ML993490218
| ML993490218 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1999 |
| From: | Skinner P Division Reactor Projects II |
| To: | Sumner H Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IRC Hatch 1999001 Integrated | |
| Download: ML993490218 (26) | |
Text
April 2, 1999 Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. H. L. Sumner, Jr.
Vice President, Hatch Plant Nuclear Operations P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201
SUBJECT:
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-321/99-01 AND 50-366/99-01
Dear Mr. Sumner:
On March 6, 1999, the NRC completed an inspection at your Hatch facility. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that one violation of NRC requirements occurred. This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV),
consistent with Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violation or severity level of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely, (Original signed by Pierce H. Skinner)
Pierce H. Skinner, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 50-321/99-01 and 50-366/99-01 cc w/encl: (See Page 2) cc w/encl:
J. D. Woodard
SNC 2
Executive Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 P. H. Wells General Manager, Plant Hatch Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
U. S. Highway 1 North P. O. Box 2010 Baxley, GA 31515 D. M. Crowe Manager Licensing - Hatch Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 Ernest L. Blake, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 2300 N Street, NW Washington, D. C. 20037 Office of Planning and Budget Room 610 270 Washington Street, SW Atlanta, GA 30334 Director Department of Natural Resources 205 Butler Street, SE, Suite 1252 Atlanta, GA 30334 Manager, Radioactive Materials Program Department of Natural Resources 4244 International Parkway Suite 114 Atlanta, GA 30354 cc w/encl contd: (See Page 3)
SNC 3
cc w/encl: Continued Chairman Appling County Commissioners County Courthouse Baxley, GA 31513 Program Manager Fossil & Nuclear Operations Oglethorpe Power Corporation 2100 E. Exchange Place Tucker, GA 30085-1349 Charles A. Patrizia, Esq.
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker 10th Floor 1299 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, D. C. 20004-9500 Senior Engineer - Power Supply Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia 1470 Riveredge Parkway NW Atlanta, GA 30328-4684
April 2, 1999 Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. H. L. Sumner, Jr.
Vice President, Hatch Plant Nuclear Operations P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201
SUBJECT:
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-321/99-01 AND 50-366/99-01
Dear Mr. Sumner:
On March 6, 1999, the NRC completed an inspection at your Hatch facility. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that one violation of NRC requirements occurred. This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV),
consistent with Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violation or severity level of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely, (Original signed by Pierce H. Skinner)
Pierce H. Skinner, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 50-321/99-01 and 50-366/99-01 cc w/encl: (See Page 2)
SNC 2
cc w/encl:
J. D. Woodard Executive Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 P. H. Wells General Manager, Plant Hatch Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
U. S. Highway 1 North P. O. Box 2010 Baxley, GA 31515 D. M. Crowe Manager Licensing - Hatch Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 Ernest L. Blake, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 2300 N Street, NW Washington, D. C. 20037 Office of Planning and Budget Room 610 270 Washington Street, SW Atlanta, GA 30334 Director Department of Natural Resources 205 Butler Street, SE, Suite 1252 Atlanta, GA 30334 Manager, Radioactive Materials Program Department of Natural Resources 4244 International Parkway Suite 114 Atlanta, GA 30354 cc w/encl contd: (See Page 3)
SNC 3
cc w/encl:
Chairman Appling County Commissioners County Courthouse Baxley, GA 31513 Program Manager Fossil & Nuclear Operations Oglethorpe Power Corporation 2100 E. Exchange Place Tucker, GA 30085-1349 Charles A. Patrizia, Esq.
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker 10th Floor 1299 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, D. C. 20004-9500 Senior Engineer - Power Supply Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia 1470 Riveredge Parkway NW Atlanta, GA 30328-4684 Distribution w/encl:
L. Plisco, RII P. H. Skinner, RII L. Olshan, NRR PUBLIC NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11030 Hatch Parkway North Baxley, GA 31513
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:EICS SIGNATURE NAME CWRapp:dka JTMunday*
JACanady*
TRFredette*
WPKleinsorge*
GRWiseman*
ATBoland*
DATE 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 COPY?
YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: R:\\PLTDATA\\RPTS\\HAT\\99\\9901drp.wpd U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Enclosure REGION II Docket Nos:
50-321, 50-366 License Nos: DPR-57, NPF-5 Report Nos:
50-321/99-01, 50-366/99-01 Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)
Facility:
E. I. Hatch Plant, Units 1 & 2 Location:
P. O. Box 2010 Baxley, Georgia 31515 Dates:
January 24 through March 6, 1999 Inspectors:
J. Munday, Senior Resident Inspector J. Canady, Resident Inspector T. Fredette, Resident Inspector W. Kleinsorge, Regional Inspector (Section M4.2)
G. Wiseman, Regional Inspector (Sections F1.1 through F8.1)
Approved by: P. Skinner, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-321/99-01, 50-366/99-01 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection; in addition, it includes inspection in the area of maintenance and fire protection by Region-based inspectors.
Operations Conservative decision making by licensee management was demonstrated through shutting down the Unit 2 reactor due to multiple electrical grounds on safety relief valves (SRV), and subsequent drywell re-entry for troubleshooting the 2A Recirculation pump motor lower guide bearing temperature problem. Appropriate actions were taken for the 10 CFR 50.72 reportable events (O1.2).
Maintenance The inspectors determined that licensee corrective actions were immediate and timely to 4 kV equipment maintenance performance issues. (M4.1).
A Non-Cited Violation was identified for an inadequate procedure for installation of SRV solenoid power cables and insulation. As a result of improper installation, the solenoid control circuits for the 2C and 2K SRVs were degraded, forcing a shutdown of Unit 2 for repairs (M8.1).
Plant Support Licensee efforts to investigate and determine the cause of a hot particle (Co-60) personnel contamination were thorough and aggressive (R1.1).
Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 operated at essentially 100% rated thermal power (RTP) during most of this report period.
On March 1, Unit 1 was shut down for a refueling outage.
Unit 2 began this report period at essentially 100% maximum operating power (MOP) or 98%
RTP. On January 27, Unit 2 was shut down to investigate electrical grounds on two Safety Relief Valves. Following repairs, the unit was restarted on February 1 and reached 100% MOP on February 6.
I. Operations O1 Conduct of Operations O1.1 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious; specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below.
O1.2 Unit 2 Forced Outage for Electrical Ground Repairs on Safety Relief Valves (SRVs)
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-366/99-02: Water Level Transient Following Manual Reactor Scram Causes Group 2 PCIS Isolation (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-366/99-04: Spurious Radiation Monitor Trip Causes Group 2 PCIS Isolation
- a. Inspection Scope (71707) (62707)(37551)
The inspectors observed portions of a Unit 2 forced shutdown that commenced on January 27 to repair electrical grounds on SRVs C and K.
- b. Observations and Findings During this forced outage, three Engineering Safety Features (ESF) actuations occurred.
The first occurred when reactor water level decreased to the low water level isolation setpoint as a result of a planned manual reactor trip causing a Group 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) actuation. The operators promptly restored reactor water level and reset the Group 2 isolation. The second occurred when SRV K actuated at approximately 350 psig due to an electrical ground. The SRV closed when the fuses for the valves solenoid were removed. The third occurred when circuitry noise caused by the replacement of the safe/reset pushbutton light bulb for the drywell wide
2 range radiation monitor caused the drywell purge valves to close. These valves were opened to vent the drywell to support repair of the electrical grounds on SRVs C and K. The licensee properly reported all three ESF actuations as required by 10 CFR 50.72.
Unit 2 was restarted February 1; however, the 2A recirculation pump guide bearings temperature was reading off scale high. A decision was made to re-enter the drywell to investigate the temperature problem. Maintenance troubleshooting activities found a corrosion buildup on the connectors to the temperature detector. The corrosion was removed as well as corrosion from the connector for the 2A recirculating pump lower thrust bearing temperature detector that had been bypassed earlier. Both detectors were returned to service and provided normal indication.
- c.
Conclusion Conservative decision making by licensee management was demonstrated through shutting down Unit 2 to repair electrical grounds on two SRVs, and subsequent drywell re-entry for troubleshooting the 2A recirculation pump motor lower guide bearing temperature problem. Appropriate actions were taken for the ESF actuations.
O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707)
The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to walk down accessible portions of the Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system. Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were acceptable. The inspectors identified no deficiencies as a result of this walkdown.
O3 Operations Procedures and Documentation O3.1 Review of Operator Aids (71707)
The inspectors assessed the compliance of the operator aid program and compared the status of selected operator aids with system and equipment procedures. The inspectors determined that all operator aids selected had been incorporated into the proper equipment/system procedure with one minor exception. The inspectors discussed this exception with operations management, which removed the operator aid until a permanent placard could be fabricated and installed. The inspectors determined this corrective action was satisfactory. The inspectors concluded that the operator aid program was being implemented in accordance with the procedure and status was being maintained properly.
3 O8 Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901, 92700)
O8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-366/99-01: Personnel Error Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications This LER was discussed in Section O4.1 of Integrated Inspection Report (IIR) 50-321, 366/98-09. Corrective actions included returning the emergency diesel generator (EDG) louver control switch to its proper position and counseling the responsible individual. In addition, operator aid placards were placed on the switch control panels indicating that misoperation would render the EDG inoperable.
O8.2 (Closed) LER 50-364/98-04-01: Personnel Error Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications This LER was previously discussed in Section M1.4 of IIR 50-321, 366/98-06. No new issues were identified in this revision.
II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments The inspectors reviewed portions of several maintenance activities. In general, maintenance was performed in accordance with procedures, with proper supervisory oversight, and with good attention to detail by maintenance workers. Specific observations of maintenance performance activities and deficiencies identified are documented in Section M4 of this report.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Review of Maintenance Rule Status for Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System (62707) (37551)
The Unit 2 RHR system was placed in the (a)(1)" category of 10 CFR 50.65 for failing to meet the licensees reliability criteria for Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI), Torus Cooling, Shutdown Cooling (SDC), and RHR Service Water (RHRSW). The licensee had implemented corrective actions to improve the reliability and performance of the system; however, due to continued issues associated with the RHR pump discharge check valves and 4 kV circuit breaker problems, system reliability did not improve sufficiently. The licensee will decide upon a specific solution to the RHR pump discharge check valve issue. The licensee did not consider the RHR pump discharge check valves to be a functional failure since an engineering evaluation indicated that the operability of the system was not affected. The 4 kV circuit breaker preventive maintenance and
4 overhaul program was discussed in Section E2.2 of IIR 50_321, 366/98-09. The 4 kV breaker issue was considered a functional failure since the operability of the LPCI and RHRSW pumps were affected. The inspectors concluded that the licensee was actively pursuing options for resolving RHR system reliability and performance issues.
M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance M4.1 Personnel Performance During 4kV Equipment Maintenance Activities
- a.
Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors reviewed licensee actions associated with two issues related to maintenance on 4kV equipment; loss of the 1A 4160-volt bus, and failure of the 1D RHR service water pump 4160-volt circuit breaker to close on demand.
- b.
Observations and Findings On March 1, maintenance technicians inadvertently operated the cubicle Mechanism Operated Cell (MOC) switch for the 1A 4160-volt switchgear during routine maintenance. Interlocks associated with the MOC switch caused a complete loss of power to the 1A bus. As a result, the 1A reactor recirculation pump tripped. The inspectors reviewed procedure 52PM-R22-001-0S 4160-Volt AC Switchgear and Associated Electrical Components Preventive Maintenance, Revision (Rev)15, and observed that there were no cautionary statements in the procedure to guard against operation of the MOC switch. This issue was discussed with licensee supervisors and
5 managers. The licensee initiated steps to address this issue which included assigning maintenance supervisors to investigate providing mechanical stops to prevent accidently engaging the MOC switch, incorporating warnings in maintenance pre-evolution briefings, and upgrading the procedure to provide necessary cautionary information.
On February 25, the circuit breaker for the 1D RHR service water pump failed to close on demand during pump operability testing.
The licensee determined that loose breaker mechanism bolts caused the breaker to close and immediately trip open. As part of troubleshooting activities, maintenance technicians conducted insulation resistance (megger) testing of the pump motor winding.
The inspectors reviewed the data sheet for the test and noted two inconsistencies. First, motor winding temperatures were recorded as 0°F. Second, resistance readings recorded from the first to the tenth minute of the test were all 6.3 to 6.4 megohms (M), which did not meet the acceptance criteria of 20 M. It was determined that the technicians failed to disconnect the motor surge resistor pack prior to taking resistance readings. As a result, the technicians had been measuring and recording the resistance of the surge pack instead of the motor insulation resistance. Maintenance supervisors had recognized this problem and retested the motor with the surge pack disconnected. The inspectors reviewed procedure 52IT_MEL_003-0S, High Potential and Megger Testing of Electrical Equipment and Cables, Rev. 7, and observed that the procedure did not contain steps for disconnecting
6 the surge pack. These deficiencies were discussed with licensee supervisors and managers, who initiated steps to upgrade the procedure, review training proficiency for the personnel involved, and institute more rigid requirements for supervisors familiar with the procedure to provide oversight of this activity.
- c.
Conclusions The inspectors determined that licensee corrective actions were immediate and timely to these maintenance performance issues.
M4.2 Corrective Maintenance
- a. Inspection Scope (IP 62700)
Sixteen completed apparent repetitive work packages for six components were reviewed. These work packages covered a period of approximately one year.
- b.
Observations and Findings With one exception, planning, troubleshooting, root cause determination, corrective maintenance activities, inspection, and testing for the work packages were appropriate to the circumstances.
In the case of the Unit 1 B Core Spray Jockey pump, maintenance and engineering personnel, for two months, failed to recognize the root cause of the problems associated with that pump. This was
7 discussed in Section M1.2 of IIR 50-321, 366/98-03.
In all cases required administrative approvals were obtained before initiating the work; approved procedures were used; quality control (QC) inspections were made in accordance with the licensee's requirements, and QC records were completed; functional testing and calibrations were completed and test data was reviewed by supervision; personnel who performed the tests were properly qualified; measuring and test equipment used was identified and in calibration; parts and materials used were identified and met the specifications of the original equipment; and all work was consistent with the regulatory requirements.
- c.
Conclusion The corrective maintenance work activities described in the sixteen work packages examined were properly accomplished.
8 M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-366/99-03: Simultaneous Grounds in the DC Power Supply System Result in an Unexpected Actuation of an SRV This issue was the result of chronic direct current (DC) ground conditions on the 2A Station Service DC bus. The ground conditions deteriorated to the point that the 2C SRV had to be disabled, and another ground on the 2K SRV control circuit had degraded necessitating a forced Unit 2 shutdown. The root cause of the SRV grounds was identified, in one case, as an improperly installed SRV solenoid electrical cable that allowed the cable for the 2K SRV to come in contact with uninsulated portions of the SRV valve body. In the other case, insulation on the 2C SRV assembly wrapped the SRV solenoid electrical cable against the uninsulated portions of the valve body. The solenoid electrical cable was subject to excessive temperatures, melted, and allowed the wiring to contact the metal of the flexible cable conduit. The procedure used to install the insulation, 52GM-B21-005-0S Main Steam Relief Valve Maintenance, Rev. 14, was inadequate in that it did not provide guidance concerning flexible cable conduit touching uninsulated metal or covering it with insulation.
Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering activities and applicable procedures recommended in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, Appendix A, Section 9
9 states that maintenance that can affect performance of safety-related equipment should be properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions or drawings appropriate to circumstances. Procedure 52GM-B21-005-0S provided drawings and instructions for routing of the flexible cable conduit and installation of safety relief valve insulation.
Contrary to the above, procedure 52GM-B21-005-0S was inadequate in that it did not contain sufficiently detailed instructions or drawings to support proper routing of the flexible cable conduit and installation of safety relief valve insulation following maintenance activities. As a result, safety relief valve solenoid power cables were degraded, ultimately forcing the licensee to disable the 2C SRV and causing an actuation of the 2K SRV.
This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV),
consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement
10 Policy. This issue is identified as NCV 50-366/99-01-01, Inadequate Procedure for Installation of Thermal Insulation on SRV.
This violation is in the licensees corrective action program as Significant Occurrence Report (SOR)
C09900465.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective actions as a result of this LER, including As-Built Notification (ABN)99-073 which upgrades the vendors manual and procedure drawing for insulation installation on SRVs, with precautions to be taken with SRV solenoid power cables. The inspectors determined the procedure drawing upgrades to be acceptable.
11 IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R1.1 Personnel Contamination Due to Hot Particle (71750)
The inspectors reviewed licensee actions after a worker became contaminated in a clean area due to a hot particle in the workers shoe cover. The hot particle was identified as Cobalt-60 (Co-60),
and resulted in a skin dose to the worker of 1.7 REM. The inspectors reviewed the Personnel Contamination Report (PCR) for this incident, as well as actions taken to investigate the cause and associated corrective actions. The PCR was thorough and included follow-up documentation and details describing the circumstances of the incident, a list of smear surveys where the worker had been, a protective clothing (PC) survey, shake test survey of the PCs, and extensive fixed contamination surveys of equipment used by the worker, as well as equipment in the vicinity of the workers location.
No detectable radioactive material was found. Although the cause and location of the personnel contamination were not determined, the inspectors concluded that the licensee actions to investigate were thorough and aggressive.
R2 Status of Radiation Protection and Chemistry Facilities and Equipment R2.1 Inspection of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) (71750)
12 On January 27, the inspectors observed the inspection of SCBA equipment by a Radiation Protection Technician. The technician performed the inspection in accordance with the monthly checklist attached to procedure 62RP-RAD-003-OS, Use and Care of Respirators, Rev. 7, Edition (Ed) 1. The inspectors observed that 10 SCBAs were located in the control room with 32 spare air cylinders and 2 in the Technical Support Center (TSC). These numbers met the requirements of emergency procedure 73EP-INS-001-0S for the Control Room and the TSC respectively. The inspectors verified that SCBA corrective lens inserts were available in the control room for control room operators whose license had a corrective lens restriction. The inspectors also reviewed documentation for the previous 12 months to verify that the monthly SCBA inspections required by procedure 62RP-RAD-003-OS were performed. The inspectors concluded that the SCBAs in the Control Room and TSC were being properly maintained and met the procedural acceptance criteria.
F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities F1.1 Combustible Material, Housekeeping, and Ignition Source Controls/Fire Risk Reduction
- a. Inspection Scope (64704)
The inspectors reviewed administrative control procedure, 40AC-ENG-008-OS, Fire Protection Program, Rev. 8, to determine if the
13 objectives established by the licensees commitments to implement the NRC-approved fire protection program were being met.
- b. Observations and Findings The inspectors toured 8 of the 10 highest ranked dominant fire risk locations identified in the licensees Individual Plant Examination of External Events. The inspectors observed that controls were being maintained for transient combustibles in areas containing potential lubrication oil and diesel fuel leaks.
The licensee made use of absorption materials to catch leaking fluid. There was no excessive accumulation of combustible material or waste in safety_related areas.
A designated fire inspector conducted monthly plant fire safety inspections to identify potential fire hazards. Corrective actions for the issues had been initiated. The inspectors reviewed the results of the fire inspections and associated deficiency cards (DCs) for 1997 and 1998, and noted that there was a low threshold for identification of combustible control and housekeeping issues and that the trend in the number of safety significant examples of fire prevention problems identified had declined over the period.
- c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee's implementation of the combustible control procedures and plant operational practices in safety_related areas were consistent with the approved fire protection program.
F1.2 Fire Reports and Investigations (64704)
The inspectors reviewed the station fire incident reports and DCs resulting from fire, smoke, sparks, and equipment overheating incidents for the three year period 1997-1999, to assess whether plant fire protection requirements were being met in accordance with administrative control procedure 40AC-ENG-008-OS, Section 4.2.20, Responsibilities, for investigating fire incidents, when fire-related events occurred.
The licensees fire reports and DCs indicated that during the period 1997-1998 there were three incidents of fire, smoke or significant equipment overheating within safety-related plant areas. Two were minor fire incidents involving cutting or welding activities associated with outages and one incident involved an isolated emergency diesel generator exhaust manifold fire that occurred on November 22, 1997. In all cases, the fire or overheating condition was identified and mitigating action was taken in a timely manner. The inspector concluded that these fire related conditions were
14 identified and mitigating actions were taken in a timely manner. No significant change in the number of fire related incidents occurred over the time period reviewed.
F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment F2.1 Inspection of Fire Brigade Equipment (64704)
The inspectors reviewed procedure, 40AC-ENG-008-OS, Section 8.2, Handling of Fire Emergencies, toured the fire brigade staging areas, and inspected fire brigade equipment to determine if equipment was accessible and available in the staging areas.
The inspectors toured the staging dress out area for the plant interior power block located on the 147' elevation of the Control Building and the staging dress out area building outside the main power block structure and inspected four sets fire brigade turnout gear. The inspector observed that there was no backup lighting provided at the exterior fire brigade staging dress out building or in the area of some fire brigade equipment. This enhancement to these areas were discussed with the licensee. The licensee initiated DC No. CO9901106 to address the inspectors observation. The inspector concluded that the personal protective fire fighting equipment provided to the brigade was in good condition, well maintained, and provided a sufficient level of personal safety needed to handle onsite fire emergencies.
F3 Fire Protection Procedures and Documentation F3.1 Fire Brigade Pre-fire Strategies (64704)
The inspectors reviewed five fire brigade pre-fire strategies for plant areas where unannounced fire drills had been performed in 1998, for compliance with the NRC-approved fire protection program. Plant tours were performed to verify that the fire strategies reflected as-built plant conditions. The pre-fire strategies were found to be satisfactory and met the requirements of the NRC approved fire protection program.
F5 Fire Protection Staff Training and Qualification F5.1 Fire Brigade Drill Program (64704)
The inspectors reviewed the fire brigade drill program for compliance with plant procedures and NRC guidelines and requirements. They also observed control room activities and fire brigade response associated with an unannounced back-shift fire brigade drill on February 24 to a simulated fire in the Emergency Diesel Building 4-kV Switchgear room 2E. The fire brigade demonstrated aggressive fire fighting tactics and the proper usage of fire fighting equipment. Good communications existed between the brigade leader, control room personnel, and the brigade members. The fire brigade leaders direction and performance were also good. Control room activities in response to the drill were timely and in accordance with procedures.
15 To evaluate other operating shifts drill performance, the drill critique data for selected shift drills conducted during the past 2-year period were reviewed by the inspectors.
The overall fire brigade response and participation for these drills were satisfactory.
The inspectors noted that a number of drills had been performed in risk significant plant locations. The inspectors concluded that the fire brigade drill program was effective and that fire brigade response was proper.
16 F7 Quality Assurance in Fire Protection Activities F7.1 Fire Protection Audit Reports (64704)
The inspectors reviewed the Safety Audit and Engineering Review (SAER) Audit reports 97-FP-01, 97-FP-02, 98-FP-01 and 98-FP-02 and determined that the assessments were effective in reporting fire protection program performance to management. The audits identified minor concerns that were properly documented in the licensees corrective action tracking program. The fire protection audits determined that implementation of the fire protection program was adequate and there were no programmatic problems. The inspectors concluded that the SAER assessments were effective in reporting fire protection program performance to management. The licensees corrective actions in response to identified issues were comprehensive and timely.
F8 Follow up on Plant Support Items (92904)
F8.1 (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-321,366/98-01-05: Review of Licensee Records and Engineering Evaluations to Establish the Fire Resistant Capabilities of Fire Rated Silicone Foam Penetration The licensee had acquired 18 additional silicone foam penetration seal test reports which supported the silicone foam penetration seal installations. The plant as-built penetration seal database was enhanced to incorporate seal details concerning penetration seal design parameters and document appropriate test reports or engineering evaluations. The inspectors concluded that the fire barrier penetration designs were properly supported by the enhanced seal design basis documentation and satisfied the guidance of NRC Generic Letter (GL) 86-10.
V. Management Meetings and Other Areas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 12, 1999. Interim exit meetings were held on January 29 and February 26, 1999 to discuss the findings of Region based inspections.
The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
17 PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Betsill, J., Assistant General Manager - Operations Curtis, S., Unit Superintendent Davis, D., Plant Administration Manager Dedrickson, R., Unit Superintendent Fornel, P., Plant Modifications and Maintenance Support Manager Fraser, O., Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor Googe, M., Performance Team Manager Hammonds, J., Engineering Support Manager Kirkley, W., Health Physics and Chemistry Manager Lewis, J., Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager Madison, D., Operations Manager Moore, C., Assistant General Manager - Plant Support Reddick, R., Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator Roberts, P., Outage and Planning Manager Thompson, J., Nuclear Security Manager Tipps, S., Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager Wells, P., General Manager - Nuclear Plant Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry/radiation, and corporate personnel.
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations IP 64704 Fire Protection Program IP 92904 Follow up-Plant Support IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities IP 92700:
On-site LER Review IP 92901:
Operations Followup ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Closed 50-364/98-04-01 LER Personnel Error Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications (O8.2).
50-321,366/99-01-01 NCV Inadequate Procedure for Installation of
18 Thermal Insulation on SRV (M8.1).
50-366/99-01 LER Personnel Error Results in Condition Prohibited By The Technical Specifications (Section O8.1).
50-366/99-02 LER Water Level Transient Following Manual Reactor Scram Causes Group 2 PCIS Isolation (Section O1.2).
50-366/99-03 LER Simultaneous Grounds in the DC Power Supply System Result in an Unexpected Actuation of an SRV (M8.1).
50-366/99-04 LER Spurious Radiation Monitor Trip Causes Group 2 PCIS Isolation (Section O1.2).
50-321, 366/98-01-05 IFI Review of Licensee Records and Engineering Evaluations to Establish the Fire Resistant Capabilities of Fire Rated Silicone Foam Penetration (Section F8.1).