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Entered date | Site | Region | Reactor type | Event description | |
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ENS 57141 | 24 May 2024 02:08:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2223 CDT on May 23, 2024, with Quad Cities Unit 2 at 38 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine trip signal resulting in main stop valve closure, creating a valid reactor protection system signal. Reactor vessel level reached the low-level set-point following the scram, resulting in valid Group II and Group III containment actuation signals. The trip was not complex with all systems responding as expected post-trip. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the Group II and Group III isolation. Operations responded using their emergency operating procedures and stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 remains at 100 percent power. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Unit 2 was at a reduced power for maintenance. |
ENS 57058 | 28 March 2024 01:52:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2046 (CDT) on 3/27/24 with the unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0% power, an actuation of the Reactor Protection System occurred during testing of the scram discharge volume. The cause of the Reactor Protection System actuation was leakage of water into the scram discharge volume causing a high level condition while drains were isolated for testing. The Reactor Protection System automatically actuated as designed when the high scram discharge volume signal was received. All rods were previously fully inserted and the Control Rod Drive system was shutdown. No rod movement occurred due to the actuation. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56954 | 8 February 2024 17:59:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: A supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The supervisor's access to the plant has been terminated. |
ENS 56865 | 19 November 2023 14:44:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and fax: On November 18, 2023, the presence of alcohol was discovered inside the protected area. In accordance with the Constellation Fitness For Duty (FFD) Program, the individual has been escorted offsite and access to the plant denied pending the results of an investigation. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1) as it represents a significant FFD violation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56676 | 11 August 2023 08:03:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 0329 (CDT) on August 11, 2023, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 90 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. The cause and details of the event are under investigation. Containment isolation valves actuated closed in multiple systems on a valid Group II signal. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the Group II isolation. Operations responded using the emergency operating procedure and stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 is not affected. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56606 | 3 July 2023 17:03:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1530 (EDT) on July 3, 2023, Constellation Generation Company, LLC reported to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency and Office of Homeland Security (IEMA-OHS) that tritium concentrations in existing monitoring wells in a known (10 CFR) 50.75(g) recovery area were found higher than normal (at Quad Cities Nuclear Generating Station). This higher than normal tritium concentration did not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria and there is no indication of a liquid release beyond the site boundary. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a notification of other government agency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56357 | 6 February 2023 13:26:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified. |
ENS 56210 | 4 November 2022 17:10:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On November 4, 2022, at 1400 hours, with Unit 2 (U2) in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, a manual scram was inserted on U2 due to rising reactor water level, which occurred following an unexpected opening of the 2B Feedwater Regulating Valve. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately 0 inches, which resulted in an automatic Group II and Group III isolation (expected response). Reactor Water Level control has been established in a normal band. The cause and details of the event are under investigation. The Unit 2 scram was not complicated. Operations responded using the Emergency Operating Procedures and stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100 percent power. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 55976 | 4 July 2022 09:53:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was received from the licensee via email: At 0130 CDT on July 4 2022, it was discovered both trains of Standby Gas Treatment System were simultaneously inoperable due to failure to reach required flow rates. Both trains were capable of starting but failed to reach the required flow of 4000 SCFM. Secondary Containment differential pressure was not able to be maintained at greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge, causing Secondary Containment to also be inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 55975 | 4 July 2022 05:57:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile: On July 4, 2022 at 0104 CDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, a manual scram was inserted on U2 due to lowering reactor water level, which occurred following an unexpected closure of the 2A Feedwater Regulating Valve. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately minus 16 inches, which resulted in an automatic Group II and Group III isolation (expected response). Following the scram, reactor water level rose to plus 75 inches resulting in a trip of all three Reactor Feedwater Pumps. At 0114 CDT, Reactor Water Level lowered to less than the Feedwater Pump High Level Trip setpoint and the 2C Reactor Feedwater Pump was restarted. Reactor Water Level control has been established in a normal band. The cause and details of the event are under investigation. The Unit 2 scram was not complicated. Operations responded using the Emergency Operating Procedure and stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100 percent power. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The licensee will notify the Illinois Emergency Management Agency. |
ENS 55922 | 1 June 2022 13:58:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email followed by phone call: At approximately 1043 CDT, the Quad Cities Main Control Room was notified that the Scott County Iowa warning sirens were activated in error at 1001 CDT. The sirens were not intentionally activated to notify the public of severe weather or pending emergency. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), News Release or Notification of Other Government Agencies. This is a 4-Hour Reporting requirement. The Quad Cities NRC Resident has been notified. |
ENS 55891 | 10 May 2022 23:42:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: At 1359 CDT on May 10, 2022, the 1B LPCI Loop Upstream Injection valve (1-1001-28B) was found to have a motor operated torque switch issue and inadequate lubrication. This issue called into question the ability of the valve to close when required. At 1746 CDT on May 10, 2022, both trains of Unit 1 LPCI were made simultaneously inoperable. TS 3.6.1.3 Condition A required de-activation of 1B LPCI Loop Downstream Injection valve (1-1001-29B) which was completed at 1746 CDT. Because of the de-activation of the 1B LPCI Loop downstream injection valve and LPCI Loop select logic, both trains of LPCI were made inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(V). Unit 1 HPCI and both loops of Core Spray are operable. After further engineering review, it was determined that 1B LPCI Loop Upstream injection valve condition was minor in nature and would not have affected the ability of the valve to close when required. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone call and email: The last sentence in the second paragraph, "After further engineering review, it was determined that 1B LPCI Loop Upstream injection valve condition was minor in nature and would not have affected the ability of the valve to close when required," has been deleted. The licensee is continuing to follow up on the issue and believes that sentence to be unclear and premature. Notified R3DO (Skokowski). |
ENS 55619 | 2 December 2021 00:58:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | At 1847 CST on December 1, 2021, it was discovered that the HPCI (high pressure coolant injection) system was inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The Unit 1 RCIC (reactor core isolation cooling) system was Operable during this time period. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident has been notified. Unit 1 HPCI operability was restored at 2110 CST. |
ENS 55146 | 20 March 2021 04:55:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | At 20:30 CDT on March 19, 2021, with the Unit 1 in Mode 5 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) occurred during outage activities on Transformer 12 (T-12) resulting in a trip. The cause of the Unit 1 EDG auto-start was bus undervoltage as a result of the T-12 trip. The Unit 1 EDG automatically started as designed when the Bus 14-1 undervoltage signal was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Unit 1 EDG. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 55132 | 10 March 2021 18:26:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On March 10, 2021, Exelon reported an unpermitted release of a radionuclide (i.e., tritium) into the groundwater within the site boundary at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) in accordance with Illinois state regulations. There has been no detection of the release beyond the site boundary. The suspected source for the increased groundwater tritium levels is an onsite water storage tank or pipe; however, an investigation is in progress and the exact cause and source is not yet known. The increase in groundwater tritium concentration does not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 54923 | 29 September 2020 21:19:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | On July 22, 2020, at 1030 CDT, it was discovered that the as-found Unit 2 Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Maximum Confirmation Count Setpoint did not match the values in the Quad Cities Unit 2 (Core Operating Limits Report) (COLR) per TS SR 3.3.1.3.3. All Unit 2 OPRMs were declared inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the OPRM system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). There were no other Technical Specification or safety systems inoperable at the time of this event. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Quad Cities Unit 2 returned their OPRMs to operable on July 23, 2020, at 1210 CDT, following a setpoint adjustment. In addition, during a more recent meeting between station personnel and the NRC resident inspectors, feedback was provided that brought to the station management's attention that they needed to make the required 50.72 notification as a result to this past inoperability. | |
ENS 54666 | 14 April 2020 23:36:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | On April 14, 2020 at 1645 CDT, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (CREV AC) system was declared inoperable when the electrical feed breaker to the Refrigeration Compressor Unit (RCU) was found in a tripped condition. As a result, both units entered Technical Specification 3.7.5 Condition A. Investigation is in progress to determine the cause and corrective actions of the RCU feed breaker trip. The CREV AC system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV AC could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. | |
ENS 54594 | 20 March 2020 17:47:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | On March 20, 2020, at 1025 hours (CDT), Unit 2 MCC (motor control center) 28/29-5 failed to transfer to its alternate feed during surveillance testing. This would result in MCC 28/29-5 being de-energized in the event of a DBA LOCA (design basis accident loss of coolant accident) in which the Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator fails to energize Bus 29. Consequently, the LPCI (low pressure coolant injection) Injection Valve (MO 2-1001-29A/B) would not have power to open on the loop selected by LPCI Loop Select. This renders both divisions of the LPCI mode of Residual Heat Removal system inoperable. Technical Specification 3.5.1, Condition E had previously been entered during testing, requiring restoration of LPCI in 72 hours. No other ECCS (emergency core cooling) systems were inoperable at the time of the event. Troubleshooting and repairs are in progress. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. The plant is still in its 72-hr. LCO action statement. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state of Illinois Emergency Management Agency. | |
ENS 54355 | 27 October 2019 22:36:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | On October 27, 2019, at 1605 CDT, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) was declared inoperable due to finding water in the system's Air Filtration Unit (AFU) filter enclosure. Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition A, was entered which requires the CREV system to be restored to an operable status in seven days. No other systems were out of service at the time this was declared inoperable. The CREV system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), "Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function," because the CREV system is a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
ENS 54239 | 25 August 2019 15:51:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | On August 25, 2019, at 1102 (CDT), Quad Cities Unit 1 experienced an automatic scram from 100 percent power. All rods fully inserted and there were no complications. The trip was initiated from a main generator ground fault relay. Troubleshooting of the fault is in progress. All systems responded as designed. There were no systems inoperable and no TS (Technical Specification) action statements were in progress prior to the Reactor Scram. Reactor water level dropped below the Group 2 and Group 3 Reactor Water Level Isolation set-points as expected, and recovered via the Feedwater system. Standby Gas Treatment System auto started and Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation occurred as expected. Unit 1 remains in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed using the steam bypass valves to the condenser and the safety relief valves did not lift as a result of the trip. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 2 was not affected. | |
ENS 53861 | 6 February 2019 02:22:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | On February 5, 2019, at 1804 (CST), during a Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) operability surveillance, a fuse blew in the logic for the motor speed changer for the turbine. The Unit 1 HPCI system was taken out of service for planned maintenance earlier in the day. The fuse issue was not related to any maintenance activities. Had HPCI been demanded, this fuse failure would not have allowed HPCI to reach its required speed. HPCI remains inoperable pending resolution of the issue. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was confirmed operable. There were no other systems inoperable at the time of the event. HPCI had been last successfully tested on November 6, 2018. This event is being reported as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCI system is a single train system and the loss of HPCI could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Inoperable HPCI places the unit in a 14 day Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operability. | |
ENS 53693 | 24 October 2018 17:45:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | On October 24, 2018 at 0901 CDT, during performance of the 'Functional Test of Unit 1 Second Level Undervoltage,' a loss of Bus 13-1 and Bus 18 occurred. The 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) automatically started due to a valid actuation on loss of power to Bus 13-1, but did not load due to required testing alignment. The loss of Bus 13-1 caused the loss of the 1A loop of Core Spray, both loops of Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI), and Bus 18. All equipment responded as expected. Bus 13-1 and Bus 18 were restored at 0911(CDT) on 10/24/18. Other affected systems are in the process of being restored. An investigation as to the cause of the event has been initiated. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv), 'Event or Condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B),' because the 1/2 EDG auto started due to the loss of power condition. This notification is also being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), 'Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function,' because both loops of LPCI were inoperable for a short time period. During the ten minutes where LPCI was unavailable, Unit 1 was in Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3. Unit 1 is currently in LCO 3.8.1(b) until the EDG is restored. Unit 2 was not affected by this event. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
ENS 53657 | 10 October 2018 03:26:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | On October 9, 2018 at 2002 CDT the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Condition (CREV AC) system was in the process of being returned to service following maintenance. During the return to service, the end bell on the CREV AC Condenser developed a significant leak requiring isolation. No work was performed on the CREV AC Condenser during the work window. The CREV AC system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), "Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function " because the CREV system is a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 53626 | 26 September 2018 23:25:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | On September 26, 2018 at 1908 CDT. an automatic scram was received on U1 following main generator 345 kV output breaker 7-8 trip with 345 kV output breaker 6-7 already opened for maintenance on line 0401. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately minus 15 inches, which resulted in automatic Group II and Group Ill isolations (expected response). Reactor pressure rose to approximately 1083 psig, and the 3B and 3C low set relief valves opened briefly to control reactor pressure. Reactor water level and reactor pressure have been restored to their normal bands. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 1 remains in Mode 3, with reactor pressure being controlled on the turbine bypass valves. The cause and details of the event are under investigation. Unit 2 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100% power. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)." All control rods inserted. Decay heat is being removed via the main condenser. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
ENS 53299 | 29 March 2018 16:42:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On March 29, 2018, Exelon Generation Company, LLC notified the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) in accordance with state regulations of an unpermitted release of radionuclides at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station within the site boundary. There has been no detection of the liquid release beyond the site boundary. No impact to human health or the environment are anticipated. This notification is being made to satisfy 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), notification of the NRC for any event related to the health and safety of the public for which a notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. The source of the Tritium release was from the Rad waste system. The spill was reported to be within the protected area which is within the site boundary. The quantity of the release is unknown at this point as the investigation and spill cleanup is in progress. The Licensee Notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 53235 | 1 March 2018 13:43:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | EN Revision Text: UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR TORNADO GENERATED MISSILES On March 1, 2018, during evaluation of protection for Technical Specifications (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornado generated missiles, Quad Cities Station identified a non-conforming condition in the plant design such that specific TS equipment is considered to not be adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. Tornado generated missiles could strike the Unit l, Unit 1/2, and Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator intake and exhaust stacks, day tank vents, and main fuel oil tank vents. This could result in crimping of the intake/exhaust stacks and vents, which would affect the ability of the Emergency Diesel Generators to perform their function if a tornado would occur. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is being addressed in accordance with NRC enforcement guidance provided in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, 'Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' Revision 1, and DSS-ISG-2016-01, 'Clarification of Licensee Actions in Receipt of Enforcement Discretion per Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002, Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' Revision 1. Compensatory measures have been implemented in accordance with these documents. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
The purpose of this notification today (11/07/19) is to retract event notification #53235 made on March 1, 2018, for Quad Cities Station. Additional review determined that the current design of all three Emergency Diesel Generators and associated Day Tanks and Main Fuel Oil Storage Tanks Vents is consistent with the licensing basis for Quad Cities Station. There was no non-conformance of Quad Cities' tornado missile protection design, and the EDGs were operable at the time the event notification was made. Therefore, this event does not meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and ENS report #53235 is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification. Notified R3DO (Peterson). | |
ENS 53189 | 31 January 2018 18:19:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | At 1310 hours (CST) on January 31, 2018, the Unit 2B fuel pool radiation monitor spiked high due to an invalid actuation which caused the U1 and U2 reactor building ventilation system to isolate, B train standby gas treatment system (SBGTS) started, and the control room ventilation system also isolated as designed. Secondary containment vacuum was lost for approximately one minute, and then subsequently returned to an acceptable level in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, 'Secondary Containment.' As a result of this transient, secondary containment was inoperable for approximately one minute. No emergency conditions were determined to exist. Troubleshooting of the radiation monitor spike is underway. Given the temporary loss of secondary containment vacuum, this event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 53089 | 23 November 2017 02:54:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On November 22, 2017, at 2043 (CST), Unit I MCC (Motor Control Center) 18/19-5 overvoltage relay target was found actuated and would not reset. MCC 18/19-5 was powered from the normal feed, Bus 19. Bus 19 voltages were verified to be normal. The overvoltage relay actuation would result in MCC 18/19-5 being de-energized in the event of a DBA LOCA (Design Basis Accident Loss of Coolant Accident) in which the 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator fails to energize Bus 18, therefore rendering both divisions of the Low Pressure Cooling Injection (LPCI) mode of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system inoperable. Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition E was entered, requiring restoration of LPCI in 72 hours. The overvoltage target was subsequently able to be reset at 2114 (CST), restoring the LPCI function of RHR. Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition E was exited at that time. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The purpose of this notification today (01/11/18) is to retract the ENS Report made on November 23, 2017 at 0248 hours EST (ENS Report #53089). Upon further review, it was determined that the Unit 1 MCC 18/19-5 overvoltage relay target that was found actuated and would initially not reset was caused only by intermittent degraded DC control power. During this event, MCC 18/19-5 remained powered from the normal feed Bus 19, and Bus 19 voltages were verified to be normal. It was further determined from plant drawings that under this condition the degraded DC control power to the Unit 1 MCC 18/19-5 overvoltage relay has no impact to the Technical Specification 3.5.1 required capability to auto transfer power from the normal Bus 19 to the alternate Bus 18 should Bus 19 lose power such as during a DBA LOCA. This overvoltage relay was installed in the early 1990's only to support enhanced reliability of the power supply to the LPCI injection valves, and its actuation due to degraded DC control power would not impact the ability to auto transfer to alternate Bus 18. Therefore, both divisions of the Low Pressure Cooling Injection (LPCI) mode of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system would have remained fully operable under the as-found relay condition, and Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition E was not required to be entered. On December 6, 2017, it was determined that a loose fuse clip terminal had caused the DC control power to the overvoltage relay to become degraded which in turn caused the relay target and its reset to become erratic. This fuse clip terminal was repaired on December 6, 2017. Based on the subsequent reviews of this event, the LPCI system was not required to be declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications 3.5.1 during the period of the MCC 18/19-5 overvoltage relay actuation (i.e., 31 minutes on 11/22/17), and hence was not required to be reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. Therefore, based on this information, ENS Report #53089 is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. R3DO(Jeffers) has been notified. |
ENS 53059 | 7 November 2017 22:09:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On November 7, 2017 at 1810 (CST), Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), was manually isolated following failure of the remote turbine trip pushbutton to function. Unit 1 HPCI Operability Testing was in progress to the point of securing the HPCI turbine with the remote manual pushbutton. The pushbutton failed to trip the turbine resulting in operator action to lower the flow controller setpoint and isolating the HPCI steam line. HPCI remains isolated and is Inoperable pending resolution of the Turbine Trip circuitry. This event is being reported as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCI system is a single train system and the loss of HPCI could impact the plant ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was confirmed operable. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52984 | 21 September 2017 21:07:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On September 21, 2017 at 1730 (CDT) the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Condition (CREV AC) system was declared inoperable due a refrigerant leak from the air conditioning compressor. As a result, Technical Specification 3.7.5 Condition A was entered for Units One and Two. The CREV AC system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system. The loss of CREV AC could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52955 | 8 September 2017 16:45:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On September 8, 2017 at 1130 hours CDT, Unit Two High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Minimum Flow Valve MO 2-2301-14 flow indicating switch (FIS 2-2354) failed to meet the Technical Specification Allowable Value during calibration testing. Technical Specification Table 3.3.5.1-1 Allowable Value (3.f) requires greater than or equal to 634 gpm (3.14 inches water column as required by procedure). HPCI was subsequently declared inoperable. This event is being reported as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCI system is a single train system and the loss of HPCI could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was confirmed operable. Note: On September 8, 2017 at 1140 hours CDT, the HPCI Minimum Flow Valve MO 2-2301-14 flow indicating switch (FIS 2- 2354) was successfully recalibrated and HPCI was returned to Operable status. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
The purpose of this notification today (10/19/17) is to retract the ENS Report made on September 8, 2017 at 1545 hours CDT (ENS Report #52955). Upon further investigation, it was determined that a surveillance procedure contained an overly restrictive statement that directed operators to immediately declare the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable when the HPCI Minimum Flow Valve MO 2-2301-14 flow indicating switch (FIS 2-2354) fails. This statement was in conflict with existing Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.5.1, Condition E, that allows seven days to restore the HPCI FIS (instrument channel only) to an operable status prior to entry into TS 3.3.5.1, Condition H, which requires declaring HPCI inoperable immediately. Hence, during the period of FIS inoperability (i.e., 10 minutes), the HPCI system was not required to be declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications. Therefore, based on this information, ENS Report # 52955 is being retracted. Note: On September 8, 2017 at 1140 hours CDT, the HPCI Minimum Flow Valve MO 2-2301-14 flow indicating switch (FIS 2-2354) was successfully recalibrated and HPCI was returned to Operable status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Daley). |
ENS 52758 | 16 May 2017 00:27:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On May 15, 2017 at 1918 hours (CDT), Unit Two High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Minimum Flow Valve MO 2-2301-14 failed to open as required by procedure and HPCI was declared inoperable. When the HPCI Turbine was tripped, the Minimum Flow Valve did not open when system flow reduced to the low flow setpoint. This event is being reported as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCI system is a single train system and the loss of HPCI could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. In accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition G, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was confirmed operable. This places the plant in a 14-day LCO action statement. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52527 | 1 February 2017 21:22:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On February 1, 2017, at 1929 hours (CST), a fire was discovered on the Unit 2 Main Control Room panel 902-3 in the 3E ERV/ADS valve switch. A reactor SCRAM was not required. No automatic isolations/actuations occurred. The fire was extinguished at 1932 and the reactor remained at 100% power. An Alert was declared at 1938 (CST). The initiation of the event was attempting to change a light bulb. The cause of the event is under investigation. The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of the event. The licensee entered a 14 day Technical Specification Action statement as a result of the damage to the switch. Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA, NNSA (e-mail), and NRCC SASC (e-mail).
Notified that the Alert was terminated at 2336 CST on 2/1/17. The licensee stated that the fire was extinguished and an extent of condition walkdown did not identify any additional equipment damage as a result of the fire. The licensee will be issuing a press release. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Duncan), IRD MOC (Gott), NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA, NNSA (e-mail), and NRCC SASC (e-mail). |
ENS 52508 | 24 January 2017 14:00:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On January 24, 2017, at 1000 hours (CST), Operations was notified that two Secondary Containment interlock doors (between the Unit 2 Reactor Building and Unit 2 Turbine Building) were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and Secondary Containment pressure remained negative. Unit 1 and Unit 2 share secondary containment. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open. As a result, entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A. was made momentarily due to Secondary Containment being inoperable. This event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of this event was due to an equipment interlock (solenoid) failure and the doors are currently blocked closed. |
ENS 52368 | 16 November 2016 14:32:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On November 16, 2016 at approximately 1010 CST, a local government agency (Whiteside County, Illinois) inadvertently activated emergency response sirens for less than one minute. The inadvertent actuation occurred during the scheduled Quad Cities Station emergency planning graded exercise while local government agencies were participating. A related news release and radio message was subsequently issued by Whiteside County to report that Whiteside County was participating in a drill in coordination with the Quad Cities Exelon Generating Station that the emergency response sirens were inadvertently activated, and that there is no emergency at this time and no action is required. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event as the offsite response capabilities remain functional. The site is operating normally with no emergency conditions present. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), as an inadvertent activation of emergency response sirens and news release. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52334 | 31 October 2016 09:27:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On October 31, 2016, at 0239 hours (CDT), a defect (minor audible through-wall leak) was identified on the steam line drain valve 1-2301-55, HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve. The defect was identified by Operations personnel traversing through the HPCI room as part of normal rounds. HPCI was declared inoperable under Tech Specs 3.5.1, Condition G. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was verified operable. HPCI remains available (but not operable). The leak has been isolated. The 1-2301-55 is a manual valve downstream of the HPCI steam line drain trap. In a standby line-up, this line drains condensation from the HPCI steam supply line to the main condenser. During operation in an accident scenario, this line drains condensation from the HPCI steam supply line to the Torus via a drain pot. The location of the defect is in class 2 safety related piping. HPCI is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Technical Specification 3.5.1, condition G requires that HPCI be Operable within 14 days.
The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS Report made on October 31, 2016, at 0239 hours CDT (ENS Report #52334). Upon further investigation, a pinhole through-wall leak was discovered in the body of the 1-2301-55 valve (HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve). The defect was characterized as a 1/32-inch rounded hole due to a manufacturing defect in the casting located on the downstream side of the valve near the piping connection. A subsequent evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station considering the defect size, location, and characterization, confirmed the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system would have performed its safety function when required. Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report 52334 is being retracted. Note: On November 1, 2016, at 1624 hours CDT, the 1-2301-55 valve (HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve) was successfully repaired and HPCI was returned to Operable status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Stone). |
ENS 52127 | 26 July 2016 18:12:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On July 26, 2016 at 1252 hours (CDT), the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to a toxic gas analyzer spurious alarm which resulted in the 'B' Air Filtration Unit (AFU) being inadvertently isolated. In this condition, Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system cannot be guaranteed to achieve required design flow rate. Tech Spec 3.7.4, Condition A was entered which requires the CREV system to be restored to an operable status in seven (7) days. The CREV system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions as well as protection of the operators from a high dose environment assumed during a design basis accident. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function,' because the CREV system is a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52099 | 18 July 2016 22:21:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | Testing of the Everbridge ERO (Emergency Response Organization) notification system identified that the system cannot notify all ERO individuals. This constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability. The issue has subsequently been reported resolved by the vendor and both site testing and common ERF (Emergency Response Facility) (EOF (Emergency Operations Facility) at Cantera) has verified resolution. The Everbridge system capability loss for Quad Cities was identified at approximately 1450 (CDT) hours on July 18, 2016, due to an undetermined loss of system communications, which is currently being investigated. Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) capability was not lost. The Everbridge system capability loss for the common ERF (EOF at Cantera) was identified at approximately 1500 (CDT) on July 18, 2016. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of EP offsite communications capability. The NRC Resident inspector has been notified. The site was developing compensatory measures when the event was terminated. |
ENS 51880 | 25 April 2016 12:39:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On April 25, 2016, at 0607 hours (CDT), HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) was isolated via the HPCI MO 2-2301-4 (HPCI Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve) to stop a packing leak on the HPCI MO 2-2301-5 (HPCI Outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve). The packing leak was causing a steam plume potentially impacting the motor operator on the 2-2301-5 valve. HPCI was declared inoperable and T.S. 3.5.1 Condition G was entered. Since HPCI is a single train safety system, this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D), as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 51659 | 16 January 2016 01:42:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On January 15, 2016 at 2038 CST, an alarm was received indicating Secondary Containment Differential Pressure rose unexpectedly above the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement, SR 3.6.4.1.1, limit of 0.10 inch of vacuum water gauge. This loss of differential pressure occurred when Operations had entered the 2A Reactor Water Cleanup Pump room. The pump room door was closed and Secondary Containment Differential Pressure returned to Technical Specification limits in approximately 4 minutes. The Standby Gas Treatment System remained in standby and fully operable. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1. As a result, entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to secondary containment being inoperable. Given the temporary loss of secondary containment, this event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." The licensee also notified the State of Illinois Emergency Management Agency. |
ENS 51650 | 12 January 2016 19:08:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On January 12, 2016, at 1340 CST, an alarm was received indicating secondary containment differential pressure rose unexpectedly above the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement, SR 3.6.4.1.1, limit of 0.10 inch of vacuum water gauge. A reactor building supply fan was immediately secured to restore differential pressure below the Technical Specification limit. The secondary containment differential pressure returned to below the Technical Specification limit within one minute. The Standby Gas Treatment System remained in standby, and fully operable. At 1341 CST, the secured reactor building supply fan was restarted to restore the normal ventilation lineup. The secondary containment differential pressure remained below the Technical Specification limit. Troubleshooting is in progress. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1. As a result, entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to secondary containment being inoperable. Given the temporary loss of secondary containment, this event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 51589 | 7 December 2015 14:02:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On December 07, 2015, at 0825 hours (CST), the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to the Air Handling Unit (AHU) tripping upon attempting to swap from the non-safety related CR HVAC. Swapping was being performed to allow maintenance on the non-safety related system. Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition A, was entered which requires the CREV system to be restored to an operable status in seven (7) days. Additionally, Technical Specification 3.7.5, Condition A, was entered which requires CREV AC to be restored to an operable status in 30 days. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function,' because the CREV system is a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The Licensee notified the Illinois Emergency Management Association. |
ENS 51502 | 27 October 2015 17:50:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | A planned surveillance was started on the Quad Cities Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation air filtration system. The surveillance measures the flow rate through the air filtration unit and verifies the TSC is pressurized to ensure habitability requirements. The flow rate obtained was high, outside of acceptance criteria, and the surveillance was stopped pending resolution. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing procedures. If TSC evacuation is warranted due to radiological conditions, the facility will be relocated in accordance with existing procedures. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since the air filtration unit affects an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The TSC Air Filtration system was successfully tested on 10/27/15 at 2100 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter). |
ENS 51364 | 2 September 2015 22:11:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | Planned maintenance activities will commence today (September 2, 2015) on the Quad Cities Station TSC. The activity involves inspection and replacement of the TSC charcoal absorber trays and canisters on the filtration portion of the Air Handling Unit (AHU). Work on the charcoal absorbers affects habitability of the TSC during a declared emergency when radiological conditions require activation of the filtration portion of the AHU. The duration of maintenance is currently planned to begin on September 2, 2015 at 2100 hours (CDT) and is estimated to be completed by September 3, 2015 at 1100 hours (CDT), depending on any conditions discovered during the inspections. Since restoration from this maintenance activity is expected to take longer than the required activation time of the TSC, this notification is being made. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since the maintenance activity affects an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified (and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency).
At 1430 CDT on September 3, 2015, the maintenance activity was completed and the TSC ventilation was restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency. Notified R3DO (Skokowski). |
ENS 51272 | 28 July 2015 01:08:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On July 27, 2015, at 1730 hours (CDT), the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to the 'B' Air Filtration Unit (AFU) Booster Fan discharge damper stuck open in mid-position. In this condition, the CREV system cannot be guaranteed to achieve required design flow rate. As a result, Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition A, was entered. The CREV system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions as well as protection of the operators from a high dose environment assumed during a design basis accident. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV system could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident as stated in Chapter 6 of the UFSAR (Updated Final Safety Analysis Report). This event is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since this condition also impacts the control room as an Emergency Response Facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Both units are in a seven day technical specification for troubleshooting and repairs. If the control room became uninhabitable, procedure "Complete Loss of Control Room HVAC" would be entered. |
ENS 51165 | 19 June 2015 10:03:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On June 19, 2015, at 0153 CDT, two Secondary Containment interlock doors (1/2 EDG (Emergency Diesel Generator) room door and the Unit 1 reactor building door) were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and secondary containment pressure remained negative. This condition represents a failure to meet surveillance requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open simultaneously. As a result entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to secondary containment being inoperable. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The door has been posted to notify to restrict access. The State of Illinois Emergency Management has been notified. |
ENS 51093 | 27 May 2015 18:37:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On May 27, 2015, at 0952 CDT, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to opening a ventilation duct hatch to facilitate fire damper inspection without administrative controls. The hatch was opened and upon discovery was immediately shut, re-establishing the boundary of the Control Room Envelope. As a result, Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition C, was entered and subsequently exited. The CREV system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions as well as protection of the operators from a high dose environment assumed during a design basis accident. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV system could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident as stated in Chapter 6 of the UFSAR. This event is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since this condition also impacts the control room as an Emergency Response Facility. At 0955, Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition C, for CREV System Inoperable due to inoperable Control Room Envelope was exited. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 51021 | 28 April 2015 14:50:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On April 28, 2015, at 0935 CDT, the Shift Manager was notified that two Secondary Containment interlock doors (1/2 EDG room door and the Unit 1 reactor building door) were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and secondary containment pressure remained negative. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open simultaneously. As a result entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to secondary containment being inoperable. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Personnel were posted in the area as a compensatory measure. The State of Illinois Emergency Management has been notified. |
ENS 50949 | 3 April 2015 01:32:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On April 2, 2015 at 2133 CDT, a manual scram was inserted on Unit 1 following discovery of a steam leak in the Turbine Building at the D-ring, near the Turbine Bypass valves. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately -2 inches, which resulted in an automatic Group II and Group III isolation (expected response). The steam leak was isolated by manual closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 1 remains in Mode 3, with cooldown in progress. Reactor water level is in the normal level band. The cause and details of the event are under investigation. Unit 2 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100 percent power. Operators reduced reactor power to 20 percent before initiating a SCRAM. All rods fully inserted and the reactor is shutdown and stable. The electrical supply is in a normal shutdown lineup. The reactor is being supplied by normal feedwater, and decay heat is being controlled by use of the ADS valves. The licensee is currently cooling down and depressurizing the reactor in preparation for repair of the steam leak. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50928 | 26 March 2015 16:36:00 | Quad Cities | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | Quad Cities Station has completed a review of the station strong motion seismograph's performance. The seismograph is currently functional; however, this review identified 3 times in the past 3 years that the seismograph was non-functional such that emergency classification at the ALERT level could not be obtained with site instrumentation: 1) 02/03/2014 2) 10/07/2014 3) 10/19/2014 These unplanned non-functional conditions of the seismograph were entered into the Quad Cities Corrective Action Program when they occurred. While Exelon procedural direction allowed the use of offsite sources to obtain seismic data when the seismograph was nonfunctional, this was not explicitly referenced in the approved Emergency Action Levels. The loss of assessment capability is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This report is required per 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(ii) as an event that occurred within 3 years of the date of discovery. Corrective actions are in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |