NL-03-2008, Results of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Inspections Required by Order EA-03-099

Results of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Inspections Required by Order EA-03-099

ML032890440
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	10/13/2003
From:	Gasser J Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
EA-03-009, NL-03-2008
Download: ML032890440 (3)

Text

Jeffrey T. asser Southern Nuclear Vice President Operating Company, Inc.

40 Inverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Tel 205.992.7721 Fax 205.992.0403 SOUTHERN October 13, 2003 COMPANY Energy to Srve Your World" Docket No.: 50-425 NL-03-2008 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 2 Results of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Inspections Required by Order EA-03-009 Ladies and Gentlemen:

On August 8 and August 30, 2003, Unit 2 of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP-2) entered Mode 5 to investigate indications of reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage. During these outages, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) completed inspections in accordance with the applicable requirements of Paragraph D of Section IV of NRC Order EA-03-009. SNC hereby reports the results of those inspections as required by Paragraph E of Section IV of the Order.

Results of August 8, 2003 Outage:

On August 8, 2003, SNC conducted a visual inspection of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Top Head (RPVH) inside the integrated head package and observed boric acid residue on two of the four conoseal assemblies, penetrations 76 and 77. The conoseals are mechanical joints on the four RPVH penetration extensions that form the pressure boundary for the incore thermocouples.

SNC performed a detailed RPVH penetration visual inspection in the area of penetrations 76 and 77, and a general visual inspection of other areas of the RPVH including the RPVH bare metal surface around the remaining two conoseal penetrations 75 and 78.

There was no apparent evidence of boric acid residue from active leakage at the interface between the RPVH and the penetration stalk of the inspected RPVH penetrations, nor apparent evidence of RPVH surface degradation of the inspected areas. Locations 76 and 77 had evidence of minimal streaming on the penetration stalk that appeared to originate from the suspected conoseal leak.

I'D I

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-03-2008 Page 2 Areas were cleaned sufficiently to determine that no wastage of the closure head had occurred. Mechanical connections were reworked and visual examinations were performed at operating pressure and temperature to verify connections were not leaking.

The examination performed was documented by a written report supplemented by video and photographic images supporting the examination findings: The report also provides a baseline for future examinations.

VEGP-2 returned to full power on August 17, 2003.

Results of August 30,2003 Outage:

On August 30, 2003, VEGP-2 conducted another visual inspection of the RPVH inside the integrated head package and observed steamn coming from the penetration 77 canopy seal weld. This penetration was one of the two conoseal penetrations that were suspected of leaking during the August 8, 2003, VEGP-2 outage. SNC performed a detailed RPVH penetration visual inspection in the area of penetration 77 and a general visual inspection of other areas of the RPVH. These areas included the RPVH bare metal surface around penetrations 76 and 77.

There was no apparent evidence of boric acid residue from active leakage at the interface between the RPVH and the penetration stalk of the inspected RPVH penetration 77, nor apparent evidence of RPVH surface degradation of the inspected areas.

The areas had been previously cleaned and inspected during the VEGP-2 August 8, 2003, outage and therefore very little boron residue was found. However, the areas were cleaned sufficiently to determine that no wastage of the closure head had occurred and to provide a baseline for future examinations. A mechanical clamp was installed to stop the canopy seal weld leak, and a visual examination was performed at operating pressure and temperature to verify connections were not leaking.

The examination performed was documented by video and photographic images supporting the examination findings. These images also provide a baseline for future examinations.

VEGP-2 returned to full power on September 4, 2003.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-03-2008 Page 3 Mr. J. T. Gasser states he is a Vice President of Southern Nuclear Operating Company, is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Southern Nuclear Operating Company, and to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true.

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please advise.

Respectfully submitted, SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY Gasser Sworn to andsubscribedbefore me this J5 day of -b e , 2003.

.' _ . ~NotaryPublic

-- Zi'y commission expires__

JTG/DRG cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. J. D. Woodard, Executive Vice President Mr. W. F. Kitchens, General Manager - Plant Vogtle Mr. M. Sheibani, Engineering Supervisor - Plant Vogtle Document Services RTYPE: CVC7000 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator Mr. F. Rinaldi, NRR Project Manager - Vogtle Mr. J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector - Vogtle State of Georgia Mr. L. C. Barrett, Commissioner - Department of Natural Resources