Semantic search
| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 56790 | 13 October 2023 01:27:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Manual Reactor Trip | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 10/12/23 at 2127 EDT, with the Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100% Power, operators identified degrading condenser vacuum and manually tripped the reactor. All control rods inserted as expected. The trip was not complex, and all systems responded normally post-trip. The cause of the degraded condenser vacuum was an unexpected closure of the condenser air ejector regulator. The cause of the air ejector regulator going closed is not fully understood and is being investigated. Following the SCRAM, Operators responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the Main Steam System through the Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs) and Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) systems. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid specified system actuation. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Reactor Protection System Control Rod Auxiliary Feed Water Main Steam | |
| ENS 56731 | 9 September 2023 15:43:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Trip | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 9/9/23 at 1143 EDT, with the Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, all 4 turbine control valves closed resulting in a reactor protection system (RPS) automatic reactor trip on over temperature differential temperature. All control rods inserted as expected. The trip was not complex and all systems responded normally post-trip. The cause of the control valve closure has not been determined. Following the SCRAM, operators responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the main steam system through the atmospheric relief valves and auxiliary feed water systems. Due to the RPS actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid specified system actuation. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Reactor Protection System Control Rod Auxiliary Feed Water Main Steam | |
| ENS 56559 | 5 June 2023 22:23:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1823 EDT, the shift manager was notified that one siren, part of the public notification system (siren number 10), spuriously activated for approximately one minute. Monroe County agencies were notified regarding the actuation. The cause of the actuation is being investigated and the ability for the siren to actuate has been removed until the cause is determined. There is no impact to the emergency planning zone. This event is a four-hour, non-emergency report for notification to other government agencies in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). | ||
| ENS 56363 | 6 February 2023 11:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Communications and Assessment Capabilities | The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified. | ||
| ENS 56243 | 28 November 2022 14:15:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty Report | A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 55609 | 17 October 2021 18:58:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | 60 Day Optional Telephonic Notification for Invalid Specified Actuation of Containment Isolation Train | This 60-day telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report one invalid actuation of the Unit 1 Containment Isolation System Train "A" in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On October 17, 2021 at approximately 1358 (EDT), a DC breaker was opened to perform an inspection of a Containment Isolation (CI) rack. A CI signal was produced and resulted in a loss of Letdown during filling and venting the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) with the RCS at 344 psig. RCS pressure began to rise, and prompt actions were taken by the Control Room to secure a Charging Pump within 20 seconds. The RCS pressure rise continued and both Pressure Operated Relief Valves cycled at 409.9 psig as designed, lowering RCS pressure. The CI Train "A" was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the invalid actuation of Train "A" Containment Isolation valves in more than one system. All valves functioned successfully. The DC breaker was closed, CI signal reset, and associated CI valves re-opened. All systems functioned as required and returned to normal service. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. | Reactor Coolant System | |
| ENS 55504 | 4 October 2021 04:31:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Valid System Actuation | The 'A' Steam Generator Narrow Range Water Level went less than 17 percent causing an Auxiliary Feed Water System valid actuation signal. The Auxiliary Feed Water System was in service at the time of the event providing decay heat removal. There was no adverse effect on plant systems. The Steam Generator Narrow Range Water Level was restored to normal operating band. This is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), which states, 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' (Reactor Coolant System) RCS Pressure 340 pounds and RCS Temperature 340 Degrees F. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | Steam Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Decay Heat Removal | |
| ENS 53696 | 26 October 2018 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Automatic Start of the Emergency Diesel Generator and Loss of Radiation Monitor | RCS (Reactor Coolant System) Pressure: vented to containment, refueling cavity greater than 23ft. (above reactor vessel). RCS temperature: 96 degrees Fahrenheit. The 12A bus de-energized, 'A' EDG (Emergency Diesel Generator) automatically started and loaded on (emergency) buses 14 and 18. The RCS configuration is refueling cavity level greater than 23ft. above the reactor flange with no impact to shutdown cooling. Radiation monitor R-1, Control Room radiation monitor, lost power for 2 hrs 10 min. This placed Ginna in a major loss of emergency preparedness capabilities. A temporary radiation monitor has been installed in the Control Room. Prior to the notification, the licensee had restored the 12A bus from offsite power and the R-1 monitor was re-energized. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Emergency Diesel Generator Shutdown Cooling | |
| ENS 53666 | 14 October 2018 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to a Sodium Hypochlorite Leak | Notified New York State Department of Environmental Conservation for draining of sodium hypochlorite (12-15% by weight) from the storage tank into it's engineered secondary containment of approximately 1300 gallons. Reportable per regulation 6 NYCRR Part 597. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee. Licensee investigation into the cause of the leak is ongoing. | Secondary containment | |
| ENS 53272 | 19 March 2018 13:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Out of Service | Emergency Assessment Capability cannot be performed in the Technical Support Center due to an equipment deficiency in the HVAC system which could impact facility habitability. An Alternate Technical Support Center is in place at the Emergency Offsite Facility. Priority maintenance is in progress to correct the deficiency. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | HVAC | |
| ENS 53185 | 26 January 2018 13:53:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage | On January 26, 2018, a containment entry was made to identify the source of elevated Unidentified Reactor Coolant System (RCS) operational leakage. A through-wall leak was identified on a Class 1 piping weld on the letdown line at 0853 EST. It was determined that the leak was RCS pressure boundary leakage. Ginna entered Technical Specification (TS) LCO (Limiting Condition for Operation) 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, Condition B. for the existence of pressure boundary leakage. This condition requires the plant to be in MODE 3 within 6 hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours. The leak was isolated and TS LCO 3.4.13 exited at 1015 EST. This event is reportable within 8 hours in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for 'Any event or condition that results in: (A) The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded'. The Station (Ginna) is developing an evaluation and a repair plan at this time. This condition has no impact on public health and safety. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | Reactor Coolant System | |
| ENS 53124 | 17 December 2017 12:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Following Sulfric Acid Spill | Ginna notified New York State Department of Environmental Conservation of a sulfuric acid spill of approximately 270 gallons in the AVT, All Volatile Treatment, building. Ginna is currently contacting offsite support for hazardous chemical cleanup. The spilled sulfuric acid is currently contained within the secondary containment structure associated with the sulfuric acid tank. There is no release to the environment. There is no impact to habitability in the AVT building at this time. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Secondary containment | |
| ENS 52946 | 2 September 2017 15:48:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Area Radiation Monitor Failure | MCR (Main Control Room) area radiation monitor R-1 failed at 1148 (EDT on) 9/2/2017. This caused a loss of capability to classify EAL (Emergency Action Level) RA3.1, Dose Rates greater than 15 mrem/hr in either of the following areas requiring continuous occupancy to maintain plant safety functions: Control Room (R-1) or CAS (Central Alarm Station). Compensatory measures are currently in place with a portable radiation monitor in the MCR with alarm setpoints consistent with R-1. Priority maintenance is being planned to restore R-1 to service. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 51730 | 12 February 2016 04:05:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Emergency Diesel Generator Auto-Started Due to the Loss of a Station Service Transformer | On 02/11/2016, at 2305 (EST), Ginna Station experienced a loss of Station Service Transformer 12A causing Emergency Diesel Generator 1A to automatically start due to under-voltage signals to safeguards buses 14 and 18. All plant systems responded as designed. Control room operators stabilized the plant per abnormal operating procedures. The plant is currently in a 100/0 electrical lineup (supplied by the 12B Service Station Transformer) on the off site circuit 767 with the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator secured. The loss of the station service transformer is currently under investigation. This is reportable as a valid system actuation that was not part of a pre-planned sequence during testing. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 51604 | 21 October 2015 05:29:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | Diesel Generator Start Due to Invalid Signal | This report is being made per paragraphs 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address an actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' on October 21, 2015, during the performance of a Diesel Generator Load and Safeguard Sequence Test. The Emergency AC Electrical Power system, including Diesel Generators is a system named in 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). During the performance of the Diesel Generator Load and Safeguard Sequence Test restoration steps a human performance error, while taking resistance readings on a relay, resulted in the unintentional start of the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator. The testing was aborted and the affected Diesel Generator was restored to standby service in accordance with plant procedures. This is defined as an 'invalid signal' in that the 'A' Diesel Generator did not start as the result of an actual initiating condition. The start signal is considered an INVALID signal with respect to 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), however the system was not fully removed from service. The 'B' train was not affected by this event. The actuation signal was considered complete since all necessary components responded as would have been expected if there had been a valid signal. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The licensee has determined that shorter test probe tips, when taking resistance readings, are necessary to prevent reoccurrence of this event. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 51307 | 11 August 2015 03:32:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Inadvertent Siren Activation | At approximately 2332 EDT on August 10, 2015, the Ginna Control Room was notified of an inadvertent siren activation by the Monroe County Emergency Center. It is unclear at this time why the siren inadvertently activated. Company personnel are addressing the issue with the siren. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The siren activated for approximately 1 minute. The licensee will remove the siren from service until the cause of the inadvertent actuation can be corrected. The licensee has a sufficient number of sirens to allow this siren to be removed from service. | ||
| ENS 51225 | 13 July 2015 16:10:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Inadvertent Activation of Emergency Siren by Vendor | At approximately 1210 (EDT) on July 13, 2015 during conduct of vendor maintenance, a contract maintenance worker inadvertently activated siren 71. The licensee was notified of the siren activation by the vendor at 1211 (EDT). Wayne County was notified of the siren activation by the vendor at 1212 (EDT). One of the 96 sirens in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) were activated for less than one minute. No press release is planned by Exelon. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 50536 | 14 October 2014 14:03:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation Out of Service | The Technical Support Center Air Conditioning Unit is not operating properly and has been declared non-functional. The Air Conditioning Unit functions to cool the Technical Support Center during normal and accident conditions. Current environmental conditions are acceptable. The Corrective Action process has been initiated. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 3, since this condition affects an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 50119 | 17 May 2014 10:30:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | a Contract Supervisor Violated the Licensee Fitness-For-Duty Program | A contract supervisor violated the site Fitness-tor-Duty (FFD) policy as a result of off site activities. The individuals plant access has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. | ||
| ENS 50231 | 8 May 2014 17:20:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | 60-Day Telephonic Notification of Invalid Specified System Actuation | This report is being made per paragraphs 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address an actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator 'B' on May 8, 2014 during the performance of 480v safeguards Bus 16 Under Voltage (UV) testing. Emergency AC Electrical Power system, including Emergency Diesel Generators, is a system named in 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). During testing of the Bus 16 UV cabinet, a human performance error resulted in the simultaneous auto start of the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator and trip of the Bus 16 normal supply breaker. This is defined as an 'invalid signal' in that the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator did not start as the result of an actual UV condition on Bus 16. This start signal is considered an INVALID signal with respect to 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), however the system was not fully removed from service. The 'A' train was not affected by this event. The actuation was considered complete since all necessary components responded as would have been expected if there had been a valid UV signal. The NRC Resident lnspector was notified. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 49914 | 13 March 2014 20:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Postulated Hot Short Fire Event That Could Adversely Impact Safe Shutdown Equipment | A review of industry Operating Experience identified that there were unprotected DC control circuits for non safety-related DC motors which are routed from the turbine building to other separate fire areas. Fuses used to protect the motor power conductors appear to be inadequate to protect the control conductors. The concern is that under fire safe shutdown conditions, it is postulated that a fire in one area can cause short circuits potentially resulting in secondary fires or cable failures in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires or cable failures are outside the assumptions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis. This condition is reportable as an 8-hour ENS report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. . | ||
| ENS 49548 | 18 November 2013 10:12:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Communications Loss to New York State Watch Tower | R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant was notified at 0512 (EST) by the New York State (NYS) Watch Center that the Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS) and commercial telephones were not available. The unavailability of the communications systems was a result of an unplanned computer server outage affecting the NYS Watch Center. While the RECS line remained operational, it was not available due to the relocation of personnel from the NYS Watch Center to an alternate location. An alternate method of communication was established via cell phone at the time of notification. This condition is reportable as a major loss of emergency offsite communications capability under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NYS Watch Center network and communications systems have been restored and the facility staffed as of 0757 (EST). The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 49374 | 20 September 2013 20:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Potential Design Basis Flooding Issues Related to Battery Room Wall Penetrations and Cable Vault Floor Drains | On 9/20/2013 at 1600 EDT, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant determined that there was a potential for flooding of both battery rooms during a design basis flood due to unqualified wall penetration material and partially blocked cable vault floor drains. Testing of underground cable vault drain lines failed to demonstrate that they could pass the required flow due to debris accumulation. The penetrations are below grade and approximately five feet above the bottom of the vault floor. During a design basis flood, water could flow through the holes in the vault manhole covers and fill up the vaults to the level of the penetrations. Since the penetration barriers do not appear to be qualified for flooding, leakage into Battery Room B could be expected. Battery Room A and Battery Room B have a normally closed emergency fire door between them that allows water to pass under the door into Battery Room A where a sump pump exists. It is not currently known if the sump pump capacity would have been able to mitigate flooding of both battery rooms. The discovery of this condition is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The 125VDC system is currently Operable. Current weather forecasts do not predict the conditions necessary for flooding. Additionally, compensatory measures have been implemented to provide barriers to water entry into the vault manholes until corrective actions are implemented. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition | ||
| ENS 49265 | 12 August 2013 12:59:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation Removed from Service for Planned Maintenance | This condition does not affect the health and safely of the public or the operation of the facility. At 0859 EDT on August 12, 2013, pre-planned maintenance commenced which affects the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation. The scope of the maintenance is to replace the TSC ventilation charcoal filters and sampling canisters. This maintenance is currently scheduled to be completed by August 20, 2013. TSC emergency functionality during a radiation release event requires TSC ventilation be maintained. The actual TSC ventilation emergency function for iodine removal will be lost for the duration of the pre-planned maintenance. If an emergency should occur and a radioactive release occurs, the ventilation system will not provide iodine removal capability. If an emergency is declared and the TSC facility activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the staff will be directed to relocate to the alternate TSC location. The alternate TSC has been verified to have electrical power and communication capability. The Technical Support Center Directors have been notified. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. * * * UPDATE FROM KEN CROW TO PETE SNYDER AT 1749 EDT ON 8/20/13 * * * The TSC ventilation has been returned to service as of 1742 EDT on 8/20/13. Notified R1DO (Schmidt). | ||
| ENS 49214 | 24 July 2013 18:19:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Trip from Full Power | At 1419 EDT on 7/24/2013, the reactor tripped due to a reactor protection system (RPS) actuation signal from a turbine trip, which was caused by a generator trip. All control rods inserted on the trip and reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure is currently 2235 psig and stable with RCS temperature stable at 547 degrees F. Decay heat is being removed by steam dumps (to the main condenser) and auxiliary feedwater which auto started as expected. The cause of the generator trip is under investigation. The plant will remain in Mode 3 until the cause of the trip is determined. The plant notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Reactor Coolant System Reactor Protection System Auxiliary Feedwater Control Rod | |
| ENS 49177 | 7 July 2013 07:26:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Sirens Due to Power Outages | At 0326 EDT on 07/07/2013, it was determined that 14 of 96 Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Offsite Sirens were nonfunctional. The apparent cause is loss of power to the sirens due to storm related power outages. The weather has since returned to normal conditions, and residential power restoration is in progress. (At the time of this report, only 3 sirens remained without power). This event is being reported as a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 48918 | 12 April 2013 14:10:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Unanalyzed Condition - Missing Backflow Preventer | On 4/12/2013 at 1010 EDT, it was determined that a floor drain line between the Turbine Building and Intermediate Building did not have a backflow preventer as expected. Backflow protection is provided to prevent the possible spread of a fire via the drain system. The Turbine Building and the Intermediate Building are considered two different fire areas within the scope of the fire protection program. The discovery of this condition is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). In accordance with the Technical Requirements Manual, an hourly fire watch inspection and fire detector operability verification have been established until an equivalent level of protection is provided or until permanent corrective actions can be implemented. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 48333 | 21 September 2012 18:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Unanalyzed Condition Identified in Appendix R Fire Scenario | On September 21, 2012, a condition was identified where hydrogen may become entrained in the charging pump suction after the credited pump is restarted as part of the alternate shutdown procedure for the Auxiliary Building basement and mezzanine levels. An air operated valve separates the Volume Control Tank (VCT) from the charging pump suction and this valve fails open on loss of air or power caused by the postulated fire. The alternate flow path from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) fails closed on a loss of air or power. A manual valve is provided to bypass this closed valve. However, due to hydrogen pressure in the VCT and the potential for significant pressure losses in the piping from the RWST to the charging pump suction, insufficient elevation head exists in the RWST to ensure that hydrogen will not become entrained. If this condition is left unmitigated, the credited charging pump is assumed to fail. Due to the location of the postulated fire and its impact on equipment and cables, no other inventory makeup sources are credited. Compensatory Measures have been implemented as follows: 1. All fire detection and suppression systems in the Appendix R fire zones have been verified functional. 2. All Hot Work in the area has been suspended. 3. Continuous Fire Watch has been posted in the Appendix R fire zone. 4. Combustion engine powered vehicles are restricted from entering the Auxiliary Building. 5. Within 24 hours remove all non-attended transient combustible materials from Appendix R fire zones. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. * * * RETRACTION FROM REISNER TO SNYDER ON 9/28/12 AT 1415 EDT * * * This is a retraction of ENS report 48333 that was submitted at 2028 EDT on Friday, September 21 , 2012. A 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) ENS notification was made due to a condition that was identified where hydrogen may become entrained in the charging pump suction after the credited pump is restarted as part of the alternate shutdown procedure in the event of a fire in the Auxiliary Building basement and mezzanine levels. A subsequent engineering evaluation calculated the amount of gas that will be entrained into the charging pump suction flow and the duration of the entrainment. This evaluation demonstrates that for the most limiting Appendix R scenario that the charging pump will entrain a minimal amount of gas for a short duration, and is unaffected by this condition. Inventory control for the reactor coolant system is maintained throughout the scenario. Based on the above information the 'Unanalyzed Condition' ENS notification made on September 21, 2012 is being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Bellamy). | Reactor Coolant System | |
| ENS 47988 | 3 June 2012 06:39:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Autostart of "B" Edg Due to Loss of Offsite Power Circuit 767 | At approximately 0239 hours on June 3, 2012 the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) automatically started when offsite power circuit 767 was de-energized. The EDG started and re-energized Safe Guards busses 16 and 17. The selected Service Water (SW) pump 'B' automatically started to supply cooling to the EDG. The operators responded to the loss of circuit 767 using abnormal operating procedure AP-ELEC.1 'Loss of 12A and/or 12B Busses'. Offsite power was restored to 12B bus using ER-ELEC.1 'Restoration of Offsite Power' on circuit 7T at 0318 hours. The 'B' EDG was shutdown at 0445 hours. The initial investigation of the loss of circuit 767 indicates that the likely cause was due to wildlife, e.g., raccoon. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | Service water Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 47338 | 12 October 2011 03:28:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Turbine Auto Stop Valve Closure | Automatic Reactor Trip due to Turbine Auto Stop Valve Closure and Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System. At 2328 on 10/11/2011, the reactor tripped due to a RPS actuation Signal from a turbine trip, which was caused by a Turbine Auto Stop signal. All control rods inserted on the trip, RCS pressure is currently 2235 psig and stable, and RCS average temperature is 547 degrees and stable. Decay heat removal is being controlled by auxiliary feedwater which auto started as expected and steam generator atmospheric relief valves. The licensee is investigating the cause of the Auto Stop Signal. The plant will be maintained in MODE 3 until the cause of trip is determined. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. There is no primary to secondary leakage. Offsite power is normal and all EDG's are available. | Steam Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Decay Heat Removal Control Rod | |
| ENS 47167 | 18 August 2011 14:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Unanalyzed Condition That Could Potentially Impact Both Trains of 480V Safeguards Buses | During NFPA-805 Fire PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) model development, Ginna Station identified a non-compliance with the Appendix R requirement to maintain one train of systems that are necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown and remain free from fire damage. A fire in the Turbine Building could cause a loss of 4160V power to the 480V safeguards buses while disabling control power to the 480V bus normal supply breakers and preventing both diesel generator output breakers from closing. Since the non-safety related 4160V buses are located in the same area of the turbine building, this could potentially impact both trains of AC power. This was determined to be an unanalyzed condition reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures have been established to provide interim guidance to identify the condition and locally trip the bus supply breaker prior to closing the diesel generator output breaker. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 47137 | 9 August 2011 16:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Inadvertent Actuation of an Emergency Siren | (There was an) inadvertent actuation of siren 46 due to water intrusion into the control box. The door was knocked open by a falling tree branch. Power to the siren has been isolated to prevent re-occurrence. Repair is scheduled for August 10, 2011 The licensee notified both Wayne and Monroe counties and the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 47094 | 3 June 2011 04:39:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | Invalid Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator | This report is being made per paragraphs 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address an actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' on June 3rd, 2011 while performing service water valve isolation signal testing. Emergency AC Electrical power system, including emergency diesel generators, is a system named in 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). During a refueling outage, testing was in progress to verify that service water isolation valves received the proper close signal during a safety injection. The test configuration required pulling control power fuses for the Bus 14 normal supply breaker to prevent operation and allow for manual relay actuation. Within seconds of pulling these fuses, the control room received a Bus 14 undervoltage annunciator, Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' started, and the generator output breaker closed onto Bus 14. Upon further investigation, the cause of this signal was identified as a degraded control relay that failed to mechanically latch and unexpectedly changed state when control power was removed. This resulted in an invalid undervoltage signal. Bus voltage remained within normal operating range. Given that the diesel generator was in unit mode of operation and was not fully synchronized with the normal bus supply, the diesel generator tripped shortly after starting due to a valid reverse power signal. A field verification and technical review was performed to ensure that this condition did not cause significant stress on the generator or engine. This start signal is considered an INVALID signal with respect to 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), however the system was not fully removed from service. The 'B' train was not affected by this event. The actuation was considered complete since all necessary components responded to the undervoltage signal as expected under the actual field conditions. The control relay would have remained in the desired position and performed its required function under design conditions with normal control power available. Therefore the degradation was not determined to have an impact on the safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. See related EN #46917. | Service water Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 46917 | 3 June 2011 04:39:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Unexpected Emergency Diesel Generator Actuation | On 6/3/2011 at 0039 hours, during the performance of a work order to test components associated with Service Water Isolation, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 'A' unexpectedly started automatically and its supply breaker to Safeguards Bus 14 closed. The Control Room staff observed normal voltage on Diesel Generator 'A'. Bus 14 voltage was never lost during this event, however, they also noted an associated Bus 14 undervoltage annunciator on the Main Control Board. Seconds later, Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' tripped on Reverse Power and its supply breaker to Bus 14 tripped open. The initiating action was the removal of the Bus 14 Normal Feed Breaker Control Power Fuses as part of the work order package. The Ginna EDG's have the following automatic start signals and logic: manual, safety injection signal (1/2 trains), undervoltage on respective safeguards bus, 'A' EDG Bus 14 or 18 (1 out of 2 degraded voltage + 1 out of 2 loss of voltage), 'B' EDG Bus 16 or 17 (1 out of 2 degraded voltage + 1 out of 2 loss of voltage). Investigation has commenced to determine the cause of the EDG start and undervoltage signal. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The purpose of this report is to retract the event discussed in Emergency Notification System report #46917 submitted on June 3rd, 2011. The ENS notification reported an unexpected start of Emergency Diesel Generator `A' during testing of a service water valve isolation circuit. As reported, Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' unexpectedly started and its supply breaker to Bus 14 closed. Seconds later, the Emergency Diesel Generator tripped on reverse power and its output breaker to Bus 14 opened. At the time of the event it was not understood why the diesel generator started. Subsequent troubleshooting and causal investigation identified that the signal was caused by a degraded control relay that unexpectedly changed state when control power was removed. This relay was expected to remain mechanically latched and would have remained in the desired position had control power not been removed as part of the test. Bus 14 voltage remained in the normal operating range throughout the event. Since this was not a valid undervoltage signal, the June 3rd, 2011 event is being retracted. A follow-up report will be made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. R1DO(Henderson) notified. See related EN #47094. | Service water Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 46966 | 25 April 2011 01:44:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | 60 Day Optional Notification of Invalid Start of Emergency Diesel Generator. | This report is being made per paragraphs 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address an actuation of the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator on 4/24/11 while performing a test of the diesel generator load and safeguard sequence. Emergency AC Electrical Power system including Emergency Diesel Generators is a system named in 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(6). On 4/24/11, at 2144, (hrs. EDT) while testing the continuity of relay SI-20X that is part of the test of diesel generator load and safeguard sequence, an unexpected partial Safety Injection signal occurred. The initiating action was the testing of the continuity of relay SI-20X while the 'B' train Safety Injection DC breaker was closed. Once the testing of relay SI-20X was completed, the partial Safety Injection signal ceased and all the equipment that had started, or had been repositioned, was returned to its pre-test condition. The unexpected partial Safety Injection signal was the result of the improper sequencing of a separate test of process radiation monitors that was being performed concurrently with the test of the diesel generator load and safeguard sequence. Specific information required per NUREG-1022: a. The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated: The 'B' Diesel Generator actuated. In addition, (a) equipment that started, or was repositioned, were the 'D' Service Water pump, the 'B' Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System (CREATS), and Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) valves 871B and 852B; and (b) equipment that stopped was the containment purge supply and exhaust fans, and Control Room Air Handling Unit supply and return fans. b. Whether each train actuation was complete or partial: The actuation was partial. c. Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully: The 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator started and operated successfully. It was later secured by Operations personnel. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Service water Emergency Diesel Generator Emergency Core Cooling System | |
| ENS 46775 | 21 April 2011 21:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Potential Inadvertant Activation of One Emergency Siren | On April 20, 2011, several hours after a severe lightning storm in the early morning hours, RE Ginna Nuclear Power Plant received a report that a siren may have activated. There was no specific location provided in the report. A review of the siren computer history showed no indication of any siren activation during that time frame. During the daily silent test of the siren system, one siren was determined to have failed due to loss of its AC power. During an inspection of the siren on April 21, 2011, it was reported that the siren appeared to have been struck by lightning. A number of electronic components in the siren had to be replaced and as a result the technicians were unable to determine if the siren had activated. As such. there is a potential that the siren may have been the source of the initial report. The siren has been tested and returned to service. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee. The licensee notified the Public Utilities Commission and Wayne and Monroe Counties. | ||
| ENS 46735 | 6 April 2011 19:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Degraded Fire Barrier | During walk downs for a planned site modification on April 6, 2011 at 1530 EDT, two degraded fire barrier seals were identified in the wall between the Auxiliary Building Basement and the Charging Pump Room. The wall is listed as an Appendix R wall between Fire Area (FA) ABBM and FA CHG. The wall separates redundant safe shutdown equipment. Two cylindrical six inch penetrations through the wall did not contain the required material to conform to a 3-hour fire rated barrier. This has been identified as a missing fire barrier such that the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains is lacking. A fire watch was established as a compensatory measure on 4/6/11. The discovery of this non-compliance is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
The purpose of this report is to retract the event discussed in Emergency Notification System report #46735 submitted on April 6th, 2011. The ENS notification reported an inadequate fire barrier penetration seal discovered on April 6th, 2011 when maintenance inspected the penetration in preparation for a modification. Initial investigation concluded that the fire barrier penetration seal between the Charging Pump room and Auxiliary Building Basement was inoperable because there was inadequate seal material to provide the required three hour barrier rating. It appeared that when looking in the penetration sleeve that a fire board from the opposite room was visible and no foam material was present. Subsequently, an engineering review of the penetration has been completed. The review determined that a minimum of 8 inches of foam is required to maintain a 3-hour rating. Engineering identified that the design also requires a fire board on each side of the foam. Upon measurement it was confirmed that at least 11 inches of the penetration was filled, with a fire board on each side. Based on these measurements, the fire barrier met design requirements and was operable. The individuals performing the initial investigation did not recognize the thickness of the wall. On April 7th, Maintenance proceeded to penetrate the fire barrier for the modification and it was confirmed that foam was behind the fire board. With a 24 inch thick wall, a large portion at the penetration sleeve can be void of material and still meet the 3 hour rating. As such, the April 6th, 2011 event is being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Caruso) | ||
| ENS 46624 | 29 December 2010 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | Invalid System Actuation Due to Operator Error | This report is being made per paragraphs 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address an actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' on 12/29/10 while performing a Diesel Generator shutdown. Emergency AC Electrical Power system including Emergency Diesel Generators is a system named in 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(6). Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' was coasting down following a normal shutdown in accordance with steps in a routine surveillance test procedure. A manual reset was performed prior to verification that the generator had stopped rolling causing it to return to idle speed and continue to run. A procedure compliance error occurred during the conduct of the test. The control room individual did not request verification that the diesel generator had stopped rolling prior to pushing the reset pushbuttons. This is considered an INVALID signal with respect to 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). However the system was not fully removed from service (i.e. the diesel was not considered to be in a testing mode at the time of the event). The re-start only affected Emergency Diesel Generator 'A'. Specific information required per NUREG-1022: a. The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated: The specific train(s) .and system(s) was Emergency Diesel Generator 'A'. The 'B' train was not affected by this event. b. Whether each train actuation was complete or partial: The actuation was considered complete (i.e. all necessary components responded to the reset signal as expected under the actual field conditions). c. Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully: Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' started and operated successfully until secured by Operations personnel. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 46398 | 5 November 2010 16:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Small Petroleum Spill within Site Property | This communication is intended to serve as a notification that the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation has been informed of a petroleum spill within the site property. A slight sheen and odor that indicated a petroleum product has been released to a local creek within the owner controlled property. A petroleum spill from an unknown vehicle was discovered along the length of an entrance driveway and in a parking lot, which due to the local rain entered the storm water system. Due to the area affected along the driveway spill location, Ginna's spill remediation vendor has been contacted to assist with the cleanup. Petroleum absorbent booms have been placed in the creek and along driveway runoff locations to minimize any further introduction of the spilled product and to further protect the waterway. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 46285 | 28 September 2010 15:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification - Faulty Alarm Actuation | At 1130 hrs. on September 28, 2010, the site was notified by Wayne County, New York of a single siren activation at 0620 hrs. for approximately 2 minutes. The single siren activation was not related to any condition or event at Ginna Station. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of the activation. A maintenance crew is currently investigating the cause of the spurious activation. | ||
| ENS 46073 | 6 July 2010 17:05:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm Received for Offsite Power | The Rochester Gas and Electric (RG&E) Energy Control Center (ECC) notified Ginna Operations that the Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm was received for the offsite power system. Ginna Operations entered procedure O-6.9, Operating Limits for Ginna Station Transmission, and declared the offsite power inoperable per ITS 3.8.1 (72 hour LCO). Per NUREG-1022, section 3.2.7, if either offsite power or onsite emergency power is unavailable to the plant, it is reportable per 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) regardless of whether the other system is available. The RG&E ECC monitors 115 kV voltage using their State Estimation and Contingency Analysis System. The State Estimation portion of the system evaluates real time system power flow and voltages on the 115 and 34.5 kV transmission systems. The Contingency Analysis portion analyzes the voltage effect of a Ginna main generator trip concurrent with worst case accident loading. If the Station 13A voltage would drop below the minimum required voltage for offsite power alignment a Ginna Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm occurs. If the main generator should trip, then the absence of a Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm on the RG&E State Estimation and Contingency Analysis System will ensure that the subsequent offsite 115kV system voltage transient will not result in Ginna Station experiencing an under voltage condition on the 480V Safeguard Busses. The RG&E ECC notified Ginna operations that the Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm cleared at 1311 EDST on 07/06/2010. The plant was maintained at 100% steady state conditions throughout the event. Both circuits remain inoperable but available for use. And will be restored to operable status when the system reliability is assured. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The purpose of this report is to retract the event discussed in ENS report #46071 (July 6, 2010). The ENS report covered an offsite power related event which occurred on July 6, 2010. In this event, both sources of offsite power were declared inoperable following notification to the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant that the calculated post contingency off-site system voltage was below the required value necessary to ensure that offsite power would remain available following a design basis accident. Since the ENS report, an engineering analysis of the event has been completed. The analysis determined that the offsite power system was actually operable at all times on July 6, 2010. The 'Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm (PCLVA)' computer model that is being utilized by the transmission system provider, Rochester Gas & Electric, to calculate the post contingency offsite system voltage, is inherently conservative in that it assumes the site is relying on a worst case single source of offsite power. However on July 6, 2010, both offsite power sources were available and the site was aligned in the 50/50 Normal offsite power configuration. The engineering analysis calculated the acceptable voltage in this configuration and identified that at no point did the calculated post contingency voltage decrease below the 50/50 Normal offsite power configuration's acceptable value. As such, the July 6, 2010 event is being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Burritt) was notified. | ||
| ENS 45635 | 19 January 2010 10:53:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Fire Department Assistance Required for a Failed Residential Transformer | At 0553 hours on 01/19/2010, plant personnel noted smoke emanating from a residential transformer within the Protected Area which was not affecting plant operation. The on-site fire brigade was dispatched to investigate. Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG&E) was notified to isolate the off-site power supply to the transformer. While awaiting the arrival of RG&E personnel, the on-site Fire Brigade noted that the transformer smoke was worsening along with increased noises from the transformer. The Ontario Fire Department was notified at 0715 hours to provide off site assistance. Ginna remains at 100% power, normal operating temperature of 574 degrees, and normal operating pressure of 2235 psig. The transformer supplies power to office trailers. The licensee notified the state and the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 45510 | 19 November 2009 18:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Low Level Radioactive Spill | The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation and other State and Local officials were notified today, November 19, 2009, that there had been a spill of low level radioactive material at an excavation site at the facility. Workers were conducting planned modification activities, replacing a section of piping, when sediment fell from the pipe to the ground and localized water at the excavation site. Samples of the localized water in the excavation after the sediment had fallen in exceeded the limit of the site procedure for notifying State and Local officials for a groundwater spill. No elevated levels have been detected in the nearest plant monitoring well. Therefore, we have no indications that there has been a release beyond the site from this source. Cleanup activities are currently in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The section of piping being replaced was between the plant storm drain system and the discharge canal. The radioactive material was identified as Cs-137 but was not quantified at the time of this report. | ||
| ENS 44830 | 5 February 2009 19:13:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration | Unusual Event Declared Due to Loss of Control Room Annunciators | At 1413 EST Ginna Station declared an Unusual Event due to the Loss of Main Control Board Annunciators E, F, G and H. There was ongoing maintenance at the time, however, no specific cause for the loss has been identified. The licensee confirmed that they have redundant indication available to monitor plant parameters. The unit is currently stable and operating at 100% power. The licensee informed state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Based on testing, troubleshooting, and restoration of power to the Main Control Board Annunciators, Ginna Station exited the Unusual Event at 0435 hours on 2/6/09. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified RDO (Gray), NRR EO (Hiland), IRD MOC (Grant), DHS (Kettles), and FEMA(LaForty). | ||
| ENS 44446 | 28 August 2008 17:48:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration | Unusual Event Declared Due to Loss of Communications with Offsite Agencies | At 1348 EST the licensee declared an Unusual Event and entered EAL 7.3.2 due to the loss of the ability to communicate with offsite organizations. The loss of communications was due to a maintenance worker opening the wrong breaker. This caused the loss of all land based phone lines in the control room, the satellite phones and ERDS. The power was restored and the EAL was exited at 1414. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * UPDATE FROM DAN DEAN TO PETE SNYDER AT 1930 ON 8/28/08 * * * Ginna Station is updating the Unusual Event classification and declaration made at 1348 hours on August 28th, 2008. Information received following termination of the event at 1414 hours, shows that two telephones were available in the Control Room during the entire event. At the time of the classification, the Shift Manager did not have this information. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 44320 | 10 May 2008 01:32:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | Invalid Auxiliary Feedwater System Actuation | This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). On May 9, 2008, while in a refueling outage, an invalid actuation of the 'A' Auxiliary Feedwater train occurred while performing the Turbine Trip and Auxiliary Governor Solenoids Operability Check. The cause of the event was a failure of the 'A' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (MDAFWP) bypass control relay, 63XT3-TDA. The relay failed to operate as designed under the system conditions and configuration specified by the procedure, resulting in an actuation signal. No actual plant condition existed which required an Auxiliary Feedwater actuation. The event resulted in the complete actuation of the 'A' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater train. All equipment functioned as designed for the existing plant configuration. Relay 63XT3-TDA was replaced and retested per the appropriate R. E. Ginna work control processes. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspection. | Auxiliary Feedwater | |
| ENS 44108 | 31 March 2008 12:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Minor Gas Spill | At or about 0800 on 3/31/08 it was reported that a petroleum sheen was observed in the parking lot headed for the creek. Upon investigation from the responding spill team and Maintenance, the source of the sheen was found to be coming from an employee's vehicle. It was a very minor drip of petroleum (less than 1/2 cup) that was pushed by the rain to the soil and storm catch basin. A boom was put in place to avoid the sheen from entering the creek. The parking lot and soil were cleaned and a catch device was placed under the vehicle. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) - Avon Spill Unit- was notified and assigned spill number 0751599 to the event. No further action is required. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 44025 | 1 March 2008 18:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Steam Leak Affecting Asbestos Lagging | An emergency asbestos project notification was made to NYS (New York State) Department of Labor in accordance with NYS Code Rule 56. The amount of damaged insulation has been identified as a minor project. The emergency asbestos project is a result of a Moisture Separator Reheater 1A level control system steam leak, which occurred at 0535 3/1/08. No visible damage to permanent structures or equipment, beyond the steam leak, is evident. A cap blew off a level transmitter which wetted and dislodged the surrounding asbestos insulation which subsequently fell to the floor below. The steam leak has been isolated. There were no injuries or adverse impacts on plant operations. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 43944 | 30 January 2008 17:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration | Unusual Event Declared Due to Loss of Offsite Notification Capabilities | At 1230 hrs. EST, the licensee discovered that offsite notification capabilities were lost. Upon discovery, they declared a Notification Of Unusual Event (NOUE) under EAL 7.3.2. At the time of discovery, the licensee was in their adverse weather procedure due to winds exceeding 55 mph on site. The high winds caused a loss of electrical power to non-vital power block facilities, including the site PBX (Private Branch Exchange). The backup diesel generator for PBX power initially failed to start but was manually started at 1300 hrs. and PBX functions were restored. No other vital equipment was adversely affected by the loss of non-vital power. The licensee will remain in the NOUE until normal power is restored to the power block. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 2015 EST on 1/30/08 based on restoration of normal offsite power to the PBX. In addition, the backup diesel power supply to the PBX has been verified to be functional and available. The licensee has also stationed a spare backup diesel if needed. All phone lines have been tested and confirmed to be back in service with the exception to the RECS line (dedicated line to State and County Officials). Backup commercial lines to the State and County Officials are available. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Perry), FEMA and DHS notified. | ||
| ENS 43781 | 14 November 2007 17:20:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification of Chemical Spill Onsite | During Construction Activities for a new Security Training facility, an earth mover overturned resulting in a spill of diesel fuel, hydraulic fluid, and engine coolant. The magnitude of the spill is not positively known at this time, but is believed to be less than 50 gallons. The event occurred outside the Protected Area. No personnel were injured during the event. The New York State Department of Environment Conservation (NY DEC) has been notified per plant procedures (Avon Office DEC Spill #75111)." At the time of this report, the earth mover was still overturned and the licensee is taking actions to resolve. No media interest is anticipated as a result of this incident. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |