Regulatory Guide 3.24
| ML13038A434 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/31/1974 |
| From: | US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| RG-3.024 | |
| Download: ML13038A434 (13) | |
December 1974 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
REGULATORY
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS
GU IDE
.REGULATORY GUIDE 3.24 GUIDANCE ON THE LICENSE APPLICATION, SITING, DESIGN, AND
PLANT PROTECTION FOR AN INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL
STORAGE INSTALLATION
A. INTRODUCTION
applicable as a guide for the preparation of an environ- mental report for an ISFSI. Subjects that are pertinent An "independent spent fuel storage installation" only to nuclear power plants are obviously not (ISFSI) is a self-contained installation for storing spent applicable, however, and subjects that are important to fuel. It has its own support services and operates an ISFSI, such as spent fuel transportation, should be independently of any other facility; i.e., it is not a part emphasized.
of either a nuclear power plant or a fuel reprocessing This guide discusses the license application, site plant. Such an installation is visualized as being capable evaluation, design, and plant protection of an ISFSI. It of storing 1000 tons or more of spent light-water reactor describes the measures acceptable to the Regulatory fuel. staff for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 70. In Licensed spent fuel storage installations historically addition, it identifies the information needed by the have been integral parts of either fuel reprocessing plants staff in its evaluation of an ISFSI application.
or nuclear power plants. Such plants have been licensed under 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70 in addition to 10
B. DISCUSSION
CFR Part 50.
An. ISFSI, independent and separate from either a 1. General Considerations nuclear power plant or a fuel reprocessing plant, would be licensed under Parts 30, 40, and 70. An applicant for An ISFSI could be substantially larger than. any a license for an ISFSI meeting the requirements for a existing spent fuel storage installation associated with Part 70 license would automatically satisfy the require- either a nuclear power plant or a fuel reprocessing plant.
ments for a Part 30 and 40 license. Therefore, a license The ISFSl could have an inventory of long-lived fission application for an ISFSI would be reviewed under the products and fissile materials greater than that in any requirements of 10 CFR Part 70. existing nuclear reactor or presently projected fuel
"Licensing and Regulatory Policy and Procedures for reprocdssing plant.
Environmental Protection," 10 CFR Part 51, sets forth An ISFSI will function solely in a protective the Atomic Energy Commission's policy and procedures custodial capacity, providing stable storage conditions for preparing and processing environmental impact pending some future disposition of the spent fuel. The statements and related documents pursuant to Section fuel assemblies and their contents would not be changed
102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of by the activities conducted at an ISFSI.
1969 (83 Stat. 852). Certain limitations on the Com- While the spent fuel is in passive storage. decay heat mission's authority and responsibility pursuant to the and the modest pressure within the fuel tubes are the NEPA are imposed by the Federal Water Pollution only driving forces for dispersing the relatively large Control Act amendments of 1972 (86 Stat. 816). These inventory of radionuclides contained in 1000 tons or limitations are addressed in an Interim Policy Statement more of spent fuel.
published in the Federal Register on January 29, 1973 The stored fuel elements should be protected from
(38 FR 2679). incidents or accidents resulting in massive ruptures of Regulatory Guide 4.2, "Preparation of Environ- fuel elements, and the pool water level should be mental Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," is generally maintained. Leakers should have special handling, USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES Copies of published guides may be obtained by request indicating the divisions desired to the US. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545, Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public Attenion Director of Regulatory Standards. Comments and suggestions for methods acceptable to thp AEC Regulatory staff of implementing specific parts of mtprovementts in these guides are encouraged and should tbesent to the Secretary the Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques .*ed by the staff in of the Commission. US. Atomic Energy Commission. Washington, D.C. 20545, evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents. or to provide guidance to Attention Docketing and Service Section.
applicants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliance with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:
the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the isuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission. I. Power Reactors
6. Products
2. Research and Test Reactors
7. Transportationn
3. Fuels and Materials Facilities 8. Occupational Health Published guides will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate 4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust Review comments and to reflect new information or experience. 5. Materials and Plant Protection 1
0. General
including encapsulation. to provide storage conditions contained in the 1000 tons or more of spent fuel equivalent to those for undamaged fuel elements. expected to be stored in the installation. The possibility It is assumed that the storage pools will be built *of an uncontrolled release of radionuclides, driven -by below grade. The large heat capacity of the pools should the energy available as decay heat and gases under allow adequate time to take corrective action in case of :pressure within the fuel cladding, should be considered an emergency. Even in the event of an earthquake or in the design of structures, systems, and components and other extreme natural phenomenon, sufficient cooling in plant siting. Together, these criteria should be the can be provided by emergency action in time to protect bases for the final engineering design and can only be the health and safety of the public. suitably developed from a relatively complete knowledge Storage pool water becomes contaminated with radio- of the physical characteristics of the candidate sites.
nuclides from defective fuel elements and with The siting considerations for an ISFSI should include activation products on the fuel surfaces. This material the structural engineering plant siting factors, the should be confined and treated for disposal. environmental effects of construction, the potential Accident analyses should be based on the release of effects of plant effluents from normal operations, and the volatile fission products contained in the stored fuel the potential effects from off-standard conditions. Ad- under defined accident conditions. ditionally, the potential for effects on the plan! and fuel in storage that might be attributable to site character-
2. License Application istics or the environment should be reflected in the design of plant structures and equipment.
Because of the substantial quantity of contained In general, safe storage of irradiated fuel is dependent radioactivity and the cooling requirements involved in an on maintaining the integrity of the fuel cladding as the ISFSI, the review and evaluation of the engineered primary barrier to the release of radioactive materials.
design and detailed safety analysis for the installation Fuel cladding is designed to withstand a far more severe must be conducted prior to licensing. For this reason, a environment in a reactor than in a storage installation.
license application for an ISFSI should include a safety Therefore, under the low temperature conditions of analysis report similar in scope and detail to the static storage, the cladding provides an effective barrier pertinent parts of a safety analysis report for a fuel to the escape of fission products and fissile materials reprocessing plant. into the storage facility. The installation should be The licensing of an ISFSI would be a major Federal designed to ensure that the integrity of cladding is not action within the meaning of the National Environ- lost because of either mechanical damage or the effects mental Policy Act of 1969. Therefore an applicant of excessive temperature.
should prepare an Environmental Report that can serve Historical information of public record concerning as the technical basis for an evaluation by the Commis- the regional and local meteorology, geology-seismology, sion of the potential environmental impact of the and hydrology should be supplemented by on-site installation. analyses *to provide a basis for judgment specific to the Detailed engineering plans should be filed with the candidate site. From these analyses the extremes of license application, and -its supporting environmental wind, snow, and ice loadings; the precipitation; the report at least nine months before the start of con- probable maximum flood; the design earthquake; the struction activities. surficial and foundation geological structures; the A site evaluation should be provided to ensure that topography; and any potential for landslides, liquefac- the natural characteristics of the site are sufficiently well tion, or subsidence should be determined.
known to provide the bases for the engineering design of the installation. 4. Design Considerations The applicant's safety analysis, environmental report, and security plan are fundamental. to developing the The design considerations of an ISFSI are somewhat basis for design of the installation. The license comparable to those for smaller facilities of the same application should take into account all proposed type at a reprocessing plant. However, particular normal operations, any credible off-standard conditions, consideration may be needed for the ISFSI because of and the existing potential for interaction between the its size, existence as an individual entity without the installation and the site due to natural phenomena. backup of an associated facility, and loading of 1000
When a fuel storage pool is part of a reprocessing tons or more of spent fuel with a potential inventory of
.plant or a nuclear power plant,. fuel storage pool relatively long lived fission products in excess of 109 operators are licensed under the provisions of 10 CFR curies and with cooling requirements in excess of 107 Part 55. ISFSI operators should have a comparable level Btu/hr.
of training. The safe storage of irradiated fuel depends on maintaining the integrity of the fuel cladding as the
3. Site Selection primary barrier to the release of radioactive materials.
The basic design consideration is the protection of the Site selection criteria should be based on the safe- fuel cladding, not the-protection of the pool structures.
keeping of the relatively large inventory of radionuclides The ISFSI should be designed to ensure that the
3.24-2
integrity of the cladding is not lost through mechanical contained volatile radionuclides would escape. In disruption or excessive temperature. addition, cask unloading, decontamination, and other An ISFSI would be licensed under the provisions of routine operations may result in airborne radioactive
10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70. Some provisions similar to materials.
those for plutonium processing plants would be appro- The ventilation system should be designed to oriate for these installations. Two of these that are of protect the operators and to keep the activity levels in particular importance are: (1) confinement components, the personnel occupancy areas (and radioactive materials systems, and structures important to safety should be in gaseous effluents) as low as practicable and within the designed and constructed to withstand natural phenom- limits of 10 CFR Par',20.
ena and (2) quality assurance criteria such as those in Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 should be applied to d. Liquid Effluents safety-related structures, systems, and components.
Radioactive liquid effluents should not be a. Pool Integrity discharged to the natural area drainage system. If this is not feasible, the treatment system for liquid effluents The design earthquake is based on the assumption discharged to unrestricted areas should ensure that the that the storage pools will be built below grade and radioactivity in such effluents is as low as practicable designed with a high degree of resistance to ground and within the limits, of 10 CFR Part 20.
motion. Furthermore, it is assumed that the storage pool or pools will be built either in impervious soils or with a e. Waste Treatment secondarywater containment envelope. The leak rate of such a containment envelope should be low enough that, Provisions should be made to render contaminated in the event of a gross pool leak, makeup water could be wastes into a form suitable for land burial or shipment supplied to the pool at a rate sufficient to keep the to the planned Federal repository.
stored fuel adequately covered. During the design for ultimate decommissioning of the installation, considera- f. Accident Design Considerations tion should. be given to disposing of potentially contaminated soil or other fill materials between the An ISFSI should be designed to preclude the pool exterior walls and the secondary pool water following as credible accidents:
containment envelope. (1) Criticality Large. spent fuel storage pools should be built as a (2) Exposure of stored fuel through loss of series..of separable modular units or with provisions for shielding water isolating sections of the pool when necessary. A (3) Dropping of heavy loads on fuel maximum capacity of about 500 tons of spent fuel per (4) Multiple massive ruptures of fuel elements by pool module or section appears desirabl
e. missiles
(5) Complete loss of cooling water b. Heat Dissipation g. Storage Racks *
A 5000-ton ISFSI would be ex ected to have a cooling demand in the order of 5 x 10 Btu/hr or more. Storage racks should be designed with adequate No difficulty is anticipated in dissipating this quantity of spacing to meet criticality requirements and be struc- heat by conventional means. If evaporative coolers are turally compatible with seismic and missile protection used, a reliable water supply shouldbe available for pool design criteria.
makeup water and cooling tower blowdown. Regulatory Guide -1.27, "Ultimate Heat-Sink for Nuclear Power 5. Physical Protection Plants," gives guidance on the degree of reliability required. An ISFSI should be protected from acts of industrial Certain designs of the installation and local site sabotage that could directly or indirectly endanger the conditions may result in a need for the cooling system to public health and safety by releasing radiation (airborne be serviced by the emergency power supply system of radioactive particulates rather than gaseous fission the installation. products). This protection should be achieved by estab- lishing and maintaining a physical protection system as c. Ventilation required by 10 CFR Part 73.
Further, interfacing the security organization and its A fraction of the fuel assemblies received for functions with the plant should be considered. Iden- storage at an ISFSI will presumably be "leakers," and tifying vital equipment, as defined in 10 CFR §73.2(i),
some fuel assemblies may develop leaks later while in and integrating physical protection considerations into long-term storage. Such leakers should be encapsulated the layout and design of the installation as early as in a secondary container reasonably promptly. However, possible should help preclude requirements for sub- until they are encapsulated, some fraction of the sequent modification of the installation.
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Site location is important with respect to the 71 - Packaging of Radioactive Material for availability of timely and significant assistance from Transport and Transportation of Radioactive Material local law enforcement authorities (LLEAs) in the event Under Certain Conditions of attempted industrial sabotage. A progressively larger 73 - Physical Protection of Plants and Materials
- onsite guard force will be needed as the distance of the nearest significant LLEA increases. In particular, The applicant should provide:
licensees who possess or use SNM are required by 10 CFR Part 73 to take certain actions to protect the a. An emergency plan.. consistent with 10 CFR
installation against industrial sabotage. The particular §70.24(a)(2), such as Annex B which is currently actions applicable to a spent fuel storage installation are routinely incorporated in Part 70 licenses. A copy of prescribed in §73.50, which requires: Annex B is attached as Appendix A to this guide.
b. A quality assurance program consistent with 10
a. A physical security organization including a CFR.Part 50, Appendix B. A description of the program supervisor, qualified armed guards, and written security and current status .of project design and procurement procedures. activities should be included in the license application. A
b. Physical barriers, including multiple barriers and copy of the applicant's Quality Assurance Manual monitored intervening clear areas and isolation zones. covering design and procurement should be submitted to c. Detection and alarm systems, with annunciators in the appropriate Regulatory Operations Regional Office two continuously manned central alarm stations .and 30 days before the license application.
self-checking and tamper-indicating capability. c. Design criteria consistent ;with those in the d. Access controls to limit entrance of personnel, proposed 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix P, "General Design vehicles, and packages into protected and vital areas, Criteria for FuelReprocessing Plants."
including use of metal and explosives detectors, random *d. Design criteria consistent with those in Sections I
searches, badging system, escorts, and appropriate keys, and 11. of the proposed 10.CFR Part 50, Appendix Q,
locks, andcombinations. "Design Criteria for the Protection of Fuel Reprocessing e. Communication systems, including continuous Plants and the Licensed Material Therein."*
communication between each guard and the central e.. A two-part security plan consistent with 10 CFR
alarm station, capability to request assistance from the §73.50.
LLEA, two-way radio voice communication, con- f. Information . sufficient to demonstrate the ventional telephone service, and independent power financial qualifications of the. applicant to carry out the source. activities for which the license is sought.
f. Liaison with local law enforcement autfiorities g. Financial information pertinent to the proposed- capable of providing assistance to the licensee's security decommissioning plan.
organization in the event of a security threat. h. .A site evaluation based on the factors, to the g. Testing and maintenance of security equipment. extent applicable to an ISFSI, identified in § 100.10(b),
(c), and (d). of 10 CFR Part 100. This evaluation should Section 73.40 requires submission of a security plan to contain an analysis, and evaluation of the major the Commission for approval. Such security plans consist structures, systems, and components of the installation of two parts. Part I should discuss vital equipment, vital that bear significantly on the acceptability of the site for areas, and isolation zones. It should also demonstrate its intended use.
how the applicant plans to comply with the require- i. A summary description and discussion of the ments of 10 CFR Part 73 cited above. Part II should list installation, with special, attention to design and tests, inspections, and other means to be used to operating characteristics, unusual or novel design demonstrate compliance with such requirements.. features, and principal safety considerations.
j. The principal, design features for the installation,
C. REGULATORY POSITION
including:
1. License Application (1) The principal design criteria for the instal.
lation. (See proposed Appendix P to 10 CFR Part 50 for The applicable regulatory requirements are in the guidance.*)
following parts of 10 CFR: (2) The design bases and the relation of the design
19 - Notices, Instructions and Reports to Workers; bases to the principal design criteria.
Inspections (3) Information relative to materials of con-
20 - Standards for Protection Against Radiation struction, general arrangement, and approximate
30 - Rules of General Applicability to Licensing of dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance Byproduct Material that the final design will conform to the design bases
40 - Licensing of Source Material .with an adequate margin for safety.
51 - Licensing and Regulatory Policy and Proce- dures for Environmental Protection
70 - Special Nuclear Material *39 FR 26293, July. 18, 1974.
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- . -~a ilysi(ifid valualion W the ?design ýand . 2. iteiSelection:... . ... .
peffhtm'ce
... f*Ltctues..
.. systems, and ýcomponeMts;.ofib th iisait ný e i-jsmijpperiuing -servides-v with"-. .. e-i"xal,I 0 . 6'l;. ,
-GI:.i tL. i,.
the objective of assessing the risk to the publich)healthib
- n:<site;,.sould r*,im.et!sv the, nfollowi~g, *-general.*
and safety resulting from the operation of the instal- conitd i rio s jir',, 1: - ,:* .,*... .- -.
lation and includiif tlg rm iflnfP.. ,(f-)io ofinatiai
(1) The margins of safety during normal and (1) ,:Twrershould!he. m o stoApes, close enough to the abiio a.'Lcqnditfins- ntiipated, durgiihe'life of the prnoposedyi insiallation:-.to;ube ,a;:landslide hazard. Alter- natively., ;the !lopes!,shouldj,;be;,engineexedIt
o. remain
('2) rbtý,adequacy ",.of;itructures, ;systermsT-and,
('2' stable.,with :a conservative !factor of safety iunder both components provided for the mitigation:of.the:,con- static: and dynamic conditions.
sequences of accidents, including natural phenomena (2) Capable, faults* should-be sufficiently -remote even ts. 1; .. ..; "' i.- : to preventr surface movements on the -main strand or any splay in the site area.
1. An identification of the variables, conditions, or (3) Foundation material should be unweathered other items that are determined. to be the probable bedrock or other material with a low liquefaction subjects of license conditions for the installation. potential.
m. An identification of any items requiring research (4) There should be no potential for differential or development to confirm the adequacy of their design; subsidence such as that associated with karst topo- an identification and description of the research or graphy, solution cavities, differential compaction, or development program that will be conducted to resolve man's activities (such as fluid withdrawal from the any safety questions associated with the planned subsurface and . extraction of minerals). Karst topo- installation and its operation; and a schedule of the graphy need not necessarily eliminate a site from required programs showing that such safety questions consideration if the applicant can show that the will be resolved before completion of construction of potential. for sudden collapse can be eliminated by the facility. remedial work.
.n. The technical qualifications of the applicant to engage in the proposed activities and his personnel b. Geology training program.
o. A description of the instrumentation and control Information should be provided to show that site systems and of the auxiliary and emergency systems. conditions meet the above criteria. This information can p. A description of radioactive waste handling, be obtained from literature reviews and on-site field treatment, and disposal systems. investigations such as.the following:
q. A description of the means for controlling and (1) A visual inspection of the site and study of limiting radioactive effluents and radiation exposures to rainfall, geologic structure, and topography 'can provide plant personnel. to levels that are as low as practicable information to show that there is no landslide hazard to and well within the limits set forth in 10 CFR Part 20. the fuel storage installation. Detailed investigations may r. An estimate of the quantities of each of the be required to determine stability under dynamic (earth- principal radionuclides expected to be released in quake) loading conditions.
gaseous and liquid effluents to unrestricted areas during (2) The absence of capable faults and the stability normal operations. of the foundation material can be determined by s. An identification of a spectrum of design basis reviewing literature and confirming geotechnical site incidents (DBIs) due to industrial sabotage, the investigations. The site investigations may vary from possibility of which reasonably exists although the programs involving a simple visual examination for a site likelihood may be small. The plant design and security with completely exposed bedrock foundation material system should be evaluated in terms of adequacy to to programs that require trenching and stripping for sites preclude or to minimize the danger to the public that with bedrock covered by a thin (up to 15 ft) layer of may ensue in the event of a design basis incident. A unconsolidated material. Sites with deep soil will require
"design basis incident" in this case is a postulated more detailed programs, including but not limited to credible incident and the resulting conditions for which trenching, stripping, drilling, hydrologic testing, security related equipment meets its functional ob- laboratory and field testing of soil properties, and jectives. Examples of security related incidents include a geophysical surveys.
credible armed intrusion, breach of a protective barrier. Onsite investigations may reveal fractures. If or malfunction of security equipment. so, conclusive evidence should be presented to demon- t. A description of systems used to clean up and strate that the fractures have not been displaced or are make up pool water, with particular emphasis on the not capable faults.
capacity of these systems to handle the volumes involved (3) The absence of a potential for sudden sub- and both soluble and insoluble radionuclides. sidence can be determined from the literature review and u. A description of plans for preoperational testing of the installation. *See 10 CFR 100 Appendix A for a definition of capable faults.
3.24-5
on-site investigations. Investigations will reveal whether the material underlying the epicentral location and the o hghe .- s .I
or not the site is underlain by limestoneý,)4blbimi,." charactedstibs if *h i.r* gi*
gypsum, or other soluble material that can result in karst topography. If such material is known to iindmlie the site, then onsite examinations can be expected to reveal th"196tigtik[l 4*.0s~d dd sttl*Me n * *.AiXssiblýý!,.indiat ors of such a potential would be the presence of sink,'lhlbE4;:- (3) Definition:-of lgiwogq Al f B!
soin *-tf,* lnraxul&ie.
-T1 iA .iI1*h sl~I~s4t:ia +n1imn*io~oil+/-liinducitig+*e~qa!
a ?f$eW of thee*'g-flhefddral~ndlStat ageiie*-: quake event that has a reasonably high proba*.y of re~ `sis ri"ofrtMihoring.611i¶nd miring activities, or ocuurreazeýr based ,on studies! -of .hiWrxj.sei city: and other activities such as waste, itlsposalror-ý'rawval.of. stUttumaligeology.,...;.. .
flffidsg -fo*nm the,ýibsu**fabe.,-6 n be eipewtad. rto provide the riirifoi mationfneeided ,,to": datermine .,,hethr.,such (4) Determination of the Design Earthquake activities have affected the site to the-extent -that they haveipioduced apotýentiai for sudden subsidence. Should In evaluating historic seismicity and regional such a potential be indicated, a more detailed investiga- structural geology, the historic earthquakes identified tion should be performed. from the above investigations should be associated with tectonic structures to the extent practical.
c. Seismology - Design Earthquake If historic earthquake. data indicate a high incidence of earthquakes along only a particular portion
(1) General Seismic History of a tectonic structure, the probability of similar earthquakes in the future should be assumed uniformly A full review of the seismic history of the throughout the same segment of the tectonic structure.
region in which the site is to be located should be made (Where geologic evidence indicates that the structure is a to identify earthquakes that have taken place in historic major, continuous, through-going structure with time and that could affect the selection of a Design significant displacement, a more conservative assumption Earthquake. All earthquakes within the same tectonic may be appropriate.) These earthquakes should be used province as the site (or adjacent tectonic province to the in determining the maximum vibratory motion at the site if near a border) should be examined for location, site that could be caused by an earthquake related to the size, reliability. of data, and effect on the site. Tectonic tectonic structure.
maps should be used to define the tectonic province(s) Correlation of tectonic structure and historic of significance to the site. seismicity may not be possible because (a) there is insufficient data or (b) seismicity appears uniform over a
(2) Specific Seismic History network of tectonic. structures ,or cannot be correlated with specific structures. If so, the. seismicity should be Historic earthquakes that may have affected identified with the tectonic province in which it is the site itself should also be considered. All those that reported.
resulted in or are projected to have had an intensity of IV or greater at the plant site should be included in the (5) Selection of a Design Earthquake consideration. (Intensity IV earthquakes can be determined by a review of the U. S. Coast & Geodetic In view of the limited consequences of seismic Survey, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric events in excess of those used as the basis for.seismic Administration, and U. S. Geological Survey literature.) design, it appears appropriate that the design earthquake All earthquakes with an epicentral intensity of developed from the above information -should be such as V or greater should be shown in a table. This table to have a predicted recurrence interval of about once in should include the following estimated or measured a thousand years.
data:
(a) Earthquake magnitude or highest inten- sity; d. Meteorology (b) Location of the epicenter or region of highest intensity; While an elaborate continuing program of (c) For earthquakes with intensities of VII or monitoring and measuring on-site meteorological greater at the site, an estimate of the resulting intensity phenomena comparable to that for a fuel reprocessing or acceleration and duration of ground shaking at the plant should not be necessary, the consequences of the site. release. of airborne radioactivity under both normal and An appropriate time span should be considered for accident conditions should be determined by the various intensity levels if a statistical analysis is applied. applicant. Regulatory Guide 1.23, "On-Site Meteoro- It should be recognized that there may be logical Programs," provides guidance for the basic appreciable differences between the characteristics of elements~of a suitable-program.
3.24-6
The meteorology program should be commen- Appropriate site selection can limit the potential surate with the postulated modes (release height and for flooding. A high ground site above historical flood duration) of releases of airborne radionuclides under plains is more suitable than a site at lower elevation. The normal and accident conditions, as determined by the applicant should identify a design basis flood for the applicant and confirmed by the staff. Guidance is given purpose of evaluating the safety of the selected site; the in Regulatory Guide 1.23 (Safety Guide 23), "Onsite design of structures, equipment, and components Meteorological Programs." essential to the protection of the public health and Presentation of long-term historical records of the safety; and the possible consequences of a flood equal to extremes of temperature, precipitation, wind, snow, and the Probable Maximum Flood or of floods caused by ice, and their resultant loading parameters, should be means of comparable risk other than precipitation. The included to aid in evaluating the design bases. Addi- Probable Maximum Flood or the controlling flood tionally, site-safety considerations require that the joint conditions characteristic of the region and site should be frequency distribution of wind direction, velocity, ana considered in evaluating site safety.
stability be sufficiently well known to demonstrate with At iocations near large surface bodies of water, the confidence the probable dispersion of airborne effluents. occurrence of tsunami and seiches should be considered.
Representative (preferably onsite) data and conservative The historical basis for assumptions should be atmospheric diffusion models such as those presented in documented, along with the estimated consequences of Regulatory Guide 1.3, "Assumptions Used for Eval- such phenomena. General information requirements on uating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss this subject are discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.59, of Coolant Accident for Boiling Water Reactors," may "Design Basis Flood for Nuclear Power Plants."
be used to estimate the dispersion of airborne effluents. Cooling water discharges such as those caused by The occurrence of extreme weather phenomena cooling tower blowdown to surface waters are regulated such as hurricanes, tornados, water spouts, and violent under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act thunderstorm activity should be considered as part of Amendments of 1972 (86 Stat. 816). The applicant the site safety analysis to provide the essential technical should determine what present and proposed regulations basis for site selection and installation design. The are applicable to the. selected site. Section 401(a)( ) of tornado history in the area should be evaluated and the Act requires, in part, that any applicant for a license applied to the analysis of safety as a potential source of for an installation such as an ISFSI provide the AEC
missiles. Regulatory Guide 1.76, "Design Basis Tornado with certification from the State that any discharge will for Nuclear Power Plants," is applicable to an ISFSI. comply with applicable effluent limitations and other Also applicable is WASH 1300, "Technical Basis for water pollution control requirements. In the absence of Interim Regional Tornado Criteria." The data applicable such certification, no license can be issued by the AEC
to the. selected site in these documents should be used in unless the State fails or refuses to act within a reasonable developing the missile protection design bases. period of time, The consequences of accidents due to extreme The applicant should make conservative calcula- weather conditions including missiles should be eval- tions of the dispersion and dilution capabilities and uated based on (1) a postulated release of a justifiable potential contamination pathways of the groundwater fraction of the stored available inventory of volatile environment of the proposed installation under radionuclides in the spent fuels that have experienced the operating and accident conditions. Applications for a minimum decay time since reactor shutdown for which license for an ISFSI at sites that are in areas with a the ISFSI is designed and (2) expected adverse atmo- complex groundwater hydrology should include spheric diffusion conditions. The techniques in Regu- assessment of potential impacts on the groundwater latory Guide 1.25 (Safety Guide 25), "Assumptions system. Similar assessments should be made for sites Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Conse- located over major aquifers that are used for domestic or quences of a Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel industrial water supplies or for irrigation water.
Handling and Storage Facility for Boiling and Pres- surized Water Reactors," are applicable to this eval- f. Water Supply uation.
Water from surface or groundwater sources should e. Hydrology be suitable, both in quality and quantity available, for use by the ISFSI on a uninterruptible basis. The need to The overriding considerations from the standpoint maintain a depth of high quality shielding/coolant water of hydrology are the potential interactions of the ISFSI conditioned to control corrosion, algae growth, and scale and the natural water bodies, surface, and ground deposition is fundamental to the operational safety of an associated with the site, Direct communication between ISFSI. The availability of highly dependable supplies of the fuel storage environment and surface or ground high quality water is therefore a prinrw) consideration waters should be precluded. Such communication can for site selection.
generally be presented through controlled circulation of Guidance on methods for ensuring reliability of coolant water and retention, cleanup, and controlled the water supplies for normal and emergency use is release of potentially contaminated waste waters. available in Regulatory Guide 1.27, "Ultimate Heat Sink
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for Nuclear Power Plants," and Section 2.4 of Regula- Reliable and frequently tested pool water tory. Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of monitoring equipment should be provided to provide Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants." The alarm both locally and in a continuously manned engineering design description should delineate the location if the water level in the fuel storage pool falls bounds of the water supply systems and provide details below a predetermined level or if there is a high local concerning volume, transfer capability, alternative radiation level. The high radiation level instrumentation sources, pumping capability, redundant equipment and should automatically actuate the pool water filtration components, operating procedures, and maintenance system.
plans. Similarly, reliable and frequently tested air Water use and the resulting commitment of natural monitoring equipment should be provided to alarm both resources should be addressed in the applicant's locally and in a continuously manned location if the environmental report. activity level in air from the storage pool areas exceeds preset limits or if high radiation levels are detected. An g. Site Evaluation Considerations automatic interlock with the high radiation level instrumentation should actuate the ventilation confine-
(1) Design Features ment system.
Normal operations of an ISFSI should not (2) Off-Standard Conditions result in the release to the unrestricted area of contami- nated liquid effluents containing radioactive materials in The full range of conditions outside the concentrations exceeding the ALAP design objectives for normal operating modes should be considered off- light-water-cooled nuclear power plants.* standard conditions. For the purpose of this guidance, The structure enclosing the fuel storage pool off-standard conditions are considered to be bounded by should have an appropriate ventilation and filtration normal operations on the one hand and design basis system to limit the release of gaseous and entrained accidents on the other.
particulate radioactive mateiials under normal operating conditions to quantities that will not exceed the ALAP (a) Process Deviations design objectives for light-water-cooled nuclear power The applicant should provide a compre- plants.* hensive safety analysis that takes into account the full The heating, ventilating, and air conditioning range of tasks and the conditions to be preserved for safe system should provide for controlled leakage of air from operation. Engineering estimates of the potential hazards the fuel storage pool and the cask handling areas under and consequences that may be associated with operating all normal and off-standard operating conditions. The outside the bounds of normal conditions should be structure enclosing these areas need not be designed to included. The analysis should determine the safe withstand extremely high wind loadings, but leakage operating range of critical unit operations, identify should be suitably controlled under all conditions of fuel potentially controllable off-standard conditions or transfer and storage. The design of the ventilation and design features, and establish actions appropriate for filtration system should be based on experience in mitigating the consequences of off-standard conditions.
similar facilities and on the assumption that the cladding on a fraction of the stored fuel might be breached as a (b) Loss of Power result of an accident. The inventory of radioactive Loss of power is a site-safety-related off- materials available for leakage from the building should standard condition of potentially serious consequences.
be based on the average fuel characteristics used for the Circulation and cooling requirements will probably design basis fuel. require continuous pumping capability. Ancillary The use of a closed-circuit shielding/coolant systems for safety and security should provide water system is assumed. This is a prudent means of continuous instrument, lighting, alarm, and ventilation limiting the risk of releasing radioactive material to the control power. Availability of reliable primary power to unrestricted area. Drains, permanently connected essential systems is a basic consideration for site systems, and other features that by maloperation or selection. Redundant §ystems for alternative power failure could cause loss of coolant that would uncover sources or auxiliary systems such as diesel generator fuel should not be installed or included in the design. installations can support the primary power source.
Systems designed for maintaining water quality and quantity should be designed so that any maloperation or failure in those systems from any cause will not cause the fuel to be uncovered.
(3) Natural Phenomena The site-safety analysis provides a technical basis for design criteria considerations of plant-site i:,
- WASH 1258, Volumes 1 and 2. "Numerical Guides for Design interactions. The potential actions bctween the natural Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet the environment and man-made structures are factors in site Criterion 'As Low as Practicable' for Radioactive Material in selection that should influence engineering judgments in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plant Effluents." choosing among design alternatives.
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.(a) Meteorology (1) Leaking fuel assemblies, Site-safety considerations require that (2) Fire, meteorological parameters such as wind direction, (3) Loss of coolant or cooling capability, velocity, atmospheric stability, and the joint frequency (4) Dropped fuel assembly shipping cask during of occurrence be known well enough to demonstrate cask handling operations.
that the .joint dispersion of gaseous and particulate (5) Missile penetration of the storage building effluents will be predictable, within the bounds of with fuel damaged in storage, conservative models conventionally used for analyzing (6) Natural phenomena, the radiological consequences of accidental releases of (7) Very low probability accidents (such as air- radioactive materials. craft crashes).
The applicant should perform detailed engineering (b) Hydrology analyses of such accidents and their calculated potential If pool water leaks to the ground, effects in terms of radiation dose commitment to adequate time should be available to sink survey wells individuals and populations within, the region that might for any monitoring that might be considered necessary be affected. Such analyses will provide the -technical after the leak occurs and the. region to be monitored is basis for judging the suitability of the selected site and defined. In addition, strategically located inspection the proposed plant design.
wells should be sunk at the time of construction to check for subsurface water movement and possible outleakage. 3. Design Considerations The ANSI draft standard N305, Revision 7, dated'
November 8, 1974,* "Design Objectives for Highly h. Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone, Population Radioactive Solid Material Handling and Storage Center Distance Facilities in a Reprocessing Plant," is applicable to an ISFSI with the following exceptions and clarifications:
The applicant should determine the exclusion area, "Section 2, Glossary of Terms":
low population zone, and population. center distance The terms "Operating Basis Earthquake" (OBE) and using a method analogous to that given in § 100.11 of 10 CFR Part 100. This procedure involves an estimate of:
"Safe Shutdown Earthquake" (SSE) are not applicable to an ISFSI. Rather, the term Design Earthquake as H
.(1) The potential risk from the most severe upper defined in Section. C.2.c. of this document is applicable.
limit accident and "Section 3,. Structural Criteria":
(2) Dose rates at .various. points downwind due to "3.1.2.2 Missiles" - The missiles of interest are those the. passage of the resulting radioactive cloud (under that could rupture fuel within the pool or could damage conservative atmospheric dispersion conditions). equipment. or structures that could fall into the pool and No minimum values have been established for potentially rupture stored fuel.
the size of the exclusion area, distance to the outer In addition, the Regulatory staff considers the following boundary of the low population zone (LPZ). or popu- lation center distance. Past practice has usually been to design requirements to be applicable:
establish, the population center distance as being at a. The design should preclude cask handling cranes least 1 1/3 times the distance from the installation to passing over the fuel storage pools.
the outer boundary of. the LPZ. Typically, the. distance b. The building itself need not be designed to to, the boundary of the LPZ is about 3 miles.. withstand high winds, provided critical, equipment is The.applicant should identify industrial, military, protected. * .
or other installations in the area with which the.ISFSI c. The design basis for the ventilation system should may potentially interact. be defined. This definition should include a description of the emergency air cleanup system used to accom- modate ruptured fuel. Calculations should be based on the design basis fuel characteristics.
i. Accident Analysis d.. The heat removal system pumps, heat exchangers, and associated piping should be protected from credible The considerations of normal operations, off- accidents and have a backup power supply. However, if standard conditions, design basis accidents, and natural the applicant can show that under emergency conditions phenomena provide part of the technical basis foi the pool structure can stand the' stresses imposed, that assessing the suitability of structures, equipment, and the consequences of any loss of normal cooling components relative to candidate sites. The accident capability will not lead to excessive radiation doses, and analyses complement and supplement the other analyses by considering the possible effects of events that are *Copies of this draft standard may be obtained from the characteristically infrequent, sudden, and potentially American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 345 E. 47th St.,
serious incidents. Such events include: New York, N.Y. 10017.
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that there is an assured source of pool makeup water, consisting of the water containment structure and the cooling by boiling of the pool water is acceptable and supporting auxiliary systems used to maintain appro- the cooling system need not be protected from priate radiation shielding and cooling. Vital equipment accidents. The makeup system should be capable of in this area includes the nuclear fuel in storage, fuel withstanding any credible accident or a backup water storage racks, radiation monitoring and alarm systems system capability should be provided. If the backup for fuel cladding leakage, pool water leakage detection system is not permanently installed, the applicant should system and liquid level monitors, pool water loss show that the time required to implement the system's makeup and ,cleanup systems, decay heat removal use is less than the time required for hazardous system, ventilation and confinement system, and conditions to develop. If the pool structure cannot emergency systems for purposes such as fire protection.
withstand the stress of water boiling, the cooling system
(3) The onsite auxiliary power supply system, should be designed and built to withstand any credible regardless of its location, is considered vital.
site-related natural phenomen
a. The makeup coolant
(4) The onsite central alarm stations should be water system should be equally reliable.
designated vital areas. Vital equipment in these areas e. Onsite radioactive waste treatment facilities should includes communication equipment; primary control be provided. These facilities should be designed to and annunciation equipment for alarms; metal and render all site generated wastes into a form suitable for explosive detectors; card-key readers; closed circuit interim storage and ultimate final disposal. television; and an independent power supply system f. Provisions should be made for (1) receipt of casks (i.e.,, backup or emegency power).
under abnormal circumstances, such as loss of coolant, and (2) expected cask maintenance, repair, -and modification activities. b. Physical Protection Design Criteria g. A cask drop analysis should be made. This analysis indicates the need to provide a shock absorber in the (1) The design of an ISFSI should be based on the bottom of the cask unloading pool (CUP). physical protection criteria set forth for fuel repro- h. The storage pools should be of modular design. cessing plants in proposed Appendix Q to 10 CFR Part Each module should have a maximum capacity of about 50.*
500 tons of spent fuel. (2) The design, fabrication, erecting, and testing of structures, systems, and components important to
4. Physical Protection physical protection of the facility should be conducted in accordance with an acceptable quality assurance Some of the guidance on physical protection program, as outlined in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
provided in Regulatory Guides 5.7, 5.12, 5.20, and 5.30 "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants is applicable to an ISFSI. Regulatory Guide 5.7. and Fuel Reprocessing Plants."
"Control of Personnel Access to Protected Areas, Vital (3) The concept of isolation (e.g., automation, Areas, and Material Access Areas," is applicable for remote handling, and controlled access) should be those parts related to material access areas (i.e., sections incorporated into the design. The isolation should limit D.2, D.3, and D.5.b). Regulatory Guide 5.12, "General access to vital areas or equipment to only those Use of Locks in the Protection and Control of Facilities individuals who require access.for essential purposes or and Special Nuclear Materials," and Regulatory Guide for performance of duty.
5.20, "Training, Equipping, and Qualifying of Guards * (4) The location and arrangement of equipment in and Watchmen," are applicable in their entirety. a vital area should be evaluated with respect to the need Regulatory Guide 5.30, "Materials Protection Con- for the equipment to be contained in that location and tingency Measures for Uranium and Plutonium Fuel the capability for regular testing and inspection. Equip.
Manufacturing Plants," is generally applicable except for ment other than. process or vital equipment should not those parts regarding emergency protection measures be located in a vital area.
that affect activities appropriate only to material access (5) Equipment used to store, transfer, or protect areas. material or to protect the plant should be designed to facilitate maintenance and testing so that compliance a. Vital Areas and Vital Equipment with applicable regulations and license conditions can be verified.
Several specific areas at an ISFSI should be (6) The double barrier concept, controlled access.
designated vital areas because of their importance for monitored isolation zones, designation of vital areas, and protection against sabotage: the use of keys, locks, and combinations should be
(1) The cask unloading area should be a separate integrated into the facility layout and design.
pool connected by a canal to the main storage pool (7) Isolation zones should be monitored to system. The unloading pool should be designated a vital provide timely detection of intrusion and to permit area.
(2) The spent fuel storage area should be designated a vital area. It includes the pool system *39 FR 26293, July 18, 1974.
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subsequent guard action and notification of the local law (1) Security force equipment. organization, enforcement agencies (LLEA). responsibilities; and.procedures.
(8) Isolation zones and clear areas between (2) Integration of security provisions with the site barriers should be illuminated to at least 0.2 foot-candle. and installation layout.
(9) The design for access control of personnel, (3) A description of the physical protection packages, and vehicles through physical barriers should features of the installation.
include provisions for verifying identity and authority, (4) Security ajeas, including those protected by alarming, emergency exits, operating unmanned exits, physical barriers and isolation zones: vital areas and searching packages and individuals upon entering, and equipment. *
detecting firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices. -(5) Access monitors'and controls- for personnel,
(10) The design should preclude simultaneous vehicles, and packages; a badge system; access authoriza- handling of shipments of irradiated fuel and receipt of tion and registration; personnel escort; and the use of materials other than irradiated fuel in a single area. keys, locks, and combinations.
(11) The . facility should be designed to permit (6) Surveillance systems, including intrusion and continuous surveillance of occupied vital areas and detection alarms.
alarming of unoccupied vital areas. * (7) Central alarm and communication systems.
(12) The facility should provide backup means (8) Response capability assessment arid followup such as emergency power and redundant hardware. It for alarms and threats.
should accommodate alternative procedures to provide (9) Availability of assistance from local law continued protection in such events as power failure, enforcement agencies.
equipment malfunction, or individual guard (10) Testing and inspection of security related incapacitation. equipment and devices.
(13) Alarm systems should be designed to meet (11) Maintenance of control records.
performance and reliability. characteristics described in (12) Security audit program.
§ 73.50(d)(1).
(i4). Communications equipment for use by plant
D. IMPLEMENTATION
personnel and the LLEA should be designed with appropriate re dundancy and flexibility, as described in The purpose of this section isto provide information
§73.50(e)(1) through (4). to applicants and licensees regarding the Regulatory staff's plans for utilizing this regulatory guide.
c. Security Plan Except in those cases in whichthe applicant proposes an alternative method for complying with specified A two-part security plan should be submitted with portions of the Commission's regulations, the methods a license application for an ISFSI..As a minimum, the described herein will be used in the evaluation of license following elements should be addressed: applications docketed after January 11 1975.
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APPENDIX A
ANNEX B to 10 CFR Part 70, Licenses
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR LICENSEE'S PLANS FOR
COPING WITH RADIATION EMERGENCIES
The licensee shall develop and maintain an emergency plan and implementing procedures for coping with radiation emergencies which shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:
1. An organization for coping with radiation emergencies, in which specific authorities, responsibilities, and duties are clearly defined and assigned. The methods used to assure that persons assigned specific authority and responsibility are initially qualified and are periodically trained so that they can continue to properly fulfill their duties should be specified. The means of notifying persons assigned to the organization in the event of an emergency and the means of notifying appropriate local, state, and Federal agencies so that emergency action beyond the site boundary may be taken should be specified.
2. A list of employees of the licensee (by position), other than those assigned to the emergency organization, who have any special qualifications for coping with emergency conditions. A similar list shall be made of other persons whose assistance may be needed. The special qualifications of these employees and persons shall be specified. All of the foregoing lists shall be available to the individuals responsible for directing the action necessary to cope with the emergency.
3. The actions planned to protect the health and safety of individuals and to prevent damage to property both within and outside the site boundary in the event of various types of emergencies that can be anticipated, i.e., internal accidents such as criticality, fire, and explosions, and natural occurrences such as floods, tornadoes, and earthquakes.
This should include the means for determining: (i) the magnitude of the release of radioactive materials, including guidelines for evaluating the need for notification and participation of local, state and Federal agencies, and (ii) the type and extent of protective action to be taken within and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety and prevent damage to property.
- 4. The post-accident recovery and reentry actions including guidelines for implementing these actions which shall include (i) corrective actions that may be necessary to terminate or minimize the consequences of the accident, (ii)
criteria for plant reentry, (iii) securing the accident area from inadvertent or unauthorized reentry, (iv) and resumption of operations.
5. Procedures for notifying and agreements to be reached with local, state, and Federal officials for the early warning of the public and for appropriate protective measures should such measures become necessary or desirable.
6. Provisions for maintaining up to date: (i) the organization for coping with emergencies, (ii) the procedures for use in emergencies, and (iii) the lists of persons with special qualifications for coping with emergency conditions.
7. The specifications for emergency first aid and personnel decontamination facilities, including:
(i) Identification of individuals directly involved in the accident;
(ii) Equipment at the site for personnel monitoring;
(iii) Facilities and supplies at the site for decontamination of personnel;
(iv) Facilities and medical supplies at the site for appropriate emergency first aid treatment;
(v) Arrangements for the services of a physician and other medical personnel' qualified to handle radiation emergencies; and (vi) Arrangements for transportation of injured or contaminated individuals to treatment facilities outside the site boundary.
8. Arrangements for treatment of individuals at treatment facilities outside the site boundary.
9. Provisions for testing, by periodic drills, of radiation emergency plans to assure that employees of the licensee are familiar with their specific duties. Provisions for participation in the drills by other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiation emergency shall be included.
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10. The provisions for the training of persons other than employees of the licensee whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiation emergency.
I1. Provisions for maintenance and storage of emergency equipment, considering the various types of accidents that can be anticipated, also, the performance criteria of the various types of equipment.
The licensee's emergency plan shall consist of a document providing the objectives and the bases for the actions to be taken to cope with various types of accidents which affect, or threaten the health and safety of the general public, employees of the licensee or other persons temporarily or permanently assigned to the facility. It should specify the objectives to be met by the' implementing procedures and should assign organizational and individual responsibilities to achieve such objectives.
Emergency procedures shall consist of a document defining in detail the implementation actions and methods necessary to achieve the objectives of the emergency plan for each set of circumstances considered in the emergency plan. To the extent possible these two documents should be separated.
1-=
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