TXX-4399, Forwards Updated Engineering & Const Status Rept.Pages Deleted for Items Whose Deferral Beyond Fuel Load Has Been Accepted by NRC
| ML20113H448 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 01/18/1985 |
| From: | Beck J TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TXX-4399, NUDOCS 8501250152 | |
| Download: ML20113H448 (42) | |
Text
e Log # TXX-4399 File # 10010 TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY MKYWAY TOWEH . 400 NORTH OLIVE MTHEET. L.H. Mt . DALLAN. TEXAN 75201
. January 18, 1985 t "5.*Ji'*"
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation j Attention: Mr. B. J. Youngblood, Chief '
Licensing Branch No.1 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiission Washington, D.C. 20555 SUBJEC T: COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION STATUS REPORT REF: (1) John W. Beck to B. J. Youngblood letter TXX-4389 of January 5,1985
Dear Mr. Youngblood:
Reference (1) submitted a package describing the yet to be completed engineering and construction items for CPSES Unit 1. An updated package is attached to this transmittal. The updated package replaces the previous submi ttal . The scope of the package remains the same except that the pages 3 have been deleted for those items whose deferral beyond fuel load has been accepted by the NRC staff.
All pages are dated to show when they were last revised and a bar has been placed in the right margin'beside those lines revised by the last revision.
Sincerely, by. L ohn W. Beck DRW/grr Attachmen ts Distribution: Original plus 40 copies 8
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A t)tVINDON 09' TKKAN l'TILITIEN ELECTNir COMi%N V n
January 18, 1985 Page 1 of 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE NUPEER REVISION Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Punp 9800-0116S 01/17/85 (previously 0000-00003 Appendix R Emergency Lighting 01DM-0445S 01/17/85 Appendix R NFPA-13 Issues 0603-0729S 01/17/85 Appendix R Fire Detection Panel 0613-0390S 01/05/85 EQ Control Room Air Conditioning Units 0701-0382S 01/17/85 Charcoal Filter Heaters 0701-0802S Deleted (1)
Control Room Ventilation Equalization 0701-0804S 01/17/85 Path Chlorine Detectors Reset Card 0701-0820S 01/17/85 CCW Intersystem LOCA 1101-0787S Deleted (1)
Emergency Evacuation Alarm 1201-0304S 01/17/85 (4)
EQ Valve Limit Switches 2202-0000S Deleted (1)
Post Accident Sampling System 2202-0173S 01/17/85 Fuel Building Roll-Up Door 2401-0213S 01/17/85 HVAC Balancing 2401-02185 01/17/85 (4)
Thermal Expansion Rework 2802-0800S 01/17/85 Dfesel Generator Excitation 2904-0213S 01/17/85 Appendix R Diesel Generator Current 2904-0246S Deleted (1)
Transformer Diesel Generators 2904-0247S 01/05/85 MSIY Bypass Valves 3401-1299S 01/17/85 Auxiliary and Safeguards Building 3201-0394S 01/17/85 Ventilation (previously 3601-0151S)
EQ Containment Pressure Relief Valves 4501-0062S 01/17/85 CRDM Ventilation Duct Support 4503-0029S 01/17/85 (4)
January 18, 1985 Page 2 of 3 Containment Spray Valves 4802-0789S 01/17/85 EQ Boron Dilution Detection Equipment 4901-0624S Deleted (2)
Appendix R Hydrogen Piping 5103-00095 01/05/85 EQ NSSS Auxiliary Relay Rack 5201-1022S Deleted (2)
EQ NSSS Auy.iliary Relay Rack Wiring 5201-1039S 01/05/85 Changes EQ Pressurizer Safety Valve 5501-0866S Deleted (3)
EQ RHR Miniflow Indicating Switches 5801-0431S Deleted (2)
Appendix R RHR Valve 5801-0432S 01/05/85 ERF Computer 7801-0062S Deleted (1)
SPDS Isolators 7801-0096S 01/17/85 EQ B0P Analog Control System 8801-0103S 01/17/85 EQ Process Protection System 8802-0200S Deleted (2)
Electrical Separation 8900-0064S 01/17/85 Control Room Design Review 8904-0586S Deleted (2)
Appendix R Turbine Buf1 ding 111 Roof Slab 8924-0784S 01/17/85 HELB Superheat 9800-0112S 01/17/85 U-Bolt Torques 9800-0178S 01/17/85 EQ Incore Thermocouples 9800-0181S/ 01/17/85 9800-0252S l
EQ Active Valves 9800-0183S 01/17/85 Appendix R Fire Doors 9800-0185S 01/17/85 Appendix R Chiller Package 9800-0190S 01/17/85 Appendix R FPPR Design Verification 9800-0204S 01/17/85 Appendix R Breaker / Fuse Coordination 9800-02095 01/05/85 Appendix R Portable Communication 9800-0219S 01/05/85 Appendix R Radio Repeater Systems 9800-0220S 01/17/85
n January 18, 1985 Page 3 of 3 Appendix R Thermolag 9800-0230S 01/17/85 EQ NSSS Interface Document 9800-0247S 01/05/85 NOTES:
(1) Engineering and/or construction completed to the extent that a deferral is not required.
(2) Deferral until 5% power has been accepted by NRC staff.
(3) Deferral until November 1985 has been accepted by NRC staff.
(4) This is a new item added by the latest revision.
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01DM-0445S-D APPENDIX R EMERGENCY LIGHTING DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Add 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> battery packs for emergency lighting in UPS Inverter room and adjacent corridor.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: This item is scheduled to be cogleted by 5/6/85.
CONCLUSION: Fission product inventory prior to 5% exceeding power is not significant due to the low power history. Thus a fission product release due to a fire in this area is unlikely. CPSES Unit 1 can be safely operated up to 5% power while this modification is being cogle ted.
01/17/85 i
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0603-0729S-D APPENDIX R NFPA-13 ISSUES DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Because of ceiling congestion, placement of sprinkler heads in certain fire areas does not meet NFPA 13 Section 4-1.1.1 requirements. NFPA 13 Section 4.1.1.5 allows non-standard placement if analysis or test shows comparable sensitivity and performance. An analysis to justify non-standard placement of heads has been performed.
Also in several fire areas, head placements are being modified to meet the requirements of section 4-1.1.1.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: This item is scheduled to be completed by 4/22/85.
CONCLUSION: Existing head locations have been designed to provide adequate sprinkler coverage but do not meet specific NFPA 13 guidance.
Fission product inventory prior to exceeding 5% power is not significant due to the low power history. Thus a fission product release due to a fire in these areas is unlikely. CPSES Unit 1 can be safely operated up
-to 5% power while these modifications are being completed.
] 01/17/85
0613-0390S-D APPENDIX R FIRE DETECTION PANEL DETAILED DESCRIPTION: NFPA 72D requires that the fire detection panels (main and local) be verified to be operable for their intended use.
Factory Mutual (F.M.) has reviewed and approved the panels with one minor exception which is being researched for resolution. Also the panels must undergo an environmental testing for F.M. certification.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: To be completed by 3/31/86. (environmental test)
CONCLUSION: F.M. has found the panels to be operationally adequate with a minor exception concerning the recording of the time that the annunciator alarm is acknowledged. This does not affect the ability to detect and annunicate a fire condition.
Environmental testing verifys the ability of the panels to operate under adverse conditions which are unlikely to occur. It is expected that the panels will operate satisfactorily even in these adverse conditions.
Implementation of the defense-in-depth concepts has provided multi-layers of fire protection independent of the detection system.
CPSES Unit I can be safely operated through the first cycle while the environmental testing is being completed.
4 01/05/85
m 0701-0382S-W EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION CONTROL ROOM AIR CCNDITIONING UNITS DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Make the modifications needed for the seismic qualification of the Control Room Air Conditioning Units.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: Three of the four units have been modified. This item is scheduled to be completed by 2/15/85.
CONCLUSION: Three of the four units are operational. The seismic modifications have been completed on all but one unit. Based on the fact that there is no significant buildup of fission products prior to exceeding 5% power and the low probability of seismic event during this period, operation of CPSES Unit 1 is safe and acceptable up to 5% power while this modification is being completed on this last Control Room Air Conditioning unit.
01/17/85
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0701-0820S-W CHLORINE DETECTORS - SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED RESET CARD DETAILED DESCRIPTION: A seismically qualified card must be installed in the logic for the chlorine detectors to reset the detectors following a loss of power event.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: The card is a reset card that allows the Control Room ventilation system to be shifted out of the isolation mode after a loss of power event. This item is schedule to be completed by 1/31/85.
CONCLUSION: Without this reset card, CPSES will not meet the LCO requirements of draft technical specification 3.7.3, in that the Control Room Yentilation System will not be capable of automatically shif ting to emergency air cleanup following a loss of power event. This is easily resolved by manually resetting the chlorine detectors. In addition, this automatic function is designed to protect the control room operators from a radiation release which is not a major problem before 5% power. Therefore, the license should delay implementation of this tech. spec until the qualified card is installed. CPSES can safely load fuel and operate up to at least 5% power while the Chlorine Detectors are being modified to correct this reset problem.
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0701-0804S-D CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION EQUALIZATION PATH DETAILED DESCRIPTION: The pressure between the Control Room and Equipment Room does not equalize during Control Room Ventilation Emergency Recirculation.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: A vent path with a fire damper will be added between these areas. This item is scheduled to be completed by 2/15/85.
CONCLUSION: Fission product inventory prior to exceeding 5% power is not significant due'to the low power history. Due to the low fission product inventory, there is no significant hazard to the control room operators. CPSES Unit 1 can be safely operated up to 5% power while this modification is being completed.
01/17/85
e 1201-0304S-H EMERGENCY EVACUATION ALARM DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Upon testing, the emergency evacuation alarm failed to be clearly audible in areas of the plant where background noise exceeded 100 dB, STATUS AND SCHEDULE: Appropriate solutions will be provided in areas where adequate audible alarms cannot be reasonably relied upon. This item is scheduled to be completed by 7/15/85.
CONCLUSION: The emergency evacuation alarm is used solely for evacuation of plant personnel to prevent possible injury from radiation exposure. Fission product inventory prior to exceeding 5% power is not significant due to th: low power history. CPSES Unit I can safely be operated up to 5% power while this item is being coupleted.
01/17/85
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c-2202-0173S-H POST ACCIDENT SAPPLING SYSTEM DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Two design concerns have been identified,
-associated with the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS):
(1) PASS control sw.tch relay failure which potentially could cause the assocciated Containment Isolation Yalves (IV) to fail open.
(2) No continuous indication of bypass of containment isolation Phase "A" signal in the Control Room.
For item (1), the interposing relays for contacts of hand switches on the Main Control Board require modifications to eliminate the possibility of a failure to close the associated Containment IV's on a-loss-of-power to the switch or due to relay malfunction.
For item (2), there is no indication in the Control Room that Phase "A" isolation is bypassed at the remote PASS IV control panel.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: The design modifications are scheduled to be completed by 2/1/85.
CONCLUSION: For item (1), the failure of the IV's to close on a Phase "A" 1 solation signal is not precluded by the current design. Also, the single failure of one IV should not preclude the operation of the other train's IV. For item (2), procedures are in place to verify all IV's are closed under emergency conditions. Furthermore, administrative control is maintained by means of a removable handle (for the bypass switch) preventing unauthorized use at the Remote Panel. Based on the operability of the PASS and the lack of significant fission product buildup prior to exceeding 5%, CPSES Unit 1 can be safely operated up to 51 power while the design modifications are being completed.
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2401-0213S-D FUEL BUILDING ROLL-UP 000R DETAILED DESCRIPTION: 1. There is excessive air leakage through the roll-up door in the fuel building.
- 2. With corridor doors open between buildings (for tornado venting) the building supply air trunk dampers are modulated erratically by the pressure controls.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: 1. The existing roll-up door will be replaced with a new low-leakage door. This item is scheduled to be coupleted by 7/26/85.
- 2. The building modulating supply dampers will be locked open and building pressure controlled by supply and exhaust fan opera tion. This item is scheduled to be completed by 5/10/85.
CONCLUSION: 1. No spent fuel will be stored in the Fuel Building, therefore operation through the first cycle is accep table.
- 2. Fission product inventory prior to exceeding 5% power is not significant. Thus a fission product release due to a failure of the building modulating dampers is unlikely. CPSES Unit 1 can be operated safely up to 5%
power while this modification is being completed.
01/17/85
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r 2401-0218S-D HVAC BALANCING DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Due to modifications to the HVAC system, additional air flow balancing must be performed.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: This item is scheduled to be completed by 4/26/85.
CONCLUSION: Fission product inventory prior to exceeding 5% power is not significant due to the low power history. CPSES can safely operated up to 5% power while the balancing is being completed.
01/17/85 L_
2802-0800S-D THERMAL EXPANSION REWORK DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Dimensions on U-bar pipe whip restraints must be revised based on recent Hot Functional Testing. Evaulate thermal expansion tests for requirements for further modifications to pipe supports and restraints.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: This item is scheduled to be completed by 1/25/85.
CONCLUSION: Required modifications will be made prior to entering the mode for which the system is required to be operable.
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2904-0213S-W DIESEL GENERATOR EXCITATION DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Modifications were required to the maximum excitation limitors for the diesel generators.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: Temporary modifications have been approved and completed to resolve the deficiency. Final engineering approval of the changes and reconfirmation of the qualification still needs to be comple ted. This item is scheduled to be completed by 2/22/85.
CONCLUSION: The changes are expected to be approved without further modification to the diesel generators. Qualification is not expected to be a problem since previously qualified hardware was used to make the modification. CPSES can be safely operated up to at least 5% power while these modifications are being reviewed and approved.
01/17/85
e 2904-02475-H DIESEL GENERATORS DETAILED DESCRIPTION: The NRC staff has required that the maximum emergency load requirements for the Diesel Generators be Ifmited to 5740 k W.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: All the items that the NRC staff has required prior to fuel load with respect to the emergency diesel generators is listed under Conclusion in Section 9.5.9 of SSER #6. The 5740 kW limit is based on a limit of a 185 psig break mean effective pressure (BEP) which is considered safe with respect to stress on the piston skirts and c rank sha f t. The need for this limit is based on concerns regarding these stresses at higher BEP loadings, and because of open items in the implementation of the Owner's Group Program Plan.
CONCLUSION _: The establishment of the operating restriction is partially the result of the incomplete status of implementation of the Owner's Group Program at the time of issuance. Changes in the status of implementation of the Owner's Group Program include the completion of all on-site Phase I activities, the issuance and review of the CPSES Phase II report on the Design Review / Quality Revalidation (DR/QR), and the submission of Texas Utilities' response to the DR/QR report to t1e NRC. The Owner's Group has concluded that the CPSES Unit I diesel generators are capable of reliably operating at full rated load.
In addition, Texas Utilities has taken actions to enhance and verify the reliability of the train A and B engines. These include recommendations made by the Owners' Group and the NRC Staff. A maintenance and surveillance program has also been developed and submitted to the NRC for approval.
l Since the review in SSER #6 for CPSES, Shoreham coupleted a long term reliability test on the piston skirts and Catawba completed a long term reliability test on the crankshaft. Inspections following these tests showed that the crankshaf t and piston skirts had performed adequately.
l As shown by this testing, it is reasonable to assume that the diesel l generators will perform adequately and reliably up to its rated power l loading of 7000 kW.
Based on the above, Texas Utilities believes that the CPSES Unit 1 diesel generators will provide a reliable standby source of onsite power l in accordance with General Design Criteria 17 without the operating restrictions imposed by the Staff.
01/17/85
3201-0394S-D AUXILIARY AND SAFEGUARDS BUILDING VENTILATION DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Design modifications are required to maintain environsental parameters in the Safeguards, Fuel and Auxiliary Buildings following a LOCA with loss of off-site power.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: A complete description of the design deficiencies and proposed resolution will be supplied by separate correspondence.
CONCLUSION: The lack of significant amounts of fission product generated during low power testing would indicate the acceptability of power operation up to 5% while this item is being resolved.
01/17/85 d
3401-1299S-D MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE BYPASS VALVES DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Bypass Valve pneumatic-hydraulic actuators will be replaced by manual operators.
Administrative controls will be instituted to assure a locked closed position after the MSIVs have been opened.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: This condition was determined during recent hot functional tests. This item is scheduled to be completed by 5/1/85.
CONCLUSION: These valves are only used to warm the Main Steam line to equalize pressure prior to opening the MSIVs. As an interim measure, the existing operators are being refurbished to allow use through 5%
power. Fission product inventory prior to 5% power is not significant due to the low power history. A fission product release during this period due to a failure of MSIV bypass valves is unlikely. CPSES Unit I can be operated safely while modifications are being completed.
01/17/85
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4501-0062S-W EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION 18 INCH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Documentation must be obtained to show that these valves will close against LOCA loads (50 psig air pressure).
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: The NRC staff has indicated that the requested test / analysis documentation should be provided by fuel load. The required documentation and valve modifications are scheduled to be completed by February 28, 1985.
CONCLUSION: Preliminary report from valve supplier indicates that these valves should be restricted to approximately 700 opening. With this recommendation, the mechanical stop devices will be installed to prevent the valves from opening any more than 700 Prior to exceeding 5% reactor power, there is no significant buildup of fission products in the fuel. Therefore, the need for the safety function provided by these valves is greatly reduced. CPSES Unit 1 can be safely operated up to 5% power while the modifications are being made to block these valves and while the final documentation for the design is being obtained and approved.
01/17/85
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4 4503-0029S-D CRDM VENTILATION DUCT SUaPORT DETAILED DESCRIPTION: The CRDM Ventilation Duct support system is being modified for maintenance access.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: This item is scheduled to be completed 2/18/85.
CONCLUSION: CPSES can safely load fuel load and proceed up to the point that it is necessary to energize the CRDM's while this work is being comple ted.
01/17/85 L 2
l 4802-0789S-D CONTAINENT SPRAY VALVES DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Containment spray valves fully open in 20 seconds. This causes the pugs to run-out.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: This item is scheduled to be completed by May 31, 1985.
CONCLUSION: Fission product inventory prior to exceeding 5% power is not significant due to low power history. The safety function provided by this system is not required until there is a significant butidup of fission products.
01/17/85
r; 5103-0009S-D APPENDIX R HYDROGEN PIPING J
DETAILED DESCRIPTION: An analysis of the excess flow valve closure time is required to substantiate the assunptions made for the hydrogen concentration calculations.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: To be completed by 4/1/85.
CONCLUSION: A hydrogen pipe break is a low probability event since it is not subject to corrosion, therini expansion, process fluid shock or vibra tion. Additionally, the hydrogen concentration analysis did not consider the dissipation effects of normal plant ventilation so that the results are very conservative. The piping system is seismically supported where analysis shows hydrogen concentrations exceed 2%. Yalve response time assuq)tions used for hydrogen calculations are considered to be conservative and only require final verification. Fission product inventory prior to exceeding 5% power is not significant due to the low power history. A fission product release during this period due to a hydrogen pipe failure is unlikely. CPSES Unit 1 can be safely operated
. up to 5% power while this analysis is being completed.
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-5201-1039S-W' EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION NSSS AUXILIARY RELAY RACK WIRING CHANGES DETAILED DESCRIPTION: In order to properly establish the seismic qualification of the NSSS Auxiliary Relay Rack, the wiring must be slightly rerouted within the rack to provide the best possible separation, t
- STATUS AND SCHEDULE: A J10 was subaitted on the NSSS Auxiliary Relay Racks by TXX-4304 of September 20, 1984. In NRR-6090 of December 4, 1984, the NRC staff provided a draft license condition that required that the wiring changes be completed prior to fuel load. The changes are scheduled to be completed by 1/26/85.
CONCLUSION: Separation is provided within the NSSS Auxiliary Relay Racks without the proposed modifications. The modifications are being made.to provide the greatest degree of separation possible within the as
- built racks. None of the circuitry within this rack is involved in i
protective functions and none of the equipment served provides a safety related function. However, certain circuits within the rack were routed and treated as Class 1E. Therefore, the separation within the rack is being maximized to protect against the remote possibility that a fault i would occur in a non-safety circuit within the rack of such magnitude and of such a nature that one of the train designated circuits within i
the rack would be affected in a manner that the train designated circuit would in turn jeopardize a safety related component or power supply.
Considering these facts as well as the fact that there is no significant buildup of fission products in the core below 51 power, it can be concluded that CPSES can safely load fuel ar.d operate up to 5% power without completion of the proposed wiring changes.
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5801-0432S-D
' APPENDIX R RHR VALVE DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Fire could cause a loss of instrument air to the RHR heat exchanger control valves causing them to fail in a position which results in a plant cooldown rate in excess of tech spec limits.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: The electrical system is scheduled to be modified
. by 3/1/85 to allow usage of a portable air compressor powered from either train "A" or "B" to supply operating air to these valves.
CONCLUSION: Fission product inventory prior to exceeding 5% poiver is not significant due to the low power history. Thus a fission product release due .to a fire in this area is unitkely. CPSES Unit I can be safely operated while this modification is being completed.
01/05/85 i
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7801-0096S-W SPOS ISOLATDR3 DETAILED DESCRIPTION: The NtC staff has requested specific information on the SPDS isolators.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: The information requested is being sought from the equipment vendor. If it cannot be obtained, some testing will probably be required. The NRC staff has indicated that fuses may be acceptable as an interim solution for the first cycle. These fuses are scheduled to be installed by 2/15/85.
CONCLUSION: A letter has been sent (TXX-4384) that provides for the installation of fuses as an interim solution and justifies the safe operation of CPSES Unit 1 through the first cycle.
01/17/85 u J
8801-0103S-W EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION B0P ANALOG CONTROL SYSTEM DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Some minor seismic qualification problems with the BOP Analog Control System need to be resolved. Several minor hardware modifications must be made (card replacement).
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: A J10 (MS 611B) was submitted by TXX-4208 of June 29, 1984. The JIO gave an estimated coupletion date of 12-31-84 but concluded that CPSES could safely operate until this package is cor.1pl e ted. All card replacements are scheduled to be coupleted by 2/3/85. This item is scheduled to be completed by 3/11/85.
CONCLUSION: The NRC staff has approved deferral of completion of this qualification package until 5% power (see NRR-6090 of December 4,1984).
01/17/85 t
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8900-0064S-W ELECTRICAL SEPARATION DETAILED DESCRIPTION: When cable wrap is ussd as a separation barrier, the minimum separation distance reconenended by R. G.1.75 between wire and barrier could not always be maintained.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: This item was discussed with the NRC staff on 8/23/84 and feedback was sent to engineering. This item is scheduled to be completed by 1/31/85.
CONC'.USION: The fire wrap is 1.5 inches of fire rated B&B HEMYC blanke t. The wrap is only used where the only hazard is fire. The separation distance is less than the reconsnended values in areas where it was physically not possible to separate the cables any further such as at wall or floor penetrations. Even though one cable touches the barrier of a second cable, the two cables are separated by 1.5 inches (the width of the barrier). Based on these facts, interim acceptance of this separation is reasonable for up to 5% power. CPSES Unit I can be safely operated up to 5% power while this analysis is being coupleted.
01/17/85
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8924-0784S-D APPENDIX R TURBINE BUILDING FIRE ZONE 111 CEILING SLAB AT ELEVATION 821-8 DETAILED DESCRIPTION: HVAC . ducts penetrating the ESC building through 3-hour fire barriers contain dampers not rated as three hour barriers.
Credit has been given for the integrity of the duct. This integrity is compromised if the ceiling slab collapses due to a fire in the area of the deck structural supports. This ceiling slab was intended to provide a three hour barrier but does not meet all the requirements for a three hour barrier. ,
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: The supports exposed to a turbine building fire are being protected with 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> protection. An analysis is being performed and a deviation being requested to accept the other supports a s buil t. A deviation is also being requested on ceiling slab itself.
This item is scheduled to be completed by 4/1/85.
CONCLUSION: The ceiling slab and its structural supports are located in areas where the primary fixed combustibles are IEEE 383 qualified cables and a small amount of office area combustibles. Unprotected structural steel has been known to survive intensive fires without losing. load carrying ability. However, should a fire cause a collapse of the ceiling slab only the HVAC duct integrity for the E/C Buf1 ding will be a f fec ted. This duct penetrates to the hallway adjacent to the cable spreading room. The hallway itself has no safety equipment and the 3-hour CSR boundary is unaffected. Fission product inventory prior to 5% power is not significant due to the low power history. Thus a fission product release due to a fire in this area .is unlikely. CPSES Unit 1 can be safely operated while this modification is being completed and the deviations are being prepared and reviewed.
01/17/85
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9800-0112S-W HELB SUPERHEAT DETAILED DESCRIPTION: An HELB in a Main Steamline outside containment could result in temperatures that exceed current qualification values in the room where the break occurs.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: A full status of this issue was submitted to the NRC on September 28,1984, in TXX-4320. This status showed that, based on typical data, the accident environment is such that all electrical equipment that is required to operate will not exceed its current qualification limits. A final analysis cannot be performed until final CPSES data on the break is received from Westinghouse.
In an NRR letter dated December 21, 1984, additional information was requested by the NRC staff.
This item is scheduled to be completed by 8/31/85.
CONCLUSION: The submittal of September 29, 1984, contained evidence that the CPSES design will adequately mitigate the HELB and allow for safe shutdown. When this evidence is coupled with the fact that there is no significant buildup of fission products prior to 5% power, it can be concluded that CPSES can be safely operated up to at least 5% power while the additional information requested by the NRC staff is being p rovided.
01/17/85
9800-0116S-D ,
TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUPP DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Turbina Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pusp may not meet the discharge head acceptance criteria as described in the draft Technical Specifications. Engineering evaluation is to be completed to determine resolution.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: This item is schedule to be resolved by 3/15/85.
CONCLUSION: The deviation of discharge head from acceptance criteria is only a few percentage points and should prove adequate with additional analysis. Fission product inventory prior to exceeding 5% power is not significant due to the low power history. A fission product release is unlikely during this period. CPSES Unit 1 can be safely operated up to 5% power while the analysis being completed.
01/17/85 E
9800-0178S-D U-BOLT TORQUES DETAILED DESCRIPTION: New torque values have been determined and must be verified for certain pipe supports that use U-bolts.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: This item is scheduled to be completed on 4/15/85.
CONCLUSION: Failure to torque the U-bolts to the specified torque values prior to fuel load would not affect plant safety. CPSES can safely load fuel and operate up to 5% power while this item is being '
completed.
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9800-0181S/0252S-W EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION INCORE THERM 0 COUPLES, CONNECTORS, ADAPTORS AND REFERENCE JUNCTION BOX DETAILED DESCRIPTION: The environmental qualification packages (ESE-43/44) for this equipment are not complete.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: A JIO was submitted by TXX-4209 of June 29, 1984.
The JIO gave an estimated completion date of 2-28-85 and concluded that CPSES Unit 1 could be safely operated until this qualification program is cogleted. The NRC staff has indicated that deferral will be allowed until November 1985 as allowed by 10 CFR 50.49. Qualification is scheduled to be completed by 06/30/85. The hardware modifications are scheduled to be completed by 03/07/85.
CONCLUSION: This deferral should extend until November 1985. The JIO is correct except that some hardware is being replaced. This hardware will be replaced prior to exceeding 5% power.
This equipment is part of the NUREG-0737 (Item II.F.2) backfit for Inadequate Core Cooling. The system is not required for any active safety related functions. All hardware changes will be completed prior to exceeding 5% power. Based on these facts and the fact that there is no significant butidup of fission products in the fuel prior to exceeding 5% power, CPSES Unit 1 can be safely operated until November 1985 while this environmental qualification program is being cogleted if the hardware changes are completed prior to exceeding 5% power.
01/17/85
9800-0183S-W EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION ACTIVE VALVES DETAILED DESCRIPTION: In preparation of the CPSES Tech. Specs., several valves were identified as active that were previously classified as passive.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: This effort primarily involves the generation of seismic qualification documentation and, in several cases, the addition of additional stiffeners. These valves are similar to valves that have already been seismically qualified. This item is scheduled to be coupleted by 2/22/85.
CONCLUSION: The seismic qualification of these valves and the installation of any additional stiffeners will be accomplished prior to exceeding 5% power. Based on the conservative seismic design at CPSES, the low probability of an earthquake between fuel load and 5% power, the lack of significant fission product buildup prior to 5% power and the high confidence that exists for these valves, it can be concluded that CPSES Unit 1 can safely load fuel and operate up to 5% power while the seismic documentation is finalized and the installation of the additional stiffeners is completed.
01/17/85
9800-0185S-D APPENDIX R FIRE DOORS DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Four fire doors (E-14, E-15, E-43, S-111) to be replaced by U.L. listed doors.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: Installation dependent on delivery. Scheduled to be completed by 2/1/85. The existing doors in (E-14, E-15, E-43, S-111) were designed as 3-hour rated fire doors, however, they lack a U.L.
listing.
CONCLUSION: The existing doors will remain in place until listed doors can be installed. For the short duration after fuel loading that the unlisted doors remain, safety of the plant will not be degraded.
Fission product inventory prior to exceeding 5% power is not significant due to the low power history. A fission product release due to a fire at these doors is unlikely. CPSES Unit 1 can be safely operated up to 5% power while this modification is being coupleted.
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r 9800-0190S-D APPENDIX R CHILLER PACKAGE DETAILED DESCRIPTION: A fire in the cable spreading room could cause the loss of the Diesel Generator Sequencer. A loss of the sequencer could prevent operation of the safety related chiller package.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: Design modifications have been approved to provide the capability of manually loading the chiller package on the diesel in the event of loss of sequencer. This item is to be completed by 2/22/85.
CONCLUSION: Fission product inventory prior to 5% power is negligible due to the low power history. Thus a fission product release due to fire in this area is unlikely. CPSES Unit 1 can be safely operated up to 5% power while this modification is being complete.
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e 9800-0204S-D APPENDIX R FPPR D,ISIGN VERIFICATION DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Fire Protection Program Review (FPPR) design verification includes review of 20 foot separation, I hour barriers, suppression and detection commitments. Follow-up work, if any, rey incl ude:
- 1. deviation submittal
- 2. update of FHA
- 3. additional physical work (thermolag, seals, sprinklers, e tc. )
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: The design verification is being expedited and is expected to be complete by 4/15/85. Schedules for any resulting work will be supplied af ter completion of verification.
I CONCLUSION: Fission product inventory prior to exceeding 5% power is not'significant due to the low power history. A fission product release during this period is unlikely. CPSES Unit 1 can be safely operated up to 5% while the verification is being cogleted. Follow-up work resulting from the verification, if any, will be evaluated and appropriate justification provided at that time.
01/17/85
9800-02095-W APPENDIX R BREAKER / FUSE COORDINATION DETAILED DESCRIPTION: In a request for additional information, the ASB of NRR has requested confirmation of proper breaker / fuse coordination for associated circuits.
P STATUS AND SCHEDULE: A partial breaker / fuse coordination audit was performed as part of the fire protection review for CPSES. This aspect of the CPSES design was also inspected by the NRC staff and their consultants _during the Fire Protection Walk-down. The audit and inspection revealed areas that warrant additional investigation. The investigation is complex and could take a considerable amount of time.
The confirmation of CPSES breaker / fuse coordination will be completed and required modifications, if any, will be implemented prior to startup for the second operating cycle of CPSES Unit 1.
CONCLUSION: A high confidence level exists in the CPSES design.
Breaker coordination has been considered in the past and was an element of the initial design of the CPSES electrical systems. Based on the NRC staff questions, TUGC0 intends to examine this issue until complete and proper compliance is adequately confirmed. CPSES can be safely operated during the first operating cycle while this issue is being resolved.
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9800-0219S-D APPENDIX R PORTABLE COMUNICATION FOR OPERATORS AND FIRE BRIGADE DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Lack of adequate portable consnunications restricts the ability of the fire brigade and operators to coordinate manual actions required during a fire. FCC licensing and a design to upgrade the current 40 watt operator channel to a 250 watt channel capable of comunication inside plant buildings is being implemented.
Also a new 250 watt channel is being installed for the use of the plant fire brigade.
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STATUS AND . SCHEDULE: To be completed by 7/30/85 contingent on the approval of the FCC ' license application.
CONCLUSION: The independent operator channel and fire brigade channel
'. ' may not be available until after 5% power. During the interim the backup security channel will be shared by the fire brigade and the
- operators in the event of a fire in which portable comunications are required. CPSES can be safely operated in this condition while this modification is being conpleted..
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9800-0220S-D APPENDIX R RADIO REPEATER SYSTEMS DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Resolve portable communication dead spots in the radio repeater system due to plant as-built walkdown.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: This item is scheduled to be cogleted by 5/15/85.
CONCLUSION: Fission product inventory prior to exceeding 5% power is not significant due to the low power history. Thus, a fission product release during this period due to a fire is unlikely. CPSES Unit I can be safely operated up to 5% power while this modification is being
., completed.
01/17/85
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9800-0230S-D APPENDIX R THERMLAG DETAILED DESCRIPTION: Additional thermolag required as a result of the FPPR problems identified. Identification of areas requiring thermolag not yet complete. )
4 STATUS AND SCHEDULE: This item is scheduled to be coupleted by 2/22/85.
CONCLUSION: Fission product inventory prior to exceeding 5% power is not significant due to the low power history. Thus a fire in non-thermolagged cabling is unlikely to cause a fission product release during this period. CPSES Unit 1 can be safely operated up to 5% power while this modification is being completed.
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9800-0247S-W EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION NSSS INTERFACE DOCUMENT DETAILED DESCRIPTION: This document provides interface information needed to assure that the NSSS equipment is properly interfaced in the field to assure that the environmental qualification of that equipment is maintained.
STATUS AND SCHEDULE: A revision to this document has been received.
This issue is scheduled to be resolved prior to 1/26/85.
CONCLUSION: This effort is confirmatory in nature. The NSSS equipment of concern was installed based on the insta11 tion and interface requirements provided by Westinghouse. The ins'.a11ation and interface requirements were included as an input into the equipment qualification p rograms. This final confirmatory effort will verify that the interface requirements of the qualification program are adequately met by the CPSES installation. CPSES can safely operate through November 1985 (as allowed by 10 CFR 50.49) while this confirmatory effort is being completed.
01/05/85