Semantic search
| Discovered date | Reporting criterion | Title | Description | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 57103 | 3 May 2024 08:11:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Primary Containment Degraded | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0411 EDT on 5/03/2024, it was determined that primary containment did not meet TS (Technical Specification) 4.6.1.2 (surveillance) requirement due to a primary containment leak rate test exceeding `La (allowable leakage rate). This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The final observed leak rate is still being calculated as the test is still within the stabilization period. Testing is allowed within the stabilization period for an unspecified amount of time. Short term corrective actions are to identify and repair any leak paths. No mode changes are required due to this event. | |
| ENS 56952 | 7 February 2024 21:00:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty Programatic Issue | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: A programmatic vulnerability, failure, or degradation was discovered within the fitness for duty (FFD) program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within the protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program. Public and plant safety have not been affected. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | |
| ENS 56889 | 15 December 2023 00:39:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Scram | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone call and email: On December 14, 2023, at 1939 EST, Hope Creek reactor scrammed following closure of turbine control valve number 4. All control rods fully inserted into the core. All safety systems responded as designed and expected. There was no radiological release. The unit is stable in mode 3 with decay heat being removed via the turbine bypass valves rejecting steam to the main condenser. Normal feedwater level control is providing makeup to the reactor vessel. No personnel injuries resulted from the event. The outage control center has been staffed to determine the cause of the reactor scram. The Hope Creek NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 56495 | 30 April 2023 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown | Technical Specification Required Shutdown | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0200 EDT on 04/30/23, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated at Hope Creek Unit 1. Technical Specification Action 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment Integrity was entered on 04/30/23 at 0100 with a required action to restore primary containment integrity within 1 hour. This required action was not completed within the allowed outage time; therefore, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated, and this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 56494 | 30 April 2023 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Primary Containment Integrity Degraded | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0100 EDT on 04/30/23, it was determined that the primary containment integrity did not meet (Technical Specification) TS 4.6.1.1.d requirement, suppression chamber in compliance with TS 3.6.2.1 due to the inability to establish test conditions for the bypass leakage test in accordance with TS 4.6.2.1.f. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) & 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 54198 | 3 August 2019 23:47:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Manual Reactor Trip and Manual Actuation of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling | At 1947 (EDT) on 8/3/19, with Hope Creek in Mode 1 at 37 percent power, the reactor was manually scrammed due to loss of condenser vacuum. All control rods fully inserted into the core. All safety systems responded as designed and expected. Reactor level was stabilized using Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) and Reactor Feedwater Pumps. Currently reactor water level is being maintained by the feedwater system and decay heat is being removed by the main condenser using the main turbine bypass valves. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Due to the manual actuation of RCIC, this event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50. 72(b )(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup with all safe shutdown equipment available. The licensee will be notifying the state of Delaware, state of New Jersey and the Lower Alloway Creek township. | |
| ENS 53625 | 26 September 2018 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | High Pressure Core Injection (Hpci) System Inoperable | On 9/26/2018 at 1530 EDT, it was discovered that the HPCI system was inoperable due to a blown fuse in the 10C617 Panel, E21-F15A. Therefore, this condition Is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The blown fuse also impacts 'A' channel Residual Heat Removal (RHR) subsystem and 'A' Core Spray (CS) subsystem. These Emergency Core Cooling subsystems have been declared inoperable. Remaining Emergency Core Cooling subsystems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain OPERABLE. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the local authorities. | |
| ENS 53101 | 30 November 2017 21:57:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration | Unusual Event Declared Due to Earthquake | An Unusual Event was declared at 1657 EST due to an earthquake detected onsite. The Unusual Event was declared under EAL HU1.1. There is no release in progress due to this event. There are no protective actions recommended at this time. The Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Note: See also EN #53099 for Salem Unusual Event.
An earthquake was felt onsite at time 1645 EST. Multiple phone calls were made to the Control Room confirming the earthquake. It was verified there was an earthquake felt in Delaware with a magnitude of 4.4. Neither seismic monitor at Salem Unit 1, Salem Unit 2, and Hope Creek actuated. There is no indication of any damage to any systems or plant structures. Plant walk-downs have been initiated in accordance with plant operating procedures for a seismic event. No injuries have been reported to the Control Room. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies. Notified R1DO (Gray), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 2125 EST on 11/30/2017 following plant walkdowns that revealed no damage to plant structures, systems, or components. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Gray), IRD (Grant), and NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email). | |
| ENS 52698 | 20 April 2017 17:06:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Seismic Monitor Panel Non-Functional | At 1306 (EDT) on April 20, 2017, Control Room Overhead Alarm C6-C4, Seismic Monitor Panel, was received. This alarm normally indicates an actuation of the Hope Creek OBE (Operational Basis Earthquake) Seismic Switch at 0.1g, however, this alarm was accompanied by no other indications of seismic activity. The indicator for a 0.01g earthquake was not actuated, no earthquake was felt on site, and the National Earthquake Information Center recorded no seismic activity in the area. The Seismic Monitor Panel was considered non-functional. With the Seismic Monitor Panel non-functional, the ability to classify EAL HA1.1, Operating Basis Earthquake Detected Onsite, was lost. Testing of the Seismic Monitor Panel is in progress to determine system functionality. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 52347 | 5 November 2016 08:04:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Valid Actuation of Rps While Reactor Shutdown | On November 5, 2016 an RPS (Reactor Protection System) actuation occurred from an actual high scram discharge volume level reaching the RPS actuation setpoint. This actuation was the result of a Redundant Reactivity Control System (RRCS) signal inadvertently generated during excess flow check valve testing with the reactor in cold shutdown. At the time of the actuation, all control rods were inserted. RCS pressure was approximately 830 psig to support excess flow check valve testing and shutdown cooling was removed from service. When RRCS initiated, the B Reactor Recirculation Pump tripped as expected and the scram air header depressurized as expected, which caused the high level in the scram discharge volume. The cause of the RRCS signal is being investigated. The A loop of RHR was placed back into the Shutdown Cooling mode of operation with reactor temperature being maintained at approximately 150 degrees F. There were no injuries as a result of this event. The licensee has notified Lower Alloways Creek Township and the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 52159 | 7 August 2016 05:01:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable | HPCI (high pressure coolant injection) governor valve did not respond as expected. During performance of a planned HPCI valve functional test the HPCI governor valve (FD-FV-4879) did not reposition as expected. The HCPI system has been declared inoperable based on the response per Technical Specification 3.5.1 action C.1. All other emergency core cooling systems and the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. The unit remains at 100% power. The station has initiated an event response team to identify and correct the cause of the failure. No personnel injuries resulted from the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Dispatch. | |
| ENS 51814 | 22 March 2016 13:14:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty - Non-Licensed Supervisor Tested Positive During Random Testing | A non-licensed supervisor tested positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The individual's access to the facility has been denied. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 51603 | 14 December 2015 14:04:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty - Non-Licensed Supervisor Tested Positive During for Cause Testing | A non-licensed supervisor tested positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The individual's access to the facility has been denied. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 51430 | 29 September 2015 00:46:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Scram Following Trip of Both Reactor Recirculation Pumps | On September 28, 2015 at 2046 EDT, the Hope Creek reactor scrammed following a trip of both reactor recirculation pumps. All control rods fully inserted into the core. All safety systems responded as designed and expected. There was no radiological release. The unit is stable in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed via the turbine bypass valves rejecting steam to the main condenser. Normal feedwater level control is providing makeup to the reactor vessel. No personnel injuries resulted from the event. The Outage Control Center has been staffed to determine the cause of the reactor scram. The Hope Creek NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified Lower Alloways Creek township of the event. | |
| ENS 51274 | 28 July 2015 17:58:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Discovered One Inch Diameter Hole Between Reactor Building and Auxiliary Building | At 1358 (EDT) on July 28, 2015, a 1 inch diameter hole was discovered in the secondary containment wall, between the Reactor Building and the Auxiliary Building, causing the Secondary Containment to become inoperable under Technical Specification 3.6.5.1. Reactor Building pressure was maintained at a negative pressure as required by Technical Specification 3.6.5.1 with the Reactor Building ventilation system in service before and after discovery of the hole. In addition, the Filtration, Recirculation and Ventilation system remained fully operable and remained in standby. The hole was sealed at 1600 and technical specification 3.6.5.1 was exited. Plant operation was not impacted by the event and was operating at 100% power. No personnel injuries resulted from this event. The hole was discovered by plant personnel that were walking past the wall. Due to the discovery of the hole, the plant is performing an extent of condition inspection. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Dispatch.
This event is being retracted. Hope Creek Generating Station Unit 1, is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification (EN# 51274) made on July 28, 2015, at 1855 EDT. The notification on July 28, 2015, reported that secondary containment was declared inoperable when a 1 inch hole was discovered in the secondary containment wall, between the Reactor Building and the Auxiliary Building. Secondary containment was declared inoperable based on the initial interpretation of the definition of secondary containment. The hole did not impact the ability to maintain the Tech Spec required negative pressure. Subsequent evaluation determined that secondary containment was always operable. Based on the engineering evaluation, the condition reported in EN# 51274 did not result in an inoperability of the secondary containment. Therefore, there is no reportable condition and this event report is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed on the evaluation results and informed of this retraction. The licensee also notified the Lower Alloways Creek Dispatch. Notified R1DO (Powell). | |
| ENS 51141 | 9 June 2015 07:10:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Hope Creek Technical Support Center Removed from Service for Planned Maintenance | On June 9, 2015 at 0310 (EDT) the Hope Creek Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service to perform planned maintenance. The removal of the ventilation potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. Appropriate compensatory measures are in place while the ventilation is out of service. The Emergency Response Organization duty team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to activate in an alternate location. The ventilation system is scheduled to be out of service for approximately 93 hours. The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified. | |
| ENS 51002 | 22 April 2015 03:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Worker Fatality Not Related to Plant Operation | At approximately 2330 (EDT) on April 21, 2015, a worker collapsed in the turbine building inside the protected area. Initial response by on-site responders found the person unresponsive. Subsequent response by off-site medical responders determined the person had died and the station was notified at approximately 0130 on April 22, 2015. The fatality was due to an apparent personal medical issue and not work related . The individual was not contaminated. The individual was transported off-site via onsite Site Protection personnel. Plant operation was not impacted by the event. The licensee informed Lower Alloways Creek Township and will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 50889 | 13 March 2015 14:34:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Plant Employee Tested Positive for Banned Substance | A non-licensed corporate employee tested positive for a banned substance. The individual's unescorted access has been revoked. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 50864 | 4 March 2015 19:08:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Elevated Tritium Detected Onsite | On March 3, 2015, PSEG (Public Service Enterprise Group) confirmed the presence of tritium at a concentration of approximately (0.01) microCurie/ml in ice samples taken in a small area immediately adjacent to the north side of the Hope Creek Turbine Building. The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Bureau of Nuclear Engineering was notified at 1408 (EST) on March 4, 2015, in accordance with NEI 07-07, Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative. Samples were taken and analyzed in response to ice which was observed to be forming along the exterior of the north Turbine Building wall. Sample results show detectable tritium is confined within the site boundary and there is no impact to the health and safety of the employees or the public. A catch containment was installed in the affected area. PSEG is continuing to evaluate this issue and develop corrective actions. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The local Township will be notified. | |
| ENS 50315 | 28 July 2014 05:18:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Meteorological Data to the Site | At 0118 (EDT) on 7/28/2014, meteorological data was lost to both Salem and Hope Creek. At the time, there were storms in the vicinity which (were) the apparent cause of the temporary loss of data. Both Salem and Hope Creek lost wind direction information. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), major loss of emergency assessment capabilities. At 0130, meteorological data was restored to the control rooms. Plant operations at Hope Creek and both Salem Units 1 and 2 were not affected. All three units remain at full power. The licensees notified the NRC Resident Inspectors. | |
| ENS 50302 | 24 July 2014 00:27:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Common Site Temporary Loss of Meteorological Data | At 2027 (EDT) on 7/23/2014, meteorological data was lost to both Salem and Hope Creek. At the time, there were storms in the vicinity which are the apparent cause of the temporary loss of data. Both Salem and Hope Creek lost wind direction information. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), major loss of emergency assessment capabilities. At 2036 (EDT), meteorological data was restored to the control rooms. Plant operations at Hope Creek and both Salem Units 1 and 2 were not affected. All three units remain at full power. The licensees notified the NRC Resident Inspectors. | |
| ENS 49909 | 13 March 2014 10:31:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Standby Liquid Control System Sample Concentration Outside Technical Specification Limits | On March 13, 2014 at 0631 EDT, sample analysis of the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System tank yielded a sodium pentaborate concentration outside the technical specification (TS) limits, rendering both subsystems inoperable. The sodium pentaborate concentration was found to be 4 parts per million low, at 13.598% by weight, below the required concentration of 13.6% by weight. The Standby Liquid Control System tank concentration was diluted during restoration activities following planned maintenance of the B Standby Liquid Control System pump. This condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Chemical addition to the Standby Liquid Control System tank is in progress to restore the sodium pentaborate concentration to within Technical Specification limits. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
A subsequent review of the analytical data has determined that the SLC tank sample met the Technical Specification requirement for operability (13.6 weight percent) and therefore, there was no reportable condition. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Burritt). | |
| ENS 49890 | 11 March 2014 07:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation Removed from Service for Planned Maintenance | On March 11, 2014 at 0300 (EDT), the Hope Creek Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service to perform planned maintenance. The removal of the ventilation potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. Appropriate compensatory measures are in place while the ventilation is out of service. The Emergency Response organization duty team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to activate the TSC in an alternate location. The ventilation system is scheduled to be out of service for approximately 78 hours. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Township. | |
| ENS 49826 | 14 February 2014 06:13:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Meteorological Tower Out-Of-Service Due to Weather | On February 14, 2014 at 0113 EST, all Meteorological Tower data for wind direction was lost for Hope Creek and Salem Units 1 and 2. The loss of wind direction data occurred from environmental conditions during a period of heavy snowfall and ice accumulation. Valid wind direction from Meteorological Tower data input to the Hope Creek Safety Parameter Display System was observed to return at 0246 EST, and was confirmed by visual observation of wind direction onsite. The loss of Meteorological Tower data had no effect on plant operations and all units (Hope Creek and Salem Units 1 and 2) remain at 100% power. No personnel injuries resulted from the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 49671 | 20 December 2013 18:03:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Both Control Room Air Conditioning Subsystems Inoperable | While the B control room chiller was out of service for planned maintenance, the A control room chiller was manually secured due to excessive fluctuations in load and running current. TS 3.7.2.2 Action a.2 was entered at 1303 (EST) for both control room air conditioning subsystems inoperable. Control room temperature is being maintained below the TS limit of 90 degrees F. The required TS Action is to restore one control room AC subsystem to operable status within 72 hours. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek township.
The B control room chiller was returned to service at 2120 EST. The A control room chiller remains out of service resulting in a 30-day TS LCO. Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis). | 05000354/LER-2013-010 |
| ENS 49665 | 19 December 2013 20:11:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Loss of Reactor Building Ventilation | At 1511 (EST) on December 19, 2013, bus 10A404 (D channel 4 kv 1E vital bus) deenergized while transferring infeed breakers after degraded voltage testing. Reactor building ventilation fans tripped resulting in a loss of secondary containment negative pressure. Filtration Recirculation and Ventilation System (FRVS) was manually started and secondary containment negative pressure was restored at 1525 (EST). Secondary containment pressure is stable with differential pressure negative. The technical specification requirement is to maintain secondary containment at a negative pressure for secondary containment integrity. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The standby reactor building ventilation fans did not automatically start and (the reason for that) is being investigated." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek township.
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: Hope Creek Generating Station Unit 1, is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on December 19, 2013, at 1918 EST (EN# 49665). The notification on December 19, 2013, reported that secondary containment was declared inoperable when reactor building ventilation system (RBVS) fans tripped resulting in the loss of secondary containment negative pressure. Subsequent engineering evaluation concluded that the safety function of secondary containment was not lost. The Hope Creek post-LOCA Exclusion Area Boundary, Low Population Zone, and Control Room dose calculation assumes that primary containment leakage is released directly to the environment with no credit for hold up or filtration for the first 375 seconds after the accident, i.e., the Hope Creek accident analysis does not assume that secondary containment is under vacuum at the start of an accident. In addition, the accident analysis relies upon the operation of the safety related Filtration Recirculation and Ventilation System (FRVS), which was fully operable. Upon receipt of an accident signal, FRVS would have automatically started and restored secondary containment negative pressure within the time limits of the design assumptions. The trip of the non-safety related RBVS and the failure of the stand-by RBVS fans to start did not result in an adverse impact on the dose consequence analysis. Although secondary containment was declared inoperable, the safety function was not lost and secondary containment was capable of performing its design function of minimizing any ground level release of radioactive material by providing a leak tight boundary so that FRVS may draw a vacuum In the Reactor Building and filter radioactive material at all times. The engineering evaluation is captured In the licensee's corrective action program. Based on the engineering evaluation, the condition reported in EN #49665 did not result in the loss of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. This event report is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed on the evaluation results and informed of this retraction. Notified R1DO (Powell). | |
| ENS 49608 | 5 December 2013 08:25:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Scram Following Turbine Trip on High Moisture Separator Level | While operating at 76% power on 12/5/13 at 0325 EST, the main turbine tripped on moisture separator hi level. The reactor scrammed along with the main turbine trip. All safety systems responded as designed and expected. There was no radiological release. There were no injuries. During the scram, all rods inserted into the core. Plant is stable in Mode 3 in its normal S/D (shutdown) electrical line up. Decay heat is being removed via the turbine bypass valves dumping steam to the main condenser. At 0505 EST while securing from cooldown in an attempt to start a recirc pump, BPVs (Bypass Valve) opened causing reactor level swell and subsequent shrink. During this time, RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) level lowered to below RPV level 3 and caused a RPS (Reactor Protection System) actuation. RPV level was recovered and is now stable in normal band. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
This update to ENS #49608 adds reporting criterion 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the RPS actuation at 0505 EST during post-scram recovery. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek township. The licensee will be making a press release. Notified R1DO (Cook). | 05000354/LER-2013-009 |
| ENS 49592 | 1 December 2013 11:13:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Main Turbine Trip | While operating at 100% power on 12/01/2013, at 0613 EST, the main turbine tripped on moisture separator hi level. The reactor scrammed along with the main turbine trip. All safety systems responded as designed and expected. There was no radiological release. There were no injuries. During the scram, all rods inserted into the core. The plant is stable in mode 3 in its normal shutdown electrical line up. Decay heat is being removed via the turbine bypass valves dumping steam to the main condenser. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying Lower Alloways Creek township. | 05000354/LER-2013-008 |
| ENS 49162 | 1 July 2013 12:46:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Fuel Oil Spill Into a Storm Drain Leading to the Delaware River | On July 1, 2013, at 0846 (EDT) the Hope Creek Shift Manager was notified of a fuel oil spill that entered a storm drain leading to the Delaware River. The onsite Fire Department responded to the scene to contain the spill. The spill was terminated and cleanup activities were completed at 0930 (EDT). A 15 minute notification to the State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection was required and completed on July 1, 2013, at 0900 (EDT). The unit remains at 100% power. The station has initiated an investigation to determine the cause of the spill and initiate immediate corrective actions. No personnel injuries resulted from the event. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), notification of other government agencies. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Lower Alloway Creek Township will be notified. The licensee has also notified the National Response Center. | |
| ENS 49110 | 13 June 2013 06:52:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Discovery of Pressure Boundary Leakage | On 6/13/13 at approximately 0252 EDT, during the initial walk down of the drywell of the Hope Creek Unit 1 forced outage, water was observed leaking from a 40% circumferential crack in a weld in the RHR vent line adjacent to the outboard isolation valve (BCV-597). The estimated leakage rate through the crack is less than one gallon per minute. The RHR vent line is one-inch ASME Class 1 piping. Hope Creek Unit 1 is stable in Operational Condition 3, Hot Shutdown. This report is being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for a weld or material defect in the primary coolant system which cannot be found acceptable under applicable ASME standards. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The only safety-related equipment out of service at the time event was the 'C' Service Water Pump, which was tagged for scheduled maintenance. No personnel injuries occurred. No radiation releases occurred. The licensee entered a 24 hr. action statement under T.S. 3.4.3.2, Condition A to be in mode 4 by 0252 EDT on 6/14/13. The licensee will be notifying the Lower Alloways Creek township. | 05000354/LER-2013-003 |
| ENS 49108 | 12 June 2013 17:33:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Circulating Water Pump Trip Leads to Reactor Scram | This is a report of a manual RPS actuation and manual RCIC actuation per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). At 1332 (EDT), on 6/12/13, the 'B' Circulating Water Pump tripped with a stuck open discharge valve resulting in a vacuum transient. Operators lowered reactor power from 100% in an effort to stabilize condenser vacuum. When vacuum reached 6.5 inches, the operators inserted a manual reactor scram at 1333 (EDT). All control rods inserted as required. No automatic ECCS or RCIC initiations occurred. No primary or secondary containment isolations occurred. The plant is stable in OP CON 3 HOT SHUTDOWN with the condensate pumps in service. The Reactor Recirculation Pumps are in service. At the time of the event, a RCIC surveillance was in progress, but did not contribute to the event. The RCIC pump was secured and subsequently placed in service for inventory control. The only safety-related equipment out of service at the time of the scram was the C Service Water Pump, which was tagged for scheduled maintenance. No personnel injuries occurred. No radiation releases occurred. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. | 05000354/LER-2013-002 |
| ENS 48947 | 19 April 2013 19:18:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration | Notification of Unusual Event Declared Due to Inability to Confirm a Fire in the Protected Area within 15 Minutes | Fire within the Protected Area not verified within 15 minutes. Emergency Action Level HU 2.1 declared at 1518 EDT. Confirmation of no fire completed at 1526 EDT. The fire alarm occurred in the Rad Waste Building. Due to the location of the alarm, the licensee was not able to validate alarm within 15 minutes which led to the emergency declaration. Once access to the area was obtained, there was no fire observed. The cause of the inadvertent fire alarm is under investigation. The licensee has notified Lower Alloways Creek Township, the State of New Jersey, the State of Delaware and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC and NuclearSSA via email.
At 1725 EDT, the licensee terminated the Notification of Unusual Event. The affected fire alarm was placed out of service and a fire watch has been established. The licensee has notified Lower Alloways Creek Township, the State of New Jersey, the State of Delaware and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cook), IRD (Grant), NRR EO (Skeen), DHS, FEMA, NICC, and NuclearSSA via email. | |
| ENS 48908 | 10 April 2013 13:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Notification System Telephone | On April 10, 2013 at 0930 (EDT) Hope Creek Operations personnel identified that the NRC ENS phone line was unavailable for Hope Creek Generating Station. The loss of the NRC ENS line was verified by the Hope Creek Shift Manager via backup land line communication to the NRC. The NRC Operations Center has an open repair ticket with the phone service provider. The loss of the phone line had no effect on plant operation and the unit remains at 100% power. Additionally, Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) capability was verified to remain intact and is available to transmit data. No personnel injuries resulted from the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. | |
| ENS 48905 | 9 April 2013 17:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Notification System Telephone | On April 9, 2013 at 1315 (EDT) Hope Creek Operations personnel identified that the NRC ENS phone line was unavailable for Hope Creek Generating Station. The loss of the NRC ENS line was verified by the Hope Creek Shift Manager via backup land line communication to the NRC Operation Center at 1355 (EDT). At that time, the NRC Operations Center submitted a repair ticket to the phone service provider. NRC ENS phone availability was verified restored to service at 1618 (EDT) with the NRC Operations Center. The loss of the phone line had no effect on plant operations and the unit remains at 100% power. Additionally, Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) capability was verified to remain intact during this time period and was available to transmit data. No personnel injuries resulted from the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 48897 | 8 April 2013 15:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Hpci Declared Inoperable During Surveillance Testing | On April 8, 2013 at 0908 (EDT), the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable as part of planned Controls Functional Testing. At 1115 (EDT), during the performance of scheduled testing, an initiation signal for the HPCI system was provided and the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump failed to start as expected. The HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump provides the motive force to open the HPCI Turbine Stop and Governor valves during system startup. The inability of the HPCI Turbine Stop and Governor valves to open prevents the HPCI system from fulfilling its design safety function. The HPCI system will remain inoperable until the cause of the failure has been corrected. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. The unit remains at 100% power. The station has initiated an Event Response Team to identify and correct the cause of the failure. No personnel injuries resulted from the event. The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified. | |
| ENS 48560 | 5 December 2012 14:21:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation Removed from Service for Maintenance | On December 5, 2012, at 0921 EST, the Hope Creek Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service to perform planned maintenance on the system. The maintenance consists of a 54 month inspection of the feeder breaker. The removal of ventilation, potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. Appropriate compensatory measures are in place while ventilation is out of service. The Emergency Response Organization duty team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to activate the TSC in an alternate location. The ventilation system is scheduled to be out of service for approximately 12 hours. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the local township. | |
| ENS 48404 | 13 October 2012 01:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Removed from Service for Planned Maintenance | On October 12, 2012, at 2100 EDT, the Hope Creek Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service to perform planned preventive maintenance on the system. The maintenance consists of minor maintenance to clean the intake louvers that supply outside air to the emergency filter unit (00-VH313), the supply unit fan (00-VH314) and the remote shutdown panel (RSP) supply unit fan (00-VH316). The removal of the ventilation potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared radiological emergency requiring activation. Appropriate compensatory measures are in place while the ventilation is out of service. The Emergency Response Organization duty team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to activate the TSC in an alternate location. The ventilation system is scheduled to be out of service for approximately 25 hours and the TSC Ventilation will be returned to service at 2200 on October 13, 2012. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The local township will be notified. | |
| ENS 48360 | 29 September 2012 12:09:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Power Supply for Nuclear Emergency Telecommunication System | At 0809 (EDT) on 9/29/12 a loss of power to the Nuclear Emergency Telecommunication System (NETS) at the PSEG Nuclear Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) located in Salem, New Jersey resulted in a loss of dial tone to the NETS phones located at the Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations. This failure had no effect on the safety system or ability to safely control or monitor the Salem and Hope Creek generating stations: back-up emergency telecommunications (Direct-Inward-Dial, and Centrex) remained available. At 1038 (EDT) on 9/29/12, power was restored along with full NETS functionality. No injuries have occurred. The NETS communicates between the site and the County and State. A card in the UPS power supply failed resulting in this loss of power. Power was restored by bypassing the UPS. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 48274 | 4 September 2012 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | High Pressure Coolant Injection Declared Inoperable | At 1320 EDT, on September 4, 2012, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable during performance of HC.OP-IS.BJ-0001, HPCI Main and Booster Pump Set - 0P204 and 0P217 - In Service Test (IST). The HPCI system was being started for the quarterly IST when 1-FD-HV-F001, HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Valve, failed to open per step 5.21.7 of the test. The control room operators returned the system to a standby line up. The Outage Control Center was staffed to investigate the cause of the valve misoperation. Loss of the HPCI system is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as loss of a single train safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The 'A' Residual Heat Removal System was aligned for Suppression Pool Cooling to support the HPCI IST surveillance and was inoperable for Low Pressure Coolant Injection function until realigned to a standby lineup at 1340 EDT. No additional Emergency Core Cooling Systems or safety-related equipment was inoperable during this time period. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified. | |
| ENS 48010 | 11 June 2012 07:35:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Out of Service for Planned Maintenance | On June 11, 2012, at approximately 0335 hours, the Hope Creek Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service to perform planned maintenance to the system. The maintenance consists of a 12-year preventative maintenance overhaul of the ventilation supply fan and emergency filtration unit. The removal of ventilation potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. Appropriate compensatory measures are in place while ventilation is out of service. The Emergency Response Organization duty team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to activate the TSC in an alternate location. The ventilation system is scheduled to be out of service for approximately 60 hours. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The local township will be notified.
The planned maintenance was completed and the TSC ventilation was returned to an operable status as of 0245 EDT on June 13, 2012. The TSC was not activated during the planned maintenance. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (DeFrancisco). | |
| ENS 47745 | 15 March 2012 00:34:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Hpci Inoperable Due to Failure of Turbine Governor Valve | On March 14th, 2012 at 2034 EST the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to a failure of the turbine governor valve to respond as expected to demanded position. With the HPCI system flow controller output signal at zero percent demand the governor valve traveled to the mid position and did not remain closed as expected when the oil system auxiliary pump was started. With this unexpected response the speed and flow control system for the turbine is inoperable. The failure was discovered as part of a planned evolution for oil sampling. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. The unit remains at 100% power. The station has initiated an Event Response Team to identify and correct the cause of the failure. No personnel injuries resulted from the event. The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloway Creek Township will be notified. | |
| ENS 47585 | 12 January 2012 03:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable | On January 11, 2012 at 22:15 (EST), the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to a failure of the turbine governor valve to respond to demanded position. When demanded to travel to the full closed position, the governor valve remained full open rendering the speed and flow control system for the turbine inoperable. The failure was discovered as part of a planned maintenance evolution. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. The unit remains at 100% power. The station has initiated an Event Response Team to identify and correct the cause of the failure. No personnel injuries resulted from the event. The NRC Resident Inspector (has been notified) and Lower Alloway Creek Township will be notified. The unit is in a 14-day LCO for HPCI inoperability.
The following is a retraction of ENS Notification #47585: On January 11, 2012, Hope Creek Generating Station reported to the NRC that High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to a failure of the turbine governor valve to respond to demanded position. This condition was discovered when obtaining an oil sample from the HPCI system. According to the procedure, the HPCI flow controller automatic setpoint was lowered to zero. The procedure set the manual controller setpoint by having the operator lower the demand for a time period rather than verifying the setpoint at zero. The HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump is then started. The governor valve was expected to start to open (intermediate position) and then close. Instead the valve went to the full open position and did not respond to attempts to close the valve from the flow controller. Accordingly, Control Room personnel conservatively initiated ENS reporting under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to the apparent loss of safety function for Unit 1. Subsequent technical evaluation concluded that the performance and response of the HPCI turbine governor control valve was as expected based on the manual controller demand being at 35% when the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump was started to collect a HPCI oil sample. The Engineering review concluded that there are no problems with the HPCI turbine governor control valve response to controller demand. Operating procedures have been revised to provide guidance on verifying manual controller demand at 0% before placing the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump in service under standby conditions for oil sampling or similar evolutions. Since January 11th, 2012, HPCI has remained available to perform its required safety functions and only became inoperable during planned evolutions to either obtain oil samples or to investigate HPCI turbine governor control valve performance. On this basis, the HPCI system was capable of performing its function to mitigate the consequences of an accident and the issue described in Event #47585 is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloway Creek Township will be notified of this retraction. Notified R1DO (Trapp). | |
| ENS 47556 | 29 December 2011 03:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification to State of New Jersey Due to a Discharge Into the Delaware River | At 2209 EST on 12/28/11 following a planned station service water (SSW) pump swap, a motor operated valve (MOV) failed to close in a water treatment system for the SSW pump that was secured. This was discovered shortly after the pump was removed from service by the field operators. The control room was notified at 2230 EST of the issue and ongoing efforts to troubleshoot and correct the malfunction. The release was terminated by closing a manual isolation valve at 2240 EST. This malfunction resulted in the discharge of approximately 17 gallons of 15% sodium hypochlorite (product) to the idle SSW pump intake which communicates with the Delaware river, The idle SSW pump was restarted at 2240 EST thus withdrawing all residual product from the intake and directing it to plant treatment systems (dechlorination on the cooling tower outfall). A sample was obtained from the Delaware river just outside the intake structure and there was no detectable chlorine in the sample and there were no abnormal conditions noted on the river. Based on Environmental Licensing review, this is reportable to the state of NJDEP (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection) within 2 hours. The report to the state was initiated at 0017 EST on 12/29/11. The HC Senior NRC Resident has been informed. Affected systems are limited to the Station Service Water (SSW) system and the Sodium Hypochlorite water treatment system. There were no actuations or initiating signals. There was no impact on plant operations and these systems remain fully operable. The failure was limited to the MOV which has been isolated via a manual valve. There was nothing unusual or not understood. All safety related equipment continues to function as required. There were no injuries or reported wildlife impact. | |
| ENS 47323 | 5 October 2011 19:53:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Potential Chemical Spill in the Delaware River | At 0930 on 10/5/11, a fuse failure in a 1E to non - 1E interface failed causing a false run signal to the water treatment system for a standby station service water pump. The water treatment system responded by opening the injection valve for the out of service pump. With the associated pump out of service, the sodium hypochlorite can communicate with the Delaware river. This was discovered at 1553 and immediately terminated. This resulted in the discharge of approximately 195 gallons of 15% sodium hypochlorite to SSW intake which communicates with the Delaware river. The associated service water pump was started thus withdrawing residual product from the intake. A portion of the discharged sodium hypochlorite may have entered the Delaware river. A sample was obtained from the Delaware river just outside the intake structure and there was no detectable chlorine in the sample and there were no abnormal conditions noted on the river. Based on Environmental Licensing review, this was reportable to the state of NJ within 15 minutes. The report to the state was initiated at 1608 on 10/5/11. Subsequent calls were made to the Hope Creek Senior NRC Resident, the National Response Center and the US Coast Guard. Affected systems are limited to the Station Service Water (SSW) system and the sodium hypochlorite water treatment system. There was no impact on plant operations and these systems remain fully operable. Evaluation is underway to fully understand the impacts of the fuse failure to prevent reoccurrence. There was nothing unusual or not understood. All safety related equipment continues to function as required. There were no injuries or reported wildlife impact. | |
| ENS 47192 | 23 August 2011 18:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration | Notification of an Unusual Event Due to a Seismic Event | On 8/23/11 at 1400 hrs. EDT, Hope Creek and Salem generation stations declared a common site Unusual Event in accordance with EAL 9.5.1.a, due to an earthquake felt by onsite personnel within the protected area. The plant is operating at 100% power with no significant anomalies noted. Walkdowns of safety related areas are currently in progress. All ECCS systems are available and in standby alignment. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and state and local authorities. (See also EN #47191).
Initial walkdowns are complete with no anomalies noted. Detailed walkdowns of all rooms and areas are in progress with estimated completion time of 1900 hrs. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1 IRC (Dentil).
Hope Creek and Salem have terminated their Notification of Unusual Event. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and state and local authorities. Notified R1DO (Krohn), IRD (Morris), DHS (Bean), FEMA (Via), USDA (Kraus), and DOE (Turner). | |
| ENS 47116 | 2 August 2011 13:48:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness-For-Duty Report Involving an Employee Supervisor | A utility non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's access to the site has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 46926 | 5 June 2011 16:02:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification of a Sewage Spill Into a Storm Drain | On June 5, 2011 at 1202 (EDT) the Hope Creek Shift Manager was notified of a sewage spill at the site sewage treatment plain. Approximately 1000 gallons of intimated sewage entered a nearby storm drain. The onsite Fire Department responded to the scene to contain the spill. Offsite support from a local sanitary waste disposal vendor was requested who responded to the site to assist in the cleanup. A 15 minute notification to the State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection was required and completed on June 5, 2011 at 1214 (EDT). At 1320 (EDT) the sewage input into the storm drain was terminated. Site personnel continue with the cleanup, with support from the vendor. The spill had no effect on plant operations and the unit remains at 100% power. The station has initiated as investigation to determine the cause of the sewage spill, and initiate immediate corrective actions. No personnel injuries resulted from the event The NRC resident inspector has been notified. Lower Alloways Creek Township has been notified.
Hope Creek has determined that the spill reported to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection on 6/5/11 at 1214 (EDT) was not reportable. The spill was considerably smaller than originally believed, and it did not enter the river. Cleanup and pump out of sewage that entered the storm drains is complete. Additionally the sewage that spilled to the ground is also being cleaned up. (The licensee's) site environmental personnel will follow up with NJDEP Southern Enforcement personnel tomorrow morning. To confirm, this spill is not reportable. The licensee states that the spill is now estimated at approximately 25 gallons. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. R1DO (Conte) notified. | |
| ENS 46538 | 14 January 2011 09:26:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Ens and Erds Capability Due to a Failure of the Phone System Ups | On January 14, 2011 from 0426 to 0551 (EST) the NRC ENS phone line was lost for Hope Creek and Salem Units 1 and 2. The loss of the phone lines occurred during planned island ring bus switching and was caused by a failure of the phone system Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS). The phone system UPS was manually restored by Information Technology personnel and the phone line was verified to be operational. The loss of the phone line had no effect on plant operations and all three units remain at 100% power. Additionally, Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) capability was lost during this time period and has been restored. The station has initiated a prompt investigation into the cause of the failure of the phone system UPS to properly transfer. No personnel injuries resulted from the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 46358 | 24 October 2010 16:34:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | 'A' Train Rhr Inoperable Due to Temperature Switch Failure on 'A' Control Room Chiller | On 10/24/2010, while in Mode 5 in natural circulation cooling and no fuel movement in progress, the 'A' Control Room Chiller (AK400) tripped apparently due to an equipment failure of a temperature switch. This system was providing cooling for the Safety Auxiliaries Cooling System (SACS) room coolers. This caused the 'A' train of SACS and 'A' Train of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) to be administratively declared inoperable with the remaining train out of service for maintenance. As a result of the inoperable systems, the ability to remove residual heat could have been prevented. The 'A' RHR train, the alternate 'C' RHR train and the 'A' SACS Loop remained continuously available. No personnel were injured. The licensee is in Technical Specification 3.9.11.1 Shutdown Cooling and 3.8.1.2 for SACS inoperable. The Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) are available but inoperable as a result of SACS being inoperable. Offsite power is not affected and plant risk remains 'Green'. There were no significant events on-going at the time of the event. The licensee is bench testing a replacement switch at this time, and the chiller has been returned to service. The licensee is maintaining natural circulation and ensuring the availability of redundant RHR once a shift. The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloyways Township have been notified.
Licensee is retracting this event based on the following: Hope Creek Technical Specification 3.9.11 action statement (a) for no OPERABLE RHR loops is to demonstrate the operability of at least one alternate method of decay heat removal within one hour and once per 24 hours thereafter. Prior to and throughout the event, decay heat, removal was maintained via the Fuel Pooling Cooling system through the available heat exchangers with core circulation maintained by natural circulation. Use of the Fuel Pool Cooling for decay heat removal is recognized in station procedures as an alternate method of decay heat removal in technical specification action statement (TSAS) 3.9.11. This retraction is to clarify that the inoperable systems did not prevent the ability to remove residual heat. The outage risk assessment remained Green throughout the period that both RHR loops were inoperable. There was no loss of safety function, and therefore, the event is not reportable as an event that prevents the fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(B). Notified the R1DO (Daniel Holody) | |
| ENS 46259 | 20 September 2010 11:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Erds and Spds Out of Service for Computer Upgrade | On 9/20/2010 at approximately 0700 EDT, the Hope Creek Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) will be taken out of service for approximately nine days to support a planned modification which will install a new (upgraded) computer system. During this timeframe, ERDS and SPDS will be unavailable. Should the need arise, plant status information will be communicated to the NRC, State and local responders using other available communication systems. SPDS and ERDS are expected to be restored on 9/29/2010. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a 'Major Loss of Assessment Capability'. The licensee has notified Lower Alloways Creek Township and the NRC Resident Inspector of the planned outage.
SPDS and ERDS systems were removed from service to support planned computer upgrade. Planned work which resulted in the removal from service of the SPDS and ERDS has been completed. The SPDS system has been returned to service. During the ERDS testing, a problem was discovered with the NRC's communication link supplied by Verizon. An update will be provided when ERDS testing is completed. Notified R1DO (Gray).
The ERDS communication problem was repaired and successfully tested. SPDS and ERDS are now fully functional and all work is complete. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Joustra) |