NUREG-0718, Forwards Final Rule on Licensing Requirements for Pending CP & Mfg License Applications & NUREG-0718,Revision 2.SER Comparison to New Requirements Revealed Util Commitments & CP Conditions Conform to Nureg.W/O NUREG
| ML20054C961 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/05/1982 |
| From: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Goldberg J HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0718, RTR-NUREG-718 NUDOCS 8204220175 | |
| Download: ML20054C961 (23) | |
Text
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FEB. b W cp Q '
9 Docket No. 50-466 REcyg;yg9.
g APR1819g Mr. J. ii. Goldberg E
ra Tr Q ] sier Vice President T8C 6
Huclear Engineerinq and Construction c,
Ifouston Lighting & Power Conpany 3
g P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77091
Dear Mr. Goldberg:
Su5 ject: Licensino Require 1ents for Pending Construction Permit and Manufacturing License Applications - Application of the Final Rule to Allens Creek Huclear Generating Station, Unit 1 The Comission issued its Final ilule on Licensing Requirements for Pending Construction Permit and Manufacturing License Applications on January 12
-1982 (Federal Register at pages 2286-2305 on Friday, January 15,1982).
The rule will be effective on February 16, 1982 and applicable to construction peraf t and manufacturing license appitcations pending on that date. The Final Pule includes some changes to the proposed requirenents contained in NUREG-0718, " Licensing Requirements for Pending Applications for Construction -
Pemits and Manufacturing License," dated March 1981 and NUREG-0718, Revision 1 dated June 1931.
The NRC Staff re/iew of Ilouston Lighting & Power Comnany's (HL&P) apDlica-tion for a pomit to construct Allens Creek Nuclear. Generating Station, Unit 1 was completed by issuance of the Safety Evaluation Report, Supplementi Ho. 4, NUREG-0515 in October 1931. The staff's analysis of infomation
(
submitted by llL&P to show compliance with the requironents of NUREG-0718, Revision I was contained in the Safety Evaluation Report, Supplement No. 3 issued in July 1981.
In Section 1.1 of Safety Evaluation Report, Supplement i
No. 4, the staff provided additional discussion pertaining to 'your continuing N.
studies on hydrogen source term criteria, systen actuation criteria L(including inadvertent actuation), contaiment pressurization and equipment survivability.
X The staff also delineated conditions that it recomended for issuance of a construction pemit to ensure periodic sutnittal of status reports and N
natntenance of the capability of incorporating any of the alternative systems N.
in the final design.
y We have cr*apared the results of our review as reported in the Safety Evaluation Report, Supplements 3 and 4, with portions of the Final Rule that have been changed from the proposed requirements of MUREG-0718..He have concluded that your cocMitments and plans, together with our reconnended construction '\\
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permit conditions are in accordance witu the requireuents of the final rule.
Those conditions include specified periodic reporting requirements and ualn-tenance of capability of incorporating alternative inydrogen control systems in the final design until the staft has reviewed and accepted your final report. On that basis we conclude that the requirecents of 50.34 (f)(1)(xii) for perforcing an evaluation of alternative hydrogen control systens have been ux:t.
As indicated in Section 1.1 of the Safety E. valuation Report, Supplement No.4, equipment survivapility is an issue to be addressed in your progran on the hjorogen control systems. On this basis we concluae that the requirements of 50.34 (f)(2)(1x)C have Deen n.et.
These requirebents are for providing reasonable assurance that equipment necessary for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown of the plant and maintaining containment integrity will perform its safety function during and af ter being exposed to the environmental concitions attendant with the release of hydrogen generated by the equivalent of a 100t fuel clad oetal water reaction including the environmental conditions created Dy the activation of the hydrogen control system. Other changes in the final rule either do not apply to Allens Creek or do not represent substantive issues with respect to Allens Creek.
Enclosed for your information are copies of the referenced Federal Register notice and ubkEG-0718, hevision 2.
Please advise us by February 19, 1982, if.your review results in identification of a need for any clarifying changes in your application.
Sincerely, S
Robert L. Tecesco, nssistant Director for Licensing uivision of Licensing cc: See next page
Enclosures:
h}SNNNION Docket File 50-466 JKramer LB#4 r/f RMattson DEisenhut/RPurple RHartfield, MPA EAdensam OELD CMoon 0I&E (3)
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1 ALLENS CREEK 1
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Mr. J. H. Goldberg
.l Vice President Nuclear Engineering and Construction Houston Lighting & Power Conpany i
-l P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 1
I cc:
R. Gordon Gooch, Esq.
D. Marrack Baker & Boots 420 Mulberry Lane 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Bellaire,-Texas 77401 j
Washington, D. C.
20006
'j Mr. Wayne Rentfro l
J. Gregory Copeland, Esquire
.P.. Box 1335 O
l Lowenstein, Newman, Reis & Axelrad Rosenberg, Texas 77471
.i 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
l Washington, D. C.
20036 Rosemary N. Lemner 11423 Oak Spring Mr. P. A. Horn Houston, Texas 77043 j
Project Manager, ACNGS Houston Lighting & Power Company Leotis Johnston P.O. Box 1700 1407 Scenic Ridge Houston, Texas 77001 Houston, Texas 77403 l
Mr. Ray Matzelle Mr. William J. Schuessler j
Project Manager, ACNGS 5810 Darnell Ebasco Services, Inc.
Houston, Texas 77043
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19 Rector Street New York, New York 10005 Margaret & J. Morgan Bishop 11418 Oak Spring i
Mr. Ray Lebre Houston, Texas 77043 Project Manager, ACNGS General Electric Stephen A. Doggett, Esq.
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175 Kurtner Avenue Pollan, Nicholson & Doggett San Jose, California 95125 P.O. Box 592 Rosenberg, Texas 77471 Susan Plettman, Esquire David Preister,' Esquire Bryan L. Baker Texas Attorney General's Office 1923 Hawthorne P.O. Box 12548 Houston, Texas 77098 Capitol Station Auston, Texas 78711 Robin Griffith 1034 Sally Ann Mr. and Mrs. Robert S. Framson Rosenberg, Texas 77471 4822 Waynesboro Drive Houston, Texas 77035 Mr. William Perrenod 4070 Merrick Mr. F.'H. Potthoff,'III Houston, Texas 77025 1814 Pine Village Houston, Texas 77080 s
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- L Federal Register / Vol. 47. No.10 / Fridap. January 15, 1982 / Rules and Regulations 2236 J
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I Office of the Federal Register, pursuant Action plan NUREC-0660. In y
to 1 CFR 8.2 hereby removes from the The Commissicn's consideration of h
Code of Federal Regulations Title S.
connection with a request for public the comments received are reflected m i h Chapter VL Assistant Secretary for comments on these new requ:rements, part by revised text in the pertinent the Commissien noted dat final rules h.g Administrat;on. Department of the Treasury, consisting of Part 602. and m:ght be issued on some or all cf the sections of NUREC 0713 and in part by G
the following discussion. The comments ma tteri discussed in that notice, g$
Chapter VU. Council on Wage and Price The Commission held a series of are grouped in five areas as indicated Stability. consisting of Parts 701 through meetings regarding this proposed rule in: below and are referenced by tha use of 7M inclusive.
January. February, and March of 1981.
the abbreviations indicated above. --
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Title 6. Codelf'Fedda.l Regulations is At its hfarch 12 =eeting the Commission Comments dn ProposedRequ a
i hereby vacated.
9
- decided that a furder brief period of ME-07M y1.
e,w.o coce ms.u-u public comment was-desirable prior to M-
~ promu!;ation of a final rule to ensure
.The following is a discussion of that allinterested persons have an comments received on specific NUREC--
NUCLEAR REGULATORY cpportunity to review the contents cf the 0060 items fcr which draft NUREC-0718 j
COMMISSION -
- " - - & - proposed rule and, in particular, have proposed requirements applicable to the 4;
to CFR Parts 2 and 50 the opport:=ity to co==ent on the pending applications.
- g applicability of the prcposed rule to the
!.B.I.1-Orycnizction end I
3 ;
Ucensing Requiremer'its for Pending pending manufacturing license Afencgement I.ong Term /mprovements sol'.14cnegemenyce DesQn an g.
Construction Permit and application.The additional comment
. 7g Manufacturing Ucense Applications period was discussed and noticed in the 43 O
Federal Register on March 23.1981 at Constr iction (PSOf.
AGENC*r:NGC! ear Regulatory
'Q Commission.
pages IEC45-18M9.
. Le comentor notes that dere is an M'i The Commission particularly desired mdastry-wide erfort related to these ACTION: Final rule.
comment on whe&cr or not de pending a ctivities.
N@i p
=anufactunna license appl.icat:,en, filed.
I
SUMMARY
- The Nu;! ear Regulatory by Offshore Power Systems. Inc., shou!d gj,cy,,fo, Commission is adding lo its power '
be covered by the proposed rule. At
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licensing requirements applicable only for the capacity of containments to certain to what specific activity the reactor safety regulations a set of-issueis whether de rule's requirements The Commission is not entirely W@W commenter is referring. Liaison is to construct:en permit and withstand the effects of accident.
maintained with the Institute for manufacturing license applications pending at the effective date of this rule.
generated hydrogen are sufficient when Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) which h
, The requirements stem from the.. + ' appiled to Goating nuclear power plants.is in the process of conducting utilit ma agement ads us@s own : y Commission's ongoing effort to apply.
Analysis of Public Comment.;
-m
- . i the lessons learned froci the accident at, The comments that were received and guidelines.
c.g. y e
- 7
^ Three Mile Island to power plant.-
The classificatfort of Action Plan item the Commission's responses ne ?. 5 LB.1.1 has been changed to Cate
-- j licensing. E.ich applicant covered by'this presented below in-two parts.The first. -(Le an item that is.to be addressed at_,
g
-. rule must meetthese requirements in part addresses the comments received in a,-
g order to obtain a permit or. --
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response to the Federal Rer,ister Notice -
the operatinglicense review stage rather g
... manufacturing license.
than at the construction per=ut review of October 2.1980, regarding the stage) since it deals with operations
-M EFFECTIVE DAic February 16.1982.
b l:,
. preposed requirements set f,ceth in dratt
. 'rca rudTuEn :NFCRMATION CCNTACTL. ; b C
0" anagement.The discussion that J
E Robert A. Purple; Deputy Director....n a adfresses co. The second part -
h follows addres'ses the comments with mments responding to dei respect to guidance avst! ability..
c :n.
p :
Division of Licensing. Officeof Nuclear Afarch :3.1081 notice containing de,-
[h -- Reactcr Regulation;.U.S. Nuclear..: tr. proposed requirements, as modifed Although the NRCis developing
' V:, Regulatory Cammission.. Washington. a.
f
-h[t
. guidelines for utility organization and
..,..D.C.20333. Telephone:(001) 492-7980; d. form of a proposed rule..after consideration of ccmme h, i ' ~ y. f.SUPPt.EMENTAnY INFCNMATICN; -c
.g f C ey. s to G.%Ce C%er ; _ design and construction (ILJ.3.1), the kh/
sA q
. Background of the Rulemaking. sg 2.1980. Comments were received fremr.1 NRCIs still requ
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.<g y C W. Rowley. Sand Spnngs. Cklahoma } capability prior to is' uance cf iN 3~~
MI The events leading i:p to the ~
(Rowley s
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Depar*=en)t of de Interior (USDI)
_ constructibn permit or operating license.
promu!gation of this rule were di cussed in detailin the Notice cf %;csed.
Wrvin L Lewis. Philadelphia.
available. Therefore, as has always ~ -
r even if approved guidelines are not Rulemaking., which a ppe irri
, Federal Register on October _jn th wbC og g:- w-
- been the case. applicants are reqtlired to g
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.1940,at pages es247-63248. In that notice, the Francisco California (Bechtel)
- - desenbe their organizational structure i
Mp Commission reviewed some of th*
Lowenstein. Newman. Reis. Axelrad &
and management for design and
.M actions it had already taken in response Toll (Lowenstein)
- construction, regardless of whether or Offshore Power Systems
]. to 'he accident at Three Mile Island and public Service Company o(OPS) not an industry approach is available or outlined the options it was considering f Oklahoma 1. Is being developed. For example,in the -
M with regard to the review of
. ' Boston Edison Comha"ny ('BEC1 : y~,)sNRC reviews of utility management and (pso)
,...4 organization for recently issued construction permit and manufacturing General Electric Company (CE)
'. ~ operating licenses, each one has been e
M license applications.The Commission Westinghouse Electric %rporation (W) evaluated on a case.by-case basis. In W
- proposed to resume licensing using pre ' Portland GeneralElectnC Cornpany7.. : conducting thes db
' Uf! requirements atigmented as.so (PCE) document " Guidelines fa.- Utilities necessary by new require =ents cr t-identified in the Cornmission's TMI Duke Power Company (Duke) r--
Management Structure and Technical N
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Combustion Engineenng (CE)
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s' Resources." NUREG-0731. ivhich has.
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been issued for bublic comnient' was~ : Discussionh * ':'..r::. Q T '. r U.B.S-Rulen?ckingProceedingon~~
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The Commission cons'i$rs l't..
Degraded Core Accidents (Bechtel: BEC;
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i Lewis.henstein OPStPSO: W.W).,
y The commentor also stated that NRC' important that these responsible for the l.
has ignored desup2 and construction design and construction of. nuclear.
Most comments received opposed-e.
d management guidance in response to plants have a program in place prior to requiring any concrete actions in the -
Action Plan ILJ.3.1. This is not the case.
Issuance of a CP or ML(evenif that area of accommodating degraded. core -
4 Draft guidelines for this task were program is later superseded byan accidents on the part of the applicants prepared and have been circulated for industry program) that assures an early prior to completion of the rulemaking h
i internal comment. The guidance will be awareness of safety problem areas and process. Several commentors noted that Included in the final version of NUREC-areas of safety improvements that arise the requirement in this area. as w
0731 or in a separate document.
elsewhere. The Commission would have expressed in the draft NUREC-0718.
3; LC.9-Long. Term Program Plan for no objection if a utility were to improve was too openended and did not clearly L
f/pgrading o/ Procedures (PSOJ..
such a plan at a later date by adopting a set forth acceptance criteria.
4 A commentor noted that it would be plan worked out generically between thi D/scussion " ^
- 0- EM i
difficult to describe in any significant industrf and the NRC stait ne m P n "
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detail, until after January 1982, the requirements of LE.4 are covered by Degraded core rulemaking was.
another of the four areas the..
3 extent to which that commentor's LC.S.
Commission identified in the October 2.
y program will be coordinated with INPO U.A.2-Site Evoluction of Existing activities.,,:... gg.g 1,_,. - Facilities (USDI. Lewis, Dechtel.
1980. Federal Register notice as. v.
j j Discussion N'bdo").hO,.E.: M Lowenstein.PSO BEC. CE)... 2" deserving special attention. As the rule :
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7 was drafted in that notice, the -,ru.,q Siting was one of the four areas that -.
- -- omment the.
the Commission identifiedin the..
applicants would have been required to.
E In consideration of the c.
Commission has modified thise. - -
October 2.1980 notice of proposed'~ ^
describe the extent to,which their r.f; requirement. which called for applicants rulemaking as deserving special
. designs conform to the proposed interim
)
to describe how their program would be attention. Several comments (Bechte!.
hydrogen control rule and to provide.
Q coordinated with INPO activities. He Lowenstein. PSO and BEC) cited Section reasonable assurance thatissuance of a n
modification requires that applicants 108(b) of Pub. L.06-:35 (NRC FY 80 CP or ML would not forec!ose the ability ensure coordination, to the extent Authorization) and express or imply to accommodate potential requirements l3 possible, of their program with INPO concem that the proposed requirements resulting from the rulemaking w f
proceedings.The Commhsten also listed.
and other industry efforts..
under ILA.2 are not consistent with some features as potential requirements g
LD.2-Plant Sofety Parc=eter Display exemption frorn future regulations that Console (Bechte/J. J --.
are to be promulgated under Sectica 108.
and proposed that the applicants submit m
.. 3 -
an evaluation of the preventive.and.. r-
.ne commentor suggested adding a.
Discu..-ssmn pertinent staff criteria can be found.
The Commission believes that the -,
mitigative features having a potential for reference to the document where the significant risk reductions that theya.
y proposed requirements would not have. would, propose to include at thei Discussion been inconsistent with Section.108.
facilities.
In view of the comments and upon i
Reference to NUREG-oc96 has been However, based on preliminary staff incorporated in NUREC-MIS as evaluation of the sites it.volved, as well further consideration the Commission
[
suggested.
as the requirement added in ILB.8 for has revised this requirement.The I.D.4-ControlRoom Design Standard each CP applicant to perform a plant /
principal objective in the revision has 1
(Bechtel. BEC).
site specific probabilistic risk analysis, been to take advantage of the fact that.
45 The commentor noted that the IEEE the Commission has reclassified ILA.: to for a plant that has not yirt begun,
I standard referenc'e !n the requirement is Category 1.
construction. It should be relatively
(.;
not yet available.
The USDI and Lewis comments are easier to avoid fo.eclosing design t
addressed elsewhere in this document modifications resulting from the 44 D'###'"
under the discussion of comments on the rulemaking/For some of the potential.
The Cocunission has recon'sidered methods ofimplementing the design requirements that might ber-f this proposed requirement and has re'quirements.
required by the final rule. it is relatively placed this Action Item in Category i ILB.1-RecciarCoolantSystem Ventz, easy to ensure that they can be
. g 9
(i.e., an item that is not applicable to the (Bechte/J.
accommodated at any stage of 7 Y
construction permit review). However.
The commentor suggested that th'is construction (e.g., by providing large
' N l
!.D.1 requirement goveming control applicants to describe the degree of
' accommodate a filtered vented..
r=
the need was found to strengthen the item be removed since II.B.8 requires containment penetrations to room design revisions. LD.1 places design conformance with the proposed containment concept). However, to general requirements on the ML and CP intenm requirements.
extend this approach to every.
E conceivable rule requirement could h
applicants.
Discussmn
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p LE.4---Coordination of Licensee.
. Industry andRegulatory Programs Since the proposed Literim rule, plants, for which considerable design 6
(PSO).The commentor objected to related to hydrogen control and -
has been completed possibly causing -
M desenbing, prior to issuance of a CP.
degraded core considerations. as, r unnecessary delays in their.n.~.bf e 4
i h
efforts to evaluate and factorin' published in the Federal Register (45 FR construction. On the other hand. to do r
i applicable experience at similar plants 65466. October 2.1980), did not include a nothing at this time would very likely on the gounds that the Nuclear Safety requirement to demonstrate by analysis result in foreclosure of the practical s
Analysis Center (NSAC)is developing a that direct venting will not result in implementation of some of the future
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generic industry plan and that a violations of combustible gas requirements.
separate response by the utility could concentration limits. ILB.1 has been Taking into account the fact that the f
undermine the genenc Industry program. revised to eliminate the requirement.
plants represented by the pending
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Fed ral Register / Vol. 47. No.10 / Friday. January.15,1982 / Rules and Regulations design and that the proposed sites are degraded ccre rulemaking is completed.
November 3.1980. Sinc'e itemIII.Alis -
-9' applications are of the most recent in this area should be specified until the_ i980, and became effective on comparatively good sites, the Discussiert ~ -
J n w c vered by the regulations. It has J
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been removedfromNUREC-0718 7 Commission has adopted a policy of aHowing construction to proceed while ne regmrement under II.B.8 in the.. -
!!em ULA.I.a lias b'een revised 13.'..
modifications in the sanctural design.. revised NUREG-c718 to perform an T provide clearer guidance by specie / /
~
minimizing foreclosure of plant overall plant / site risk study will. In -
area that mayresult from the effect, encompass and go beyond the - reference to NUREG-MOS..
f. ~. -?
J, Spec,al Cons deration Areas of Siting.7, rulemaking proceeding on degraded core simplified reliability analyses called for i
accidents. Specifically, a s reflected in in the draft NUREG-0718.ne Degraded Core Rulemaking. Reliability..
ILB.8. prior to issuance of a CP or hil.
comprehensive risk study is expected to Engineering, and Emergency the applicants would be required to achieve a more thorough evaluation of Preparedness commit to (1) performing a sitelplant plant safety and will provide a sounder (See the discussion above under RAJ. !I.B.S.
probabilistic risk assessment (This risk technical basis for making decisions U.C.4. and IILA.1..2) study would encompass many of the -
regarding potential plant improvements.-
~
Deviations Frorn the Standard Review- -
other concems related to siting. systems Accordingly, the more limited ' effort pg,,
reliability. and degraded core called for in the draft NUREC-0718 has accidents), (2) making provisions for one been replaced by the risk study.
. Several of the resp'onse's ccmmente.d.
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- or more containment penetrations for requirem:nt ofILB.B.'
, on the proposed requirements to possibly venting the containment. (3) n-U.D2-Resecrch on Relief andSofety document deviations from the Standard providing hydrogen control measures.,
Valve Test Reg:rinments (Bechtel.;.,, -
Review Plan. On. October 9,1980 =9.2 and (4) providing preliminary design - - -BEC). " + -
9"-'
another Notice of Proposed Rulemaking The commentor noted that the two
- was published in the Federal Register..
information sufficient to demonstrate.2:.
entries shown for this item snould either (45 FR 67099) which also detailed Z";
given a 100 percent fuel clad metal. M water reaction accompanied by either be combmed or oneentry deleted. '-
requirements for documenting ' _ 7 ~.
~ hydrogen buming or post-accident Discussion N"b
..),,
deviations from the SRP.This second.
- notice not only reiterated the J' "'..
Inerting, that (a) containment integ:ity '
Action! tem ED.2 has been placed in -
documentation requirements of the first
'will be maintained at an internal Category 1 since it desis with research notica.but also extended the.. W.
pressure of at least 45 psig. (b) systems
" 8**** I'*t** ^cuon Item ILD.1 has requirements to operating plants and.
necessary to insure containment.
been expanded to m.e!ude the 2 construction pefmit holders. A Integrity will perform their intended.
mf rmati npresentfy shownmILD :
comprehensive final rule whichTvill also function. (c) facility design will provide
- 288#C# 08 /"*08/20fi4 include action for the pending CP andc.
reasonable assurance that unifonnly s
- @ I" S 7.C Ib hiL applications is under consideration distributed hydrogen concentrations.
.9 )(PSO).
In connection with 45 FR 87009.
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. cannot exceed 10 percent (controlled.... The commenter expressed concern
. Accordingly, no special requiremenfon-burning) or, in the altemative. the po4 accident atmosphere will net support.
3enisue}.
I e ff.tl forthe hydrogen combustion. (d) facility design utilities to meet the NUREG-c7ia Comments on In'struction to Atomic wt!! provide reasonable assurance that requirements in a timely manner.
Safety and Licensing and Appeal Boa'rds hydrogen will not collect Lt areas where (Lowenstein: PSO: BEC) localized concentrations cocid Discussion unintentionally bum cr detonate and I<evision 2 to Regulatory Guide 137 The notice of proposed rulemaking result in loss of containment integrity or was issued on December 24.1980.
also requested comments en the extent,
loss of apprcpriate mitigating features.
HLA.1-Impmve Licensee Emergency to which Judgments reached by the and (e) inadvertent operation (based on Preparedness-Shcrt Term /SEC. PSO).
Commission on siting. emergency-CO,1 post-accident inerting hydrogen in.A.: _fmprov, License,g,,fgency preparedness, reliabil!!y engineering, control system can be safely preparedness-Long Term (BEC.PSOJ.
degraded core rulemaking and the requirements of NUREC-0718 should..
accommodated during plant op'eration.
The commentors suggested that the.
form the. basis for instructions to II.C.4-Reliability Engineering requirements in these two items be (Dechtel: Lowenstein: PSO: W: Duke).
pombined and noted that the licensing and, appeal boards in the CP,
Reliability engineering was one of the requirements should only represent and AfL proceedings...
four areas that the Commission information submitted at the CP review One commentor (Lowenstein) identified in the October 2.1980 notice of stage.
suggested that the licensing boards should be instmeted thatstrict time' proposed rule making as deserving O'.#C #88'0"-
. schedules are to be imposed and special attention.
The commentors generally expressed Item IILA.1.1 in the ThG Action Plan enforced for compl' tion oflitigation.
e
' the view that reliabihty eng neering is was intended to apply only to operating. He Commission v:ticipates that an important toolin desig:ung for safety, reactors and certain operating license licensing boards would. under present but felt that, because the methodology is applicants, not to CP and hiL applicants. authority. Impose and. enforce not well developed. it would be For CP and hiL applicants, the long term appropriate schedules.
Inappropriate to require extensive item IIIA2 called for licensees to With respect to siting. :his commentor analysis as a prerequisiteforaar rm participate in the development of _
recommends that the licensing boards '
construction permit. hiost commentors guidance and criteria, which has now be, permitted to entertain contentions ~
believed that a commitment to been ccepleted. The Commission has that any par: of additional requirements incorporate reliabihty engineering issued new regulations to upgrade proposed by the NRC staff as a result of during final design, after CD issuance.
emergency preparedness planning for the proposed rule on siting are would be appropriate. However.rne NRC-licensed fac:lities.These new unnecessary or that such proposed commentor argued that no requirement regulations were issued on August 19.
requirements are not being complied 2 m
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1 Feder;al Register / Vol. 47. No.10 / Friday, January.15, 1982 / RuIes and Regul n..
1 ns
~2280.
with, but that' requirements be, ond regulations, may be challenged in One commentor (USDI) recommended I
those proposed by the staff may not be accordance with to CFR :.73a.
that no construction permits be issued entertained and that boards' authority to rais,e issues suo.sponte should be Comments on the Meth5d of-until the siting rde=aking has been subject to the same limitations. Also.
Implementing the Requirements-completed. While it is true that a.sttm, g l
rule is being for=ulated, it is not.
this commentor would have the boards in the notice of proposed rdemaking.
" expected to be so drastically different.
instructed not to entertain contentions three options for resuming licensing on from the present guidelines as to make that alternate sites be considered due to the pending CP/ML applications were these previously evaluated sites grossly demographic considerations in view of presented. Briefly, they were as follows:
deficient. The Commission therefore the provisions of Section 108(b) of the NRC appropriation authorization for g;ff,, y declines as a matter of policy to delay consideration of the pending Fiscal Year 1980, discussed under item Resume !! censing using the pre.TMI applications for conclusion cf the siting
{
II.A.2 above.
requirements augmented by the rdemaking..
With respect to degraded core applicable requirements identified in the c
rulemaking, the above ccmmentor wodd Commission's June 18,1980 Statement of One commentor (Lewis) asserted that have the licensing boards instructed to Policy regarding operating licenses.
any action at this time is unnecessary limit the litigation in a fashion similar to and/or premature. Among other things
/
the commentor stated that there is no p
that proposed by this commenter on the g,,j,, y demand or "need for power" from new b
siting issue, namely by restricting Take no further licensing action until contentions to the NUREG-0718 the rulemaking actions desc:ibed in the plants at this time.The Commission; -
9 requirements applicable to the CP Action Plan. NUREG-4660. have been finds that those considerations are.. s E
outside the scope of this rulemaking.-
E review stage, including the requirement completed.~
Need for power and related issues have to consider certain preventive and mitigative features..
Option J.
been or will be addressed in the-..
individual CP or ML proceedings by the 3
With respect to reliability engineering.
Resume licensing as indicated undef licensing boards. This commentor also the above commentor would have the Option 1 above, but also require certam licensing boards instructed that they 6dditional =easures or ccmmitments in stated that many new requirements will p
may only entertain contentiens on the selected areas (e.g., those that wul be eventually be developed in answer to 5
nature, method of conduct and the subject of rulemaking.)
the accident at TMI-3. Included are completion dates of the studies and the A maj,onty of those conme~ntm.g favor proposed rule changes on population b'
program to assure that the results are Option I wruch, with respect to the TMI density, ana consideration of " Class 9" f
reflected in the final design. Here also.
Action P!an, would, m effect. treat the accidents. In his view, concurrent h
this commentor recommends that the pendmg applications as if they were the consideration of several rulemakings at*
td authority oflicensing boards to raise last of the present generation of nuclear one time makes for duplicative efforts.-
issues suo.sponte be subject to these power plants. The applicants for these However, the comments in this regard
(@
d plants would not. under this option. be overlook the fact that ongoing licensing W
same limitations.
Another commentor (PSO) beh, eves that the Commission should issue a rule requ: red to address the four special proceedings are always subject to
?
areas cited in the notice. Reasons cited matters in rulemaking and that directmg licensing boards to resume fcr selecting that option inc!ude:
applications are in any event judged licensing proceedings in accordange with Option 1 (which the commenter Option 3 could significantly delay CP against current licensing requirements.
g On balance, the Commission f
believes would entail further notice and licensing process (Bechtet. PGE)-
N continues to believe that Option 3. as opportunity to comment before Option 3 constitutes excessive and
. modified by' revisions to II A.2. ILB.8.
N implementation). (The options are unnecesary regulation (Lowenstein) and ll.C.4. is the mcst suitable course of Y
described in the followmg secticn.) If.
pending CP applicants should be action to take' h
treated like present CP holders (PSO)
IL Comments to FR Notice of March N
Co issio n t is ertor auld
" additional measures" of Option 3 23.1981. Comments were received frcm:
h propose that the rule should be issued w uld be mordinately costly (BSE) and made effective within 30 days after Option 3 proposes a different and 1/J. D. Sloan. Charlotte. North Carolina y
publication in the Federal Register, escalated set of TMI.related (Sloan) b The third commentor(BEC) who also requirements (CE)
-- 2. Southern Company Services. Inc.,
favors Opticn 1. would have the Option 3 adds uncertainty to the review Birmingham. Alabama (SCS) f licensing boards instructed that they process.by requiring commitments to
- 3. Minnesota Pol'ution Control Agency, h
may entertain contentions that one or future events (CE)
Roreville. Minnesota (MPCA) f$
more NUREG-0718 requirements Sufucient "in the mtenm,, and can be
- 4. Offshere Power Systems (OPS) b applicable to the CP review stage are tmplemented m a realistic and cost
- 5. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company N
not complied with but may not entertain effective manner (W)
(BG&E)
NG contentions that requirements beyond Reduce dependence on foreign oil
- 6. Boston Edison Company (Boston these are necessary. This commentor (Rowley)
Edison) 3 would also have the licensing boards
- One commentor (OPS) suggested that
- 7. Gilbert Associates. Inc Reading.
IS Pennsylvania (Gilbert)
A authority to raise issues suo.sponte either Option 1 or Op* tion 3 would
- 8. Town of Hampton Falls. New- -
9 subject to these same limitations.
provide a reascnable basis for resuming Hampshire (Hampton Falls)
Discussion licensing.
- 9. Marty Casella. Sun Valley. California M
One commentor (Duke) proposed its
-(Casella) d The Commission has decided that affected units (Perkins) be exempted
- 10. Jane ). Estes. Blacksburg. Virginia g
Option 3 should be embodied as a rule.
from the rulemaking altegether because (Estes) to be effective 30 days after publication those units are intended to be identical
- 11. Stcne & Webster Engineering X
of the notice in the Federal Register, to other units (Cherckee) already Corpora tion. Besten. Massachusetts
$S This rule. like other Commission granted CP's.
(S&W)
M h-Rb nb
._ -=
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- - s-
- - ~ ~ '
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- 5 * }!290 Federal Register'/ Vol. 47. No.'10 / Friday, January 1S,1982 / Rules and Regulations'
~~
- 12. Atomic Indusittal Forum.
- 1. Inclusion of the ML Appilcation.
- Discussion forinclusion ofthe.
Washington. D.C. (AIF) 1
- 13. Edison Electric Institute,.
The following is a discus'sion cf the AI8""/ C#8'i"81IC#### I" #h'R"I8 Wa shington. D.C. (EEI) comments received on including the -
The Commission generhily agrees a'pplication for a Manufacturmg Ucense with the co=ments that favorinc?usion l
(ML)in the rule for licensing of the ML application in the rule and.
- 15. Combustion Engineering. Inc requirements for pending applications has, therefore. included IL._.
Windsor. Connecticut (CE) for Construction Permits and '
Manufacturing Ucenses.
- 2. Comment Pen. d Too Short -
o
- 16. Marvin I. Lewis. Philadelph.ia.
Pennsylvania (Lewis)
One commentor (Lewis) clearly favors One commentor (Cilbert) stat'ed that.
" Based upon the numerous c-iteria (Alexander) rule.The basis for exclusian presented contained in this proposal, and the 1
- 18. Committee on Nuclear Quality by the commentoris that Offshore potential monumentalimpact of those Assurance. American Society of Power Systems lacks a customer for the requirements, the 20-day cocunent i
Mechamcal Engineers (NQA)
Floating Nuclear Plant (FNP).
~
period is too shcrt and restrictive for
- 19. Bechtel Power Corporation. San A majority (16) of the (20) commenling public rulemaking in spite of the NRC's Francisco, Califorma (Bechtel) letters that address the issue strongly rationalization of this time interval **
j
- 20. Consolidated Edison Company of favor inc!uding the ML in the rule. Three others (30ston Edison. EEL Lowenstein)
Discussion New Yo& (Con Ed) l
' 21. General Electric Company. San Jose, believe the ML should bc included. but The ca. day comment' period provided!
not if this results in a delayIn -
in the notice printe'd in the Federal California (CE) e f -.
Carolina Power & Light Company -
promcigation of the rule for the CP Register on March 03,1981 (46 FR 38ais) '
applications. Some of the reasons given was considered by the Commission to.
s (CP&L) -.. ~. -
for this support are the standardized '
be sufficient. considering the 45-day.
)
comment period provided in a previous aY(
we s n)on eh if of CON ED. CP&L FPC). conservation o notice on October 2.1980 (45 FR 65247).
Al w
. Houston Ught & Power Company and resources. diversity el fuel supplies.
Promulgation of the rule will provide the Puget Sound Power and Ught and
- innovation (BC&E). Also, the affected parties with a firm basis for.
Company c nsiderable expenditure of dollars,
- 6. Commonwealth of Massachusetts expert engi eering man-years and' responding to TMI-related requirements.
thereby eliminating the present
- 27. Tampa Electric Coc:;lany (TEC) _
support facility constmction are noted.
(Massachusetts) -
uncertainty and its attendant potential.,
e
[
P"#[g
' fro J: rale would
' " ~ " ~~
IC 5
- 08. Bu'siness and Professional People for the Public In: crest. Chicago. Elinois
.,
- greatly damage the concept of -
- 3. Application of the Pmposed Rule to -
standard.ization and would cast Present cps and OL App!Ications,'~ -
(BPI).
- 30. Westinghouse E:ectric Corporatinn. - substantial doubt on whether the 1
~
Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania (W) incentives perceived to result from One commentor (EPf) submits that.m the new rule. if enacted should be
- 31. Pub!!c Service Company of standardization m fact exist. OPS.
made app'.!;able to present holders of l
Oklahoma (PSO) further submits th'at the investment in
- 33. Portland General E!ec:nc Company the FNP was made "* *
- in reliance on construction permits, as well as to i
(PCE) our understanding that the standards to applicants for construction permits and
- 34. Commonwealth Edison Company be applied to the Manufactur:ng License manufacturing licenses. To decline to so
~
(CEC) are the same as those wnich apply to apply the amendment. especially to _
- 33. Middle South Services. Inc New Construction Permits, with only such klants which are in the very early stages Orleans. Louisiana (MSS) distinctions as are set out in 10 CFR Part of construction. suggests that the Commission is not seriously attempting
- 36. Florida Power & Ught Company
- 50. Appendix M",and,that to segregate to implement the needed upgrading of (pp3tj them now would insert a
- 37. Central Power and Ught Company commercial requirement completely at safety for all nuclear plants!' Another (Central P&L) odds with the Manufacturing Ucense commentor (Mattack) argues that all
- 39. Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) concept and the Commission,a prior plants not yet operating should meet the
- 40. Ebasco Services. Inc.. New York.
licensing philosophy. OPS asserts that minimum improved standards.
N.Y. (Ebasco) the requirements in Subsection (3)(v) of Discussion
- 42. Dabcock & Wilcox. Lynchburg/VA the proposed rule are"* *
- entirely appropriate for application to Floatmg Holders of construction pe mits have (B&W)-
- 43. D. Marrack. Bellaire. Teris Nuclear Plants, and that -[DJesign already been informed by letter that (Marrack) features reqmred by the rulecan and they must meet the TMI-related
~
it.etters numbered 23.2132.33 and 41 are ot will be incorporated into the Flcating requirements contained in NUREC-o737.
listed because they are duplicates of the Nuclear Plant desip * * *". OPS also Phere is an ngoing ru1emaking to codify
- letters numbered 6. 24. 21,32 and 11.
notes that "(Mlany of the Near-Term these requirements in the Commission,s respectively. The letters numbered 1. 8. 9.10 Construction Permit plants utilize regulations. This action will ensure that bMdb t M are end :s contain no conunents on the proposed containments with volumes and desip rWs).
o :.,
pressures compar6!e to the Ice contained in this new rule for pending CP/MLapplicants will be made The staff's consideration of the "pj,"a t p o{e j,n pe appl cable to all helders of construe: ion uclear n *.
l pertinent comments received is provided in the following discussion.The information reported at March 1.1981 permits. For those areas in this new rule comments are grouped as indicated ACRS meetings * *
- indicate (sic) that that go beyond the requirernents o.
below, with the source of the comments the capability to increase containment NUREC-o737(such as those related to referenced by use of the abbreviations strength is very nearly the same fcr the c ntainment strengthening and other Indicated above.
Near. Term Construction Permit plants
..ydrogen control measures). the and the Floating Nuclear P! ant...
Commission,in the near future, intends i
i
.2 f
(
Federal Register / Vol. 47, No.10 / Friday, January 15. 1982 / Rules and Regulations
- 1291 g
to consider their applicability to present relative to degraded core conditions. as Regulatory Guides. Standard Review d
CP holders on a case.by-case basis.
premature.
Plans, and/or various NUREC M
- 4. Imposition of New Requirements.-
Another commenter (W) said that "in documents. One commentor (Cilbert).
j light of the ongoing generic NRC goes on to state:"The current proposal.
j One commentor (FPC)' urges "the proceedings with respect to safety goals applies to but seven pending p
Commission to impose new licensing and methodology. degraded core applications, y_et proposes to more than d
requirements en plants during the cooling. siting and emergency planning.,
double the volume of 10 CFR 50.34.
O licensing process only after a cost /
the Commission should make it ch.ar Furthermore, a number of the individual j
benefit evaluation has been completed that the nnal rule when adopted is an requirements are so design specific as to utilizing identified safety benefit interirn rule to be applied pending the preclude the possibi'ity c'f a!temate compared to financial requirements to outcome of these proceedings and the designs or soluticns in the future. We j
implement i.e. containment stren;6. We risk assessments required by the rule."
thus see these new proposed regulations i
c have a concern that without such "Pa r a gra p hs (e)(1)(xv). (e)(3)(iii),
as in conSict with both President y
- evaluations licensing requirements may (e)(3(iv). (B thru 0): Each of these items Reagan's directive for both simplified j
be imposed with minbalincrease or are either premature impositions of regulatory requirements as well as his 2
perhaps no increase in overall safeef at requirements not yet authorized by the stated beuefs that new nuclear plants sigmficant costs. This will quickly erase NRC or are clearly the subject of current should not be unduly regulated into h
j the nuclear alternative at viable and ongoing rulemaking e.g. hydrogen oblivion * *
- We believe that the Q
severely limit our energy resources."
control and degraded ccre rulemahng.
general goals and objectives of.
t i
Another commentor (CE) also To impose these requirements at the CP proposing the new 10 CFR 50.34(e) can -
W 8
recommends that any :najor stage precludes the full airing of these be obtained through means other than d
modifications should undergo complete issues prior to assc=ption by the the new regulations (as has been done L;;
s cost / benefit asse sment.In addition, the applicant of constmction cos*J." stated on plants undergoing OL review) on a j
commentor urges "that this requirement cne commentor (CEC).
Case-by-case or even a generic basis.
y e
should be coordinated with other opfscy,,jo, and that imposing these requirements by y
rulemaking proceedings in progess.
use of a new 10 CFR 50.34(e) is e
specifically the development of an TL. rule d'>es m, clude some unwarranted and without justification."
i overaU safety goal" eau..;ments which are subjects of other h
Another commentor (Lowett,tein) ng ing mie-making proceedings. The Discussiort saici. "we also think it essential that the pepne f ding these aquiremmts '
h 5 028 NI818 t 838"" 031 futur' '
The regulatory authonty provided by Commission recognize that in many a rule ensures a clear and concrete way d
instances applicants have already require =ents are n t rendered completed designs, procured equipment. impractical because construction has to impose the necessary requirements in the wake oflessons learned from the '
or committed to fabrication of been allowed to proceed on t%se plants-. TMI-2 accident. Separate mies for the plants. The Commission should make 6em.
CP/ML applicants and the OL f
t hama made provisions for w
equipment on much of the proposed applicants will clarify the specific clear to the NRC staff that the new
- 6. NUREG-0 13 Is Premature, Limited requirements the Commission considers-4 i
requirements should be interpreted to and Mis!cading necessary for plants at these stages in i
minimtza extensm redesign and One commenter (Lewis) states that the !icensing process. Excessive details
[
procurement of new equipment to "the staff guidance in NUREC-0718 * *
- have been removed.from tne proposed p,}
replace that already purchased."
riscussion is so limited and so misleading that it rule: where details are specified. tne
{3 g
will probably be a matter of civil suit Commission has demded they are ne Ccamission agrees that new between NRC and Licensee's. Many necessary to ensure the safety of the tj ce n3,,.s will be able to argue that the public.
(
requirements snould be based on favorable cost / benefit evaluations, but staff guidance mislead them into
- 8. Comments on the Method of
}
believing that new requirements would a
' this is not possible, in quar.tifiable be easy.to-meet and low cost." The
~
Implementing the Rcquirements d'
terms, at present due to the lack of a specified safety goal. The Commission commentor therefore, suggested that One commentor (PSO) provided Q
NUREG-0718 be eliminated.
c gets @gg to Optien 3* on the 4
and its staff recognize that unnecessary basis of timing, i.e., this option requires extensive redesign and procurc=ent of Discussion the completion of a myriad of time R
new equipment should be avoided.
The Cornmissica is not aware of consuming engineering activities and y
However. !n its extensive deliberations specific additional guidance the analyses before issuance cf construction E
concerning TMI.related requirements.
commentor would have it provide at this permits. On the other hand. Option 1 the Comnussion has decided that the time.The staff wdl provide applicants would have required only that an C
requirements in the new rule are with additional guidance as the need applicant make necessary commitments.
y necessary for protection of the public anses. Eliminating NUREG-cria at this including reasonable implementation
':1 and that their costs are not exorbitant.
time would remove all guidance and schedules, befere issuance of the
'"y Accepteble alternative methods of could lead to more instabity in the constmetion permits."
(;
meeting the requirements stared !n the review process..
- 0A= s rmns cemin mim oc b
i" rule will be considered.
- 7. Objections to Detail of the CP/ML ccmman's m seleced aress (e s. w. se tut ma 5
- 5. Impasing Requirements Now Under Rule be thb4ct of rumm.odirinn so aho.,
2 Rulemaking waec br Cbe 1. caua s is m ese g
Two commentcrs (Cilbert. CEC) bcens.ca s.i,q e., pre.nti requ.rerr.e:ts s
Several commentors (SMY. CEC.
object to the regimentation. " great wmen'ed by e.e aW6;* r=w.en *c'y$
s Lewis. Ebasco) oppcse the != position of detail", and " specificity" of placing such (d'Qdy*
["QQS4S
' requirements subject to other a rule in the Code of Feceral s m s m, m,ogpecy,,prem,ep,,,,,,
h rulemaking proceedings. particulaly Regulstions. They support the usa of 1.censu T'
i' a
h
. y a
i
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.j terweru awwwe=n - -
Y }.
- }.-
~ '
2292 Federal Register /-Vol. '47; N6: 10 / Friday; Mnuary'15.'1982 / Rules nnd Regulations l
Another commentor (TVA) expressed should be recognized that as an over fulfillment of those requirements i
the belief that the majorissues in the acceptable means of ccmpliance.-
for studies to be completed subsequent i
proposed rule have not been resolved Another commentor (Ebasco) also to issuance cf the CP. However, the sufficiently to process final rule change's pointed out that the proposed rule Commission does expect the staff to '
at this time.TVA suggested the imposes new requirements in areas review such studies in a timely manner following approach as a more effective where final NRC acceptance criteria and to take appropriate action.
means of accornplishing the changes in have not been finalized and that NRC Regarding the Ebasco comment.one of licensing requirements:
policy relative to implementation of the study requirements has been deleted
- 1. R'equire that all pending construction those criteria must be flexible because for the reason suggested.
permit and manufacturing license applicants of the different types of requirements.
C. Another commentor (Lowenstein) commit to implement the fmal rules that grow To expecite the CP hearing process.
stated. "It is essential that the out of the money pending post @U Ebasco suggested that " compliance with Commission make clear that tlus rulemakings, such as prcbabilistic risk NUREG-0718 be considered prima fecie -zegulation, along with the existing atme odology, safety goal siting.
vidence that TMI requirements have regulations, establishes an adequate and '
jssess
"2
- 2. implement only those changes in the sufficient response to the Commission's proposed rule which have been promulgated Discussion post-TMI requirements. While the notice intimates this on page 18046 (of the FR and issued for use by the near term onerat;ng The Cornmissia agrees with ee -
notice), we urge'that it be explicitly f
license plants. For other changes retain the comrnents. The Commission has existing rules pending completion of the post,
reviewed NUREG-0718 and has - -
stated in the rule "f~,-,',,...
TMI rulemakings.
=
cucu at poMn conta ed massion
~
Discussion therein can provide a basis for In the Notice of R'ulemaking (48 FR.
The Commission has adopted Option responding to the Thu-2 accident.
- 3. which will ensure that approved '
Applicants may, of course, propose to 18&t5) published on hiarch 23.1981.
under Substance of the Rule, the -
action items in the ThU Action Plan are - satisfy the rule's requirements by a Commission stated." Itis the-applied to the new cps and htL and will method other than detailed in NUREC-Commission's view that this new rule.
provide for early consideration of these 0718. but in such cases must provide a added safety measures so as to basis for determining that the together with the existing regulations, minimize the costs of incorporating them requirements of the rule have been met.
form a set of regulations, conformance into the design of the facility.
NRC acceptance criteria will be with which meets the requirements of sufficiently fexible to permit the Commission forissuance of a
- 9. Comments on Prompt Adoption of the appropriate alternative methods of cmstruction permit or manufacturing-meeting the requirements.
Ifcense." The Commission reaffirms this Rule hiany of the commentors (AIF. EEI.
B. Two commentors (Boston Edison.
view with the exception of hydrogen' m -
Lowenstein. etc.) expressed strong,.
' Lowenstein)notedthat"Some of the control measures for the manufacturing. -
support for the prompt adoption of the provisions of the proposed rule required license, and, to eliminate'any ambiguity rule. One commentor (Boston Edison) the applicant to conduct studies and regarding its intent, is amending its i
submitted "that the Commission would subrnit them to the NRC for review and special review procedures in 10 CFR d
be shirking its vital responsibility in this appropriate action. Boston Edison 2.764 to delete the statement in j
area if it did not issue a rule such as this pointed out that "these studies will be paragraph (e) that compliance with j
and if this rule were not intended as completed after issuance of the existing regulations may turn out to no binding upon the Commission's construction permit. In soroe instances longer warrant approval of a license subsidiary boards." Another stated. "C-several years later; We believe it is application. However,it should be noted E agrees with th: ommission's irdent of necessary to make clear that the that the Commission also indicated in defining the set or Thu.related construction permit licensing boards or that notice that some eternents in the 3
requirements that are both necessary appeal boards do not retain jurisdiction Thil Action Plan have not been acted and sufficient to resume NRC review or supervisory authority over the upon and thus may be required on the and approval of pending and htL applicant and NRC staff for the purpose basis of future rulemaking.
applications. These requirements (as of reviewing the completed studies. This
- 11. AdditionalTht!-Related modified to reflect public comments) would extend the construction permit Requirements should therefore be issued expeditiously proceeding far beyond the actual in conjunction with a clear enunciation issuance of the permit and continue One commentor (hfPCA) su'ggested of the sufficiency of those requirements.
needless uncertainty. Issues concerning that additionalitems of the Tht! Action the required studies are appropriate Plan should be incorporated into the rule so that NRC staff acticn on pending applications can recocmence."
matters fcr the operating license stage as CP/ML licensing requirements.The review." Another commentor(Ebasco) speciSc items in NUREC-0718 and Discussion noted that NRC will have received the NUREG-0660 suggested for inclusion in The Commission believes that studies, in some instances, prior to SER the rule are:
!ssuance of the final rule is the proper issuance for cps since some of these
.1.A.4.1 hutial Simulator Improvement response to these comments.
study requirements were, applicable to LC.1 ShortTerm Accident Analyses and operating plants and are generic in Procedures Remion.
..J.
- 10. Dasis for Compliance With the Rule nature. Ebasco suggested that the H.B.4 Training for stitigating Core Damage A. One commentor (Bechtel) notad studies be excluded from the (CPJ that most of the items contained in the hearings.
H.B.o Risk Reduction for Operating Reactors at Sites with High Population Densities proposed rule reference action plan U.B.7 Analysis of Hydrogen Control Discussion items in NUREG-0718 and NUREG-0660 U.E.2.1 Reliance on ECCS and recommended that where the The Commission does not expect its U.E.2.3 Uncertainties in Performance referenced paragraph in these NURECs adjudicatory boards to retain Predictions amplifies the requirements of the rule. It jurisdiction or supe visory authority H13.2 Systems Reliability i
+
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FFdarat Rdgister / Vo'l.*47.Tol 10-/ -Friday! Jahuary 15. 1982 / Rules and Regulations 2293 g
Y
!!.E.3.3 Coordinated Study of Shutdown (JJ/O -Plant / Site Specific PRA Study C. Two cocunentors (TVA. B&W) 9 r[s nu no e c po t out tha e C has n t e a es t ci t as e ment
!!!.D.1.2 Radioactive Gas Management defined the methodology to be used in. should be those that are signincant with respect to public health and safety not j
III.D13 Ventilation System and the PRA study.
just generally signiScant and practical j
Radionuclide Adsorber Cntena.
Mscussion.
m llLD.t.4 Radwaste System Design Features Discussion
}
Y to Aid in Accident Recovery and.
The Commission notes that a PRA H
Decontamination Procedures Guide was issued as a draft The aim of the probabilistic risk W
IILD11 ' Radiological hfonitoring of for discussion by an IEEE technical assessment, as expressed in the T
E.Tuents symposium in October 1981, and will be requirement,is to seek such 4
III.D.2.3 IJguid Pathway Radiological Issued in proposed final form for improvements in the reliability of core 1
III D offsite Dose Measurements c nsideration at an ANS conference in and containment heat removal systems' Discussion April 19811t is expected that the Culde as are practical and do not Impact,- -
y e
will be published soon after the ANS excessively on the plant The b
The Commission has considered conference. Meanwhile, plans for a PRA Commission believes that such b
incorporating each of these study, and the actual conduct of the improvements in reliability would also P
requirements m, tu the proposed nu,e, but study. need not wait until the safety goal be signincant with respect to public.
C for the reasons stated below it has and degraded core cooling rulemakings health and safety. Accordingly, the - --
determmed that none of these should be are resolved.Durmg a meeting with the Commission does not c6nsiderit > -
f CP/ML applicants on April 8.1981. the necessary to change thela5guage of the i
added.,ILE.13. IILD 1.2-4. IILD.2.1 and NRC ataff made available a PRA requirement.
5
' ~ ~
Items 3
program outline which should serve as a flyibys. Wee @aie@em IILD.2.3-4 have been judged lower guideline for CP/ML applications. The a
Muccan.
priority TMIissues as reflected by task program outline addresses issues such.
initiation dates of FY82 orlater. Because as the scope of the PRA study,how the Two cor$mento'rs (CEC. 'IVA) argued -
of their relative low priority, the PRA study should be performed, wb:it that the existence of paragraph (1)(il b
Commission believes their incorporation should be considered in setting up a regarding performance of a probabilistic 9
into the CP/ML rule is unnecessary.
schedule, and most importantly, how risk asses:; ment (FRA) makes paragraph k
However, the results and cccc!csions of the results of the nsk study should be these tasks willbe appropriately factored into the design. fabrication and - (1)(ii) superfluous, since a PRA study would include the analyses and reviews y(
. considered denng the OL revnw.
eventual operation of the plant to discussed in (1)(ii) and in paragraphs _
A'second group of suggested items is improve the reliability of core and (1)(iiiMxh].: '
1
~~
1 covered in other TMI action tasks that containment heat removal systems. It is Discussio r. '
- EP .l.Pr '.~~
. ey y -
{
are included as requirements in the ~.
reasonable to expect that an applicant m-v proposed rule. !! ems ILB.S and IL7.3.13 can utilize the staff guidelines to Q ommission d$es not'a'gieelith 5
~
are intended to be included in develop its own program for performin8 this comment. It is not at all certain that I
i 50.34(f)(1)(i), the required plant / site a meaningful PRA study. Consequently.
the PRA would necessarilyinclude all specific probabilistic nsx assessment.
the Commission will retain this parts of the evaluation called for in Item ILS.7 is covered by i 50.34(f)(2)(ix) requirement.
paragraph (1)(ii). The result might be and (3)(v). Items LA.4.1 and LC.I. are B. Another commentor (GE) expressed non. uniform and incomplete submittals N
applied to operating plants and the the belief that :' completion of the PRA by'the applicants, with consequent time-U substance is included in i 50.34(f][2] (i]
studies and comparison to a reasonable consuming reiterations. It is, therefore.
3 and (ii). respectively. for these CP/ML safety goal wi!! demonstrate that the important that the three parts of the applications.
Boiling Water Reactor includes design auxiliary feedwater system evaluation
+
Another group ofitems is not features which ensures that the public applicable for vanous reasons. Item health and safetyis protected. If. on the be specified.'However,if an applicant's b
1y.1.1 applies to NRC and not to CP/ML other hand. the results of the studies PRA does. in fact. include all parts of 5
the' evaluation called for in paragraph 32 show that fcrther nsk reduc applicants. Item ILB.4. pertaining to appropriate, plant modifications
- ycn is (1)(iii. then this requirement will be b
crew training. is more appropriate as an sa tisfied.
E OL item. Finally. ILE.11 requires the should be considered 4
assessment of ECCS data by operating Discussion
- I N.
N#
c
- 4 plant licensees and is not applicable to -
CP/ML applicants.
Based on'the risk studies performed to in summary, the Commission has date accident sequences relating to core One commentor (CEC) states that
- I and containment heat ternovel systems paragraph (1)(iii) is superfluous, given y
reviewed and considered all of the contribute substantially to overall the requirement for a plant / site specific y
additional require =ents suggested by acc dent risk. To reduce such nsk.
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) as J
MPCA and has determined that they are alternate system designs for core and specified in paragraph (1)(i).
h either covered by provisions of the containment heat removal systems Discussion 6
proposed rule or are not applicable or should be considered and PRA studies appropriate 'for construction permit and should be performed in coccarison with The rule requires applicant's to I
manufacturinglicense applications.
the PRA study for the orignal design._
evaluate reacror coolant pump seal
- 12. Comments on Certain Rule
. The outcome of the comparison should damage and consequential added loss.
=
Requirements be selection of a system design from.
of-coolant. following a small. break among several design alternatives that LOCA with loss of offsite power.The The following discussion responds to incorporates significant i=provements PRA might consider this area only the comments received on the specific in the reliability of core and per pherally,if at all since its th:vst is items of 10 CFR 50.34(f) listed below:
containment heat removal systems.
in the improvernent cf the reliability of
-w-..~..
--3...
~
.. F 2294 FJd:r:l RIgist2r / Vol. 47. No.10 / Friday. Januar~y 15.1982 / Rults and Regulaiions S
core and containment heat removal it is noted that the specific paragraphs--
for at least two [2] hours. (applicable to.C systems. Accordingly, no change has requiring study or evaluation by the BWRs only) (IlX3.24]
been made in paragraph (1)(iii).
applicant resulted from
'For plants with high pressure core spray b However, this requirement will be recommendations by the Bulletins and systems in !ieu of high pressure coolant-a satisfied if an applicant's PRA includes Orders Task Force. This Task Force.
injection systems. substitute the words.-high -
the evaluation called for in paragraph conducted generic reviews of loss.cf.
{T'jQC 'uon' ( '
b "HP P
- ,c (1)(iii).
feedwater and small break loss-of-3 (1)(iv}-S8LOCA Probability Due to a coolant events on operating pWRs (2)(iii}--ControlRoom Design '..
Stuck.Open POR V fesig 8h use and One commentor (PSO) states that the '
, b an One commentor (CEC) argued that the operating BWRs.
text conilicts with the predicate given in PRA analyses required by paragraph These ite=s were not explicitly
"".Y'"E8#*""
(1)(i) would also include the analysis included in the PRA in (1)(i) to ensure discussed in (t)(iv)in terms of the th th
- s are specifically
- human factor principles (l.D.1)." Two 8"
- 'E probability of small LOCA events.The 8d 8888 1n 8 58 8888-other commentors (SRW. CEC) commentor said. "the criteria for judging generalized PRA may not be extended to suggested that the design be submitted
. whether or not an improvement is to be cm e aquimd area. for example:
for NRC " review" instead of " approval" rnade should. however..not rest with LOCA probabilities but rather with paragraph (1)(vik study to idgntify
~
connotations in the engmeenng area.,,
since the latter has specific legal practicable system modifications to overall risk contnbution and ultimately nduce challenges to and failum of relief The suggestion was also made that "the with the comparison of plant' risk to a.
the items called for in paragraphs (1)(v human factor principles. since direct?
Discussion The WASH-1400 analysis for a PWR through xvu), then these requirements '
application of all such' principles may will be satisfied.e conflict with existing regulations."
Indicated that SBLOCAs contnbute significantly to core melt probability.
With regard to the second comment. It Furthermore, the TMI experience and is the judgement of the Commission that Discussion subsequent analysis have shown that potentially sigmficant increases in plant In response to the first cornment.1t.
~'
the likelihood of a SELOCA due to a safety could evolve from these studies should be noted dat section (2) does not stuck.open PORVis greater than that and evaluations. At this timc. the require a control room design prior to 1.
assumed in WASH-1400. The purpose of Commission is awaiting results of these the granting of a CP. only sufficient this requirement is to determine whether studies and evaluations to determine information to ensure that an
. this probability contributes substantially whether certam plant modifications are appropriate design will be submitte'd to the SBLOCA probability from all.
warranted to t= prove plant safety.
prior to fabrication or revision of panel's
~
causes. If it does. an evaluation should In response to the last question -
andlayouts.The Commission agrees.
be performed to ensure that this regarding paragraphs (1)(v through xii).
with the other comments'and has. "
probability will be reduced by the Commission considers a risk amended the text to read as follows:
incorporating an automatic pORV assessment one of many tools which Provide, for Commission review a contrcl lholation system, which will give may be used to evaluate plant room design that rei'ects state-of-the. art assurance that the public health and mocifications and improvements. Direct human factor pnnc:ples pnor to ccmmitting safety is protected in the event of a evaluation. as, considered in these to fabrication or revisidn of fabricated stuck.open PORV. The Commission will paragraphs,is an equally valid tool control room panels and layouts. fl.D.1) retain this requirement. However, the In view of the foregoing discussion, no requirement will be met if an applicant's changes have been made m paragraphs (2)(vi)--Reactor Cooiant System Vents PRA includes the analysis called for in (1)(v through xii) as a result of this The commentar (CEC) notes that it
(
comment. However, the Commission has may be well to review this requirement
,1)(iv).
~.
made changes in wording to clarify the carefully on a plant specific basis to -
(1)(v through xn..)-Additional Studies intent of paragraphs (1)(vii). (viii) and determine if any core cooling benefit A. One commentor (CEC) states that (ix). Proposed paragraph (1)(xi) has been can be identified: for some plants.
all topics discussed in these paragraphs deleted since a generic study applicable reactor coolant system vents may offer "could readily be considered in the PRA to all the affected applicants has been no real benefit.
discussed in parag sph (1)(i)". Further, submitted for Commission review.
the commentor states that "it appears B. Another commentor (GE] noted that that many of the studies and criteria
. the NRC staff has agreed that the The reactor coolant system high point have a basis only in NRC staff requirements specified in IIX3.24 of vent requirement was developed to judgment". Lastly, the ccmmenter states NUREG-M18 should apply only to loss provide a means to eliminate gases that that these studies. which are additional of offsite attemating current power.
could inhibit core cooling. Since all to the PRA discussed in paragraph (1)(i).
UI#####I#"
plants have a potential to release non-
"should be required only for those cases.
condensible gases. this requirement where the basic systems and related The Commission concurs and has.
applies to all plants. Although events in.
questions involved are shown to have a revised paragraph (1)(ix) as follows to..
which gas venting would be required are- -
~
significant contnbution to risk-in order clarify its intent:
highly unlikely, there does not appear to be an acceptable substitute at this time to priontize the work to be done and t Perform a study to determine the need for conserve industry and NRC resources."
add:tional space cociing to ensure reliable
'or those cases where ventmg may be Discussion I ng. term operatien of the reacter cere needed. Consequently. the Commission isolation cooling (RCICI and high pressure is retaining this requirement. but has In response to the first comment coolant injection (HPCIl* systems. following made a minor wording change for regarding paragraphs (1)(v through xii).
a complete loss of offsite power to the plant clarification. The paragraph now reads:
l.
l
- ~ ~ ~ - - -
~~
~ ~~~ ~ ~ ^
Federal R'eg. ster'/ V'bt OfNo.' ho' / Friday 'ja$uarf15. i952 / Rules ~ a' d Regulatior5s t ~
n 2295 Provide the capability of high point venting will be the subject of the deg aded core analysis of a condition normally of noncondensible * *
- rulemaking.
assessed during the design of a safety-(2)(vii}-Radiction andShielding C Another comentor(B&W) grade system. e.g.. the auxiliary Design suggested that a maximum rate of feedwater system. The commentor hydrogen generation should be provided maintains that it is unnecessary to One commentor (PSO) suggested for the hydrogen centrol system.
require this specinc analysis in the rule.
Inserting the words " Provide a plan and submit a schedule to" at the beginning.
Discussica Discussica
.of the text to clarify its intent.
The hydrogen generation rates and Discussion
. release rates into the containment a e a The Commission agrees with the function of the reactor type, the accident comment and has deleted this part of The Commission does not beh, eve this sequence being considered, and the the requirement because the regulations change is necessary since the language recovery (of cooling) schemes employed. already require analyses of such under (f)(2) clearly indicates that only Further, the effects of hydrogen systems (10 CFR 50.34(a)(4)). In addition, the term " safety-grade" has been -
sufficient informa tion is required prior generation rates and release rates (in deleted because that term is not to granting a CP to demonstrate that the ter:ns of burning or detonation) are requirements, e.g.. (2)(vii), will be met by dependent on blowdown and steam-explicitly denned in the regulations.'
the operating bcense stage. However. _.. inerting characteristics in the With these changes. (2)(xii) now reads as follows-the Commission has substituted the containment.Thus, one maximum rate word " materials" for." fluids" in t'he text would be inappropriate and possibly Provide automatic and manual auxiliary..
since not only fluids are involved. and overly conserva tive. Not having a Id"* I^##I 'Y'" " I"ItiI "' *"d -
the words " TID 14844 source term" have ' maximum rate does not necessarily :
fnd!catian thcon been substituted for " highly, for t roo ppbcable to mean that the Commission expects PWRs only! (US 1.:.)
clarification.
detailed mechanistic analyses of.
(2)(ix)-Hydrogen ControlSystem hydrogen generation and release for a (2
i PrimczySystem Sensitivity to variety of sequences. Parametric A. One commentor (OPS) requests analysis that adequately scopes the clarification of the word handling m, physical processes for the sequences A commentor (C!Ibert), referring to the requirement. Provide a system for under consideradon would be this requirement. said."some statements hydrogen control capable of handlm3 acceptable.
of design criteria are so general as to be hydrogen generated by the equivalent of neb. ulous".Another com. mentor (B&W) a 100% fuel. clad metal water reaction."
- (2)(x)-ReliefandSafety Valves cbjected to.. sensitivity. and reduce in
~
Two commentors (Bechtel. B&W) this requirement as not we!!-denned -
Discussion-pointed out that this requirement terms, making it difScult to know wh'at The Commission has substituted the '
appears to. elevate ADVS to the status fea ures must be provided. A tMrd-words "that can safely accommodate" of a design basis event.
commentor (PGE) indicated.that the~,
for "capab!e of handling" to clanfy the item ILE.5-1 appears incorrect.
reference to NUREG-0718 actica plan intent.
Discussion B. Several commentors (OPS. Bechtel.
This is not intended, as the Discussion GE. W, CEC. TVA) asserted that the Commission is presently reviewing a 100% metal / water reaction rdquirement proposed ABVS rule. Appropriate valve
'The requirements in 10 CFR 50.34(f) is too stnngent and inconsistent with the quahScation requirements for ATWS are intended to be general enough to value of 75% metal / water reaction in the can only be finalized after the allow a reasonable amount of flexibility proposed interir r rule on hydrogen.
Ccmmission issues a final ATWS rule or in their interpretation. However, the decides that plants do not have to be Co= mission has deleted this designed to withstand an ATWS event.
requirement because'it has not yet been While it is true that the TMI-2 To clanfy the intent of this requirement, sufHciently defined. After further stucy, accident produced less hydrogen than it has been revised to read as follows:
appropriate action on this subject will that assumed in the rule and that the 100% requirement is greater than the "5 Provide a test program and associated a
requirement in the proposed interim model development and conduct tests to (2)(xix)--lndicction offnadequate Core quahfy reactor coolant system relief and Coc/ing rule. the Commission finds that 100% is safety valves and. for pWTs. FORV block appropriate as a conserv'ative bound for valves for all Cuid conditions expected under A commentor (PGE] suggested the use the design of piants not yet under operating conditions, transtects and of "and/or"instead of"and"in the last construction. More specifically, the accidents. Consideration cf anticipated sentence since the present wording amount of hydrogen should not be tied transants without scram (ABVS1 con:iitons implies that all of the instruments must to a given accident sequence (e.g,TMI-hs
$$ns$ d' ot$e be pr vided. Anotter commentor(B&W) l ud 2), but rather a class of accidents which produce a large amount of hydrogen but carned out until subsequent phases of the suggested deleting the examples of test program are developed.
instrumentation that may be required.
hold promise of being recoverable. that is. for cooling to be re. established prior (2)(xii}-A uxilicry Feedwater System Discussion _ _. _
g_.,.
to what would otherwise be a A commentor (CE) suggests that the ne commentor's reference to the -
substantial core melt.down. The requirement to " provide an analysis of
"!ast sentence"is not clear since (2)(xix]
proposed intenm rule wdl be limited to the effect on containment integnty and has only one sentence. The Commission accidents for whrch no or limited core return to reactor power of automatic believes that the words"such as" melting takes place. The CP/ML rule AFW system initiation with a postu!ated clearly indicates that what follows are considers potential accidents that are main steam line leak inside examples of instrumentation that may more severe than those considered in containment" be deleted since it would be required. However, the words " exit" the interim rule. These severe accidents institute a regulatory requiremer.' for an and " core c' olant flow rate" have been c
l i
~
2296 Fad r:1 R; gist:r / Vol. 47, No.10 / Friday; January 15. 1982 / Rules and Regula* ions eliminated to better reflect the design These actions removed the runback -
item is' identified in NUI1EG-0737..
requirements. As revised and capability for turbine trip events. In SpeciEc console requirements for -
addition. B&W plants were required to operating reactor licensees and OL renumbered (2)(xviii), the paragraph
~ install anticipatory reactor trips for loss applicants are under consideration by--
now reads as follows:
of feedwater and turbine trip.
the Commission at the present time.The Provide instnimei:ts that provide in the
~
Commission considers that central- -
centrol room an unambiguous indication of On aEplicatiens currently nndergeir.g OL water level recording is necessary for Inadequate core cochng. such as pnmary review, such as Midland. 'm'e appHcast BWRs. and that it is appropriate to coolant saturation meters in PWR's. and a suitable combination of sq;nais from has proposed certain design address such capability in a preliminary indicaters of coolant level m the reactor modmcations that-may reduce the
& CP s4 avim vessel and in-core thermocouples in PWTs probability of a small break loss-of-Consequently, this requirement will be and BWR's. (ILF.2) coolant accident (SBLCCA) caused by a maintained. However, the Commission stuckpen PORV.
has noted that the range over which the (2)(xxi)-PowerSupplies These modifications include:
reactor vessel water level =ust be A commentor (PGE) noted "the (1) A funy qualified safety-grade recorded as speciEed in the proposed -
i requirement that rnotive and control PORV:
rule is inconsistent with that spec!Eed in components be designed to safety grade (2) Safety-grade indication of PORV Regulatory Guide 1.97. Since either criteria is inconsistent with the p sit:en:
range is acceptable for the plants applicable requirement of NUREG-0737 (3) Dual safety-grade PORV block covered by the rule, the Commission has (which is referenced in NUREG-0718)..
valves, capable of being automaticaUy mod!Eed the requirement to allow that Discussion;.
'. ' '. _. ~
~
closed if a PORV malfunction occurs:
flexibility in its implementation. This '.
Paragraph (2)[xxi) has bei.-l.
(4) A test program to de=enstrate paragraph has been renumbered.,,"
e (2)(xxiv) and changed to read as ?.T,
renumbered (:)(xx) and part (B) has -
PORV operability:
c~
(5) Installation of a safety-grade follows:
~ '
been revised to read:
-~
reactor trip on totalloss of feedwaterr Provide the capability to record reactor
-w Motive and'contrel power cennectfons to' and
~
vessel water levelin one location on -
the emergency power sources are thrcugh (6) Resetting the PORV and high -
recorders that meet normal post-accident devices qualified m accordance with
. pressure reactor trip setpoints to geir recording requirements. (Applicable to requirements applicable to systemsimportant original values of 2255 psig and 2355 BWTs only) (U.K.3.03) to safety.
psig. respectively.
(2)(xxii}-Auxilicry He=tRemovcl Should these modincations be found.
(2)(aviii}-ALARA Exposuresv.-
Systems" :
acceptable by the staff. 6e necessity of A commentor (BecEel)' noted that this A commentor (PCE) noted that de.
mstalling an ant 2cipatory reactor tnp requirement applies to the deeign basisi
' reference to NUREC-0718 action plan upon turbine trip may be negated.
of systems outside containment likely to item H.K.1.2 is incorrect. -
However, until these or similar contain radioactive material, rather than
~ - -"-
m difications are proposed andfound the development of leakage control and Discussion acceptable by the Commissics the plant detection provisions intended by This reference has been corrected to design must incorporate antic:patcry NUREG-0718. Item HI.D.1.1*
U.K.1.21 and the paragraph has been reactor trips for both loss of feedwater renumbered (t)(xxi).
and turbine trip.
Discussion (2)(xxiv)-Anticipatory Recctor Trip gf','y'y*,*,*f*jg s, The Co"sion 1;as tenu=bered the g
paragraph (2)(xxvi) and, for One commentor (B&W) indicates that comments. However, the Commission a hard-wired, safety grade reacter trip has modined the wording for cpEcation. replaced the requirement.
mth the following:
on loss of feedwater willbe clarification and deleted the wcrds incorporated into the design of B&W
" safety grade" because this term has not Provide for leakage control and detecticn plants: however. "B&W believes that the been defined in the regulations. The in the d'52gn cf systems outside containment that contam (or =ight centain) T D 14M4 reactor trip upon turbine trip is paragraph has been renumbered wurceJenn radi active matenals i uowing disadvantageous." B&W states that (2)(xxiii) and modified to read as
' " ' ' "" #EP"'*"I' "" * ***
" plants utilizing a once-through steam follows-leakage control program including an initial
- enerator have the capability to run Provide. as part of the reac'~ prctectica test program. a schedule for re-testing these back on turbine tri9 without a reactor system. an anticipatory reactor inp that systems, and the actions to be taken for would be acutated cn less cf main feedwater minimizing leakage from such systems.The trip" and the " avoid!ng of a reactor trip-and on turbine trip. ( Applicable to B&W-goalis to minmuze potential exposures to for this event results in smaUer perturbations in tha pnmary system."
designed plants on:y) (n.K.2.:o).
workers and public and to provide reasonable assurance that excessive leakase
^
Discussion (2)(xxvi}--Recording Reactor Vessel wiu not prevent the nn of syste=s needed in Prior to the accident at DU-2. B&W WaterLevel an eme gency.(IILD.1.1) operating plants utilized a nmback One commentor (GE) stated that this (JJ(i) (ii) (iiij-Administrctive feature to avoid a reactor tnp upon requirement should be deleted because Procedures and Quality Assurccce turbine trip. However. for each of these task II.K.3.23 was not included in A. A commentor (GUbert) stated that '
events, the PORV was opened to relieve NUREG-0737.
these requirements are a restate =ent of reacter coolant system pressure. As part U18CU38'0" of the post-BU-2 fixes to minimize present 10 CE requirements.
challenges to the PORV. B&W-designed The nil action plan. Table C.3.
- C'#####
plants were required to lower the high NUREG-0660. indicates that this issue is pressure reactor trip setpoint from 2355 being covered in connection with 30 Item (3)(i) has not been a previous psig to 2300 psig and raise the PORV action plan item 1.D.1 plant safety requirement for CP reviews (recently, setpoint from 2255 psig to 2450 psig.
. parameter display console; this !atter
'iis bas been identified as a requirement t
M
,.m
_c..
_.m
._a._.a.-__
a O
Federal Register / Vol. 47, No.10 / Friday, January 15. 2932 / Rules and Regulations 2297 s
~
for OLs as Item I.C.5 UREG-0737) not relocation to the construction site of not (3)(iii)(E) to ensure that they are :
. p?
have Items (3} tii) and (iii), as stated in only top management, but also all considered.in the QA propam.The.
the proposed rule, been previous CP support organizations."
word " minimum" has been deleted from M
requirements.
this section to be consistent with B
gj,cussion B. Three commentors (S&W. NQA.
Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.
E@
TVA) noted that the inference of section The objective of item B is to ensure H. The commentor (NQA] notes "that (3)(iii) is that Appendix B of 10 CFR 50 is that suf5cient quality assurance and existing regulations would require h
nof sufficiently definitive. If this is the quahty control activities are performed staffing the quality assurance unit of the W
I.
casd. the proper place to provide such at the site rather than at corporate organization commensurate with its
(
clarification or additional requirements offices to provide closer management duties and responsibilities. It is not at all
. Is through Appendix B. It is the oversight and communicatica. To clanfy clear how the organization is staffed 2
I recommendation of the NQA Committee - the Commission's intent. (3)(iii)(B) has commensurate with its 'importance to f
that paragrarhs 50.34(f)(3) (ii) and (iii).
been modined to read:
safety'. Ordinarily, duties and
i I*
be deletea from the proposed addition to (BI performing quality assurance / quality responsibilities reflect the importance of h
the regulations because they do net control functior.s at construcuan sites to the ' the activity to be performed." Part clarify Appendix B and can only add maximum feasible extecn (3)(iii)(F)"Is not c! ear what is intended E
E. The commentors (NQA. Bechtel) by the addition of 'importance to Discussion.
noted that (3)(iii)(C) is not clear whether safety.
3,gy.
10 CFR Part 50 Ap'pendix B does ' set ~ quality assurance personnel should be--
Discussion' M].cu.
forth basic QA criteria from which to involved in development of the.
[O develop a QA program.10 CFR procedures or should be assigned To clartfy the intent.,(3)(iii)(F) has y,
mo fied by d etr-phrase 50.34(a)(7) requires that the applicant actions through the procedures.
,g describe its QA program in the PSAR gj,cy,3jon regulations do not cifically address -
5 and include a discussion of how the 7
applicable requirements of Appendix B The Commission agrees that this item the-numbers of QA QC individuals will be satisfied. Regulatory Guide 1.70 needs c!anfication to. ensure a better required for the design anc construction and the Standard Review Plan provide understanding of the intent. Item act2vities associated with building a f
additional guidance on the extent to (3)(iii)(C) has been modified to read as nuclear power plant.The size of the which this QA program should be follows: " including QA personnel in the QA/QC organization should be 4
g desenbed. The controls described in documented review of and concurrence - dependent upon the quantity and type of j
{ 50.34(f)(3)(ii) and (iii) provide in quality.related' procedures associated quality-related activities that are on.
f additional detailed criteria for proper with design. construction, and
. going or projected during the design and installation."
constructon of the nuclear facility,
- g implementation of Appendix B requirements.
F. A commentor (NQA) noted that L The commentor(NQA) notes.'.
3 C. Two commentors (NQA. Bechtel)
(3)(iii)(D) is "not clear in what is meant-relative to (3)(iii)(Gj. "that existing ;
j noted that existing regulations contain by QA requirements. If this refers to the regulations contain requirements for
+
p provisions for the independence requirements for quality assurance preparation and maintenance of (separation) of those individuals who progra==atic acuvities the statementis documentation including 'as-built'
,' perform functions of attaining quality acceptable;ifit refers to requirements documentation. The problem concerning objectives from those Individuals who for the physical characteristics for procedures may lie not in the verify compliance with requirements.
classes of equipment. the statement is requirements for them or their P.
Regulatory Guide 1.M contains inappropriate."
establishment, but.in their
~'
additional explanation for the intended
- implementation:1.e ' procedures are P
Ui8C288/CD independence for design verification available, but they may not be being
. purposes. The proposed addition to 10 The Commission agrees that this followed."
(
CFR Part 50 goes beyond other requirement should be clariEed.
gj,cy,3foy
$d regulations and regulatory guides and (3Xiii){D) has been revised to read:
suggests the emphasis be placed on
" establishing enteria for determining Existing regulations (i.e Criterion VI, p
organizational independence rather than QA programmatic requirements "
" Document Control" of Appendix B to 10 independence of personnel for G. A commentor (NQA) noted that CFR Part 50) establish QA requirements (i
objectivity and proficiency.
" existing regulations now require the for"* *
- instructions procedures, and B
establishing of qualification drawings * * *" but do not address "as.
4 Discussion requirements for personnel performing built" documentation (e.g., as-built
[
The Commission agrees that quality assurance activities. Regulatory drawings). Because the controle i= posed Regulatory Guide 1.M contams Guides such as 1.58 and 1.146 add upon as-built drawings, which 0
sufficient guidelines for independent additional clarification concerning accuretely reflect the actual plant I
[
verification of designs. Of particular personnel who perform quality design. have been abused in the past. it y
concern to the Commission is the lack of verification activities. it is not at au -
is the Co==ission's position that as.
L sufficientindependence of the clear what additional requirements are built documentation be addressed h
organization responsible for performing intended" by Section (3)(iii)(E).
specifically by the QA requirements
(
checks. verifications and inspections.
contained in the design and construction w
08C28810" Therefore, this aspect of an effective QA QA program. Therefore. (3)(iii)(G) has program is emphasized in the rule.
The Commission acknowledges that not been modified.
c D. A commentor(NQA) also noted the existing regulations do require.
J. Three commentors (S&W. NQA.
that (3)(iii)(B)"would require the entire although not explicitly, the Bechtel) assert that the intent of body of quahty assuring activities to be establishnent of such qualification (3)(iii)(H) is not clear. The NQA said performed at the construction site. This requirements. Howeve.r. the Commission that "if intent is to place quality would require massive upheaval and is retaining the requirements stated in assurance personnel en the design and
'~'
...-.-.a_.-_.-
_-.c
-- w.
I 2298 Federal Register / Vol. 47. No.10 / Friday. January 15,1982 I Rules and Regulations analysis team. their independence may (3)(v}-Containment Design Discussion be compromised. Appendix B now requires that danng design. the activities A. One commentor(OPS) Interprets The Commission believes that the ten.
of design control and design verification the information requested on post.
percent limit is appropriate as a -
are to be identined. defined, performed inerting and Ignition systems as not conservative bound for the design of in accordance with written procedures allowing pre.inerting as a hydrogen plants under construction. Accordingly, by persons having proper capabilities centrol measure. Another commentor this requirement remains unchanged.
and sufficientlyindependent of those (CE) states that the level of detailed D. One commentor (CE) contends that criteria requested by the Commission for the requirement (3)(v)(D) that the who produced the design, so as t
~
ehmmate.any conflict ofinterest. This hydrogen control obviates the use of containment structure accommodate being true, it is not at all clear what is p
s m hdre
' inadvertent fullinerting is unnecessarily intended by the prcposed addition.
control which may be developed in the conservative.The commentor argues futare and recommends eliminating the that a post accident inerting system may Discussion detailed criteria.
be designed such that inadvertent inerting during plant operation could
'llie Commission agrees that existing Discussion entail actuation of only part of the 8
Con o of ppe d oO P rt The Commission is noti ting the
] ys es g
r i
- 50) already establish the require =ents options for hydrogen contro y that verification of the adequacy of including criteria for post-inerting and requested that the rule only address the design be "* *
- performed by Ignition systems. Other systems (e.g g
l individuals or groups other than those pre-inerting) may be proposed to meet for the given system design. The
~ '
who performed the original design,
the re u emen sta p posed g
g -
However,it is the Comnussion's required for plants utilizing a post.
)i be f i e pos ine gn n
ine tem base n ea ent a
s spe cati
.e reviewed by individuals knowledgeable. systems. The mfermation requested on g
and qualified in QA/QC techniques to these systems is needed to ensure that preven ensure that the documents contain the operation of these systems will not Discussion.
necessary QA/QC requirements (e.g.,
ay sely impact the safe shutdown of inspection and test requirements). For p ant.
It is the Ccmmission's position that this reason. (3)(iii)(H) has not been B. A commentor (OPS) suggested that, human error needs to be considered in the inadvertent actuation of the post. ~
changed..
,to be consistent with (U(ix}.
inerting system and that partial.
(3)(iv}-Containment Penetration 8'
m ed to pe tait nt a'nalYsis - m this case. Therefore,"accommodataan Several commentor: (OPS. Gilbert. W.
to be based on the performance CEC.TVA) centered on the asserted characteristics of existing systems and/
ofinadvertent fullinerting will be arbitrariness of the requirement for a 3 or systems to be added during final required. However. (3)(v)(D) has been foot diameter penetration, the lack of design. The commentor also suggested renumbered (3)(v)(B) and revised such technicaljustifi stion and the rewording (3)(v)(A) to make the text that all containment designs affected by possibility that containment venting easier to read. In doing so, the this rule must have the capability to i
provisions may not provide a significant commentor suggested deleting the safely accommodate the pressure explicit requirement that the-resulting from inadvertent actuation-contribution to safety.
containment withstand the added
_from a post. accident inerting system.
pressure resulting frorn post. accident This requirement will ensure that post-The contamment penetration size was operation of the merting system and accident inerting remains a viable selected so that it would be consistent mserted,the internal pressure shall be option until an applicant's comparative th maximum calculated pressure or 45 evaluation (See (1)(xii)) is completed.
. with mitigation features designed to 9
accommodate medium. and slow. rate psig, whichever is greater.
and final selection of the hydrogen "
contr61 system is made.
pressure rises in containments that Discussion E. One commentor (OPS) proposed would otherwise have failed. Among the features considered were filtered vented Part (3)(v)(A). as written.'does not wording changes in (3)(v)(E) to make the containment systems and passive preclude consideration of the text easier to read. Another commentor containment cooling systems. Rapid. rate performance characteristics of either (Bechtel) suggested other changes "to avoid applying environmental pressure rises from hydrogen burns, for.
existmg systems or systems that may be qualification requirements to safety example, were escluded from added during the final design..
. consideration. The 3-foot penetration Furthermore, the suggested phrase related systems and equipment which would not be needed to accommodate was determined to be a conservative
" maximum calculated pressure makes the conditions occurring following pent.tration size that would not preclude the requirement somewhat ambiguous.
significant core degradation." Bechtel the eventualinstallation of one of the The Commission believes the present aforementicned features.Of course.
wording expresses the requirements also proposed "to allow demonstration there is the possibility that such....
clearly; therefore, no change has been of qualification of these items by penetrations will not be needed. but that made.
analysis and judgment and not mandate -
that these conditicas be specified as will be known only after the completion C. One commentor (TVA) maintains design bases fer the equipment."
I of the degraded core rulemaking.
that the ten-percent uniformly i
Therefore. the Commission has retained distnbuted hydrogen concentration limit Discussion this requirement so as not to preclude in (3)(v)(B) is unrealistically restrictive Equipment required for safe shutdown l
.later installation of containment venting and should be resolved as part of the must perform its safety function in the systems,if required.
degradt d-core rulemaking.
environment to which it will be exposed use
. ~
a _, _ _
l g
~
Tcdiral R:gister / Vol. 47. No.10'/ Friday January 15. 1982 / Rules.and ReSulations 2299 p
g' i
t danng normal abnormal and accident final selection of the method for In addition. this rule does notidentify.
h I
ccnditions. If particular equipment is not hydrogen control is made.
as does NUREG-0718 the items from de i
needed durmg or af ter a hydrogen burn.
Sy3,fene,of3,gyf,-
TE: Action P!an, Mg60. eat it need not perform its function in that are considered either not apphcable to.
This rule. which has been drawn from pending ccastruction permit and h
environment. provided it can be shown that the failure of the equipment will not NUREG-0718. Licensma Requirements manufacturing license applicatiens, or to 6
adversely affect any other needed safety for Pending Applications for be requirements of the type custc=arily l'
function or rnislead the operator. in Constructica Permits and Manufacturing left for the operating license stage.
License. March 1981, imposes new However. the Commission has reviewed T
general the acceptable meWods of demonstrating 'quipment perfct=ance safety requirements en pendin?
NUREG-0718. as revised
- to account for N
are by testing or analysis based on constructicn permit and manufacturir8 the changes made between he proposed C
parti 5l test data. Such demonstration license app!! cations. The Commission and final rule, and has cencluded that f
6 has determined that these requirements the list of TMI.related requirements 5
based on analysis or judgment alor.e may not be acceptable in all cases. No must be met by ail apphcants for contained therem can provide a basis a
because of the com=ents: however, the licenses whose appb,catiens are pencmg Applicants may, of course, propose to.
)(
change has been made in (3)(v){El constructica per=its or manufacturing for responding to the TMI-2 accident.
as of the effective date of the rule.
satisfy the rule's requirements by a words "cnd maintaining centainment integrity" have been inserted to clarify Specifically, these applicants are: Duke method other than that detailed in O
that this consideration is meant to be Power Company (Perkins Nuclear NUREG-0718, but in such cases must.
[
Station. Units 1. 2 and 3). Housten provide a basis!ct detecnining that the
[4 included. and the requirement has been expanded to be applicable to all Lighting & Power Cc=pany (A!! ens requirements of the mle have-been met.
Creek Nuclear Generatmg Station. Unit Bared upon its extensive review and 4
containment designs, irrespective of the selected method of hydrogen control.
1). Portland General Electnc Company consideration of the issues arisirg as a D.
(Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant. Units I result of the Th ee Mile Island accident.
2 Additional C3 cages z,n Requirements and :). Public Service Co=pany of the Commission hu decided that 3
As a result ofits consideration of the Oklahoma (Blacx Fox Station. Units 1 pending applications for a construction
/
and 2). Puget Sound Power & Light permit or manufseture license should be i
comments from the public. the Commission has deleted pararaph Company (Skagit/Hanford Nuclear measured by the MC staff and b
Power Project. Units 1 and 2), and Presiding Office s in adjudicatory '. ~
R
(:)(xvii) and changed the wording of several paragraphs of the preposed rule, pshore Power Systems (License t proceedings against tlie existing -
..ianufacture Floating Nuclear Plar.ts). It. regulations, as augmented by this rule. It T
as discussed above.
should be noted, howevdr. that there are is the Commission's view that this new E
In addition. the Commission has s me elementsin the TMI Action Plan rule, together with the existing - -
M modified the wording cf several more (NUREG-0660); not meluced in NUREG-regulations. forms a set of regulations.
O paragaphs, as shown in the final rule, to 0718. at have not yet been acted upon - conformance with which meets the - -
h clarify their intent. and has deleted by the Commission. Ihese are items that requirements of the Commission for 7 paragraphs (1)(xi) and (2)(xxv) of the as [e [s issuance of a construction per=it or j
t proposed rule for the reasons discussed g
f manufacturing Itcense, with one l
betow:
action. It is po'sible, therefore, that exception. For the manutacturing 1:, cense s
- 1. The requirement propcsed :.
n scme of these items will be aperoved fer application. Se hydecgen control paragraph (1)(xi) is no longer needed.l ofmplementatien pner to comp!'etion of pr visi ns cf de existing regulations, smce a genene study applica61e to al the licensing review of the pending the affected applicants has been construction permits or manufacturing namely.,!0 CFR 50.44 and Criterion 50 of y
Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, together 3
submitted for NRC staff review to license.In that event, such items might with the hydregen centrol provisions of h
demonstrate that the BWR core remam.s be added to this rule. The Commission is the new ru!e (subsections (1l(xii). ( l(ix)..
H covered for anticipated transients,
aware however, that the applications and (3)(v). are to be censidered combined witn the worst sing!e fan.ure.
covered by this rule have already been necessary but not necessarily sufficient.
'2
~
- 2. The requirernent in paragraph substantiaily delayed and the facility That is. &e issue of the sufficiency of g
( !(xxv) concermng the type of pressure-designs may be further advanced than the hydrogen control meascres required g
operated relief valve is too specific and normally expected at the constfuction by these provisions raay be considered y
the purpose of the requirement is permit and manufacturmg license in the manufacturing license proceeding.
adequately covered in parapaph (2)(xt review stage. The Commission will take and the Commission =ay decide to M
Deletion of the three paragraphs cited this mio account as further requ:rements above has resulted in appropriate are considered. Full opportunity for impose additional requirements. Further
(
renumbering of the succeeding public comment will be provided if studies in the area of hydrogen centrol, f
containment loading, and mi!!gatica a
paragraphs m the final rule.
additional requirements are Finally the Commission has added a contemplated which would apply to may, at some later date, resolve this j[
issue sufficiently so that!! may be comparative evaluation of alternative While this rule contains the basic addressed by further rulemaking and h
requirement (paragraph (1)(xii)) for a these applications.
hydrogen control systems and a requirements set out in NUREG-0718. it removed from the pending requirement (paragraph (3)(v){B)) that does notincorporate the entirety of the manufactur:ng license proceedings.
j
- all containment desi;ms must have the document. In particular. the rule does So=e of the proposed rule's... __
4 structural capability to safely not contain the detai!ed entena provisions deal with studies to be'.
~
accommodate the pressure resulting contained in Appendix B to NUREG conducted by thelicense applica::!s.The p
from inadsertent actuation of a post-0718 for satisfying many of the accident inerting system. These new requirements. To have included such wa EO-e ta. Rensten :. deed J nwry 19a:.
L requirements ensure that the post.
detail would have resulted in a rule that yg
- /jyfpfg'jgl
[
acc: cent inerting =cthod of hydrogen would be excessively detaned and R w m com. m. 6 se w r.
Control remains a viab!e option until restr1Ctive.
W asnmgiori. D C 35'as er by calne (301) 492 es3a e
i I
1
n A
s
)
'2300 Fed nl Registir / Vol. 47. No.10 / Friday, Jarruary 15,1982 / Rules and Regulations i
l Commission intends to impose license require consideration ofinstability For the plants nearing completion.
1 conditions upon all permits and licenses (buckling) for conta! =ent loading due compromises had to be made to covered by this rule which will require to inadvertent inerting.
accommodate the realities of the plants
- l submittal of these studies to lhe NRC for The staff recommended that the construction-in many cases the 6
l review and appropriate action.The Commission include buckling in the CP/
containment was already completed. No license conditions will specify due dates ML rule. It is the staffs opinion that such compromises needed to have been
. or may require that studies be subm'tted prudent rule development.would require made in the case of plants whose 3
prior to hardware procurement or oJter that ASNE code requirements for construction has not yet begun.
construction events.
buckling be met for all high likelihood It is true that redesign of the Conforming Changes to M CFR Part2. events that might affect the containment and associated features g
Several conforming changes have been containment. such as madvertent would have been necessary and that made to lo CFR 2.764. Because thess inertbg. I agree with the staffs opinion this would have taken time. But we had q
amendments are non-substantive, on this requirement.
the time. It is now almost three years notice.and. comment procedures are Separate Views of Commissioner since the Three Mile Island accident unnecessary. Although these Cilinsky. I approve this rule in its demonstrated that large hydrogen burns amendments could be made entirety as it applies to pressurized immediately effective, they wiU be water reactors (PWR's) with standard were possible and that such burns could effective on the same date as the Part 50 large containments, which includes most generate p essures which exceed the amendments in this notice.
such reactors.1 also approve the rule as capabilities of the smaller and weaker containments. It is unfortunate that the Views of Chairman Palladino and it applies to other reactors with the j
Commissioners Ahecrae andRoberts.
following exceptions:
. Commission did not face up to this issue The Commission decision to establish a I disapprove the hydrogen control,
earlier.
rule for pending construction permits provisions of the rule as they apply to Separate Views ofCommissioner -
and manufacturing licenses is based on General Electric Mark III plar.ts and Bradford. The Commission recently the view that nuclear plants in the early Westinghouse ice condenser plants, declined to consider a proposed rule stages of construction-where capital both of which have relatively smaller (SECY-at-244) that would have imposed investment is relatively small--are most and. weaker contain=ents than standapi many of the lessons learned from the 2
amenable to a generic regulatory PWFJs. and are therefore less able to Three Mile Island accident on NRC approach. On the other hand, the withstand possible post. accident-licensees in regulation form.The Commission believes regulatory hydregen burns. Substantially stronger argumeros advanced against this
. flexibility is needed for nuclear plants containments should have been required approach were that such a regulation that are cperating.This flexibility in both cases.
would reduce needed flexibility and
, recognizes that operating plants-which Under the rule. the Commission has would encortpass too many different represent a stabstantial capita!
permitted Mark III prants whose subjects within'the scope of ode rule.
'~
investmentwften need case by-case.
construction has not yet begun to While both of those arguments were..
rotect against post-accident hydrogen
, review to determine the best way to.
make changes deemed necessary for gurns by instal!!ng, among eier means, probably wrong in the context in which they were advanced. tb.ey app!y i
public health and safety.Theref ore, the essentially the same hydrogen control Commission does not agree with systems-electrical igniters intended to
[recisely to the rule being promulgated ere. No legal or logical reason can be C'ommissioner Bradford s views on &is burn excess hydrogen in a controlled l
subject.
manner-that are being added to similar advanced that favors the imposition of It is the Commission's view that this plants which are nearing completion.
this rule on the licensing process while new rule. together with the existing The Commission has taken a more weighing against the imposition of the regulations, is suf5cient for issuance of tentative approach in the case of PWR's similar rule on the operating reactors.
i a limited number of manufacturing with ice condenser containments. The The only possible governing principle is licenses. As stated in the " Substance of rule provides that the hydrogen control the convenience of the nuclearindustry, the Rule" section above, however the.
requirements fcr these plants are to be which the Commission has Commission may decide to i= pose
" considered necessary but not additional requirements, and the.
necessarily sufficient." and that the
'ta the context of the reiected rute for operatins sufficiency of the hydro. gen control sufficiency of these requirements may
['lll,,j',c emns ou(d gl(eme,,d me c
g g,
measures mandated by this rule and the be litigated in the Manufacturing tu expenence wie are protecuen. A si nduly existing regulations will remain a hiCense proceeding. The Commission is informal approach was attempted with de licensees litigable issue in the manufacturing apparently less sure about the efficacy fouowms the m Brown rerry nre. As the very license proceeding pending further rule of current hydrogen control systems in
[",'g,",',%dl$l,'j']@d[* Ns*[of making based on the results of future this case.The Commission states that the stunce et a ar.n ruie to isnare acuens that the studies.For the sake of clarity,if should' further studies "may, at somelater date, ratc etatt thouaht important. As a result. the be stated that for de Construction resolve this issue" so as to remove this commismon wee nnauy forced to pun its fire permit proceedings covered by this rule, issue from the proceeding by -
Fr't"I' " "9"2"*"" * "8"I* "" I ""-
the existing regulations together with rulemaking.
,7c".TZ",h"8M.Yro$SYpt.ca.
this new rule are both necessary and The Commission does not have a wit 3 ngua to the pomi e,i,,mgie na, c,o suNICient as regards hydrogen control technical basis for drawing a distinction encompa.. io. many.uhi ct iii. worth remarkins measures. If the results of future studies in this instance between the unbuilt that the danser is much less when the parties pnma y dected by 6e nde am de hcennes.
warrant. the hydrogen Control issue Mark lll plants and the unbuilt ice may, by furthe'r rulemaking, be removed condenser plants. Both types of plants
(([d*((i, l$'f,$'//,'/"y [,'fc' [p;,,
d
[
from manufacturing license proceedings. have relatively weak containments, and rutemakms to such an extent th. the commission Additional Views of Chairmen strenger centainments are needed in mil te fuuy awere of the consequences cr its ruae Pc/ladino (with which Commissioner both cases.The Commissien should beton unposms it. rureumm. e, opuauns Bradford agrees).The CP/ML rule have required such stronger
'(('7dj,y'.Te de',',l'lf[ll,4 3[,,"lf['[;,'
d l
approved by the Co= mission does not containments now, no uman promion.
l i
e
.., + - - -
g Federal Register / Vol. C. No.10 / Friday, January 15. 1982 / Rules and Regulations 2301
'M l
p.5
{
accommodated completely in both needed 'to be cocsidered for theinadvertent -
Recrganization Act of 1974, as amended, h
situations, inerung conditions dunng normal operatiens.
and Sections 552 and 553 of Title 5 of de The Commission has al*eady
-' '
- the staH was asked whether or not United States Code, the following L*/.;
instructed the staff to use specific
- 'g*,*g [*,P*
\\ejbe amendments to Parts 0 and 50 of Title provisions in th s rule as the basis for,ts considered. Or. to re;hrase it. whether or not
- 10. Chapter L Code of Federal g
d g
s g
position in contested construct 2cn the centainment shed of both ice condenser Regulations are publtsned as a -
py permit cases. What it is now prc.viding amd Mark CI;! ants would buckle under the document subject to codification..
r
[
is that intervencrs who wish to inadvertent inerting and test conditions.
M f
challerige the adequacy of some of the
- *
- ne gene al censensus was that PART 50-DOMESTIC LICENSING OF I
provisions proposed here will not be the containment would not buckle for the PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION f
being required to rule against them g, *, *, the code has a factor cf safety of 3 l@
able to do so. In effect the Boards are fotowing nasons * *
- FACILITIES without hearing their evidence.
__,,, 6e Codelimits are established for reads as follows:
8
%!s authoritarian obsession with the external pressure and uniaxial Aut'b'ority: Secs. 03.104. isi.18:.183.189.
avoidmg of pubhc challenge has been a compression * *
- 68 Stat. 93S. 93r. Ma. S$3. 9M. $55. S56. as E.D source of centinumg trouble for nuclear
-* *
- the case of c w__.. a. Were)is for amended (42 U.S C 2133. 2134. =01. 231 M
power over the last decade.Datit intema! pressunzation that ic62ces tension
=33. =29); secs.:.01. 202. 206. 53 Stat.1:43.
shculd now be applied to limit the.
In =ost parts cf the shell * *
- 1244,1:46 (42 U.S.C !&41. 5842. 5a46) nnless d
lessons to be learned from the accident
-* *
- then was an agreement (by NRC otherwise noted. Secten 50:3 also issued M
that it helped to cause provides an staff management end technical perscnnell under sec.i=.t8 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C :152).
IM dat de pesden is naUy not a techmeal Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under Sec.
F unsettling indication that the NRC may be returning to its former bad habits.
$o'c";'1," N,*7 [ d E 5 d Ee t 184, sa Stat. 954. a s amende&,[c U.S.C g.c 34).Seccces som1c:1ssued u= der Additionc! Views of Commissinner canditions-sec.186. 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C :'.=S). For the Ahectne. Lest silence be taken as As I wrote in my December 17th pm.pos,, cgs 3 1,3. 6a stat. s5a. as
@/
assent. I note that I strongly d:ssg ee
.me=orandum to c2y fellow amended (42 U.S.C = 3).150.54(ilissued with Cc=missioner Bradford's cpinions Cc:nmissioners ("CP/ML Rule under sec.1611. Sa Stat. s49: (c U.S.C 5
of the reasons for decliningto =ake Containment Structural Requirements"):
=c1[iD. It io.ro. 502: and safa issued under HE SECY-al-M4 into a mle. the reasons for uc.161. 68 Stat. 950. as amendei (42 U.S.C h
I do not see the analytic case for requinna
=c1M) and the Laws referred to in g4 making SECY-41-20D into a rule. the a buckling criterion * * *. I do =ot believe lesscns ! earned from the fire protection the Code buckiing cnterion is needed fer
, 1
' I N
^PP'"dC"-
rule. and of the NRC's approach to fnadve-tect me-tes. Ca the other hand. (Ohis
- 2. A new paragr[ph'(f)'is added to public hearings.
cnterion also does not co=e close to meetina 1 S0.M to read as fouows:-
M Fur:herAdditional Views of the detonation press =re (if tere were a X
Commissioner Aheerne.De NRC staff hydresen exp;osion).lf the Carnussion s i 50.34 contents et applications: technicat pg
" suggests that the Commission censider p sition is that aReentainments should have Inf ormation.-
gg
~.-
g an estu ated pressure capahility of X. we the desirability of furSer modiF ing f
'CD*
section (3)(v}{BMI) cn page 81 to require (f) Additicac! TMI.re!cted that instability be considered in I believe we must develop regulatcry requirements. In additica to the h
designing the containment to wiSstand requirements based on reason. If we are requirements cf paragraph (a) of this E
ina dvertent inerting." (P 3. Secy-a1431, substantially uncertain about an issue.
section. each applicant for a light-water-Novembcr 4.1981) we should leaveit open to be debated in reactor construction permit cr D
The basis for this recocusendaticn is individual cases.
manufacturing license whcse M
a November 2.1981 NRR memorandu=
Regu/cicrp flexibility Stctement. In applicatica was pending as of (insert M
"Containtnent Instability." (Encicsure accc dance wiS the Regulatcry effective date of ameninent) shall meet 7
to Secy-81-431) In this memorandu=.
Flexibility Act of 1980. 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
the requirements in paragraphs (b) (1)
E the reasons are given to be the the Commission hereby cert!Ses that Srough (3) of Sis section. This rule 8pC fo!!owing:
this rule wtil not have a signifiennt applies only to the pendi=g applications impact on a substantial m:=ber of small by Duke Power Company (Perkins W
dera on7ade. b a entides.This rule affects five applicants Nuclear Station Units 1. 2 and 3).
at inerung p$
co condition may linut the usefulness of the rule for construction pennits and one Houston Lighting & Power Company eu by presentirg the opportumty for technical applican* for a manufactunng license.
(Allens Creek Nuclear Generating challenges to future operation of plants These applicatiens are for per=its or a Station. Unit 1). Portland General M
choosing post accident inerung systems.
License for plants Sat do not fall wiiin Electric Ccmpany (Pebble Spnngs d**
-ASME Code Semce U: tit A stress Se scope cf the definition of"small Nuclear Plant. Units 1 and 2). Public criteri are therefore required in the rule to entities" set fcrth in the Regulatcry Service Cc:npany of Oklaho=a (Black M
assure with high cocEdence that inadvertent Flexibility Actin the SmallBusiness Fox Station. Units 1 and 2). Puget Sound
$g orIeN:NeIfor Iat c Sice Standards set out in regulations Power & Light Cornpany (Skagit/
e r.
o d tssued by the Sma.1 Business Hanford Nuclear Power Project. Units 1 not result to deg adation of the contammest Administration at 13 CFR Part 121.
and 2) and Offshore Power Systems W
structure.
OMB Regu!ctory Requirement.s (Llcense to Manufacture Floattng This staff suggestion was discussed at Clect=nce. The application requirements Nuclear Plants).The number of units N
a meeting with the NRC staff, desenbed centained in this final rule affect fewer that will be specifiedin the Y
in a December 17.1981 rnemorandum by than 10 persons (applicants) and, manufa cturing license, if issued, will be Dr. B. D. Liaw "NTCP/ML Rule therefere, are not subject to Office of that number whose start of manufacture.
5 Contain:nent Structural Requirements."
Manasement and Budget c!earance as as defined in the license application ca::
b j
Dr. Liaw makes the follcwing points:
required by Pub. L 90-511.
practically begin wiSin a ten-year de
~
-* *
- the q.estion centered areund Pursuant to the Atomic Ene gy Act of period commencing en the date cf V
l whether er not the Code buckhng cntena 1954. as amended. the Edergy issuance of the. manufacturing license.
ge
-i nbr M.
3[
s.
(-
~. - - -. -. -.
~...---.x
'2302 F;d:r:1 R:giser / Vol. 47. No.10 / Friday, January 15. 1982 / Ruhs and Regulations 1
but in no event will that number be in probability of an automatic PORV normal expected air (or nitrogen).
' excess of ten. The manufacturing license Isolation system that would operate.
leakage through valves. (Applicable to j
will require the plant design to be when the reactor coolant system BWR's only). (ILK.3.23) updated no later than five. years after its pressure falls after the PORV has (xi) Provide an es a!uation of a pproval. Para gra phs (b)(1)(xii), (2)(ix).
opened. (Applicable to PWR's o.nly). -
depressurization methods, other than by and (3)(v) of this section. pertaining to (ILK.3.2) full actuation of th'e automatic hydrogen control measures. must be met (v) Perform an evaluation of the safety depressurization s> stem. that would by all applicants covered by this rule.
effectiveness of providing for separation reduce the possibdity of exceeding However, the Commission may decide of high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) vessel integrity limits during rapid to impose additional requirements and and reactor core isolation cooling cooldown. (Applicable to BWR's only) the issue of whether compliance with (RCIC) system initiation levels so that (ILK.3.45) these provisions. together with 10 CFR the RCIC system imtiates at a higher (xii) Perform an evaluation of 50.44 and Cnterion 50 of Appendix A to water level than the HPCI system. and alternative hydrogen control systems 10 CFR Part 50,is sufficient for issuance of providing that both systems restart on that would satisfy the requirements of of the manufacturing license may be low water level. (For plants with high paragraph (b)(21(ix) of this section. As a considered in the manufacturing license pressure core spray systems in heu cf minimum include consideration of a proceeding.
high pressure coolant injection systems, hydrogen ignition and post. accident (1) To satisfy the following substitute the words "high pressure inerting system.The evaluation shall requirements, the application shall core spray" for "high pressure coolant include:
provide st.fficient Information to injection" and "HPCS" for "HPCl")
(A) A comparison of costs and..
desenbe the nature of the studies.how (Applicable to BWR's only). (ILK.3.13) benefits of the alternative systems' 4
they are to be conducted, estimated
. (vi) Perferm a study to identify considered.1 i
submittal dates, and a program to -
practicable system modifications that (B) For the selected system. analyses ensure that the results of such studiea would reduce challenges and failures of and test data to verify compliance with are factored into the final design of the relief valves. without compromising the the requirements of(b)(2)(ix) of this facility. All studies shallbe completed performance of the valves or other section.
no later than two years following systems. (Applicable to BWR's only).
(C) For the selected system, issuance of the construction pernut or (ILK.3.16) preliminary design descriptions of manufactunng license.2 (vii) Perfor t a feasibility and risk equipmment, function. and layout.
(i) Perform a plant / site specific assessment study to determine the probabilistic risk assessment, the a,m of optimum automatic depressurization (21To satisfy the following t
r th Wim 611 which is to seek such improvements in
- system (ADS) design modifications that
. the reliability of core and containment would ehminate the need for manual provide sufficient mformation to heat removal systems as are significant activation to ensure adequate core demonstrate that the required actions and practical and do not impact.
. cooling. (Applicabl.e to BWR's only).
will be satisfactonly completed by the excessively on the plant. (ILD.8)
(!LK.3.18) 2 operating license stage. This mfomation (ii) Perform an evaluation of the '
(viii) Perform a study"of the effect on
.is of the type customanly required to l
proposed auxiliary feedwater system all core-cooling modes under accident satisfy 10 CFR 50.35(a)(2) or to address
( AFWS). to include (applicable to conditions of designing the core spray wesolved genenc safety issues.
PWR's only)(!LE.1.1):
and low pressure coolant injection (i) Provide simulator capability that (A) A simplified AFWS reliability systems to ensure that the systems will correctly models the contrcl roem and analysis using event-tree and fault. tree automatically restart on loss of water includes the capability to simulate logic techniques.
level, after having been manually small-break LOCNs. (Applicable to IB) A design review of AFWS.
stopped. if an initiation signalis still construction permit apphcants only)
(CL An evaluation of AFWS flow
' present. (Applicable to BWR's only).
(LA 4M design bases and criteria.
(!LK.3.1)
(ii) Establish a program. to begin (iii) Perform an evaluation of the -
(ix) Perform a study to determine the during construction and fol!aw into potential for and impact of reactor need for additional space cooling to operation, for integrating and expanding -
ensure reliable long-term operation of current efforts to improve plant coolant pump seal damage following -
^
small-break LOCA with loss of offsite the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) procedures.The scope of the program power. If damage cannot be precluded.
and high-pressure coolant injection shallinclude emergency procedures, provide an analysis of the limiting smali- (HPCI) systems, following a complete reliability analyses, human factors break loss-of-coolant accident with loss of offsite power to the plant for at engineering, cnsis management, subsequent reactor coolant pump seal least two (:) hours. (For plants with high operator training. and coordination with dama ge. (ILK.2.16 and ILK.3.05) pressure core spray systems in lieu of LNPO and other industry efforts..
(iv) Perform an analysis of the high pressure coolant injection systems.
(Applicable to construction permit
. probability of a sn.all. break loss.cf-substitute the words. "high pressure applicants only) (LC.9) coolant accident (LOCA) caused by a core spray'* for "high pressure coolant (iii) Provide, for Commission review, a stuck-open power. opera:ed relief valve injection" and "HPCS" for "HPCI")
control room design that reflects state.
(PORV). If this probability is a (Applicable to BWR's only). [II.K.3.24) of-the-art human factor principles prior significant contributor to the probability (x) Perform a study to ensure that the to committing to fabrication or revision of small. break LOCNs from all causes.'
Automat;c Depressurization System.
of fabricated control room panels and provide a description and evaluation of valves, accumulators, and associated layouts. (LD.1) - t' the effect on small-break LOCA equipment and instrumentation will be (iv) Provide a plant safety parameter capable of performing their inter:ded display console that will display to
' Afrhaaumenc d8"*' *a' correspond to the functions during and following an.
operators a minimum set cf parameters
(.'nd 'N k's"c"*"$n $nNe [pe*N a accident situation. taking no credit for defining the safety status of the plant.
c Resu;t of the TMia Acc: dent." They are provided non safety related equipment or capable of displaying a full range of herein for mformation c dy.
instrumentation, and accounting for important plant parameters and data
.a.
.e..
._ _ m.
gg.w w w e m Federal Register / Yol. 47. No.~10 / Friday. January 15. 1982 / Rules and Regulatidns 2303 trends on demand, and capable of (C) Equipment necessary for achieving exposure. Provide and demonstrate high indicating when process limits are being and maintaining safe shutdown of the assurance that the purge system will
^
W approached or exceeded. (l.D.2)
~
plant and maintaining containment reliably isolate under accident.
4
~
(v) Provide for automatic indication of - integrity will perform its safety function conditions. (11.E.4.'4) -
the bypassed and operable status of during and after being exposed to the (xvi) Establish a design criterion for environmental conditions attendant the allowable number of actuation N
safety systems.(I.D.3) bility of high with the release of hydrogen generated cycles of the emergency core cooling 5.t.
(vi) Provide the capa point venting of noncondensible gases by the equivalent of a 100% fuel-clad system and reactor protection system G.
from the reactor coolant system, and metal water reaction !ncluding the consistent with the expected occurrence other systems that may be required to environmental conditions created by rates of severe overcooling events 4
maintain adequate core cooling.
activation of the hydrogen control (considering both anticipated transients N
Systems to achieve this capability shall system.
and accidents). (Applicable to B&W be capable of being operated from;he (D)If the method chosen for hydrogen designs only). (!!.E.5.1) 9 control room and their operation shall control is a post-accident inerting (xvii) Provide instrumentation to d'
not lead to an unacceptable increase in system. Inadvertent actuation of the measure, record and readout in the the probability ofloss-of-coolant system can be safely accommodated control room: (A) containtnent pressure.
r 4
i accident or an unacceptable challenge during plant operation.
(B) containment water level. (C)
N to containment integrity. (U.B.1)
(x) Provide a test program and containment hydrogen concentration.
M
[vii) Perform radiation and shielding associated model development and (D) containment radiation intensity (high design reviews of spaces around conduct tests to qualify reactor coolant level), and (E) noble gas effluents at all '
M systems that may, as a result of an system relief and safety valves ~and. fer potential, accident release points.
4 accident. contain TID 14844 source term PWR's PORV block valves, for all fluid Provide for continuous sampling of -
E radioactive materials and design as conditions expected under operating radioactive iodines and particulates in O
necessary to permit adequate access to conditions, transients and accidents.
gaseous effluents from a!! potential '
?d important areas and to protect safety Consideration of anticipated transients accident release points, and for onsite 'e W
equipment from the radiation without scram (ATWS) conditions shall capability to analyze and measure thes environment. (U.B. )
be included in the test program. Actual samples. (U.F.1)
G (viii) Provide a capability to promptly testing (xvii) Provide instruments that h
obtain and analyze samples from the not be carried out until subsequent provide in the control room an 2
reactor coolant system and containment phases of the test program are unambiguous indication of inadequate fj developed.,de direct indication of reliefcore cooling. such as primary coolant ~
v (U.D.1) tljat may contain TID 14844 source term g
radioactive materials without radiation (xi) Provi saturation meters in PWTs. and a exposures tc any Individual exceedmg 5 and safety valve position (open or suita,;e combination of signa;s from-.
p t
g rem to the whole.bcdy or 75 rem to the closed) in the control room. (U.D.3) indicators of coolant levelin the reactor g
extremities. Materials to be analyzed (xii) Provide automatic and manual -
nssel and in-core thermocouples tn -
g and quantified include certain auxiliary feedwater (AFW) syster:i PW,R*s and BWR s. (U.F.2),
y l
radionuclides that are indicators of the initiation. and provide auxiliary degree cf core damage (e g., noble gases. feedwater system flow indication in the (xix) Provide instrumentation lodines and cesiums, and non. volatile control room. (Applicable to PWR's adequate for monitoring
- plant g:
conditions following an accident that isotopes), hydrogen in ths containment only) (II.E.1.2) atmosphere.. dissolved gases, chloride.'
(xiii) Provide pressurizer heater power includes core damage. (11.F.3) p and boron concentrations. (!!.B.3) supply and associated motive and (xx) Provide power supplies for
~
(ix) Provide a system for hydrogen control power interfaces sufficient to pressunzer relief valves. biock valves.
control that can safely accommodate establish and maintain natural and levelindicaters such that:(A) Level indicators are cowered from vital tuses:
E hydrogen generated by the equivalent of circulation in hot standby conditions a 100% fuel. clad metal water reaction.
with only onsite power available.
(B) motive and control power g
Preliminary design information on the (Applicable to PWR's only) (!!.E.3.1) connections to the emergency power 3
tentatively preferred system option of (xiv) Provide containment isolation sources are through devices qualified in 3
those being evaluated in paragraph systems that: (U.E.4.0) accordance with requirements g
(1)(xii) of this section is sufficient at the (A) Ensure all nen. essential systems applicable to systems important to y
construction permit stage. The hydrogen are isolated automatically by the safety and (C) electric power is provided y
control system and associate'd systems containment isolation system.
from emergency power sources.
g shall provide. with reasonable '
(B) For each non-essential penetration (Applicable to PWTs only).(U.G.1) assurance, that: (U.S 8)
(except instrument lines) have two (xxi) Design auxiliary heat removal p
concentrations in the containment do (C) Do not result ia reopening of the and manual actions can be taken to q
(A) Uniformly distnbuted hydrogen isolation barriers in series.
systems such that necessary automatic
+
not exceed 10% during and following an containment isolation valves on ensure proper functioning when the f
accident that releases an equivalent -
resetting of the isolation signal.
main feedwater system is not operable.
amount of hydrogen as would be (D) Utilize a containment set point (Applicable to B%Ts only). (ll.K.1.20) y generated from a 100% fuel clad metal-pressure for initiaung containment (xxii) Perform a failure modes and c
[$
water reaction. or that the post. accident isolation as low as is compatible with effects analysis of the in'tegrated control atmosphere will not support hydrogen normal operation.
system (ICS) to include consideration of combustion.
(E) Include automatio c!csing on a failures and effects ofinput and output 1
(B) Combustible concentrations of high radiation signal for all systems that signals to the ICS. (Applicable to B&W.
{
hydrogen will not collect in areas where provide a path to the environs.
designed plants only). (!!.K.2.3)
{
unintended combustion or detonation (xv) Provide a capability for (xxiii) Provide, as part of the reactor r
' could cause loss of containment containment purging / venting designed protection system, an anticipatory integrity orloss of appropriate to minimize the purgmg time consistent.
reactor trip that would be actuated on mitigatirg features.
with ALARA principles for occupational loss of tnain feedwater and c:1 turbine t
i
,.__ w _
w..
u j
2304 Fcd;rd R::gistir / Vol. 47. No.10 / Friday, January 15. 1982 / Rules and Regulations
'i' trip. (Applicable to B&W-designed responsible for performing the functions; are referenced in paragraphs plants only). (II.}C.2.10).
(B) performing quality assurance / quality (f)(3)(v)(A)(1) and (f)(3)(v)(B)(f) of this (xxiv) Provide the capability to record control functions at construction sites to section. were approved for reactor vessel water livelin one the maximum feasible extent:(C) incorporation by reference by the location on recorders that meet normal. including QA personnelin the Director of the Office of the Federal
]
3 post. accident recording requirements.
documented review of and concurrence Register. A notice of any changes made (Applicable to BWR's only). (ILK.323) in q:uality related procedures associatedto the materialincorporated by (xxv) Provide an onsite Technical wit. design. construction and reference win be published in the Support Center, an onsite Operati;nal installation:(D) establishing criteria for FederalRegister. Copies of the ASME.
Support Center, and, for construction
. determining QA. programmatic Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code =ay be permit applications only, a nearsite requirements:(E] establishing purchased from the American Society of Emergency Operations Facility.
qualification requirements for QA and Mechanti.al Engineers. United a
(ULA.I.21 QC persormel:(F) sizing the QA staff Engineering Center. 345 East 47th St (xxvi) Provide for leakage centrol and commensurate with its duties and New York NY 20017. It is also availab!e 4
detection in the design of systems responsibilities: (G) establishing for inspection st the Nuclear Regulatcry ~
outside containment that contain (or procedures for maintenance of"as-Commission's Public Document Rqom.
might contain)'nD 14844 source term built" documentation: and (H) providics 1717 H St NW War.hington.D.C.
I-radioactive materials following an a QA role in design and analysis (1) Containment structure loadings accident. Applicants shall subaf t a activities. [1.F2)
~
produced by an inadvertent full i
leakage control program, including an (iv) Provide one crmore dedicated actuation of a post-accident inerting initial test program, a schedule fcr re-containment penetrations, equivalent in hydrogen comrol system (assuming testing these systems, and the acticns to size to a single 3-foot diameter oper.ing; carbon diox!de) but not including,
9 be taken for nunimizing leakage from in order not to preclude future seismic or desip basis accident -
such systems. ' Die goal is to mini =ize :
installation of systems to prevent loadings will not produce stresses in po'ential exposures to workers and containment failure, such as c filtered steel containments in excess of the public, and to provide reasonable vented containment system. (ILB.8) limits set forth in the ASME Boiler and.
assurance that excessive leakage will (v) Provide preliminary desip not prevent the use of systems needed in information at a level of detail Pressure Vessel Code. Section IH. -
an emergency. (ULD.I.1)
. consistent with that normally required Division 1. Subsubarticle NE-3220, 3
(xxvii) Prov:de for monitoring of at the construction permit stage of Service Level A Limits except that review sufficient to demonstrate that:.
evalua tion of instability is not required inplant radiat:en and airberne radioactivity as appropriate for a broad (U.B 8).
(for concrete contam=ents the loadings (A](1) Containmentintegrity w specified above will not produce strains
. range of routine and accident maintained (i.e. for steel conum, ill be -in the containmentlinerin excess of the conditions. (HLD.3.3) m ents -
(xxviii) Evaluate potential pathways by meeting the requirements of the limits set forth in the ASME Eoiler and 4'
for radioactivity and radiation that may ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
Pressure Vessel Code. Section UI..
lead to control reorc habitalfility Section HL Division i. Subsubarticle --
Division Subiubarticle CC-37:0, problems under accident conditions NE-33 0, Service Level C L!mits, except Service L ad Category,(?)The resulting in a TID 14844 source term that evaluation cfinstability is not C$i[d;
' Pabii / to saf release, and make necessary design requ: red. considering pressure and dead te s' a provisions to precluce such proolems.
lead alone. For concrete contain=ents times (fer steel and concrete (IILD.3.4) by meeting the requirements of the cakulated to result from car [cen :iioxidecon (3) To satisfy the following ASME Boiler Pressure Vessel Code, requirements, the application shall
- Section HL Division : Subsubarticle CC-fnertmg.
provide sufficient information to 3720. Factored Load Category.
(vi) For plant designs with[extemal demonstrate that the requir'e=ent has considering pressure and dead load hycrogen recembmers, provide been met. This information is of the type alone) dur=g an accident that releases redundant dedicated containment custamanly required to satisfy hydrogen generated from 200% fuel clad penetrations so that, assuming a p!nde paragraph (a)(1) of this section or to metal-water reaction accompanied by failure, the recombiner syste=s can be i
address the applicant's technical either hydrogen burning or the added ". connected to the containment qualifications and management pressure from post-accident inerting atmosphere. (ILE.4.1) structure and competence.
assuming carbon dioxide is the inerting (vii) Provide a descriptico of the (1) Provide administrative procedures agent. As a mmimum, the specific code manhgement plan fer' design and
- for evaluating operating, design and requirements set forth above construction activities. to include: (A) construction experience and fo'r '
appropriate f'or each type of the crganizational and management ensuring that applicable important containment will be met for a structure singularly responsible for industry expenencas will be provided in combinatica of dead load and an direction of desip and construction of '
a timely manner to those designing and intemal pressure of 45 psig. Modest thy proposed plant:(B) technical constructing the plant. (LC.5) deviations from these enteiia wiH be resources director by the applicant:(C)
(ii) Ensure that the quality assurance considered by the staff,if good cause is details of the inte:.fon of desip and (QA) list required by CriterionIL App.
shown by an applicant. Systems construction within the applictnt's
'.B.10 CFR Part 50 includes all structures, necessary to ensure containment organization and the manner by which systems, and components important to
' integrity shr.ll also be demonstrated to the applicant will ensure close:
safety. (LF.1) perfonn their functi,on tmder these integration of the architect entneer and (iii) Establish a' quality assurance conditions..
the nuclear steam supply vendor:(D)
~
(QA) program based on consideration (2) Subarticle NF5s:00. Division 1. and proposed procedures for handling the of:(A) Ensuring independence of the subarticle CC-37 0, Division 2. cf
- transition to operation:(E) the degree of organization performing checking Section In of the July 1.1980 ASME.
top level management oversight and functions from the organization Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which technical control to be exercised by the e
e'
~ _.
n P
f.
W
(
Federal Rei;ister / Vol. 47. NO.10 / Fr: day, January '15,1982 / Rules and' Regulations 2305
,' n i
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[
applicant during design and (iii)In announcing the result cf its
{ 101.3-7 Delegations of authority to construction, including the prtparation review cf any Appeal Board stay conduct prograrn activities in field offices.
]
and i:::plementation cf procedures decisien. the Commission may allow the Pursuant to authority vested in me by necessary to guide the effort. (11.}.3.1) proceeding to run its ordinary course or the Small Business Act. 72 Stat. 384, as ks give whatever instructions as to de amended, and the Small Business PART 2-RULES OF FRACTICE FOR future bandling cf the proceeding it Investment Act of 1953. 72 Stat. 639, as Y
DCMESTIC LICENSING FROCEEDINGS deems apprepnate (for example,it may amended the following aubudty is h
direct the ApvealBoard to review the hereby delegated to field positions as
(-l
- 3. The Author:ty citation for Part :
merits f particular issues m expedited hereinafter set fcrth:
{
b reads as,fo!!ows:
fashion: fumish policy guidance with Preface
(
Authority::ses. letp snd 181. P*.b. L
- respeu to particular issues: or decide to 70168 Stat. 950 and 953. [4 U.S.C 0 01(p) revi*w the merits of particularissues The pclicies rules. procedures 4=d c ther requiremen:s. as wei! as c:ta*: ens to t. e and 2:3t u:191. as amended. Pub. L 87-615.
itself, bpassug ie Appeal Board).
statutes. gae : uni; Se ;re; ams for w mch 75 Otet. 409 (42 U.S.C r.041); sec 20L as amended. Pub. L 93-438. 88 Stat.1:42 (42 Dated at Washington. D.C this 12th day of th:s de:egation of au$c ::y is issued. are i
U.S.C $841): 5 U.S C 552: unless otherwise January 1982.
contair.ed in vanus pris ci he Regdaucas -
noted. Sections 2.000-2.206 also issued under For the Nuc! ear Regulatory Cac:miss:en.
of the Small Bus: ness Admints::aton.
[
Chapter I of Tide 13 of the Ccde of Federal i
sec.186. Pub. L a3-rC3. Sa Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C Samuel 1. Chilk.
Regulations. as amended hem time to time m
- 36) and sec. 206. Pub. L S438. 88 Stat.
g,,7,3c,7,f g3, coy gj,,jo, the Federal Register.
w 1:46 (43 U.S.C 5848). Secticns 2.8o0-2.308
~
k N D* "b"7**4*"-8 **' **3 also U-~d under 5 U.S.C 553.
Part I-Financing Program -
I sit.t.mo coes 7ssw.u N -
{/
- Ai"" AFP*I A" U
l hs (e)(1)(ii) and (e)(3)[ili) of
{
..evised to read as follows:
- 1. Business Loans (Small Business Act)
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION l 2.764 Imrnemate effectiveness of certain (SBAct).
e
. a. To, approve or decline direct and j
lostial decisions.
13 CFR Part 101 tmmediate participation secton 7(a) business 6
S Po;2, Amot. 221 loans (except section 7ta)(13Hoans) not (e) * *.
exceeding the following amounts (SBA IgI...
Administratlon; Celegations of share):
L (ii)In tesching the:r decisions the Authority To Conduct Prograrn
~
Boarda sh0uld interpret exist:ng Activities in Field Offices t swo l o vegulau,ons and regdatory policies with I smw
'due consideration to the.mclicanons for ' AGENCY:Small Business kdministration. oia,. ae,,,,
- som o
m one s.g
.wnw_) mm mm L
those regulations and polices of Se ACTION: Final rWe.
?
Three MileIsland accident As provided mu mu suuuARY:SBA is revising its.
c., cm., rice o,,.co m.ooo
.s3aroo
[
in paragraph (e)(3) of this section.'in aidition to takin3 8eneric rulemakina delegations of authority to field of5ces.
m o*='v ceci c-==
mm m ooo mm m eco t
actions. the 'enatssion wdl be
%'..is revision will inccrparate changes in ma==ooceo,c-u J
f m ew emncy o o mu m ooo prcviding case-by. case guidance on the Agency's lending progra=s and m r~ nom u n. - am changes in regulatory policies i:1 crganization of statutory provisiens C*c*"****
- C' mj conducting its reviews in adjudicatory caused by de enactment at Pub. L 97-m sem t.un sc.c e. r,
.'N proceedings.The Boards shall. in turn.
35: reorganizatica cf SBA's !!ald of! Ice y0;o N"
~ '
structure includmg the installation cf tne c,.,,, c.3,, c%.ne o p,
, m aca mu apply these revised regulations and new Area Director (Disaster) ard other 04 Brecn umr. Escan Fu. l g
policies in cases then pending before them fo the extent that Sey are disaster positions: and additionally I"', '[o* L "*" C^"l C
[
m ooo applicable. The Ccm=ission expects the cancels the Pilot Program in the on amw e un u.w.an l Columbia. S.C. District Office.
g,g - eos w ;
!.fcensing Boards to pay particular attention in their dec;sicas to analymng EFFECTIVE DATE: January 15.1982.-
03i sancn u.ng. F m s er g
$ mBw un.g.Wu 7
the eddence en those safety and FOR F1JRTrtER INFORMATION CONTACT:-
04 environmental issues arising under Ronald Allen. Paperwork Mana5ement coe cims wo o p
- a. si C"'
app!! cable Commission regulations and Branch. Small Business Administration.
policies which the Boards believe 1441 "L" Street. NW., Washington, D.C.
present serious, close questions and
- m18 (202] 653-8538.
- b. Gaaranty Loans. 7(a) busmess Io.ns which the Boards believe may be crucial SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Part 101 (except section 7(al(13) loans):
to whether a license should become consists of rules relating to the Agency's effective before full appe!! ate review is organization and procedures: therefore.
I ao.o i c.an.
completed. Furthermore, the Boards notice of proposed rulemaking and l Sa" should ident:fy any apects of the case public participation thereon as 7c *o'** ^ *""",".
5 "m m
s which in their judg=ent, present issues presenbed in 5 U.S.C. 553 is not required m a== a.e,.~ moi N
SN on which prompt Commission policy
, and this revisien of Part 101is adyted jy guidance is called for.The Boards may widout rescrt to these proceduas.
m cm, cmici o.ua soo coo soc eco 500 000 request the assistance of the parties in
- ^="re c* D *c="53 --
rri cr.
nc ig oro sooroo sococo P ART 101--ADMINISTRATION identifymg suchjo'cy issues but.
m rnneuu ne us u
absent specific Commissica directives.
Acccrdingly pursuant to authority in "o*
C"'*- * * " * * * * *
- u~m o
such policy issues shall not be Se Section 5(b)(6) cf the Small Eusiness m so.w-v u n so.wn r. '
""**3 5* *o subject of discovery, examination or Act.15 U.S.C. 634. I 101.3-2 of Part 101.
"2 "EN.'".7D.D l sm oco cross examination.
Chapter I. Title 13 of the Ccde of Fedcral sonnea sm ooe Regulations is revised to read as
,3)...
follows:
nu sancn wen.s. se o wo ! uwe om,,.
m q
1 k
i
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.-