RIS 2005-31, Official Exhibit - Mandatory Hearing - NRC000086-MA-BD01 - NRC Reg Issue Summary 2005-31, Control of Security-Related Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Info Handled by Individuals, Firms, and Entities Subject to NRC Regulation of the
| ML16196A237 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Eagle Rock |
| Issue date: | 12/26/2017 |
| Revision: | 1 |
| From: | Kock A L Division of Materials Safety, Security, State, and Tribal Programs |
| To: | |
| Goldberg P | |
| References | |
| RIS-05-031, Rev. 1 | |
| Download: ML16196A237 (31) | |
| ML16277A133 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Eagle Rock |
| Issue date: | 12/22/2005 |
| Revision: | 0 |
| From: | NRC/OIP |
| To: | |
| Langlie G -- 287-9076 | |
| References | |
| RIS-05-031 | |
| Download: ML16277A133 (29) | |
ML16196A237 December 26, 2017 NRC REGULATORY ISSUE SUMMARY 2005-31, REVISION 1 CONTROL OF SECURITY-RELATED SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED NON HANDLED BY INDIVIDUALS, FIRMS, AND ENTITIES SUBJECT TO NRC REGULATION OF THE USE OF SOURCE, BYPRODUCT, AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
ADDRESSEES
All radiation control program directors and State liaison officer All licensees, certificate holders, applicants, and other entities (hereafter referred to as "licensees and others") subject to regulation by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the use of source, byproduct, and special nuclear material, excluding the following:
- All holders of and applicants for an operating license or construction permit under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," and those licensees that have permanently ceased operations and have submitted certifications under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) or have submitted applications for license termination under 10 CFR 50.82(b)(1).
- All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit, combined license, standard design approval, or manufacturing license under 10 CFR Part 52, "Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants." All applicants for a standard design certification, including such applicants after initial issuance of a design certification rul
- All holders of and applicants for certificates for reactor design
INTENT
The NRC is issuing this regulatory issue summary (RIS) to accomplish the following:
- Inform licensees and others of the screening criteria that the NRC uses to identify and protect security-related sensitive information in documents generated by the NRC and in documents developed by licensees and others, particularly those received by the NRC. (Enclosure 2)
- Encourage licensees and others to identify security-related sensitive information in documents submitted to the NRC by using the marking procedures in Enclosure 1 and the screening criteria in Enclosure RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1
- Encourage licensees and others that may possess security-related sensitive information to control the information in order to limit the risk that the information might fall into the hands of those who would use it for malevolent act No specific action or written response is required.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The NRC traditionally has given the public access to a significant amount of information about the facilities and materials the agency regulate Openness has been and remains a cornerstone of the NRC's regulatory philosoph The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; subsequent legislation; and various NRC regulations have given the public the right to participate in the licensing and oversight process for NRC licensee To participate in a meaningful way, the public must have access to information about the design and operation of regulated facilities and use of nuclear material However, the NRC and other Government agencies have always withheld some information from public disclosure for reasons of security, personal privacy, or designation as proprietary information (commercial or trade secret protection).
In the post-September 11, 2001, environment, the NRC has found it necessary to be more judicious in determining what information to voluntarily release so that it does not inadvertently provide assistance to those who might use certain information for malevolent act The NRC has issued orders, advisories, and rules; taken specific actions on the security of its licensed facilities; and assessed and revised its policies and practices for making information available to the publi As one such action, the NRC temporarily suspended public access to documents in its electronic Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) on October 25, 200 Subsequently, the NRC screened those documents to determine whether they contained security-related sensitive informatio Based on this screening, the NRC returned a large number of documents to public access in ADAM This screening process continues as requests for specific documents are received and as new documents are created by the NRC and received from licensees and other entitie The NRC has continued to presumptively withhold some categories of documents from routine public releas In SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated October 19, 2004 (ADAMS Accession No. ML043140175), and SECY-05-0101, "Withholding from Public Disclosure Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Materials Licensees and Certification Holders," dated October 7, 2005, (ADAMS Accession No. ML051040407) (non-public) the staff proposed to withhold certain information on fire protection and emergency planning and response to ensure that information that could reasonably be expected to be useful to a potential adversary was not made publi The Commission approved the initial withholding of this information and the review of the information for release in response to requests such as those made under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See Staff Requirements Memorandum SECY-04-0191 dated Nov. 9, 2004 and Staff Requirements Memorandum SECY-05-0101 dated October 7, 200 In SECY-15-0032, "Reviewing Documents for Public Release Using Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information Guidance," dated March 6, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14352A172), the staff proposed to discontinue this policy and instead apply the NRC's sensitive unclassified nonsafeguards information (SUNSI) policy to review, release, and withhold fire protection and emergency preparedness document The Commission approved this proposal in its staff requirements memorandum to SECY-15-0032, dated June 15, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15167A090). The advice in this RIS reflects that chang RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 To facilitate the screening process for the public release of information, the NRC developed screening criteria and issued two RISs that pertain to nuclear reactors for conducting its review On November 7, 2005, the NRC issued RIS 2005-26, "Control of Sensitive Unclassified Nonsafeguards Information Related to Nuclear Power Reactors," (ADAMS Accession No. ML051430228) for assessing whether documents associated with reactor licensees should be made publicly availabl On December 23, 2015, the NRC issued RIS 2015-17, "Review and Submission of Updates to Final Safety Analysis Reports, Emergency Preparedness Documents, and Fire Protection Documents," (ADAMS Accession N ML15321A400) to remind licensees of the review and submission requirements of 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding," on information that may be withheld from public disclosur As part of related efforts in the nonreactor arena, the NRC has developed the enclosed criteria for identifying security-related sensitive information that the staff encourages licensees to screen out or to mark and protect as sensitive information, particularly before those licensees that handle source, byproduct, or special nuclear material submit documents to the NR The advice in this RIS and its enclosures does not apply to classified information, Safeguards Information, or Safeguards Information-Modified Handling, which by law must be withheld from the publi
SUMMARY OF ISSUE
SUNSI includes information that, if lost, misused, or modified, can reasonably be foreseen to harm the public interest, the commercial or financial interests of an entity, the conduct of NRC and Federal programs, or the personal privacy of individual It also includes security-related informatio If practical, licensees and others that submit documents to the NRC should avoid including any security-related sensitive information to permit the release of the document to the public in its entiret However, if that is not practical, the following steps will help ensure that sensitive information is not released:
(1) Screening of Licensee-Generated Documents To ensure that any security-related sensitive information in submitted documents is not made publicly available in ADAMS, the NRC is encouraging licensees and other entities to screen submittals in accordance with the criteria in Enclosure In addition, to ensure that licensees and other entities identify and control security-related sensitive information in their documents, the NRC is encouraging them to develop implementing procedures to screen documents that might have sensitive security-related information in order to identify and control the information appropriatel The goal is to limit the risk that the information might fall into the hands of those who would use it for malevolent act (2) Cover Letter If a cover letter that does not itself contain sensitive information is used to transmit a document(s) that contains security-related sensitive information, the cover letter should clearly state thi Furthermore, the cover letter should have a statement that indicates that once its sensitive attachments are removed, the cover letter itself may be handled as an uncontrolled documen However, if the cover letter itself contains security-related sensitive information, it cannot be decontrolle RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 (3) Marking Documents That Contain Security-Related Sensitive Information As shown in Section A of Enclosure 1, include the marking "Security-Related Information-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390" at the top center of every pag If submitting both a public and a nonpublic version of the same document, licensees and other entities should "black out" the sensitive information in the public version or withhold the sensitive information with a notation that it was withheld on the basis that it is "security-related information."
Alternately, security-related sensitive information may be segregated from the main body of the document and included only in attachments to the submitta In this scenario, only the attachments that contain security-related sensitive information would be marked for withholding from public disclosur If this approach is used, the public version does not need to be marked as containing security-related sensitive informatio Enclosure 1, Section B, contains additional information on suggested handling and methods of submitting security-related sensitive informatio Protection of Security-Related Sensitive Information Documents that contain security-related sensitive information should be protected from public disclosure using methods similar to those for protecting proprietary informatio To the extent practical, any existing documents that contain security-related sensitive information that licensees or other entities have previously made available to the public should be withdrawn from public acces Licensees and other entities should have sufficient internal controls to prevent release of information to limit the risk that sensitive security-related information could be released to someone with malevolent inten In addition to the points enumerated above, other methods to prevent the inadvertent release of security-related sensitive information include (1) restricting access to electronic recordkeeping systems that contain such information, (2) controlling the reproduction, distribution, and destruction of potentially sensitive records, and (3) releasing sensitive information only to those individuals who have a need to know the information to perform their jobs and who are made aware of the security-related nature of the informatio Certain categories of security-related sensitive information under 10 CFR Part 37, "Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material," must be protected pursuant to 10 CFR 37.43(d) and 37.77(f), as described in more detail in Section D, "Security Program Information," of Appendix 3, "Reviews of Medical, Industrial, and Academic Users of Nuclear Materials," to Enclosure Much of the NRC's information is readily available to the public through the NRC's Web site (http://www.nrc.gov) and ADAMS (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html). In addition, the agency may release other information to the public in response to formal or informal request Although the NRC developed these security-related sensitive information screening criteria with the principles of FOIA in mind, a review for security-related sensitive information does not substitute for a FOIA revie The NRC will continue to review and process FOIA requests under 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1), independently from the security-related sensitive information review proces RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1
BACKFIT DISCUSSION
This RIS informs addressees of the screening criteria that the NRC uses to identify and protect security-sensitive information, and to encourage licensees and others to identify and control such informatio This RIS requires no action or written response beyond that already required by NRC regulations, and is, therefore, not a backfit under the backfitting provisions of 10 CFR 70.76, 72.62, or 76.76, all titled "Backfitting." Consequently, the NRC staff did not perform a backfit analysi
FEDERAL REGISTER NOTIFICATION
A notice of opportunity for public comment was not published in the Federal Register because this RIS is informational and does not represent a departure from current regulatory requirements and practic
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT
This RIS is not a rule for purposes for purposes of the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-80
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT
This RIS does not request any information collections and, therefore, is not subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).
RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1
CONTACT
S Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contacts listed belo /RA Kevin Williams for/ Andrea L. Kock, Acting Director Division of Material Safety, State, Tribal and Rulemaking Programs Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Technical Contacts: Paul Goldberg, NMSS/MSTR Raynard Wharton, NMSS/DSFM 301-415-7842 301-415-7497 E-mail: Paul.Goldberg@nrc.gov E-mail: Raynard.Wharton@nrc.gov Kevin Ramsey, NMSS/FCSE Zahira Cruz, NMSS/DUWP 301-415-7506 301-415-3808 E-mail: Kevin.Ramsey@nrc.gov E-mail: Zahira.Cruz@nrc.gov Gary Langlie, OIP 301-287-9076 E-mail: Gary.Langlie@nrc.gov
Enclosures:
1. Suggested Markings and Handling for Those Subject to NRC Regulation Screening Criteria for Security-Related Sensitive Unclassified Nonsafeguards Information Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under NRC Library/Document Collection RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 SUBJECT: CONTROL OF SECURITY-RELATED SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED NON HANDLED BY INDIVIDUALS, FIRMS, AND ENTITIES SUBJECT TO NRC REGULATION OF THE USE OF SOURCE, BYPRODUCT, AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL DATE: December 26, 2017 ML16196A237 CAC A34010 OFC NMSS/MSTR NMSS/MSTR NMSS/MSTR OGC OGC NMSS/FCSE NMSS/DSFM/ Staff NAME PGoldberg SAtack AMcIntosh ACoggins CSafford KRamsey RWharton DATE 12/15/16 12/5/16 7/15/16 9/12/17 9/18/2017 1/24/17 2/14/17 OFC NMSS/DUWP OE OCIO OCIO OIP NMSS/FSCE NMSS/DUWP NAME ZCruz DFurst Via e-mail DCullison RGagnon PHabighorst CErlanger JTappert DATE 1/26/17 1/23/17 9/18/17 6/30/16 2/09/17 2/13/17 1/26/17 OFC NMSS/DSFM NSIR/DSO QTE NMSS/MSTR NAME MLayton MBailey CHsu KWilliams for AKock DATE 2/14/17 1/27/17 2/22/17 12/26/17 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 Enclosure 1 SUGGESTED MARKINGS AND HANDLING FOR THOSE SUBJECT TO NRC REGULATION This enclosure provides information on markings suggested by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for pages of a document that contains security-related sensitive information (Section A) and suggested handling of such documents (Section B).
Section A: Page Markings Place the overall page marking on the top and bottom of all pages of a document that contains security-related sensitive informatio Note that a cover letter must include the marking if the letter or any attachment to the letter contains security-related informatio If the cover letter itself is nonsensitive, add the following statement to the bottom of the letter: "Documents transmitted herewith contain sensitive, unclassified informatio When separated from the sensitive information, this document is decontrolled." Ensure that the subject line is nonsensitiv Security-Related Information Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390
Security-Related InformationWithhold under 10 CFR 2.390 RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 Enclosure 1 Section B: Appropriate Controls for Handling Documents Access: Access is based on "need to know" to perform official licensee, applicant, or other entity function Storage: Documents can be stored openly within licensee, applicant, or other entity facilities but with electronic or other access controls (e.g., key cards, guards, alarms).
Mail: Documents should be sent through U.S. Postal Service first class mail, registered mail, express mail, or certified mail in a single opaque envelope with no external markings to indicate contents covered by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding." Electronic Transmission: Information can be handled over the telephone if the recipient is confirmed as being authorized to access the information, over facsimile if it is confirmed that a recipient who is authorized to access the information will be present to receive the transmission, or over encrypted computer e-mail (using computer software such as SecureZip). Note that the NRC uses SecureZip to encrypt electronic information before transmitting security-related sensitive information by e-mail to licensees and other entitie Users will be prompted for a password to access a free download of the reade RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 Enclosure 2 SCREENING CRITERIA FOR SECURITY-RELATED SENSITIVE U N C LASSIFIED NON December 26, 2017 INTRODUCTION This enclosure provides the criteria that should be used to determine what information may be disclosed to the public and what information should be withheld to prevent inadvertent assistance to those who might wish to use security-related information for malevolent act As a reminder, the advice in this enclosure applies to all security-related information except for classified information, Safeguards Information, or Safeguards Information - Modified Handlin
BACKGROUND
Historically, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has made large amounts of information, more than required by law, routinely available to the publi However, in the post-September 11, 2001, environment, the NRC, like many other agencies, has found it necessary to be more judicious in what it voluntarily releases so that it does not inadvertently provide assistance to those who might use this information for malevolent act The NRC developed guidance in SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated October 19, 2004, and advised licensees in NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2005-26, "Control of Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information Related to Nuclear Power Reactors," dated November 7, 2005, on the conduct of a broad security/sensitivity review to assess whether documents associated with reactor licensees should be made publicly available in the first instance as a matter of administrative discretio The NRC has now developed the guidance in this enclosure, which addresses the criteria for screening from public disclosure certain types of information associated with various classes of materials licensees, applicants, certificate holders, and other entitie Consistent with the Commission's Staff Requirements Guidance on SECY 05-0091, "Task Force Report on Public Disclosure of Security-Related Information," dated June 30, 2005, the screening criteria in these guidelines "...should follow the principles for withholding security-related information under FOIA." Although the NRC developed these security-related sensitive information screening criteria with the principles of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in mind, a review for security-related sensitive information does not substitute for a FOIA revie The NRC will continue to review and process FOIA requests independently from the security-related sensitive information review proces RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 ORGANIZATION OF THIS ENCLOSURE Table 1 outlines the contents of this enclosure:
- Section 1 indicates the criteria under which documents may be released to the public without any further screenin However, Section 1 also notes specific requirements for withholding documents in certain cases even if the documents meet the criteri
- Section 2 contains general criteria for screening documents that do not meet the criteria in Section
- Appendices 1-5 contain guidance, in addition to that in Section 2, for screening documents specific to fuel cycle facilities; decommissioning and low-level waste sites; medical, industrial, and academic uses of nuclear materials; spent fuel/transportation; and export/import, respectivel Table 1 Stakeholders Using This Guidance and Applicable Sections of the Guidance1 STAKEHOLDER APPLICABLE SECTION AND APPENDIX Fuel cycle facilities, including milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication facilities Sections 1 and 2 for general information and Appendix 1 Decommissioning and low-level waste sites Sections 1 and 2 for general information and Appendix 2 Medical, industrial, and academic uses of nuclear materials Sections 1 and 2 for general information and Appendix 3 10 CFR Part 71 certificate holders and registered users Sections 1 and 2 for general information and Appendix 4, Parts A, B, and E Special attention should be given to the guidance on detailed design drawings and control of the registered users list for transportation packages. 1 With regard to high-level waste, Subpart J, "Procedures Applicable to Proceedings for the Issuance of Licenses for the Receipt of High-Level Radioactive Waste at a Geologic Repository," of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 2, "Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure," contains requirements that an applicant of the proposed geological repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada must follow when making information publicly available through the Licensing Support Networ RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . STAKEHOLDER APPLICABLE SECTION AND APPENDIX 10 CFR Part 71 quality assurance program (QA) holders Sections 1 and 2 for general information and Appendix 4, Parts A, B, and E
Based on the NRC staff's experience, most QA program holder submittals do not contain sensitive information as defined in this RI However, attention should be given to the guidance on detailed design drawings and control of the registered users list for transportation packages. 10 CFR Part 72 certificate holders, general licensees, and specific licensees Sections 1 and 2 for general information and Appendix 4, Parts A, B, C, D, and E Export and Import Sections 1 and 2 for general information and Appendix 5 RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . SECTION 1: GENERAL SCREENING CRITERIA FOR DOCUMENTS TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC Low-Hazard Information Documents Documents that meet the following criteria may be released without the need for any further screening, except as specifically noted: (1) Documents that specify the quantities of radionuclides located in any single location if those quantities are below the International Atomic Energy Agency's Category 3 quantities (as listed in Table 2 of these guidelines). However, the staff will withhold from public access the exact location of the material even if material levels are below the Category 3 threshold value Thus, the staff will release a document if it indicates a general location (e.g., in a certain building), but if the document gives the exact location (e.g., "Room 12"), the staff will redact the exact location unless the location is intuitively obviou (2) Documents from licensees (other than fuel cycle licensees) authorized to possess radionuclides that are not listed in Table However, the staff will withhold information on the exact location of this radioactive materia (3) Uranium recovery documents describing or discussing yellow cake and mill tailings onl (4) Current information on decommissioning materials sites with diffuse contamination onl However, check for other active licenses or radioactive material at the site (e.g., high-activity reactor components and high-activity waste) and screen any related documents separatel (5) Documents concerning terminated licenses for which all radioactivity except diffuse contamination has been remove However, screen old files for operational information that may contain sensitive informatio B. Information Readily Available to the Public Elsewhere (Based on Reactor Criteria Approved by the Commission (SECY-04-0191))
The following criteria apply to information on materials facilities: (1) If the information is available from open source literature such as text books, Web sites, or other sources, an NRC decision to withhold the information may decrease the openness of the agency's regulatory programs without obstructing an adversary. (2) Information clearly visible from locations accessible to the public, including general (low-resolution) drawings of the site and adjacent areas, is generally release RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . SECTION 2: GENERAL SCREENING CRITERIA FOR DOCUMENTS TO BE WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC RELEASE This section lists the general screening criteria that the NRC staff will use for withholding information from the public, as well as the information that the staff will releas A. Facilities Where Licensed Material May Be Located (1) The NRC staff will withhold the following information related to locations and quantities of radioactive material that equal or exceed the threshold values listed in Table 2: (a) information for identifying the exact locations of radioactive material The staff will release a document if it indicates a general location (e.g., in a certain building), but if the document gives the exact location (e.g., "Room 12"), the staff will withhold it unless the location is intuitively obviou (b) information on possession limits or actual inventories of radionuclides (c) manufacturers and model numbers of sealed sources and devices (d) for fuel cycle facilities, information on possession limits and inventories of enriched uranium and plutonium exceeding a critical mass (e) lists of licensees registered to use transportation packages approved by the NRC under 10 CFR Part 71, "Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material" (2) The NRC staff will release the following information: (a) identification of radionuclides and form (b) 10 CFR Part 71 certificates and information under 10 CFR Part 72, "Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste," related to radionuclide form, content, quantities, model numbers, and locations of independent spent fuel storage installations regardless of the quantities (c) event reports involving lost, stolen, abandoned, or found radioactive material, regardless of whether the radioactive material equals or exceeds the quantities specified in Table 2 Design of Structures/Equipment (1) The NRC staff will withhold the following information for design of structures and equipment (site specific):
RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . (a) information related to security requirements, information from analyses that could reveal vulnerabilities, reports of specific or predicted failures, and any other information that could reasonably be expected to be useful to potential adversaries (b) information related to predicted structural failures that could be useful to potential adversaries (see Appendix 1 for specific guidance on fuel cycle facilities) (2) The NRC staff will release the following information: Notwithstanding paragraph B(1)(b) above, the NRC staff will release information on the design of structures provided to the NRC, which typically consists of analyses to show that the design feature will withstand the combinations of forces associated with design-basis events and natural hazard Such analyses do not typically provide realistic information on the failure of structural features and, except for fuel cycle facilities, are not considered sensitiv C. Nearby Facilities The NRC staff will withhold information related to nearby facilities if the information might reasonably be helpful to those planning a malevolent ac D. Design Information: Spent Fuel Casks, Transportation Packages, and Other Information (1) The NRC staff will withhold information related to nonsite-specific spent fuel casks, transportation packages, sealed source and device catalog and files, and other such items, including the following types of information: (a) drawings that show detailed design information (b) design/performance information that indicates vulnerabilities that could reasonably be expected to be useful to potential adversaries (2) The NRC staff will release text information describing how spent fuel casks, transportation packages and devices/sources are constructe E. Emergency Planning/Fire Protection Information (1) In regard to emergency planning/fire protection information, the NRC staff will withhold the following information:
(a) the document in its entirety if it contains site-specific information that would be useful to an adversary in planning a malevolent act The NRC staff will review any considerations or requests for release on a case-by-case basi As part of the review, the staff will determine whether the State or local governments are withholding related information as sensitiv RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . (b) detailed information describing response capabilities (e.g., personnel and resources available) (c) information and drawings identifying the locations of radioactive material and onsite routes and pathways to or from the locations of radioactive material, especially detailed descriptions of areas not normally visible to the public (d) information that State or local government agencies have designated as sensitive F. Security Program Information Much information related to security programs at fuel cycle facilities and other materials facilities with high risk sources has already been designated to be withheld as classified information, Safeguards Information, or proprietary informatio In addition to withholding classified information, Safeguards Information, or proprietary information, the NRC staff will withhold any security information that could reasonably be expected to be useful to potential adversarie In addition, certain categories of information are protected under 10 CFR Part 37, "Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material." G. Vulnerability and Security Assessments, Accident Analyses, Safety Analyses, and Risk Assessments
(1) The NRC staff will withhold the following information:
(a) assessments that use a malevolent event as an initial condition (e.g., vulnerability/security analysis) (b) descriptions of structural features related to potential malevolent acts (c) detailed information and drawings describing the specific locations of equipment that is relied upon for safety or security (d) discussions of safety features or mitigation strategies within vulnerability/security assessments (e) any analysis that identifies which events have significant consequences and which events do not (f) information related to security events and any information that could be useful to an adversary as a result of the identification of vulnerabilities (2) The NRC staff will release typical accident analyses that involve conservative models to demonstrate a facility's ability to respond to design-basis events (i.e., nonsecurity-related events), unless the analysis could reasonably be expected to be useful to an adversar RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . APPENDICES 1-5: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR SECURITY-RELATED SENSITIVE INFORMATION SCREENING REVIEWS Appendices 1-5 contain additional guidance for screening documents for security-related sensitive information specific to types of facilities and uses of material These appendices cover the following topics, respectively: (1) fuel cycle facilities, including milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication facilities (2) decommissioning and low-level waste sites (3) medical, industrial, and academic uses of nuclear materials (4) spent fuel/transportation (10 CFR Part 71 certificate holders and registered users; 10 CFR Part 71 QA program holders; and 10 CFR Part 72 certificate holders, general licensees, and site-specific licensees) (5) export/import licensing RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . APPENDIX 1 FUEL CYCLE FACILITY REVIEWS NRC Contact: Division of Fuel Cycle Safety, Safeguards, and Environmental Review, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards A. Descriptions of Facilities Where Licensed Material May Be Located (1) Withhold information on the quantity of enriched uranium or plutonium authorized in possession limits, or possessed in actual inventories, when the quantity exceeds a critical mas Information identifying radionuclides and chemical/physical forms authorized may be release (2) Withhold information related to military contract operations, even if it is publicly available elsewher (3) Withhold information that identifies the exact locations (e.g., detailed floor plans)
of radioactive and hazardous material whose release or theft could allow adversaries to create a diversion for theft of material or result in a significant consequenc Planning a sabotage activity (e.g., bombing a building) would likely require less detailed information than planning a theft, for which exact locations would likely be necessar (4) Withhold information about the design of structures that consists of analyses to show that design features will withstand the forces associated with both security-related scenarios and nonsecurity-related scenarios, such as tornadoes, high winds, and snow load Analyses indicating forces associated with nonsecurity regulatory requirements could be useful in planning terrorist activitie For example, information related to seismic loadings could be used to determine blast loads for bomb (5) Withhold detailed design information, including diagrams showing dimensions, material properties, and descriptions of how the facility/equipment is constructe Additionally, withhold process information that could potentially allow an adversary to access radioactive or hazardous materials or gain knowledge of detailed information or potential weaknesses of systems designed to ensure safe operations (necessary to prevent or mitigate accidents) at fuel cycle facilitie B. Nonsite-Specific Design Information There is no additional fuel cycle facility guidance for this categor C. Emergency Planning/Fire Protection Information (1) Withhold site-specific information that would be useful to an adversary planning a malevolent ac This includes detailed information or potential weaknesses of systems designed to ensure safe operations (necessary to prevent or mitigate accidents) at fuel cycle facilitie Withhold detailed information and drawings of areas not normally visible to the publi This includes information identifying routes to or from the locations of radioactive and hazardous material whose release or theft could allow adversaries to achieve their goal RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . (2) Withhold information that State or local government agencies have designated as sensitiv (3) Withhold any detailed accident analysis that identifies which accidents have significant consequences and which accidents do no Accident analysis information can appear in many documents (e.g., an emergency plan, fire protection plan, integrated safety analysis summary, environmental report or assessment). General information may be releasable, but details should be withhel (4) Withhold site-specific emergency action levels used to declare emergencie (5) Withhold detailed information about response capabilities (e.g., personnel and resources available). D. Security Program Information (1) Much information related to security programs at fuel cycle facilities and other materials facilities with high-risk sources has already been designated to be withheld as proprietary information, classified information, or Safeguards Informatio (2) Withhold information on security equipment and programs, descriptions of equipment and radioactive or hazardous materials, and accident studies that closely resemble programs, equipment, radioactive or hazardous materials, and studies at other active licensee sites if that information would reveal vulnerabilities or would be expected to be useful to adversaries at active licensee site E. Vulnerability and Security Assessments and Accident Analyses (1) Withhold detailed information and drawings describing the exact locations of radioactive or hazardous materials or that would allow adversaries to gain knowledge of detailed information or potential weaknesses of systems designed to ensure safe operations (necessary to prevent or mitigate accidents) at fuel cycle facilitie (2) Withhold any detailed accident analysis that contains accident sequences, identifies accident consequences, identifies systems and components that are relied upon for safety, or identifies which accidents have significant consequences and which accidents do no Accident analysis information can appear in many documents (e.g., an emergency plan, fire protection plan, integrated safety analysis summary, environmental assessment). General information may be acceptable, but details should be withhel RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . (3) Withhold information identifying the exact locations (e.g., detailed floor plans) of radioactive and hazardous material whose release or theft could allow adversaries to create a diversion for the theft of material or could result in a significant consequenc Planning a sabotage activity (e.g., bombing a building)
would likely require less detailed information than planning a theft, for which exact locations would likely be necessar RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . APPENDIX 2 DECOMMISSIONING AND LOW-LEVEL WASTE SITE REVIEW NRC Contact: Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs (DUWP), Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards DECOMMISSIONING AND LOW-LEVEL WASTE SITE CRITERIA Note that U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-26, "Control of Sensitive Unclassified Nonsafeguards Information Related to Nuclear Power Reactors," dated November 7, 2005, informs licensees of the appropriate handling of sensitive unclassified nonsafeguards information for decommissioning reactor The following criteria apply:
(1) "Diffuse contamination" consists of soil, ground water, and surface contamination on and in buildings, including that which is on equipment, floors, walls, and other surface It also could include volumetrically contaminated materials whose concentrations are sufficiently lo For determining whether only diffuse contamination is present at a decommissioning site, apply the following information derived from the International Atomic Energy Agency's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of Conduct) (ADAMS Accession Number ML043270621) (see Table 2). Category 3 sources in the Code of Conduct are typically about 1 curi (The NRC is developing a rulemaking to control the import and export of such sources.) At a concentration of 2,000 picocuries per gram, which is well above the concentrations of plutonium typically found in soil at sites undergoing decommissioning, this equates to approximately 15,000 cubic feet of material, which is well in excess of the amount a terrorist could reasonably use for malevolent purpose For materials at the Class A limit for plutonium (10 nanocuries per gram) in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 61, "Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste," the volume of waste that would contain the Category 3 activity limit for plutonium would be 3,000 cubic feet, which is also in excess of the amount a terrorist could reasonably use. However, for cobalt-60, the amount of loose material or rubble at the Class A limit (700 curies per cubic meter) containing the Category 3 quantity (about 1 curie) would be less than 0.1 cubic foot, which is an amount that could easily be used for malevolent purposes because of its small volum Reviewers should apply values taking into consideration the examples given above in determining whether a decommissioning site is within the threshold value RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR DECOMMISSIONING AND LOW-LEVEL WASTE SITES Most sites undergoing decommissioning are expected to be below the threshold values in Table 2, such that most licensing documents can be release Sensitivity reviews must be conducted on documents related to low-level waste storage, safety, and security systems and procedure Reviews should focus on determining whether the information contained in these documents could be useful to an adversary in planning a terrorist ac Examples include the location and security arrangements for high-activity waste, the location of highly activated components, or the transportation security arrangements for high-activity waste or activated component For fuel cycle, materials, and spent fuel pool and independent spent fuel storage installation licensees that are undergoing decommissioning, issues that are not unique to decommissioning (e.g., descriptions of plant processes, vulnerability/security assessments) should be reviewed with regard to Appendices 1, 3, and 4, respectivel A. Descriptions of Facilities Where Licensed Material May Be Located (1) Withhold information identifying the exact locations of radioactive material (e.g., detailed drawings or maps of facilities, room numbers and locations, and specific locations of waste storage/processing operations). (2) Withhold design information that could reasonably be expected to be useful to potential adversarie Examples include detailed drawings or maps showing the locations of security measures/operations and infrastructure, locations of critical site infrastructure (electrical or power systems), and the design of facilities that could be useful in developing approaches to breech the facilit (3) Withhold procedures for the receipt of low-level waste at a waste facility or processing sit (4) For transportation package information provided in connection with decommissioning or low-level waste disposal licensing, consider Appendix 4 for sensitivity of the informatio RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . APPENDIX 3 REVIEWS OF MEDICAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND ACADEMIC USERS OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS NRC Contact: Division of Material Safety, State, Tribal, and Rulemaking Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Descriptions of Facilities Where Licensed Material May Be Located (Equals or Exceeds the Threshold Values in Table 2) (1) Copies of Licenses and Mailing Lists (a) For copies of licenses, release authorized radionuclides and for Withhold authorized quantitie Withhold manufacturers and model numbers of sealed sources and device Withhold information that identifies buildings or rooms where radioactive material is locate (This may be in the license condition that specifies the authorized location.) (b) Withhold mailing lists that are compiled for security purposes or that identify facilities that may have quantities of radioactive material that equals or exceeds the threshold values listed in Table 2 or vulnerable facilities such as those that possess material that equals or exceeds the threshold values in Table 2 but do not aggregate the materia (c) Release individual mailing addresses and the street address where material is located (normally included on licenses). (2) Locations of Radioactive Material (a) Withhold lists of authorized or actual inventories of radionuclide (b) Withhold building numbers and room numbers (other than mailing addresses) or similar information that identifies the locations of materia (c) Withhold site drawings that identify individual buildings on the licensee sit (d) Withhold building drawings that identify the location of radioactive material or onsite pathways or routes to and from locations of radioactive materia (e) Release individual mailing addresses and street addresse RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . (3) Site-Specific Design/Description of Structures, Equipment, and Operating Procedures (a) Most descriptions of structures, equipment, and procedures may be released if they are not security relate (b) Withhold drawings of buildings, rooms, and devices in which radioactive material is located. (c) Withhold manufacturers and model numbers of sealed sources and device (d) Withhold information on security programs, guards, access controls, key cards, alarms, barriers, chains, and lock B. Nonsite-Specific Design Information: Sealed Source and Device Catalog (1) Release information on addresses of manufacturers/distributor (2) Establish a password system for sensitive information for users who have with a valid need to know and who have agreed to protect the information from unauthorized disclosur C. Emergency Planning/Fire Protection Information (1) Release general descriptions of emergency procedures for safety-related events, such as radioactive material spills, releases, contamination, and fire (2) Withhold information on routes to and from locations of radioactive materia (3) Withhold information related to responses to security events and malevolent event (4) Withhold information on responses of offsite law enforcement official (5) Withhold information designated by State or local governments as sensitiv D. Security Program Information (1) For applicable licensees- (a) Under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 37.43(d), licensees limit access to, and unauthorized disclosure of, their security plan, implementing procedures, and the list of individuals that have been approved for unescorted acces RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . (b) Under 10 CFR 37.77(f), individuals who receive schedule information related to shipments of Category 1 material, as identified in Appendix A, "Category 1 and Category 2 Radioactive Materials," to 10 CFR Part 37, "Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material," are required to limit access to, and unauthorized disclosure of, that information. (2) Withhold any security information that is related to malevolent events or suspicious incidents or that could be useful to potential adversarie Examples include information on guards, access controls, key cards, alarms, barriers, chains, and locks. Vulnerability and Security Assessments and Accident Analyses There is no additional guidance for medical, industrial, and academic users of nuclear material for this categor RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . APPENDIX 4 SPENT FUEL/TRANSPORTATION REVIEWS NRC Contact: Division of Spent Fuel Management, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards A. Descriptions of Facilities Where Licensed Material Is Located SUBJECT DISCUSSION AND TYPICAL CONTROLS 10 CFR Part 72 Specific Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
Licenses and General Licenses - Text descriptions of the following: general description, site characteristics, principal design criteria, storage cask design, operations, waste management, radiation protection, accident analyses, conduct of operations, operating controls and limits, and quality assurance (QA) Release-Information provided to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for specific ISFSI licenses and general licenses that typically consists of analyses to show that the design feature will withstand the combinations of forces associated with design-basis events and natural hazard The analyses do not typically provide realistic information on the failure of structural features and are not considered sensitive. 10 CFR Part 72 Specific ISFSI Licenses and General Licenses - Drawings and locations of related hazards Potentially Withhold-Decisions on the control of information that shows the plant site and buildings are dependent on the level of detai Information on aspects clearly visible from locations accessible to the public near the site is generally release This includes general (low resolution) layout drawings of the site and adjacent area Drawings showing details such as the specific locations of equipment within buildings, doorways, stairways, storage areas, and other such areas are to be withheld under 10 CFR 2.390(d). Drawings showing locations of hazards in relation to the ISFSI are also withhel A text description of the hazards in relation to the ISFSI is uncontrolled and will not be reviewed. 10 CFR Part 72 Specific ISFSI Licenses and General Licenses
- Nearby industrial, transportation, and military facilities Withhold-Information related to nonnuclear facilities located near the ISFSI such as pipeline data (usually withheld per the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)) and chemical facilities (some data withheld per the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)) is controlle Other information may be protected by other Federal agencies (e.g., U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, EPA, DOT). 10 CFR Part 72 Specific ISFSI Licenses and General Licenses Release-Information related to radionuclides, form, and quantitie RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . B. Nonsite-Specific Design Information: Transportation Packages and Spent Fuel Casks SUBJECT DISCUSSION AND TYPICAL CONTROLS 10 CFR Part 71 Transportation Package Descriptions
- Text descriptions, including radionuclide form, content, and quantity Release-Information provided to the NRC typically consists of analyses to show that the design features will withstand the combinations of forces associated with design-basis events and natural hazard The analyses do not typically provide realistic information on the failure of structural features and are not considered sensitive. Text descriptions on the design of transportation packages do not need to be controlled because (1) 10 CFR Part 71 does not authorize possession of byproduct, source, or special nuclear material, (2) package design information is required for commerce both domestically and internationally, and (3) the information that "could reasonably be expected to be useful to terrorists in planning or executing an attack" for transportation packages containing large quantities of byproduct, source, or special nuclear material is controlled by other means (e.g., route controls, escort requirements, and other means in accordance with the Commission's orders, interim compensatory measures, or other applicable requirements). 10 CFR Part 71 Drawings Potentially Withhold-Withhold diagrams showing detailed design informatio Do not withhold drawings that have already been made public through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, hearings, rulemakings, or other public forums. 10 CFR Part 71 Transportation QA Program Plan Descriptions Release-An entity wishing to use or fabricate an approved transportation package must submit a description of its QA program to the NR This submittal is assigned a 10 CFR Part 71 docket and reviewed and approved by the staf The QA program description typically does not contain the type of information found in the generic criteria that would cause it to be controlle In addition, filing and approving a QA program description does not authorize possession of byproduct, source, or special nuclear materia RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . SUBJECT DISCUSSION AND TYPICAL CONTROLS 10 CFR Part 71 Package Information (as related to radionuclides and their form and quantities) Release 10 CFR Part 71 Advance Notification of Shipments of Irradiated Reactor Fuel and Nuclear Waste Release unless waste shipment is Category 1 material subject to 37.77(f) -- Under 10 CFR 71.97, the NRC requires advance notifications to the governor of a State, or the governor's designee, and to Tribal officials, of certain shipments of high-risk radioactive materia Notification of shipments of irradiated reactor fuel in quantities less than those subject to 73.37(f) has been moved to 73.35, which requires licensees to follow the requirements of Subpart D of Part 37. 10 CFR Part 72 Dry Cask Storage Systems
- Certificates of Compliance safety analysis report information Release-Information provided to the NRC typically consists of analyses to show that the design features will withstand the combinations of forces associated with design-basis events and natural hazard The analyses do not typically provide realistic information on the failure of structural features and are not considered sensitiv Text information in the safety analysis report, including design information, is not controlled because (1) the design of the casks are simple by nature, and the criteria for which they are designed are widely known, (2) most cask designs involve storage of the casks in open areas on concrete pads that are often readily seen from offsite locations, and (3) this information has been historically released to the public to support rulemaking for approved cask designs and other public outreach efforts. 10 CFR Part 72 Dry Cask Storage Systems - Drawings Potentially Withhold-Withhold diagrams showing detailed design informatio Do not withhold drawings that have already been made public through FOIA requests, hearings, rulemakings, or other public forums. 10 CFR Part 72 Package Information (as related to radionuclides and their form and quantities) Release RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 . C. Emergency Planning Information SUBJECT DISCUSSION AND TYPICAL CONTROLS 10 CFR Part 72 Specific ISFSI Licenses and General Licenses
- Emergency planning Release-Most information related to emergency planning will not need to be designated as sensitiv Special attention is needed to determine whether information relates to the response by a licensee or Government agency to a terrorist attac Note that some State and local governments consider parts of their emergency plans to be sensitiv D. Security Program Information SUBJECT DISCUSSION AND TYPICAL CONTROLS 10 CFR Part 72 Specific ISFSI Licenses and General Licenses
- Security Potentially Withhold-Information related to security programs is generally designated as Safeguards Information or Safeguards Information-Modified Handling and is protected in a manner similar to classified confidential informatio Security-related information within the inspection and oversight program is withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(d). E. Vulnerability and Security Assessments, Accident Analyses, and Risk Assessments SUBJECT DISCUSSION AND TYPICAL CONTROLS Vulnerability/Security Assessments - 10 CFR Part 71 transportation package designs - 10 CFR Part 72 dry cask storage systems - 10 CFR Part 72 ISFSIs Withhold-Vulnerability/security assessments used to determine the ability of transportation packages, dry cask storage systems, or ISFSIs to withstand events from malevolent acts have been and will continue to be withheld from public disclosur RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 APPENDIX 5 EXPORT/IMPORT LICENSING NRC Contact: Office of International Programs (1) On a case-by-case basis that documents compelling reasons, withhold information on authorized quantities or actual inventories of radionuclides that equal or exceed the threshold values in Table 2, mixed-oxide materials, and enriched uranium above 6 percent unranium-23 Release information identifying radionuclides and for (2) For quantities that equal or exceed the threshold values in Table 2, withhold information on projected or actual shipment schedules, delivery dates, date required, mode of transport, storage arrangements, or any other related logistical information provided by the licensee in the application or added by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissio RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 Table 2 Radionuclide Screening Threshold Values RADIONUCLIDE QUANTITY OF CONCERN1 (TBq) QUANTITY OF CONCERN2 (Ci)Am-241 0.06 1.6 Am-241/Be 0.06 1.6 Cf-252 0.02 0.54 Cm-244 0.05 1.4 Co-60 0.03 0.81 Cs-137 0.1 2.7 Gd-153 1 27 Ir-192 0.08 2.2 Pm-147 40 1080 Pu-238 0.06 1.6 Pu-239/Be 0.06 1.6 Ra-226 0.04 1.1 Se-75 0.2 5.4 Sr-90 (Y-90) 1 27 Tm-170 20 540 Yb-169 0.3 8.1 Combinations of radioactive materials listed above3 See footnote below4 1 The activity of multiple aggregated sources should be included when the total activity exceeds the quantity of concern. 2 Terabecquerel (TBq) values are the regulatory standar Curie values are provided for convenience only and have been rounded to two significant figures. 3 Radioactive materials are to be considered "aggregated" if breaching a common physical security barrier (e.g., a locked door at the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to the radioactive material or devices containing the radioactive materia See the definition of "aggregated" in 10 CFR Part 37 and related guidance in NUREG-2155, "Implementation Guidance for 10 CFR Part 37, 'Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material, '" Revison 1, January, 201 For calculations concerning multiple sources or multiple radionuclides, the licensee must use the following sum-of-fractions methodology to evaluate combinations of multiple sources or multiple radionuclides when determining whether a location equals or exceeds the threshold values and, therefore, is subject to the guidance in this document:
RIS 2005-31, Rev. 1 (1) If multiple sources of the same radionuclide or multiple radionuclides are aggregated at a location, the licensee must determine the sum of the ratios of the total activity of each of the radionuclides to verify whether the activity at the location is less than the values in Table If the calculated sum of the ratios, using the equation below, is greater than or equal to 1.0, the applicable recommendations of this RIS appl (2) First, determine the total activity for each radionuclide from Table 2 by adding the activity of each individual source, the material in any device, and any loose or bulk material that contains the radionuclid Then, use the equation below to calculate the sum of the ratios by inserting the total activity of the applicable radionuclides from Table 2 in the numerator of the equation and the corresponding threshold values from Table 2 in the denominator of the equatio The licensee must perform the calculations in metric values (i.e., TBq); the numerator and denominator values must be given in the same unit .0 =1 where: R1 = total activity for radionuclide 1 R2 = total activity for radionuclide 2 Rn = total activity for radionuclide n AR1 = threshold value for radionuclide 1 AR2 = threshold value for radionuclide 2 ARn = activity threshold value for radionuclide n