Semantic search
Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
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ENS 50382 | 20 August 2014 12:47:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Service Water Return Radiation Monitor Nonfunctional for Planned Maintenance | On August 20, 2014, at 0747 hours CDT, Kewaunee Power Station rendered the Auxiliary Building Service Water Return Monitor (R-20) nonfunctional for planned maintenance. R-20 is used for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification of an unplanned release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that would result in an Alert or Unusual Event and is being conservatively reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability. R-20 is planned to be restored to functional by 1400 CDT today, 08/20/2014. The NRC Regional Inspector has been notified. | Service water | |
ENS 50297 | 23 July 2014 12:48:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation System Removed from Service for Planned Maintenance | On Wednesday, July 23 at 0748 CDT, the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned maintenance. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location. The ventilation system is expected to be out of service for approximately 2 hours. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. NRC Regional Inspector has been notified. | ||
ENS 50131 | 22 May 2014 12:08:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Maintenance on the Auxiliary Building Service Water Return Monitor | On May 22, 2014 at 0708 CDT, Kewaunee Power Station rendered the Auxiliary Building Service Water Return Monitor (R-20) nonfunctional for planned maintenance. R-20 is used for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classifications of an unplanned release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that would result in an Alert or Unusual Event and is being conservatively reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability. R-20 is planned to be restored to functional by 1530 CDT today, 05/22/2014. The NRC Regional Inspector has been notified. | Service water | |
ENS 49929 | 19 March 2014 12:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Radiation Monitor Taken Out of Service for Planned Maintenance | On March 19th, 2014, at 0745 hours CST Kewaunee Power Station rendered the Auxiliary Building Service Water Return Monitor (R-20) non-functional for planned maintenance. R-20 is used for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classifications of an unplanned release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that would result in an Alert or Unusual Event and is being conservatively reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability. R-20 is planned to be restored to functional by 1230 CST today 03-19-2014. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Service water | |
ENS 49845 | 20 February 2014 12:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Auxiliary Building Service Water Return Radiation Monitor Removed from Service for Planned Maintenance | On February 20, 2014, at 0655 CST, Kewaunee Power Station rendered the Auxiliary Building Service Water Return Radiation Monitor (R-20) non-functional for planned maintenance. R-20 is used for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classifications of an unplanned release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that would result in an Alert or Unusual Event and is being conservatively reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability. R-20 is planned to be restored to functional by 1430 CST today, 2/20/2014. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Service water | |
ENS 49771 | 28 January 2014 13:34:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Service Water Effluent Radiation Monitor Non-Functional Due to Preplanned Maintenance | On Jan. 28, 2014, at 0734 CST, (Radiation Monitor) R-20, Service Water Sampling Effluent Line (Auxiliary Building Service Water Header) was declared non-functional due to planned maintenance. R-20 is used for Emergency action level (EAL) classifications of an unplanned release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that would result in an Alert or Unusual Event and is being conservatively reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability. R-20 is planned to be returned to functional (status) by 1300 CST today, 1/28/2014. The spent fuel pool is the only heat load requiring Service Water for cooling and no spent fuel pool activities are in progress or planned. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed by the licensee. | Service water | |
ENS 49748 | 21 January 2014 12:40:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Out of Service for Planned Maintenance | On Tuesday, January 21 at 0640 CST, the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned maintenance. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO activation required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location. The ventilation system is expected to be out of service approximately 8 hrs. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The TSC system maintenance is complete and returned to service as of 1140 CST on 1/21/14. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R3DO (Valos). | ||
ENS 49499 | 4 November 2013 13:28:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Maintenance on the Particulate, Iodine, and Noble Gas Radiation Monitor | On November 4, 2013 at 0728 CST, the Kewaunee Power Station rendered the Auxiliary Building SPING (Particulate, Iodine, and Noble Gas) Radiation Monitor Mid and Hi ranges non-functional for planned maintenance. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) has been notified of the Auxiliary Building SPING non-functionality. Work will be performed with high priority on a continuous schedule. The Auxiliary Building SPING is expected to be restored to functional at 1800 CST on November 6, 2013. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently identify and classify an Emergency Action Level for off-site radiation conditions). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The planned maintenance is complete and the Radiation Monitor was returned to service on 11/6/13 at 1010 CST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Duncan). | ||
ENS 49365 | 20 September 2013 11:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Auxiliary Building Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas (Sping) Maintenance | On September 20th, 2013 at approximately 0645CDT, the Kewaunee Power Station rendered the Auxiliary Building Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' both Mid and High Range (radiation monitors) non-functional for maintenance on the Mid range. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the Auxiliary Building SPING non-functionality due to the maintenance. The SPING is expected to be out of service for approximately 7 hours. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently identify and classify an Emergency Action Level for offsite radiation conditions). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The maintenance required the replacement of the Geiger Muller (GM) detector. The GM detector requires a 12-hour burn in time. The detector is expected to be returned to service at approximately 1900 CDT on 9/21/13. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R3DO (Riemer).
At 2019 CDT on 9/21/13 the SPING system has been returned to service. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Riemer). | ||
ENS 49247 | 7 August 2013 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Power to Emergency Sirens Due to Severe Weather | On August 7, 2013, at 0345 (CDT), Kewaunee Power Station was notified that a loss of alert sirens impacting greater than 50% of the Emergency Planning Zone population are non-functional due to a loss of power. The sirens are used to provide a public prompt notification. The sirens lost are those that Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant takes primary responsibility. Power was lost to them during a severe thunderstorm and the expected out of service time is unknown at this time. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. See related EN #49246 * * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT CIESLEWICZ TO PETE SNYDER AT 1652 EDT ON 8/7/13 * * * Most emergency sirens have been returned to service such that the lost coverage is now only 24%. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lara). | ||
ENS 49223 | 30 July 2013 11:35:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation Out of Service for Pre-Planned Maintenance | On July 30th, 2013 at 0635 CDT, the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned maintenance. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location. The ventilation system is expected to be out of service for approximately 5 hours. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Maintenance was completed and the TSC was returned to service at 1430 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Orth). | ||
ENS 49202 | 18 July 2013 13:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability Due to Planned Maintenance | On July 18th, 2013 at approximately 0830 hours CDT, the Kewaunee Power Station will render the Auxiliary Building Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' (Mid- and Hi-Range) non-functional for planned maintenance. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the Auxiliary Building SPING non-functionality due to planned maintenance. The SPING is expected to be out of service for approximately 5 hours. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently identify and classify an Emergency Action Level for offsite radiation conditions). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
ENS 49088 | 4 June 2013 13:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Assessment Capability Due to Planned Maintenance | On June 4, 2013, at 0830 CDT, the Kewaunee Power Station rendered the Auxiliary Building Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' (Mid and Hi Range) and the Reactor Building 'SPING' (Mid and Hi Range) non-functional for planned maintenance. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the Auxiliary Building SPING and Reactor Building Vent SPING non-functionality due to planned maintenance. The SPINGs are expected to be out of service for approximately 7 hours. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently identify the upper two emergency action levels for offsite radiation conditions). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
ENS 49026 | 12 May 2013 22:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Service Water Effluent Lines Non Functional | At 1755 (CDT) on 05/12/13, R-16, Service Water System Effluent Line (Containment Fan Cooling) and R-20, Service Water System Effluent Line (Auxiliary Building Service Water Header) were declared NON-FUNCTIONAL due to low SW (Service Water) sampling flow. R-16 and R-20 are used for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classifications of an unplanned release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds the requirements of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for an Unusual Event and an Alert, and is therefore being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability. The Licensee is investigating to determine an appropriate recovery plan. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Service water | |
ENS 48920 | 13 April 2013 16:09:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Service Water System Effluent Line Non-Functional | At 1109 CDT on 4/13/13, R-20, Service Water System Effluent Line (Auxiliary Building Service Water Header) was declared non-functional due to low SW (Service Water) sampling flow. R-20 is used for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classifications of an unplanned release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds the requirements of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for an Unusual Event and an Alert, and is therefore, being conservatively reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | Service water | |
ENS 48900 | 9 April 2013 12:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Auxiliary Building Vent Monitor Out of Service for Planned Maintenance | On April 9, 2013, at approximately 0730 hours (CDT), the Kewaunee Power Station declared the Auxiliary Building Vent Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' Radiation Monitor (Mid and Hi Range) nonfunctional for planned maintenance. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the Auxiliary Building Vent SPING nonfunctionality due to planned maintenance. The SPING is expected to be out of service for approximately 3 hours. Although manual 'grab samples' could be used as a backup, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently identify the upper two emergency action levels for offsite radiation conditions). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. See similar EN #48881 and 48891.
SPING was returned to service at 0819 CDT. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Passehl). | ||
ENS 48891 | 5 April 2013 12:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Assessment Capability Due to Planned Maintenance | On April 5, 2013, at approximately 0730 hours (CDT), the Kewaunee Power Station declared the Reactor Building Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas (SPING) (Mid and Hi Range) nonfunctional for planned maintenance. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of this Reactor Building Vent SPING nonfunctionality due to planned maintenance. The SPING is expected to be out of service for approximately 3 hours. Although manual 'grab samples' could be used as a backup, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently indentify the upper two emergency action levels for Offsite Radiation conditions). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
ENS 48881 | 3 April 2013 13:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Auxiliary Building Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas Monitor Out of Service | On April 3, 2013, at 0800 CDT, the Kewaunee Power Station discovered that the Auxiliary Building Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' Monitor (Mid and hi Range) was Non-Functional due to an external failure. The SPING is used to aid in assessing Emergency Action Levels. The expected out of service time is unknown at this time. Trouble shooting is currently in progress. Work will be performed with high priority. Although manual 'grab samples' could be used as a backup, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently identify the upper two emergency action levels for Offsite Radiation conditions). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' Monitor was recalibrated and returned to service at 1257 CDT on 4/03/13. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Daley) notified. | ||
ENS 48830 | 19 March 2013 13:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Tsc Ventilation Removed from Service for Planned Maintenance | On March 19, 2013, at 0830 hours (CDT), the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned TSC ventilation system maintenance. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location. The ventilation system is expected to be out of service for approximately 5 hours. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
ENS 48626 | 26 December 2012 15:22:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Radiation Monitor Used for Assessment and Response Inoperable Due to Pre-Planned Maintenance | At 0922 on 12/26/2012, R-16, Service Water System Effluent Line Radiation Monitor (for Containment Fan Cooling service water) was removed from service for scheduled maintenance. R-16 is used for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classifications of an unplanned release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds the requirements of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for an Unusual Event and an Alert, and is therefore being conservatively reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability. The maintenance was completed and R-16 restored at 1308 on 12/26/2012. R-16 is also scheduled to be removed from service for calibration on 12/27/2012 from 0800 -1400 CST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Service water | |
ENS 48605 | 19 December 2012 14:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Maintenance Affecting the Ability to Assess an Emergency Classification | Voluntary ENS Notification Regarding Maintenance Affecting the Ability to Assess an EAL Classification. Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) is preparing to perform routine planned calibrations on Wednesday, December 19, and Thursday, December 20, 2012, on the forebay level indication. This maintenance will impact the forebay level computer and Control Room indication normally used to make the Unusual Event or Alert emergency classifications in the event the lake or forebay threshold is exceeded for greater than 15 minutes. The maintenance is planned to occur from 0800 (CST) on 12/19/12 until 1230 (CST) on 12/20/12. There are four level transmitters each with local indication. Each transmitter will be calibrated, but only one at a time, so that the capability to locally determine forebay level using the other three transmitters will remain. This activity has been evaluated against the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) and it has been determined that the condition does not rise to the significance necessitating an event notification since Kewaunee retains the capability to make the necessary emergency classifications. However, this information is being conservatively provided so that NRC may be aware of the condition should an emergency develop. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
ENS 48397 | 10 October 2012 21:33:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Reduced Radiation Monitoring Capability for Auxiliary Building and Containment Vent Stacks | On October 10, 2012, at 1633 (CDT), Kewaunee Power Station staff identified (in response to concerns raised by the NRC Resident Inspector) that the Containment and Auxiliary Building SPING (Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas) units could likely not have been relied upon to determine Emergency Classifications based on the Kewaunee Emergency Action (EAL) Level Matrix. This was due to these SPINGs having been nonfunctional during the period from 2/28/2011 at 0150 (CDT) until 3/30/2011 at 1845 (CDT). Alternate radiation monitoring capability remained available to provide indication of radiation levels in the Auxiliary Building and Containment vent stacks; however, they would not have been sufficient to identify the upper two emergency action levels. Alternate means (e.g., grab samples) could also have been used to make the appropriate declarations. However, use of the alternate means could potentially impair the plant's ability to declare an emergency in a timely manner. These SPING units had been returned to service on 3/30/2011 and were subsequently available for EAL classifications. However, the ramification of this condition was not fully recognized until today. This condition is being conservatively reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
ENS 48364 | 1 October 2012 12:40:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Out-Of-Service for Planned Maintenance | On October 1, 2012, at approximately 0740 hours (CDT), the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned TSC ventilation system maintenance. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location. The ventilation system is expected to be out of service for approximately 7 hours. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
On October 2, 2012, at approximately 0828 hours (CDT), the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned TSC ventilation system maintenance. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location. The ventilation system is expected to be out of service for approximately 7 hours. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Passehl). | ||
ENS 48016 | 12 June 2012 16:21:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Taken Out of Service for Maintenance | On June 12, 2012, at approximately 1121 hours (CDT), the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service to allow TSC electrical distribution system repairs. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location. The ventilation system is expected to be out of service for approximately 2 hours. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. TSC work was completed and the TSC was returned to service at 1326 CDT. | ||
ENS 46666 | 10 March 2011 21:49:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Inadvertant Opening a Substation Breaker Causing Loss of Station Power | At 1549 on 03/10/2011 with the plant shut down and the reactor defueled, power was lost to Safeguards 4160 Volt Bus 6. Diesel Generator B started and re-energized Bus 6. At the time of the event, Bus 6 was energized from the Main Auxiliary Transformer (MAT) on backfeed. The event was caused by opening of substation breaker TA2066 as the result of an error by technicians working In the substation. All equipment operated as expected for the voltage restoration to Safeguards Bus 6. Safeguards Bus 5 remained energized from offsite power through the Tertiary Auxiliary Transformer during the event. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Train A remained In operation during the event. Spent Fuel Cooling Train B was restarted following restoration of power to Bus 6. The loss of the MAT also resulted in the loss of non-safeguards 4160 V Buses 1-4. In response to the loss of power to Bus 4, the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Station Blackout (SBO) Diesel started and failed to load onto 480 Volt Bus 46. This resulted in a loss of power to the Technical Support Center. The loss of power to the TSC is being reported as a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. At 1632, the TSC/SBO Diesel Generator tripped due to the failure of the output breaker to close and provide power to its support equipment. The cause of the failure of the TSC/SBO output breaker to close is unknown at this time. The licensee is investigating the cause of the breaker being opened and failure of the TSC/SBO diesel to load. One Spent Fuel Pool cooling train was in service throughout the event and no pool heatup occurred. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | 05000305/LER-2011-002 | |
ENS 46527 | 10 January 2011 15:21:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Unavailability of Tsc and Eof Functions Due to Scheduled Maintenance | At 0921 CST on Monday January 10, 2011, the Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) disabled electrical power to the KPS Technical Support Center (TSC) to perform motor control center maintenance. The major TSC components that were disabled include plant process control system (PPCS) workstations, primary lighting, and ventilation. In the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), PPCS workstations have been disabled. Additionally, the dose projection program (MIDAS) does not have the capability to automatically populate with plant data. The safety parameter display system (SPDS) and emergency response data system (ERDS) remain operational. This activity has been evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) to ensure that KPS will be able to deal with an accident or emergency should one occur. If required, existing procedural guidance will be utilized to relocate TSC personnel to predetermined alternate locations. A copy of emergency procedures and emergency telephone directories are staged in the alternate locations. The maintenance is scheduled to be completed by 1400 CST on January 10, 2011. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * UPDATE FROM GARY AHRENS TO PETE SNYDER AT 1701 EST ON 1/10/11 * * * At 1545 CST all of the functionality that was removed from service per the above notification was restored to service. Notified R3DO (Kunowski). | Emergency Response Data System Safety Parameter Display System | |
ENS 45883 | 30 April 2010 08:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss Safety Parameter Display System (Spds) Due to Computer Problems | At 0300 (CDT) on 04/30/2010, the Plant Computer Group identified that the SPDS stalled and was not updating data points as required. The SPDS also supplies data to several Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) points. Redundant, normal control room indications are still available to the operators. This is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and therefore, reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). SPDS was restored at 0356 (CDT) on 4/30/2010. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Emergency Response Data System Safety Parameter Display System | |
ENS 45551 | 9 December 2009 14:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Blizzard Results in Greater than 50% Siren Coverage Loss | On December 9 at 0800 CST, seven emergency notification system sirens in Kewaunee Power Station Emergency Planning Zone were reported out of service. It is expected the cause of the sirens to be out of service is the severe winter weather. The loss of these emergency notification sirens results in a lost population coverage of 56%. As a result, this event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) and guidance in NUREG-1022 as a major loss of off-site communications capability. It is unknown, at this time, when the sirens will be returned to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
ENS 45438 | 15 October 2009 17:04:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Momentary Loss of Shutdown Cooling with Autostart of Emergency Diesel Generator | At 1204 power was lost to Safeguards Bus '5' and Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' started and re-energized Bus '5.' Event was caused by starting SI Pump 'A' to fill SI Accumulator 'A' which resulted in a Tertiary Auxiliary Transformer trip and lockout. At the time RHR Pump 'A' was in operation and tripped, RHR Pump 'B' was started within 2 minutes using the Abnormal Operating Procedure and flow restored to the RCS. RCS temperature decreased initially due to an increase in service water cooling and actions were taken to stabilize RCS Temperature. All equipment operated as expected for the voltage restoration to Safeguards Bus '5.' Both trains of RHR were declared inoperable as of 1204 (CDT) due to the loss of normal power supplies per Technical Specification 3.7. Emergency Busses were energized and both trains of RHR remained available for decay heat removal during this event. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | Service water Emergency Diesel Generator Shutdown Cooling Decay Heat Removal | |
ENS 44027 | 4 March 2008 07:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Maintenance on Mlshlcot Substation by Wps Results in Greater than 50% Siren Coverage Loss | On March 4, 2008, at 0100 CST, ten emergency notification system sirens in the Kewaunee Power Station Emergency Planning Zone (one in Kewaunee County, nine in Manitowoc County) were de-energized due to a planned power outage. The loss of power to these emergency notification sirens resulted in a lost population coverage of 51.2%. As a result, this event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) and guidance in NUREG-1022 as a major loss of off-site communications capability. The expected duration of the planned power outage is 2 hours. Kewaunee and Manitowoc County Emergency Management agencies have already established appropriate contingency measures for the planned loss of the emergency notification system. Contingency measures include route alerting and an available plane with loud speaker for the areas affected by the power outage. The State of Wisconsin and the Federal Emergency Management Agency were previously informed of this planned outage. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
ENS 43196 | 28 February 2007 05:33:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Reactor Trip During the Performance of a Surveillance | On 2/27/2007 at 2333 CST a Reactor Trip occurred during performance of a surveillance procedure calibrating a Nuclear Power Range instrument. The Reactor trip resulted in an automatic Turbine Trip and actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. No safeguards equipment was out of service at the time of the trip. Following the trip, a steam inlet valve on a Moisture Separator associated with the main turbine failed to close which resulted in RCS temperature decreasing to 537 degF. This valve was manually isolated and RCS temperature returned to normal 547 degF. Normal heat sink to the Main Condenser was available during the event. Investigation is continuing into the exact cause of the Reactor trip. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for actuation of the Reactor Protection System and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. Decay heat is being removed by Auxiliary Feedwater feeding the steam generators, steaming to the main condenser. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Steam Generator Reactor Protection System Auxiliary Feedwater Main Turbine Main Condenser Control Rod | |
ENS 43096 | 12 January 2007 16:39:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip | At 1039 Kewaunee Power Station experienced a loss of auto stop oil pressure on the main turbine while performing the monthly Turbine Trip Mechanism Test resulting in a reactor trip. No safeguards equipment was out of service at time of trip. Following the trip one of the moisture separators associated with the main turbine had its associated steam inlet valve fail open, which resulted in RCS temperature decreasing to 536 degrees F. This valve was manually isolated and RCS temperature returned to normal 547 degrees F. Normal heat sink via the condenser was available during the event. Investigation is continuing into the cause of the turbine trip. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for actuation of the Reactor Protection System and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System." All rods fully inserted and no primary or secondary PORV's lifted. There was no injection from any safety systems, other than AFW. Decay heat is being dumped to the condenser via steam dumps. The reactor coolant pressure and temperature are stable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Reactor Protection System Auxiliary Feedwater Main Turbine | |
ENS 42983 | 10 November 2006 20:20:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Trip at Low Power | On 11/10/2006 with a shutdown in progress to repair a degraded bearing on the turbine generator, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a power range nuclear instrumentation (NI) low range - high flux trip. Reactor power had just been lowered to below 10% power (P-10) where the power range (NI) low range trips become active. The bistable for power range NI N-42 had been tripped due to an unrelated failure on 11/09/2006. When P-10 automatically unblocked, a power range NI low range high flux reactor trip was generated. At the time of the trip, reactor power was well below the trip setpoint of 24.5% power. Following the trip, Main Feedwater Regulating Valve, FW-7A, did not automatically close as required on the reactor trip coincident with Low Tave (554F). The Reactor Operator reported FW-7A was mid-position and attempted to manually close FW-7A. It did not respond. As a result, levels in steam generator A rose to greater than 67%, which initiated feedwater isolation. The feedwater isolation signal tripped the running feedwater pump. With no feedwater pumps running, both Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A and Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B automatically started as required. The High-High steam generator level also resulted in a second reactor trip initiation signal. The Reactor Operator manually controlled Auxiliary Feedwater flow to steam generator A to restore normal level. Following the feedwater isolation, FW-7A fully closed. Following the trip, MS-201B1, the steam supply to main steam reheater B1 was locally isolated to limit the RCS cool down. This was a previously discussed contingency action. Main steam isolation valves remained open and normal condenser heat sink remained available. Further investigation as to the cause of the trip is in progress. Recovery actions per normal operating procedures are in progress. The plant was being shut down at a rate of a half percent power per minute at the time of the trip. All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip and no safety or relief valves lifted. The plant was aligned for the normal shutdown electrical lineup prior to the trip. The temperature on the generator bearing reached a maximum of 190F with trip guidance set at 225F. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Steam Generator Feedwater Main Steam Isolation Valve Auxiliary Feedwater Control Rod Main Steam | |
ENS 42947 | 30 October 2006 14:48:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Reactor Trip | During power operation, at 92% rated power, an automatic reactor trip occurred. The reactor protection signal that caused the reactor trip was steam generator 'B' steam flow greater than feedwater flow coincident with low water level on steam generator 'B.' The cause of the plant transient that led to the reactor trip was a loss of Instrument Bus 1 (Red Channel). Instrument Bus 1 unexpectedly deenergized during the performance of maintenance on the inverter (BRA-111) that feeds Instrument Bus 1. Following the reactor trip, the auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically started, as designed, due to a low level in the steam generators. After the trip, non-safety related 4160 Volt AC Bus 4 de-energized and secondary plant feedwater heater 15B relief valve lifted. The cause of the loss of Bus 4 and 158 feedwater heater relief lifting Is under Investigation. The plant is currently stable and in the hot shutdown (HSD) mode. Power was restored to Instrument Bus 1 at 1018. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical because of the automatic reactor trip and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed below because of the actions of the RPS and the automatic start of the AFW pumps. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed by feeding the steam generators with AFW and steaming to the Condenser Dump. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Due to the loss of Bus 4, the running Circulating Water Pump was lost resulting in a loss of normal heat sink to the condenser. The standby Circulating Water Pump was started at 1002 CST and the condenser heat sink was restored. Until the condenser steam dump was restored, the plant was steaming through the steam generator PORVs (atmospheric steam dumps). There is no steam generator tube leakage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (M. Phillips) | Steam Generator Feedwater Reactor Protection System Auxiliary Feedwater Control Rod | |
ENS 42530 | 27 April 2006 01:49:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Failure of Rps Signal to Initiate Reactor Trip | At 2043 (CDT) on 4-26-06, during a plant shutdown with the reactor at approximately 35% power, the operating crew manually initiated a reactor trip. The operating crew had just stopped one of the two condensate pumps and then the remaining feedwater pump tripped unexpectedly. The operating crew recognized the turbine did not trip, as it is expected to automatically trip when no feedwater pumps are running. The automatic turbine trip would have automatically tripped the reactor. Therefore, the operating crew manually initiated a reactor trip. Because the reactor did not automatically trip (i.e., failure of RPS to initiate and complete a reactor trip), the Shift Manager declared an Alert, at 2049, based on Chart F of Table 2-1 EPIP-AD-02. Therefore, this is a one-hour notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(a)(1)(i) 'The declaration of any of the emergency classes specified in the licensee's approved Emergency Plan.' The manual reactor trip is reportable (4-hour) in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'Any event or condition that results in an actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' All systems functioned as expected following the manual reactor trip. Service Water Train B is inoperable because of a one-gallon per minute leak. All rods inserted fully. Decay heat is being removed with the steam dump and secondary PORVs. The condenser is losing vacuum due to the turbine trip. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started as required. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 2049 on April 26, 2006, Kewaunee Power Station staff declared an Alert emergency classification (reference EN# 42530). The Kewaunee Power Station staff has assessed this event. There was no affect on the health and safety of the general public and no release of radiation. No plant personnel were injured and the only plant equipment problem was with the failure of a trip of both feedwater pumps to cause the main turbine to trip. The Kewaunee Power Plant staff has conducted a preliminary investigation of the control room indications and sequential events recorder, which indicates that before the manual reactor trip there was no automatic reactor trip signal present and a failure of the reactor trip breakers did not occur. The Alert was terminated at 0024 CDT (on 04/27/06). The unit is currently in the Hot Shutdown Mode with plans to cool the plant to less than 350 degrees Fahrenheit. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying State and local government and issuing a press release. Notified NRR EO (MJ Ross-Lee), IRD Mgr (P. Wilson), R3DO (H. Peterson), DHS (Holz ), FEMA (Steindurf), NRC/EPA (Crews), DOE (Wyatt), USDA (Timmons), HHS (Peagler).
When performing a review of the event reported on April 26, 2006 (EN# 42530), the Kewaunee Power Station staff determined another reporting criterion was met. An eight-hour report is required to be made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of 10 CFR 50.72 except when the actuation results from and is apart of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6) is PWR auxiliary or emergency feedwater system. As described in EN# 42530, a manual reactor trip of the Kewaunee Power Station was initiated at 2043 on April 26, 2006. The manual reactor trip was initiated when the plant experienced a loss of both feedwater pumps. With a loss of both feedwater pumps and a manual reactor trip, the narrow range water level in both steam generators decreased to the actuation setpoint value for starting the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, causing all three Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps to start as designed. Because the steam generator water level was below the actuation setpoint, this was a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. As a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system, this condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv). The untimeliness of the report has been entered into the Kewaunee Power Station's corrective action program. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (H. Peterson). | Steam Generator Feedwater Service water Reactor Protection System Auxiliary Feedwater Main Turbine Emergency Feedwater System | |
ENS 42173 | 29 November 2005 04:20:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Trip Following Main Feed Pump Trip | At 22:19 CST, Main Feedwater Pump B tripped on over current. A secondary plant runback from 100% power was automatically initiated. During the secondary plant runback, the reactor automatically tripped on Steam Generator B low-low level at 22:20 CST. All three Auxiliary Feedwater pumps automatically started due to low-low Steam Generator level. The plant has been stabilized at Hot Shutdown (RCS temperature approximately 547 degrees F, RCS pressure approximately 2235 psig). Investigation into the cause of the trip is on-going. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. All control rods fully inserted on the automatic trip. Steam generator water levels have recovered to indicate in the narrow range. The current decay heat removal path is auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators steaming through the power operated relief valves. There are no known primary to secondary leaks. All safety related buses are powered from offsite power. Emergency diesel generators are available and in standby. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Steam Generator Feedwater Reactor Protection System Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Decay Heat Removal Control Rod | |
ENS 41425 | 20 February 2005 17:58:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Rps Actuation on Steam Generator Low Level | The following information was reported by fax: During a plant shutdown from 100% power due to the condition as discussed in previous event notice EN #41423, a valid actuation of the reactor protection system occurred. The plant was in the intermediate shutdown mode at approximately 510�F, using the S/G's to cool the Reactor Coolant System, S/G water level was being controlled with one Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and manual control of its outlet valve. Following the initiation of RCS cooldown, Steam Generator levels began to decrease. The operator began to throttle the operating AFW pump's outlet valve open, however at 1158 on 2/20/05, the Control Room received the Annunciator for S/G B Low-Low Water Reactor Trip, which has a setpoint of 2/3 S/G level channels <17% narrow range level. This caused a Reactor Trip signal to be initiated by the Reactor Protection System. The trip signal was generated, however the plant was already in a shutdown condition with the reactor trip breakers open." All systems were functioning normally. The operator started an additional AFW pump and, at 1206, normal level was restored to S/G B and the automatic Reactor Trip signal cleared. The lowest level during this transient in Steam Generator B was 14.5% narrow range level. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Steam Generator | |
ENS 41309 | 6 January 2005 13:00:00 | Information Only 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Modification to Process Computer That Will Impact Erds and Spds | The Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) will be taken out of service for an approximate 2 week period to implement a planned modification. The current PPCS is being replaced and the computer outage is required to allow cutover to the new PCCS. During this time period ERDS and SPDS will not be available. Also, a small portion of the plant annunciator system (Trouble Light Alarms) will not be available. Regulatory Guide 1.97 Category 2D Containment Temperature and Category 3D Component Cooling Water Temperature indicators will not be available in the Control Room, although other instrumentation is available to monitor these parameters. This is an 8-hour reportable event per 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) Major Loss of Assessment Capability. The operation of plant systems will not be affected due to this planned action. ERDS and SPDS parameters will be monitored by control board indications. Compensatory actions have been developed. The PPCS outage is expected to commence around 0700 CST on 1/6/05. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
The Plant Process Computer System was restored at 0005 CST on 01/20/05. ERDS and SPDS are now available. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (A.M. Stone). |