portion of the containment wall.-

b' . . Redundant Instrumhnt Cabinets C-11A and C-11B are separated by 192 feet (horizontally) and the southern portion of the containment wall.

~ c. Redundant train 'A' conduit for the Diesel Oil Transfer Pump

'A' is provided with a 1-hour wrap.

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RAB 32 Enclosure 1 Page 40

d. Redundant Safety Injection System valves located within this area are required for cold shut'down only and are provided with manual override capabilities should fire impact the valve operator or assigned cable. These valves and corresponding separation are provided below:

' Valve No. Separations (Feet)

SIS Recire Valves 2SI-V809A 45

-2SI-V801B SIS Recire Valves 2SI-V810A -

45 2SI-V802B LPSI Valves 2SI-V1549Al 60 2SI-V1539B1 LPSI Valves 2SI-V1541A2 69 2SI-V1543B2 SDCS Isol Valves 2SI-V327A 130 2SI-V326B SDCS Warmup Valves 2SI-V393 190 2SI-V346 2.- The existence of the below listed I hour round fire dampers in fire area boundaries:

Duct Duct Penetration- Size _

Fire Adjacent Adjacent Area

= Location- (Inches) Damper' Area ~ Fire Severity (Min.)

South Wall. 30 D - Yes Pipe Chase Negligible Ceiling 18.D Yes(FD-31) RAB 8B~ 20 Ceiling .14 D: Yes(FD-30) RAB 25- 2 South Wall- ~ 30.D Yes(FD-6) RAB 39 13 South Wall 16 D Yes(FD-7) RAB 35 15 South Wall ~ 16 D Yes(FD-8) RAB-35 15

, South Wall 12 0 Yes(FD-9) RAB 34 Negligible South Wall- 16 D Yes(FD-10) RAB 33 7 a.

Detection exists on both sides of each damper.

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' b. Fire severity in adjacent areas less than the fire rating of the damper. '

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b b RAB 32 Enclosure 1 Page 41

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- 3. Additional considerations applicable to the above deviations:

n. Presence of portable fire. extinguishers and standpipe hose stations ensure'the ability to extinguish exposure fire in

-this area in a timely; manner..

'b. ' Detection is provided throughout this area.

-c. Administrative controls and low traffic volume limit the introduction of significant amounts of combustible materials.

'd.. -Ventilation exhaust system has sufficient capacity to allow adequate accessibility for damage control.-

e. Low combustible loading in the fire area.

" 4. " The above mitigating features-ensure that at least one train of safe shutdown equipment will remain free.of fire damage and

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therefore the previously stated exceptions from the technical

requirements of Appendix R should be-granted.-

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. .;RAB 33'- SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT. EXCHANGER ROOM

, _ . A. : (EXCEPTIONS 1.; Relief from the. technical requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, s ?Section-III.G.2;is: requested in this area,.specifically:

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- ;a~ The need for a completejl-hour barrier between~ redundant Esafe_ shutdown equipment.

, b.> lThe exirtence.of 1 -hour fire dampers in the' fire area

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] ! boundaries, i ci. The'need for total area wide' coverage of automatic fixed

,' g,K4 , - . suppression systems.-

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B . .. ' FIRE. HAZARDS ANALYSIS (FHA)-

. 1. - : See FSAR' Section 9.5'.1, Table VIII-2, RAB,.33 and Figure X-3.

2E . Combustible Material Loading:

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Fire Severity -

Material- (Minutes)

.. Cable ^ Insulation .

a .

Power- -

1 4

s.* ^ '

'. Control" -

5 ILow-Level: T 2-

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a

._ . Total' \c 8 gj -

, ^C k ' SAFE SHUTDOWN 1 ANALYSIS (SSA) 1~..,SeelFSARSection.9.5;1, Table 9.5A-4 RAB-33 and. Figure 9.5A-11.

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7 DF -BASIS FOR EXEMPTION.'

-3 21..'/Part-height. wall separating the following safe shutdown equipment:

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.?- , ' 7 J Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers A & B

- ' r4 E- JAir Handling Units'AH-3(3A-SA) & AH-3(3B-SB)

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Instrumentation' Cabinets C-27A & C-27B bM

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, Temperature Eleme'nte TE-303X & TE--303Y m .

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a. .: Walliextends the' entire width of fire area and constitutes a-

, . Jcomplete J-1 -hour ' separation ' (including doors Jand

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'" penetrations):up to"the height'of the wall (approximately 10

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feet above: floor elevation)'. The top of-the wall is' 1pproximately-2 feet above the top of the'SDCS heat

exchangers and associated temperature elements. Redundant

instrument cabinets: are separated by-full' height walls and

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RAB 33 Enclosure 1 Page 43-lare enclosed in. separate concrete block _ cubicles within each

. heat exchanger room. With'the exception of air handlers Sc

'. "AH-3 (SAT & SB) which are mounted _above the top of the part _

c height wall, at least_ one ' train of : redundant: safe shutdown dN!" - ;.. equipment;is protected by'the described barriers from the

f fdirect radiative effects of a' fire in.this' area. Redundant hii air' handlers are approximately 17 feet apart and procedures f 4 '" exist.to provide alternate ventilation for this area-in the-

@e ..unlikely event both units are damaged.by fire. The'large j ; room volume is expected to dissipate any convective ~ effects from.a postulated fire unti1~actuntion of thel smoke-detection'and; automatic fixed suppression system or arrival fof the: fire: brigade. . '

- b'. The following redundant train ~'A cable or conduit which'

._ ' extends;beyond the height'of the wall'which separates A&B Lequipment spaces.will:be providedlwith a 1-hour wrap:

. '1) ,30589B-SA - 3/4 2): 30589A-SA -:1 2 3), y30589T-SAL-il

s. (4): , BOX-B30024SA 4 -

c.; :In-situnintervening combustibles in:this area. consist of one 1 -cable 5 tray located 10~ feet' horizontally.and 15 feet

. vertically from.the nearest heat exchanger.- LThis negligible amount of. combustibles is expected.to,have little.or no Y

cimpact.on a postulated-fire-inithis area.

4 rd. 7Presenceiof 1-hour, wrap and1 smoke detection will provide

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sufficient protection-to at least one redundant safe-

' shutdown' train untilfarrival of the fireLbrigade or

actuation of;the2 automatic fixed. suppression, system.

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?2.- lThe'existencefof the.below' listed ~1h hour round fire dampers in

,d?.1 ' -

~fireLarea. boundaries:

5 7 . Duct. ' Duct .

Penetration' Size- ~

Fire- . Adjacent Adjacent Fire H

Location' ;(Inches) . Damper Fire = Area Severity (Minutes)

" D , North Walli 16 DE TYes(FD-10)' RAB 32 5

/ South Wal'11 ~ 16' D - =Yes(FD-5) ' IUUS 39 13 II y

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w RAB 33 Enclosure 1 Page 44

a. Detection and Suppression exists on both sides of each damper.

,c - b. Adjacent area fire severity is less than the fire rating of each damper.

3. - .The need for.~ automatic fixed suppression coverage for the enclosed ' cubicles' within RAB-33. housing redundant Instrumentation Cabinets C-27A & C-27B:

a. Cubicles.are completely enclosed and are divided by full height reinforced concrete wall and Class A fire doors.

b .' Smoke detection provided ensures prompt notification of a postulated fire starting in one of these cubicles and its early suppression by fire brigade members before damage can occur to other safe shutdown equipment in this area (outside the. cubicles).

c. 1-hour wrap smoke detection and automatic fixed suppression coverage outside of these entry way cubicles provide

. . sufficient protection to safe shutdown equipment'from hot f- gases escaping these cubicles until arrival of the fire

< brigade.

4.- Additional considerations-applicable to the above deviations:

a. -Presence of portable. fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stations ensure the ability to extinguish an exposure fire

-in this area in a timely manner,

b. Detection and automatic fixed ~ suppression is provided

-throughout this area with exception of the entry cubicles,

c. Administrative. controls and low-traffic volume limit the introduction of significant amounts of combustible materials.

Id. Ventilation exhaust system has sufficient capacity to allow

' adequate accessibility for damage control.

Le.- Low combustible loading in the fire area.

L5- The"above mitigating features ensure that at least one train of safe shutdown equipment will remain free of fire damage and 1

therefore the,previously~ stated exceptions from the technical requirements ofjAppendix R should be granted.

L

p S-RAB 34 - VALVE CALLERIES A. ' EXCEPTIONS

'1. . Relief ~from.the' requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section-III.G.2 is requested for this fire area,.specifically:

a. The need for an automatic fixed suppression system, b.- The existence of th-hour fire dampers in the fire area

boundaries.

.B. FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS (FHA)

'l . -See FSAR Section 9.5.1, Table VIII-2, RAB 34 and Figure X-3.

2. Combustible Material-Loading is negligible.

C. . SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS (SSA)

1. .See FSAR Section 9.5.1, Table 9.5A-4, RAB 34 and Figure 9.5A-11.

'D. BASIS FOR EXCEPTIONS

'1. Absence of an automatic fixed suppression system:

a.. 'The following train B cable / conduit will be provided with a 1-hour. wrap:

(1) 30535A-SB-4 (2)- 30548M-SB-3/4

.b. Presence of.1-hour wrap and detection will provide sufficient. protection to at least one redundant safe shutdown train until arrival of the fire brigade.

c. Cable / conduit assigned to Shutdown Cooling System (SDCS) valving-(cold shutdown only) can be lost without adverse impact on the capability to safely shutdown. 'The SDCS valves are located outside RAB'34 (i.e. RAB 35 & 36) while their handwheels are located inside RAB 34 should manual operation become necessary.

2.- .The. existence of the below listed ih hour round fire dampers in fire area boundaries:

' Duct ~ Duct Penetration Size : Fire Adjacent Adjacent Fire

Location- (Inches). -Damper Fire Area Severity (Minutes)

South Wall 12 D .Yes(FD-9) RAB 32 5 Ceiling 12 D Yes(FD-4) RAB 39 13

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1 RAB 34 Enclosure 1 Page 46

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a.- ' Detection exists on both sides-of each damper.

7b. ' Fire severity of adjacent areas is less than the fire rating of each' damper.

3. Additional' considerations applicable to the above deviations:

a. Presence of portable fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stations ensure the abilitysto' extinguish exposure fire in this' area in a timely manner.

b. ' Smoke detection is provided throughout this area.

c.- Administrative controls and low traffic volume limit the introduction of significant amounts of combustible materials.

/d.- -1 Ventilation exhaust system has sufficient capacity to allow adequate' accessibility for' damage control.

.e. Low combustible loa'ing d in the fire area.

4. The ab'ove' mitigating features ensure that at.least one train of

' safe' shutdown equipment will remain free of fire damage and

'therefore the previously stated' exceptions from the. technical Lrequirements of Appendix R'should be granted.

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RAB 35 -: SAFETY INJECTION PUMP ROOM

-A. EXCEPTION 1 -

1. . JRelief.from the requirements of 10CFR5'0, Appendix R Section

, , 'III.G.2,is-requested.in this area, specifically:

-a. The existence of 1 -hour fire dampers in the fire' area 9 s

boundaries.-

- ~ ?B., ' FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS.(FHA)

--1~. See FSAR Section 9.5.1,-Table VIII-2, RAB 35 and Figure X-3.

s!

2.

Combustible' Material Loading:

--e . Fire Severity

Material ^ '(Minutes)

Cable Insulation Power: 7

' Control; 5'

Lubricating .011 -- 6

-Total -18'

.C. = SAFE SHUTDOWN' ANALYSIS (SSA)-

'1. See FSAR Section 9.5.1,~ Table 9.5A-4, RAB 35 and Figure 9.5A-11.

-D.

~

IBASIS FOR EXCEPTION:

, :1.- fExidtenceiof 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , fire dampers in the followin'g. fire area iboundaries:

Duct

~

Duct.

il _-r Penetration. 'SizeL . ~ Fire Adjacent Adjacent Area

'(Inches) . Damper

~

. Location Area- ' Fire Severity (min.)-

W LNorth Wall' 16 D. Yes(FD-7)- ~ RAB.32 ~ 5

, _ , North Walli. 16 D Yes(FD-8)~ RAB 32 5

c - West Wall .16 D. Yes(FD-1) RAB 39 13

a. - Ionization detection coverage is1provided on both sides of

, , - the[ damper.:

-d- . b. - Fire severity in: adjacent areas is less than the fire rating

of each damper.

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~: c. : ~ Presence ofIportable fire l extinguishers and-standpipe hose

~ ~ _

s . stations = ensure _the. ability to extinguish exposure fire in

. this.' area-in'a timely manner.

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A RAB 35 Enclosure 1 Page 48

d. Administrative controls and low traffic volume limit the introduction of significant amount of combustible materials.

e. Ventilation exhaust system has sufficient capacity to allow

, adequate accessibility-for damage control.

.f.- . Low combustible. loading in the fire area.

2. -The'above mitigating features ensure that at least one train of

-safe shutdown equipment will. remain free of fire damage and therefore the previously stated exception from the technical

~ requirements of Appendix R shold be granted.

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4 RAB'36 - SAFETY' INJECTION PUMP ROOM "A" lA. EXCEPTIONS

1. Relief from the technical requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R,

.Section III.G.2 is requested:in this area,'specifically:

~

a. ;The need to provide an' automatic fixed suppression system.

'b. iThe existence of a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months fire dampers in 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months rated fire boundaries.

.B; FIRE! HAZARDS ANALYSIS (FHA)

- 1. 1See FSAR Section~9.5.1, Table VIII-2, RAB 36 and Figure X-3.

- 2.. Combustible Material Loading:

Fire Severity

= Material ~ (Minutes)

. Cable Insulation Power 7

. Control 6 Lubricating Oil 1

. Total -14

~

.C.; , SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS (SSA)-

.1. See- FSAR Section 9.5.1, Table 9.5A-4,1 RAB -36 and Figure 9.5A-11.

.D.- , BASIS FOR-EXCEPTIONS,

-1. ~ Absence of an' automatic fixed suppression for this fire area:

', };

-a.- The following train B safety shutdown cable tray and conduit

_c will be provided with'a 1-hour wrap throughout the: fire area:

41)f 31008C-SB-1 2)~ :31008A-SB-1

b. Presence of 1-hour wrap ~and detection will provide

. sufficient' protection to at least'one redundant safe shutdown train until arrival of the fire brigade.

.2.

'The~ existence of the below' listed'1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months round fire dampers in

, m- nthe following fire' area boundaries:

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_ Duct -~ Duct Penetration _ Size Fire. Adjacent Adjacent Area

Location- (Inches) . Damper. ~ Area Fire Severity (min.)

-South Wall 16 D' .Yes(FD-3)- RAB 39 13

-South: Wall- 12-D Yes(FD-4) RAB 39 13

!a.. ' Smoke detection exists on.both sides of each damper.

~

b.- ' Fire: severity of adjacent areas is less than the fire rating -

sof each damper.

?3.

Additional considerations applicable to the above deviations:

-a. . ! Presence of protable fire extinguishers and' standpipe hose

, . stations' ensure'the' ability to extinguish exposure fire in

' tis' area-in a timely manner.-

Smoke.detectionLis provided-throughout this area.

~

b;

, Ec'.. ,-Administrative controls'and-low traffic volume limit the-

':- : introduction of significant amounts of combu'stible materials.

'd.,--Ventilation 1exhaustsystemhassufficient.capacitytoallow-

~ adequate accessibility for. damage-control.

1 e.n -: Low combustible loading-in;th'e firefarea.

l4.- ;The above-mitigating features. ensure.that.attleast one train of-

. :p y : safe' shutdown equipment will: remain free _of-fire damage and (therefore the previously stated exceptions from the' technical requirements of. Appendix.Rzshould be-granted.

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RAB'39 - GENERAL ~ AREA J A.- EXCEPTIONS'.

1. Relief from.the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section .

tIII'G.2uis

. requested in this area :specifically:

a. The1need'for total area wide coverageaof smoke: detection and

, l automatic. fixed. suppression-systems.

b. ~The'need for a. complete 1-hour barrier between redundant.

isafe shutdown equipment.

c. 'The; existence'of.aL1 -hour fire damper in the fire' area

< boundaries.

d'. - The enclosure'of-. redundant: cable tray and conduit in the

. .same.1-hour rated fire wrap.

B.- ' FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS.(FHA)-

L1. See'FSAR Section'9.5.1,zTable VIII-2, RAB.39 and Figures X-3 and n 1 X-4 . -

7 72L . Combustible-Material Loading:

. Fire Severity Material' (Minutes)

Cable Insulation

' Power: 3

Control ~ 7-Low-Level: 4

Lu$ricating Oil?

1

, Total' 15

C. SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS,(SSA)'

11 - See FSAR Section 9.5.1, Table 9.5A-4, lRAB 39 and Figures 9.5A-10, 4 = 9.5A-12, 9.5A-13 andL9.5A-16.

. . D.; ' BASIS lFOR. EXCEPTIONS g 1. -Absence of' smoke detection and automatic fixed suppression for:

la . ' Waste gas processing rooms,' boric _ acid condensate room, spent resin tank? room, laundry; room and waste management system rooms:

1) ' No~ safe shutdown equipment.

. 2) Separated from remainder of-fire area by discontinuous

- 4: reinforced concrete fire walls with wire mesh' doors and unrated penetrations.

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RAB 39 Enclosure 1 Page 52

3) Negligible combustible loading.

4) ' Presence of detection and automatic fixed suppression in spaces adjacent to these rooms ensures that any postulated fire will be detected in a timely manner and propagation of hot gases through unrated penetrations will be checked until arrival of the fire brigade,

b. Boric acid makeup tank rooms:

1) Damage to safe shutdown equipment (i.e. makeup tanks) by fire not deemed credible.

2)- Separated from remainder of fire area'by discontinuous

-reinforced concrete fire walls-with wire mesh doors and unrated penetrations. Presence of detection and automatic fixed suppression in spaces adjacent to these rooms ensures that any postulated fire will be detected in a timely manner and propagation of hot gases through the unrated, penetrations will be checked until arrival of'the fire brigade.

3). -Negligible combustible loading.

4) Smoke detection provided ensures prompt notification of any postulated fire starting in this room and its early suppression by fire brigade members before damage to

-safe shutdown equipment can-occur.

- 2. -Part-height 1-hour walls constructed around charging pump "A":

a. ' Detection and automatic suppression protection provided for all-redundant equipment.

b. Overhead interference makes construction of complete 1-hour wall cost prohibitive.

.c. Chargine pump "A" cable trays and conduit have been provided with a 1-hour fire wrap.

l'

( ,

RAB 39 Enclosure 1 Page 53

3. Existence-of 1 -hour fire dampers located in the following area boundaries:

Duct Duct

-Penetration Size. Fire Adj acent Adjacent Fire Location (Inches) Damper Fire Area Severity (Minutes)

North Wall 16 D Yes(FD-3) RAB 36 13 North Wall. 12 D- Yes(FD-4) RAB 34 Negligible North Wall 16 D Yes(FD-5) . RAB 33 7 Ceiling 18lD Yes(FD-12) IUB 31 22 East Wall 16 D Yes(FD-1) RAB 35 15 North Wall 30 D Yes(FD-6) RAB 32 5

a. ' Smoke Detection exists on both sides of damper.

b. Fire severity _ of adjacent areas is less than fire rating of each damper, f4. Enclosure of essential redundant cable tray conduit in the same

.1-hour wrap for _the following system:

. Shutdown Cooling

.a. Reg. Guide'_1.75 criteria prevents' internal tray fire from Lpropagating to redundant tray or conduit.

-1) This separation between one cable tray and a redundant cable tray or. conduit within the same fire wrap is

-accomplished by providing the subject cable tray with either a metal tray cover or.a inch B&B blanket cover

-(i.e. 30 minute fire rating). Where access and spatial separation between cable trays allows, a 1 inch B&B blanket tray cover (i.e. 1-hour fire rating) is

-preferred over a inch blanket.

b. 1-hour wrap provides sufficient protection to redundant cabling until actuation of automatic suppression system or arrival of fire brigade.

5. Additional' considerations applicable to the above deviations:

a .- Presence of portable fire extinguishers and standpipe hose stations ensure the ability to extinguish an exposure fire in this area in a timely manner.

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RAB 39 Enclosure 1

-Page 54 b; Detection'and automatic fixed suppression extend at least 20 J feet beyo'nd all redundant safe l shutdown equipment in the

' area .-

2,

c. -' Administrative controls and' low traffic volume limit the introduction.of significant amounts of combustible materials.

-: d.~._ . Ventilation exhaust syst'em has sufficient capacity to' allow

' adequate accessibility for. damage control.

Je.. ' Low combustible _loadingLin the if're area.

?f. One train of redundant < safe shutdown cable. trays and/or

, conduit have been provided with a 1-hour fire wrap.-

J6. - The;above mitigating features ensure that at least'one train of x

. safe:shutdownLequipment will remain free of fire damage and

.therefo're the previously[ stated _ exceptions from the technical requirements of. Appendix.R.should be granted.-

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- WATERFORD SES UFIT NO. 3 n ::,

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. Demonstration'of Equival'ency of Reactor-a- ,

Containment Building to Technical-Requirements of Sections III.G.2, III.L andlI'II.0 of Appendix R to.10CFR50.

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Enclosure 2 1 Page ii ac TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

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LI. Introduction '

1 II. _ Demonstration'of Compliance to Appendix R,Section III.L.2 1 JL ~, Charging : Lines: Isolation and ~ Auxiliary Spray Valves -1

11. Introduction 1

2. .-Physical Configuration. 2

- 3. Alternate. Shutdown-Evsluation 2

. 4. Spurious' Operation- 3

B. Safety. Injection. Tank I' solation Valves- 4

1. Introduction 4

- 2. f-Physical Configuration- 4 Alternate Shutdown Evaluation

~

3. 4

4. Spurious Operation' 5

-! C . -Steam Generato'r Pressure Indication 5

Introduction:

1. 5

2. Physical Configuration: 5 4

3. Alternate Shutdown Evaluation- 5 s i D. Manual / Automatic Ser'vice1 Pressurizer-Pressure'and 6 Level ~ Controls-

- - 1. 1 Introduction 6

- 2. Alternate Shutdown. Evaluation .6'

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- n Enclosure 2 Page.iii s . -

. TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)'

. Page L III. Request for Exceptions' toi the Technical Requirements of 6-

-Appendix'R to 10CFR 50, Section III.G.2 in the-Reactor-y . Containment Building

-A. Pressurizer Heaters 7

' 1. ' Introduction 7 1

n :. 2. Basis'.for Exception 7

B. 'Shu'tdown: Cooling System Isolation. Valves- 9 l - 1 1 '. LIntroduction- 9

2. Basis for Exception 9-Ci -'PressurizerLPressure/ Pressurizer Level Indication 10 1-. Introduction ~ 10

!2. : Basisffor Ex'ception ,

10

_-D.~ ; Steam Generator Level-Indication 12

1. Introduction. 12:

<2. Basis for' Exception' 12

?EA RCS' Hot Leg Temperature Indication 14 4 '1. Introduction- 14

2. --Basis for Exception 14 W

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-TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd).

Page

, - F. -

RCS; Cold Leg Tempe'rature Indication 15 11 . Introduction '

15 L2. ; Basis for Exception -16 G. /Neutren-Flux Monitors 16

1. -Introduction 16

2. l Basis for-Exception. 16 H . JContainment' Fan Coolers :17

+

11. Introduction 17-

2. Basis for Exception;- 17 IVi ? Request for IException t' o, the Technical Requirements of - 18

. Appendix R to 10CFR 50 Section III.0 o

1~

1.- Basis for Exception - 18 n

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, Page v LIST OF TABLES

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TABLE DESCRIPTION PAGE t

- 1. Saf'e Sh'utdown_ Components and Process ~ Monitoring ~ 20 Variables-Inside' Containment

-2. ISafeShutdownComponentsandProcessMonitoring 23

' Variables ~ Inside' Containment .for which . compliance-with'Section III.L.2-of Appendix R to 10CFh50 is LDemonstrated for a Fire Inside Containment

3.

Safe Shutdown Components and Process' Monitoring 24

' Variables Inside Containment for which' Exceptions-from:Section III.G.2_of Appendix R to 10CFR50 are

. Requested.

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Page vi LIST OF FIGURES T-a '?

a FIGURE -DESCRIPTION ~

f jIII.A-1 iPressurizer Proportional Heaters Trains A & B~ .(Plan EL.-4.00)

~ TIII.'A-2l ; Pres'surizer Proportional Heaters - Trains A & B (Plan EL +21.0 & +35.0)

III.A-31 ' Pres'surizer~Propor'tional Heaters.- Trains A~& B (Plan EL +46.00) fIII.B-1 1 Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valves-Trains A & B c (Plan EL -4.00)

III.B-2 ~ Shutdown. Cooling Isolation Valves-Trains A &~B (Plan:EL +21.0.& +35.0)

~

III.Bv3.: Shutdown: Cooling Isolation Valves-Trains A & B-1 (Plan EL +46.00) ilII .C-1 :: Pressurizer; Pressure / Level Indication-Trains A & B (Plan EL -4.00)

-- III'.' C-2 L Pressurizer Pressure / Level Indication-Trains A & B:(Plan EL'+21.0 & +35.0) 2III'C-2. Pressurizer Pfessure/ Level Indication-Trains A & B (Plan EL +46.00)

LIII.D-1L ISteam Gen. Il&12 Level' Transmitters-Trains A & B~ (Plan EL -4.00)

' Steam _Gsn.<1 &'2 LevelsTransmitters-Trains A &iB III.D-2 (Plan EL'+21.0 & +35.0)

III'. D Steam Geni 1.& 2 Level Transmitters-Trains'A & B '(Plan EL +46.00)

'EIIIiE-1z .RCS Hot' Leg' Temperature Indication-Tra' ins A'& B- '(Plan EL -4.00).

(III.E-2: ;RCSlHotLegTemperature) Indication-Trains 1A&B- -(Plan EL +21.0 & +35.0)

(III.E-3LlRCSHot' Leg. Temperature' Indication-TrainsA&B

~

'(Plan EL +46.00).

~

' III.F-1 IRCS; Cold. Leg' Temperature Indication-Trains;A & B (Plan EL -4.00).

III.F-2 RCSLCold Leg Temperature: Indication-Trains A-& B- (Plan EL +21.0 & +35.0)

III'.F-31: :RCS Cold Leg < Temperature Indication-Trains A & B (Plan ~EL +46.00)

. ,III.G-1: ? Neutron Flux-Monitors (Excore)-Channels 1~&.2 (Plan-EL -4.00)-

JIII.G-2 4 NeutronLFlux Monitors (Excore)-Channels 1 & 2 (Plan EL +21.0 & +35.0)'

~: III.G-3-: l Neutron Flux Mo'nitors'(Excore)-Channels'1 & 21 1

-(Plan EL +46.00)

+x iII'I .H-1 Containment Cooling Fans'- Trains A & B -(Plan EL -4.00) g - . )III.H 2: lContainment: Cooling Fans - Trains A & B (Plan EL +21.0 & +35.0)

. ~tIII.H-3: ,Cantainment Cooling Fans , Trains A.& B' (Plan'EL +46.00)

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1Page 1

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'I. ' Introduction

~

EThis-document' demonstrates that Waterford-3.either meets.or provides (equivalent-levels'of_protectionas:thatrequiredby;SectionsIII.G.2,

~

LIII.L,(andIII.0fortheReactorContainmentBuilding.

s 1Those components-and process monitoring ~ variables-inside containment

'which have been determined by the Waterford-3 Safe Shutdown Analysis to;be required for: safe shutdown are listed in Table 1. It is the purpose of this enclosure; to demonstrate 1that the plant. can be brought -

s;; -.from normal power operating. conditions to. cold _ shutdown,.and be maintained.in that state, with 'or without the availability of offsite

~

,s R~ power and 'a ~ fire inside : containment.

~

This is-accomplished in'two steps'. First, for_the components' listed in c

Table 2,?itL is.shown inLPart :II of thisisubmittal that the performance fgoals-fo'r shutdown function delineated in Section III.L.2 of Appendix R to 10CFR50 can be met _ assuming their--loss to fire or any other icause._ Second,'for the components listed in-Table 3, it is shown in

- Part ,III that, although' the criteria for: fire protection of safe

-shutdown: equipment!of Section-III.G.2 of Appendix _R is'not met,

' appropriate mitigating features exist or will be provided.to insure

-that one train'of safe shutdown equipment or conduit remains. free of fire: damage.

^

' Part IV contains a1 request'for exception to the technical requirements ~

of Section--III.O (Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection System).

II. Demonstration of Compliance to Appendix R,Section III.L.2

- JA. 'Ch'arging Line Isolation and Auxiliary Spray Valves

1. Introduction

+

The-charging-line isolation. valve to loop 1A (ICH-E2503A),

~f]' ,

the! charging line isolation valve to loop'2A (1CH-E2504B),

, e and,the two redun' dant auxiliary spray valves (1CH-E2505A and

~

3 .

J1CH-E2505B) are'used to maintain'the-reactor coolant _ system E '< 3 inventory and shutdown-margin'and' provide pressure control

'and reduction while bringing the. plant from hot standby to cold shutdown. They are, therefore, designated in FSAR

, ~ Table:9.5A-1B'as-safe shutdown" components.

LThese.four valves are located in the Containment Building in-

the-Regenerative Heat Exchanger (RHX): cubicle . (see FSAR EFigures'1.2-18 Land 9.5A-30). Since they~are located within itheisame area,:they are evaluated together to' determine

~

'4' ? alternate safe: shutdown capabilities.

r ,

The charging line isolation valves are normally open, fail-closed,' solenoid operated globe _ valves; the' auxiliary spray-fvalves are normally~ closed,: fail closed, solenoid operated ca ,

-glob ~e valves. (See Flow Diagram, FSAR Figure.9.3-6).

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Enclosure 2 Page 2

2. ~ Physical Configuration The' charging line isolation valves and auxiliao '

spray

(- ~ valves are-all-located in the. Regenerative Heat Exchanger (RHX) cubicle in the southeast quadrant of _ the containment on' elevation +21.0. Therefore,-a fire in this cubicle will

.c shave the'most significant effect on the valves' ability to

. provide their safe shutdown functions. In. addition, the fail closed,' solenoid actuated,' pneumatic letdown valves 1CH-F1516A/B'and ICH-F2501A/B) are:also located in this cubicle.

1.

fJ l ?Th5 RHX. cubicle is enclosed on'allfsides by concrete walls.

(There isian entryway.ontits east face,:a blowout area on its-

~

- southL face (approximately twenty feet above the floor elevation), and an' equipment hatch above the RHX at

' elevation +46.0-(see FSAR Figures- 1.2-18, 1.2-21, 9.5A-30

and 9.5A-33).. There are no cable trays in the cubicle. All z the components are located near-the floor and their cables are routed in conduits inside the cubicle. Outside the

' cubicle, the' conduits empty'into either the A or B i

~

cable trays traversing the southern perimeter of the containment'and are then routed to either the A or B electrical penetration areas.

There are-therefore negligible combustible materials.inside se Ethel cubicle and minimal- chance of an. exposure fire due to

- its limited ' accessibility.

3. : Alternate Shutdown Evaluation.

LA fire in the'RHX cubicle-that envelops:the cables-to these-

. valves;would most probably.cause their deenergization and Eclosure.. Although'the letdown isolation valves are not,

> designated safe shutdown, their position will influence the-shutdown method and,therefore,ftheir closure due to a fire and

_ : deenergization is considered.

1 Assuming. closure'and loss of function of the. charging line isolation, auxiliary spray and letdown isolation valves, the shutdown : functions of Section III.L.2 'of Appendix R can be LLachieved~as'follows:

- SafA2 shutdown:is initially performed manually by rod a) insertion from:the control room, Lor' automatically ~on

~1oss:of power.

4?g :b) Reactor coolant inventory and-the reactor shutdown r #'

~

margin are maintained by'one of three positive E -

fdisplacement charging pumps by either of two alternate

routes:

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Enclosure 2

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p : 1); fvia' thel normal l charging line RCS nozzle by injecting

~

f and borating.through a spring loaded check valve 1(ICE-V2506) in' series with'a locked open manual

-~ - : bypass valve (ICH-V2507) around the charging line

Lisolation: valve to loop 1A. These valves are located o' :in the RHX cubicle in a' space below the floor grating at elevation +21.0 or,-

i ii).~by injecting andLborating via the HPSI header. This

e is accomplished--outside containment by locally opening W - 'two locked closed manual valves (2CH-V1501-5-and 2SI-V1600) (see FSAR Figures 9.3-6 and 6.3-1)~, and

closing.the' normal ~ charging line containment isolation valve;(2CH-F1529AB), located outside containment. The

=

latter~ action can be done: remotely from the control room.

s C Decay heat; removal land cooldown to shutdown cooling entry c) 1 conditions can be accomplished by releasing steam from the

steam generators via'the atmospheric-dump valves and the safety relief valves. Makeup.to the. steam generators can

-be provided.by the Emergency Feedwater:(EFW) Pumps (2 motor

. driven',71 st'eam driven). These pumps take suction from the condensate storage. pool (170,000 gallons minimum) or, if necessary, Lean be aligned to.the Wet Cooling. Tower basins (360;000 gallons).

..p d)' Primary system' pressure can be-reduced by. removing' heat through natural; circulation cooldown with steam generators

( '

i to shutdown cooling. entry conditions. The pressurizer can be' cooled gradually by refilling with condensate

~

inventory by way ofl charging ~ pumps.- Primary. pressure

can be controlled.by use-of the pressurizer heaters, which care _ unaffected by a-fire in this area (RHX' cubicle), and use-

" -of.the charging pumps as described above. This method of cooldown,; assuming the ' unavailability'of the letdown lines and auxiliary spray lines will be. covered under the Waterford Functional Recovery Emergency Operating Procedure. Under these conditions, cold-shutdown can be achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

2Subcooling margin and the presence'of v'oids in the reactor vessel upper-head region would be monitored-by the Qualified:

.s - ) Safety Parameter Display System-(QSPDS)l installed as a result 7

: of. NUREG-0737, Item II.F.2 (seel FSAR Appendix 1.9A)'.

L There is

~

.a potential for void formation in the upper head region under ithis' scenario. It will not, however, inhibit natural circulation V '

cooldown (see.CEN-199/ Effects of Vessel' Head Uncovering Transients

^

and Accidents ~in CE NSSS).

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4. ' Spurious' Operation

~

3 ~

. . Failure of the charging line isolation, auxiliary spray or i-J ' letdown. valves,in other than the fail closed position is e ,

considered' spurious. It has been' assumed to occur, in this 4

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_ case,.as a result of fire induced' hot shorts. ~ Spurious I

~ '

operationiof any combination of these valves will have no

~

affect'on.the' ability to achieve cold shutdown as described

' ~

, < i in Section 3.above for the following reasons

)

a) -The valves may be deenergized by opening breakers in theirLrespective: Power' Distribution Panels (PDP's) ]

3: : located outside containment. Safe shutdown may then i sproceed as-described in Section 3.

b) :In the' highly unlikely event of a hot short which precludes deenergization,'the charging and~ auxiliary-U ' spray lines which branch off the common charging header inside' containment.may be' isolated from outside 1 containment and charging provided via the cross-connect to the HPSI header described'in Section 3.b)ii)

Tabove. The letdown:line may also be isolated or controlled'from the control room by operation of the letdown containment isolation valve located outside x

containment. Shutdown may.then proceed as described in

Section 3 above'or by feed and bleed of the primary loop using charging and letdown lines if we assume the 1

~ letdown isolation valves in the RHX cubicle fail open.

- B.. Safety Injection Tank Isolation-Valves

. ?1. EIntroduction-

?

The SITIV's are motor-operated valves. located at the 1 discharge:of the-four SIT's:(See,FSAR Figure 6.3-1). They

~

n >

Larefopened-above approximately 500~psig RCS pressure. After opening, they are locked open.in the control; room, and the motor: circuit breaker-is; padlocked in the open position.

During cooldown, the SIT pressure is lowered to 377 psig at lan RCS pressure;off 650 psig ~by venting to prevent inadvertent

, : pressurization of the shutdown cooling system. The SITIV's are theniclosed by the_ operator when RCS pressure drops to about

-400 psig.

. 2. Physical Configuration Thhfour SIT'sLand their respective isolation valves are-e'ach located in a. quadrant of the containment. The power cables for the SIT's are' routed'in conduits, most of which

-are embedded in concrete. There areLareas where these 2 conduits come within twenty feet:of each other.

3. AlterdateShutdownEvaluation

[" In the highly unlikely event that a. containment fire sprecludes-closing one.or more of these valves, they may be Lclosed' manually by handwheel operators. These handwheels are in easily; accessible locations in shutdown radiation zone III-IVi(see FSAR Section-12.3) areas outside the primary Jshield wall.

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i 4) - Spurious Operation

. Since theLelectrical cables servicing these valves are run

- in conduit and.are deenergized, and the valves.have handwheels-as described above, a. spurious operation

. evaluation;is not applicable.

' C. Steam Generator Pressure-Indication Introduction

1.

This: is a~ process monitoring variable which is required as-cooldown is' conducted via blowdown of the steam generators through the atmospheric; dump and safety relief valves under f- - the' scenario of a shutdown with the loss of offsite power.

2. -Physical-Configuration

=The pressure transmitters listed.in the Safe Shutdown Analysis are the two redundant.contro1' channels on each steam generator (see' Table 2). -The cables are routed from

-each steam generator in exposed and embedded conduit'to

their respective containment penetrations. -There are locations--at each' electrical penetration area where three of-

.g '

four conduits carrying redundant steam generator pressure

-indication cables are separated by less than twenty feet.

~

3. ' Alternate Shutdown Evaluation- '

!r J_ ( Alternate steam generator; pressure indication is -provided ^

1 completely:outside containment via pressure transmitters

~PT-0301ASLand PT-0303AS.(Steam Generator 1) and PT-0301BS

, Land PT-0303BS'(Steam' Generator-2). .These pressure transmitters are located outside containment on the main steam

_ : lines between the. penetrations and the main steam isolation valves. 'PT-0301 provides 0-1300 psig indication on a: chart

'ecorder and'on a CRTiinLthe control room.' PT-0303-provides r

0-1200 psig indication ~on a CRT.in the~ control room. Both the

Plant ComputerLand CRTs are' powered by a static uninterruptable 3 power supply (SUPS).

"In addition, there are;four Plant Protection System channels

_ _ with-pressure' transmitters located'inside containment which p provide similar pressure indication in the~ control. room.

1They'are;as-follows:

w.a SGi l' SG 2 PT-MS-1013A; B, C,~D PT-MS-1023A, B, lC, D

~

-There is therefore .no fire which can cause total loss of pressure

+

' indication-to either steam generator.

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D .' JManual/ utomatic Service Pressurizer Controls

1. Introduction

- These' controls were listed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis

.(FSARLTable 9.5A-1B), since, if offsite power is available, and the~ plant is being maintained at hot standby, they may

,# f be' utilized to automatically maintain the pressurizer pressu're and level program.

L2. JAlternate' Shutdown Evaluation Pressurizer pressure and level may be maintained and y

> c controlled. manually. These'~ controls and associated cable are therefore not required for either hot standby or cold shutdown.

s III. -Request' for Exceptions t) the-Technical Requirements of Appendix R to 10CFR50,- Section III.'3.2 in the Reactor Containment -Building n

There'are certain' fire protection features that are, generic to the following~specificLrequests. They'are described in more detail in the Fire

Hazards Analysis for the Reactor' Containment Building (FSAR Section 9.5.1,

~

Volume 1,.Section VIII,;p VIII-218) but are summarized-below:

a Ionization type. detectors in areas of high relative fire loadings

, L(See Figures X-13, 14.and 15).

. y,

'

LContinuousLline thermistor type detectors over the Reactor Coolant

~. 1 Pump areas.

~*- HMulticycle automatic. sprinkler systems lin the Reactor Coolant Pump areas.

u .

' ' Reactor' Coolant' Pump. Lube Oil-Collection System-

^

- Strategically located.hos'e stations 'such that. all areas are within ~

%*T

- 75: feet of 'a hose nozzle (See' Figures .X-13, .14 ~ and 15).

~ ^

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.. Portable Fire ~ Extinguishers-(See Figures'X-13, 14 and 15)'.

' a?

>*> LFire breaks at approximately 15 foot! intervals in' vertical cable

trays.

S -

[ '*? . Low' combustible loading.

W; : IEEE-383 qualified cables.

[ . ,

fAdministrative procedures'to: limit quantities of transient

+r, 40mbustibles.

, , A '

i 'well', trained Fire Brigade'and a well" thought out Fire Protection i Program.

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Sin'ce', exception to theErequirement that there be-~no intervening combustibles:between redundant divisions of safe shutdown equipment located.

~ , fin the same-fire area (i.e., RCB)Lis:the primary focus of this part, a

" generic description of combustibles"in containment is in order, Combustible. materials'inside containment consist of cable insulation,

. lubricating oi1 Land charcoal'in'the Airborne Radioactivity Removal System (ARRS).

LCable' is run either in conduit or trays. The cable trays-in containment are particularlyzlightly. loaded. Currently there is~a maximum of-'35 J- . percent; fill.in power cable trays,7 65^ percent in control cable trays and 60 percent in. low' level cable trays. As indicated above,'the cables themselves are all qualified to'IEEE-383. Tray and conduit separation-in +

, accordance with' Regulatory: Guide- 1.75 is provided either by meeting the (minimum separation distances of the guide (three feet vertical, five feet horizontal)-or by totally enclosing the redundant raceways.

, Lubricating oil inside containment'is discussed in Section IV of this fenclosure.

(The dwo charcoal filter systems are located in wholly' contained tight HVAC

~

' cabinets. -Under norma 1' conditions, the captured radioactive particles are

insufficient to:cause self-ignition.. In the unlikely event of. temperature increases, forced air maintains the system below self-ignition

.. temperatures. -.By first refueling, a manual deluge system.will also be provided for each filter bank. ,

t

'In' summary,1since the containment is a single fire area, the justifications-for' exceptions,to the technical ~ requirements of'III.G.2 that follow are bas'ed on demonstratingLthat- by a combination of physical: distance, inherent-barriers such as' shield walls and low levels of intervening combustibles, at-least one channel:or division of; safe shutdown' equipment will.be

availab1e after fire. _In; addition, in Sections C, D, E, F and G, it'is

also shown.that-there is additional instrumentation,;aside from that

-. designated in~the Safe Shutdown-Analysis, that will. provide the. control

~

l-room operator with'the required information.

'n A. . Pressurizer Heaters-

'1.

Introduction

~

7 Two b'anks of proportional heaters (150 Kw each) from. redundant

': electrical-buses are capabletof being~ manually loaded onto their

> 1 respective: diesel generators. Pressurizer ~ heaters are used to 2 -

imaintain adequate ~subcooled margin during a shutdown. Emergency V -

? operating' procedures. based.on'the NRC approved guidelines of CEN-152 Jexist which provide. for: shutdown without the pressurizer heaters. It

- has been decided, however, to justify exception'to the technical

_ ;requi'rements'of'Section III.G.2 rather than base compliance on III.L.

((Alternate Shutdown).

Basis'for Exceptig

~

2.

I'-

Enclosure 2 Page 8 Exception'to the technical requirements of Section III.G.2.d that cables.and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains be separated by a horizontal distance of more than twenty feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards is based on the following.

As shown in Figures III.A-1, 2 and 3, the cables from the banks of

-proportional heaters leave the bottom of the pressurizer inside the-skirt area, and enter conduits separated by about seven feet. There

- are about two feet of exposed cable before they enter the conduits.

The conduits then descend six feet into the slab beneath and are embedded. The conduit for each redundant bank next'comes out of concrete-at boxes on opposite sides of the pressurizer cubicle.

-It is not credible that a fire in the pressurizer cubicle could

-disable both banks of proportional heaters. The exposed cable beneath

.the pressurizer, connecting to the heater elements, consists of short

lengths of Rockbestos Rockhide cables (Firewall SR Class 1E electric cables, each wrapped _ with 45 mils of asbestos glass braid) capable of

. performing'at temperatures up to 200*C.

The' entire pressurizer cubicle is extremely restrictive both from a-temperature and radiological' point of view. The skirt area itself is also physically restrictive. It is accessible via only one small

-manway. Thus, there is little chance that' transient combustibles would be brought into the space. The only actual combustibles permanently in the. cubicle are the small amounts _of Rockbestos cable

. lengths from the heater elements to the conduit.

-Thus, at the locatio'n where redundant pressurizer heater cables would be most vulnerable to a fire, the cable itself effectively acts as a radiant energy shield, and the low combustible loading and restrictive

~

access precludes self-ignited or transient combustible generated fires.

~

The A train conduit-exits the pressurizer' cubicle on its west face above Elevation -4.0; the B train conduit exits on the east face. At this point, the cubicle itself acts as full height barrier. The A train conduit then empties into the A cable tray.at EL. 30'-9". This

- tray is one of a bank of- five located labout- 15 feet above the Elevation +21.0 grating. The B conduit empties into the B tray

. located beneath the. Elevation -4.0 grating. Thus, the closest point of approach of the redundant. conduits outside the cubicle is in the area outside the Southeast ~ corner. -At this point, the A cables are in a tray about 15 fee ^t above.the Elevation -4.0' grating and the B cables

~

are in.a tray ju'st below the grating with about five feet horizontal

. separation between them. The only intervening combustibles are two slightly loaded trays.of control and low-level. cables. An exposure fire that could consume both trays is' considered highly unlikely. The nearest operating platform below both trays is at Elevation -4.0 which is twenty-five feet below that A tray and about' forty feet below the B tray. The area is also covered by ionization detectors that alarm in the control-room.

.p k

l

$N Enclosure 2

~

Page 9 a

From this area,jthe cables diverge as.they travel to their respective

electrical penetrations. . At-: the penetrations, there is about 60 feet !

horizontal separation. ' Again, the ~only-intervening combustibles are the~ banks of= trays shown.

' B.. : Shutdown Cooling-System Isolation Valves L1.L cIntroduction .

~ '

0n'each shutdown coolin'g train, there are two isolation valves inside

~

containment. ;These valves form the boundary between the Class 1 RCS and'the Class 2 SDCS. Each train has two gate valves which are locked-closed'during normal operation. Both valves in each train lare.on~the

g ~

.same electrical channel,.i.e. thereLis an "A-A" train redundant to a

"B-B" train. LThe two' valves within each train are' located side by m, '

iside on elevation +21.0'. The:A division valves are at approximately.

116* in the: southeast quadrant and'the.B division valves are at

~

m tapproximately :255':in_ the ' southwest -quadrant.

These valves-areLnormally_ remote manually: opened from the control room ,

Lwhen aligningDthe shutdown. cooling heat exchangers, prior to jproceeding to colde hutdown s .

_ ;2. " Basis for Exception l Exception tolthettechnical' requirements of Section'III.G.2.d that

! cables _and equipment and associated cables of non-safety circuits of Jredundant trains be: separated.by a horizontal-distance of more1than etwenty feet withino: intervening combustibles _or fire hazards is based C on the..following:

hPleaseirefer:to Figures-III.B-1, 2 andL3.

~

o ,

Thefelectrical cables' servicing these valves.are rou'ted inside

~

/ .

g ,

. containment entirely in exposed and embedded conduit from the area of

. .the valves themselves to their respective penetration areas. The~A jdivision valves'are: located within approximately 18 feet horizontally Lof the.B_divisionfelectrical penetrations ~'andLthe.B division valves

< care' located within'approximately 18 feet horizontally of the A (division electrical penetrations. LThese are the only areas where-

' redundant: divisions.are vulnerable to a: fire. From the valves, the

= conduits: trave 1Lnorth' around- the primary. shield wall; the A ' division

. cables then: travel southwest in embedded conduit to their penetration area intthe> southwest quadrant; the B division cables ~then travel-

_ isoutheast in embedded ' conduit to: their penetration area in the U -

'. southeast; quadrant. . Thus,iexcept on the platform on Elevation +21.0,

adjacent totthe? valves, the exposed conduits from the redundant trains

~

careishieldedifrom each other by the two outer secondary shield walls

~

and" inner. primary: shield walls which'all extend forty feet'above fElevation"'+21.0.

4 1 E N i \ ?

b -, -

O

Q

. Enclosure 2

.Page 10 j

~

'InordertoprovideLatleasttwentyfeebofseparationbetween

_ redundant. divisions at these points,'the conduits for one set of Lyalves..(i.e., A' train or B train) shall be protected by a radiant w' ' anergy shield to a point where'there is at'least~. twenty' feet of-

' separation between the redundant-divisions...This will ensure that the Nk '

cables, actuators and penetrations of at least one SDCS train will be

. undamaged after:al fire.

C. Pres'surizer Pre'ssure/ Pressurizer Level Indication

1. Introduction i v

. Pressurizer. pressure and pressurizer level are important process

. variables for monitoring adequate subcooling margin and RCS inventory.

w- :

Although cabinets C-1A and C-1B house /the pressure and le. vel

, transmitters listed linLthe Waterford 3 Safe' Shutdown Analysis as being

?those which are required for. safe shutdown, redundant instruments are 1available in cabinet C-ID which can be used in lieu of those in wg. . cabinet:C-lb. The-following exception request is based on this

' redundant availability.=

2._ ' Basis for Exception Exception to.the technical: requirements of Section'III.G.2.d that.

_ 1 " cables;and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of '

r

> ,P- ' redundant traius:be separated by a horizontal distance of more than W : twenty' feet.with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards is based ca.the following:

PhaseLrefertoFig'uresIII.C-1,2and3.

.The Waterford 3 Safe Shutdown' Analysis (FS % Table-9.5A-18): indicates. ,

that-.the following pressure and level indication is required for safe shutdown: b

, g g, Pressure: ( :

~u . _

. Cabinet Cabinet-Location-

. Electlical Transmitter.. Division

, 'M PT-102A

, C-1A- .

RCB El W 1.0 SA>

PT-102B, .

C-1B' "

RCB El +21.0 -

SB s2 * , - ,

f', ' Level. - y pn ~

~

-Electrical Transmitter .. Cabinet . Cabinet Location Division:

LT-110X- 'C-1A -RCB El-+21.0- SA i LT-110Y- x ~C-1B.

.RCB El +21.0 SB

~y :.

r s

} ,'

e __, .,, g 4: . ., ,%. .

g; %.

'q ty, y N ,=[q u m,, ; ,

, m.

?

3 Enclosure 2

~

-Page 11-u

, ' v?However, Tin addition'to the above, there are redundant' instruments as

< - follows:

Level:

Electrical s

Transmitter; 1 Cabinet- Cabinet-Location Division LT-0103 / C ID - RCB El +21.0- NS (Vital) l Pressure:

, Electrical Transmitter Cabinet Cabinet Location ~. Division JPT-102D ~C-1DL .RCB El +21.0 SB

~

LT-0103 has full.fspan' level indication with readout in the control

. room. PT-102D has.,similar range and indication as PT-102A and PT-102B. All of these instruments are powered by vital AC supplies J

and~therefore will be available upon loss-of offsite power.

Cabinets C-1A and C-ID are located'outside the secondary shield wall i at about 200* and 230', respectively, in the southwest quadrant.'- C-1A i ls locat'ed approximately 7 feet-below two~ banks of' lightly loaded overhead cable trays and is serviced by cables which are run in'

~

, , exposed-conduit which travels.from the cabinet' southward under the Egrating at EL. +21.0 to:the containment wall where it rises up to

Penetration 121 at EL.' +40.5--and passes out of containment. Cabinet 1C-ID is 1ocated"approximately 50 feet.from cabinet C-1A and

. : approximately -7 feet below and 5 feet horizontally, from a bank of

" 311ghtly. loaded overhead cable' trays. The' cable servicing PT-102D and cabinet C-1D is run in embedded conduit below the cabinet to

~* its-penetration area where the conduit becomes exposed and travels-

~

4 upwards from EL.E+21 0 to' Penetration 123, EL.1+40.5,cand below and

- 'approximately.5. feet horizontally from a bank of lightly loaded overhead

. cable trays. . The' cable' servicing LT-0103 in.' cabinet.C-ID,is run in~

' exposed conduit below and in a northeast ~ direction from the cabinet to

~

!i_tsu'?B" train low 1evel cable ~ tray which'is a covered and solid bottom -

r - , ' type _ cable ~ tray.'.This lowslevel cable ~ travels along in a bank of a

,(three lightly loaded; cable trays at;approximately El +11_-0", below

.the pressurizer cubicle.and around the southern perimeter of the RCB twhere it leavesLthe_ tray and. enters-exposed conduit that runs-

south' east to'the containment ^ wall and ascends to' Penetration 140, El S +37.5 and passes out of containment. .'At one location, the covered low Llevel '!B" train _ cable tray passes approximately 10 ; feet:below cabinet C-1A. f Al fire on the grating at E1.:+21.0.in the vicinity of,C-1A will not damage!the train "B"Leablei s ince it is.in a completely enclosed' cable tray which'-is 10 feet'below. ~A fire-at-EL -4.0, below the

covered cable tray and cabinet.C-1A,_will not'dama'ge either the_ train 4

. .f"B.. cable iin ;the tray or the redundant- train "A": instrument in C-1A or E' Litsicable,(due to-heat. dissipation and'the fact ~that both the cable x . .

+ + v

)

.o .

~

j Q n+n ;-. _

L, '

r Enclosure 2 -!

Page 12 tray.and C-1A have solid metal b'ottoms. The penetration location for '

the C-1A cables is widely separated by approximately 58 feet from the .

penetration location.for the C-1D cables.. Therefore, at least one train of redundant instruments are assured of being available after a fire.

- D. -Steam Generator Level Indication i

1; . Introduction r Steam Generator Level.is a process variable needed for monitoring the performance of the emergency feedwater system during reactor coolant

system decay heat removal and cooldown'via the Steam Generators. The Safe Shutdown Analysis takes credit for the two redundant channels of

-Wide. Range Level indication-on.each steam generator.

2. : Basis for Exception-

Exception'to the technical. requirements of III.G.2.d that cables and

-equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains be separated by a horizontal distance _of more than twenty feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards is based on following:

The level' indication assumed in the; safe shutdown analysis is as follows:

Electrical

[ Transmitter. ~ Cabinet ' Cabinet Location Division SGI1 e _

LT-FW ll15AS Local Rack ~ RCB E1 -4.0 (SW quad) SA

.LT-FW lll5BS- Local Rack RCB El -4.0.(NW quad) SB

'SG2 LT-FW 1125AS -Local Rack RCB El_-4.0 (SE quad) SA y LT-FW ll25BS o Local Rack 'RCB E1 -4.0 (NE quad)~ SB

Please referfto' Figures III.D-1, 2 and_3'

-n ~

1.As indicated-above, the localJinstrument racks from which the cables

~

for these : instruments' originat'e are widely: separated via their location in the four separate quadrants-of containment outside.the secondary shield wall. _The-local cabinets for the redundant transmitters for each individual steam generator are themselves L ' separated by about'25. feet horizostally in areas with low levels of

, l intervening combustibles. The cables for these instruments are routed

-Lvia-' exposed conduit from four separase instrument racks to their

~

electrical penetrations.

~

,J. The conduit for the"B-instrument for SG1 runs from the instrument rack

, along,the periphery of the Shield. Building at about Elevation -9.0.

.Near, column'18,;the conduit for-the B instrument runs adjacent to the

, conduit for'the A. instrument for SGl. .They run together to Column 15.

\

t 4' .-

'u!_

Enclosure 2 Page 13 The area, so far described, i.e. at about Elevation -9.0, under the grating at Elevation -4.0 is one with a minimal combustible load.

There are neither exposed cable trays nor oil or flammable liquids in this area. From Column 15, the A and B conduits for the SGI ascend together to Elevation +21.0. They then run together above the grating at Elevation +21.0, against the Shield Building to Column 15. At this point, the A conduit ascends along Column 15 to Elevation +35.0 and then to adjacent Penetration 148; the B conduit, however continues traveling along the Shield Building Wall at Elevation +21.0 to Penetration 119 near Column 8 at Elevation +28.0.

The conduits for instruments A and B for SG2 run in a near mirror-image like manner as those for SG1, from the instrument racks to penetrations 148 and 119, respectively.

An inspection of Figures III.D-1 thru 3 reveals that the only areas where 3 of the 4 conduits are within twenty feet horizontally ere at the electricc1 penetrations. A fire would have to occur at these areas to damage three of four conduits. A fire at either area would Le approximately 90* away from the fourth conduit. As can be seen, the entire interposing area is one of very low combustible load with a small number of lightly loaded cable trays and no flammable liquids.

This combined with the tremendous distance between the area of 3-conduit vulnerability and the fourth conduit, guarantees that at least one steam generator would continue to have wide range level indication. As analyzed in the FSAR, the plant can be shutdown via a single steam generator.

Another mitigating factor is that, in addition to the above discussed Wide Range Level indication, there are the following four channels of narrow range level indication available on each steam generator:

Electrical Transmiter Cabinet Cabinet Location Division SG1 LT-1113A C-1A RCB El +21.0 SA (SMA)

LT-1113B C-1B RCB El +21.0 SB (SMB)

LT-lll3C C-1C RCB El +21.0 SA (SMC)

LT-1113D C-1D RCB El +21.0 SB (SMD) :

SG2 LT-1123A C-1A RCB El +21.0 SA (SMA)

LT-1123B C-1B RCB El +21.0 SB (SMB)

LT-1123C C-1C RCB El +21.0 SA (SMC)

LT-1123D C-ID RCB EL +21.0 SB (SMD)

First it is assumed that a fire takes place in the vicinity of Penetration 148 and disables both Wide Range Level Indication channels from SGI and one of two channels from SG2. SG2, therefore, is left with one channel of Wide Range Level Indication, SG1 with none. However, the SMD narrow .:nge level instrument (LT1113D) is located in Instrument Cabinet CID. This cabinet is located approximately 60 feet frem the

L Enclosure 2 Page 14 5

vertical plane at Penetration 148. The intervening area has a minimal combustible load consisting of two banks of lightly loaded overhead cable trays. The conduit from CID leaves the cabinet, descends to below Elevation -4.0, is then embedded, and runs as embedded conduit across the containment to the B electrical I penetration area. Similarly, if a fire were to occur in the vicinity of Penetration 119, both Wide Range Level Indicators from SG2 should

[ be disabled, and one channel from SGl. In this case, the SMA and SMC channels on SG2 (I.T-1123A and LT-1123C) would still be available.

These instruments are located in cabinets C-1A and C-1C on Elevation

+21.0, respectively. As can be seen, these cabinets are located approximately 90 from the vertical plane near Penetration 119. The intervening area again consists of minimal combustibles with two I banks of lightly loaded overhead cable trays and no permanent

& flammable liquids.

The narrow range indication has the same upper limit but a higher lower limit than the wide range coinciding with the normal operating levels of the steam generator. Although wide range is p preferred to verify performance of the Emergency Feedwater System, the L narrow range is a viable alternative. During the cooldown, level is maintained with the narrow range limits. If it dropped below its range, the EFW pumps and control valves (outside containment) would be automatically or manually ramped to bring ring level within indicated y range. There is, therefore, no credible fire which could affect both the narrow and wide range level indication for either steam generator.

j E. RCS Hot Leg Temperature Indication

1. Introduction RCS Hot Leg temperature indication is an important process monitoring

variable used to monitor subcooling margin and decay heat removal while shutting down.

The hot leg instrumentation listed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis is as follows:

i 3

Temperature Element RCS Loop Range TE-RC0112HA 1 525 - 675 F J TE-RC0112HB 1 525 - 675 F TE-RC0122HA 2 525 - 675 F

! TE-RC0122HB 2 525 - 675'F

2. Basis for Exception 5 Exception to the technical requirements of III.G.2.d that cables and

equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains be separated by a horizontal distance of more than twenty feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards is based on the following

Please refer to Figures III.E-1,2 and 3.

Enclosure 2<

Page 15 The cables are routed.-in exposed conduit from th'eir respective instrument boxes, located on _the hot legs at about Elevation +16.0, to the point where they are embedded in the secondary shield wall. From Figure III.E-1,

'it is obvious that_the conduits.for each loop's instruments.are separated

.by two sides of the primary shield-walls and a minimum horizontal distance

~

.ofiabout'35 feet. The~only intervening combustibles are cables and cable trays:above the reactor' vessel (See Figure III.E-3). The hot gases and

' products;of combustion from a fire affecting one loop's instruments would-Lbe dissipated into the;1arge overhead RCB volume and would not affect the other. loop's instruments.

~

A ~

Once'the conduits leave the secondary shield wall embedments they-travel directly to the containment wall, ascend to Elevation +35,0 and 7 '

travel to'their electrical penetrations.

b

"~

AsLean be seen from Figure.III.E-2, there are two locations where three-

, .of the four conduits are vulnerable to.the same fire, i.e. in the l vicinity of the electrical penetrations. If, therefore, it is assumed that a fire o_ccurs adjacent to Penetration 134, then RCS Loop 1 would

,' lose both' instruments, RCS Loop 2 would lose its train B-instrument (TE-RC0122HB)'. ;The fourth conduit would, however, be 55 feet-horizontally away from the area of fire. The intervening combustibles

.between'the three, cables _ assumed destroyed and the fourth would be low,

' consisting of two stacks of. lightly loaded' cable traysias indicated.

~

A-fire at Penetratica 135.would have-similar effects. Thus, there is no.

. fire in containment that could disable more than 3 of 4 instruments.

, .One channel of_ hot leg indication is sufficient for safe shutdown.

' There is therefore, no fire which could cause the loss.of this' process monitoring variable. ;Another mitigating feature is the fact that there are additional: hot leg _ temperature elements, namely TE-111X and

~

TE-121X. These are powered from vital AC and are therefore available with . loss of offsite power, and have suitable control room indication. The. conduits from these instruments are routed on

- ', .oppos.ite" sides of the. containment._ In fact, their_ closest point of

,' approach iscat their electrical penetrations which are separated by_

ebout'50' feet.

3s 4

/[ ? F. 'RCS Cold Leg Temperature' Indication t D1. IntroductionE

}v4 c

, 'RCS Cold Leg temperature-indication is an important process monitoring

. , variable'used to monito'r subcooling margin.and decay heat removal

^

while shutting down.

The cold leg. instrumentation listed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis is j >

.as follows:

< !. Temperature 1 4 4 DElement- : RCS Loop __ Range

'.TE-111Y- 1A 500-650*F TE-0112CB 1B 50-750*F

tTE-121Yi 2B 500-650*F R TE-0122CA- 2A '50-750*F 9.-

S. k f ___3

Enclosurs 2 Page 16

2. Basis for Exception Exception to the technical requirements of Section III.G.2.d that cables and equipment and associated cables of non-safety circuits of redundant trains be separated by a horizontal distance of more than twenty feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards is based on the following:

Please refer to Figures III.F-1, 2 and 3.

The cables from these elements are routed in a similar fashion as for the hot legs and are routed to adjacent electrical penetrations. The same reasoning and justification therefore applies. There are also additional temperature elements on loops 1A and 2B, TE-RC0112CA and TE-RC0122CB respectively, which are routed in exposed and embedded conduit located on opposite sides of the primary shield wall, to their respective electrical penetration and maintaining greater than twenty feet of separation at all times. Their closest point of approach is at the widely separated electrical penetration areas. -

G. Neutron Flux Monitors

1. Introduction.

Two redundant startup neutron flux channels are process monitoring variables used to verify reactor trip and monitor reactor power levels i during shutdown. The two excore flux channels are powered from vital ACsgppliesandhaveindicationsinthecontrolroomwitharangeof 1-10 CPS on a log scale.

2.- Basis for_ Exception Exception to the technical requirements of Section III.G.2.d that cables and equipment and associated cables of non-safety circuits of redundant trains be separated by a horizontal distance of more than twenty feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards is based on the following:

Please refer to Figures III.G-1, 2 and 3.

These two redundant channels for excore neutron flux indication travel through the containment in embedded and exposed conduit. Channel 1 indication is routed in exposed conduit down along the south side of the reactor vessel until it reaches EL. -4.0' where the conduit becomes embedded as it travels southeast to a coil box and pre-amplification box located approximately 28 feet below a bank of lightly loaded overhead. cable trays and approximately 15 feet horizontally from a

' bank of lightly loaded overhead cable trays. The channel continues

' embedded from the adjacent boxes, southwest to the containment wall where it runs in exposed conduit approximately 10 feet horizontally and below a_ bank of lightly loaded cable trays, up to Penetration 126 at EL +40.5' and out the containment. Channel 2 is routed similarly from the north side of the reactor vessel but proceeds embedded into the northeast quadrant where its adjacent boxes are approximately 20 r

a p .

Enclosure 2 Page 17 feet ih'orizontally from the "B" train charcoal filter unit. The channel then continues embedded from the boxes, southeast to the n

containment wall where~it' runs in exposed conduit approximately 3 feet

' horizontally and below a bank'of-lightly loaded cable trays,.up to Penetration-125 at EL. +37.5' and out the containment. The exposed redundant boxes are located on opposite sides of the refueling pool in

the northeast and southeast quadrants and the redundant penetration

~

areas-are widely separated by approximately 120 feet. Therefore, at

. least one startup channel of excore neutron flux indication is assured of availtbility' after a fire.~

H. Containment Fan Coolers

} 11. : ' Introduction There are four CFCs. .Two are powered from the A electrical division Land two from the B. 'The cooling units are located on two levels in the containment.outside the secondary shield wall. The A fan coolers

~ are at elevation .+21.0' !and the B fan coolers are at elevation -4.0' .

The fan coolers ~are located;in the northeast and northwest quadrants

-of the containment.- EachA division CFC is located approximately 8

> feet above a B division CFC.and separated by a steel grating.

The CFCs;are' designed.to, operate during normal and accident c conditions to remove heat from.the containment atmosphere, thus maintaining containment pressure and temperature at acceptably low levels. During normal operation,.three of four fan coolers are usually operating at high speed.

, , ' 2. Basis:for Exception '

1 Exception to the: technical requirements of Section III.G.2.d that icables'and equipment and associated non safety circuits of redundant trains be separated by a . horizontal distance of more than twenty feet

with'no' intervening; combustibles is based on the following:

-As;can be seen on Figure III.H-2, the power cables from redundant

. divisions come no closer.than at-their electrical penetration area

~

above the platform at Elevation +35.0. At this point,. cables.from Junits 3A-SA and 3B-SB are about 40 fect apart. -The only intervening

~

4

~ combustibles are the. inboard. banks _of lightly loaded cable trays. As

is' apparent.from Figure III.H-2, all four penetrations for.the power.

L; cables'are widely' spaced.

As shown in Figure III.H-l'and 2, the control cables-from the two i opposite sets of' fan coolers run in conduit and tray outside the c secondary shield wall to their respective penetrations. . Control t-cables from units 3B-SB and 3D-SB terminate inside containment at g e Penetration 142; cables from units.3A-SA and 3C-SA terminate-at i Penetration 141. ~At each electrical penetration area, the control

, cw icables from 3 of '4- fan coolers could conceivably be damaged by fire.

i g;r

Enclosure 2 Page 18 If a fire is assumed at Penetration 141, then control cables from units 3A-SA and 3B-SA which terminate there could be damaged, as well as the control cable from unit 3D-SB which traverses in a tray below the Elevation +21.0 grating. Note there is approximately 16 feet vertical separation. In this case, however, the control conduit from the remaining fan cooler, 3C-SA, is approximately 90* and 100 feet away. The space intervening between the three conduits assumed damaged and the fourth, contains low levels of intervening combustibles. These consist of the two banks of lightly loaded cable trays, the majority of which are filled with low energy level and control cables.

Thus, at least one fan cooler will be operable for any fire in the containment. Safe shutdown can be. achieved with one fan cooler.

All' class 1E equipment inside containment is qualified in accordance with NUREG-0588 for 40 years of life at maximum normal ambient conditions plus one year post LOCA (with the exception of certain components for which justification for interim operation is submitted under the environmental qualification program).

Once offsite power is restored, Containment Purge could be aligned to make the containment more habitable for fire fighters. With offsite power available, there would be some additional heat input from the i Reactor Coolant Pumps but this would be compensated for by the fact that the S-3 and E-23 supply and exhaust fans would be lined up for purge. Equipment survivability without fans is not a concern as indicated above. In any case, due to the low combustible load in the RCB, lack of continuity of combustibles, administrative controls to preclude introduction of large quantities of combustibles, and heat dissipation into the large RCB volume, a fire in the RCB would have little effect on overall RCB ambient temperature.

IV. Request for Exception from the Requirements of Appendix R to 10CFR50, Secti.in III.0

1. Basis for Exception Exception from the technical requirement of Section III.0 of Appendix R to 10CFR50 to provide an oil collection system capable of holding the entire lube oil system inventory from all Reactor Coolant Pumps is based on the following:

a. The four Reactor Coolant Pumps have a gravity drain piping system in conjunction with their oil pan / enclosures, installed to transport leaking lube oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in their lube oil systems, via two separate collection headers. One header serves RCP 1A and IB and the other serves RCP 2A and 2B. Each header feeds into an individual 200 gallon oil collection tank which is installed outside the steam generator shield walls. _These tanks each have the capacity to hold the entire inventory of lube oil from one RCP.

Enclosure 2 Pcge 19

b. The O'il Collection System and the Reactor Coolant Pumps' lube oil

. systems are seismically designed such that there is reasonable assurance that the system.will withstand the SSE. This is consistent with NRC memo; R. H. Vollmer to D. G. Eisenhut, dated April 1,'1983, Position 3.

L

-c. There.is automatic suppression and thermistor wire detectors over each RCP.

[

b

+

J 7 k

.'M 2_ fi__ _ _._ '____._i___ _ _ _ . . - _ _ _ _ _ ____ . _ - _ . -_ . _ . . _ _ __ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ . _ _ _ _ - - -

o Enclo:ure 2

~Page 20

, TABLE 1 s .

-SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS'AND PROCESS MONITORING VARIABLES INSIDE CONTAINMENT

~

4

(

Reference:

FSAR Tables 9.5A-1B and 9.5A-2B)

-Components Tag No.

E' 1. - ' Charging Line Isolation Valves. ICH-E2503A (SA)

ICH-E2504B (SB)

1CH-V2507

< '*2CH-V1501-5+

. *2SI-V1600+

' 2. : - Auxiliary Spray Valves ICH-E2505A (SA)

ICH-E2505B (SB)

.3. : Safety: Injection Tank Is'olatica Valves. ISI-V1505-(SA) (TK1A)

ISI-V1506 (SB) (TK1B) 1SI-V1507 (SA) (TK2A)

ISI-V1508-(SB) (TK2B)

}. 4'.1 ; Pressurizer Proport.ional Heaters Two Redundant Strings; 150 Kw each.

. 95. Shutdown' Cooling System Isolation Valves ISI-V1504A (SA)

TRAIN A.(MOV)

ISI V1503A~(SA)

TRAIN.A (ELECTRO-HYDRAULIC) s ISI-V1502B (SB)

TRAIN B (MOV)

ISI-V1501B (SB)

TRAIN,B

-[,

(ELECTRO-HYDRAULIC)

{ 16.' Containment Fan Coolers -AH-1 (3A-SA)

AH-1 (3B-SB) i L

~

AH-1-(3C-SA)

AH-1 (3D-SB) c *To:be added to the FSAR Tables.as primary or additional equipment to fachieve-the-described function ~inside Containment only.

,+ Located outsidelthe Reactor Containment' Building. .

a

_ _ _ _ - -- - )

Enc 1cette.2 Page 21

- TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

' Process Monit'oring Variables

~

l' . INeutron Flux Startup Channels l'& 2 JI-RC0005-1 JI-RC0006-2

[2. RCS Cold Leg Temperature: TE-111Y TE-121Y TE-RC0122CA TE-RC0113CB

^ 3.. RCS Hot Leg Temperature TE-RC0112HA

, TE-RC0112HB b

TE-RC0122HA TE-RC0122HB

14. ' Steam Generator Level (Wide Range) LT-FW1115AS (SGI)

~

LT-FW1115BS (SGI)

LT-FW1125AS (SG2)

LT-FW1125BS (SG2)

5. . Steam Generator Pressure PT-1013B (SG1)

PT-1013D (SGI)

PT-1023B (SG2)

PT-1023D (SG2)

PT-0301AS (SGI)+

PT-0303AS (SG1)+

PT-0301BS,(SG2)+

PT-0303BS (SG2)+

6. --Pressurizer Pressure PT-102A-PT-102B

PT-102D E

4 m

N r

e Enclocuro 2 Page 22 TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

. 7.

Pressurizer Level. LT-110X (SA)

LT-110Y (SB)

. *LT-0103 Y

, m

-* - To be'added to the'FSAR Tables as primary or additional indication for_ the describ'ed process monitoring variable for inside Containment

only..

+ Located outsidei the Reactor Containment-Building. .

," i ,

'~

s=.

f

.s T

\

W

-^ , ?

e

_l1 d

s

/ m __ ____o____ _ ____-._ _m __.-________-________m____

- _ _ _ .__ _m rt a is J

n _

Enclosure 2-Page 23 s cg TABLE 2-

- SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS AND PROCESS MONITORING VARIABLES

~

INSIDE CONTAINMENT FOR WHICH COMPLIANCE WITH

_ SECTION III.L.2 0F APPENDIX R TO 10CFR50 IS DEMONSTRATED FOR A FIRE INSIDE CONTAINMENT

~CAmponent/PMV- Tag No.

J

1. Charging Line Isolation Valves ICH-E2503A (SA)

ICH-E2504A (SB)

~

2. ' Auxiliary' Spray Valves' 1CH-E2505A (SA)

ICH-E2505B (SB)

3. ' Safety Injecti~on Tank' Isolation Valves ISI-V1505 (SA) (TKIA)

ISI-V1506 (SB) (TK1B)

I ISI-V1507-'(SA) (TK2A)

ISI-V1508 (SB) (TK2B)-

24. JStican Generator' Pressure PT-1013B-(SGI)

, PT-1013D-(SGI)

PT-1023B'(SG2)

.PT-1023D-(SG2) 2

i. :~ . -

q - . - -

i k

)

3 f ,

s v ,

d f+,,..

p - 'E w._m._.s

Encloture 2 Page 24 TABLE 3

. SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS AND PROCESS MONITORING VARIABLES INSIDE CONTAINMENT FOR WHICH EXCEPTIONS FROM SECTION III.G.2 0F APPENDIX R TO 10CFR50 ARE REQUESTED.

Component /PMV- Tag No.

1.. . Pressurizer Proportional Heaters ~ Two Redundant Strings; 150Kw each

2. . Shutdown Cooling System Isolation Valves ISI-V1504A (SA)

TRAIN A (MOV)

ISI-V1503A (SA)

TRAIN A (ELECTRO-HYDRAULIC) i; 3; Containment Fan Coolers AH-1 (3A-SA)

( AH-1 (3A-SB).

AH-1 (3C-SA)

AH-1 (3D-SB)

4. -Pressurizer Level / Pressure LT-110X (SA)

~

LT-110Y (SB)

-PT-102A PT-102B

5. Steam Generator Level (Wide Range) LT-FW-1115AS (SG-1)

LT-FW-1115BS (SG-1)

LT-FW-1125AS'(SG-2)

LT-FW-1125BS (SG-2) a d'

..f

.t'- -

i

. Enclosure 2 Pagn-25 TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

I Component /PMV Tag No.

26. RCS Hot Leg Temperature TE-RC0112HA TE-RC0112HB TE-RC0122HA TE-RC0122HB

. 7. - RCS-Cold ~ Leg Temperature-TE-111Y TE-121Y

..c.

TE-RC0122CA TE-RC0112CB 8 .' . Neutron Flux Startup Channels 1 & 2 JI-RC0005-1 JI-RC0006-2 o

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- - 70' nt ' ' _TR AIN B " 38-S B/ 3D-S B EMDEDDED CONDulT - - - - - (EXC EPT IN CABLE ); UP TO PEN I42 EXPOSED CONDulT TRAYS) Y EL. 37 '6 " -, A3ERTJ E CARD UP TO PEN 117 Also Xvailable Un [ E L. 37'6" A.pertiire Card SCALE (FT)

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FAN COOLERS Waterford Steam Electric Station TRAIN A & TRAIN B FIRE PROTECTION REACTOR BUILDING PLAN EL -4.00*

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?- EL 37' 6" PEN 107 LOUl51ANA POWER & LIGHT CO. EL. 37'6" efX,./- CONTAINMENT Waterford Steam Electric Station ~ ~' I FAN .00OLERS FIRE PROTECTION 389C . TRAIN A & TRAIN B REACTOR BUILDING (POWER) PLAN EL +21.00* AND +35.00' FIGURE 111. H-2 A 8404020067-2 3 J W [ N - g . x m (- ! _2N_.# . All Bli . *3,M g -v y sii j/ $O i ,L-l PLAN EEMmoN, +4G.oo' lt EL. CO O _ lCilG NE] .E it/T.O ' lcIl7.N$l EU ')S

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m 57 o ites.swl pos.g E.t.57.o fu?G.O lbe& 6.m] illot$ Mig to $$.o All tei!4 N6l EL p .o 1Cilb M9l w 'A.o 16182 5 9 Et, % .c .M..

D- %l'O '909 Mbl 1vot wM w 61.o

~ j "O a Q Tt i lL18EA nAl f,L. Esc.-O RE . .. i.,*' g\ Bil CARD E1. 25 7.c psJ.5 mal }Liod % e4,97-o N w a.s, . c ., ,_, m ,,.c \ <:. I 1 h [t.10F5Y4 l lC14*NO 3 II 174 6d44 W>l Em / #

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, g ,, y,,, . , , iLioT S@l 17il 61 iv.st *1 su 9(.c. TA44( 18'll ' '{* 'trailable gg ' Periure Card SCALE (FT) Imi! !- ! ! I I o '1 to to *p .40 ,9by " ^" " LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. FAN COO ERS TRAIN A 8 TRAIN 8 Waterford Steam Electric Station I FIRE PROTECTION REACTOR BUILDING PLAN EL +46.00* FIGURE Ill.H-3 na n 4 0 2 0 0 67-2 # ENCLOSURE 3 FIRE DAMPER INSTALLATION EXCEPTIONS NS30302 t s Enclosure 3 Page 1 i . . LRelief-is requested from'the technical requirements of Appendix R section III.G.2 ~ as.it relates.to separation!of fire. areas by fully. approved 3-hour fire

boundaries. Specifically,' exceptions in fire. damper installation in fire
area boundaries as follows:

,, 'l. Requirement'for U.L. labels on fire dampers installed in , non-safety duct systems. ~2. ; Fire' dampers. installation variances between.Wa'terford 3 installation and tested configuration ~as outlined in vendor /U.L. installation instructions. - These exceptions are considered mino'r and do not adversely effect operation

or fire resistive' ratings-of the fire damper assemblies. Specific

' exceptions'are listed and discussed below: Exception No.-1: _ Requirement for U.L. labels on fire _ dampers installed 9 ' in non-safety-duct systems. Fire dampers installed in E ^ non-safety duct-systems.are constructed in accordance with , U.L. labeling requirements and' meet the requirements of NFPA 80-1974'but do not-have U.L. labels attached. Vendors'have provided a' letter of' certification for the - .above. -Exception No.'2: Fire damper installation variances ~between Waterford 3 installation and. tested configuration as outlined in m ' vendor / installation. instructions.

The~ following is antitemized listing of these installation varances

$ 1. U.L.' and NFPA 90A requires 'that a sleeve be installed in place of . .the normal: duct where' dampers are installed through fire rated. walls.-or floor / ceiling ~. In lieu of this arrangement, Waterford

3 uses a sleeve-which is inserted into the duct which results' f~ ,

fin'a double thickness through'the wall'or floor / ceiling. The -: sleeve ~is. welded to the duct in accordance with the minimum R , ; spacing requirements.of the vendor /U.L.' requirements for Eattaching'the damper to the' sleeve.. The' objective'(A sleeve that li 'is stronger than1the normal duct).is met, if not exceeded, with J ~t he Waterford-3' installation. n h pJ ~

2. LSleeve welded-one side only: Damper sleeves'with a perimeter of.
108"ior less~are welded to the duct on one side.only. Advanced.

~ ^ Air's '(a manufacturer of. fire dampers similar in construction to C , those'provided at Waterford 3)' installation instructions g; indicate that for-dampers with a perimeter of;108"..or less, ( Lattachment of only one~ face'of.the' damper-to sleeve is ! sufficient.3 Since a 16 gage sleeve is-installed in a 20 gage or W . thicker duct, the assembly provides adequate strength without the ' additional welds between the sleeve and duct. (The~ damper'to y sleeve-attachment is on'both sides.)~ y- . }; a; ,

b; - ._ -.

D L' . s , Enclosure 3 Page 2 ~

3. . . Damper-to-sleeve welding and damper-to-damper welding (multiple damper. assemblies) ininon-safety duct systems. varies from the manufacturers installation-instruction: The installation

. contractor purchased'the damper / sleeve assemblies from the vendor ~ (Ruskin)'who used a maximum 12"Lon center welding requirement for - shop assembly. .The vendor's shop assembly procedure is -considered equivalent to the field installation requirement for - 8" on center welding. 4 ~. - Sleeve to wall or floor / ceiling arrangemeut varies from the vendor's installation instructions and NFPA 90A. Since Jpenetrationa must meet additional functional requirements (air, radiation, etc.) the opening'outside the sleeve / duct is sealed in

accordance with tested-penetration seal details or filled with

- grout;.therefore, the.NFPA 90A and vendors installation e instructions requirements for an open air space and retaining - angles are replaced with a penetration seal which provides . equivalent. fire barrier protection while meeting the other functional-requirements. .o 5.- Arrangement ofLduct-to-sleeve; varies from NFPA 90A and vendors installation instructions: -The joint between the.cleeve and duct must be within 6"'of the wall or floor / ceiling andLthe sleeve must be 14_ gauge if' damper is larger than 36" .W or 24"H to meet the NFPA and vendor instructions. Waterford 3 uses'a 16 gauge sleeve inside a minimum 20 gauge duct which is equivalent to the 3 14 gauge requirement. TThe 6"~from wall or flo'r/ o ceiling ^to.first < connection joint is based on an industrial l requirement that assumes gross structural! failure, and therefore; a joint that will allow the

duct;to break away from'the damper.. sleeve. Since Waterford 3 duct systems ^are-seismicly-supported, this failure.is not required.

E v - 4 [ m ge 94" . , 'y y ~ t 4 I f,' .-. lt-- m 7 r ~ ~ .

2 a r -

'T ,k t , . ; Ff, " , r b 5-t <N O s > v s M I ENCLOSURE'4 i:- - PREVIOUSL REQUESTED EXCEPTIONS TO ' APPENDIX R-AND MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS 'ASSOCIATEbWITHFIRE. PROTECTION D ,/', N' i t 4 e __ ^ ! L; NS20099-( '._4 s --). ,\ . I I 7, A j. J l- E s r fl Enclosure 4 . Page 1 . A number of miscellaneous or- generic. items requiring further NRR ' attention'are itemized below for the convenience of the reviewer.

1. :Previously. submitted exception re' quiring review:

, 'a. ' Letter from F. J. Drummond (LP&L) to Director NRR, " Fire . Water System Connection ~(Tertiary Backup) to Lubrication and 97 Cooling Water for Circulating Water Pumps," dated August 8, 1983. ' ~

b. Letter from F.'J.'Drummond (LP&L) to Director NRR, "HVAC

-Fire Dampers,". dated-September.9, 1983.

c. ~ Letter from F. J. Drummond (LP&L) to Director NRR,.

" Removable Section-in South Wall-of. Diesel Generator 3BS Room",Ldated 0ctober:.3, 1983. 2; ' Corrections to wording in supplemental safety evaluations (SSER) are-requested: . 4 a. SSER'3, P. 9-10, Switchgear Room - Described as having total area wide' automatic fixed' suppression coverage and complete 1-hour barrier separation.: 'This is incorrect and Enclosure

1. requests. relief from meeting these requirements in this area 1(RAB 8).

. b .E SSER 5, Section 9.5.1.6(1), pg. 9 The third paragraph should read:. F "The_ applicant committed by letter dated December 21,.1981 to install a control supplement to ensure complete electrical independence from.the control. room after activation of the , . transfer switches'.~ The in'strumentation and control circuits to .the,. remote' control: panel will i be modified to ensure that there is-sufficient electrical and physical separation such that a fire in <either the control ' room or at the remote control panel will not affect at least one. train of the. instrumentation and controls determined to be needed- for safe shutdown." r E k (di 4

a 4

I. 1 2 __ _ _ _ _.-_ _ _ _ .__. Enclosure 4 Page 2 . 3. To satisfy human factors safety- concerns, carpet is proposed for the control room. NRR concurrence is requested for this carpet which is NFPA Class A ASTM E-84 Collins and Achman Carpet, type Gramercy Park ~' Style No. 15003 colors.cordova (Code 08900) and Elmwood (Code 08600); and meets the following criteria:

a. Flame spread of no more than 25-
b. = Fuel combustion-factor of 25 or less-

- c. . Smoke density of-50 . d. ' Rad'ent i flux greater than .45' Watts /cm 2 M. ' The carpet's effect on fire loading (BTU per square foot) is ~ a negligible. ~ Fuel loading of book-binders and administrative materials - is included in fire hazard analysis. ~ t '.2 0 $Y.- 1 _.n 5 1 P r*' g w i . p ENCLOSURE 5 Fire Door Installation Exceptions NS40207SEG i. u . Enclosure 5 Page 1 Relief'is requested from the requirements.of Appendix R,Section III.G.2 in that-installed fire doors must.have a national laboratory fully approved

rating equivalent to that of the required. barrier it forms a part of. The doors requiring review are listed below by door number and can be located iby referring toLthis number as' it appears in the fire area figures of

,the Fire Hazard Analysis, Section 4.5.1 of the FSAR. In most cases the >g . doors were. built .to Class A or Class B construction standards but have- . variances not previously tested in laboratory conditions. These exceptions '(duelto; security, or airtight or other special requirements) are minor in . nature and should not detract from-the overall capability of these doors to .act as effective fire barriers. 10 utside doors generally were not built to Class: A or B const'ruction standards due to tornado or watertight constructionLrequirements. :They are only listed for your consideration ,wherever their; location might be: deemed necessary for fire mitigation purposes.

Doors with exceptions as . documented -by vendor and visual inspection:

'D7 'D9 -'Elmwood security double doors: ~ -(1)lMissingU.L.labelonframe. Vendor ID tag installed on frame. Letter of certification'en file. (2)' Electric striker of security latch in the inactive door. .(3) Removable transom modified on site to a solid transom. D24,'D29'- Pioneer securityldouble door: (1) U.L. label cannot be applied due to conduit in the inactive door.

(2) Cla'ss "A" construction. label on doors and' frame. Vendor certification

~ on file. D35, 36, 37 - R. V.-Harty Door: (1), Exterior door located in wall between fire ' area and outside space - lits primary function is 'other than fire resistance .(i.e. , tornado,

flood, leaktight, or radiation shield' door). 0utdoor exposure fires are'not postulated in.the plant yard based on lack of combustible Un _

istorage: adjacent to buildings. Where concentrations of-combustible ? material-(such as foil'in the Turbine Generator Building or transformer area) exist, fire: detection and automatic suppression systems are provided and the flow of' combustible liquids is? confined as outlined .in the Fire Hazard Analysis Report; - D 46, 47. -Pioneer airtight: double doors - U.L. label missing due to items , y2 -(1)'through-(4): } P Enclosure 5 Page 2 (1) Stainless steel door ~ . .(2)' Oversized. . (3) Surface Gasket: installed. (4) Frame. __ ' (5) hour. "A" construction label on door and frame. Letter of certification'on file.- D53A - Elmwood: (1) . Removable transom modified on site to a solid transom. -(2) Vendor I.D. tag or - frame. Letter of certification on file. D71,-D77, D78, D121, D174, D175, D178, D218,-D219, D259, Mosler Doors: .(1) U.L.11abels damaged or. lost during constr'uction. -(2) Vendor label. installed on-assembly. Letter of certification on file. D84 - Pioneer security double door: ,(1) ;Special purposeIdoor missing U.L. label. (2) Bullet; proof glass windows installed'in door. (3) Oversized double doors. (4) Vendor' label' installed on assembly with letter of certification on file. } D85:- Pioneer security double door:

(1)--Electric. security strike installed in inactive-door.-

-(2). Door is made with-14 gauge steel. 3-hour "A" construction labels on doors and frame. D91 - Pioneer airtight door: (1) LSurface mounted gasket profile not U.L. accepted.

(2)- 1 -hour "B" construction label on doors and frame.

D96,'D97 R.~V.' Harty: (1) ' Exterior do'or located in wall between stair tower and roof - its primary. function is other than fire resistance (i.e., tornado, missile door). Outdoor exposure: fires are not postulated on-rooftops based on the= lack of combustible. storage and heat dissipation from fires in transient combustibles. D128 - Pioneer airtight door: _'(1) E Surface mounted gasket-(2). Mortised' door bottom L(3) '3-hourl"A" construction labelJon' door and frame. 7 C Y_ . u I Enclosure 5 Page 3 D141 - Pioneer double door: (1) Fuseable link door louvers needed for proper ventilation are not U.L. listed. (2) 1 -hour "B" construction label on doors. Frame is U.L. labeled. D161, D167 _?ioneer security doot: (1) Electrical components in door not U.L. listed. c (2) 14 gauge steel construction. p (3) 3-hour "A" construction label on door and frame. D163, D250 - Pioneer: (1) 14 gauge steel construction not U.L. listed. (2) l Vendor 3-hour "A" construction label on desr and frame. D170-- Pioneer airtight security door: (1) Electrical items and security-latch in inactive door. l(2) Surface type gaskets. '(3) 3-hour "A" construction label on doors and frame. .D179 - Pioneer airtight security door: -(1) Electrical items in door. '(2) Surface type gaskets. .(3) Mortised door bottom. l(4) 3-hour "A" construction labels on' door and frame. D185 - R. V. Harty: (1)- Exterior door _ located in wall between stair' tower and roof - its primary function is other than fire resistance (i.e. , tornado, missile ' door). Outdoor exposure fires are not postulated on rooftops based on the' lack.of combustible' storage and heat dissipation from fires in transient combustibles. D192 --Pioneer' airtight security door: l(1) Electrical items in door. '(2) Surface type gaskets. (3). 3-hour "A"' construction label on door and frame. A' .D208A, D208B, D209A,LD209B - Elmwood: (1) IHead section of. frame missing due to installation in part-height wall. _(2) , Vendor I.D. tag installed on' frame. Letter of certification on file. L i i i Eaclosure 5 Page 4 D252 - Elmwood: (1) U.L. label damaged or lost during construction (2) Vendor ID tag installed on door and frame. Letter of certification on file. D252A - Elmwood double door: (1) Oversized door. (2) Head section of frame missing due to part-height wall installation. (3) Vendor ID tags install on assembly. Letter of certification on file. D262 - R. V. Harty: (1) Exterior door located in wall leading to outside stair tower - its primary function is other than fire resistance (i.e., tornado, missile door). Outdoor exposure fires are not postulated on rooftops based on the lack of combustible storage and heat dissipation from fires in transient combustibles. D263, D265, D266, D270 - R. V. Harty: (1) Exterior door located in wall between fire area and outside space - its primary function is other than fire resistance (i.e., tornado, missile door). Outdoor exposure fires are not postulated on rooftops based on the lack of combustible storage adjacent to building. Where concentrations of combustible material, such as diesel generator fuel oil storage day tanks, is located adjacent to building, adequate confinement is provided via rated fire barriers; fire doors; retention curbs; and detection and suppression systems. Containment Personnel Access: (1) Two such entries exist for the containment building. They consist of two double gasketed, airtight, solid steel doors placed in series for each entry. Adequate fire protection measures as described in the Fire Hazards Analysis precludes damage to these doors from transient or in-situ combustibles. RAB E1IVATOR SHAFT DOORS: (1) Constructed in accordance with U.L. and vendor requirements for 1\-hour Class "B" fire doors with the exception of a 5" a 8" wire glass window. Letter of certification on file. L. - ,,

W3P84-0709, Requests Review of Encl Exceptions from 10CFR50,App R Technical Requirements for Reactor Auxiliary Bldg,Per Ser. Generic Ltr 83-33 Used to Reevaluate Compliance W/Technical Requirements

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W3P84-0709, Requests Review of Encl Exceptions from 10CFR50,App R Technical Requirements for Reactor Auxiliary Bldg,Per Ser. Generic Ltr 83-33 Used to Reevaluate Compliance W/Technical Requirements

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SUBJECT:

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Introduction:

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