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 Discovered dateReporting criterionTitleEvent description
ENS 5704222 March 2024 04:37:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Notification of Unusual Event Due to Fire in the Protected Area

The following information was provided by the licensee: A Notification of Unusual Event, HU4.4 (see note below) was declared based a fire in the protected area requiring off site assistance to extinguish. The fire was in the main transformer yard. The fire was detected at 2328 CDT on March 21, 2024, and the fire was declared out at 0009 CDT on at March 22, 2024. An automatic reactor trip was initiated due to a loss of offsite power to the "B" train and a failure to automatically transfer from unit auxiliary transformer "B" to startup transformer "B. The licensee notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC remained in Normal. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email). NOTE: Due to a typographical error initiating condition HU4.1 was initially recorded for the event. The correct initiating condition is HU4.4 as now shown.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0345 EDT ON 03/22/24 FROM LARRY GONSALES TO BILL GOTT * * *

The licensee terminated the Notification of Unusual Event at 0221 CDT on 3/22/24. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gepford), IR-MOC (Grant), NRR-EO (Felts), DHS-SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0420EDT ON 03/22/24 FROM JOHN LEWIS TO BILL GOTT * * *

RPS ACTUATION The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On March 21, 2024, at 2328 CDT, Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 was operating at 98 percent power when an automatic reactor trip was initiated due to a loss of offsite power to the B train and a failure to automatically transfer from unit auxiliary transformer B to startup transformer B. Emergency feedwater actuation signal 2 (EFAS), safety injection actuation signal (ECCS), containment isolation actuation signal and emergency diesel generators automatically actuated. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3. All control rods fully inserted and all other plant equipment functioned as expected. Forced circulation remains with one reactor coolant pump per loop running. Decay heat removal is via the main condenser. A train safety bus is being supplied by off-site power, and B train safety bus is being supplied by emergency diesel generator B. Following the loss of offsite power to the B train, it was reported that main transformer B and startup transformer B were both on fire. The Emergency Director declared an Unusual Event at time 2337 CDT. The fire was reported extinguished at 0009 CDT on March 22, 2024, and the Unusual Event was terminated at 0221 CDT on March 22, 2024. Offsite assistance was requested. The local fire department responded to the site but the fire was extinguished by the on-shift fire brigade. NRC Region IV management was contacted regarding the emergency plan entry at 0030 CDT on March 22, 2024. This event is being reported as a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical and as an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as valid actuation of the EFW system, ECCS, Containment Isolation and Emergency Diesel Generators. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Gepford)

  • * * RETRACTION OF NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT FROM ON 03/26/24 AT 1721 FROM L. BROWN TO K. COTTON * * *

The initial notification in event notice #57042 by Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, reported a Notice Of Unusual Event (NOUE) emergency declaration due to a fire in the protected area requiring off site support to extinguish. The basis for retraction of the initial emergency notification is that this event did not meet the definition of a fire in the protected area that requires off site support to extinguish. Guidance provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, Rev. 6 and implemented in Waterfords Emergency Plan procedure, initiating Condition HU4.4 states, The dispatch of an offsite firefighting agency to the site requires an emergency declaration only if it is needed to actively support firefighting efforts because the fire is beyond the capability of the Fire Brigade to extinguish. (NOTE: The Initial Notification Form sent from the Control Room at 2341 CDT on March 21, 2024, requested by and provided to the NRC Headquarter Operations Center via e-mail at 0302 CDT on March 22, 2024, stated that the Emergency Classification had been made on Initiating Condition HU4.4 rather than HU4.1)" When the event occurred on March 21, 2024, the Emergency Director declared an Unusual Event at 2337 CDT and requested offsite support based on the information available at that time including the initial assessment by the fire brigade leader and expected need for offsite support to extinguish the fire. As reported in the 0420 EDT update on March 22, 2024, the fire was reported extinguished at 0009 CDT on March 22, 2024, by the Waterford Fire Brigade without the need of offsite support." Notified R4DO (Kellar).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1209 EDT ON 03/27/24 FROM JOHN LEWIS TO KAREN COTTON * * *

The initial notification in EN 57042 by Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, reported an emergency declaration of an Unusual Event due to a fire in the protected area requiring off site support to extinguish. The basis for the update to the initial notification is that this event did not meet the definition of a Fire in the Protected Area that requires offsite support to extinguish. As provided in NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 and implemented in Waterfords emergency plan procedure, initiating condition HU4.4 states, The dispatch of an offsite firefighting agency to the site requires an emergency declaration only if it is needed to actively support firefighting efforts because the fire is beyond the capability of the Fire Brigade to extinguish. Additionally, EAL 4.1 for a fire not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection in any Table H-1 fire area was not applicable because the fire did not occur in a Table H-1 fire area. When the event occurred on March 21, 2024, the Emergency Director declared an Unusual Event at 2337 CDT and requested offsite support based on the information available at that time including the initial assessment by the fire brigade leader and expected need for offsite support to extinguish the fire. As reported in the 0420 EDT update on March 22, 2024, the fire was reported extinguished at 0009 CDT on March 22, 2024, by the Waterford Fire Brigade without the need of offsite support. (NOTE: The Initial Notification Form sent from the Control Room at 2341 CDT on March 21, 2024, requested by and provided to the Headquarters Operation Center via e-mail at 0302 CDT on March 22, 2024, stated that the emergency classification had been made on initiating condition HU4.4 rather than HU4.1) In accordance with NRC Approved guidance in FAQ 21-02 (ML21117A104), Waterford 3 is retracting the initial event notification made at 0117 EDT on March 22, 2024. The remaining events that were reported in EN 57042 as a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical and as an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as valid actuation of the EFW (emergency feedwater) system, ECCS (emergency core cooling system), containment isolation and emergency diesel generators are still applicable and require no additional update at this time. The licensee also provided a site map. Notified R4DO (Kellar)

ENS 5607327 August 2022 14:15:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News ReleaseTurbine Trip Due to Main Transformer FireThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0810 EDT on August 27, 2022, with Unit 2 at 27% power, the operating crew received an annunciator for a Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip. At 0812 EDT, a report came in from the field of a fire in the north yard due to an "A" Main Transformer upper bushing failure. The station fire brigade was dispatched and offsite assistance was requested. However, at 0842 EDT the fire was put out, prior to needing the offsite assistance. No Emergency Action Level threshold was exceeded for this event. The switchyard is in a normal alignment for providing offsite power to Unit 2. At 1015 EDT, the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) was notified of the event. Additionally, a notification to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality will be made due to approximately 100 gallons of oil reaching the ground. As such, this issue is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for "'Any event or situation for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.' The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5558015 November 2021 22:28:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Manual Reactor Trip Due to Main Transformer Fault

At 1728 EST on 11/15/2021, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 47 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a main transformer fault. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the emergency feedwater system through the main condenser. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, due to the valid actuation of the emergency feedwater system, this event is being reported as a non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/16/21 AT 1649 EST FROM BRUCE BENNETT TO KERBY SCALES * * *

At approximately 0900 (EST) on 11/16/2021, it was identified that mineral oil from the faulted main transformer had surpassed the capability of the oil containment system and discharged into Lake Monticello. It is estimated that less than 50 gallons of mineral oil entered the Lake. The oil is contained with booms and cleanup is ongoing. The EPA National Response Center and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control have been notified. This is considered a news release or notification to other government agencies; therefore, this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 552957 June 2021 20:27:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationAutomatic Reactor Trip on Turbine Trip Due to Fault and Fire in the Main TransformerAt 1527 (Central Standard Time) Unit 2 Reactor tripped caused by a turbine trip due to a fault and fire on Unit 2 Main Transformer #1. All Aux Feedwater Pumps started due to steam generator Lo-Lo levels. Unit 2 is being maintained in Hot Standby (Mode 3) in accordance with Integrated Plant Operating Procedure IPO-007B. The Emergency Response Guideline Network has been exited. Decay heat is being rejected to the Main Condenser via the steam dump valves. Fire was extinguished at 1546 without offsite assistance. No major injuries reported and no personnel transported offsite for medical attention. Cause of the fault and fire are under investigation. NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All rods inserted into the core during the trip. There were no relief valves or safety valves lifted during the transient. The plant is stable in its normal shutdown electrical lineup via the auxiliary transformer with all safety equipment available. Unit 1 was not affected by the transient.
ENS 5525914 May 2021 18:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News ReleaseIndividual Fall from Scaffold Ladder - Other Government Agency NotificationAt approximately 1300 CDT on 05/14/2021, a contract worker, who was using a scaffold ladder to access their work area on the iso-phase bus duct system for the main transformers at the Callaway plant, fell approximately 27 feet to the ground. An ambulance was dispatched to transport the individual to a local hospital. Union Electric (Ameren Missouri) subsequently learned that the event caused the individual to have a serious injury that required an overnight hospital stay. This event is reportable to OSHA per 29 CFR 1904.39(a)(2) by the contract worker's employer and is reportable to the Missouri Public Service Commission in accordance with Missouri regulation 20 CSR 4240-3.190(3)(A). This notification is being made to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to other government notifications that will occur as a result of a situation related to the health and safety of onsite personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. The individual was not working in a contamination area.
ENS 5399312 April 2019 04:00:0010 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in ComponentPart 21 Report - Overheating and Failure of TransformersThe following was received via e-mail: COMPONENT DESCRIPTION: AMETEK part number 80-315382-90, T801 main transformer. PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE: Overheating and failure of transformers installed in equipment with 0.7 power factor load requirements CAUSE: The inverters on AMETEK job number C72143 were required to support a 0.7 power factor load. To meet this requirement, CVT capacitors were added which led to overcurrent on the capacitor current windings and overheating. The overheating led to a breakdown in insulation between windings, causing a premature failure of the transformer set and inverter relative to its 40-year qualification life. EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE: The overheating accelerates the degradation of the insulation between windings and eventually leads to shorting. This will cause an inverter failure and require the load to be transferred to bypass. ACTION REQUIRED: This is the only instance AMETEK has experienced for this issue. Therefore, action is only required for the equipment on AMETEK job number C72143, located at TVA Sequoyah. New transformers have been provided as replacements that require fewer capacitors, contain additional venting to improve cooling, and include larger winding material to reduce current density. The main transformers (T801) installed in the serial numbers associated with this job (C72143-0111 through 0911) should be replaced to prevent any similar occurrences. AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION: AMETEK has enhanced this particular transformer design to improve cooling and reduce capacitor current. Additionally, corrective action #175 has been issued in AMETEK's system. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Mark Shreve of the Client Services group at 1- 800-222-9079 or 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6332. mark.shreve@ametek.com. Sequoyah is the only site affected by this Part 21 Report.
ENS 5341018 May 2018 13:51:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationAutomatic Reactor Scram Caused by Main Transformer TripAt 0651 (PDT) on May 18th, 2018, Columbia Generating station experienced a Main Transformer trip, that caused a Reactor Scram. Reactor Power, Pressure and Level were maintained as expected for this condition. MS-RV-1A (Safety Relief Valve) and MS-RV-1B (Safety Relief Valve) opened on reactor high pressure during the initial transient. MS-RV-1B appeared to remain open after pressure lowered below the reset point. The operating crew removed power supply fuses for MS-RV-1B and it currently indicates intermediate position. SRV (Safety Relief Valve) tail pipe temperatures indicate all valves are closed. Suppression pool level and temperature have remained steady within normal operating levels. All control rods inserted and reactor power is being maintained subcritical. RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) water level is being maintained with condensate and feed system with startup flow control valves in automatic. Reactor Pressure is being maintained with the Turbine Bypass valves controlling in automatic. The main condenser is the heat sink. No ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling Systems) systems actuated or injected; the EOC-RPT (End of Cycle-Recirculation Pump Trip) and RPS (Reactor Protection System) systems actuated causing a trip of the RRC pumps and a reactor scram. Core recirculation is being maintained with RRC-P-1A (Reactor Recirculation Pump) running. No release has occurred. At this time there will be no notifications to state, local or other public agencies. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified. The cause of the event is currently under investigation. Plant conditions are stable. The plant is in its normal electrical alignment and offsite power is available to the site.
ENS 5293228 August 2017 12:37:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor Trip on Turbine TripOn 8/28/2017 at 0837 (EDT), VC Summer Nuclear Station automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The turbine trip was caused by the Main Generator Differential Lockout due to a fault on the center phase lightning arrester on the Main Transformer (XTF-001). There were no complications with the trip. All control rods fully inserted. Balance of Plant (BOP) buses automatically transferred to their alternate power source XTF 31/32. All Emergency Feedwater pumps started as required. All systems responded as required. The plant is stable in Mode 3. Station personnel are investigating the cause of the fault on the main transformer lightning arrester. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 with decay heat removal via the Main Steam to the Main Condenser. The licensee will inform both State and local authorities.
ENS 5286317 July 2017 21:17:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Unusual Event Declared Due to Loss of Offsite Power

During a rain and lightning storm, plant operators observed arcing from the main transformer bus duct and notified the control room. The decision was made to trip the main generator which resulted in an automatic reactor trip. The plant entered EAL SU.1 as a result of the loss of offsite power for greater than fifteen minutes. Plant safety busses are being supplied by both emergency diesel generators while the licensee inspects the electrical system to determine any damage prior to bringing offsite power back into the facility. Offsite power is available to the facility. No offsite assistance was requested by the licensee. During the trip, all rods inserted into the core. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric dump valves with emergency feedwater supplying the steam generators. The main steam isolation valves were manually closed to protect the main condenser. There were no safeties or relief valves that actuated during the plant transient. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. Reactor cooling is via natural circulation. All safety equipment is available for the safe shutdown of the plant. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and the local Parish emergency management agencies. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 7/17/17 AT 2007 EDT FROM MARIA ZAMBER TO DONG PARK * * *

This notification is also made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On July 17, 2017 at 1606 CDT, the reactor automatically tripped due to a loss of Forced Circulation, which was the result of Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) to the electrical (safety and non-safety) buses. Both 'A' and 'B' trains of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) started as designed to reenergize the 'A' and 'B' safety buses. The LOOP caused a loss of feedwater pumps, resulting in an automatic actuation of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system. Prior to the reactor trip, at 1600 CDT, personnel noticed the isophase bus duct to main transformer 'B' glowing orange due to an unknown reason. Due to this, the main turbine was manually tripped at 1606 CDT. Following the turbine trip, the electrical (safety and non-safety) buses did not transfer to the startup transformers as expected due to an unknown reason. The plant entered the Emergency Operating Procedure for LOOP/Loss of Forced Circulation Recovery. At 1617 CDT, an Unusual Event was declared due to Initiating Condition (IC) SU1 - Loss of all offsite AC power to safety buses (greater than) 15 minutes. All safety systems responded as expected. The plant is currently in mode 3 and stable with the EDGs supplying both safety buses and with EFW feeding and maintaining both steam generators. Offsite power is in the process of being restored. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and the local Parish emergency management agencies.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ADAM TAMPLAIN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2203 EDT ON 7/17/17 * * *

The licensee terminated the Notification of Unusual Event at 2056 CDT. The basis for terminating was that offsite power was restored to the safety busses. The licensee has notified Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, St. John and St. Charles Parishes, Louisiana Homeland Security Emergency Preparedness, and will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified IRD (Stapleton), NRR (King), R4DO (Hipschman), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1724 EDT ON 7/19/17 * * *

This update is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). During the event discussed in EN# 52863, at 1642 CDT (on July 17, 2017), Condensate Storage Pool (CSP) level lowered to less than 92% resulting in entry to Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.3. Level in the CSP was lowered due to feeding from both Steam Generators with EFW. Normal makeup to the CSP was temporarily unavailable due to the LOOP. Filling the CSP commenced at 1815 CDT (on July 17, 2017), and TS 3.7.1.3 was exited on July 18, 2017 at 0039 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Hipschman).

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1233 EDT ON 9/14/17 * * *

Waterford 3 is retracting a follow up notification made on July 19, 2017 for EN# 52863, concerning the loss of safety function associated with the Condensate Storage Pool (CSP) per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The Condensate Storage Pool was performing its required safety function by providing inventory to the Emergency Feed Water pumps when the required Tech Spec level (T.S. 3.7.1.3) dropped below 92%. The Technical Specification was entered at 1624 (CDT) on July 17, 2017 and exited after filling at 0039 on July 18, 2017. The total allowed outage time allowed by Tech Spec 3.7.1.3 is 10 hours to be in Hot Shutdown if not restored. The Condensate Storage Pool level was restored to greater than 92% prior to exceeding the allowed outage time. Based on level being restored and the Condensate Storage Pool performing its required safety function, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) does not apply. Prior to the automatic reactor trip, Condensate Storage Pool level was greater than 92%. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the retraction. Notified R4DO (Groom).

ENS 517706 March 2016 20:20:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration
Emergency Declaration Due to Fire/Explosion in the Main Transformer

At 1512 EST, a fire/explosion occurred in the Unit 1 Main Transformer which resulted in a reactor trip. At 1520 EST, the licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event. Offsite assistance was requested. At 1633 EST, smoke and flame were no longer visible. Fire brigade personnel were applying additional foam to prevent a re-flash. No personnel injuries occurred. Offsite assistance was requested with three local fire departments responding. All rods inserted on the trip. Steam generator feed is by the normal path. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. The licensee has notified state and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, and DHS NICC. Notified FEMA NWS and Nuclear SSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DAVID HALE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1711 EST ON 03/06/16 * * *

At 1658 EST, the licensee declared an Alert based on EAL Alert A.1. The cause of entry was that the fire damaged an overhead power line that supplies emergency power to all three units at Oconee. Offsite power is still available to all units. At 1708 EST, the fire is declared out. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, USDA, HHS, DOE, and EPA. Notified FEMA NWS, FDA and Nuclear SSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DAVID HALE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1805 EST ON 03/06/16 * * *

The licensee made notification of the RPS actuation as a result of the transformer fault. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sykes).

  • * * UPDATE FROM DAVID HALE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2026 EST ON 03/06/16 * * *

At 2016 EST, the licensee terminated all emergency declarations. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sykes), IRD (Gott), NRR EO (Morris), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, USDA, HHS, DOE, and EPA. Notified FEMA NWS, FDA and Nuclear SSA via email.

ENS 5150629 October 2015 08:48:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationActuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System Due to Main Transformer LockoutAt 0348 CDT, while Point Beach Unit 2 was performing outage activities, it experienced a Main Power Transformer lockout and associated loss of busses (2A-01, 2A-02, 2B-01 and 2B-02). The loss of the two non-vital 4160 V buses resulted in actuation of the Unit 2 undervoltage logic which resulted in actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The Auxiliary Feedwater System functioned normally upon actuation. This condition was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)(6), PWR auxiliary or emergency feedwater system actuation. This event did not affect the operating Unit 1. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 510609 May 2015 21:50:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release
10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Unusual Event Declared Due to Main Transformer Fire

At 1750 EDT (05/09/15,) Indian Point Unit 3 experienced a fire on the 31 Main Transformer resulting in a unit trip. An Unusual Event was declared at 1801 EDT. The onsite fire brigade was mobilized. Offsite fire fighting assistance was requested. The fire was reported extinguished at 1815 EDT. The reactor was shutdown by an automatic trip. Plant response to the trip was as expected with no complications. The 31 and 33 Auxiliary Feed Pumps are operating and feeding the steam generators. Accountability is being performed. The plant is stable in mode 3, all control rods fully inserted, with normal offsite electrical power, and decay heat is being released to the main condenser. There was no impact on Unit 2 which continues to operate at 100% power. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and state and local authorities. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, and Nuclear SSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM LUKE HEDGES TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2037 ON 5/9/15 * * *

Oil from 31 Main Transformer has spilled into the discharge canal and has made its way into the river. Plant personnel are sandbagging drains and release paths. IPEC (Indian Point Energy Center) has contacted its environmental contractor, who is expected onsite at 2100 EDT to assist with cleanup. The National Response Center was notified at 1945 EDT and issued notification number 1116011. A message was left with the Westchester County Department of Health at 1953 EDT. The NY State DEC (Department of Environment Conservation) was contacted at 1955 EDT and issued notification number 1501459. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Indian Point Unit 3 remains in an Unusual Event at this time. Notified R1DO (Schroeder).

  • * * UPDATE FROM LUKE HEDGES TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2141 ON 5/9/15 * * *

Indian Point Unit 3 exited the Unusual Event at 2103 EDT. The basis for exiting the Unusual Event is that the fire is out and field operators report they have been successful in cooling the transformer. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and state and local authorities. Notified R1DO (Schroeder), R1RA (Lew), NRR (Dean), NRR EO (Morris), NRR EO (Howe), and IRD (Grant). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, and Nuclear SSA via email.

ENS 496976 January 2014 21:59:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Transformer Fault

At 1659 EST hours on January 6, 2014, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 automatically tripped from 100% power. The cause of the reactor trip was a main transformer differential trip. All rods fully inserted into the core and the plant is stable in Mode 3. All three auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically started as expected. Normal and Emergency Busses are being powered by Offsite Power. The cause of the main transformer differential trip is being investigated. All other equipment functioned as expected. At 1757 EST hours the Emergency Operating Procedures were exited. Resident inspector has been notified. Decay heat is being removed via the turbine bypass valves to the condenser. No primary or secondary safety valves lifted. Unit 2 was unaffected.

Licensee notified the States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia and the Counties of Beaver, PA, Hancock, OH, and Columbiana, OH.

ENS 486598 January 2013 22:40:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Unusual Event Declared Due to Main Transformer Fire

Fire in Unit 2 main transformer 2A. Reactor trip. Two train of offsite power lost to Unit 2. An Unusual Event was declared based on EAL HU-2 - Fire or explosion in protected area or switchyard which affects normal plant operations. At 1655 CST, South Texas Unit 2 declared an Unusual Event due to a main transformer fire. Unit 2 tripped from 100% power and is currently at 0% power in Mode 3. The transformer fire is out. In addition to the loss of the main transformer, several safety related electrical busses and non-safety electrical busses lost offsite power. The appropriate emergency diesel generators started and powered the safety related busses. Unit 2 is currently stable and on natural circulation due to the loss of power to the reactor coolant pumps. Auxiliary feedwater is functioning as required and decay heat is being removed through the steam generator atmospheric relief valves. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RICK NANCE TO BILL HUFFMAN AT 2055 EST ON 1/8/2013 * * *

On January 8, 2013, at 1640 CST, a failure of the Unit 2 Main Transformer occurred which resulted in a Unit 2 automatic trip. The failure of the main transformer resulted in a fire and damage to the transformer. The onsite fire brigade responded to the fire. The fire was declared under control at 1649 CST and declared out at 1656 CST. No offsite assistance was required. An Unusual Event was declared at 1655 CST for initiating condition HU-2 (Fire or explosion in protected area or switchyard which affects normal plant operations) due to the main transformer fire. Due to the site electrical lineup at the time, the loss of the main transformer resulted in a loss of power to 4160 ESF buses 2A and 2C, and associated Standby Diesel Generators 21 and 23 started as required and loaded on to their respective buses. 4160 ESF bus 2B remained energized from offsite power during this event and Standby Diesel Generator 22 did not start since an undervoltage condition did not exist on its ESF bus. All three (3) motor-driven and the steam-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started as required. The Main Steam Isolation Valves were closed in accordance with procedure to limit plant cooldown. Decay heat is being removed via Auxiliary Feedwater with Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves. Following the reactor trip, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve 656A momentarily lifted and re-closed. There were no personnel injuries and no radiological release as a result of this event. A press release has been issued. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 and the cause of the event is under investigation. The Unusual Event was terminated at 1947 CST on 1/8/2013. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gaddy), NRR (Leeds), R4 (Reynolds), IRD (Gott), NRR EO (Hiland). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA, and NuclearSSA via email.

ENS 4850111 November 2012 08:55:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration
Reactor Scram Due to Turbine Trip Followed by Unusual Event Declared Due to Main Transformer and Bus Duct Fire

An unplanned, automatic reactor scram occurred at 0355 EST due to a Main Turbine trip signal. All safety systems operated and actuated as expected. Both the Main Transformer, T-1A and normal station services transformer T-4 activated their respective deluge systems. On-site fire brigade and offsite fire assistance have successfully extinguished the T-1A transformer fire. There is still an active fire in the T-1A bus ductwork. The plant will be taken to cold shutdown conditions. At 0545 EST the plant entered the emergency plan at the NUE level due to inability to successfully extinguish the fire. All control rods fully inserted following the reactor scram. MSIVs remain open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. All electrical buses are powered from their normal offsite reserve source. The licensee notified the NRC Resident and appropriate State and local government agencies. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN WALKOWIAK TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0642 EST ON 11/11/2012 * * *

As of 0639 EST the fire in the T-1A bus ductwork has been extinguished.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MARK HAWES TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0747 EST ON 11/11/2012 * * *

Local fire department is on-site. No radiological release and no protective actions required. Plant cooldown in progress.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MARK HAWES TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0810 EST ON 11/11/2012 * * *

The Unusual Event (HU 6.1) has been terminated at 0801 EST. Cooldown in progress to cold condition. Reactor level at 206 inches and pressure is at 530 pounds. The licensee notified the NRC Resident and appropriate State and local government agencies. Notified R1DO (Dentel), NRR EO (McGinty), IRD (Gott). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA via email.

ENS 4797229 May 2012 08:31:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Main Generator Load Reject SignalOn 5/29/2012 at 0331 (CDT) the Unit 3 reactor scrammed due to turbine control valve fast closure initiated by a load reject signal on the Main Generator. The cause of the load reject signal is Main Transformer differential relay 387T. Reactor power at the time of the SCRAM was approximately 75%. All systems responded as expected to the load reject signal. Main Steam Isolation Valves remained open and reactor pressure is being controlled on the Main Turbine Bypass Valves. No Main Steam Relief Valves lifted during the transient. No Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) reactor water level initiation setpoints were reached. Primary Containment Isolation Signals (PCIS) Groups 2, 3, 6 and 8 were received. The lowest reactor water level observed was -41 inches. Reactor water level was restored to and is being controlled by the Feedwater system in the normal band. This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and requires an LER within 60 days per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). This event is documented in the station corrective action program on SR# 557947. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All control rods inserted into the reactor core. Electrical power is being back fed from offsite power through the 161 KV feeder line. The reactor is being cooled down within the Technical Specification rates.
ENS 465822 February 2011 01:18:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationReactor Scram After a Main Transformer TripAt 1918 CST on February 1st 2011, LaSalle Unit 1 automatically scrammed due to a MPT (Main Power Transformer) trip and subsequent load reject, both RFP (Reactor Feed Pumps) tripped and (the reactor) scrammed on TCV (Throttle Control Valve) fast closure. 'U' safety relief valve actuated in the relief mode on the turbine trip and has subsequently reset with tailpipe temp returning to normal. As a result of the electrical transient, U1 and U2 RWCU (Reactor Water Cleanup) isolated, and this is not reportable due to being a single train system and there was no isolation in multiple systems. The plant is stable with reactor pressure control to the main condenser via the main steam isolation valves. Unit 2 remained at 96% in coastdown throughout the event. The plant is planned to remain in hot shutdown pending investigation of the cause of the MPT trip and load reject. All control rods fully inserted on the reactor scram. The cause of the RFP trips was swelling of the reactor water level as expected after a scram. The first out alarm was "turbine control valve fast closure." The plant is experiencing severe weather which may have influenced the MPT trip. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 464007 November 2010 23:39:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Alert Declared Due to Explosion in the 21 Main Transformer

At 1849 EST, the licensee declared an Alert due to an explosion in the 21 Main Transformer. As a result of the loss of the transformer, Unit 2 experienced a reactor trip. Plant response to the trip was normal and the plant is stable in Mode 3. At 1839 hrs., the licensee activated their Emergency Response Organization. Additionally, there was a report of smoke issuing from a metering station at the site boundary. Offsite assistance has been requested to investigate the metering station. No injuries were reported and the licensee is investigating whether any other equipment damage occurred as a result of the transformer failure.

  • * * UPDATE FROM NICK LIZZO TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2200 EST ON 11/07/10 * * *

On November 7, 2010, at 1839 hours, the Reactor Protection System automatically actuated at 100% Reactor Power when the 21 Main Transformer failed. The failure resulted in a turbine / reactor trip. All plant equipment responded normally to the unit trip. This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv). The transformer failure was characterized as an explosion that meets the IPEC (Indian Point Energy Center) EAL criteria 8.2.3. An Alert was declared at 1849 hours. The plant is stable in Mode 3 at this time. The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated following the manual trip, as expected. This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The Emergency Diesel Generators did not start as offsite power remained available and stable. The Station Auxiliary Transformer tap changer has remained at the maximum tap changer position and is inoperable, however the unit remains on offsite power and all electrical loads are stable. No primary or secondary relief valves lifted. The plant is in Hot Standby at normal temperature and pressure with residual heat removal using auxiliary feedwater and normal heat removal through the condenser via steam dumps. There was no radiation released. Indian Point Unit Three was not affected by this event and remains at 100% power. A post trip investigation is in progress. A one hour notification of the Alert Declaration was made to the NRC Emergency Operations Duty Center officer Howie Crouch at 1907 (hrs. EST). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the New York State Public Service Commission, New York State EMA and local county officials. Notified R1DO (White).

  • * * UPDATE FROM CHARLES LAVERDE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2230 EST ON 11/07/10 * * *

At 2218 EST, the licensee exited the Alert emergency declaration. The exit criteria was that: 1) The plant was in or was proceeding to cold shutdown, 2) No radiation release was in progress or anticipated 3) All radiation levels in the plant were stable or decreasing, and 4) No limitation on access to all plant areas. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified IRD (Gott), R1DO (White), NRR EO (Bahadur), FEMA (Heyman), DHS (Doyle), HHS (Gruenspecht), USDA (John) and DOE (Turner).

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/8/2010 AT 1228 FROM MICHAEL McCARTHY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Approximately 50-100 gallons of oil from the transformer reached the Hudson River. The licensee notified the National Response Center and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (White).

ENS 4602518 June 2010 15:08:0010 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class DeclarationUnusual Event Declared Due to Damaged Energized Equipment

On June 18, 2010, at approximately 0807 MST, a manual turbine trip was initiated due to loss of cooling for Main Transformer X01C. The power supplies for the transformer cooling system was lost due to an inadvertent actuation of the transformer fire protection deluge system. The damage to the energized equipment met the definition for an Emergency Action Level HU 2.2. Based on HU 2.2 the Unit 1 Shift Manager declared a Notification of an Unusual Event (NOUE) at 0808 MST applicable to Palo Verde Unit 1 only. The manual trip of the turbine initiated a Reactor Power Cutback Large Load Rejection actuation which was successful. The reactor is stable at 25% with Heat Removal via main feedwater and steam bypass to main condenser. A down power to approximately 12% power is being planned. No anomalies were noted during the manual turbine trip. (There is) no release in progress and no safety systems actuations were required. Palo Verde Unit 1 is in a normal post-trip electrical lineup. State and local authorities have been notified as well as the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM BRIAN FERGUSON TO DONG PARK @ 1333 EDT ON 6/18/10 * * *

The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1030 MST. The reactor remains stable at approximately 12% power, and heat removal is via main feedwater and steam bypass to the main condenser. Notified IRD (Gott), NRR EO (Cheok), R4DO (Jones), DHS (Inzer) and FEMA (Hollis).

ENS 457444 March 2010 17:20:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News ReleaseOffsite Notification Due to Deceased Birds on Site

On the morning of 03/04/2010, approximately 500 dead European starlings were found in the area surrounding the north part of the Turbine Building. Most of the dead birds were found around the main transformers. External examination of the dead starlings initially indicates the birds likely died from respiratory distress as a result of damage to their respiratory system. Initial indications are that the birds were somehow poisoned offsite, came to Wolf Creek to roost, and subsequently died while roosting. Wolf Creek notified the Kansas Department of Wildlife and Parks and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of this event. This is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) since Wolf Creek made a notification to other government agencies. The Senior Resident Inspector was notified of this event.

  • * * UPDATE FROM LANCE LANE TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1904 EST ON 3/4/10 * * *

Wolf Creek was informed that a bait/poison was applied under permit (USDA & USFWS) at a local dairy farm near Westphalia, KS. Poison was placed on Tuesday, which coincides with some birds in a weakened state Tuesday night and major die off Wednesday. The USDA has agreed to let Wolf Creek know if similar baiting is done in the future. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Giessner).

ENS 4517830 June 2009 22:13:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News ReleasePotential Media Interest Due to Forced OutageOn June 30, 2009, at 1513 PDT, Unit 2 commenced a ramp(-down) in accordance with the annunciator response guidance to enter Operating Procedure (OP) Abnormal Procedure AP-25 due to loss of forced cooling to main transformer bank (MTB) C-Phase transformer. At 1538, Unit 2 was separated from the grid in accordance with plant OP AP-25 initiation of a main generator unit trip. At 1554 PDT, the Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs) were manually opened per OP AP-25 Step 24.j. (Reactor) power was being held in Mode 2 at about 3% reactor power per the procedure when the RTBs were opened. The investigation into the cause is continuing. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Offsite Notification, as Pacific Gas and Electric plans to make a news release regarding the event that may raise media interest. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4502125 April 2009 22:05:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationManual Scram Following Loss of Cooling to Main TransformerOyster Creek inserted a manual reactor scram due to a loss of cooling to one of its main transformers. All systems responded normally during the reactor scram. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. " The manual scram was described as uncomplicated. All control rods fully inserted. No safeties or PORVs lifted during the transient. There were no electrical power issues besides the problem associated with the main transformer cooling. Normal feedwater cooling was maintained to the reactor and decay heat removal is to the main condenser. There were no ESF actions during the transient. The loss of cooling was to one of Oyster Creeks' two main transformers. Power to the transformer cooling system components (oil cooling pumps and cooling fans) was lost when the control power transformer to the cooling system components failed. The licensee manually scrammed because sustained operation at power would not be possible with loss of cooling to the main transformer and operation with one of the main transformers de-energized is also not possible. The licensee will continue to cold shutdown to perform other maintenance activities while shutdown. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 448222 February 2009 02:56:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration
Unusual Event and Reactor Scram Due to Main Transformer Fire

At 2156 EST, a fire occurred on Main Transformer M1A. The loss of the main transformer resulted in a reactor scram from full power without complications. The transformer deluge system activated. The fire brigade responded and offsite assistance from the fire department was obtained to help extinguish the fire. The fire department has since departed the site. An Unusual Event was declared at 2211 EST based on the transformer fire lasting longer than 15 minutes. The fire was extinguished at 2227 EST. A fire reflash watch was established. There was no damage to any other equipment besides the main transformer. During the reactor scram transient, the isolation condenser actuated as expected and was subsequently secured. Four electro-magnetic relief valves actuated and reseated normally. The plant is currently in hot standby with reactor pressure at 927 psi and water level at 150 inches with all conditions stable and a normal electrical configuration. The licensee is assessing the criteria for exiting the UE at this time. The licensee has notified State and local government agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ZUCHOWSKI TO HUFFMAN AT 0001 EST ON 2/02/09 * * *

The licensee terminated the UE at 2337 EST due to stable plant conditions with all entry criteria for the UE exited and no concern of reflash. The licensee did note that there is an oil sheen on the water around the transformer and indication of a small amount of oil dripping from the transformer. The licensee is taking efforts to contain the spill with spill kits and barriers. The NRC Resident has been notified. Notified R1DO (Schmidt), R1 (Bellamy), NRR EO (Blount), and IRD (McMurtray). Informed DHS (Banner) and FEMA (Barden).

  • * * UPDATE FROM FLESHER TO HUFFMAN AT 1907 EST ON 2/02/09 * * *

Upon review of the electromagnetic relief valve performance during the reactor scram at 2156 EST on 2/1/09, two electromagnetic relief valves opened - not four (as originally reported). Due to subsequent seat leakage of one electromagnetic relief valve, the valve was cycled and was able to be reseated. At 0444 EST on 2/2/09 downstream relief temperatures confirmed that the valve had reseated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Schmidt) notified.

ENS 4468829 November 2008 02:01:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Main Transformer Fault

At 98% power, a reactor scram occurred due to a Main Transformer fault. The plant is currently stable in the Hot Shutdown Mode. Isolation Condensers initiated as part of this event are currently in Standby Mode. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2) and (b)(3) and the Station Reportability Manual section SAF 1.6 and SAF 1.7. The cause of the transformer fault is unknown and under investigation. There was no fire or explosion associated with the fault. All rods inserted during the scram. As a result of the transient, one electromatic relief valve lifted and subsequently reseated. There were no other isolations or safety equipment actuations during the transient. The station electrical system is in its normal shutdown lineup with offsite power available. Decay heat is being removed via the turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. Pressure is currently at 700 psi with water level being maintained at 160" via the main feed system. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the State of New Jersey.

  • * * * UPDATE FROM CARL SUCHTING TO JOHN KNOKE AT 0017 EDT ON 11/29/08 * * * *
Notification performed to NJDEP of fish mortality following a reactor scram.  As of this report, one dead bluefish spotted and three distressed bluefish spotted.

Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Doerflein).

ENS 4441917 August 2008 07:12:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Unusual Event Declared Due to Fire in Main Bank Tranformer

At 0012 the licensee declared a Notice of Unusual Event due to a fire in Main Bank Transformer. The licensee is fighting the fire along with offsite assistance from CAL FIRE. The unit is shutdown and stable in mode 3. All control rods fully inserted on the trip. Decay heat is being removed via auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators steaming to the main condenser via the main condenser steam dumps. Emergency buses remain powered via offsite power with emergency diesel generators available if required. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS (Barnes), FEMA (Blankenship).

* * * UPDATE FROM J. DILLIS TO J. KOZAL AT 0501 EDT ON 8/17/08 * * * 

The fire is out. Plant personnel are assessing the damage in the main transformer area. The plant is stable in mode 3. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM J. DILLIS TO P. SNYDER AT 0542 EDT ON 8/17/08 * * * 

The licensee has terminated the Notice of Unusual Event at 0231 PDT due to the fact that the fire was out and no reflash occurred. The plant remains stable in mode 3. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Lantz), IRD (McMurtray), NRR EO (Wermiel), R4 (Collins), NRR (Grobe), DHS (Wallace), FEMA (Biscoe).

  • * * UPDATE FROM M. KENNEDY TO J. KOZAL AT 1038 EDT ON 8/17/08 * * *

This is an update of the Notification of Unusual Event due to Fire in the 'C' phase of the main bank transformer, and Automatic Reactor Trip. This update is to report automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) and is being reported as an 8-hour non-emergency event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'System Actuation.' The unit is stable in mode 3 (Hot Standby) with offsite power being supplied to all buses via the 230 Kv startup circuit. All rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. All systems performed as designed. Operators are preparing to place the unit in Mode 5, while preparing to assess the damage to the 500 Kv transformer. All emergency diesel generators remain operable in standby. Unit 1 was unaffected by this event and remains at 100% power. This notification also constitutes a late 4 hour notification for the RPS actuation. To summarize, on August 16, 2008, at 2356 PDT, the 'C' phase 500 Kv transformer failed resulting in a fire and an automatic reactor trip, and automatic actuation of AFW. An unusual event was declared on August 17, 2008, at 0012 PDT due to the fire. Cal Fire was called to assist and support the on-site fire brigade. The fire was extinguished and the NUE was downgraded at 0231 PDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified as well as State and local government agencies. The licensee intends to issue a press release. R4DO (Lantz) notified.

ENS 4423422 May 2008 18:20:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationReactor Trip Due to Lightning Strike

Lightning struck the main transformer for Millstone Unit 2 and caused actuation of the reactor protection system. The reactor had an uncomplicated trip. Reactor shutdown and all control rods fully inserted. No primary or secondary relief valves lifted. Plant is stable in Hot Standby at NOP and NOT. Level is being maintained with normal feedwater and AFW is available if required. Decay heat is being removed via steam bypass valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED AT 2127 EDT ON 05/23/08 FROM MARK STROLLO TO JEFF ROTTON * * *

The purpose of this update is to clarify the stated cause of the reactor trip and plant response. The original title was 'Reactor Trip Due to lightning Strike on Main Transformer'. Although there was a lightning storm in the vicinity of Millstone 2 at the time of the reactor trip, the cause of the reactor trip may be related to a grid disturbance caused by a lightning strike on a transmission line off site. This cause remains under investigation. (Initial) event report states that no primary or secondary relief valves lifted. A steam generator safety relief valve (secondary) lifted for about 34 seconds. The NRC Sr. Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Gray).

ENS 4408621 March 2008 20:25:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationAutomatic Reactor Scram from a Main Turbine TripActuation of an RPS signal while the reactor was critical. At 1525 a generator trip signal on the main transformers initiated a reactor scram due to Turbine Stop and Control Valve fast closure. Safety relief valves operated initially to lower reactor pressure. Turbine bypass valves operated initially to lower reactor pressure. Turbine bypass valves are maintaining pressure control currently. Reactor recirc pumps A and B transferred to slow speed operation as expected. No ECCS initiations were received. Reactor level is being controlled with normal systems condensate and feedwater. Lowest level indicated was approximately -6" wide range. Level 3 initiations occurred to group 3 isolation valves. No valves operated, they are normally closed. The site is investigating the cause of the trip. A probable cause is the "C" phase differential trip which was received from the main transformer. All control rods fully inserted during the scram. The plant is on its normal shutdown electrical lineup. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4389912 January 2008 22:26:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Manual Reactor Scram Due to Degraded Cooling to Main TransformersOn 1/12/08 at 1626 hours a manual scram was inserted due to degraded cooling on the main transformers. All control rods fully inserted and all systems actuated and/or operated as designed. No safety relief valves opened during the event and reactor pressure is currently being controlled within normal bands with bypass valves. Reactor water level is also being controlled within normal bands with the condensate and feedwater system. Group 2 and 3 isolation signals were received however, no valve movement occurred since these valves are normally closed." The licensee is investigating a potential electrical fault which may have caused the event, but it appears that there was an electrical fault in the transformer cooling system. The grid is normal with no transmission system warnings in effect. All feeds are available. Reactor vessel level is 32.6 inches stable with normal condensate system feeding the vessel. Primary plant pressure is 815 psig. All safety and BOP electrical buses are energized normally. No bus power was lost. Decay heat path is via bypass valves to the main condenser. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 433454 May 2007 17:56:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationManual Reactor Scram Due to Loss of Cooling to Number 2 Main TransformerAt approximately 1256 CDT on May 4, 2007, a manual reactor scram was initiated following the loss of cooling to the no. 2 main transformer. Reactor power at the time of the scram was approximately 70 percent (initially 100% power). Following the scram, reactor water level briefly decreased below Level 3, resulting in the automatic closure of containment isolation valves in the suppression pool cooling system. This isolation was confirmed to have occurred as designed. Reactor pressure and water level control were promptly established. All control rods inserted, and no emergency injection system operation was required. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as a condition resulting in a manual actuation of the reactor protection system. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
ENS 432856 April 2007 15:11:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration
Main Generator Transformer Explosion - No Impact on Plant Safety Related Systems

At 1143 on 4/6/07 the licensee declared an Unusual Event due to a main transformer explosion in the protected area. The event was declared in accordance with EAL 8.2.2. Unit 3 automatically tripped due to a load reject at the main generator. The Unit is currently stable at normal operating temperature and pressure. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to the main condenser. All emergency diesel generators are available if needed but safety buses are currently supplied with offsite power. At the transformer site the deluge system actuated and the fire brigade responded. The fire was out at the time of the report The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1232 ON 4/6/07 FROM LAUGHLIN TO HUFFMAN * * *

The offsite local fire department was called by the licensee but their support was not needed and they were released.

* * * UPDATE AT 1259 ON 4/6/07 FROM LAUGHLIN TO HUFFMAN * * * 

The licensee exited Unusual Event at 1247 based on the fact that the fire was confirmed to be extinguished, there was no damage to safety equipment and the plant was in a safe and stable condition.

* * * UPDATE AT 1440 ON 4/6/07 FROM PRUSSMAN TO KNOKE * * * 

On April 6 at 1143 hours, an unusual event was declared based on Emergency Action Level 8.2.2, an explosion in the 'B' phase of the 31 main transformer. This is a one hour reportable event to the NRC made at 1159 hours. This is an update of EN 43285. The NUE was terminated at 1247 hours. The State and County were also notified of the unusual event. A press release was made. Although no one was injured as a result of this event, a four hour report is being made since this is related to on-site personnel safety. The main generator tripped and this resulted in a consequential reactor trip. The Reactor Protection System shut down the reactor at 1109 hours, a four hour report. The plant operated as designed and the Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated, an eight hour report. The fire was reported to the Control Room at 1111 hours. The fire was put out in less than 15 minutes. The event is currently under investigation. The header information in this event was revised as a result of this update to indicate 'Offsite Notification.'

ENS 4264315 June 2006 14:53:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationAutomatic Reactor Scram Due to Turbine TripAt 10:53 on 6/15/06, a reactor scram, occurred due to a Turbine/Generator Trip. All control rods fully inserted into core. The lowest vessel water level reached was 134 inches. Water level is now being controlled in the normal water level band using Condensate/Feedwater system. No SRVs lifted. RPV pressure is being controlled by the Turbine Pressure Regulator. At the time of the scram, 2B Main Transformer cleaning was taking place. The initial alarm was 'Main Transformer 2B Oil Temp Hi' followed by Generator Differential Relaying and a Turbine Trip. Transformer Deluge also initiated. An investigation is in progress to determine the specific cause for the initiating event. Group 13 'Drywell Sumps' isolated on Level 3 as expected. At the time of the scram, all ECCS systems and Emergency Diesel Generators were Operable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4257615 May 2006 14:59:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationMomentary Loss of Dhr Due to Automatic Actuation of the Keowee Emergency Power SupplyEvent: At 10:59 hours on 5-15-06, while in Mode 6 following completion of refueling activities, Oconee Unit 3 experienced a lockout of CT-3, the transformer for the Startup power source, which was in service at the time. This resulted in a momentary loss of AC power to the unit. Keowee Hydro Station, the Oconee emergency power source received an automatic emergency start signal, started, and closed in to supply power via the Underground Emergency Power path within approximately 40 seconds. Initial Safety Significance: Initial conditions of significant systems: Normal power via backcharge of main transformer was not available. The Fuel Transfer Canal was full and valves open connecting it to the Spent Fuel Pool. Time to core boil was 58 minutes per procedure. The Equipment Hatch was open. The initial loss of power resulted in interruption of Decay Heat Removal (DHR) Cooling, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling, and other support systems. Power was automatically restored and the affected systems returned to service promptly. Therefore there was no safety significance to this event. Reactor Coolant System heated up from approximately 80F to approximately 89.5F during this event. Corrective Action(s): As stated, Keowee started and supplied power automatically. The appropriate Abnormal Procedures were entered to restore power and restart these systems. DHR was restored at 11:13. Actions were initiated to achieve Containment Closure due to the loss of DHR. The Equipment Hatch was closed by 11:40. Backup power is available from Central Switchyard via CT-5. The cause of the initiating transformer lock out is under investigation. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 425371 May 2006 08:39:0010 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class DeclarationUnusual Event Declared Due to a Fire in an Isophase Bus Duct Lasting 11 Minutes

The Unusual Event was declared due to a fire lasting greater than 10 minutes (after discovery) within the protected area. The fire was located on the Isophase Bus Duct near the Main Transformer. A load reduction to 80% rated thermal power is in progress on Unit 1. The fire was extinguished at 0450 with dry chemicals extinguishers." The licensee believes the fire was on cabling in the Isophase bus duct due to overheating. The licensee has been monitoring hot spots on the duct cabling for several days. The fire did not apparently impact any other systems and observers are at the location monitoring for any change in conditions. No Tech Spec Limiting Conditions of Operations resulted from the fire and there is no impact on Unit 2 operations (which is currently at 100%). Termination criteria will be based on management judgment and safety assessment.

  • * * UPDATE FROM P. UNDERWOOD TO M. RIPLEY 0727 EDT 05/01/06 * * *

Unusual Event terminated at 0655 (EDT). Fire extinguished. Reactor power reduction continuing. Management evaluating continued operation. The unit is currently at 77% power and plans are to reduce power to 60% pending their evaluation of continued operation. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2 DO (K. Landis), NRR EO (M.J. Ross-Lee), IRD Manager (P. Wilson), DHS (S. York), and FEMA ( M. Roland).

ENS 4249111 April 2006 13:24:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required ShutdownTechnical Specification Required ShutdownAt 0924 Unit 2 experienced multiple Fire Protection System Deluge Valve actuations for the Main Filter Banks, System Station Service Transformers (SSSTs) 2A and 2B, the Main Transformer, Condensate Polishing building ventilation charcoal filter and Decontamination building ventilation charcoal filter. The Transformers were unaffected by the spray actuation and remained operable. No actual fire occurred or was observed for these components or areas. The Motor driven and Engine Driven Fire Pumps automatically started upon the actuations. These above noted areas and components received water spray down until manually isolated. It was verified that both of the Charcoal Main Filter Banks (TS 3.7.8.1) had become wetted down by the spray actuation. With the charcoal main filter banks wet, their filtering capability becomes impacted and is being evaluated. These filter components were declared inoperable. At 0924, Unit 2 entered the actions of Tech. Spec. 3.0.3. The requirements of Tech Spec 3.0.3 are: Within 1 hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in Hot Standby within the following 6 hours, Hot Shutdown within the following 6 hours, and Cold Shutdown within the subsequent 24 hours. At 1055 Unit 2 commenced shutdown at 20%/hr. The cause of the multiple actuations is not understood at this time. An Event Response Team has been formed to investigate the issue. All other safety related systems are operable. The action required for the licensee to exit this Tech Spec required shutdown will be to restore the charcoal filter banks to operable status. The licensee estimates the investigation, troubleshooting, and repair efforts to last approximately 40 hours. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4209629 October 2005 17:25:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Unusual Event - Main Transformer Fire

NUE declared on Hatch Unit 1 due to a fire on the main transformer lasting greater than 10 minutes. Unit 1 reactor scram on main turbine trip. Group 2 PCIV (Primary Containment Isolation Valves) isolation on low reactor water level (+3 inches). All group 2 valves closed as required. Fire extinguished at 1358 hours. Plant is stable. All control rods fully inserted on the reactor scram. The plant is in hot shutdown steaming through the turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. No safety systems are affected. Emergency electrical buses are on normal offsite power and emergency diesel generators are available if required. The onsite fire brigade responded to the fire and the fire suppression system for the main transformer functioned as expected. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM E. BURKETT TO W. GOTT AT 1950 ON 10/29/05 * * *

The licensee is still in a NUE. The fire is out. The fire reflashed at 1603 when the deluge system was secured to inspect the transformer. The deluge system was restarted immediately. Offsite fire support have responded. Cleanup efforts are in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified IRD (Blount), R2DO (Cahill), and NRR EO (J. Hannon).

  • * * UPDATE FROM E. BURKETT TO P. SNYDER AT 2010 ON 10/29/05 * * *

The licensee is still in a NUE. This call is to add an offsite notification per 10 CFR 72.75 (b)(2) to another government agency. The site chemistry department notified the National Response Center (Coast Guard) at 1636 that the site had discharged an unknown quantity of oil into the Altamaha River and was implementing site spill control and countermeasures procedures. The licensee also notified the Georgia Environmental Protection Division. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified IRD (Blount), NRR EO (J. Hannon), and R2DO(Cahill).

  • * * UPDATE FROM E. BURKETT TO W. HUFFMAN AT 0021 EDT ON 10/30/05 * * *

The licensee reports that the fire is confirmed extinguished (i.e., no risk of reflash) based on long term monitoring of the transformer including thermography measurements. The Unit remains in an Unusual Event until assessment activities related to the transformer fire have been completed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM E. BURKETT TO W. HUFFMAN AT 0105 EDT ON 10/30/05 * * *

Based on the results of assessment activities related to the transformer fire, the licensee has exited the Unusual Event at 0050. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R2DO (Cahill), EO (Hannon), IRD (Blount), DHS (Doyle), and FEMA (Bisco) have been notified.

ENS 4183713 July 2005 13:17:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip

On July 13, 2005, at approximately 0917 hours, Unit 1 received a Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip and a Main Turbine trip. All control rods fully inserted into the core. Plant response to the reactor shutdown resulted in a reactor coolant level transient that caused a Low Level 2 signal and subsequent High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system initiation. The HPCI system started but did not inject into the vessel because reactor coolant level was already recovered by the Reactor Feedwater system. Proper operation of the RCIC system has not been conclusively determined. Both Reactor Recirculation pumps tripped, as expected, from the low reactor coolant level and high pressure transient. Additionally, primary containment isolation system actuation signals for valve groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 were received and the valves, that were open, closed as required. The Reactor Building Ventilation System isolated and both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System automatically started and operated successfully. The RPS trip was reset and the HPCI turbine secured. Both trains of the SBGT system were secured. At 1119 hours, the plant exited the scram recovery procedure and entered General Plant Operating procedure 0GP-05, "Unit Shutdown." Investigation into the cause of the RPS and Main Turbine trip is still in progress. The plant is currently in Mode 3 (i.e., Hot Shutdown) and activities are in progress to transition to Mode 4 (i.e., Cold Shutdown). The resident inspector has been notified. INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION The initial safety significance of this condition is considered to be minimal. The plant responded as designed to the transient, with the exception of the verification of RCIC system performance, and the plant was safely shut down. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS An event investigation team has been assembled to determine the cause of the event. Plant response to the event is being evaluated and identified issues will be addressed prior to plant restart. During the transient, four safety relief valves lifted and reset. The plant is currently in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Reactor vessel level is being maintained using normal feedwater. The bypass valves are available for cooldown. There was no effect on unit-2.

  • * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE TO ABRAMOVITZ AT 1741 ON 7/14/05 * * *

On July 13, 2005, at approximately 0917 hours, Unit 1 received a Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip and a Main Turbine trip. All control rods fully inserted into the core and the plant safely shut down. A non-emergency notification (Event Number 41837) was made to the NRC Operations Center at 1303 hours. This follow-up notification discusses plant recovery from the Unit 1 event. After investigation team review of plant data, it was determined that the RCIC system performed appropriately (i.e., was not required to start) in response to the reactor coolant level transient. Reactor coolant level decreased to near, but did not exceed, the RCIC System actuation instrumentation setpoint. The investigation team determined that the direct cause of the RPS/Main Turbine trip is the shorting to ground of one phase of the Unit 1 Main Generator No-Load Disconnect Switch, which electrically connects the generator to the Main Transformer. The switch grounding caused a generator ground fault that resulted in a backup generator lockout and fast closure of the turbine control valves. Fast closure of the turbine control valves provided the trip input to the RPS. Unit 1 is now making preparations to go to mode 4, cold shutdown. Unit 1 and Unit 2 are currently in Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1 'AC Sources - Operating,' for one of two required Unit 1 offsite AC circuits inoperable. The resident inspector has been notified. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Further testing of RCIC System Low Reactor Level actuation instrumentation will be performed to further verify satisfactory RCIC System performance during the event. Activities are in progress to address the damaged No-Load Disconnect Switch and to determine the cause of the switch failure. Notified the R2DO (Fredrickson).

ENS 4180027 June 2005 07:16:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Declaration of an Unusual Event Due Transformer Fire >10 Minutes

UNUSUAL EVENT (EAL #16 - Fire) declared at 0327 on 6/27/05 due to uncontrolled fire in the Unit 4 Main Transformer lasting longer than 10 minutes. Unit 4 experienced an automatic reactor trip from 100% on a turbine trip due to a fire in the Main Transformer. The fire was extinguished after approximately 25 minutes. On-site fire brigade and Miami-Dade fire department responded. The cause of the fire is under investigation. The reactor is stable in Mode 3. No safety systems were affected. All rods fully inserted, no ECCS actuations, no relief valves lifted and no personnel injuries occurred. Offsite power is still available and no emergency diesels auto started, however, there was an auxiliary feedwater actuation. Hazardous Material response is being implemented due to discharge of transformer oil. There may be a possible press release on this event. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified along with State and local agencies.

  • * * UPDATE ON 06/27/05 @ 05:13 BY SPEICHER TO GOULD * * *

The NOUE was terminated at 05:00 due to the fire being extinguished and the emergency no longer existing. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Notified RDO 3 (Evans), EDO (Case), IRO (Frant), FEMA (Bagwell), DHS (Reed)

  • * * UPDATE 0915 EDT ON 6/27/05 BY S. SANDIN * * *

Received a call from a member of the Turkey Point Communications Group. The licensee does not plan on issuing a press release at this time. Notified R2DO (Evans).

ENS 4172824 May 2005 17:50:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionUnanalyzed Condition Involving Emergency Backup Power GeneratorsEvent: On 5-19-05, Oconee discovered that an electrical contactor had failed at Keowee Hydro Station. This contactor normally can provide auxiliary power from one Keowee Hydro Unit (KHU) to cooling fans on the Keowee Main Transformer, which is part of the Overhead power path (one train of emergency power to the three Oconee units). At the time, power to the cooling fans was being provided by an alternate power source. A problem report (PIP) was written and an Operability Assessment concluded that the Overhead power path was fully operable. On 5-24-05 at 1350 hours, it was recognized that the alternate power source supplying the cooling fans was supplied from the auxiliary power bus associated with the KHU then aligned to the Underground power path (the redundant train of emergency power to the three Oconee units). It was recognized that this alignment presented a single failure vulnerability in that loss of the auxiliary power bus for the KHU aligned to the Underground path could also result in loss of Main Transformer cooling on the Overhead power path. As a result, Operations declared entry at 1350 hours into Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1 condition C for the Overhead power path being inoperable (a 72 hour allowed completion time). A review of available information indicates that the electrical contactor actually failed on or before 5-2-05. Therefore the period of vulnerability to this potential single failure was approximately 22 days. This condition is being reported as an unanalyzed condition per guidance in NUREG 1022 section 3.2.4. Initial Safety Significance: If the postulated single failure occurred during a design basis event, it is expected that, without credit for Operator intervention, both KHUs would fail, but the failure is not expected until a minimum of one hour after the loss of auxiliary power. During this time Operations would have been able to realign the KHU with auxiliary power to the Underground path and/or to have started and aligned a combustion turbine at Lee Steam Station. Therefore, the condition being reported is not expected to result in a loss of safety function. Corrective Action(s): The immediate corrective action was to realign the Keowee units to the opposite power paths. This aligned the KHU capable of supplying power to the Main Transformer cooling fans to the Overhead path. The KHU associated with the failed contactor was aligned to the Underground path. The TS condition was exited at 1540 hours when this realignment was complete. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4164628 April 2005 11:19:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Unit 2 Manual Reactor Scram Due to Loss of Main Transformer CoolingAt approximately 0700 U2 B Main Transformer cooling was lost. Unit 2 reactor power was reduced from 100% to 75%. Attempts to restore the 2B Main Transformer cooling were unsuccessful, and Unit 2 was manually scrammed from 75% reactor power. RPV water level decreased to -30" due to the SCRAM and was restored by normal Feedwater and RCIC injection. The Main Condenser remained available as a heat sink and there were no SRV lifts. The low water level did result in receiving the Level 2 Division 2 containment isolation signal (-38"), and all expected isolations and initiations did occur. This event requires a 4 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for an RPS actuation when critical, and an 8 hour ENS notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the injection from RCIC and receipt of the level 2 Containment Isolation signal. Additionally, a press release to the public will be issued, and requires a 4 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). All rods fully inserted during the manual scram. The electrical system is in a normal shutdown lineup. Secondary containment ventilation was momentarily disrupted in unit-1 and successfully restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the state and media concerning this event.
ENS 4082718 June 2004 10:50:0010 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class DeclarationUnusual Event Declared Due to a Main Transformer Fire Lasting Fire Longer than 10 Minutes.

Main transformer fire caused a load rejection/automatic reactor scram. All rods fully inserted into the core. Offsite power is being supplied through their startup transformers. Offsite fire department, Vernon, responded with three fire trucks and one ambulance. Main transformer fire was extinguished at 0751 EDT. There were no personnel injuries. All emergency core cooling systems and their emergency diesel generators are fully operable if needed. Reactor vessel water level is being maintained at its proper level via the condensate and feedwater system. Both recirculation pumps tripped. Licensee is looking into the reason why the recirculation pumps tripped. There was no release of radioactivity from the plant. Licensee notified the states of New Hampshire, Vermont , Massachusetts and local surrounding counties of the declaration of an unusual event. The NRC Resident Inspector was on scene when the event occurred.

  • * * UPDATE FROM LAURIE TKACZYK TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1301 HRS. EDT ON 06/18/04 * * *

At 1245 hrs. EDT, the Licensee terminated the Unusual Event. The basis for the termination was that the fire is out, a reflash watch is established and the plant is stable. The hydrogen in the generator is depressurized and the plant is currently purging the generator with carbon dioxide. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The Headquarters Operations Officer has notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), NRR EO (Reis), FEMA, DHS, DIRO (Wessman), HQPAO (Gagner), DIRO (Andrews), R1 (Blough and Wiggins).

  • * * CLARIFICATION TO INITIAL EVENT NOTIFICATION FROM DAVID HALLONQUIST TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1402 HRS. EDT ON 6/21/04 * * *

The Licensee has amended the initial report statement: "There was no release of radioactivity from the plant." to read "There was no release of radioactivity related to this event". The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Headquarters Operations notified R1DO (Dimitriadis) and NRR EO (Reis).

ENS 4010025 August 2003 13:45:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Due to a Sudden Pressure Relay Signal from Main Transformer Bank "1COn August 25, 2003, Watts Bar (WBN) Unit 1 was operating at 100 percent power when there was an operation of a "Sudden Pressure Relay" for Main Transformer Bank 1C. The actuation of the relay resulted in a turbine trip and a subsequent reactor trip at approximately 0945 EDT. The cause of the relay actuation is under investigation at this time. All control rods inserted as required and the safety systems actuated as designed including the motor and turbine driven pumps for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System. AFW pump 1B-B was inoperable at the time of the trip due to work on an area cooler. However, the pump was available for service and started as required. Unit 1 is currently stable in Mode 3 and will remain in this mode until the completion of the investigation into the cause of the trip. At the time of the Sudden Pressure Relay for Main Transformer Bank 1C, an oil sample was being taken of the Transformer. Fire Brigade was sent but there was no fire and no explosion to the Transformer. The electrical grid is stable, and Emergency Core Cooling systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed. At this time only the 1B-B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump is still operating. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.