Text

Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding the Implementation of Alternative Source Term
	ML033530478
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	12/12/2003
From:	O'Connor W; DTE Energy
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	NRC-03-0095
	Download: ML033530478 (61)
	v • d • e

lWilliam T. O'Connor, Jr.

Vice President, Nuclear Generation Fermi 2 6400 North Dixie 1Hwy., Newport, Michigan 48166 Tel: 734-586-5201 Fax: 734-586-4172 DTE Energy-10CFR50.90 10CFR50.67 December 12, 2003 NRC-03-0095 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington D C 20555-0001

References:

1) Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43

2) Detroit Edison Letter to NRC, "Proposed License Amendment for the Implementation of Alternative Radiological Source Term Methodology," NRC-03-0007, dated February 13, 2003

3) Detroit Edison's Letter to NRC, "Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding the Implementation of Alternative Source Term," NRC-03-0053, dated July 8, 2003

Subject:

Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding the Implementation of Alternative Source Term In Reference 2, Detroit Edison requested NRC approval of a proposed license amendment that modifies the Technical Specifications (TS) based on a re-evaluation of the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) radiological dose consequences using the Alternative Source Term (AST) methodology. In Reference 3, Detroit Edison provided responses to NRC request for additional information regarding the proposed license amendment. In reviewing Reference 3, the NRC raised additional questions regarding the modeling of main steam line leakage aerosol deposition credit. These questions were discussed in telephone conversations between the NRC staff and Detroit Edison personnel on August 7, 14 and 22, 2003, and on October 22, 2003.

Enclosure I to this letter provides responses to the NRC questions. Enclosure 2 provides a replacement marked up page of the existing TS and a replacement typed A1))

USNRC NRC-03-0095 Page 2 version of the affected page with the changes incorporated. Enclosure 2 also provides three replacement marked up pages of the existing TS Bases showing the proposed changes. The PAVAN and ARCON96 computer programs' input data provided previously in Reference 3 is not impacted by the current changes; however, the RADTRAD computer program input files and LOCA nuclide information files provided in Reference 3 are replaced with the ones in Enclosure 3 to this letter.

The conclusions made in Reference 2 regarding no significant hazards consideration and categorical exclusion from environmental assessment are not impacted by the changes in this letter.

Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr.

Norman K. Peterson of my staff at (734) 586-4258.

Sincerely, tj3QQAck 3 st Enclosures cc:

H. K. Chemoff M. A. Ring NRC Resident Office Regional Administrator, Region III Supervisor, Electric Operators, Michigan Public Service Commission

USNRC NRC-03-0095 Page 3 I, WILLIAM T. O'CONNOR, JR., do hereby affirm that the foregoing statements are based on facts and circumstances which are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

WILLIAM T. O'CONNOR, JR.

Vice President - Nuclear Generation On this

/ 2L 1

~

day of b~cLC M~rWI~

, 2003 before me personally appeared William T. O'Connor, Jr., being first duly sworn and says that he executed the foregoing as his free act and deed.

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Notary Public KAREN M. REED

!otary Public, Monroe County, mi' MY Commission Expires 09102/2005

ENCLOSURE I TO NRC-03-0095 FERMI 2 NRC DOCKET NO. 50-341 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-43 RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOURCE TERM to NRC-03-0095 Page 1 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regardina the Implementation of Alternative Source Term Detroit Edison's response is provided after each NRC question (in italics):

NRC Question:

Additional RAlfor FERMIAST TAC MB7794 By letter dated July 8, 2003, Detroit Edison responded to a staff request for additional information. The staiffinds the responses to be generally acceptable. However, Detroit Edison's response to Questions #3, #6, and #7 regarding its modeling of main steam line leakage aerosol deposition credit has raised additional concerns regarding the acceptability [of] Detroit Edison 's approach. Because of incomplete description of the methodology in the initial submittal, the staff was not able to identify these concerns earlier.

Part ofyour response to Question #7 notes that your approach is "consistent with RADTRAD modeling guidance. " RADTRAD is a contractor-prepared computer code.

The inclusion ofparticuilar modeling options in a code does not constitute that the staff willfind their use acceptable in any particular application. The staff notes the explicit statements in Paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 of AppendixA to RG 1.183 that endorse two modeling options in RADTRAD. However, Section 6.0 of Appendix A does not endorse the use of RADTRAD for main steam line aerosol deposition. In fact this section contains language to the contrary, such as "the model should be based on the assumption of well-mixed volumes " The Brockman[n]-Bixler model incorporated in RADTRAD is not based on well-mixed volumes. However, Paragraph 6 3 does providefor use of other models with suitable justification.

In the response to Questions #3.1 and #3.2, Detroit Edison addressed the assumption of an eight-hour delay period based on plug flow. Response #3.2 provided a brief justif cation for assuming plug flow. The response stated that "This approach has been previously approved by the NRC in otherASTapplications such as for the Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant." There are several significant differences between the Brunswick and Fermi analyses:

Brunswick did not assume deposition in piping upstream of the inboard MSIV; Page 10 to Enclosure I ofyour response states that piping surface area and volume were calculatedfrom the vessel nozzle to the discharge of the third MSIV.

Brunswick assumed a single failure of one of the inboard MSIVs, reducing the pipe surface area creditedfor deposition; Fermi did not assume a single failure of an inboard MSIV.

Brunswick did not credit a delay time in the onset of the release; Fermi did.

to NRC-03-0095 Page 2

Brunswick assumed a constant pressure and temperature of 4.33 bars and 560 degree F. over thirty days; Based on Attachment 4 to the response, Fermi assumed 1.36 to 1.0 bar and 560 to 200 degrees over a 96-hour period

Brunswick-provided information to certify that the main steam piping downstream of the thirdMSIVandthe main condenser could meet the prerequisites provided in the staff-approved BWROG report NEDC-31858P-A, thereby establishing a greater holdup volume; Fermi did not provide a similar analysis.

The stafffound that the added conservatism from the above assumptions provided additional margin to compensate for differences in conservatism in plug flow and well-mixed volume assumptions. The Brunswick approach is similar to that approved earlier for the Duane Arnold Energy Center.

Please respond to the following questions:

1. Given the above, the staffquestions whether the approach used is acceptably conservative for use in a design basis accident analysis and requests that Detroit Edison provide an adequate justification for the proposed modeling approach, or re-perform the analyses using methods and assumptions acceptable to the staff Appendix A of the staff report: AEB-98-03, "Assessment of the Radiological Consequences for the Perry Pilot Plant Application using the Revised (NUREG-1465)

Source Term" documents an acceptable methodology. The methodology of this report, which can befoound online in ADAMS at ML011230531, was successfully used by at least two additional licensees. The staff has accepted two applications ofplug flow in which the licensee has committed to maintaining a seismically rugged drain path from the 3rd MSIV to and through the main condenser as provided in BWROG report NEDC-31858P-A (see Paragraph 6.5 ofAppendbxA to RG 1.183). The safety evaluations for these amendment requests are available on ADAMS at ML011660142 and ML021480483 Detroit Edison's Response:

Plug flow based holdup and deposition credit using the Brockmann-Bixler model in the RADTRAD computer program are no longer used in the analyses. The analyses have been re-performed based on the more conservative well-mixed methodology described in AEB-98-03 for modeling the main steam line leakage aerosol deposition.

Table 1 provides a summary of parameters used for crediting main steam line piping deposition for aerosols, elemental and organic iodine.

This same well-mixed modeling approach is also applied to the proposed method for optional adjustment of measured secondary containment bypass leakage for piping deposition described in Reference 2 (Pages 6 and 7 of Enclosure 1). Applying the well-mixed modeling results in a change to the Feedwiter penetration evaluation example to NRC-03-0095 Page 3 provided. Using Approach A (see Reference 2) would require multiplying the measured penetration leak rate by 0.162 instead of 0.0721; and using Approach B would require multiplying the measured leak rate by 6.51 instead of 3.25.

NRC Ouestion:

2. While the staff agrees that a single isolation valve establishes the massflow rate through the piping (Response #7), the assumption of a single failure was not directed towards establishing the mass flow rate. Rather, it was directed at thefact that fission product deposition in the primary coolant system was already credited in establishing the release fractions provided in Table 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.183 (and Table 3.12 of NUREG-1465). The releasefractions establish the release to containment. Depending on the particular sequence, some deposition offission products may occur in the main steam lines prior to the release to the containment.

This deposition would have already been credited in establishing the release fractions. The assumption of the failed inboard MSIV extends the boundary of the primary coolant system to the second MSIV, reducing the piping volumes in which deposition can be credited. Please provide a justification of why you believe that the main steam piping between the reactor vessel nozzles and the inboard MSIV should be [included] in establishing the deposition volumes and surface areas.

Detroit Edison's Response:

Credit for inboard main steam piping from the reactor vessel is justified based on the overall conservatism of the revised analysis. The revised analysis eliminates delay due to transport by assuming a well-mixed volume. Also, the outboard piping is assumed to remain at normal steam line temperature for the 30-day duration of the accident.

Similar inboard main steam line piping starting at the reactor pressure vessel nozzles has been credited as a deposition volume in other plants' AST applications (e.g. Perry, Duane Arnold, Brunswick, and Hope Creek).

Perry, Duane Arnold, and Brunswick postulated that the Design Basis Accident - Loss of Coolant Accident (DBA-LOCA) could involve a steam line and, therefore, did not credit inboard piping on one line. Hope Creek credited inboard piping on all lines. The Duane Arnold and Brunswick Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) indicate that this pipe break and associated single failure assumption exceeded minimum regulatory guidance in that multiple failures are postulated.

The revised analysis assumes a DBA-LOCA involving a recirculation line break. This assumption is consistent with the non-mechanistic source terms delineated in Regulatory Guide 1.183.

to NRC-03-0095 Page 4 In using the AEB-98-03 well-mixed two-node modeling, it is necessary to treat inboard and outboard piping differently. Outboard piping is depressurized and velocities are higher, resulting in less settling or deposition. Therefore, the outboard MSIV is selected as the worst single failure. An outboard MSIV failure results in an increased length of piping with the higher velocity. Conservatively, the outboard MSIV is assumed as a single failure for all steam lines with postulated leakage.

NRC Ouestion:

3. Based on information provided in Enclosure 4 of the response, you Slave assumed an MSIV leakage rate of 0.62 cfin for the 100 sqflz lines, and 0.31 cfin for the 50 sqfl7 line, prior to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months post-accident and 50 percent of these values after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

The staff believes that these values are understated. When the proposed MSIV leakage, in scfli, at test conditions (typically 70 degrees and 25 psig) are scaled to peak containment pressure and temperature (typically 40-50 psig and about 250-350 degrees) the TS leakage past the inboard MSIV has been shown to be 1.3-1.6 cfin, at least double the value you have assumed. However, the temperature of the fluid in the steam lines is based on the steam piping temperatures, typically 500-600 degrees.

At the steam piping conditions, the flow in scfin is even higher, typically 4-8 cfin.

Please explain the basis of the values you used and why these values are adequately conservative since the effectiveness of deposition decreases with increasingflow.

Detroit Edison's Response:

The analyses have been revised to more conservatively model MSIV leakage. In the re-performed analyses, the MSIV assumed leakage rates are adjusted for pressure and temperature by the following formulas:

Pressure:

Atmospheric / (Atmospheric + Test) ;

[14.7/ (14.7+25)]

Temperature: (Pipe Wall + 460) / (Test + 460)

[(558 + 460) / (60 + 460)]

Where:

558 degrees Fahrenheit is the assumed normal steam temperature and 25 psig is the MSIV test pressure This adjustment results in leakage rates of 1.2 cfm for the 100 scfh line and 0.60 cfm for the 50 scfh line, for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the accident. These leakage rates are reduced by 50% after the initial 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the accident.

The adjusted leakage rates above are about twice the ones used in the previous analyses described in References 2 and 3. As outlined in Table I below, the conservatism used in the revised analyses compensates for other effects such as potentially higher volumetric flow rates during the initial few minutes of the accident before containment pressure falls below the MSIV test pressure.

to NRC-03-0095 Page 5 The leakage rates for outboard piping are derived from the rates for the inboard piping established above by conservatively expanding the rates for atmospheric pressure assuming main steam piping remains at the normal steam temperature for the duration of the accident.

NRC Ouestion:

4. Based on information in Enclosure 1 Page 11 ofyour response, your steam line temperatures are based on generic analyses reported in a contractor-report. Please explain why these generic results are adequately conservative for Fermi and why assuming a non-constant value provides adequate conservatism.

Detroit Edison's Response:

As discussed in the response to Question 3 above, the analyses have been conservatively revised to assume a constant steam line temperature of 558 degrees Fahrenheit for inboard and outboard main steam piping for the duration of the accident.

NRC Ouestion:

5. Based on information in Enclosure 4 to your response, you have also reduced the steam line pressure versus time. Please explain the derivation of these values an[d]

why assuming a non-constant value provides adequate conservatism.

Detroit Edison's Response:

As discussed in the response to Question 3 above, the analyses have been conservatively revised based on constant test pressure for the inboard piping and constant atmospheric pressure for the outboard piping. The 50% flow reduction after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is supported by the expected post-accident pressure response of the containment.

to NRC-03-0095 Page 6 Primary Containment Chlorine-Bearing Material Update:

On Page 14 of Enclosure I to Reference 2, the quantity of chlorine-bearing material present on exposed cables inside contairnent was conservatively represented as approximately 5,792,250 square centimeters of Hypalon with a 0.514 centimeter thickness (80% of the average cable radius). This chlorine-bearing material is potentially subject to radiolytic breakdown and carryover of the free chlorine radicals as hydrochloric acid to the suppression pool; therefore, it was evaluated for impact on suppression pool pH for the 30-day duration of a LOCA.

During the last refueling outage (RFO9) in April/May 2003, permanent lead shielding blankets were installed inside the primary containment. The outer fabric material encasing the lead wool shielding is a silicone-impregnated fiberglass material that is subject to potential radiolytic breakdown. The breakdown of chlorine, fluorine and sulfur contained in the fabric could potentially result in carryover of hydrogen ions into the suppression pool.

A re-evaluation to consider the effect of the radiolytic breakdown of the recently installed shielding blankets on suppression pool pH levels post-LOCA concluded that the 30-day pool pH would be 7.46 (compared to 7.5 as reported in Table 13 of Reference 2).

Furthermore, the re-evaluation considered the potential of installing additional shield blankets in future outages. The results concluded that up to 14 times more blanket material than was installed in RFO9 would be required to cause a suppression pool pH to drop to 7 at 30 days post accident.

Enclosure I to NRC-03-0095 Page 7 Impact on MSIV Leakage and Control Room Unfiltered Inleakage:

As a result of changes to the methodology used in the re-performed analyses described in this letter, some of the input assumptions used had to be revised as described below:

The MSIV allowable leakage is assumed at a maximum of 100 scfh per steam line and a total of no more than 150 scfh for all four lines The Control Room Envelope (CRE) unfiltered inleakage is assumed to be no more than 600 scfim.

All references to total MSIV allowable leakage and CRE unfiltered inleakage in References 2 and 3 should be revised to 150 scfh and 600 scfm, respectively.

Additionally, the revision to the analyses described in this letter results in a change to one page of the proposed Technical Specifications (TSs) submitted in Reference 2. The current 100 scfh combined MSIV leakage rate acceptance criterion for allfour main steam lines in Surveillance SR 3.6.1.3.12 on Page 3.6-17 of the TS is revised to 150 scfh (previously proposed: 250 scfh).

Reference 2 also included marked up pages of the Fermi 2 TS Bases pages, for information only. As a result of the re-analyses described herein, the proposed changes to SR 3.6.1.3.11 on page B 3.6.1.3-16, SR 3.6.1.3.12 on page B 3.6.1.3-17, and the References on page B 3.6.1.3-18 have been revised to reflect the re-analyses. to this letter provides a revised marked up page No. 3.6-17 of the existing TS and a typed version of the page incorporating the revised changes. The three revised marked up pages of the TS Bases are also included in the same enclosure.

Analyses Results:

¢ The LOCA radiological consequence results presented in Table 9 of Reference 2 have changed as a result of the revision to the analyses described in this letter. The revised results are presented in Table 2.

Enclosure I to NRC-03-0095 Page 8 Impact on the Significant Hazard Consideration:

A review of the analysis of no significant hazard consideration submitted in Reference 2 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(a) against the changes made in response to this NRC RAI and the responses provided earlier in Reference 3 concluded that the analysis is not impacted by these changes. A public notice regarding this license amendment request was published in the Federal Register on May 27, 2003.

to NRC-03-0095 Page 9 Table 1 Summary of Main Seam Line ipingDeposition Credit' Parameter

'V Basis

1) Leakage MSIV leakage per line: < 100 scfh Assumed values. The 100 scfh leak is assigned Limits to the shortest steam line and the 50 scfh Total MSIV leakage for all lines:

balance to the next shortest. This minimizes

150 scfh credit for settling and deposition by conservatively maximizing the velocity of the leakage inside the piping.

2) Steam A steam line is modeled as two, well-This approach is consistent with the.

Line mixed nodes.

nodalization applied in AEB-98-03 for Perry as Nodalization The first node is defined as the piping well as with previously approved analyses from the RPV nozzle to the inboard performed for Perry, Brunswick, Duane Arnold MSIV. The second node is defined as and Hope Creek. Perry, Brunswick and Duane the piping between the inboard (first)

Arnold assumed a faulted steam line; however, and third MSIVs, which is the both the Brunswick and Duane Arnold SERs boundary of the seismically analyzed indicate that the faulted line assumption in piping. No faulted line is assumed.

combination with an MSIV single failure exceed minimum regulatory guidance. The Fermi 2 analysis assumes a worst case single active failure of an MSIV (see below) and assumes no faulted steam line. The non-mechanistic LOCA source terms are applied with the design basis recirculation line break.

Table 3 provides a summary of the piping take-off and Table 4 provides the corresponding line nodalization summary.

3) Single Failure Assumptions The outboard MSIV is assumed to be the worst case-single failure.

Conservatively, the outboard MSIV is assumed to fail to close for all steam lines with postulated leakage.

An active failure of an inboard MSIV would result in flow through penetration piping to be at containment conditions, i.e. at a lower volumetric flow than the depressurized flow outside of containment. A failure of the outboard MSIV depressurizes and speeds flow through penetration piping. For conservatism, two nodes are used for all steam lines with postulated leakage.

Aerosol removal in the inboard and outboard piping nodes is evaluated using the formulations of the well-mixed methodology in AEB-98-03, Appendix A. This removal credit is implemented in the RADTRAD calculation in the form of an effective filter credit.

This approach is consistent with the recommendations of Reg. Guide 1.183.

Furthermore it is conservative in that only horizontal piping is credited and the settling area is assumed to be only the bottom half of this piping.

AEB-98-03 indicates that, based on the conservatism of the well-mixed assumption, the median velocity is an acceptable value.

to NRC-03-0095 Page 10

,1';'

Tablel1 Sumimary of Main Steam Line Piping Deposition Credit Parameter Vaue-

Basis-The settling velocity is assumed as the Table 5 provides a summary of the effective median velocity based on the Monte pipe filter efficiencies applied to the MSIV Carlo analysis presented in AEB-98-03 piping leak paths evaluated in the RADTRAD models.

5) Elemental Elemental iodine removal in the For conservatism, the deposition velocities are Iodine inboard and outboard piping nodes is based on an assumed constant pipe wall Deposition also evaluated using the formulations temperature of 558 degrees Fahrenheit for the in AEB-98-03, Appendix A. However, 30 day accident duration.

Cline* deposition velocities are used, and with total piping credited, since gravitational settling is not an applicable transport mechanism.

6) Organic No organic iodine removal is credited.

Conservative Iodine Deposition

7) Transit No plug flow based holdup credit will Conservative Delay Credit be taken.

8) MSIV LLRT acceptance criterion is The temperature adjustment is an arbitrary Containment converted to its containment leak rate conservatism; however, it provides an Leak Rate equivalent by applying pressure and allowance for other effects such as a potentially temperature adjustment factors:

higher volumetric flow rate during the estimated 10 minute post-LOCA period before Pressure:

14.7/ (14.7 + 25) containment pressure falls below the MSIV test Temperature:

(558 + 460)/(60 + 460) pressure.

After 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , the MSIV leak rate is This assumption has been made in accordance assumed to decrease by 50%.

with Reg. Guide 1.183, Appendix A. This is supported by the expected post-accident pressure response of the containment and on the basis of the conservatism inherent in the application of the full MSIV leak rate during the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , as well as the calculation of MSIV piping filter credit based on a 30-day post-accident constant pipe wall temperature that corresponds to normal steam line conditions with no credit for the expected post-accident cooldown.

9) Flow Inboard piping flow rates are the same Conservative. No credit is taken for MS pipe Rates Inside as established above. Flow rates in cooling, which would increase settling and Piping outboard piping are "expanded" by not deposition in outboard piping.

applying pressure adjustment.

J.E.Cline, "MSIV Leakage Iodine Transport Analysis," Letter Report, March 26, 1991 (ADAMS ML003683718) as implemented in NUREG/CR-6604, Supplement 2 to NRC-03-0095 Page I 1 Table 2: LOCA Radilogical Consequence Anaysis'

:;:----,:,,Regulator Limit:

Location Duration TEDE (rem)

TEDE (rem)j' Control Room 30 days 4.28 5

EAB Maximum, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 4.31 25 LPZ 30 days 2.66 25

Enclosure I to NRC-03-0095 Page 12 Table 3 - Main Steam Pipinq Summarv 24.1 Main Steam 26 inch pipe ID (inches) 21.6 Main Steam 24 inch pipe ID (inches)

Horizontal Only Line A Line B

-Line C I LIne D 1500.4 982.6 1629.1 1487.1 706 462 766 700 317 208 344 314 479.2 497.6 496.2 481.1 252 262 261 253 126 131 131 127 958 724 1027 953 444 339 475 441 456.6 564.0 564.0 456.6 240 297 297 240 121 149 149 121 240 297 297 240 121 149 149 121 Total Line A Line B Line C I Line D 2005.9 1486.9 2134.6 1993.5 944 700 1004 938 424 314 451 421 479.2 497.6 496.2 481.1 252 262 261 253 126 131 131 127 1196 961 1265 1191 550 446 582 548 I'

1210.6 1338.3 1338.3 1210.6 637 704 704 637 320 353 353 320 637 704 704 637 320 3353 353 320 24 inch Outboard Piping, length (inches) 24 inch Outboard Piping inside surface area (sq. ft.)

24 inch Outboard Piping inside volume (cu. ft.)

26 inch Outboard Piping, length (inches) 26 inch Outboard Piping inside surface area (sq. ft.)

26 inch Outboard Piping inside volume (cu. ft.)

Total Outboard Pipe Surface Area Credit (sq. ft.)

Total Outboard Pipe Volume Credit (cu. ft.)

26 inch Inboard Piping, length (inches) 26 inch Inboard Piping inside surface area (sq. ft.)

26 inch Inboard Piping inside volume (cu. ft.)

Total Inboard Pipe Surface Area Credit (sq. ft.)

Total Inboard Pipe Volume Credit (cu. ft.)

24 inch Outboard Piping, length (inches) 24 inch Outboard Piping inside surface area (sq. ft.)

24 inch Outboard Piping inside volume (cu. ft.)

26 inch Outboard Piping, length (inches) 26 inch Outboard Piping inside surface area (sq. ft.)

26 inch Outboard Piping inside volume (cu. ft.)

Total Outboard Pipe Surface Area Credit (sq. ft.)

Total Outboard Pipe Volume Credit (cu. ft.)

26 inch Inboard Piping, length (inches) 26 inch Inboard Piping inside surface area (sq. ft.)

26 inch Inboard Piping inside volume (cu. ft.)

Total Inboard Pipe Surface Area Credit (sq. ft.)

Total Inboard Pipe Volume Credit (cu. ft.)

to NRC-03-0095 Page 13 Table 4 - Main Steam Line Nodalization Nodalization (Horizontals)

Line A.:

Line B Line C

,Line D 456.6 564.0 564.0 456.6 240 297 297 240 121 149 149 121 1979.6 1480.1 2125.3 1968.2 958 724 1027 953 444 339 475 441 Nodalization (Totals)

LineA-Line B Line C ILine D 1210.6 1338.3 1338.3 1210.6 637 704 704 637 320 353 353 320 2485.1 1984.5 2630.8 2474.6 1196 961 1265 1191 550 446 582 548 Node I Length (inches)

Node 1 Surface Area (sq. ft.)

Node 1 Volume (cu. ft.)

Node 2 Length (inches)

Node 2 Surface Area (sq. ft.)

Node 2 Volume (cu. ft.)

Node 1 Length (inches)

Node 1 Surface Area (sq. ft.)

Node 1 Volume (cu. ft.)

Node 2 Length (inches)

Node 2 Surface Area (sq. ft.)

Node 2 Volume (cu. ft.)

to NRC-03-0095 Page 14 Table 5 - MSL Decontamination Factors Due to Iodine Deposition Node Inboard Inboard Outboard:

Outboard t,.>

' }

B D

D Uncorrected Flow Rate (scfh) 100 50 100 50 Aerosol Settling Velocity (m/s) 1.170E-03 1.170E-03 1.170E-03 1.170E-03 Elemental Deposition Velocity 5.359E-06 5.359E-06 5.359E-06 5.359E-06 (m is)

Flow Rate (0-24 hrs.) corrected for 1.208 0.604 3.263 1.631 Temp and Press (cfm)

Aerosol Settling Rate 1.38E+01 1.38E+01 1.49E+01 1.49E+01 Constant (hf 1)

Elemental Deposition Rate 1.26E-01 1.26E-01 1.37E-01 1.37E-01 Constant (hrf')

Aerosol Filter Efficiency (0-24 hrs) 96.58%

97.86%

96.23%

98.53%

Aerosol Filter Efficiency (24-720 hrs) 98.26%

98.92%

98.08%

99.26%

Elemental Filter Efficiency (0-24 hrs) 38.06%

52.64%

23.71%

43.50%

Elemental Filter Efficiency (24-720 hrs) 55.13%

68.97%

38.33%

60.63%

Notes:

No flow assumed in lines A and C.

No organic iodine removal is credited.

ENCLOSURE 2 TO NRC-03-0095 FERMI 2 NRC DOCKET NO. 50-341 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-43 RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOURCE TERM Replacement Marked Up TS Page No. 3.6-17, a Typed Version of the Same Page, and Replacement TS Bases pages B 3.6.1.3-16, B 3.6.1.3-17 & B 3.6.1.3-18

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.11 Verify the combine leakage rate for all In accordance secondary containment bypass leakage with the paths that are ot provided with a seal Primary system is <

L, when pressurized to Containment 2 56.5 psig.

Leakage Rate Testing Program ro.0 S Q and Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.12 Verify-combined MSIV leakage rate for all In accordance four main steam lines is I when with the tested at - 25 psig.

Primary Containment H~o scfIt~ oJ t 100 s4~1-i.

Leakage Rate v

.fa-'t~~j SAM-L;5~L

~

Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.13 ---------------

NOTE------------------

Only required to be met in MODES 1, 2.

and 3..

~~~.

Verify combined leakage rate through In accordance hydrostatically tested lines that with the penetrate the primary containment is Primary within limits.

Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program FERMI - UNIT 2 3.6 17 Amendment No. 134

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.11 Verify the combined equivalent leakage In accordance rate for all secondary containment with the bypass leakage paths that are not Primary provided with a seal system is ` 0.05 La Containment when pressurized to 2 56.5 psig.

Leakage Rate Testing Program and Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.12 Verify combined MSIV leakage rate for In accordance all four main steam lines is

150 scfh with the and " 100 scfh for any one steam line Primary when tested at 25 psig.

Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.13 --..-.....--------.

NOTE-

=.----..

Only required to be met in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

Verify combined leakage rate through In accordance hydrostatically tested lines that with the penetrate the primary containment is Primary within limits.

Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program I

I FERMI - UNIT 2 3.6-17 Amendment No. Aft,

1, X:, I PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The.18 month representative sample test frequency is based onl the typical performance of this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The nominal ten-year maximum limit is based on performance testing.

Any EFCV failure will be evaluated per the Corrective Action and the Maintenance Rule programs to determine if additional testing is warranted to ensure overall reliability is maintained. Operating experience has demonstrated that these components are highly reliable and that failures to isolate are very infrequent.

Therefore, testing of a representative sample was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint (Reference 6).

SR 3.6.1.3.10 The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges.

An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive squib is removed and tested to provide assurance that the valves will actuate when required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired.

No squib will remain in service beyond the expiration of its shelf life or its operating life. The Frequency of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is considered adequate given the administrative controls on replacement charges and the frequent checks of circuit continuity (SR 3.6.1.3.4).

Le&k 1v'4e5 k?

$ecowlvv coWtafh1nt bvqs5s fedkje 4t%

IANA Le KJiusfeJ 4-r

,.Foti P'tf;.id SR 3.6.1.3.11 Uh vde 40.o-This SR ensures that the leakage rate of secondar containment bypass leakage paths is han the (seT hi;at4eThis pr6vides assurance that the assumptions in the radiological evaluations of Reference 1 are met. The leakage rate of each bypass leakage path is assumed to be the maximum pathway leakage (leakage through the worse of the two isolation valves) unless the penetration is isolated by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange'. In this case, the leakage rate of the isolated bypass leakage path is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If both isolation valves in the penetration are closed, the actual leakage rate is the lesser leakage rate of the two valves. The frequency is required by the Primary I

"I d pes;h4o crx vA4 rcsk~'K M

idueJI4E FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.6.1.3 16 Revision 2

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This SR simply imposes additional acceptance criteria. Additionally, some secondary containment bypass paths (refer to UFSAR 6.2.1.2.2.3) use non-PCIVs and therefore are not addressed by the testing Frequency of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. testing.

/

as_ t~To address the testing for these valves, the Frequency also includes a requirement to be in accordance with.the Inservice Testing Program.

t%

t Secondary containment bypass leakage is also considered part of La.

,50 sc

, JhJ e- -O1softer AaSR 3.6.1.3.12 V B s The analyses in References 1 and 4 are based on leakage that

-U.

v

£ is less than the specified leakage r e. Leakage through E

s s

all four main steam lines must be 400-_efhrwhen tested at

~~

Ž~

Pt (25 psi ).

a Z -;

t s

'aGcountefd eor to assum-e safety nls ssmtos axe> V regar-ding the MSIV LC6 aiiyt rvd

~fi~

/5 so t~bprczsurc seal bctween -MIVs romaiy~yn-yvl d. Tibsleakage estis performe in ieu of 10 CFR 50. Appendix J. Type C s

test requirements, based on an exemption to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J_. As such, this leakage is not combined with the

-l 4 Q

Y Type B and C leakage rate totals. The Frequency is required U

4 aby the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.3.13

~

Surveillance of hydrostatically tested lines provides l

'lS_

+

assurance that the calculation assumptions of Reference 4 are met.

The acceptance criteria for the combined leakage of all hydrostatically tested lines is 1 gpm times-the number of valves per penetration, not to exceed 3 gpm, when tested at 1.1 Pa (2 62.2 psig). Additionally, a combined Aleakage rate limit of < 5.gpm when tested at 1.1 Pa (2 62.2 psig) is applied for all hydrostatically tested 5

d 2

t tPCIVs that penetrate containment. The combined leakage rates must be demonstrated in accordance with the leakage rate test Frequency required by Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

This SR has been modified by a Note that states that these valves are only required to meet the combined leakage rate in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since this is when the Reactor Coolant System is pressurized and primary containment is required.

FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.6.1.3-17 Revision 9 FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.6.1.3-17 Revision 9

PCI Vs B -3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

In some instances, the valves are required to be capable of automatically closing during MODES other than MODES 1, 2, and 3. However, specific leakage limits are not applicable in these other MODES or conditions.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

2. UFSAR, Table 6.2-2.

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.

4. UFSAR, Section 6.2.

5. UFSAR, Section 15.6.2.

6.

GE BWROG B21-00658-01, 'Excess Flow Check Valve Testing Relaxation," dated November 1998.

7. Technical Requirements Manual, Section TR 3.6.3

-A;'>7

)

r~~-7H, I

~

I FERMI

-UNIT 2

B 3.6.1.3-18 Revision 9~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.6.1.3-18 Revision 9

ENCLOSURE 3 TO NRC-03-0095 FERMI 2 NRC DOCKET NO. 50-341 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF43 RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOURCE TERM RADTRAD Files

Radtrad 3.03 4/15/2001 3499MWth Power Level Fermi Unit 2 MSIV Leakage - Separate Compartmentalized Inboard/Outboard Piping Deposition Credit - AEB-98-03 Type Dep Model -

600 cfm CR Unfiltered Inleakage Nuclide Inventory File:

c:\\program files\\radtrad3-03\\defaults\\fermiast-loca.nif Plant Power Level:

3.4990E+03 Compartments:

10 Compartment 1:

Containment 3

2.9460E+05 0

0 0

1 0

Compartment 2:

MS Line B Inboard 3

1.0600E+02 0

0 0

Compartment 3:

MS Line D Inboard 3

3.2000E+02 0

0 0

Compartment 4:

MS Line A Inboard 3

3.2000E+02 0

0 0

Compartment 5:

Environment 2

0.OOOOE+00 0

0 0

Compartment 6:

Control Room 1

5.6960E+04 0

0 1

0 0

Compartment 7:

Hold 3

1.OOOOE+00 0

0 NRC-03-0095 Page I

0 0

0 Compartment 8:

MS Line B Outboard 3.

3.5600E+02 0

0 0.

0 0

Compartment 9:

MS Line D Outboard 3

5.4800E+02 0

0 0

Compartment 10:

MS Line A Outboard 3

5.5000E+02 0

0 0

Pathways:

13 Pathway 1:

Containment 1

7

,4 Pathway 2:

Containment 1

2 2

Pathway 3:

Containment 1

3 2

Pathway 4:

Containment 1

4 to Hold (Other PC Leakage)

Leak to Node 1 MSL B Leak to Node 1 MSL D Leak to Node 1 MSL A 2

Pathway 5:

Filtered Environment to Control Room (Intake) 5 6.

2 Pathway 6:

Unfiltered Environment to Control Room (Inlea 5

6 2

Pathway 7:

Control Room to Environment (Exhaust) 6 5

2 Pathway 8:

MS Line B Node 1 Inboard to MS Line B Node 2 2

kage)

Outboard NRC-03-0095 Page 2

8 2

Pathway 9:

MS Line D Node 3

9 2

Pathway 10:

MS Line A Node 4

10 2

1 Inboard to MS Line D Node 2 Outboard 1 Inboard to MS Line A Node 2 Outboard Pathway 11:

MS Line B Node 2 Outboard 1 8

5 2

Pathway 12:

MS Line D Node 2 Outboard 1 9

5 2

Pathway 13:.

MS Line A Node 2 Outboard I 10 5

2 End of Plant Model File Scenario Description Name:

to Environment to Environment to Environment Plant Model Filename:

Source Term:

1 1

1.OOOOE+00 c:\\program files\\radtrad3-03\\defaults\\fgrll&12.inp c:\\program files\\radtrad3-03\\defaults\\bwrdba.rft 0.0000E+00 1

9.5000E-01 4.8500E-02 Overlying Pool:

0 0.0000E+00 0

0 0

0 Compartments:

10 Compartment 1:

0 1

0 0

0 3

3 1.0000E4-01

,1 0.0OOOE+00 0.OOOOE+00 Compartment 2:

0 1

0 0

1.5000E-03 1.OOOOE+00 NRC-03-0095 Page 3

0 0

0 Compartment 3:

0 1

0 0

0 Compartment 4:

0 1

0 0

0 Compartment 5:

0 1

0 0

0 Compartment 6:

0 1

0 0

1 2.7050E+02 2

O.OOOOE+O0 7.2000E+02 0

0 Compartment 7:

0 1

0 0

0 Compartment 8:

0 1

0 0

0 Compartment 9:

0 1

9.5000E+01 0.OOOOE+00 9.5000E+01 0.OOOOE+00 9.5000E+01 O.OOOOE+00 NRC-03-0095 Page 4

0 0

0 Compartmnent 10:

0 1

0 0

0 Pathways:

13 Pathway 1:

0 0

1 3

0.OOOOE+00 2.4000E+01 7.2000E+02 I

0 Pathway 2:+

0 0

0 1

3 0.OOOOE+00 2.4000E+01 4

7.2000E+02 I

0 0

Pathway 3:

0 0

0 1

3 0.OOOOE+00 I

2.4000E+01 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 5.OOOOE-01 2.5000E-01

.OOOOE+00 L.2080E+00

5. 04OOE-01

.OOOOE+00 5.0400E-01

3. 0200E-01

).OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 0.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 NRC-03-0095 Page 5

Pathway 4:

0 0

0 1

3 O.OOOOE+00 2.4000E+01 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 Pathway 5:

0 0

0 1

2 O.OOOOE+00 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 Pathway 6:

0 0

0 1

2 O.OOOOE+00 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 Pathway 7:

0 0

0 1

2 O.OOOOE+00 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 Pathway 8:

0 0

O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 4.0570E+02 O.OOOOE+00 1.3526E+02 O.OOOOE+00 5.4086E+02 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 9.9750E+01 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 l.OOOOE+02 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 9.9750E+01 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 l.OOOOE+02 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 9.9750E+01 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00

1.OOOOE+02 O.OOOOE+00 NRC-03-0095

]Enclosure 3 Page 6

0 1

3 O. OOOOE+00 2.4000E+01 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 Pathway 9:

0 0

0 1

3 O. OOOOE+O0 2.4000E+O1 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 Pathway 10:

0 0

0 1

3 O.OOOOE+00 2.4000E+01 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 0.

0 Pathway 11:

0 0

0 1

3 O. OOOOE+00 2.4000E+01 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 Pathway 12:

0 0

0 1

1.2080E+00 6.0400E-01 O. OOOOE+00 9.6580E+01

9. 8260E4-01 0.OOOOE+00 3.8060E+01 5.5130E+01 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O. OOOOE+00 O. OOOOE+00

6. 0400E-01 3.0200E-01 O. OOOOE+00 O. OOOOE+00 O. OOOOE+00 O. OOOOE+00 3.2630E+00

1. 6310E+00 OO.OOOOE+00 9.7860E+01 9.8920E+01

0. OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O. OOOOE+00 O. OOOOE+00 9.6230E+01 9.8080E+01 O. OOOOE+00 5.2640E+01 6.8970E+01 O.OOOOE+00 O. OOOOE+00 O. OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 2.3710E+01 3.8330E+01 O. OOOOE+00 O. OOOOE+00 O. OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O. OOOOE+00 O. OOOOE+00 NRC-03-0095 Page 7

3 O.OOOOE+OO 2.4000E+O1 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 Pathway 13:

0 0

0

1. 6310E+O0 8.1600E-O1 O.OOOOE+0O O.OOOOE+0O O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+O0 9.853OE+O1 9.9260E+01 O.OOOOE+0O O.OOOOE+OO O.OOOOE+OO O.OOOOE+0O 4.3500E+O1 6.0630E+01 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+O0 O.OOOOE+O0 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+0O O.OOOOE+OO O.OOOOE+OO O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+OO 1

3 O.OOOOE+0O 2.4000E+O1 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 Dose Locations:

3 Location 1:

Control Room.

6 0

1 2

O.OOOOE+00 7.2000E+02 1

4 O.OOOOE+OO 2.4000E+O1 9.6000E+O1 7.200OE+02 Location 2:

EAB 5

1 3

O.OOOOE+0O 1.1000E+OO 3.1000E+OO 1

4 O.OOOOE+0O 8.OOOOE+OO 2.4000E+01 7.2000E+02 0

Location 3:

LPZ 5

1 5

O.OOOOE+OO 8.OOOOE+O0 2.4000E+01 9.6000E+01 7.2000E+02 1

4 3.4700E-04 O.OOOOE+0O 1.OOOOE+OO 6.OOOOE-O1

4. OOOOE-O1 O.OOOOE+OO O.OOOOE+O0 2.0900E-04 O.OOOOE+00 3.4700E-04 1.7500E-04 2.3200E-04 O.OOOOE+00 2.1700E-05 1.450OE-05 6.0200E-06 1.710OE-06 O.OOOOE+00 NRC-03-0095 Page 8

O.OOOOE+00 3.5000E-04 8.OOOOE+00 1.8000E-04 2.4000E+01 2.3000E-04 7.2000E+02 0.OOOOE+00 0

Effective Volume Location:

1 6

0.0000E+00 3.1000E-04 2.OOOOE+00 2.3300E-04 8.0000E+00 9.9300E-05 2.4000E+01 7.0800E-05 9.6000E+01 5.4800E-05 7.2000E+02 0.OOOOE+00 Simulation Parameters:

1 0.OOOOE+00 0.OOOOE+00 Output Filename:

C:\\Documents and Settings\\01751\\Desktop\\Ast Project\\Fermi\\Fermi AST LOCA Re-Analysis\\Attachment F\\(3499MWth) Fermi 2 AEB-98-03 Compartmentalized MSIV Deposition Model (No Faulted Line -. 150 scfh Leak -

600cfm CR Unfilt Inleak).oO 1

1 0

0 End of Scenario File NRC-03-0095 Page 9

Radtrad 3.03 4/15/2001 3499 MWth Power Level PC Leak, 15 minute SC bypass, 600 cfm CR bypass Nuclide Inventory File:

c:\\program files\\radtrad3-03\\defaults\\fermiast-loca.nif Plant Power Level:

3.4990E+03 Compartments:

5 Compartment 1:

Containment 3

2.9463E+05 0

0 0

1 0

Compartment 2:

Reactor Building 3

1.OOOOE+00 0

0 0

Compartment 3:

Environment 2

0. OOOOE+00 0

0 0

Compartment 4:

Control Room I

5. 6960E+04 0

0 1

0 0

Compartment 5:

Hold 3

1.OOOOE+00 0

0 0

Pathways:

9 Pathway 1:

Containment to Reactor Building 1

2 Pathway 2:

Filtered Environment to Control Room 3

4 2

Pathway 3:

Control Room to Environment 4

3 2

NRC-03-0095 Page 10

Pathway 4:

Unfiltered Environment to Control Room 3

4 2

Pathway 5:

MS Line B Containment to Hold 1

5 2

Pathway 6:

MS Line D Containment to Hold 1

5 2

Pathway 7:

MS Line A Containment to Hold 1

5 2

Pathway 8:

Containment to Environment 1

3 4

Pathway 9:

Reactor Building to Environment 2

3 2

End of Plant Model File Scenario Description Name:

Plant Model Filename:

Source Term:

1 1

1.OOOOE+00 c:\\program files\\radtrad3-03\\defaults\\fgrll&12.inp c:\\program files\\radtrad3-03\\defaults\\bwr.dba.rft O.OOOOE+00 1

9.50OOE-01 4.8500E-02 1.5000E-03 l.OOOOE+00 Overlying Pool:

0 0.OOOOE+00 0

0 0

0 Compartments:

5 Compartment 1:

0 1

0 0

0 3

3 1.OOOOE+01 0

Compartment 2:

0 1

0 0

0 NRC-03-0095 Page I I

0 0

Compartment 3:

0 1

0 0

0 Compartment 4:

0 1

0 0

1 2.7045E+02 0.OOOOE+00 9.5000E+01 9.5000E+01 9.5000Ei-O1 0

0 Compartment 5:

0 1

0 0

0 Pathways:

9 Pathway 1:

0 0

1 3

0.OOOOE+00 4.7500E-01 2.4000E+01 2.3750E-01 7.2000E+02 0.OOOOE+00 0

Pathway 2:

0 0

0 1

2.

0.0OO0E+i00 4.0570E+02 9.9750E+01 9.9750E+01 9.9750E4-01 7.2000E+02 0.OOOOE+00 0.OOOOE+00 0.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 0

0 0

0 NRC-03-0095 Page 12

0 0

Pathway 3:

0 0

0 1

3 0.0000E+00

5. 0000E-01 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 Pathway 4:

0 0

0 1

3 0.0000E+00 5.OOOOE-01 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 Pathway 5:

0 0

0 1

3

0. 0000E+00 2.4000E+01 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 Pathway 6:

0 0

0 1

3 o.000E+00 2.4000E4-01 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 5.4086E+02 5.4086E+02 O.OOOOE+00 9.9000E+01 9.9000E+01

0. 0000E+00 9.9000E+O1 9.9000E+O1 O. OOOOE+00 9.9000E+01 9.9000E+01 O.OOOOE+00 1.3526E+02 1.3526E+02 O. OOOOE+O0 1.2080E+ 00 6.0400E-01 O.OOOOE+00 6.0400E-01 3.0200E-01 O. OOOOE+00 0.OOOOE+00 0.OOOOE+00 0.OOOOE+00 0.OOOOE+00 0.OOOOE+00 0.OOOOE+00 0.OOOOE+00 o.OOOOE+s00 o.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+O0 O. OOOOE+00 O. OOOOE+OO O. OOOOE+O0 O.OOOOE+O0 O.OOOOE+OO O.OOOOE+00 O. OOOOE+0O O.OOOOE+0O O.OOOOE+0O O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+0O O.OOOOE+00 O. OOOOE+00 O. OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 NRC-03-0095 Page 13

Pathway 7:

0 0

0 1

3 O.OOOOE+00 2.4000E+O1 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 Pathway 8:

0 0

1 3

O.OOOOE+00 2.4000E+O1 7.2000E+02 0

Pathway 9:

0 0

0 1

3 O.OOOOE+00 2.5000E-01 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+OO 0.0000E+0O O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 0.OOOOE+0O O.OOOOE+OO O.OOOOE+OO O.OOOOE+OO O.OOOOE+00 2.5000E-02 1.25OOE-02 O.OOOOE+OO 1.OOOOE+05 1.OOOOE+05 0.OOOOE+00 0.OOOOE+00 9.9000E+01 O.OOOOE+O0 O.OOOOE+OO 9.9000E+01 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 9.9000E+01 O.OOOOE+OO Dose Locations:

3 Location 1:

EAB 3

1 3

O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+OO 1.1000E+O0 2.0900E-04 3.1000E+OO O.OOOOE+O0 1

4 O.OOOOE+O0 3.4700E-04 8.OOOOE+00 1.7500E-04 2.4000E+01 2.3200E-04 7.2000E+02 O.OOOOE+O0 0

Location 2:

LPZ NRC-03-0095 Page 14

3 1

5 O.OOOOE+OO 8.OOOOE+OO 2.4000E+01 9.6000E+01 7.2000E+02 1

4 O.OOOOE+0O 8.OOOOE+0O 2.4000E+01 7.2000E+02 0

Location 3:

Control Room 4

0 1

2 O.OOOOE+0O 7.2000E+02 1

2.1700E-05 1.4500E-05 6.020OE-06 1.7100E-06 O.OOOOE+00 3.4700E-04 1.7500E-04 2.3200E-04 O.OOOOE+00 3.4700E-04 O.OOOOE+O0 4

O.OOOOE+OO 1.OOOOE+0O 2.4000E+01 6.OOOOE-01 9.6000E+01 4.OOOOE-01 7.2000E+02 O.OOOOE+OO Effective Volume Location:

1 6

O.OOOOE+0O 6.1800E-04 2.OOOOE+00 4.5300E-04 8.OOOOE+00 1.8800E-04 2.4000E+01 1.2600E-04 9.6000E+01 8.7000E-05 7.2000E+02 O.OOOOE+00 Simulation Parameters:

2 O.OOOOE+00 1.OOOOE-01 1.2000E+01 O.OOOOE+00 Output Filename:

C:\\Documents and Settings\\01751\\Desktop\\Ast Project\\Fermi\\Fermi Analysis\\Attachment F\\(3499MWth) PC LEAK - PEAK-Only 5% bypass -

MSIV Leak) smallCR-with 3 MS H-Lines 600 CR unfiltered.oO 1

2 AST LOCA Re-(with 150scfh 1

0 1

End of Scenario File NRC-03-0095 Page 15

Radtrad 3.03 4/15/2001 3499 MWth Power Level ECCS Peak w reduced flashing, 15 min SC bypass, 600 cfm unfiltered CR intake Nuclide Inventory File:

c:\\program files\\radtrad3-03\\defaults\\fermiast-eccs.nif Plant Power Level:

3.4990E+03 Compartments:

4 Compartment 1:

ECCS FLUID 3

9.4934E+05 0

0 0

Compartment 2:

Reactor Building 3

l.OOOOE+00 0

0 0

Compartment 3:

Environment 2

O.OOOOE+00 0'

0 0

Compartment 4:

Control Room 1

5.6960E+04 0

0 1

0 0

Pathways:

5 Pathway 1:

ECCS FLUID to Reactor Building 1

2 2

Pathway 2:

Reactor Building to Environment 2

3 2

Pathway 3:

Environment to Control Room 3

4 2

Pathway 4:

Control Room to Environment 4

3 2

Pathway 5:

Unfiltered Environment to Control Room 3

NRC-03-0095 Page 16

4 2

End of Plant Model File Scenario Description Name:

Plant Model Filename:

Source Term:

1 1

l.OOOOE+00 c:\\program files\\radtrad3-03\\defaults\\fgrll&12.inp c:\\program files\\radtrad3-03\\defaults\\bwrdba.rft O.0000E+00 1

9.5000E-01 4.8500E-02 1.5000E-03 1.OOOOE+00 Overlying Pool:

0 O.OOOOE+00 0

0 0

0 Compartments:

4 Compartment 1:

0 1

0 0

0 Compartment 2:

0 1

0 0

0 Compartment 3:

0 1

0 0

0 Compartment 4:

0 1

0 0

1 2.704 5E+02 0.OOOOE+00 9.5000E+01 9.5000E+01 9.5000E+01 0

0 Pathways:

5 Pathway 1:

NRC-03-0095 Page 1 7

0 0

0 1

3 o.000E+00 2.4000E+01 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 Pathway 2:

0 0

0 1

3 0.OOOOE+00 2.5000E-01 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 Pathway 3:

0 0

1 2

0.OOOOE+00 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 Pathway 4:

0 0

0 1

2 0.OOOOE+00

7. 2000E+02 0

0 0

0 Pathway 5:

0 0

5.0000E+00 5.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 1.OOOOE+05 1.OOOOE+05 O.OOOOE+00 4.0570E+02 O.OOOOE+00 5.4086E+02 O.OOOE+00 9.8000E+01

9. 8000E+01 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 9.9000E+01 O.OOOOE+00 9.9750E+01 O.OOOOE+00 9.9000E+01 O.OOOOE+00 9.8000E+01 9.8000E+01 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 9.9000E+01 O.OOOOE+00 9.9750E+01 O.OOOOE+00 9.9000E+01 O.OOOOE+00 9.8000E+01 9.8000E+01 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 9.9000E+01 O.OOOOE+00 9.9750E+01 O.OOOOE+00 9.9000E+01

.O.OOOOE+00 NRC-03-0095 Page 1 8

0 1

2 O.OOOOE+OO 7.2000E+02 0

0 0

0 1.3526E+02 O.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 0.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+OO Dose Locations:

3 Location 1:

EAB 3

1 3

O.OOOOE+O0 1.lObOE+OO0 3.1000E+00 1

4 O.OOOOE+OO 8.0000E+OO 2.4000E+O1 7.2000E+02 0

Location 2:

LPZ 3

1 5

O.OOOOE+00 8.0000E+OO 2.4000E+01 9.6000E+O1 7.2000E+02 1

4 O.OOOOE+O0 8.OOOOE+00 2.4000E+01 7.2000E+02 0

Location 3:

Control Room 4

O.OOOOE+00 2.0900E-04 O.OOOOE+00 3.4700E-04 1.75OOE-04 2.3200E-04 O.OOOOE+0O 2.1700E-05 1.4500E-05 6.0200E-06 1.7100E-06 O.OOOOE+00 3.4700E-04 1.7500E-04 2.3200E-04 O.OOOOE+00 0

1 2

O.OOOOE+00 3.4700E-04 7.2000E+02 O.OOOOE+00 1

4 O.OOOOE+00 1.OOOOE+OO 2.4000E+01 6.OOOOE-01 9.6000E+01 4.OOOOE-01 7.2000E+02 O.OOOOE+00 Effective Volume Location:

1 6

O.OOOOE+0O 3.1000E-04 2.0000E400 2.3300E-04 8.OOOOE+00 9.9300E-05 2.4000E+01 7.0800E-05 9.6000E+01 5.4800E-05 7.2000E+02 O.OOOOE+00 Simulation Parameters:

1 NRC-03-0095 Page 19

O.OOOOE+00 0.0000E+00 Output Filename:

C:\\Documents and Settings\\01751\\Desktop\\Ast Project\\Fermi\\Fermi AST LOCA Re-Analysis\\Attachment F\\(3499MWth) ECCS PEAK-600ufil 15min drawdown reduced flash.oO 1

2 1

0 1

End of Scenario File NRC-03-0095 Page 20

FERMIAST-LOCA.nif Nuclide Inventory Name:

Source Terms per DC-6120, Rev. 0 FERMI AST LOCA -

35 GWD/MTU 4.58 MW bundle -

in Ci/MW Power Level:

0.1000E+01 Nuclides:

60 Nuclide 001:

Co-58 7

0.6117120000E+07 0.5800E+02 0.1529E+03 none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 002:

Co-60 7

0.1663401096E+09 0.6000E+02 0.1830E+03 none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 003:

Kr-85 1

0.3382974720E+09 0.8500E+02 0.3736E+03 none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 004:

Kr-85m 1

0.1612800000E+05 0.8500E+02 0.6693E+04 Kr-85 0.2100E+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 005:

Kr-87 1

0.4578000000E+04 0.8700E+02 0.1343E+05 Rb-87 0.1000E+01 none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 006:

Kr-88 1

0.1022400000E+05 0.8800E+02 0.1863E+05 Rb-88 0.1000E+01 none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 007:

Rb-86 3

0.1612224000E+07 0.8600E+02 0.4767E+02 none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 NRC-03-0095 Page 2 1

none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 008:

Sr-89 5

0.4363200000E+07 0.8900E+02 0.2609E+05 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 009:

Sr-90 5

0.9189573120E+09 0.9000E+02 0.3295E+04 Y-90 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 010:

Sr-91 5

0.3420000000E+05 0.S9100E+02 0.3263E+05 Y-91m 0.5800E+00 Y-91 0.4200E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 011:

Sr-92 5

0.9756000000E+04 0.9200E+02 0.3463E+05 Y-92 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 012:

Y-90 9

0.2304000000E+06 0.9000E+02 0.3405E+04 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 013:

Y-91 9

0.5055264000E+07 0.9100E+02 0.3387E+05 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 014:

Y-92 9

0.1274400000E+05 0.9200E+02 0.3497E+05 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 015:

Y-93 9

0.3636000000E+05 0.9300E+02 0.2656E+05 NRC-03-0095 Page 22

Zr-93 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 016:

Zr-95 9

0.5527872000E+07 0.9500E+02 0.4575E+05 Nb-95m 0.7000E-02 Nb-95 0.9900E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 017:

Zr-97 9

0.6084000000E+05 0.9700E+02 0.4322E+05 Nb-97m 0.9500E+00 Nb-97 0.5300E-01 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 018:

Nb-95 9

0.3036960000E+07 0.9500E+02 0.4609E+05 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 019:

Mo-99 7

0.2376000000E+06 0.9900E+02 0.4988E+05 Tc-99m 0.8800E+00 Tc-99 0.1200E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 020:

Tc-99m 7

0.2167200000E+05 0.9900E+02 0.4428E+05 Tc-99 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 021:

Ru-103 7

0.3393792000E+07 0.1030E+03 0.4183E+05 Rh-103m 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 022:

Ru-105 7

0.1598400000E+05 0.1050E+03 0.2826E+05 Rh-105 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none -

O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 023:

Ru-106 7

0.3181248000E+08 NRC-03-0095 Page 23

0.1060E+03 0.1558E+05 Rh-106 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 024:

Rh-105 7

0.1272960000E+06 0.1050E+03 0.2624E+05 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 025:

Sb-127 4

0.3326400000E+06 0.1270E+03 0.2278E+04 Te-127m 0.1800E+00 Te-127 0.8200E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 026:

Sb-129 4

0.1555200000E+05 0.1290E+03 0.8507E+04 Te-129m 0.2200E+00 Te-129 - 0.7700E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 027:

Te-127 4

0.3366000000E+05 0.1270E+03 0.2244E+04 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 028:

Te-127m 4

0.9417600000E+07 0.1270E+03 0.3799E+03 Te-127 0.9800E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 029:

Te-129 4

0.4176000000E+04 0.1290E+03 0.8084E404 1-129 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 030:

Te-129m 4

0.2903040000E+07 0.1290E+03 0.1639E+04 Te-129 0.6500E+00 1-129 0.3500E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 031:

Te-131m NRC-03-0095 Page 24

4 0.1080000000E+06 0.1310E+03 0.5246E+04 Te-131 0.2200E+00 I-131 0.7800E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 032:

Te-132 4

0.2815200000E+06 0.1320E+03 0.3823E+05 1-132 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 033:

1-131 2

0.6946560000E+06 0.1310E+03 0.2657E+05 Xe-131m 0.11OOE-01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 034:

I-132 2

0.8280000000E+04 0.1320E+03 0.3901E+05 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 035:

1-133 2

0.7488000000E+05 0.1330E+03 0.5500E+05 Xe-133m 0.2900E-01 Xe-133 0.9700E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 036:

1-134 2

0.3156000000E+04 0.1340E+03 0.6078E+05 none O.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 037:

1-135 2

0.2379600000E+05 0.1350E+03 0.5235E+05 Xe-135m 0.1500E+00 Xe-135 0.8500E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 038:

Xe-133 1

0.4531680000E+06 0.1330E+03 0.5412E+05 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 NRC-03-0095 Page 25

Nuclide 039:

Xe-135 1

0.3272400000E+05 0.1350E+03 0.1451E+05 Cs-135 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 040:

Cs-134 3

0.6507177120E+08 0.1340E+03 0.4793E+04 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 041:

Cs-136 3

0.1131840000E+07 0.1360E+03 0.1463E+04 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 042:

Cs-137 3

0.9467280000E+09 0.1370E+03 0.4270E+04 Ba-137m 0.9500E+00 none 0.0000E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 043:

Ba-139 6

0.4962000000E+04 0.1390E+03 0.4843E+05 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 044:

Ba-140 6

0.1100736000E+07 0.1400E+03 0.4877E+05 La-140 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 045:

La-140 9

0.1449792000E+06 0.1400E+03 0.5079E+05 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 046:

La-141 9

0.1414800000E+05 0.1410E+03 0.4422E+05 Ce-141 0.1000E+01 NRC-03-0095 Page 26

none O.OOOOE+O0 none O.OOOOE+O0 Nuclide 047:

La-142 9

0.5550000000E+04

0. 1420E+03 0.4320E+05 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 048:

Ce-141 8

0.2808086400E+07 0.1410E+03 0.4477E+05 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 049:

Ce-143 8

0.1188000000E+06 0.1430E+03 0.4142E+05 Pr-143 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 050:

Ce-144 8.

0.2456352000E+08 0.1440E+03 0.3790E+05 Pr-144m 0.1800E-01 Pr-144 0.9800E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 051:

Pr-143 9

0.1171584000E+07 0.1430E+03 0.4041E+05 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 052:

Nd-147 9

0.9486720000E+06 0.1470E+03 0.1800E+05 Pm-147 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 053:

Np-239 8

0.2034720000E+06 0.2390E+03 0.5051E+06 Pu-239 0.1000E+0l none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 054:

Pu-238 8

0.2768863824E+10 0.2380E+03 NRC-03-0095 Page 2,7

0.8162E+02 U-234 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+0O none O.OOOOE+OO Nuclide 055:

Pu-239 8

0.7594336440E+12 0.2390E+03 0.1041E+02 U-235 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 056:

Pu-240 8

.0.2062920312E+12 0.2400E+03 0.1826E+02 U-236 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 057:

Pu-241 8

0.4544294400E+09 0.2410E+03 0.3847E+04 U-237 0.2400E-04 Am-241 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 058:

Am-241 9

0.1363919472E+11 0.2410E+03 0.4902E+01 Np-237 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 059:

Cm-242 9

0.1406592000E+08 0.2420E+03 0.1233E+04 Pu-238 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 060:

Cm-244 9

0.5715081360E+09 0.2440E+03 0.5321E+02 Pu-240 0.lOOOE+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 End of Nuclear Inventory File NRC-03-0095 Page 28

fermiast-eces.nif Nuclide Inventory Name:

FERMI-ECCS FERMI AST ECCS -

35 GWD/MTU 4.58 MW bundle -

in Ci/MW Power Level:

0.1000E+01 Nuclides:

-60 Nuclide 001:

Co-58 7

0.6117120000E+07 0.5800E+02 O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 002:

Co-60 7

0.1663401096E+09 0;6000E+02 O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 003:

Kr-85 1

0.3382974720E+09 0.8500E+02 O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+O0 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 004:

Kr-85m 1

0.1612800000E+05 0.8500E+02 0.0000E+00 Rr-85 0.2100E+00 none O.OOOOE+0O none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 005:

Rr-87 1

0.4578000000E+04 0.8700E+02 O.OOOOE+00 Rb-87 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 006:

Kr-88 1

0.1022400000E+05 0.8800E+02 O.OOOOE+00 Rb-88 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 007:

Rb-86 3

0.1612224000E+07 0.8600E+02 0.0000E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 NRC-03-0095 Page 29

none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 008:

Sr-89 5

0.4363200000E+07 0.8900E+02 O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 009:

Sr-90 5

0.9189573120E+09 0.9000E+02 O.OOOOE+00 Y-90 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 010:

Sr-91 5

0.3420000000E+05 0.9100E+02 O.OOOOE+00 Y-91m 0.5800E+00 Y-91 0.4200E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 011:

Sr-92 5

0.9756000000E+04 0.9200E+02 O.OOOOE+00 Y-92 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 012:

Y-90 9

0.2304000000E+06 0.9000E+02 O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 013:

Y-91 9

0.5055264000E+07 0.9100E+02 O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 014:

Y-92 9

0.1274400000E+05 0.9200E+02 O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 015:

Y-93 9

0.3636000000E+05 0.9300E+02 O.OOOOE+00 NRC-03-0095.

Page 30

Zr-93 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 016:

Zr-95 9

0.5527872000E+07 0.9500E+02 O.OOOOE+00 Nb-95m 0.7000E-02 Nb-95 0.9900E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 017:

Zr-97 9

0.6084000000E+05 0.9700E+02 O.OOOOE+00 Nb-97m 0.9500E+00 Nb-97 0.5300E-01 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 018:

Nb-95 9

0.3036960000E+07 0.9500E+02 O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 019:

Mo-99 7

0.2376000000E+06 0.9900E+02 O.OOOOE+00 Tc-99m 0.8800E+00 Tc-99 0.1200E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 020:

Tc-99m 7

0.2167200000E+05 0.9900E+02 O.OOOOE+00 Tc-99 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 021:

Ru-103 7

0.3393792000E+07 0.103OE+03 O.OOOOE+00 Rh-103m 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 022:

Ru-105 7.

0.1598400000E+05 0.1050E+03 O.OOOOE+00 Rh-105 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 023:

Ru-106 7

0.3181248000E+08 NRC-03-0095 Page 3 1

0.1060E+03 O.OOOOE+00 Rh-106 O.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 024:

Rh-105 7

0.1272960000E+06 0.1050E+03 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.0000E+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 025:

Sb-127 4

0.3326400000E+06 0.1270E+03 O.OOOOE+00 Te-127m 0.1800E+00 Te-127 0.8200E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 026:

Sb-129 4

0.1555200000E+05 0.1290E+03 O.OOOOE+00 Te-129m 0.2200E+00 Te-129 0.7700E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 027:

Te-127 4

0.3366000000E+05 0.1270E+03 O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 028:

Te-127m 4

0.9417600000E+07 0.1270E+03 O.OOOOE+00 Te-127 0.9800E+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 029:

Te-129 4

0. 4176000000E+04 0.1290E+03 O.OOOOE+00 1-129 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 030:

Te-129m 4

0.2903040000E+07 0.1290E+03 O.OOOOE+00 Te-129 0.6500E+00 I-129 0.3500E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 031:

Te-13lm NRC-03-0095 Page 32

4 0.1080000000E+06 O.1310E+03 0.OOOOE+OO Te-131 0.2200E+00 I-131 0.7800E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 032:

Te-132 4

0.2815200000E+06 0.1320E+03 O.OOOOE+OO 1-132 0.lOOOE+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 033:

I-131 2

0.6946560000E+06 0.1310E+03 0.2657E+05 Xe-131m O.11OOE-01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 034:

I-132 2

0.8280000000E+04 0.1320E+03 0.3901E+05 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+0O none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 035:

1-133 2

0.7488000000E+05 0.1330E+03 0.5500E+05 Xe-133m 0.2900E-01 Xe-133 0.9700E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 036:

I-134 2

0.3156000000E+04 0.1340E+03 0.6078E+05 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 037:

1-135 2

0.2379600000E+05 0.1350E+03 0.5235E+05 Xe-135m 0.1500E+00 Xe-135 0.8500E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 038:

Xe-133 1

0.4531680000E+06 0.1330E+03 O.OOOOE+0O none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 NRC-03-0095 Page 33

Nuclide 039:

Xe-135 1

0.3272400000E+05 0.1350E+03 O.OOOOE+00 Cs-135 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 040:

Cs-134 3

0.6507177120E+08 0.1340E+03 O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 041:

Cs-136 3

0.1131840000E+07 0.1360E+03 O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 042:

Cs-137 3

0. 9467280000E+09 0.1370E+03 0.OOOOE+00 Ba-137m 0.9500E+00 none 0.0000E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 043:

Ba-139 6

0.4962000000E+04 0.1390E+03 O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 044:

Ba-140 6

0.1100736000E+07 0.1400E+03 O.OOOOE+00 La-140 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 045:

La-140 9

0.1449792000E+06 0.1400E+03 O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 046:

La-141 9

0.1414800000E+05 0.1410E+03 O.OOOOE+00 Ce-141 0.1000E+01 NRC-03-0095 Enclosutre 3 Page 34

none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.0000E+00 Nuclide 047:

La-142 9

0.5550000000E+04 0.1420E+03.

O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+OO none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+O0 Nuclide 048:

Ce-141 8

0.2808086400E+07 0.1410E+03 O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+O0 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 049:

Ce-143 8

0.1188000000E+06 0.1430E+03 O.OOOOE+00 Pr-143 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 050:

Ce-144 8

0.2456352000E+08 0.1440E+03 O.OOOOE+00 Pr-144m 0.1800E-01 Pr-144 0.9800E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 051:

Pr-143 9

0.1171584000E+07 0.1430E+03 O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 052:

Nd-147 9

0.94867200000E+06 0.1470E+03 O.OOOOE+00 Pm-147 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 053:

Np-239 8

0.2034720000E+06 0.2390E+03 O.OOOOE+00 Pu-239 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 054:

Pu-238 8

0.2768863824E+10 0.2380E+03 NRC-03-0095 Page 35

O.OOOOE+00 U-234 0.lOOOE+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 055:

Pu-239 8

0.7594336440E+12 0.2390E+03 O.OOOOE+00 U-235 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 056:

Pu-240 8

0.2062920312E+12 0.2400E+03 O.OOOOE+00 U-236 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 057:

Pu-241 8 -

0.4544294400E+09 0.2410E+03 O.OOOOE+00 U-237 0.2400E-04 Am-241 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 058:

Am-241 9

0.1363919472E+11 0.2410E+03 O.OOOOE+00 Np-237 0.lOOOE+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 059:

Cm-242 9

0.1406592000E+08 0.2420E+03 O.OOOOE+00 Pu-238 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 060:

Cm-244 9

0.5715081360E+09 0.2440E+03 O.OOOOE+00 Pu-240 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 End of Nuclear Inventory File NRC-03-0095 EnClOSUre 3 Page 36

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