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| ENS 55453 | 9 September 2021 13:53:00 | The following is a synopsis of information received via E-mail: Component Description: AMETEK Part Number 07-740108-00, K306 relay, used in the float/equalize circuit of AMETEK Battery Chargers. The relay is a solid-state timer manufactured by Omron with manufacturer part number H3CR-A-AC100-240/DC100125. Problem You Could See: AMETEK was notified of a condition of a nonconforming K306 relay that led to failures of battery chargers. AEP DC Cook reported a single failure of a K306 Float/Equalize timer relay in a controlled environment where the relay failed to transfer from float to equalize and caused the DC output to fail. Transferring the battery charger to equalize mode is always a manual operation and the float/equalize function is typically used after an outage or a discharge test in order to bring the batteries back to full charge. Before performing a discharge test, the charger should be put in equalize mode. AMETEK was not able to evaluate this specific instance of failure, but it was determined the circuit does not meet the minimum contact current rating. As a result, the operation of the relay may be unreliable and the charger may experience a loss of output when equalize is initiated, failing to charge the batteries. The failed relay was installed in 2017 and was original to the equipment. Effect on System Performance: If the charger fails to transfer between float and equalize, the equalize light may turn on, the charger output will fail, voltage will drop below float voltage or to 0, and there will be no charging capabilities. An alarm will indicate Low DC voltage in the event the charger does not transfer between float and equalize. The charger will restart after the AC input breaker is cycled Off and On. The relay should be replaced if the charger output is lost. Other alarm(s) may be included with the design: - Battery Discharge Alarm - Low Current Alarm The battery will charge with float voltage, but will take longer than with equalize voltage (~8-24 hours after charging current stabilizes). The safety impact is a loss of battery charger output after an event where the float/equalize button is utilized and does not retransfer to equalize for charging. If the charger fails to transfer and the output is lost prior to a safety event, the battery may not be at full capacity for a shutdown. Each utility will need to evaluate the application of the battery charger and the battery it is charging. Affected Entities: Alabama Power Company; Arkansas Nuclear One; Atomic Energy of Canada; Constellation Energy; Consumer's Power, Palisades; Dominion - Kewaunee; Dominion Energy; Dominion Inc.; Duke Energy; Duke Power Co.; EM Test (Switzerland) GMBH; Engine Systems; Ergytech Inc.; Exelon; Exelon Generation Co.; First Energy; Formosa Nextech Co.; Framatome Technologies; Georgia Power; Indiana Michigan Power Co.; Millstone Nuclear Power Station; Niagara Mohawk; NPP Krsko; Progress Energy; TVA; TVA Watts Bar; Ulysses - Taiwan Power; and Ulysses System Development. Ametek Contact: Ametek Solidstate Controls Client Services group, 1-800-222-9079 or 614-846-7500, extension 1. |
| ENS 55167 | 1 April 2021 17:20:00 | The following is a synopsis of a Part 21 interim report received by email: COMPONENT DESCRIPTION - 300V, 250 A clamp diodes with Vishay/International Rectifier part numbers IN3737 and IN3737R and Ametek part numbers 07-600250-00 and 07-600251-00, respectively. Diode failures occurred in 20kVA Inverters, Ametek part number 85-VC0200-41 with serial numbers C84733-0211 and C84733-0511. Two failed diodes returned for evaluation were manufactured in India in 2004. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED - TVA has experienced 5 diode failures since November of 2017. The diode failures experienced at TVA resulted in alarms for abnormal conditions and equipment alarms for fan failure, inverter fuse blown, and inverter failure. The equipment will transfer to bypass when a diode fails. POTENTIAL CAUSE - Diodes installed in the TVA equipment were shorted in most cases and degraded in one instance. Only two of the shorted diodes were sent to AMETEK SCI for evaluation. While the precise cause of this failure is unknown, diode failures are generally attributed to transient voltage spikes and overheating. TVA did indicate there have not been any transient events on the DC bus that could have caused this failure. The inverters at TVA are loaded below 50%. This could contribute to increased heat and stress on the diodes due to increased current draw. However, test data from the original testing of the equipment at no load did not show elevated temperatures on the diodes. EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE - Failures described above could result in loss of output voltage and transfer of the static switch to the bypass source which could result in potential loss of load. EVALUATION OF THE POTENTIAL DEFECT - AMETEK is sending the parts to the original manufacturer for further evaluation with the intent to obtain more insight on the interior condition of the diodes. The targeted completion date for this evaluation of the two diodes returned is June 1, 2021.
What is being classified as a 'minor adjustment' is being made to the notification originally submitted on 4/1/2021. All diodes TVA identified as failed were shorted. None were degraded. Notified R2DO (Miller) and the Part 21/50.55 Reactors E-mail group.
The following excepts provide a synopsis of information provided by AMETEK in the final report. ... The failure was caused by electrical overstress, but the specific root cause is indeterminate. PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE: A diode failure could occur and will result in the equipment transferring to bypass, a loss of output voltage, blown fuses, and unexpected alarms such as fan failure, inverter fuse blown, and inverter failure alarms. There are no conclusive warning signs that a failure is imminent, or detection method for predicting an approaching failure. CAUSE: Diodes that failed in the TVA equipment were shorted according to the summaries provided by TVA. Only two of the shorted diodes were sent to AMETEK SCI for evaluation. The condition of all other diodes is unknown. While the precise cause of this failure is unknown, diode failures are generally attributed to transient voltage spikes and overheating. TVA did indicate there have not been any transient events on the DC bus that could have caused this failure. Additionally, AMETEK sent a representative to the site to review the equipment and operating conditions. The field service technician concluded that there were no abnormalities apparent in the operating conditions or the equipment itself. According to TVA, the inverters at TVA are loaded below 50%. The AMETEK field service representative determined load was at 25% of full load during the site visit in August of 2021. This could contribute to increased heat and stress on the diodes due to increased current draw. However, there was no indication of overheating of the diode at no load or 25% of unit C84733- 0511 (1-II). All diodes were within acceptable temperature conditions on the equipment evaluated. EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE: Failures described above could result in loss of output voltage and transfer of the static switch to the bypass source which could result in potential loss of load. ACTION REQUIRED: AMETEK Solidstate Controls recommends that each facility evaluate the potential risk and performs replacement as determined necessary. Evaluation could include oscilloscope measurements across the diodes and temperature measurements of the diodes and the equipment. Voltage readings from the oscilloscope measurement should not exceed the rating of the diode. Temperatures should be compared to original test data and should not exceed 100ø C. Recent evaluations have been unable to pinpoint a failure mode and there are no conclusive connections to previous failures. Only the failures provided in this report have surfaced for the subject part numbers and the failure rate has been low. AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION: AMETEK Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements and spare parts for your application as needed. Please contact our Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079 or 1- 614-846-7500, extension 1. Notified R2DO (Miller) and the Part 21/50.55 Reactors E-mail group. |
| ENS 54520 | 11 February 2020 00:00:00 | The following is a synopsis of a Part 21 report received by email: SUMMARY - AMETEK Solidstate Controls recently discovered a concern with the structural integrity of the 85-RP2675-01 Rack Mounted Power supply. While qualifying a replacement part for an obsolete breaker, the left panel of the power supply came loose after the hardware had sheared during the seismic simulation testing of the qualification. The loss of structural integrity of the power supply led to internal shorting and a premature stoppage of the simulation testing. PROBLEM - During a seismic event, a structural failure of the power supply enclosure resulting in a loss of output could occur. At this point, it is suspected that the failure is related to a variation in the components that increased strain on the power supply enclosure, and it is indeterminate if there is a widespread deviation. It is also possible that the cause of the failure is attributed to inadequately sized hardware that supports the bottom panel of the power supply. In the current design, there are 3 #10-32 machine screws through each of the side panels that fasten to the bottom panel to support the transformer. AMETEK is unable to identify the actual structural support of power supplies in the field. In the recent testing performed, no support was provided under the power supply during the testing. If there is support in the end application from the bottom of the power supply, there may not be a structural concern as the connection screws would not be exposed to the same forces. In this instance, the power supply had been exposed to a peak acceleration of approximately 4.8 giga second. It should also be noted that acceptable results have been obtained in previous seismic tests and changes have not been made to the structure of the power supply since its initial design in 1996. ACTION RECOMMENDED - At this time, there are no actions to take as the evaluation is ongoing. The next step is to determine if the screws are likely to become overstrained with enough seismic force. To do this, AMETEK is repeating the test with two new power supplies. One power supply will not have any changes made to the structure while the second power supply will be enhanced to improve its seismic withstand capabilities. The enhancement is an increase in the size of the hardware to 1/4 inch bolts that connects the side panels to the bottom panel through 5/16 inch through holes with a nut and washers. In combination, these changes will increase the force required to shear the hardware (and) reduce the force on the bolt itself by allowing some movement to dampen the forces during a seismic event. While AMETEK believes this solution will be suitable, it has not been validated with a follow up seismic simulation test. Additionally, AMETEK is unable to determine the criticality of the applications the power supplies are installed in and if the safety function is required to be maintained during a seismic event, which will determine the need to take corrective actions. A report of the next seismic test results will follow upon completion as a final evaluation. The current expected date for completion is May, 2020. For questions or clarifications in the meantime, please contact Ethan Salsbury, Quality Director, at 1-614-410-6293.
The following is an update of a Part 21 report received by email: ACTION RECOMMENDED - AMETEK does not consider this to be a likely failure based on these test results. Additionally, AMETEK is unable to determine the criticality of the applications the power supplies are installed in and if the safety function is required to be maintained during a seismic event, which will determine the need to take corrective actions. The following enhancements can be applied to power supplies in operation: - Add a #10-32 nut to each of the six (6) mounting screws to avoid any lateral movement of the sheet metal parts that would lead to potential elongation or striping of the fastener. - Add support to the bottom of the transformer to prevent horizontal forces on the support screws Although recent testing did not result in a similar failure, AMETEK is taking actions to enhance the design of the power supply. On new power supplies, the mounting hardware will use ¬" bolts that connect the side panels to the bottom panel through 5/16" through holes with a nut and washers. In combination, these changes will increase the force required to shear the hardware reduce the force on the bolt itself by allowing some movement to dampen the forces during a seismic event. Notified R1DO (Bower), R2DO (Miller), R3DO (Feliz-Adorno), and R4DO (Kellar) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email. |
| ENS 53993 | 12 April 2019 09:31:00 | The following was received via e-mail: COMPONENT DESCRIPTION: AMETEK part number 80-315382-90, T801 main transformer. PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE: Overheating and failure of transformers installed in equipment with 0.7 power factor load requirements CAUSE: The inverters on AMETEK job number C72143 were required to support a 0.7 power factor load. To meet this requirement, CVT capacitors were added which led to overcurrent on the capacitor current windings and overheating. The overheating led to a breakdown in insulation between windings, causing a premature failure of the transformer set and inverter relative to its 40-year qualification life. EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE: The overheating accelerates the degradation of the insulation between windings and eventually leads to shorting. This will cause an inverter failure and require the load to be transferred to bypass. ACTION REQUIRED: This is the only instance AMETEK has experienced for this issue. Therefore, action is only required for the equipment on AMETEK job number C72143, located at TVA Sequoyah. New transformers have been provided as replacements that require fewer capacitors, contain additional venting to improve cooling, and include larger winding material to reduce current density. The main transformers (T801) installed in the serial numbers associated with this job (C72143-0111 through 0911) should be replaced to prevent any similar occurrences. AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION: AMETEK has enhanced this particular transformer design to improve cooling and reduce capacitor current. Additionally, corrective action #175 has been issued in AMETEK's system. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Mark Shreve of the Client Services group at 1- 800-222-9079 or 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6332. mark.shreve@ametek.com. Sequoyah is the only site affected by this Part 21 Report. |
| ENS 53816 | 7 January 2019 12:48:00 | EN Revision Text: PART 21 - COMPONENTS PROVIDED AS SAFETY-RELATED SPARE PARTS WITHOUT BEING DEDICATED AMETEK Solidstate Controls (SCI) is providing this report in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 as notice of a process defect that resulted in components being provided as safety-related spare parts without being dedicated. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: Lack of evidence of dedication testing for AMETEK Solidstate Controls Safety-Related Operational Spare Parts Kits provided with SCI equipment CAUSE: In October 2018, NextEra Seabrook notified SCI of a part number discrepancy with a safety-related fuse that was provided with an operational spare parts kit with an equipment order. After further investigation, it was determined that dedication testing was not performed on the operational spare parts kits provided with the equipment on various jobs in recent years. Generally, spare parts are ordered separately from equipment and a process is in place to direct the parts to quality for commercial grade dedication testing. In this instance, the parts were ordered as a line item on the sale and the parts in question were selected from inventory without being routed through quality for commercial grade dedication. PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE: Evidence of dedication testing is not available for operational spare parts kits which were provided with equipment orders, however, there are no functional concerns with the components provided on these orders. The parts would have been selected at the same time as the parts that were installed in the systems. Additionally, for the commercial grade items provided, there is no history of failure during dedication testing performed by AMETEK either in equipment or during bench testing. ACTION REQUIRED: Aside from printed circuit boards, the parts supplied as operational spare parts will need to be dedicated. AMETEK SCI recommends returning the untested items and will work with (the customer) to arrange returns and retesting. Please contact Mr. Mark Shreve of AMETEK SCI's Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079, 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6332, or mark.shreve@ametek.com. The non-dedicated parts were supplied to Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Seabrook Station, and North Anna Power Station. In addition, non-dedicated parts were also supplied to the Krsko Nuclear Power Plant in Slovenia and the Maanshan Nuclear Power Plant in Taiwan.
The following was received via email from Ametek: After further evaluation, (Ametek) has determined that additional kits are impacted by this issue, but the same customer list and POs apply. No additional customers are impacted and a corrected notification will be provided to customers that have been previously identified. R1DO (Bickett) and R2DO (Lopez) were notified. Part 21 Reactors Group was notified via email. |
| ENS 53529 | 27 July 2018 16:14:00 | COMPONENT DESCRIPTION: 277VAC Voltage Sense Board. PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE: In May of 2018, AMETEK Solidstate Controls (SCI) experienced failures during preventative maintenance with the 80-210833-90 AC Voltage Sense board during the startup of a unit. While the failures were experienced on commercial equipment, a version of the AC Voltage Sense printed circuit board is used in safety-related equipment as well. CAUSE: The failure of the AC Voltage Sense Boards is caused by the opening of the 100 OHM 2W R7 metal oxide resistor, AMETEK SCI part number 03-804103-00, due to insufficient peak power withstand capability for the application. In all instances of failures experienced, the peak inrush power dissipation during startup caused the 2W metal oxide resistor to open. Failures have been limited to the metal oxide resistor. EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE: If the 100 OHM, 2W metal oxide resistor in the R7 position (PN: 03-804103-00) of the AC Voltage Sense board experiences peak power above its rating and opens, the AC Voltage Sense board may fail. This failure could cause a false low AC voltage alarm and an inoperable high AC voltage alarm condition. During steady state operation, the resistor will not be exposed to power dissipation significant enough to impact the resistor. This potential defect and 10 CFR 21 notification applies to SCI safety-related 277VAC version of the AC Voltage Sense printed circuit board: 80-9210842-90 - PCB ASSY, VLT SENSE 277VAC, 1PH. ACTION RECOMMENDED: The R7 metal oxide resistor is being replaced in the 80-9210842-90 version of the AC voltage sense printed circuit board with a wire-wound resistor (PN: 03-804103-10). The AC Voltage Sense Board will be revised to revision level 'I'. AMETEK recommends replacing any prior revisions of the 277VAC AC Voltage Sense boards at the earliest convenience. AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION: If you wish to replace the 277 VAC AC Voltage Sense Board with the latest revision, AMETEK Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements. Please contact Mr. Mark Shreve of our Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079 or 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6332. mark.shreve@AMETEK.com. AFFECTED CUSTOMERS The list below identifies all AMETEK Solidstate Controls customers who have purchased the printed circuit board 80-9210842-90 since 2008. Any purchases prior to 2008 should have been replaced according to the recommended preventative maintenance schedule and, therefore are not applicable to this 10 CFR 21 notification. China Nuclear, Edison Material Supply, Energy Northwest, Jade Dragon Trading, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Company Limited, KRSKO, Exelon Business Services - Braidwood Warehouse, Exelon Business Services - Braidwood/ Byron Generating Station, Georgia Power Company - Vogtle 1 & 2, Shenzhen Chance New Energy Scientific Instrument Co. |
| ENS 53043 | 30 October 2017 12:36:00 | The following is excerpted from an email received from Ametek: COMPONENT DESCRIPTION: Eaton auxiliary switches, catalog number AUX2A2BPK installed in EG Frame Molded Case Circuit Breakers (30A - 125A). PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE: Eaton auxiliary switches manufactured after May 2015 and installed in EG Frame Breakers (30A - 125A) could experience intermittent operation of the auxiliary switch due to a design defect of the auxiliary switch. The design defect of the auxiliary switch can result in the auxiliary switch to fail to change state during breaker operation. CAUSE: Ametek Solidstate Controls identified intermittent auxiliary switch operation during testing. Eaton confirmed a problem with the auxiliary switches used in EG Frame Breakers manufactured since May of 2015. The auxiliary switch in the EG frame breakers may not operate reliably, resulting in the auxiliary switch returning to, or staying in, its shelf state. The auxiliary switch is being redesigned to improve the mechanical interface reliability between the breaker mechanism and the auxiliary switch. EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE: The breaker overcurrent protection and shunt trip function are not affected by this defect. If the auxiliary switch defect occurs in the DC Input breaker (B1) while the system is operating, the static switch will transfer the load to Bypass (alternate Source) and the Inverter will shut down. If the defect occurs during startup, the Inverter will not start. If the auxiliary switch defect is present in any other breaker, it will result in a failure to annunciate a breaker closed indicator. A list of affected equipment with the breaker locations is provided below. ACTION REQUIRED: Replacement auxiliary switches from Eaton are expected to be available sometime in the second quarter of 2018. An immediate solution is not available. For circuit breakers in the B1 position, Ametek Solidstate Controls recommends replacing the auxiliary switch as soon as a redesigned auxiliary switch is available. For all other breakers, the state of the breaker should be verified prior to performing any maintenance until the auxiliary switch can be replaced. In this situation, the auxiliary switch should be replaced at the earliest convenience. AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION: If you wish to replace the auxiliary switches, Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements. Please contact Mr. Mark Shreve of our Client Services group at 1-800- 222-9079 or 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6332. mark.shreve@ametek.com A copy (including Eaton EG Frame Part Number, Ametek Part Number, Serial Number, Equipment Part No., Customer, Breaker Location and Total) will also be provided to the affected licensees - Ameren, TVA, Southern Nuclear, Duke, and Krsko. Curtiss Wright also received eight (8) of the suspect breakers. |
| ENS 52736 | 8 May 2017 09:52:00 | Ametek Solidstate Controls began a 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation after receiving notification from NextEra Energy Seabrook Station that a 7.5kVA Inverter would prematurely transfer to alternate source at 27A load during commissioning. The X202 Crest factor board (80-9213516-90) was replaced and the unit operated normally. Analysis of the failed X202 Crest Factor board identified an SCR on the printed circuit board was turning on prematurely and resulted in a transfer to alternate source or with the absence of the alternate source, to a dead bus. A capacitor was placed across the SCR on the X202 board to protect the SCR from dv/dt turn on. Subsequent testing determined the added capacitor corrected the anomaly. In addition to Seabrook, Ametek has recently experienced similar anomalies on two separate occasions. However, these occurrences were discovered during manufacturing and in-house testing phase for new product and were attributed to a SCR failure, excessive noise, and long leads. ACTION RECOMMENDED: Ametek Solidstate Controls recommends installing a 0.22 microfarad capacitor p/n 80-134734-90 across X202 terminals J1-11 to J1-12. This capacitor will have no effect on EMI or seismic qualifications. If you wish to acquire the 80-134734-90 capacitor, Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to provide spare parts. Please contact Mr. Mark Shreve of our Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079 or 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6332. mark.shreve@ametek.com
The following information was excerpted from an Ametek Solidstate Control email: Ametek Solidstate Controls began a 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation after receiving notification from NextEra Energy Seabrook Station that a 7.5kVA Inverter would prematurely transfer to alternate source at 27A load during commissioning. The X202 Crest factor board (80-9213516-90) was replaced and the unit operated normally. Analysis of the failed X202 Crest Factor board identified an SCR on the printed circuit board was turning on prematurely and resulted in a transfer to alternate source, or with the absence of the alternate source, to a dead bus. A capacitor was placed across the SCR on the X202 board to protect the SCR from dv/dt turn on. Subsequent testing determined the added capacitor corrected the anomaly. In addition to Seabrook, Ametek has recently experienced similar anomalies on two separate occasions. However, these occurrences were discovered during manufacturing and in-house testing phase for new product and were attributed to an SCR failure, excessive noise, and long leads. Ametek Solidstate Controls recommends installing a 0.22 microfarad capacitor, p/n 80-134734-90 across X202 terminals J1-11 to J1-12. This capacitor will have no effect on EMI, seismic, or aging qualifications. If you wish to acquire the 80-134734-90 capacitor, Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to provide spare parts. Please contact Mr. Mark Shreve of our Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079 or 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6332. mark.shreve@ametek.com Notified R1DO (Bower), R3DO (Daley) and Part 21 Group via email. |
| ENS 52384 | 21 November 2016 12:13:00 | The following report was excerpted from an e-mail: Product: Ametek Solidstate Controls Analog Oscillator, printed circuit board part number 80-9230404-90 A single unit, Ametek part number 80-9230404-90, was shipped to Exelon Dresden Station on the reference purchase order has an incorrect capacitor installed. This error was identified during testing of a subsequent identical part. Ametek reviewed all printed circuit boards built under that run and verified all affected printed circuits boards less one, were still in house. This shipment was made on October 26, 2016. Ametek contacted Exelon Dresden immediately upon identification of the incorrect part installation and Exelon was able to have the board retrieved from their inventory. Ametek Solidstate Controls is submitting this notification as a precaution under the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21, but considers it a limited incident as the single defective part was isolated and the board is in the process of being returned. No further action is required and this notification does not affect any other installation, client, inventory, or equipment provided by Ametek.
The following report is an excerpt from an email received: Ametek reviewed all the printed circuit boards built under that run and verified all affected printed circuits boards less one, were still in house. The single affected board was shipped to Exelon Generation Company, Byron warehouse on purchase order # 00588294 and Ametek sales order #46001912. This shipment was made on October 26, 2016. Ametek contacted Exelon Byron immediately upon identification of the incorrect part installation and Exelon was able to have the board retrieved from the inventory. Notified R3DO (McCraw) and Part 21/50.55 (via email). |
| ENS 51972 | 2 June 2016 16:30:00 | The following was excerpted from the Ametek Part 21 Report received via email: Ametek inverter manufactured with Signal Transformer R-10607, Ametek part number 80-310879-90 was inadvertently installed in several units from an unapproved supplier. The potential for this situation to occur exists for new equipment delivered between July of 2015 and May of 2016. Affected utilities and equipment serial numbers are identified below. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Millstone 96000067-0411, 96000067-0511, 96000067-0611, 96000067-0711 Krsko Nuclear Power Plant 96000068-0211, 96000068-0311, 96000068-0411 Exelon, Byron Station 96000075-0311, 96000075-0411, 96000075-0511, 96000075-0611 Ametek Solidstate Controls is submitting the following Report of a Potential Defect in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR Part 21. To replace the transformers, Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements. Please our Client Services group at 1-614-846-7500. mailto: eric.phillips@ametek.com The potential problems include: - Mag wire terminated with improper lug and tooling which may cause loss of feedback to static transfer function. - Spot welded band around the core which has not been adequately seismically evaluated. - 180 degree Celsius insulation system provided instead of the approved 200 degree Celsius and unapproved materials used which impacts the aging analysis.
Serial numbers for KRSKO and Millstone are corrected as follows: Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Millstone 96000068-0211 96000068-0311 96000068-0411 KRSKO Nuclear Power Plant 96000067-0411 96000067-0511 96000067-0611 96000067-0711 Notified the R1DO (Schroeder), R3DO (Hills) and Part 21 Group via email. |
| ENS 52657 | 3 April 2017 09:28:00 | The following information is the summary letter was received from Ametek via email: Product: Vishay/ International Rectifier Clamp, Diodes 600 V, 250A, forward and reverse bias. Ametek part numbers 07-600254-00 and 07-600255-00. Ametek Solidstate Controls is submitting the following Report of a Potential Defect in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR21. This notification is applicable to equipment model number 85-VC0250-29 provided to Dominion Nuclear at Millstone Power Station. Serial numbers affected by this potential defect are: C901880111 C901880211 C901880221 C901880231 C901880244 AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION: If you wish to replace the diodes, Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements. Please contact Mr. Mark Shreve of our Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079 or 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6332. mark.shreve@ametek.com Please contact us at telephone: 614-846-7500; 1-800-635-7300 or e-mail: ethan.salsbury@ametek.com, if there are any questions.
The original notification for this report contained a typo on the last serial number of the equipment affected. Instead of serial number C901880244, the correct serial number is C901880241. Notified R1DO (Cahill), R2DO (Nease), R3DO (Skokowski), R4DO (Vasquez), and Part 21 Reactors group by email. |