NL-13-1236, Updated Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report Requested by NRC, Including SNCV061-RPT-02, Ver. 2.0, Vogtle Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic. Part 1 of 14
| ML13211A256 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/2013 |
| From: | Pierce C Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-13-1236 SNCV061-RPT-02, Ver 2.0 | |
| Download: ML13211A256 (58) | |
Text
Charles R. Pierce Southern Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Director Operating Company, Inc.
40 Inverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 Tel 205.992.7872 SOUTHERN Fax 205.992.7601 COMPANY July 25, 2013 Docket No.:
50-425 NL-13-1236 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 2 Updated Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report Requested by NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(o) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012
Reference:
- 1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident; dated March 12, 2012.
- 2. Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance: For Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012.
- 3. Southern Nuclear Operating Company Letter dated November 27, 2012, Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report Requested by NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(o Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (NL-1 2-2271, ADAMS Accession No. ML1235A033)
Ladies and Gentlemen:
On March 12, 2012, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference 1 to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. Enclosure 3 of Reference 1 requests licensees to perform seismic walkdowns using an NRC-endorsed walkdown methodology.
The NRC requested information for the following purposes:
to gather information with respect to NTTF Recommendation 2.3, as amended by staff requirements memorandum (SRM) associated with SECY-11-0124 and SECY-11-0137.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-13-1236 Page 2 to request licensees to develop a methodology and acceptance criteria for seismic walkdowns to be endorsed by the NRC staff.
" to request licensees to perform seismic walkdowns using the NRC-endorsed seismic walkdown methodology.
to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions through the corrective action program.
to verify the adequacy of licensee monitoring and maintenance procedures. of Reference 1 requires each addressee to submit its walkdown report within 180 days of the NRC's endorsement of Reference 2 of this letter.
Reference 3 of this letter provided Southern Nuclear Operating Company's 180 day response to Reference 1 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 2.
Included in Reference 3 was a list of inaccessible areas that would have to be inspected at a later date. A schedule for completion of the walkdown for these inaccessible areas was provided in Enclosure 2 of Reference 3.
The VEGP Unit 2 seismic walkdowns and area walkbys of the inaccessible areas previously mentioned have been completed. VEGP Unit 2 had no significant degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions that warrant modification to the plant. VEGP Unit 2 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions. In accordance with References 2 and 3, this letter provides the updated seismic walkdown report. Enclosure 2 of this letter contains the updated seismic walkdown report. This letter also completes the Regulatory Commitment made in Enclosure 2 of Reference 3.
This letter completes the required actions and responses of Enclosure 3 to Reference 1.
This letter contains no new NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact John Giddens at 205.992.7924.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-13-1236 Page 3 Mr. C. R. Pierce states he is Regulatory Affairs Director of Southern Nuclear Operating Company, is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Southern Nuclear Operating Company and, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true.
Respectfully submitted, C A.,
(
-i Mr. C. R. Pierce Regulatory Affairs Director CRP/CLN/lac Sworn to and subscribed before me this_____ day of T&
,2013.
"Notary Public My commission expires: "
td i
Enclosures:
- 1. Licensing Summary of Walkdown Report
- 2. Updated Vogtle Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic cc:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. S. E. Kuczynski, Chairman, President & CEO Mr. D. G. Bost, Executive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. T. E. Tynan, Vice President - Vogtle Mr. B. J. Adams, Vice President - Fleet Operations Mr. B. L. Ivey, Vice President - Regulatory Affairs RType: CVC7000 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. V. M. McCree, Regional Administrator Mr. R. E. Martin, NRR Senior Project Manager - Vogtle Mr. L. M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector - Vogtle State of Georgia Mr. J. H. Turner, Environmental Director Protection Division
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 2 Updated Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report Requested by NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, dated March 12. 2012 Licensing Summary of Walkdown Report to NL-13-1236 Licensing Summary of Walkdown Report LICENSING
SUMMARY
OF WALKDOWN REPORT The report objective is to document the results of the Seismic Walkdowns at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 2 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic". The scope of the walkdowns was to identify potentially degraded, unanalyzed, or nonconforming conditions relative to the seismic licensing basis. The Seismic Walkdowns followed the guidance contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 2), which was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. This final report submits the entire body of the report, Attachments 1, 2, and 3 (which are revised from Version 1 submitted November 27, 2012), and new Attachments 7 and 8 added by Version 2 of this report.
SNC submitted its original walkdown report for VEGP Unit 2 on November 27, 2012, in accordance with the March 12, 2012, NRC 50.54(f) letter.
During that initial walkdown, some equipment was identified as not being accessible, as noted in Table 7-1 of SNC's November 27, 2012 response. This inaccessible equipment could not be accessed because of unit operation.
Consequently, walkdowns had to be deferred until the outage. Additionally, supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse seismic conditions was received after the VEGP Unit 2 walkdowns were complete. Consequently, walkdown of equipment affected by this guidance was deferred until after SNC's November response and were included in Table 7-2 in that same response. Walkdowns of this equipment along with the equipment originally deemed as inaccessible have been completed. Tables 7-1 and 7-2 have been updated to show this equipment as complete with the completion date noted.
During the course of the seismic walkdowns, a total of 16 Unit 2 Potentially Adverse Conditions were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program. In addition, four were entered that are Common to both Units 1 and 2. It has been determined that none of these as-found conditions would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions as defined by Reference 2.
Table 8-1 provides additional details on the SSCs that were identified during the walkdowns and entered into the CAP as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed relative to their seismic licensing basis. This table has been updated to provide the status of these areas.
In conclusion, the Seismic Walkdowns at Vogtle Unit 2 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3:
Seismic" are complete as all items on the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) have been inspected. Plant Vogtle Unit 2 had no significant degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions that warrant modification to the plant.
Plant Vogtle Unit 2 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.
El - 1
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 2 Updated Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report Requested by NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 Updated Vogtle Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic
NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 PROJECT REPORT VERSION 2.0 COVER SHEET Pae1 of 52 I
Vogtle Unit 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT, RER SNC432485 For Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Prepared by:
Reviewed by:
James Dovel pria-e
- / Paul Miltus Date:
Date:
7-24$/-AV~
Approved by: (ENERCON)
(3-*I&
_ Date:
Project Manager or Designee
.~CS~i P4/AABill Henne rL CK#
Approved by:
(SNC)
Technical Lead or Designeed Peer Review Team Leader Approved by:
(SNC)
Melanie Brown David Whita Date:
Date:
2-Project Manager or Designee
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 2 OF 52 I
TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
3 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE.....................................................................................................................................
4 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH.................................................
5 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS
SUMMARY
6 3.1 SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE.................................................................................... 6 3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND METHODS................................................................... 7 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS.......................................................................................................................
8 4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES..................................................................... 10 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES (Report Version 1)............................................................. 11 4.3 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES (Report Version 2)............................................................. 16 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING..................................................................................................
17 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT...................................................................
18 6.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 1............................................................................................. 18 6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 2............................................................................................... 21 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS..................................................................................
.22 7.1 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS.................................................................................................... 24 8.0 RESULTS...............................................................................................................................................................
31 8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS.............................................................. 31 8.2 EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY............................................................................................... 43 8.3 PLANT CHANGES............................................................................................................. 44 8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS................................................................................... 44 9.0 PEER REVIEW..............................................................................................................
45 9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS.................................................................................................
45 9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS
SUMMARY
................................................................................ 45
10.0 REFERENCES
51 11.0 ATTACHMENTS..................................................................................................................................................
52
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 3 OF 52 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The Seismic Walkdowns at Vogtle Unit 2 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" are complete as all items on the SWEL have been inspected. The walkdowns were performed using the methodology outlined in the NRC endorsed "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (EPRI Report number 1025286). Plant Vogtle Unit 2 had no significant degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions that warranted modification to the plant. Plant Vogtle Unit 2 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 4 OF 52 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE The objective of this report is to document the results of the Seismic Walkdowns at Vogtle Unit 2 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3:
Seismic" (Reference 10.1).
The Seismic Walkdowns followed the guidance contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2),
which was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. The scope of the walkdowns was to identify potentially degraded, unanalyzed, or nonconforming conditions relative to the seismic licensing basis.
The 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns for Vogtle Unit 2 are complete as all items on the SWEL have been inspected. This is the final report and documents the findings from all Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. This final report submits the entire main body of the report, Attachments 1, 2 and 3 which are revised from Version 1 submitted November 27, 2012, and the new Attachments 7 and 8 added by Version 2 of this report.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 5 OF 52 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH The requirements of the 50.54(f) Letter are satisfied by application of and compliance with the NRC endorsed methodology provided in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). In accordance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), the following topics are addressed in this report:
" Documentation of the seismic licensing basis for the Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) in the plant (Section 3.0);
- Assignment of appropriately qualified personnel (Section 4.0);
- Reporting of actions taken to reduce/eliminate seismic vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) program (Section 5.0);
" Selection of Seismic Category I SSCs that were inspected in the plant (Section 6.0);
" Performance of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys (Section 7.0);
" Evaluation of potentially adverse seismic conditions with respect to the seismic licensing bases (Section 8.0); and
" Performance of Peer Reviews (Section 9.0).
Supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012.
This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes, and switchgear to inspect the internals for potentially adverse seismic conditions, even when opening the components was not required to be able to inspect the anchorage. At the time of this supplemental guidance/clarification, the Vogtle Unit 2 walkdowns were complete for items that were considered accessible.
However, the components affected by the supplemental guidance were identified and scheduled for re-inspection with component doors opened. These components are listed in Table 7-2.
The walkdowns for these components, as well as for the components originally determined to be inaccessible, as listed in Table 7-1, are now complete. Further discussion is provided in Section 7.0.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSIUMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 6 OF 52 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS
SUMMARY
This section provides a summary of the licensing bases for the Seismic Category I Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) in the plant. It includes a discussion of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and the codes and standards used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements.
3.1 SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE The plant site geologic and seismologic investigations are covered in Section 2.5 of the Vogtle Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) (Reference 10.7). Based on this data, the peak ground accelerations for Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) are established as 0.20g and 0. 12g, respectively, as discussed in FSAR subsection 2.5.2 (Reference 10.7).
The VEGP site design response spectra are provided in Figures 3.7.B.1-1 and 3.7.B.1-2 for the horizontal and vertical components of the SSE and in Figures 3.7.B.1-3 and 3.7.B.1-4 for the horizontal and vertical components of the OBE (Reference 10.7). The design response spectra are in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants (Reference 10.5). The ground spectra were applied to models of the various structures and amplified in-structure response spectra were generated taking into account the flexibility of the soil and structure.
POWER GENERATION DESIGN BASES Seismic Category I systems, structures and components are designed so that stresses remain within normal code allowable limits during an OBE and to ensure that they will perform their safety-related functions during and/or after an SSE.
MAJOR COMPONENT DESIGN BASES The horizontal and vertical OBE and SSE in-structure response spectra curves form the basis for the seismic qualification and design of Category I SSCs and for demonstrating the structural integrity of Seismic Category 1I SSCs, where required. In addition, systems supported by more than one structure shall be designed to withstand the seismic relative displacements between the supporting structures.
The seismic analyses of safety related systems, equipment, and components are based on either the response spectra method, the time-history method, or the equivalent static method.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 7 OF 52 All Seismic Category I safety-related instrumentation and mechanical and electrical equipment meet the requirements and recommendations of IEEE 344-1975.
Damping values are consistent with those specified in Regulatory Guide 1.61 (Reference 10.10).
3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND METHODS The design codes and standards for seismic qualification are listed in Chapter 3 of the Vogtle FSAR (Reference 10.7). Examples of the pertinent codes, standards, and methods used in the original design of Vogtle Unit 2 are listed below.
ANSI B3 1.1, Power Piping ANSIASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Rules for Construction of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Division 1 ANSI/ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 1-A, Appendix N, Dynamic Analysis Methods IEEE 317-1976, Standard for Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations IEEE 323-1974, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations IEEE 344-1975, Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations Manual of Steel Construction (AISC), 7th Edition
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM
- V TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 8 OF 52 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS Table 4-1 identifies the project team members and their project responsibilities per EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Table 4-2 and Table 4-3 identify the Peer Review Team members and responsibilities for Versions 1 and 2 of this report, respectively. Section 4.1 provides an overview of the project responsibilities. Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 include brief experience summaries for all project personnel in alphabetical order.
Table 4-1. Project Team Members and Responsibilities Site Equipment Seismic Licensing Name Point of Selection /
Plant Walkdown Basis Contact IPEEE Operations Engineer Reviewer (POC)
Reviewer (SWE)
Justo Chacon X
X X
James Dovel X
X Parimal Gandhi X
X Jose Hernandez X
X X
X Thomas Petrak X
X Winston Stewart*
X X
David Volodarsky X
X Matthew X
X Wilkinson Frank Yao X
X
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 9 OF 52 Table 4-2. Peer Review Team Members and Responsibilities (Report Version 1)
Peer SWEL Walkdown Licensing Submittal Review PeL aedw Basis Report Name TemPeer PeerPerer Team Reviewer Reviewer Perer Leader Reviewer Reviewers Robert Ashworth
- X X
X X
Melanie Brown
- X X
X X
Richard Starck
- X X
Kenneth Whitmore
- X X
X X
Table 4-3. Peer Review Team Members and Responsibilities (Report Version 2)
Peer SWEL Walkdown Licensing Submittal Review PeL Ped n
Basis Report Name TemPeer PeerPerer Team Reviewer Reviewer Perer Leader Reviewer Reviewers Robert Ashworth
- X X
X X
Melanie Brown*
X X
X X
X Richard Starck
- X X
Notes (Table 4-1, Table 4-2 and Table 4-3):
- 1)
- Indicates Seismic Capability Engineer
- 2) As stated in Section 7.0, all potentially adverse conditions were entered into the plant Corrective Action Program (CAP) system. However, as part of the process of entering the condition into the CAP, the SWEs made a preliminary assessment of the condition with respect to the plant licensing basis. Further licensing basis reviews were performed as discussed in Section 8.0 as part of the CAP resolution process by personnel not directly involved in the walkdowns.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 10 OF 52 4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES The Site Point of Contact (POC) is a site engineer from Southern Nuclear that has experience with the site equipment, site procedures, plant operations, and overall personnel organization. The site POC coordinated site access for walkdown personnel and any resources required for the walkdowns such as inspection equipment and support from plant operations. The POC was responsible for development of the walkdown schedule and any updates to the schedule based on equipment availability.
Equipment Selection Personnel (ESP) were responsible for identifying the sample of SSCs for the Seismic Walkdowns.
The ESP have knowledge of plant operations, plant documentation, and associated SSCs.
The ESP also have knowledge of the IPEEE program.
For this project, site engineers and plant operations personnel participated in the equipment selection. The ESP also performed the responsibilities of the IPEEE Reviewers. The IPEEE Reviewers also ensured that the walkdown scope included a sample of equipment that had IPEEE seismic vulnerabilities.
Plant Operations Personnel (POP) provided detailed review of the sample of SSCs to ensure the walkdown scope included equipment located in a variety of environments, equipment in a variety of systems, and equipment accessible for a walkdown. For the Vogtle Unit 2 project, the POP is a former licensed Senior Reactor Operator.
The SWEs were trained on the NTTF Recomnmendation 2.3: Seismic, and on the material contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEs that had previously completed the Seismic Walkdown Training Class developed by the Seismic Qualification Utilities Group (SQUG) were not required to complete training on the NTTF Seismic recommendations but were trained on the differences between SQUG activities and activities associated with the NTTF Seismic recommendations.
The Licensing Basis Reviewer was responsible for determining whether any potentially adverse seismic conditions identified by the SWEs met the plant seismic licensing basis. The Licensing Basis Reviewer has knowledge of and experience with the seismic licensing basis and documentation for the SSCs at Vogtle.
A Peer Review Team was formed for this project to provide both oversight and review of all aspects of the walkdowns. The Peer Review Team members have extensive experience in seismic design and qualification of structures, systems and components as well as extensive field experience. The Peer Review Team for this project interfaced with the ESP and SWEs to ensure that the walkdown program satisfied the guidance in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VESO 2.
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE I11 OF 52 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES (Report Version 1)
Listed below are the experience summaries of the personnel who contributed to Version 1 of this report.
Mr. Ashworth has more than six years of experience providing engineering solutions for a wide variety of nuclear power plant components and systems.
His experience includes equipment walkdowns at industrial facilities to assess material condition, structural modeling and analyses, and seismic qualification in accordance with current industry standards for mechanical and electrical equipment in nuclear power plants. Mr. Ashworth has completed the training course for the EPRI Report 1025286 and is also a Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) as defined in the SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for resolution of unresolved safety issue (USI) A-46.
Ms. Brown has over 31 years of experience with Southern Company, the majority of which has been serving the nuclear fleet. Ms. Brown's most recent assignment was as a Seismic Qualification Engineer in the Fleet Design Department, where she was responsible for performing activities associated with the Governance, Oversight, Support, and Perform (GOSP) Model including:
Management of the seismic design bases, Seismic equipment qualification, Seismic evaluation of plant structures and components, Design documentation and configuration management.
She is currently serving as the Southern Nuclear Seismic Technical Lead for the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns for all three Southern Nuclear plants.
Mr. Chacon is an engineer with Southern Nuclear Operating Company. He is working at Vogtle Nuclear Plant in the Modification Group in the Civil/Mechanical area. Mr. Chacon has a degree in Industrial Engineering and has worked on numerous site projects associated with civil/mechanical applications. Being part of Modification Group, he is exposed to the seismic engineering issues as they apply to nuclear power plants. His extensive experience also as a Reactor Operator (roughly 6 years) provides experience with nuclear power equipment. Mr. Chacon completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 12 OF 52 James Dovel, SWE (ENERCON)
Mr. Dovel is a Registered Professional Engineer with over 20 years of Civil/Structural experience in the design and construction of nuclear power plants, and in commercial and Industrial design. Mr.
Dovel is a Civil Lead Engineer. In this capacity he has provided structural support of modification packages for numerous Entergy plants including Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS), River Bend Station, Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, and Waterford 3. Mr. Dovel also supported the extended power uprate (EPU) for FPL's Turkey Point plant, pipe stress analysis for DC Cook and the design of new power plants for China. Mr. Dovel completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.
Mr. Gandhi is a senior engineer with Southern Nuclear Operating Company. For the past 25 years, he has been working with the design and modifications of numerous Nuclear Power Plants and other industrial facilities including evaluating the condition of structural steel and concrete.
His experience includes static and dynamic analysis of steel frames, platforms, towers, crane girders, and various miscellaneous structures and finite element analysis of pressure vessel and lifting devices.
Mr. Gandhi completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.
Mr. Hernandez is an engineer with Southern Nuclear Operating Company. He is working at Vogtle Nuclear Plant in the Site Design department. Mr. Hernandez is a registered professional engineer in the state of Georgia. His experience consists of 8 years in reinforced concrete analysis and design, elastic design, seismic rehabilitation, nonlinear analysis, nuclear design engineering, and geotechnical elements on reinforced concrete structures. Mr. Hernandez is familiar in-depth with structural and civil construction codes.
Mr. Hernandez managed the internal project team and subcontractors on numerous site projects.
Mr. Hernandez's previous experience includes participation in several researches that investigated the seismic vulnerability of existing school and hospital buildings located in high intensity activity seismic zones. Mr. Hernandez completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Seismic Walkdowns as SWE.
I
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 13 OF 52 Thomas Petrak (SNC)
Mr. Petrak has 30 years of nuclear power plant experience with 26 years at Plant Vogtle. Mr.
Petrak's current assignment is the Fukushima Project Manager - Vogtle. During his time at Plant Vogtle, Mr. Petrak maintained an active SRO license for twenty years, 1989 - 2009. Positions held by Mr. Petrak include:
Engineering Systems Manager Shift Manager Unit Shift Supervisor Support Shift Supervisor Maintenance Superintendent I&C Team Leader Engineering Supervisor Richard Starck, SCE (MPR)
Mr. Starck is a registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic qualification of nuclear plant equipment. He is the principal author of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). He developed and taught the six sessions of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course to more than 200 engineers.
He has provided technical oversight of work for various SQUG projects aimed at resolving USI A-46. Mr. Starck developed for SQUG the generic guidelines, criteria, and procedure for identifying safe shutdown equipment for resolution of USI A-46, is the editor and principal author of the SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure, and has interfaced with the NRC Staff and the SQUG Steering Group to resolve open issues on several revisions of the GIP. Mr. Starck is a SCE and has performed Seismic Walkdowns and evaluations of nuclear plant electric and mechanical equipment as part of the NRC required USI A-46 program.
This work included equipment qualification, anchorage evaluation, seismic interaction review, outlier resolution, and operability determination.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 14 OF 52 Winston Stewart, SCE (ENERCON)
Mr. Stewart is a Mechanical Engineer with over eight years of experience in various capacities including: Modification Engineer, Engineering Mentor, IOCFR50.59 Evaluator, Apparent Cause Evaluator, Contract Administration and Designated Representative, Project Manager, Procedure Technical Reviewer, and Environmental Monitoring Team Leader for Emergency Response Organization. Mr. Stewart was responsible for the preparation of technical evaluations for various configuration changes to plant systems, structures, or components, as well as the preparation and revision of civil/structural calculations, pipe stress calculations, and other design documents. He also served as subject matter expert for Pipe Stress Analysis and Pipe Flaw Evaluation (ANSI B31.1, ASME Section III and ASME Section XI).
During this time he qualified as SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer.
Mr. Stewart completed his EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.
David Volodarsk, SWE (ENERCON)
Mr. Volodarsky is a Registered Professional Engineer with over 30 years of Civil/Structural experience in the design and construction of nuclear power plants. His design experience includes field survey; piping design and stress analysis; seismic qualification of equipment, parts and structures; and design of supports for various systems (piping, ductwork, raceways) for nuclear power plants. His recent work was associated with 10 CFR 73.55 nuclear plant security upgrades at Plant Farley, Plant Hatch, and Plant Vogtle. Mr. Volodarsky supported modification packages for the installation of the Emergency Sump Strainer for Davis Besse, Crystal River Unit 3, McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 &
2, Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 & 2, Indian Point Unit 2 & 3, Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 and Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3. Mr. Volodarsky completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.
I
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 15 OF 52 Kenneth Whitmore, SCE (ENERCON)
Mr. Whitmore is a Registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic design and seismic equipment qualification in nuclear power plants.
Mr. Whitmore is a Seismic Capability Engineer that was involved in the development of the SQUG methodology for verification of nuclear plant components.
Specifically, Mr. Whitmore served on the sub-committee that developed the SQUG methodology for evaluation of raceways and on the sub-committee that performed the peer review of the SQUG walkdown training class. Mr. Whitmore performed A-46 and IPEEE walkdowns at Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island and has subsequently performed SQUG evaluations at numerous nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore served as both Chairman and Technical Chairman of the Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Service (SQRTS), has witnessed numerous seismic tests and is a recognized industry expert in seismic qualification of components.
Mr. Whitmore has significant experience in all aspects of structural analysis and design and has extensive experience in performing plant walkdowns associated with seismic issues. Mr. Whitmore completed his EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.
Matthew Wilkinson, SWE (ENERCON)
Mr. Wilkinson is a Civil Engineer with over 5 years of experience.
He has a B.S. in Civil Engineering. As a civil engineer, he is responsible for the development of engineering packages, calculations, analyses, drawings, and reports. Mr. Wilkinson has significant design experience with Florida Power and Light, primarily providing his services for Turkey Point Nuclear Station (PTN) on several modification packages and calculations. Mr. Wilkinson has significant site support experience at PTN, McGuire Nuclear Station and River Bend Nuclear Station. Moreover, Mr. Wilkinson worked directly at PTN for the majority of 2010 to support the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) construction and 2011 to 2012 to support the Extended Power Uprate (EPU) project design phase. Mr. Wilkinson completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -
Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR I
FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 16 OF 52 Frank Yao, SWE (ENERCON)
Mr. Yao is a Registered Professional Engineer with over 40 years of Civil/Structural experience in the design and construction of nuclear and fossil power plants and highway bridge design. His design experience includes structural steel design (including anchorages); supports for suspended systems (piping, ductwork, raceways); seismic qualification of equipment, parts and structures; rigging and scaffold; retaining walls, cooling towers, concrete slabs, beams and foundations. His recent work is associated with 10 CFR 73.55 nuclear plant security upgrades at Plant Hatch, and Plant Vogtle. Mr.
Yao supported modification packages for the installation of the Emergency Sump Strainer for Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station, Catawba Unit 1 & 2, McGuire Unit I & 2, Qinshan Unit 3 & 4 (China),
and Ling Ao Unit 3 & 4 (China). He has also supported several plants during the implementation phase of the strainers, providing engineering support, resolving construction issues and performing structural evaluation to qualify changes made during the installation phase of the project. Mr. Yao completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.
4.3 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES (Report Version 2)
Listed below are the names of personnel who contributed to the work addressed by Version 2 of this report. Experience summaries for these personnel are provided in Section 4.2. There were no new personnel added to the project team for Version 2. The experience summaries in Section 4.2 show the experience level at the time of Version 1. 'They have not been updated for Version 2.
Thomas Petrak (SNC)
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 17 OF 52 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING Information on the seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program is reported in.
Within this context, "vulnerabilities" means seismic anomalies, outliers, or other findings.
For each vulnerability, Attachment 5 also provides a description of the action taken to eliminate or reduce the seismic vulnerability, and specifies whether the configuration management program has maintained the IPEEE action (including procedural changes) to ensure that the vulnerability continues to be addressed.
As part of a Seismic PRA/IPEEE update, in May 2012, Plant Vogtle conducted a walkdown of Equipment modified under the IPEEE - Seismic. As a result of this walkdown, Document No.
12L0075-RPT-001 was issued (Reference 10.9). That walkdown revisited systems and components that have been either significantly modified or replaced since the issuance of the original VEGP IPEEE-Seismic Report to NRC (Reference 10.8). The findings of the walkdown conducted in May are documented in Appendix A-2 (Previous IPEEE Open Item Walkdown Resolution Notes)
(Reference 10.9). Appendix A-2 is included in Attachment 5.
In addition, RER SNC359855 was issued to document the walkdown report (Reference 10.9) and additional information. The purpose of these walkdowns was to ensure that the IPEEE vulnerabilities had been resolved.
During those walkdowns, two outliers were discovered that were potentially unresolved (either had never been resolved or was currently no longer resolved, i.e., the problem had "re-occurred").
The first item involved a potential clearance issue for an air regulator and air pump associated with valve 2-HV-15196 (BFIV for SG 1) (See CR 502493). Subsequent to Version 1 of this report, an engineering evaluation determined that the maximum displacements of the actuator's air pump is less than the 1.25 inch gap available between the air pump and the wall during a seismic event; therefore, the air pump will not hit the wall during a seismic event. The evaluation is documented in calculation number X4CP7072C, Version 6.0 and CR 502493 is closed. The second item involved missing screws on an ASCO valve for valve 2HV-3514. CR 664733 has been issued to resolve this IPEEE outlier.
The seismic walkdown equipment list (SWEL) for Vogtle Unit 2 included 5 components that had seismic vulnerabilities previously identified during the IPEEE program.
Even though the items identified as IPEEE vulnerabilities had been walked down in May 2012, implementation of these modifications for SWEL items was verified again during the walkdowns performed for resolution of the NTTF Recommendations 2.3, Seismic. During the walkdowns, the walkdown teams verified that the recommended resolutions to the IPEEE vulnerabilities associated with these five items had been implemented or resolved as described herein.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 18 OF 52 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT A team of individuals with extensive knowledge of Plant Vogtle systems and components developed the SWEL. Qualifications of the personnel responsible for developing the SWEL are provided in Section 4.0 of this report.
The equipment selection personnel used a SNC-template to ensure compliance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and consistency across the fleet.
Two SWELs were developed (SWEL I and SWEL 2) consistent with the guidance in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 1 consists of a sample of equipment related to safe shutdown of the reactor and maintaining containment integrity as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 consists of items related to the spent fuel pool as described in Section 3.0 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The two SWELs form the overall SWEL for the plant.
Attachment I provides the final SWEL I and SWEL 2.
In some cases, components listed on the SWEL were removed from the SWEL or were replaced with equivalent components.
These changes were made when it was determined during the Seismic Walkdown that access to the equipment on the original SWEL would be impractical to achieve during a walkdown. For example, components located very high overhead were replaced with equivalent items that could be seen without erecting scaffolding. All such changes meet the provisions of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Attachment 1 of Version 1 of this report contains the SWELs after all changes were incorporated (at the time of Version 1 report submittal).
Under Version 2 of this report, Attachment I also contains the final SWELs resulting from the completed walkdowns (items indicated in Tables 7-1 and 7-2).
6.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL I SWEL 1 was developed using the four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
Screens 1 to 3 Screens 1 to 3 were used to select Seismic Category I equipment that do not undergo regular inspection and support the five safety functions.
In accordance with the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance (page 3-3), Screens 1 through 3 can be satisfied using previous equipment lists developed for the IPEEE program. Consequently, the Seismic Review Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) developed for the Vogtle Nuclear Plant IPEEE Unit 2 (Reference 10.8) was used as Base List 1 for the development of SWEL 1.
The specific guidance used to create the IPEEE Seismic SSEL was EPRI Report NP-6041, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin" (Reference 10.12).
The
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 19 OF 52 I
Seismic SSEL from IPEEE - Seismic was checked and verified to meet the intentions set forth in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The intent of the Base List I was to provide an equipment list of the SSCs used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity following a Seismic Safe Shutdown Earthquake. The EPRI Report 1025286 (page 3-1) listed three screens to use in selecting the Base List I if a utility was to not start from an existing equipment list used in previous plant evaluations.
Applying these three screens would result in an acceptable base list that was comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the five safety functions:
" Reactor reactivity control
- Reactor coolant pressure control
" Reactor coolant inventory control
" Decay heat removal, and
" Containment function.
The criteria used in selection of the Seismic SSEL are detailed in Section 3.1.2.5 of the IPEEE -
Seismic Report (Reference 10.8).
Therefore, based upon the review of the Base List, it was determined that the list did satisfy the requirements as specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) which is a list comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the five safety functions described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), which are used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment cooling integrity. Base List 1 is presented in Attachment 1. However, before proceeding any further with the subsequent screens for the base list, it was necessary to confirm that the components satisfied screens 1 to 3. Hence, screens 1 to 3 were applied to the base list and a small number of components were identified and screened out of the base list.
Screen 4 Screen 4 provides the sample considerations to select components from the Base List 1. The selection of components for SWEL 1 was developed through an iterative process that ensured a representative sample (i.e., Screen 4 from EPRI Report 1025286). Various drafts of SWEL I were provided to the POP for review and input. The POP identified and recommended inclusion of additional equipment important to plant operations.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 20 OF 52 The following list summarizes the sample considerations used to develop SWEL 1:
" Variety of systems
" Major new or replacement equipment
" Classes of equipment
" Variety of environments
" Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program
" Risk significance Variety of Systems - EPRI Report 1025286 specifies that equipment from a variety of plant systems must be included on the SWEL 1. The systems represented in the Base List were reviewed and components from a majority of these systems are included on the SWEL.
Major New and Replacement Equipment - Major new or replacement equipment installed within the previous 15 years was identified through a search of work order (WO) histories for selected equipment and input from the plant personnel familiar with plant modification and from the PRA group on equipment changes to components that are included in the PRA.
Variety of Equipment Classes - A list of the 21 Classes of Equipment that should be included on the SWEL is provided in Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286. SWEL 1 includes components from each equipment class except Class 12 (Air Compressors) and Class 13 (Motor Generators). Vogtle does not contain any safety-related Air Compressors or Motor Generators.
Variety of Environments - The EPRI Report 1025286 specifies that the SWEL contain components located in various plant environments, including environments subject to corrosion and high temperatures. SWEL 1 includes equipment in three environment types. These include Harsh (e.g.
Containment Building, Main Steam Valve Room), Mild (e.g. Control Room, Auxiliary Building), and Outdoors/Intake Structures (e.g. valve boxes, Service Water Intake Structure).
IPEEE Vulnerabilities - SWEL I includes equipment identified with seismic vulnerabilities identified in Reference 10.8.
Risk Significance -
Information from the Vogtle Unit 2 PRA and the Maintenance Rule implementation documentation were used to determine whether items were risk significant.
Representative samples of Risk Significant items are included in the SWEL.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 21 OF 52 6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 2 SWEL 2 is developed using four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 is presented in Attachment 1.
Screens 1 to 2 The equipment selected through Screens 1 and 2 provide any Seismic Category I components associated with the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) that are also accessible for a walkdown. For Vogtle Unit 2, the only Seismic Category I equipment associated with the SFP is the Spent Fuel Cooling and Purification System. The SSCs in the Spent Fuel Cooling and Purification System that are accessible and available for a walkdown comprise Base List 2.
Screen 3 Screen 3 provides the sample considerations that ensure that a broad category of equipment included in SWEL 2. These considerations include:
" Variety of systems
" Major new or replacement equipment Classes of equipment Variety of environments For Vogtle Unit 2, SWEL 2 is developed from the Base list 2 which is provided in Attachment 1.
Screen 4 Screen 4 identifies any items that could potentially lead to rapid drain down of the SFP. These include any penetrations in the SFP that are below 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.
For Vogtle Unit 2, there are no SFP penetrations within 10 feet above the fuel in the SFP. All piping connected to the SFP, either terminates more than 10 feet above the fuel or has anti-siphon holes, located more than 10 feet above the fuel, to prevent rapid drain-down of the SFP. Based on the fact that there are no penetrations within 10 feet of the fuel and accompanied with the design of the anti-siphon hole in the SFP discharge piping, no rapid drain-down items exist.
Therefore, there are no components associated with rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pool included on SWEL 2.
I
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 22 OF 52 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS Walkdowns were performed for all components on the (combined) SWEL. A Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) was completed for each component and an Area Walk-by Checklist (AWC) was completed for each area containing equipment on the SWEL. In some cases, specific components were re-inspected to satisfy the requirements of the Supplemental Guidance which was issued after completion of the original accessible walkdowns, as explained in Section 2.0. Copies of the SWCs can be found in Attachments 3 and 7 while the AWCs are provided in Attachments 4 and 8 for Version 1 and Version 2 of this report, respectively.
The personnel performing walkdowns received training on the NTTF 2.3 seismic walkdown guidance.
Prior to the walkdown teams arriving onsite, walkdown packages were assembled into folders that contained the SWCs and AWCs and other pertinent information (e.g., calculations, test reports, IPEEE walkdowns, equipment location, and layout drawings). Each walkdown team consisted of two SWEs.
The walkdown teams spent the first week on site obtaining unescorted plant access and organizing for the walkdowns. Organization included assignment of specific components to the teams, review of the walkdown packages, development of a process for tracking the Seismic Walkdowns/Area Walk-bys and familiarization with the plant.
The second week on site began with peer reviewers (Whitmore and Ashworth) providing an overview on the information contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Expectations for the walkdowns were discussed and questions were answered. After this overview, each walkdown team performed an initial Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by. This initial walkdown was performed in the presence of the other teams and at least one peer reviewer. The purpose of this initial walkdown was to ensure consistency between the different teams, to reinforce the expectations for identifying potentially adverse seismic conditions, and to allow team members to provide and obtain feedback.
Following the initial walkdowns, the walkdown teams began performing the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. Support from plant personnel (operators, electricians, engineering) was obtained as required to open equipment and to assist in locating and identifying components. All Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were documented on the SWCs and AWCs, respectively. The final status of all SWCs and AWCs indicated one of the three following statuses:
" "Y" - Yes, the equipment is free from potentially adverse seismic conditions;
" "N" - No, the equipment is not free from at least one potentially adverse seismic condition;
- "U" - Undetermined, a portion(s) of the walkdown could not be completed due to equipment inaccessibility and the condition is not known.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 23 OF 52 The walkdowns focused on anchorage and seismic spatial interactions but also included inspections for other potentially adverse seismic conditions. Anchorage in all cases was considered to be anchorage to the structure. This included anchor bolts to concrete walls or floors, structural bolts to structural steel and welds to structural steel or embedded plates. For welds, the walkdown team looked for cracks and corrosion in the weld and base metal. Other bolts such as flange bolts on in-line components were not considered to be anchorage. These connections were evaluated and any potentially adverse seismic concerns were documented under "other adverse seismic conditions".
As part of the walkdown, the anchorage of at least 50% of the anchored components was evaluated to verify if the anchorage was consistent with plant documentation. The document that provided the anchorage configuration was identified on the SWC and the anchorage in the field was compared to the information on this referenced document. In cases where the anchorage could not be observed (e. g.
where the anchorage was inside a cabinet that could not be opened except during an outage), the items related to anchorage were marked as "U" (Undetermined) and deferred until an outage when the piece of equipment would be available for inspection. However as of the issuance of Version 2 of this report, all inspections have been completed and the results are documented on the SWCs (see ).
In cases where the seismic walkdown team members identified a potentially adverse condition, the condition was noted on the SWC or on the AWC and a Condition Report (CR) was written to document and evaluate/resolve the condition. As part of the process of generating the CR, preliminary licensing basis evaluations were perfonrmed by the SWEs during the walkdowns. Additionally, detailed licensing basis reviews were conducted as part of the resolution of the CR, as required. Conditions that were not obviously acceptable were documented on the checklists and a basis was provided for why the observed condition was determined to be acceptable.
Area Walk-bys were performed in the rooms containing the SSCs for walkdowns. For cases in which the room where a component was located was large, the extent of the area encompassed by the Area-Walk-by was clearly indicated on the AWCs. For large areas, the walk-by included all structures, systems and components within a 35-foot radius of the equipment being walked down, as described on the AWC. The AWCs are included in Attachments 4 and 8.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 24 OF 52 SWEL 1 Walkdowns A total of Ill Component Walkdowns were performed. All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.
Three of the plant areas were walked down twice resulting in two AWCs for each of the three plant areas. Therefore Attachments 4 and 8 together contain 75 AWCs for 72 plant areas.
The three areas that were walked down twice are: Auxiliary Building Room RA103, elevation 195';
Auxiliary Building Room R159, elevation 220'; and the Diesel Generator Building Room R101, elevation 220'.
SWEL 2 Walkdowns A total of 4 component walkdowns were performed. In addition, a total of 3 Area Walk-bys were completed. All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.
During the final Peer Review it was determined that Equipment ID No. 2-FSL-12045 was inadvertently listed on both the SWEL (contained in Attachment 1) and the SWC (Attachment 3, pages 255 through 258 of 433) as "Class 19-Instrument Racks" as opposed to "Class 18-Instrument Racks".
For completeness, Version 2 of this report includes the revised SWC pages in Attachment 3 (Pages 255 and 256) and the SWEL has been revised to indicate the item is "Class 18."
7.1 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS Table 7-1 identifies the components originally determined to be inaccessible for walkdowns. These items are located throughout the plant and the required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were not completed for these items in Version 1 of this report. These items have since been inspected for Version 2 of this report.
Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope (See Note 1)
Item No.
Description Access Remaining Completion Walkdown (See Note 2)
Scope
- 1.
2-1606-S6-Reactor Trip No cabinet door opening Inspect Completed 002 (See Switchgear was allowed during plant anchorage 3/12/13 Note 3) operation
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FORI FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 25 OF 52 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope (See Note 1)
Item No.
Description Access Remaining Completion Walkdown (See Note 2)
Scope
- 2.
2-1804-S3-4160V Switchgear No cabinet door opening Inspect Completed A02 (See 2AA02 was allowed during plant anchorage 3/21/13 Note 3) operation
- 3.
2-1501 -A7-CTB Cooling Unit Inside containment. Not SWC &
Completed 001-000
& Motor accessible during plant AWC 3/12/13 operation (see Note 1)
- 4.
2-HV-Reactor Head Inside containment. Not SWC &
Completed 0442A Letdown Line accessible during plant AWC 3/12/13 Control SOV operation (see Note 1)
- 5.
2-HV-Accumulator Inside containment. Not SWC &
Completed 0943B Nitrogen HDR accessible during plant AWC 3/12/13 Vent-Solenoid operation (see Note 1)
Operated Valve
- 6.
2-HV-1978 ACCW Supply to Inside containment. Not SWC &
Completed RCP Coolers MOV accessible during plant AWC 3/12/13 operation (see Note 1)
- 7.
2-HV-Normal CTB Purge Inside containment. Not SWC &
Completed 2626B Supply and accessible during plant AWC 3/12/13 Equalizing AOV operation (see Note 1)
- 8.
2-HV-Accumulator 3 Inside containment. Not SWC &
Completed 8875C Nitrogen Vent -
accessible during plant AWC 3/12/13 Solenoid Operated operation (see Note 1)
Valve
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR1 FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 26 OF 52 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope (See Note 1)
Item No.
Description Access Remaining Completion Walkdown (See Note 2)
Scope
- 9.
2-LT-0501 SG I Wide Range Inside containment. Not SWC &
Completed Level accessible during plant AWC 3/12/13 operation (see Note 1)
- 10.
2-1511 -E7-CTB Reactor Inside containment. Not SWC &
Completed 001-000 Cavity Cooling accessible during plant AWC 3/19/13 Coil operation (see Note 1)
- 11.
2-1515-A7-CTB Aux Air Inside containment. Not SWC &
Completed 001-000 Cooling Unit (Coil) accessible during plant AWC 3/12/13 operation (see Note 1)
Table Notes:
- 1) With the exception of the Reactor Trip Switchgear (2-1606-S6-002) and 4160V Switchgear 2AA02 (2-1804-$3-A02), all components determined to be inaccessible during the initial walkdowns were located inside an area of the plant not accessible during normal plant operation, such as inside Containment.
Walkdowns of these components and of the associated plant areas were initially deferred to an outage but are now complete.
- 2) All walkdowns were completed as documented in Report Version 2.
- 3) Items I & 2 also appear in Table 7-2 as items 7 & 9 respectively since they meet the criteria for both Tables.
Inspection of the cabinet internals could not be performed without opening the doors of the equipment.
As documented in Version 1 of this report, opening doors on these types of components was not permitted by plant operations at the time of the original Seismic Walkdowns due to equipment deemed too sensitive to permit access, or requiring special, planned precautions, to open the doors.
Supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012.
This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes, and switchgear to inspect the internals for potentially adverse seismic conditions, even when opening the
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 27 OF 52 components was not required to inspect the anchorage.
At the time of this supplemental guidance/clarification, the original Vogtle Unit 2 Seismic Walkdowns were complete. However, the affected components were identified and scheduled for re-inspection with component doors opened.
The following table provides a list of components that had to be opened in order to inspect for "other adverse conditions" inside the cabinets.
These components have been inspected and the results incorporated into Version 2 of this report.
I Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions (See Note 1)
Item No.
Description Remaining Completion Walkdown (See Note 2)
Scope
- 1.
2-1500-Q5-HVC HVAC PANEL Inspect Completed Internals 1/8/13
- 2.
2-1604-Q5-PCl PROCESS CONTROL GROUP 1 Inspect Completed Internals 1/8/13
- 3.
2-1604-Q5-PS I PROCESS I&C PROTECT I Inspect Completed Internals 1/8/13
- 4.
2-1605-C5-ASI ALTERNATE SHDN IND EAGLE 21 Inspect Completed CAB Internals 1/16/13
- 5.
2-1605-P5-SDA SHUTDOWN PANEL TRN A Inspect Completed Internals 3/18/13
- 6.
2-1605-Q5-STA SAFEGUARD TEST CAB-TRN A Inspect Completed Internals 1/15/13
- 7.
2-1606-S6-002 REACTOR TRIP SWITCHGEAR Inspect Completed Internals 3/12/13 (See Note 3)
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 28 OF 52 Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions (See Note 1)
Item No.
Description Remaining Completion Walkdown (See Note 2)
Scope
- 8.
2-1623-D5-001 REMOTE PROCESSING UNIT A Inspect Completed CAB I Internals 1/15/13
- 9.
2-1804-$3-A02 4160V SWITCHGEAR 2AA02 Inspect Completed (See Note 3)
Internals 3/12/13
- 10.
2-1805-S3-ABA 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 2ABA Inspect Completed Internals 3/19/13
- 11.
2-1805-S3-ABB 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 2ABB Inspect Completed Internals 3/19/13
- 12.
2-1805-$3-BBC 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 2BBC Inspect Completed Internals 3/22/13
- 13.
2-1806-$3-DCC 125 VDC MCC 2CDIM Inspect Completed Internals 3/11/13
- 14.
2-1805-$3-B04 480V SWITCHGEAR 2AB04 Inspect Completed Internals 3/22/13
- 15.
2-1805-S3-RHRIA STARTER/RHR 2-HV-8701B Inspect Completed Internals 1/15/13
- 16.
2-1805-Y3-IC5 RHR ISO VLV INVERTER Inspect Completed Internals 1/15/13
- 17.
2-1807-Y3-ID4R VITAL AC INVERTER 2DD114 Inspect Completed Internals 3/12/13
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 29 OF 52 Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions (See Note 1)
Item No.
Description Remaining Completion Walkdown (See Note 2)
Scope
- 18.
2-1806-B3-CAA BATTERY CHARGER 2AD ICA Inspect Completed Internals 3/18/13
- 19.
2-1806-Q3-DAI 125 VDC DISTR. PANEL 2ADI 1 Inspect Completed Internals 3/18/13
- 20.
2-1806-S3-DSA 125 VDC SWITCHGEAR 2ADI Inspect Completed Internals 3/18/13
- 21.
2-1807-Q3-VI6 120 VAC VITAL DIST PANEL 2BY2B Inspect Completed Internals 1/8/13
- 22.
2-1807-Q3-VI4 120 VAC VITAL PANEL 2DY IB Inspect Completed Internals 1/8/13
- 23.
2-1807-Q3-VII 120 VAC VITAL PANEL 2AYIA Inspect Completed Internals 1/15/13
- 24.
2-1816-U3-001 AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL A Inspect Completed Internals 1/16/13
- 25.
2-1816-U3-014 AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL Inspect Completed Internals 1/16/13
- 26.
2-1821-U3-001 SF SEQUENCER BOARD TRAIN A Inspect Completed Internals 3/18/13
- 27.
2-2403-P5-DG1 DG 1A GEN CTL PNL Inspect Completed Internals 1/16/13
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 30 OF 52 I
Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions (See Note 1)
Item No.
Description Remaining Completion Walkdown (See Note 2)
Scope
- 28.
2-1805-S3-BBF 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 2BBF Inspect Completed Internals 3/22/13 Table Notes:
- 1)
Vogtle Unit 2 has 3 transformers (Equipment Class 4) in the SWEL-1. The transformers were inspected to the extent practical. All visible anchors, hardware and surfaces were inspected.
The anchorage for the transformers was visible without opening the component. To inspect the transformer further would require disassembly and therefore would not be considered part of a normal electrical inspection. The inspection of the transformers meets the requirements of the guidance document and the 50.54(f) letter.
The transformers are as listed below:
2-1807-Y3-14 Regulated Transformer 2BBC42RX Feeds 2BYC 1 2-1807-Y3-10 Regulated Transformer 2ABC09RX Standby Feed to 2AYIA 2-1807-Y3-15 Regulated Transfonrer 2ABE51RX Feeds 2AYE 1
- 2)
All walkdowns were completed as documented in Report Version 2.
- 3)
Items 7 & 9 also appear in Table 7-1 as items 1 & 2 respectively since they meet the criteria for both Tables.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FORI FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 31 OF 52 8.0 RESULTS This section discusses the results of the Seismic Walkdowns that were performed in response to the NRC 50.54(0 letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic". As potentially adverse conditions were identified conditions reports were initiated in the Plant's Corrective Action Program (CAP) and evaluated. The sections below discuss the results of these walkdowns and evaluations.
8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS All potentially adverse conditions were conservatively entered into the Plant CAP per Southern Nuclear expectations in a timely manner. While some preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs as part of the generation of the CAP entries, the items did not first undergo a detailed seismic licensing basis review as described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
Consequently, the as-found conditions in Table 8-1 do not necessarily indicate that SSCs were deficient or not in conformance with their seismic licensing basis. Instead, it is an indication that Southern Nuclear has a very low threshold for CRs and actively uses the system.
SNC personnel familiar with the Plant Vogtle Seismic Licensing basis, Plant Vogtle seismic qualification methods and documentation, and Southern Nuclear requirements and procedures for entering items into the CAP reviewed and dispositioned all of the potentially adverse seismic conditions as part of the CAP process. The subsections below summarize the key findings from the CAP reviews that pertain to equipment operability, SSC conformance with the seismic licensing basis, and any required plant changes.
During the course of the seismic walkdowns, a total of 16 Unit 2 Potentially Adverse Conditions were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program. In addition, another 4 were entered that are Common to both Units 1 and 2. Table 8-1 provides additional details on the SSCs that were identified during the walkdowns and entered into the CAP as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed relative to their seismic licensing basis.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 32 OF 52 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Brief Discussion of Planned to (In Progress/
e Potentially Adverse CR #
Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve Closed)
/Area Seismic ConditionthCodtn the Condition Area Materials/equipment 500988 Perform an Cart is properly Closed Control (under a tarp) were evaluation to identify secured with all Bldg 325 found stored in a the need for any four wheels temporary storage area corrective actions.
clamped.
in the U2 Control Temporary storage Building Room 325.
is now in full According to a Temp compliance with Storage Sign, the 00352-C.
materials were stored there under MWO SNC142333. It could not be determined what was under the tarp, however, it was noted only one wheel on the cart was restrained which is not consistent with the procedure 00352-C "General Plant Housekeeping and In-Process Materials Control". The storage area was near MCC 2-1805-S3-ABA. The Temp Storage area should be reviewed to ensure it is in full compliance with Procedure 00352-C.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 33 OF 52 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Brief Discussion of Planned to (In Progress/
SPotentially Adverse CR #
Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve Closed)
/Area Seismic Condition the Condition Component An improperly 500990 The Vogtle site Replace/repair light In Progress 2LT-5 111 restrained light fixture design group restraint.
was found above level performed an Area transmitter 2-1302-evaluation of the as CST LT-5 I1l located at the found condition and bottom of RWST. It is concluded that no judged by the seismic interaction walkdown team that hazards exists that the light could become could affect dislodged during a equipment seismic event and operability.
impact the transmitter.
Repair/replace hook.
This should be further evaluated for significance.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSIJIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 34 OF 52 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Brief Discussion of Planned to (In Progress/
PoArea Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve Closed) the Condition Components The chains of a 502483 The seismic team The hoist has been Closed 2PV-3000 &
monorail crane above judged no operability secured.
2PV-3030 both Atmospheric concerns for this Relieve Valves 2-PV-condition. Secure Area 3030 and 2-PV-3000 hoist.
Aux Bldg, were in contact with R159 such valves. It was the judgment of the Seismic Walkdown Team that in a seismic event the chains could possibly strike or become entangled with the ARVs. This is not in accordance with procedure 00352-C which states that safety-related equipment will not be vulnerable to impacts from chain or controllers of hoists and cranes during a seismic event.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 35 OF 52 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Potentially Adverse CR #
Brief Discussion of Planned to (In Progress/
PoArea Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve Closed) the Condition Component A component 502493 Corporate performed Complete analysis Closed 2HV-15196 associated with the an evaluation to and implement valve operator 2-HV-determine seismic corrective actions.
15196 was measured adequacy of the valve to be less than 1/4 inch 2HV-15196.
from the wall. The Per Corporate seismic team judged evaluation, there will that in case of a be no impact to air seismic event the pump being so close component would to wall.
have the potential to collide with the wall due to proximity. This concern was previously identified in the IPEEE list and a solution was provided to resolve the condition, however, it has not being implemented.
Component Seismic team raised a 502509 Seismic adequacy of None required Closed 2HV-3006B concern regarding the fire protection piping adequacy of the fire was confirmed.
protection pipe supports located in the U2 South Main Steam Isolation Valve room, located near and above the Main Steam Safety Relief Valves 2-PSV-3001 to 3005, the 2-HV-3006A and 2-HV-3006A outboard MSIV and the 2-PV-3000 Atmospheric Relieve Valve, among other components.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 TFOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 36 OF 52 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Brief Discussion of Planned to (In Progress/
SPotentially Adverse CR#
Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve Closed)
Area Seismic ConditionCondition I
This fire protection piping was judged by the walkdown team to have a potential of loss of pressure boundary capability during a seismic event. This is due to the very long unsupported spans and extremely long flexible rod hanger supports. While it is unlikely that this pipe will fall and damage any safety-related components, especially if the system is normally dry, a seismic event could cause the piping system to collapse during a seismic event.
There are no operability concerns for this area if the piping is normally dry.
If the piping is normally wet, further investigation is required to determine if the resulting spray would create any operability concerns.
Even if the system is normally dry, the configuration appears not to be consistent with normal practice for seismic 1I/I
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 37 OF 52 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Brief Discussion of Planned to (In Progress/
PoArea Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve Closed) the Condition configurations.
Analysis is required to show that the piping meets seismic II/I conditions.
Area The seismic team 502522 The seismic Seismic adequacy Closed Diesel Gen along with the NRC walkdown team of the cover plate Bldg, R101 Inspector Resident concluded that the confirmed.
identified a potential bent plate was issue regarding a floor presently not a cover plate near the seismic/structural Engine Control Panel concern based on the for the 1B Diesel configuration Generator (location 1-(shape), the location 2403-P5-DG4). This of the cover, and plate is not required to proximity to be bolted down, but surrounding the walkdown team equipment.
identified some minor However, this CR is deflection in the plate.
to initiate an (Note: D/G's lA, 2A evaluation to and 2B all have the determine the long-same condition) term adequacy of the cover plate and identify the need for any corrective actions.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 38 OF 52 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Brief Discussion of Planned to (In Progress/
Area Potentially Adverse CR Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve Closed)
/
ra Seismic ConditionthCodin the Condition Component A lighting hook was 504862 Perform seismic Complete seismic In Progress 2-1807-Q3-found that was not analysis.
analysis.
V16 fully closed. It was Repair/replace hook.
Repair/replace found in Room R147 hook.
Area in the Auxiliary Aux Bldg, Building Unit 2. The R147 light was above the panel 2-1807-Q3-VI6.
This condition needs to be investigated to determine the adequacy of this connection.
Area Two lighting hooks 504868 Perform seismic Complete seismic In Progress Aux Bldg, were found to be not analysis.
analysis.
R147 fully closed. It was Repair/replace hook.
Repair/replace Room found in Room R147 hook.
in the Auxiliary Building Unit 2. Both lights were above the panel 2-1805-S3-BBB.
Area An exit sign hook was 505324 It was judged by the Complete seismic In Progress Aux Bldg, found to be not fully Seismic walkdown analysis.
RB130 closed. This was team that this does Repair/replace found in Room RB 130 not represent a hook.
in the Auxiliary seismic concern.
Building. This sign There are no was nearby the rack operability concerns location number 2-for these conditions.
1407-P5-SG5.
This CR is written to initiate the investigation of the condition and identify the need for any corrective actions.
Repair/replace hook.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 39 OF 52 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Brief Discussion of Planned to (In Progress/
/Area Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve Closed) the Condition Component A discrepancy was 505327 There is no Subsequent to the Closed 2-1604-Q5-found between the as-operability concerns initial walkdown, PCI built condition and the related to this the correct drawing anchorage condition. The anchorage drawings details. The drawing seismic team judged were obtained and a shows the connection that in case of a second walkdown to be bolted while the seismic event the confirmed that the as-built condition was component would not as built anchorage found to be welded.
have the potential to matched the fail and the drawing details.
connection does not show any sign of degradation.
Component A fluorescent lighting 509115 Per resolution Complete seismic Closed 2-1807-Q3-fixture is inside the submitted under analysis and ViI "spatial interaction" of Technical Evaluation implement cabinet 2-1807-Q3-510496, seismic corrective actions.
Area VII. This means that vulnerability is not a Control the lightning fixture concern for this Bldg, RB29 could have physical condition.
contact with this cabinet on a seismic event. Unistrut for light fixture is within z2" of 2-1806-S3-DSA (125VDC MCC 2AD1M) and could impact top of panel during seismic event.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR1 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 40 OF 52 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Brief Discussion of Planned to (In Progress/
/Area Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve Closed) the Condition Component The base of the U2 513338 Per resolution Repair concrete.
Closed 2-1540-B7-NSCW Exhaust Fan 2-documented under 003 1540-B7-003-000 has Technical Evaluation voids in the concrete 515513, it has been where the anchor bolts judged that this that support this fan condition does not are installed, represent a vulnerability concern. WO SNC433017 was generated for the concrete voids.
Area The Seismic 517075 Replacement trash The trashcan Closed Control Walkdown team found cans (plastic) have barrels are not Bldg, R164 that none of the been ordered (Ref.
located near any SR trashcans barrels on TE 518968).
equipment; the control room trashcans to be (R163 & R164) are replaced with secured or suitable trashcans.
unrestrained.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 41 OF 52 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Brief Discussion of Planned to (In Progress/
/Area Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve Closed) the Condition Component The Seismic 517082 The seismic Confirm seismic In Progress 2-1606-S6-Walkdown team found walkdown team adequacy of the 002 an apparent case of a judged that this current design.
rigid connection condition does not Area between a cabinet 2-represent a seismic or Control 1606-S6-002 and a operability concern.
Bldg, B07 conduit. Reactor Trip The equivalent Unit 1 Breaker.
cabinet should also be evaluated to determine if this is a case of an extended condition. The Vogtle site design group has confirmed that the installation is per the current design. Site design group to confirm seismic adequacy of the design.
I
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR i
RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 42 OF 52 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Brief Discussion of Planned to (In Progress/
PoArea Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve Closed) the Condition Component Seismic walkdown 540146 The qualified seismic Based on the Closed 2-1806-B3-team found a walkdown team evaluation CCB fluorescent lighting concluded that in performed, the as-fixture to be directly case that a seismic found condition above the cabinet with event occurs, the provides reasonable the location number 2-lightning tubes could expectation that no 1806-B3-CCB.
dislodge from the seismic hazard fixture and impact exists that could the cabinet since they adversely affect the were installed safety related directly above the component 2-1806-cabinet. This CR is to B3-CCB initiate an evaluation operability if it is to determine the impacted by the adequacy of the fluorescent bulb condition and tubes.
identify the need for any corrective actions. There is no operability concerns related to this condition.
Component 2-HV-8701A Seismic walkdown team found significant residues of boric acid on valve.
605182 The operations Review concluded the boric acid buildup does not prevent the valve from performing its safety function.
The valve will be decontaminated to remove the boric acid buildup.
In Progress
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR!
FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 43 OF 52 During the course of the walkdowns the team identified issues that, while not rising to the level of a seismic concern, warranted evaluation to determine if programmatic enhancements are warranted.
These issues have been entered into the SNC corrective action program.
CR 537446: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, a possible trend was identified with regards to the failure of plant personnel to properly secure hoist and cranes following use. 00352-C requires that "that safety related equipment will not be vulnerable to impacts, from chains or controllers of hoists and monorail cranes, during a seismic event. Place any hoist or monorail cranes in the vicinity of the safety related equipment in a location where, during a seismic event, the chains and controllers cannot strike or become entangled with the equipment." Contrary to the requirements of 00352-C, 3 of 4 hoist controllers near the D/G electrical panels and a hoist near Unit 2 Loops l&4 ARV's were not properly secured. All controllers have seen been secured. Reference CR's 502483 & 504859.
CR 537451: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, a possible trend was identified with regards to the failure of plant personnel to maintain housekeeping and temporary storage areas in accordance with procedure 00352-C. Reference CR's 500988, 504853, 504860, 504882, 504895, 504901, 511980, 513336, 517075 & 605182.
CR 537453: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, a possible trend was identified with regards to the management of seismic restraints of lighting fixtures. Reference CR's 500990, 501548, 504862, 504868, 505324 & 505954.
CR 537454: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, a possible trend was identified with regards to fasteners and hardware. Several CR's were generated which identified missing or loose fasteners and hardware.
Reference CR's 501546, 501650, 504850, 505329, 507939, 509102, 513331, 524560, 524568, 525039, 525046, 525340, 525343, 527135, 527556, 527624, 527627, 527695, 527701, 528369, 572877, 573765, 573770, 573774, 574264, 604433, 605869, 608019, 609600, 609608, 609616, 611859 & 611862.
8.2 EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY Plant Vogtle Unit 2 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM V
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 44 OF 52 8.3 PLANT CHANGES There were no plant changes that resulted from the as-found conditions. Plant changes are any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features (i.e., plant modifications) that result from the Seismic Walkdowns or Area Walk-bys.
8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS Housekeeping items were identified during walkdowns and walk-bys that were not potentially seismic adverse conditions. All such items were brought to the attention of plant personnel and CRs were generated as necessary. These issues included water on the floor and loose items (small tools, trash, etc.) stored in the plant areas. These items were processed through the site CAP process and are not specifically documented in this report though are available in the Plant CAP database.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR I
RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 45 OF 52 9.0 PEER REVIEW 9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS The peer review for the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns was performed in accordance with Section 6 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The peer review included an evaluation of the following activities:
review of the selection of the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL);
review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys;
- review of licensing basis evaluations and decisions for entering the potentially adverse seismic conditions in to the plant's Corrective Action Plan (CAP); and review of the final submittal report.
This report provides a summary of peer review results as well as the results of the above peer review activities. There are two versions of information included in the following subsections. Version 1 describes the work completed during the initial evaluation and submitted in November 2012.
Version 2 describes the subsequent work completed since that time. Except for a few minor editorial changes, the material in Version 2 of this Report is identical to that submitted to the NRC in November 2012.
9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS
SUMMARY
9.2.1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Development - Version I The selection of items for the SWEL underwent peer review according to the guidance in Section 3 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The SSCs to be evaluated during the Seismic Walkdown were selected as described in Section 6.0 of this report. The list of components was provided to the members of the Peer Review Team, which consisted of the peer reviewers listed in Section 4.0. The Peer Review Team members independently provided comments to the personnel who selected the components on the SWEL. All comments were addressed and the Peer Review Team reviewed the changes made to the SWEL and the final SWEL, to ensure all recommendations from EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) were met. Specifically, the Peer Reviewers confirmed that all SSCs in SWEL 1 and 2 were Seismic Category I components that do not undergo regular inspections. Specific
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 46 OF 52 considerations for the peer review process are described below for SWEL I and SWEL 2. The peer review checklist of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.
For SWEL I, the Peer Review Team verified that the list of SSCs represented a diverse sample of the equipment required to perform the following five safety functions, as specified by EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2):
Reactor Reactivity Control Reactor Coolant Pressure Control Reactor Coolant Inventory Control Decay Heat Removal and Containment Function For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team also verified that the SSCs included an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:
" Various types of systems
" Major new and replacement equipment Various types of equipment Various environments Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE and Risk insight consideration The final SWEL I contains items that perform each of the five safety functions specified by EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
Numerous components perform more than one of the safety functions and all five safety functions are well represented by the components on the list. SWEL I contains components from all the classes of equipment listed in Appendix B of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), except for cases where there were no safety-related components at the plant that fall into that specific equipment class.
The list contains major new and replacement items, and items enhanced based on the IPEEE as well as equipment located in various environments and areas of the plant.
All major safety-related systems are represented and risk factors were considered in the development of the list.
For SWEL 2, the Peer Review Team determined that the process to select spent fuel pool related items complied with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Portions of the spent fuel pool cooling system
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTIONOOF2FO RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 47 OF 52 at Vogtle Unit 2 are Seismic Category I and all different types of components are represented on the SWEL 2. No items that could cause rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pool for Vogtle Unit 2 were identified. Therefore, SWEL 2 does not contain any components associated with potentially rapid drain down of the pool. The Peer Review Team concluded that the bases for including/excluding items associated with the spent fuel pool are well documented and that the final SWEL 2 complies with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
In summary, all of the Peer Review comments made during development of SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 were resolved by the team that prepared the SWELs. The resolutions were reviewed by the Peer Review Team and it was determined that all comments were adequately addressed. The SWEL was determined to incorporate all comments made by the Peer Review Team during the process.
During the process of conducting the walkdowns, a small number of isolated components that were not accessible were removed from the list and in most cases equivalent items that were determined to be accessible were added.
The Peer Review Team reviewed all changes made to the SWELs and detennined that these changes had no impact on the adequacy of the SWELs with respect to the provisions contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The Peer Review Team concludes that the team that developed the SWELs appropriately followed the SWEL development process described in Section 3 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The Peer Review Checklist of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.
9.2.2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Development - Version 2 The Peer Review Team was consulted as necessary during the walkdown to ensure that no equipment substitutions (due to equipment availability, being energized, etc.) would conflict with the EPRI report requirements. The final SWELs reflect completion of all seismic walkdowns of equipment. The Peer Review Team reviewed the final SWELs and concluded that both SWELs (for original walkdowns and the outage walkdowns) met the requirements in Section 3 of EPRI Report 1025286.
During the final Peer Review it was determined that Equipment ID No. 2-FSL-12045 was inadvertently listed on both the SWEL (contained in Attachment 1) and the SWC (Attachment 3, pages 255 through 258 of 433) as "Class 19-Instrument Racks" as opposed to "Class 18-Instrument Racks".
For completeness, Version 2 of this report includes the revised SWC pages in Attachment 3 (Pages 255 and 256) and the SWEL has been revised to indicate the item is "Class 18."
The Peer Review Checklist of the final SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR1 FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 48 OF 52 9.2.3 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys - Version 1 The Peer Review Team was on-site and very involved with the Seismic Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. The Peer Review was performed as follows:
- Each of the three walkdown teams perfonned an initial equipment Seismic Walkdown and an Area Walk-by under the observation of the other teams and the walkdown Peer Review Team.
The Peer Review Team provided comments and suggestions and answered questions raised by the team performing the walkdown and the other walkdown teams.
" During the first week of walkdowns, a member of the walkdown Peer Review Team individually accompanied each of the SWE walkdown teams and observed the SWE team conducting the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. The Peer Review Team confirmed first-hand that the SWE walkdown teams performed the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys as described in Section 4 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). A member of the Peer Review Team accompanied each of the three walkdown teams on at least one full day of walkdowns. SWE walkdown teams were encouraged and expected to carry a copy of Section 4 from the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and refer to it, as necessary, during conduct of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.
" Finally, the walkdown Peer Review Team reviewed the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages completed during the first week to ensure that the checklists were completed in accordance with the guidance provided in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The walkdown Peer Review Team confirmed that the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages were consistent, thorough, and the packages accurately reflected the results of the walkdowns and walk-bys as witnessed during the first week of walkdowns.
The Peer Review Team concluded that the SWE teams were familiar with the process for Seismic Equipment Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. The SWE teams adequately demonstrated their ability to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions such as adverse anchorage, adverse spatial interaction, and other adverse conditions related to anchorage, and perforin anchorage configuration verifications, where applicable. The SWEs also demonstrated the ability to identify seismically-induced flooding interactions and seismically-induced fire interactions.
The SWEs documented the results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys on the appropriate checklists from Appendix C of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The Peer Review Team inspected all the checklists completed during the first week of Seismic Walkdowns, which represents approximately 30% of the total number of the checklists. Peer review of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys identified minor editorial errors and also some instances where comments in the checklists required additional explanation and information. Mr. Ashworth and
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 49 OF 52 Mr. Whitmore provided verbal feedback to the SWEs to adjust these entries accordingly. The SWEs understood the comments and incorporated the recommendations and updates from the Peer Review Team.
Since the peer review occurred at the start of the Seismic Walkdowns, the peer reviewers were able to provide comments at the early stages of the walkdown process to ensure consistency in the reporting for all packages. Subsequently, the Peer Review Team considered the number of completed walkdown packages reviewed to be appropriate. In addition, all members of the Peer Review Team, including Mr. Ashworth, Ms. Brown, Mr. Starck and Mr. Whitmore were available by phone as necessary during the entire Walkdown process.
9.2.4 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys - Version 2 The Peer Review Team, in particular Mr. Ashworth and Ms. Brown, was available by phone and email for consultation to the Plant Vogtle SWEs for the scope of walkdowns covered by Version 2 of this report.
Jose Hernandez and Justo Chacon (two of the SWEs from the original walkdowns, as transmitted under Version 1 of this report) performed the remaining walkdowns.
To be conservative and to ensure consistency, a percentage of the checklists prepared for Version 2 were submitted for formal Peer Review. This is in addition to the "10 to 25% requirement" that was met during Version 1 of the report. Verbal and written comments were provided by the Peer Review Team and incorporated by the SWEs. It is noted that the checklists for Version 2 include several pictures that show the overall condition of the equipment (generally in excellent condition), as well as the equipment areas (generally clean and free of interactions/adverse conditions). Having numerous pictures was an efficient way to document resolution of the checklist questions.
The Peer Review Team members (Ashworth and Brown) concluded that the SWEs were performing walkdowns and completing checklists in a manner consistent with that witnessed/performed in support of Version 1 of this report.
The SWEs are familiar with the process for Seismic Equipment Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. Additionally, the SWEs adequately demonstrated their ability to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions such as adverse anchorage, adverse spatial interaction, and other adverse conditions related to anchorage.
They also performed anchorage configuration verifications, where applicable. The ability to identify seismically-induced flooding interactions and seismically-induced fire interactions was also demonstrated by the SWEs.
They documented the results of the outage Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys on the appropriate checklists from Appendix C of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 50 OF 52 9.2.5 Licensing Basis Evaluations - Versions l and 2 All potentially adverse seismic conditions identified were immediately entered into the plant CAP for further review and disposition as discussed in Section 8.1 of this report. Therefore, the Seismic Walkdown teams did not perform licensing basis evaluations apart from evaluations performed as part of the CAP. The Peer Review Team considers this CAP process approach fully comprehensive and acceptable for addressing the potentially adverse seismic conditions observed during the Seismic Walkdowns.
9.2.6 Submittal Report - Version 1 The Peer Review Team was provided with drafts of the submittal report. This allowed the Peer Review Team to provide guidance and input and to verify that the submittal report met the objectives and requirements of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The Peer Review Team provided both verbal and written comments on the draft reports and was active in ensuring the report was thorough, complete and accurate. The final version of the submittal report included all necessary elements of the Peer Review and met the requirements of the 50.54(f) letter.
9.2.7 Submittal Report - Version 2 Similar to the process for Version 1, the Peer Review Team was provided with drafts of the submittal report. This allowed the Peer Review Team to provide input and to verify that the submittal report met the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The Peer Review Team provided both verbal and written comments on the drafts and was active in ensuring the report was thorough, complete and accurate. The final version of the submittal report includes all necessary elements of the Peer Review and meets the requirements of the 50.54(f) letter.
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 2.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 51 OF 52
10.0 REFERENCES
10.1 10CFR50.54(f) Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, March 12, 2012 10.2 EPRI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, June 2012 10.3 Generic Letter No. 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities 10.4 Generic Letter No. 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 10.5 Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, December 1973 10.6 NMP-GM-033-GLO1 Ver. 1.0, SAM NTTF Seismic Walkdowns Guide 10.7 VEGP FSAR, Rev.18, September 2012 (Version 1) and FSAR, Rev. 18, June 2013 (Version 2) 10.8 Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) - Seismic, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 10.9 Document No. 12L0075-RPT-001, Revision 0, May 18, 2012, "Southern Nuclear Company Seismic IPEEE Walkdown of Modified Equipment in Support of 10CFR50.69 Risk Informed Project - Plant Vogtle" 10.10 Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1973 10.11 NUREG/CR-0098, Development of Criteria for Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants, May 1978 10.12 EPRI Report NP-6041, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Revision 1, August 1991
VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 52 OF 52 11.0 ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS (Version 1 and Version 2)
ATTACHMENT 2 - PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR THE SWEL I AND 2 (Version 1 and Version 2)
ATTACHMENT 3 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (Version 1 and Version 2)
ATTACHMENT 4 - AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS (Version 1)
ATTACHMENT 5 - IPEEE VULNERABILITIES INFORMATION (Version 1)
ATTACHMENT 6 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEER CERTIFICATIONS (Version 1)
ATTACHMENT 7 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (Version 2)
ATTACHMENT 8 - AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS (Version 2)