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ENS 5713623 May 2024 04:25:00The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0400 EDT on May 23, 2024, a technical specification required shutdown was initiated at Perry. Technical specification action 3.4.5 condition B (unidentified reactor coolant system leakage exceeds 5 gallons per minute) was entered on May 23, 2024 at 0000 with a required action to reduce leakage to within limits within 4 hours, due by 0400 on May 23, 2024. This required action was not completed within the completion time, therefore, a technical specification required shutdown was initiated, and this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The reactor coolant leakage was stable at approximately 6 gallons per minute.
ENS 571138 May 2024 14:30:00The following information was provided by the licensee via phone: Per the licensees Technical Specifications (TS) 6.1.3.a, "The minimum staffing when the reactor is not secured shall be: . A reactor operator or the senior reactor operator on duty in the control room. On May 7, 2024, following the reactor shutdown, there was an indication that one control rod was not fully inserted. Both the reactor operator and reactor engineer left the control room to investigate and discovered that one control rod was not fully inserted. The reactor operator leaving the control room violated the minimum control room staffing requirements of TS 6.1.3.a. On May 8, 2024, the licensee determined that the cause for the control rod not being fully inserted was a dislodged plastic buffer at the bottom of the control rod barrel. The NRC Project Manager has been notified.
ENS 571107 May 2024 14:56:00The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone: A patient had a written directive to receive 90 Gy of Y-90 TheraSpheres to the liver. When the order was entered into the system, the wrong activity was entered. The higher activity of 360 Gy Y-90 TheraSpheres was then administered to the patient. The calculated dose to the liver may exceed 50 rem. The patient and referring physician were informed. No health effect or permanent functional damage is expected. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facilitys use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 570991 May 2024 16:58:00The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via telephone: On May 1, 2024, while conducting radiography on a weld using a QSA D880 with a 90 curie iridium-192 source, the source became disconnected from the cable when attempting retrieval. Surveys showed the source was still in the collimator. The radiation safety officer (RSO) set up boundaries and contacted the manufacturer for guidance. After about three hours, the RSO was able to return the source to its shielded container in the radiography camera. Pocket dosimetry indicated that the RSO received a dose of 178 mrem and the assistant RSO received a dose of 12 mrem. Film badge dosimeters will be read to confirm the exposures.
ENS 571117 May 2024 15:50:00The following was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via email: On May 7, 2024, the Department was notified by the licensee that on May 1, 2024, one of its radiography crews was unable to fully retract a 82.92 curie iridium-192 source into a QSA 880D exposure device. The radiographers had cranked the source out to test a weld, but when they tried to retract the source back to the fully shielded position they could not. The radiographers immediately notified the licensees site radiation safety officer (SRSO), set up new barriers, and warned other individuals in the area. After a licensee manager arrived at the location, it was determined that a bend in the guide tube was too sharp to allow the source to be retracted. Using a set of 6.5 foot tongs, the SRSO repositioned the guide tube, and a radiographer was able to return the source to the fully shielded position. No individual received an exposure that exceeded 100 millirem. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident Number: 10104 Texas NMED Number: TX240014
ENS 571086 May 2024 12:49:00The following information was provided by the Arkansas Department of Health, Radiation Control Section (ADH) via email: On 4/25/2024, (the licensee) notified ADH by phone that, during semi-annual routine inspection, five Berthold process nuclear gauges were either stuck/seized or difficult to operate. All affected gauges were stuck in the open/operate position. A representative from Berthold reported to the site on 4/30/2024 and successfully cleaned/lubricated all shutter/operating mechanisms restoring normal operation to the affected gauges. The following gauges were affected: Berthold Model LB 7440-D-CR: SN 37624-12090: Cs-137 50 mci: (Unknown License) Berthold Model LB 330: SN 2868-11-89: Cs-137 24 mci: (Unknown License) Berthold Model LB 300L: SN 6001: Co-60 4.1, 0.7, 0.2 mci: (General License) Berthold Model LB 300: SN 7687: Co-60 1.8, 0.5, 0.2 mci: (Specific License) Berthold Model LB 300L: SN 17729-1396-10023: Cs-137 24 mci: (General License) Licensee corrective actions included flagging the gauges locally, involving management, notifying their safety department, and suspending any activity that would require access to the gauges until they were repaired. The licensee is evaluating disposal of the gauges and possible replacement. The licensee confirmed at 1020 CDT on 5/06/2024, that one LB 300 gauge shown above is a specific license gauge. The investigation is ongoing, and reporting will proceed in accordance with SA-300. Arkansas Event Number: AR-2024-003
ENS 5708822 April 2024 14:33:00

The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via email: Global Nuclear Fuel discovered instances of GNF3 fuel assembly spacers relocating within the fuel bundle. A safety communication was issued in 2022 following the discovery of a raised water rod (WR) at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. Shutdown inspections in February 2024 at Lasalle identified five spacers out of position. Shutdown inspections at Limerick in April 2024 identified four spacers out of position. Those discoveries prompted this Part 21 report. An evaluation concluded that the relocated spacers could result in a degraded critical power margin, but the evaluation of this condition indicates it will not compromise or greatly reduce protection to public health and safety. Plants with suspect bundles installed: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (Raised WR but no defective spacers) Lasalle (1 bundle with 5 relocated spacers found) Limerick (1 bundle with 4 relocated spacers found) Nine Mile Point (No defects found) Fermi (No defects found) Peach Bottom (Shutdown scheduled in Fall 2024) Fitzpatrick (Shutdown scheduled in Fall 2024)

  • * * UPDATE ON 4/26/24 AT 1220 EDT FROM LISA SCHICHLEIN TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *

Updated to correct administrative errors in the summary of defects. Corrections were made above. Notified R1DO (Werkheiser), R3DO (Betancourt-Roldan), R4DO (Warnick), Part 21/Reactor Group (email)

ENS 5708218 April 2024 18:18:00The following was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via email: On April 18, 2024, the Department was notified by the licensee that the shutter on a Vega model SH-F1 nuclear gauge failed to close. The gauge contains a 20 millicurie (original activity) cesium - 137 source. Open is the normal position for the gauge shutter. The licensee reported there is no risk of additional radiation exposure to members of the general public or radiation workers, due to this failure. The manufacturer has been contacted to repair the gauge shutter. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident Number: 10100 Texas NMED Number: TX240013
ENS 5708118 April 2024 16:32:00The following information was provided by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection Bureau of Radiation Protection (the Department) email: On April 18, 2024, the licensee informed the Department of a medical event. It is reportable per 10 CFR 35.3045. On April 17, 2024, a patient was receiving an iodine-131 (sodium iodine solution) treatment. The patient was prescribed 100 mCi of I-131. However, the patient received only 5 mCi of I-131. At this time no other information is available. The Department will update this event as soon as more information is provided. The Department will perform a reactive inspection. More information will be provided upon receipt. PA Event Number: PA240006 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facilitys use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5705928 March 2024 12:55:00

The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone: On March 27, 2024, at 1101 EDT, a sample containing 20.3 mCi of carbon-14 (C-14) in 1,3-Dichloropropene liquid form (348 microliters) was dropped when being removed from a storage container. The authorized user immediately called for assistance and restricted access to the laboratory where the spill occurred. Decontamination efforts began immediately after the incident, and it was confirmed that the contamination was contained to the laboratory where the spill occurred. It was determined on March 28, 2024, at 1025 EDT that restrictions would remain in place greater than 24 hours, and that this incident was reportable under 10 CFR 30.50(b)(1). Following the spill, a nasal swab was taken of the worker with no detectable activity, however, a urine bioassay taken the following day indicated a potential internal dose of 213 mrem. No other staff were exposed, and there was no risk to public safety or the environment. The applicable 10 CFR 20 Appendix B annual limit for intake for C-14 is 2000 microcuries. Decontamination efforts will continue until detectable surface contamination is less than 1000 dpm/100 square centimeters.

  • * * UPDATE ON 4/26/24 AT 1609 EDT FROM KELLY WEGENER-GAVE TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *

The licensee submitted a 30-day written report for this event. Notified R3DO (Betancourt-Roldan) and NMSS Events (email).

ENS 5704623 March 2024 03:47:00

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0004 EDT on March 23, 2024, with the unit in Mode 1 at 23 percent power, the reactor automatically scrammed due to high reactor pressure vessel pressure when the turbine bypass valves unexpectedly closed while attempting to lower generator MW to 55 MWe to support shutdown for a refueling outage. The scram was not complex, with systems responding normally post-scram, with the exception of the pressure control system. The transient occurred while lowering on turbine speed/load demand which caused a rise in pressure and power until the reactor protection system setpoint for reactor pressure high was exceeded and resulted in an automatic reactor scram. The plant was preparing to shut down for a refueling outage when the trip occurred. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Reactor water level is being maintained at normal level. Decay heat is being removed by the main steam system to the main condenser using manual operation of the turbine bypass valves. All control rods inserted into the core. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CPR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, received expected (primary containment) isolations for Level 3: Group 13 drywell sumps, Group 15 (traverse in-core probe) TlPs (which was already isolated) and Group 4 (residual heat removal - shutdown cooling) RHR-SDC (which was already isolated). The primary containment isolation event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Also, due to the main turbine bypass valves unexpectedly closing, this is also being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 4/22/24 AT 1448 EDT FROM WHITNEY HEMINGWAY TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) reporting criteria of event notification 57046 reported on March 23,2024. Based on further evaluation, Fermi 2 has concluded that there was no event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function that was needed to mitigate the consequence of an accident. Although discussed in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR, the turbine bypass valves do not provide a safety related function and are not credited safety related components for accident mitigation. Therefore, Fermi 2 is retracting the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) reporting criteria that was included on the March 23, 2024 event notification. Notified R3DO (Betancourt-Roldan)

ENS 5702915 March 2024 12:00:00The following information was received from the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program (the Agency) via email: On 3/14/2024 at 1225 EDT, a MDS Nordion, Inc. GammaMed Plus iX high dose rate (HDR) remote afterloader device malfunctioned, leaving the source in an unshielded position. Since the quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) checks are performed in a shielded room, no individuals received any excess dose due to this device failure. On the same day at 1630 EDT, individuals from a device manufacturer, Varian Medical Systems, Inc. (NRC License # 45-30957-01) came to the site and returned the device to a shielded position. One field agent received a dose of 0.025 mSv (2.5 mrem) during this operation. On 3/15/2024, Varian personnel performed work to repair the device. This repair work is ongoing at the time of this report. The Agency will follow up with UMass Healthcare Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) to determine event cause and corrective actions. The Agency considers this event open. The Agency will follow up with a special inspection of the licensee. Device Information: MDS Nordion, Inc. GammaMed Plus iX HDR remote afterloader (sealed source and device registry number: CA-1080-D-103-S) Source Information: MDS Nordion Inc. model GM 232, Ir-192, 4.4 Ci (sealed source and device registry number: CA-1080-S-104-S) NMED Number: TBD
ENS 570126 March 2024 17:05:00The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via telephone: On March 6, 2024, around 0600 CST, a technician found loose molybdenum (Mo-99) / technetium (Tc-99m) contamination inside a restricted area. Prior to the discovery, a production hot cell inside the restricted area had been deep cleaned as part of the regular maintenance program. A thorough investigation of the area was conducted which revealed additional loose contamination on the lab floor. Surveys of surrounding areas did not reveal any spread of contamination outside of the restricted lab area. Due to (1) the existing access controls, (2) personal protective equipment requirements for lab access, and (3) the absence of contamination identified by body scans of personnel exiting the lab; the licensee does not suspect any spread of contamination outside of the restricted area or personnel intake. Biological samples will be collected to confirm that no intake occurred. The highest contamination level identified was 260 mrem/hr on contact and 2.3 mrem/hr at 1 foot. The contamination has been remediated to below licensee action levels. Overall, 2.4 mCi of Mo-99 was identified outside of the production hot cell. The 10 CFR 20 Appendix B limit for Mo-99 is 1 mCi. The licensee is investigating the root cause of this event.
ENS 570157 March 2024 18:22:00The following is a synopsis of information received via email from the Alabama Department of Public Health, Office of Radiation Control: On the evening of March 6, 2024, the licensee experienced a source disconnect at a job site in Russellville, Alabama. The source connector appeared to have not been connected properly, and the source apparently disconnected from the drive cable while outside the exposure device (camera). The source was retrieved and secured in a 650L model source changer about 45 minutes later when a source retrieval team arrived on site. The two source retrieval personnel received 45 milliroentgens and 15 milliroentgens of exposure respectively. The radiography crew dosimetry had not yet been retrieved for emergency processing at the time of the report. The camera and source information is as follows: Sentinel 880D, D1120, about 78.9 curies of iridium-192 in a model A424-9 source. Alabama Incident Number: TBD
ENS 570075 March 2024 14:17:00

The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone and email: At 1000 MST on 3/5/24, a 10,000 Ci Co-60 source (Model 7810) became stuck in the unshielded position during operator training. The irradiator is a J.L. Shepherd, Model SDF-34-M1, panoramic dry-source storage type. Upon determining that the source was stuck, the operator attempted to manipulate the source back into the shielded position using the emergency cable, but it came loose. Site staff have secured the irradiator facility. No personnel exposure occurred, and there are no elevated dose rates outside of the irradiator enclosure. The site has requested manufacturer support to resolve the issue. The NRC Project Manager (OKeefe) has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 4/18/24 AT 1508 EST FROM MAJ RYAN EISWERTH TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *

On 3/18/24, authorized users were able to return the source to a shielded position. A post-event inspection was scheduled during the week starting 4/22/24 with the vendor to verify operability of the irradiator. At approximately 1000 MST on 4/18/24, while an authorized user was conducting a performance functional check in preparation for the scheduled inspection, the irradiator source again became stuck in an unshielded position. The irradiator had not been used since the initial report on 3/5/24. No personnel exposure occurred, and there are no elevated dose rates outside of the irradiator enclosure. The site has requested manufacturer support to resolve the issue. Notified R4DO (Young), IRMOC (Crouch), and NMSS Events (email).

ENS 570105 March 2024 19:14:00

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

      • 8 Hour Notification was due at 1520 CST *** Follow up discussion of conditions after recovery determined that a report is required. This report restores reporting compliance.

On March 5, 2024, at 0720 CST, the X-02 118V uninterruptible power supply air conditioning (UPS A/C) unit tripped with the associated emergency fan coil units (EFCUs) shut down for planned maintenance in the area. The X-01 UPS A/C unit was declared inoperable upon discovery due to a scheduled outage of support systems (Unit 1 station service water) via the safety function determination process. This placed the site in technical specification 3.7.20 condition A, B, and C to restore the UPS A/C system within one hour. The EFCUs were restarted at 0729 which satisfied condition B and C, and X-01 UPS A/C unit was aligned to Unit 2 cooling water at 0801, exiting condition A. The condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function lasted for approximately nine minutes. Area temperatures had no notable change based on field observations during the condition. The UPS HVAC system provides temperature control for the safety related UPS and distribution rooms during all normal and accident conditions. The UPS HVAC system consists of (a) a dedicated UPS room EFCU in each safety-related UPS and distribution room, and (b) two electrically independent and redundant A/C trains either of which can support all four safety related UPS and distribution rooms; each train consists of an air conditioning unit, ductwork, dampers, and instrumentation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 570095 March 2024 17:30:00The following information was provided by the California Department of Public Health, Radiologic Health Branch via email: Isolite Corporation notified the California State Warning Center of the loss of a container containing eight tritium exit signs with a total activity of 60.8 curies of tritium (H-3). Fifty-one containers of tritium signs were to be delivered by (common carrier). Only 50 containers of tritium exit signs were delivered, leaving one container containing the eight exit signs missing. (The common carrier) is currently conducting a search to determine the status of the missing container of exit signs. Since this exceeds the amount of H-3 by greater than 1000 times the value in Appendix C of Part 20, it constitutes a less than or equal to 24-hour reportable event. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 570085 March 2024 17:28:00The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via email: On March 5, 2024, the Department was notified by the licensee that during routine shutter testing, the shutter on a Vega SH-F2C failed to close. Open is the normal operating position for the gauge shutter. The gauge contains a 500 millicurie (original activity) cesium-137 source. The gauge is in an area that is accessed only to test the shutter as it is located 230 feet off the ground. The gauge does not present an exposure risk to any individual. The licensee has contacted a service company to repair the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident Number: 10093 NMED Number: TX240008
ENS 569452 February 2024 12:00:00

The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone: A patient received a Y-90 Therasphere injection to the liver. The procedure was successfully completed with no abnormalities noted. After the procedure, an imaging study was conducted on the patient's liver, and it was determined that the Theraspheres had concentrated in a single segment of the liver (segment 4) when they had been expected to distribute throughout the entire liver. The calculated dose to the single segment would have exceeded the prescribed dose (633 Gy vice 91 Gy) due to the higher concentration of Y-90. The physician and patient were notified. No adverse effect is expected to the patient or the target organ.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 2/8/24 AT 1547 EDT FROM VRINDA NARAYANA TO BILL GOTT * * *

After further review, the correct target was irradiated, the correct activity was injected and all procedures were followed. The average dose to the target matched the written directive. Thus, the event was not reportable, and the licensee is retracting the event. Notified R3DO (Ziolkowski), NMSS Events (email). A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

ENS 569411 February 2024 15:32:00

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On February 1, 2024, a contract worker was transported offsite for medical treatment due to a work-related injury that required the individual to be admitted to the hospital. The individual was free-released from the site prior to transport. The injury and hospitalization were reported by the contract worker's employer to OSHA per 29 CFR 1904.39(a)(2). Based upon that notification to another government agency, Tennessee Valley Authority is reporting this per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 2/29/24 AT 12:29 EST FROM MATTHEW SLOUKA TO KAREN COTTON * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous Event Notification, EN 56941, reported on 02/01/2024. On 02/01/2024, at 15:32 EST, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) made an Event Notification 56941 notifying the NRC of a notification to another government agency. During further review of NRC reporting guidance, BFN has concluded that the contract worker's employer report to OSHA was below the reporting threshold outlined in NUREG 1022, Revision 3. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 569431 February 2024 15:33:00The following information was provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (the Division) via email: On Thursday February 1, 2024, at approximately 1030 MST, the Division was notified of a vehicle collision that resulted in the damage of a portable nuclear gauge (Nuclear Gauge - Troxler 3430 SN: 28355). The initial report indicated the Type A package containing the nuclear gauge was thrown from the vehicle and both the package and the gauge sustained damage. Colorado State Patrol responded to the scene and determined the nuclear gauge was intact, and it was turned over to the licensee. The Department confirmed with the licensee the gauge was able to be secured with the source in the shielded position and the shielding for the sources is not compromised. A leak test is being expedited at this time. Colorado Event Number: CO 240001
ENS 5693325 January 2024 14:37:00The following information was provided by the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section via email: On January 25, 2024, the licensee reported a medical event at 1119 CST which had occurred the same day at 0900 CST, where the dose delivered for a single fraction differed from the prescribed dose by more than 50 percent. This event is also reportable as an equipment failure. A patient was being treated with a Nucletron Corporation Model 106.990 high dose rate remote after loader unit, and during the fraction, the physicist noticed that the timer on the console had frozen while the source remained exposed. The planned treatment time was 6 minutes and 15 seconds over 9 dwell positions, and the timer, counting down, was frozen at 6 minutes and 7 seconds. Once the freeze was noticed, the physicist pressed the emergency stop button on the console to terminate the treatment. The physicist estimated that the total treatment time was approximately 30-40 seconds, all of which was to the first dwell position. The authorized user had prescribed 550 cGy for this fraction and the physicist estimated that only 11 percent of the prescribed dose was delivered. The physicist reported that the timer functioned properly during the daily quality assurance checks prior to treatment. The patient and patient's family were notified by the authorized user. The licensee is contacting the device vendor for emergency service. Wisconsin Event Number: WI240001 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 569441 February 2024 20:47:00The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1640 CST on February 1, 2024, it was determined that a condition occurred that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function due to two of the four steam generator (SG) power-operated relief valves (PORVs) being simultaneously inoperable. In certain accident scenarios, more than two PORVs are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The first PORV was declared inoperable at 1025 on January 22, 2024, and the safety function is considered to have been lost when the second PORV was declared inoperable at 1902 on January 23, 2024. The safety function was restored at 2234 on January 23, 2024, when the first SG PORV was declared operable. There was no impact to unit 2. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The plant remained in mode 3 for the duration of the condition. The causes for the two PORVs being inoperable were neither related nor systemic in nature. All SG PORVs have been restored to operation.
ENS 5692818 January 2024 21:38:00

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On January 18, 2024, at 0030 PST, diesel generator 2 (DG2) was shut down following a monthly surveillance run. Subsequently, a leak was discovered in the DG2 building. Service water pump '1B' was secured at 0117, effectively stopping the leak. The leak was determined to be service water coming from a diesel generator mixed air cooling coil. Service water system 'B' and DG2 were subsequently declared inoperable at 0135. After discussion with engineering, it was identified that the amount of service water leakage from the cooling coil was assumed to be greater than the leakage allowed by the calculation to assure adequate water in the ultimate heat sink to meet the required mission time of 30 days. At 1204, it was determined that entry into Technical Specification 3.7.1 condition D was warranted since the assumed leakage from the cooling coil could exceed the calculated allowed value. At 1238, the control power fuses for service water pump '1B' were removed. DG2 and service water system 'B' were declared unavailable, and the technical specification condition for the inoperable ultimate heat sink was exited. With the control power fuses removed, the pump is kept from auto starting, effectively preventing the leak and ensuring the safety function of the ultimate heat sink is maintained while the cooling coil is repaired or replaced. Due to the leakage assumed greater than the calculated allowable value this condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 3/18/24 AT 1923 FROM VALERIE LAGEN TO KAREN COTTON * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On January 18, 2024 at 2138 EST, Columbia Generating Station notified the NRC under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) of an unanalyzed condition on the available capacity of the ultimate heat sink (UHS) and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) of an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems needed to remove residual heat. On January 18, 2024, following monthly surveillance of the diesel generator DG2, a DG2 room cooler flow alarm was received at 0115. A leak was discovered in the diesel mixed air (DMA) air handler unit. Service Water Pump '1B' was secured and the leakage was stopped at 0117. The service water system 'B' and diesel generator system 'B' were declared inoperable at 0135. The leak was assumed to be greater than that allowed to ensure adequate water in the UHS required to meet the 30-day mission time, and the UHS was declared inoperable at 1204. Control power fuses for the service water pump '1B' were removed to fully eliminate the leakage path from the cooler, and the UHS was declared operable at 1238. Following the event, engineering performed an analysis based on the size and location of the leak, and concluded it would have taken 1.4 days to deplete the available excess water in the UHS to below the minimum technical specification required water level of the spray pond. Operations were able to secure the service water subsystem of the UHS prior to exceeding the volumetric margins in the spray ponds to ensure the 30-day mission time was met. The condition did not represent a safety significant unanalyzed condition nor a loss of safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Gepford).

ENS 5696213 February 2024 08:14:00The following information was provided by the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection (DEP) via email: On January 18, 2024, the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) was completing shutter checks and leak tests on a Berthold fixed gauge, model number: LB-300 W, serial number 1744-11-14 containing sealed source number P-2608-100 with 8 millicuries of Co-60. During the checks, the shutter's shear pin broke, and the RSO was unable to close the shutter. The vessel that this gauge is on is not entered very often and is not readily accessible. A licensed contractor will be on site on February 13 - 14, 2024, to repair the gauge. If they are not able to repair the gauge on-site, the gauge will be placed in storage until it can be sent for repair. The DEP has been in contact with the licensee. PA event report ID: PA240004
ENS 5691028 December 2023 18:55:00The following information was provided by the licensee via email: Plant alignment caused an unanalyzed condition regarding unit 1 and unit 2 Appendix R procedures. (Watts Bar Nuclear) (WBN) unit 1 and unit 2 Appendix R procedures require manual operator action times including (volume control tank) (VCT) isolation. They are calculated with an assumed hydrogen cover gas constant at 20 psig. This is to preclude hydrogen ingestion into the charging pumps with an operator action time of 70 minutes. Due to recent lower hydrogen concentration in the (reactor coolant system) (RCS), (unit 2) VCT hydrogen regulator set point was increased to 28 psig. This increased pressure set point invalidated the initial assumptions made in the Appendix R calculations for manual operator action times. WBN unit 1 VCT hydrogen regulator was also verified high out of band at 22 psig. WBN has restored unit 1 and unit 2 VCT hydrogen regulators to the required specification. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition.
ENS 5692110 January 2024 13:13:00The following is a summary of information provided by the Washington State Department of Health via email: A shipment from Environmental Management and Controls, Inc. (EMC) to a commercial low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal site near Richland, Washington, was identified as violating Department of Transportation regulations, Washington administrative code, and the LLRW disposal site license. Specific violations were (1) improper transportation vehicle utilized for a shipment with surface radiation greater than 200 mrem/hr, (2) two containers arrived with higher than manifested surface radiation levels, and (3) one container arrived with lower than manifested radiation levels. The Washington Department of Health issued a notice of violation to the licensee which detailed required remediation including root cause analysis, corrective action plan, and a quality assurance plan in a written response. The licensee use of the LLRW disposal site was also suspended pending a passing inspection by the state of Washington. This incident was not a contamination event and is under investigation. Washington Incident Number: WMS-DOT-23-07
ENS 5690120 December 2023 08:04:00The following is a summary of information provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email: The licensee, Medical Center of Aurora, discovered a leaking sealed source on December 18, 2023, during a routine semi-annual inventory and leak test. The sealed source is an Eckert and Ziegler (Serial Number 1360-6-20) Cs-137 vial with estimated current activity of 0.136 millicuries. The plastic vial had been stored in a lead box since the last inspection, but it was discovered that the plastic was cracked. Wipe test showed 0.052 microcuries of removable activity inside the storage box. No contamination was found outside of the box. The source vial will be wrapped in several layers of plastic to stabilize it and limit contamination inside the box. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer to return the source. Colorado Event Number: CO230044
ENS 5688914 December 2023 21:05:00The following information was provided by the licensee via phone call and email: On December 14, 2023, at 1939 EST, Hope Creek reactor scrammed following closure of turbine control valve number 4. All control rods fully inserted into the core. All safety systems responded as designed and expected. There was no radiological release. The unit is stable in mode 3 with decay heat being removed via the turbine bypass valves rejecting steam to the main condenser. Normal feedwater level control is providing makeup to the reactor vessel. No personnel injuries resulted from the event. The outage control center has been staffed to determine the cause of the reactor scram. The Hope Creek NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 568772 December 2023 12:47:00The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0610 CST on 12/2/2023, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the South Texas Project switchyard south electrical bus was de-energized. Emergency diesel generator (EDG) '22' automatically started in response to the loss of offsite power on the train 'B' engineered safety feature (ESF) electrical bus. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in the valid actuation of an emergency AC electrical power system (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(8)). All required loads were successfully started. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The initial loss of the south electrical bus, partial loss of off-site power, put the plant in a 24 hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) in accordance with (IAW) technical specification (TS) 3.8.1.1.E. Power was restored to the train 'B' ESF bus via an alternate offsite power source and the EDG was returned to its automatic standby condition. Currently, the plant is in a 72 hour LCO IAW TS 3.8.1.1.A.
ENS 5690928 December 2023 12:20:00The following information was provided by the licensee via email: In accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201 (a)(1)(ii), the US Army is (telephone) reporting the recovery of a 120 mm depleted uranium (DU) projectile from a landfill in York, PA. (10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - Within 30 days after the occurrence of any lost, stolen, or missing licensed material becomes known to the licensee, all licensed material in a quantity greater than 10 times the quantity specified in appendix C to Part 20 that is still missing at this time.) An M829 120 mm DU projectile has 4000 grams of DU, which equates to approximately 1,520 microcuries of U-238. The M829 DU projectile was manufactured in the 1970's - 1980's. The Part 20 App C limit for U-238 is 100 microcuries. 100 microcuries times 10 equals 1,000 microcuries. The specifics on retrieving the 120 mm DU projectile are as follows: 1. A military explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team was contacted (Nov 28) and requested to respond to a possible unexploded ordnance (UXO) device at the York County Resource Recovery Center, York, Pennsylvania. 2. The EOD team arrived (Nov 28) and identified the UXO as a 120 mm DU projectile (projectile with tailfin, no propellant, no cartridge case, no explosives, no tracer). 3. EOD placed the item in an ammo storage container and transported the item to Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey for safe storage. 4. US Army Joint Munitions Command DoD Low Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) Lead Agent was notified on or about December 1. 5. A member of the LLRW team is at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst on December 27-28 to package and ship the DU projectile to our Morris Consolidation Facility (NRC License 12-00722-15), Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island, IL, for safe storage and eventual disposal. 6. At this time, we have no further information or evidence to determine how the item arrived at the Pennsylvania landfill. 7. There are no clear identification markings that we have viewed on pictures (so far) that will help us to determine where the device was stored or possessed. We will conduct a more thorough visual exam once we have the item in our possession at our Rock Island Arsenal facility (Morris Consolidation Facility). In accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201 (b), a written report will be provided to the NRC within 30 days after making the telephone report. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Swipe test of the ordinance revealed no loose contamination. Dose rate on contact is 1-2 mrem/hr, so exposure exceeding limits to public is unlikely. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5685616 November 2023 05:15:00

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0227 EST on 11/16/23, Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 experienced an automatic trip from the reactor protection system (RPS) based on reactor trip bus undervoltage (UV). At that time, a loss of U-4000-22 (13 kV to 4 kV transformer) caused a loss of 22, 23, and 24 4 kV busses. This resulted in a loss of both motor generator (MG) sets causing the reactor trip bus UV. The loss of 22 and 23 4 kV non-safety related busses resulted in a loss of main feedwater. Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) was manually initiated and is feeding both steam generators. The 2B diesel generator (DG) started and restored the 24 4 kV safety related bus. Heat removal is via the normal turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. RPS actuation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - 4 hour report ESFAS (engineering safety features actuation system) actuation (2B DG start on UV) is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - 8 hour report AFW operation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) - 60 day report The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: All rods fully inserted. There was no impact on Unit 1 operations. Unit 2 is stable in mode 3.

  • * * UPDATE ON AT 0940 EST FROM KERRY HUMMER TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *

ESFAS actuation (AFW manual initiation) is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - 8 hour report Notified R1DO (Defrancisco).

ENS 5684911 November 2023 00:23:00

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1545 CST on November 10, 2023, personnel at Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 determined that 19 conduits in the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) auxiliary relay cabinets A and B did not have the required fire seals for bay separation. This condition meets the criteria involving an unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety. The plant is currently defueled. Decay heat is being removed by normal spent fuel cooling system operations. ESFAS is not required to be operable in the current plant mode. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Region 4 Branch Chief (Dixon) has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 1/8/2024 AT 1222 EST FROM PETER RAMON TO ERNEST WEST * * *

On November 10, 2023, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 reported in EN 56849 that 19 conduits in engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) auxiliary relay cabinets A and B did not have the required fire seals for bay separation. This condition met the criteria involving an unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety. Waterford 3 has determined that the ESFAS auxiliary relay cabinets A and B jumper conduits do not require fire seals based on review of an engineering specification that specifies the size and length of conduits which require fire seals to be installed. None of the nineteen affected conduits meet the size and length criteria that would necessitate installation of a fire seal. Based on this, the condition described in EN 56849 is not considered to be an unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety as described in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and therefore is not reportable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gaddy)

ENS 5684810 November 2023 22:52:00The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 11/10/23 at 0642 CST, essential chiller 'B' train and cascading equipment was declared inoperable due to chill water temperature exceeding limits. At 1413 CST, essential chiller 'C' train and cascading equipment was declared inoperable due to discharge pressure exceeding limits. This condition resulted in an inoperable condition on two out of the three safety trains for the accident mitigating function including the 'B' and 'C' train high head safety injection, low head safety injection, containment spray, electrical auxiliary building HVAC, control room envelope HVAC, and essential chill water. All 'A' train equipment remained operable. This was determined to be reportable within 8 hours as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Plant is in a 72 hour limiting condition for operation per technical specification 3.7.7. Restoration of 'B' train anticipated on 11/11/23 mid day.
ENS 568324 November 2023 01:11:00The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 11/03/2023 at 2231 CDT, a security officer found 2 bottles of vanilla extract in the protected area. One bottle was a 1.5 ounce size with a trace amount of vanilla in the bottle, the other bottle was a 4.5 ounce size with approximately 1 ounce of vanilla. Alcohol was identified as an ingredient on the label. It was determined the vanilla extract is 35 percent alcohol by volume (ABV), above the 0.5 percent ABV considered low alcohol content. Security personnel took custody of the bottles of vanilla extract. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5678610 October 2023 19:44:00The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: On October 10, 2023, at 1553 CDT, Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) was notified of a spurious actuation of a single alert notification system siren in Nemaha, Nebraska. The CNS Emergency Alert System (EAS) was not activated. The actuation occurred during siren testing conducted at approximately 1545 CDT. No emergency conditions are present at Cooper Nuclear Station. A press release from Nebraska Public Power District is not planned at this time. This condition is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for any event or situation for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made which is related to heightened public or government concern. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Offsite notification was to local Nemaha County Emergency Management.
ENS 567849 October 2023 21:52:00The following information was provided by the licensee via email: A non-licensed employee supervisor failed a test specified by the fitness for duty testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5679916 October 2023 13:14:00The following is a summary of information provided by the Georgia Radioactive Materials Program via email: On September 14, 2023, the licensee determined that an iodine-125 seed used for non-palpable lesion localization had been lost. Two seeds had been previously implanted in a patient. On September 12, 2023, a specimen containing both seeds was removed from the patient. When transported to pathology lab, only one seed was located in the specimen. It was confirmed through survey and imaging that the seed was no longer in the patient, and it is suspected that the seed was lost in the operating room. At the time of the loss, the seed had an activity between 0.218 and 0.221 millicuries. After conducting a search of the operating room, the surgical equipment, and the pathology lab, the radiation safety officer declared the source lost on September 14, 2023. Georgia NMED Incident Number: 71 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5675725 September 2023 09:04:00The following information was provided by the Georgia Radioactive Materials Program via email: During a routine shutter check, it was discovered that a shutter was not working on an in service source device. This device is an Ohmart/Vega containing sealed source of 400 mCi cesium-137, serial number 65574, Model SHF2-45 K2 Chip Bin. The radiation safety officer (RSO) reported that the shutter had failed in the open position. The source was then barricaded from the area with appropriate signage. On August 21, 2023, a qualified technician from VEGA visited the site and repaired this shutter. The technician removed the old rotor and installed a new rotor on the source holder. Georgia incident number: 70
ENS 5664530 July 2023 18:20:00The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On July 30, 2023 at 1526 EDT, with unit 1 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to low main turbine electro-hydraulic control oil level. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat removal is being accomplished using the steam dumps in steam pressure mode to the main condenser. Emergency Feedwater actuated due to low-low steam generator level as expected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5664430 July 2023 17:25:00

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On July 30, 2023 at 1119 CDT, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 declared the control room envelope inoperable in accordance with technical specification (TS) 3.7.6.1 due to the control room envelope doors failing a door seal smoke test creating a breach in the control room envelope. Operations entered TS 3.7.6.1 Action b. Mitigating actions were implemented and tested satisfactorily by 1215 CDT. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, due to the control room envelope being inoperable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 09/12/23 AT 1357 EDT FROM MONICA PEAK TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *

The original operability determination of inoperable was made based on a conservative evaluation that with presence of smoke in-leakage through Door 261 and 262, the CRE boundary could not perform its safety function. A more detailed engineering evaluation was subsequently performed. No maintenance or intrusive testing was performed on the doors after initial test failure. As documented in version 2 operability determination for condition report WF3-2023-14604, the CRE boundary remained intact for the condition identified and was able to fulfill its safety function. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Warnick).

ENS 5663825 July 2023 16:23:00

The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via telephone: A patient was prescribed Y-90 microsphere implants to the liver. The procedure occurred on 4/20/23 with no abnormal outcomes reported. The patient returned to the hospital on 7/24/23 reporting stomach pain which was diagnosed as an ulcer. A biopsy of the ulcer revealed microspheres. Due to the tissue damage, it was assessed that the dose to the stomach lining exceeded 50 Rem. This event is being reported per 10 CFR 35.3045(a)(3).

  • * * RETRACTION ON 8/9/23 AT 1405 EDT FROM CHRISTIANA CARE HEALTH SYSTEM TO KAREN COTTON * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone: The Radiation Safety Officer called the NRC Headquarters Center at 1405 EDT to retract Event 56638. NRC and Christiana, the licensee, assessed the event, and determined that it was due to shunting, and thus did not meet the criteria of a medical event. Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis) and NMSS Events Notification (email) A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

ENS 5662818 July 2023 13:35:00The following information was provided by the licensee via email: This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1). At 1111 (PDT) on 7/17/23, a knowledgeable individual received test results from a lab which identified a prohibited substance that was found in the protected area during the recent refueling outage. This prohibited item was found on 5/21/23 in an infrequently accessed area, the condenser bay, and removed from the protected area. The item was old and is surmised to be from construction. Residual ash on the prohibited item tested positive for a prohibited substance. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5662718 July 2023 12:56:00The following information was provided by the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) via email: Cardinal Health made a telephone notification (to ODH) on 7/17/2023 that a Lantheus Tc-99m generator, lot number M190311A, exceeded the Mo-99 breakthrough limits. The generator was eluted three times on 7/10/23. The results of the Mo-99 breakthrough test were 0.224, 0.313, and 1.705 microcuries Mo-99/millicurie Tc-99m. None of these elutions were used to dispense activity to customers or prepare drug kits. No doses containing Tc-99m from this generator were administered to patients. Lantheus was notified on 7/10/23, the generator was pulled, and a return kit was provided. Ohio Incident Number: OH230008
ENS 5662617 July 2023 17:12:00The following information was provided by the Arkansas Department of Health, Radiation Control Section (the Department) via email: The Arkansas Department of Health, Radiation Control Section, was notified on July 7, 2023, via a phone call received from 3D Imaging Drug Design Development (3DI) in Little Rock, Arkansas, of a radioactive material package not ever reaching its intended destination (Canada). The package, when offered to the common carrier, contained 48.5 mCi of Zr-89 oxalate solution. Considering the half-life of 78.4 hours, the package contains approximately 2.5 mCi at the time of this report (July 17, 2023). The single, 3 mL glass vial was shipped within a 4-5 inch tall lead, cylindrical pig inside of a DOT Type A package, 1 cubic foot, 30 pounds, Yellow III. A second package of 12.9 mCi Zr-89 oxalate, was offered at the same time (July 3, 2023) to the same carrier but with a different destination (Maryland - also licensed for this type and quantity of material). The 3DI customer intended to receive the 48.5 mCi package instead received the second package with lesser activity. The 48.5 mCi package has not been located. 3DI and the Department have been in communication with the carrier. The Department also contacted its NRC Regional State Agreement Officer who informed NRC Region I concerning the Maryland licensee and the NRC liaison for Canada concerning the Canadian licensee. The investigation is ongoing, and reporting will proceed in accordance with SA-300. Arkansas Event #: AR-2023-005 Reporting requirement: RH-1501.a.1.B. of the ASBH Rules for Control of Sources of Ionizing Radiation (10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii)) THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 566117 July 2023 09:43:00The following information was provided by the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) via email: At approximately 1100 EDT on 6/29/23, ODH received notification from an Ohio radioactive materials licensee that a portable device containing radioactive sources had been lost. The device is a Troxler Model 3430 portable moisture/density gauge containing an 8 millicurie Cesium-137 source and a 40 millicurie Americium-241 source. The device had mistakenly been left on the tailgate of the technician's pickup truck when he left a jobsite to go to another work location. When the driver was stopped at an intersection, he saw in his rearview mirror that the tailgate was open and stopped to verify the contents of the truck. At that point, he realized the gauge was missing. The technician had travelled approximately 13 miles before discovering that the device had been lost. The gauge was recovered later that same day (6/29/23) with no apparent damage. Ohio Incident Number: OH230007 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5659126 June 2023 13:25:00The following information was provided by the Maryland Department of the Environment via telephone: On 6/26/23 at 1116 EDT, the licensee was working at Howard University in Washington, D.C. when a Niton XLp 300 (lead base paint analyzer containing a maximum of 50 mCi of Cd-109) was stolen out of a vehicle. The Howard University and Washington, D.C. police were notified of the vehicle break in. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5658823 June 2023 17:04:00The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1521 EDT on 6/23/2023, Perry Nuclear Power Plant reported elevated levels of tritium in the underdrain system to the State of Ohio as a non-voluntary reporting of tritium. An investigation is currently ongoing to identify the cause of the elevated tritium levels. The tritium levels did not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. Tritium has not been detected in any other locations and is not expected to impact groundwater or exceed any limits in the Off Site Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The following agencies were notified by licensee: Lake County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) Ashtabula County EMA Geauga County Department of Emergency Services Ohio EMA Radiological Branch
ENS 5659026 June 2023 11:49:00The following is a synopsis of information provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email: On 6/23/23, the licensee discovered that a tritium exit sign was lost. The exit sign was an Isolite Corporation Model 2000 containing 7.62 Ci of tritium (H-3). This is being reported under Colorado Regulations Section 4.51.1.1 (10 CFR 20.2202(a)(1)(i)). Event Report ID No.: CO230017 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5658923 June 2023 19:53:00The following is a summary of the information provided by the Washington State Office of Radiation Protection via email: On 6/22/23 at 1419 PDT, the licensee identified that a 56.4 Ci Ir-192 radiography source could not be retracted into the exposure device (QSA Model 880D) due to a crank malfunction. The radiographer immediately contacted the Radiation Safety Officer who provided source recovery/retrieval actions along with crank mechanism fixes. The radiographer secured the source in the exposure device at 1422 PDT. The problem with the retrieval was identified as a loose securing nut that caused the crank to spin freely and the drive cable to come out of the crank conduit. During the incident, the radiographer's survey meter read 20 mr/hr at the crank location. A radiographer assistant expanded the boundaries and ensured the general public was not affected. The radiographer's total direct dosimeter reading after 6 normal radiography exposures and the source recovery actions were complete was 3 mRem. The incident took place at a temporary job site in Anacortes, WA. There were no overexposures or spread of contamination. WA Incident Number: WA-23-010