ML26027A103
| ML26027A103 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/2026 |
| From: | James Drake NRC/NRR/DORL/LPL4 |
| To: | Entergy Operations |
| Drake, J | |
| References | |
| EPID L-2024-LLA-0180 | |
| Download: ML26027A103 (0) | |
Text
February 3, 2026 Vice President, Operations Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station 5485 US Highway 61 St. Francisville, LA 70775
SUBJECT:
RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 220 RE:
REVISION TO THE LICENSING BASIS AND MINIMUM BASIN WATER LEVEL FOR THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (EPID L-2024-LLA-0180)
Dear Sir or Madam:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 220 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 for the River Bend Station, Unit 1 (River Bend). The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated December 30, 2024, as supplemented by letter dated September 24, 2025.
The amendment modifies the River Bend licensing basis through a revision of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) to credit makeup to the ultimate heat sink (UHS) in less than 30 days to account for system leakage and for operation with both standby service water subsystems in operation. Additionally, the proposed amendment would revise TS Surveillance Requirement 3.7.1.1 to increase the minimum UHS cooling tower basin water level in order to maximize UHS inventory.
A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions monthly Federal Register notice.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jason J. Drake, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-458
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No. 220 to NPF-47
- 2. Safety Evaluation cc: Listserv
ENTERGY LOUISIANA, LLC AND ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
DOCKET NO. 50-458 RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 220 Renewed License No. NPF-47
- 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee), dated December 30, 2024, as supplemented by letter dated September 24, 2025, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2)
Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 220 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. EOI shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
In addition, by Amendment No. 220, Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 is hereby amended to authorize revision to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) as set forth in the licensees application dated December 30, 2024, as supplemented by letters dated September 24, 2025, and evaluated in the NRC staffs safety evaluation associated with this amendment. The licensee shall submit the update of the USAR authorized by this amendment in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e).
3.
The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days from the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Michael Mahoney, Acting Chief Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 and the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: February 3, 2026 MICHAEL MAHONEY Digitally signed by MICHAEL MAHONEY Date: 2026.02.03 15:59:08 -05'00'
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 220 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47 RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-458 Replace the following pages of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 and the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
Renewed Facility Operating License Remove Insert Technical Specifications Remove Insert 3.7-3 3.7-3
Amendment No. 220 (2)
EOI, pursuant to Section 103 of the Act and 10 CFR Part 50, to possess, use and operate the facility at the above designated location in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in this renewed license; (3)
EOI, pursuant to Section 103 of the Act and 10 CFR Part 70, to receive, possess and to use at any time special nuclear material as reactor fuel, in accordance with the limitations for storage and amounts required for reactor operation, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended; (4)
EOI, pursuant to Section 103 of the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required; (5)
EOI, pursuant to Section 103 of the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (6)
EOI, pursuant to Section 103 of the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.
(7)
EOI, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 30, 40, and 70 to receive, possess and use, in amounts as required, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, River Bend Station, Unit 1, and Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, without restriction to chemical or physical form for the purposes of sample analysis, equipment calibration, or equipment repair.
C.
This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:
(1)
Maximum Power Level EOI is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3091 megawatts thermal (100% rated power) in accordance with the conditions specified herein.
(2)
Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 220 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. EOI shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
SSW System and UHS 3.7.1 RIVER BEND 3.7-3 Amendment No. 81, 185, 196, 220 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME H.
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, E, or G not met.
H.1 ----------NOTE-----------
LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.
Be in MODE 3.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> I.
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B, D or F not met.
OR Both SSW subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition F.
OR Three or four UHS cooling tower fan cells inoperable.
I.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND I.2 Be in MODE 4.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.1.1 Verify the water level of UHS cooling tower basin is t 82.6%.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.7.1.2 Verify the average water temperature of UHS is d 88qF.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 220 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47 ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-458
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By application dated December 30, 2024 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML24365A265), as supplemented by letter dated September 24, 2025 (ML25267A061), Entergy Operations, Inc, (Entergy, the licensee),
requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) approve an amendment for River Bend Station, Units 1 (River Bend or RBS), for Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 in the form of changes to the River Bend licensing basis through revision to the River Bend Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and technical specifications (TSs). The licensees evaluation of the proposed changes is located in attachments 1 and 2 of the application and referenced as license amendment request (LAR) sections in this document.
The proposed change is a revision to the limiting single failure from an assumed failure of one emergency diesel generator (EDG)/standby service water (SSW) train to assuming failure of one SSW return header isolation valve while operating two EDGs/SSW subsystems. The licensees evaluation results in the need for makeup to the ultimate heat sink (UHS) to meet the current licensing basis to support 30 days UHS operation following an accident, while accounting for system leakage and both SSW subsystems in operation. The proposed changes also would revise Surveillance Requirement (SR) SR 3.7.1.1 to increase the minimum UHS cooling tower basis water level in order to maximize UHS inventory.
The technical analysis for the proposed change can be found in section 3.0 below. The conclusions represent the NRR staff's position based on information specific to River Bend and do not generically apply to other licensees or sites.
The supplemental letter dated September 24, 2025, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staffs original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register (FR) on April 15, 2025 (90 FR 15727).
1.1 Purpose of the Proposed Changes As stated in its LAR, the licensee determined the need for the proposed change to address a historical design basis issue from 2002, in which Entergy revised the USAR and TS Bases crediting makeup to the UHS to account for system leakage during the case where the Division II diesel generator does not fail, and the associated Division II SSW components are operated in addition to Division I/III during the 30 day post design-basis accident (DBA) mission time. This change was made under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)
Section 50.59, Changes, tests, and experiments, with the understanding by Entergy at the time that this scenario was considered outside the design basis case evaluated in the USAR.
In 2011, the NRC issued Inspection Report 05000458/2011008 (ML113400127), which contained a noncited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.59 regarding Entergy failing to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing the change to the UHS inventory requirements in 2002.
To resolve the violation, the licensee submitted the subject LAR and proposed revision of River Bend USAR section 9.2.5, Ultimate Heat Sink (ML24340A014), to remove the current assumption of a single failure of the Division II EDG following a trip. USAR section 9.2.5 is instead revised to indicate that the limiting case for determining UHS water storage basin capacity is all EDGs operating following the DBA, including both SSW divisions, along with the single failure of one of the two SSW return header isolation valves. The proposed change to USAR section 9.2.5 reflects that the UHS water storage basin is sized to provide a minimum of 21 days inventory without replenishment. Replenishment from either the deep well pumps or the circulating water flume must be started by day 10 following an accident to ensure the safety functions of the UHS are maintained for 30 days.
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
2.1
System Description
The UHS is designed to operate under emergency conditions only. Normal cooling for service water including shutdown is accomplished by the cooling tower in the service water cooling system and the normal service water heat exchangers.
The UHS consists of a standby cooling tower (SCT) and water storage basin forming a part of the SSW system, which functions as the UHS for River Bend. The UHS contains one 200-percent Seismic Category I cooling tower and one 100-percent capacity water storage basin. In section 2.2 of enclosure 1 to the LAR, the licensee provided a description of the components and water inventory available for UHS and makeup function:
Standby Service Water (SSW)
The SSW System is comprised of two equally sized, redundant piping systems, each supplying the components listed in Table 9.2-15 of the USAR. During normal plant operation, the normal service water pumps use SSW piping to supply safety-related components. The SSW System is designed to provide cooling water for the removal of heat from unit auxiliaries such as Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System heat exchangers, EDGs, High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator, and room coolers for Emergency Core Cooling System equipment required for a safe reactor shutdown following a Design Basis
Accident (DBA) or transient. The SSW System also provides cooling to unit components, as required, during normal shutdown and reactor isolation modes.
Cooling water for normal station operation, including shutdown, is provided by the Normal Service Water (NSW) System. During normal operation, the NSW System pumps use the SSW System piping to supply cooling water to safety-related components. During a DBA with a loss of offsite power, the equipment required for normal operation only is isolated from the SSW System, and SSW cooling is directed only to safety related equipment. Isolation of the NSW [normal service water] System from the SSW System is achieved via automatic closure of the SSW System supply header isolation valves (SWP-MOV57A and SWP-MOV57B) and return header isolation valves (SWP-MOV96A and SWP-MOV96B) when the SSW System pumps are initiated. The mission time of the SSW System is 30 days following a DBA LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident].
Standby Cooling Tower (SCT)
Post DBA heat loads are dissipated by the SCT, also referred to as the UHS, which is an evaporative cooling tower containing two 100% cooling tower divisions. The SCT structure is a single seismic Category I structure designed to withstand seismic, tornado, and missile loads. Each division contains 100%
capacity piping, fill, and fans capable of removing 100% of the heat load to mitigate the consequences of a DBA assuming a loss of offsite power. One 100%
common basin is provided for both divisions of fans and pumps/piping. The evaporative cooling provided by the cooling tower depletes inventory in the basin.
In addition to evaporation, other losses include drift, the Main Steam Positive Leakage Control System (MS-PLCS), and system leakage. The SCT is designed to provide sufficient cooling to permit safe shutdown and cooldown of the unit following an assumed worst case LOCA DBA. The UHS is required to perform its intended safety function assuming any single active or passive failure coincident with a loss of offsite power.
The SCT, including its storage basin, is designed in accordance with RG 1.27 Revision 2, as stated in USAR Table 1.8-1. The UHS basin capacity, [as currently described in USAR Section 9.2.5, should] maintain a minimum of 30 days inventory to mitigate the consequences of a DBA without replenishment assuming a loss of offsite power and a single failure. The current TS minimum water level for the UHS basin is 78%, as required by TS SR 3.7.1.1, which corresponds to an elevation of 111 10. Note that elevations and levels discussed in this LAR refer to mean sea level (MSL).
Deep Well Pumps The normal method of replenishing water in the SCT is performed using the installed deep well pumps, which are part of the makeup water treatment system.
Raw water is pumped from two deep well pumps (MWS-P1A and MWS-P1B) to maintain level in the SCT basin. The pumps are in wells that are approximately 1800 ft deep and have an approximately 14 ft discharge column above the impellers. Each pump is sized to provide 150 [gpm [gallons per minute)) and pumps can supply a combined flow of 200 [gpm] when operated in parallel.
The two pumps are located in the yard along the south plant access road. MWS-P1A is located east of the fire pump house and MWS-P1B is located west of the fire pump house. The pumps are located approximately 460 ft apart. Both pumps discharge above ground into pipelines that drop underground into the fire pump house. At the fire pump house, the two pump discharges combine into a common 4 [inch] line. This line goes underground in the fire pump house and is buried until it enters the auxiliary control building. The line then enters the southwest corner of the turbine building heater bay and then the service water piping tunnels. From the piping tunnels, the line enters at the southeast quadrant of the cooling tower basin.
Circulating Water Flume and Fire Protection Piping The [proposed] backup method of replenishing the SCT if the deep well pumps are unavailable is to use the circulating water (circ water) flume and fire protection piping. The water is transferred to the SCT from the flume using the fire protection system piping and a temporary diesel driven pump. Site procedures are in place to implement this makeup source if needed.
The circ water flume is an open channel located between the plant cooling towers which serves to transfer the water from the cooling tower basins to the suction of the circ water pumps. It is low-profile concrete structure with walls that extend up from its base to about 3 ft above grade. The walls are nominally 2.5 thick reinforced concrete. An outlet flume runs from the main flume channel to each of the cooling tower basins.
The fire protection piping system runs throughout the plant. The portion of the system used for replenishment of the SCT is the piping from fire hydrants FPW-FHY29 or FPW-FHY1 to either FPW-FHY10 or FPW-FHY9. Hydrant FHY29 is located to the west of the flume inside the Generation Support Building (SOCA) fence and FHY1 is located just south of the plant near the demineralized water storage tanks. FHY10 is located east of the SCT and FHY9 is located just west of the SCT. The piping is all underground except for the hydrants. Water from the flume can be pumped with fire hoses to hydrant FHY29 or FHY1, through buried fire protection piping to either hydrant FPW-FHY10 or FPW-FHY9 and transferred from the hydrant to the SCT with fire hoses.
2.2 Description of the Proposed Changes The proposed change to the current licensing basis, as described in the River Bend USAR, revises the limiting single failure from an assumed failure of one EDG/SSW train to operating two EDGs/SSW subsystems assuming failure of one SSW return header isolation valve. This change results in required makeup to the UHS in less than 30 days to account for operation with both SSW subsystems performing their safety function.
The licensee proposed USAR and TS changesare described below. Additions are shown in underlined italicized text and deletions are shown using strikeout.
The current USAR section 9.2.5.1, Design Bases, Item 2 states:
The capacity of the UHS water storage basin is designed to provide necessary cooling for the period of time (30 days) needed to evaluate the situation, to take corrective action to mitigate the consequences of an accident, and if required to take any necessary measures to permit water replenishment. In addition, alternate methods are available for ensuring the continued capability of the sink beyond 30 days (Section 9.2.5.2).
The current paragraph in USAR section 9.2.5.2, System Description, states:
Heat transfer to standby service water is seen to occur immediately after a DBA, postulated as a large break of a main steam line (DBA-MSL) coincident with a complete loss of offsite power. The loss of offsite power is assumed to last for the full 30-day post shutdown period. The single failure of the Division II diesel generator is postulated to occur immediately after trip.
The proposed USAR section 9.2.5.1 (Item 2.) states:
The capacity of the UHS water storage basin is designed to provide necessary cooling for the period of time (3021 days) needed to evaluate the situation, to take corrective action to mitigate the consequences of an accident, and if required to take any necessary measures to permit water replenishment.
Replenishment from either the deep well pumps or the circulating water flume is credited starting by day 10 to replenish the UHS water storage basin in less than 30 days. In addition, alternate methods are available for ensuring the continued capability of the sink beyond 30 days (Section 9.2.5.2).
The proposed paragraph in USAR section 9.2.5.2 states:
Heat transfer to standby service water is seen to occur immediately after a DBA, postulated as a large break of a main steam line (DBA-MSL) coincident with a complete loss of offsite power. The loss of offsite power is assumed to last for the full 30 day post shutdown period. The single failure of the Division II diesel generator is postulated to occur immediately after trip. For inventory analysis, the worst case single failure of either SWP-MOV96A or B (Standby Service Water Return Header Isolation Valves) is postulated to occur immediately after the trip.
For temperature analysis, the worst-case single failure of the Div II SCT fans is postulated to occur immediately after the trip.
The licensee proposed an additional change to TS 3.7.1, Standby Service Water (SSW)
System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS), minimum UHS basin water level requirement:
Current TS SR 3.7.1.1 states:
Verify the water level of UHS cooling tower basin is 78%.
The proposed TS SR 3.7.1.1 states:
Verify the water level of UHS cooling tower basin is 78 82.6%.
2.3 Regulatory Requirements and Guidance Used in the Evaluation of the Changes Regulatory Requirements 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2), Limiting conditions for operation, requires, in part, that technical specifications include limiting conditions for operation, which are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit, when the holder of an operating license seeks to amend that license, they must submit an application to the Commission that fully describes the proposed changes. The application should, to the extent applicable, follow the format used for original license applications. NRC evaluates this LAR against the common standards of 10 CFR 50.40 (i.e.,
provide reasonable assurance that the applicant will comply with the regulations in this chapter, including the regulations in part 20 of this chapter, and that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered) via 10 CFR 50.92(a) because there are no specific regulations that apply to a change to reevaluation of single failure scenario.
Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, to 10 CFR Part 50 establishes the minimum requirements for the principal design criteria for water-cooled nuclear power plants.
General Design Criterion (GDC) 44, Cooling water, is applicable to the capability to transfer heat from structures, systems, and components important to safety, to an ultimate heat sink. GDC 44 states, The system safety function shall be to transfer the combined heat load of these structures, systems, and components under normal operating and accident conditions.
Suitable redundancy in components and features, and suitable interconnections, leak detection, and isolation capabilities shall be provided to assure that for onsite electric power system operation (assuming offsite power is not available) and for offsite electric power system operation (assuming onsite power is not available) the system safety function can be accomplished, assuming a single failure.
GDC 13, Instrumentation and control, states, Instrumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety, including those variables and systems that can affect the fission process, the integrity of the reactor core, the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment and its associated systems.
Appropriate controls shall be provided to maintain these variables and systems within prescribed operating ranges.
GDC 2, Design bases for protection against natural phenomena, states, Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. The design bases for these structures, systems, and components shall reflect: (1) Appropriate consideration of the most severe of the natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area, with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated, (2) appropriate combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions with the effects of the natural phenomena and (3) the importance of the safety functions to be performed.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances.
Regulatory Guidance NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: [Light-Water Reactor] LWR Edition (SRP), chapter 18, section 18.0, Human Factors Engineering, Revision 3, December 2016 (ML16125A114),
provides the regulatory guidance for human factors engineering (HFE) considerations for applicants.
NUREG-1764, Guidance for the Review of Changes to Human Actions, Revision 1, September 2007 (ML072640413), provides guidance for determining the appropriate level of human factors review and the criteria to be considered for proposed changes to human actions.
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.27, Revision 2, Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Power Plants (ML003739969), provides NRC accepted guidance to meet the GDC 44 requirements.
The UHS is considered compliant if it can supply enough cooling water to support safe shutdown and cooldown of the station for 30 days without makeup under both normal and accident conditions.
RG 1.27 (Revision 2) also notes that a capacity of less than 30 days may be acceptable if it can be demonstrated that replenishment can be effected to ensure the continuous capability of the sink to perform its safety functions, taking into account the availability of replenishment equipment and any limitations that may be imposed on freedom of movement following an accident.
RG 1.105, Setpoints for Safety Related Instrumentation (ML20330A329), describes an approach acceptable to the staff of the NRC to ensure that: a) setpoints for safety-related instrumentation are established to protect nuclear power plant safety and analytical limits, and b) the maintenance of instrument channels implementing these setpoints ensures they are functioning as required, consistent with the plant technical
specifications. This RG provides guidance for evaluating the uncertainty of instrument channels that provide monitoring of critical plant parameters to ensure that they provide information to plant operators for making key operational decisions as well as for initiating safety functions.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
The NRC staff evaluated the safety-significance and shutdown risk of using non-safety components to fulfill the UHS basin capacity to account for the 30-day supply in accordance with RG 1.27, Revision 2. The staff considered the potential UHS safety function impact and reliability of makeup source.
The main objective of this safety evaluation is to ensure that the UHS continues to meet the regulatory requirements of GDC 2 and GDC 44. The NRC staff considers that the requirements of the GDCs are met for the UHS if the LAR adheres to the guidelines of RG 1.27, Revision 2, and the licensing basis stated in the USAR. The UHS will meet the regulatory requirements and guidelines if it provides sufficient cooling water to permit safe shutdown and cooldown of the station for 30 days with no makeup for both normal and accident conditions.
As described above, the licensee is requesting to resolve a long-standing issue with re-analyzed UHS inventory. The licensee indicates that this LAR revises the assumed single failure from the Division II EDG to one of the SSW return header isolation valves (SWP-MOV96A or SWP-MOV96B) failing open, which is indicated as the bounding single failure with respect to inventory.
RG 1.27, Revision 2, states, in part, that, A capacity of less than 30 days may be acceptable if it can be demonstrated that replenishment can be effected to ensure the continuous capability of the sink to perform its safety functions, taking into account the availability of replenishment equipment and limitations that may be imposed on freedom of movement following an accident.
The SCT and water storage basin forms a part of the SSW system which functions as the UHS for River Bend. The SSW system is designed to provide cooling water for the removal of heat from unit auxiliaries such as the RHR system heat exchangers, EDGs, high pressure core spray diesel generator, and room coolers for emergency core cooling system equipment required for a safe reactor shutdown following a DBA or transient. Cooling water for normal station operation, including shutdown, is provided by the NSW system. During normal operation, the NSW system pumps use the SSW system piping to supply cooling water to safety-related components.
During a DBA with a loss of offsite power, the equipment required for normal operation only is automatically isolated from the SSW system, and SSW cooling is directed only to safety-related equipment. The SSW system is designed to Seismic Category I requirements, and protection is provided from extreme natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods. The system is also protected from the effects of externally and internally generated missiles, as well as the effects of pipe whip and jet impingement from high and moderate-energy line breaks.
As discussed in River Bend USAR section 9.2.5, the SSW system operates under emergency conditions, in conjunction with the UHS, to remove heat from those plant components required for the safe shutdown and cooldown of the unit. The system provides all the necessary cooling water to the reactor plant components required to safely bring the reactor to a cold shutdown condition and to maintain it in cold shutdown for a 30-day post-accident period.
3.1 Human Factors Evaluation 3.1.1 Description of Human Actions The NRC staff determined that the increase in the water level of the UHS cooling tower basin does not involve a change in human action. As indicated in the River Bend technical specifications (TS), the operator action is to verify the water level of the UHS cooling tower basin and this action is in the current licensing basis. The only change is the value the operator is verifying (this has changed from 111 ft 10 inches (111 10) to 114 ft 9 inches (114 9). Thus, no further information is needed for this element.
The operator action credited for the use of the deep well pumps as an alternative SCT makeup source is introduced in section 3.3 of enclosure 1 to the LAR. Specifically, this section describes that there are existing site procedures for this manual human action that are currently used to replenish the SCT using the deep well pumps and to provide temporary power using the SBO
[station blackout] diesel generators when normal power is not available. Thus, the NRC staff determined that this is an action in the current licensing basis, not a new action, and no further information is needed for review.
The NRC staff identified in section 3.4 of enclosure 1 to the LAR, that the process for using the circulating water flume as the makeup water source for the SCT would involve using the circulating water flume and pump structure, and other piping and pumps stored in the FLEX buildings. Further, the licensee indicated in the LAR there are site procedures available that direct operators to perform the human action necessary to use the circulating water flume via one of the two alternate flow paths. In response to Operator Licensing and Human Factors Branch (IOLB)-Request for information (RAI) 1, by letter dated September 24, 2025, which asked whether, and if so how, the current site procedures would need to be changed, the licensee indicated that no modifications to existing FLEX or SBO procedures would be required as part of this LAR. Thus, the NRC staff determined the licensees proposal to provide makeup water to the SCT basin using the circulating water flume did not present a change to any human action within the facilitys licensing basis.
Regarding the amount of time for the operators to perform the tasks, there are a few relevant time periods reported in the LAR. The first is that the mission time associated with crediting the two water sources for the UHS is 30 days. The manual human action must be performed by the operators within the first 10 days of this mission time, and this human action must be completed within 20 minutes. This description indicates that even if the task is not completed correctly the first time, there would be sufficient time to do it correctly within this 10-day time window.
Additionally, in response to IOLB-RAI 1, the licensee provided information regarding the low dose consequences associated with human action. Specifically, the licensee reported analysis has indicated that mission dose is acceptable after 4-days post-DBA, as such, there is a 6-day period in which makeup water equipment can be installed and makeup flow started, indicating a low exposure risk to the operator.
SRP chapter 18 indicates that, for requests associated with important human actions, applicable acceptance criteria are contained in NUREG-1764. NUREG-1764 provides guidance for determining the level of HFE review required for such requests and the HFE criteria to be considered while completing the NRC staffs evaluation. The following sections discuss the staffs review of the licensees submittal, completed in accordance with the guidance in NUREG-1764.
3.1.2 Risk Assessment to Determine Level of Review In consideration of the River Bend LAR to revise USAR section 9.2.5 and TS SR 3.7.1.1 to credit makeup to the SCT from two water sources, the NRC staff used the guidance in section 2.4 of NUREG-1764, Screening Process for Non-Risk-Informed Change Requests.
This guidance allows the NRC staff to assess potential risk implications to any new or modified operator actions associated with LARs that are not risk-informed. Specifically, the NRC staff assessed the safety significance of the identified human action by reviewing Table A.2 (pressurized-water reactor (PWR)), Generic PWR Human Actions That Are Risk Important, in appendix A of NUREG-1764. The NRC staff verified that no actions from Group 1: PWR Human Actions That Are Risk-important, are included in the LAR, nor were there any actions in Group 2: PWR Potentially Risk-Important Human Actions.
Based on these considerations, the NRC staff concluded that, although the deployment and staging of the FLEX equipment in conjunction with using the fire protection system associated with the circulating water flume is a potentially risk-important human action, it is a human action that is part of the current licensing basis. Thus, the human actions associated with the licensees submittal warrants an assignment of a Level III review.
3.1.3 Human Factors Technical Evaluation Although the NRC staff ultimately determined that a Level III review was appropriate for the reasons stated above (Level III reviews require minimal human factors considerations), the staff considered information in the application and RAI responses in the supplement dated September 24, 2025, when conducting the screening process. The staff has documented the considerations supporting this decision below.
Regarding task and performance considerations, the NRC staff determined that the makeup water strategy involving the circulating water flume does not constitute a change of the task itself, but rather a change in the context of performing the task. Currently, the makeup strategy is associated with FLEX strategies for beyond-design-basis events to shut down River Bend, safely. The licensee described in the LAR that procedures are in place for implementing FLEX actions that address deploying equipment in challenging conditions that include flooding, storm damage to site infrastructure, and debris accumulation. The LAR would provide alternative backup water sources in the event the deep well pumps and piping are unavailable. These backups would specifically be the circulating water flume and the fire protection piping. In response to IOLB-RAI 1a, which asked whether, and if so how, the current site procedures would need to be changed, the licensee stated that they are requesting to credit existing makeup systems for the UHS. Thus, no modifications to human action are required for the application of the strategy to the new circumstance.
In response IOLB-RAI 1b-1d, which asked for b) analysis regarding there being sufficient time for the human action; c) assurance of redundancy and defense-in-depth; and d) estimation of the importance of the human action, the licensee provided the specific procedures for using the two alternative water sources and specified that the operators would have sufficient time to complete the task given 1) that it can be completed within 10 days following the event and
- 2) can be completed during a single shift. This creates a time redundancy because if one operator fails at performing the task, there is sufficient time for another to perform it correctly.
Further, the licensees reported analysis indicated that mission dose is acceptable after 4-days post-DBA, as such there is a 6-day period in which makeup water equipment can be installed and makeup flow started. These aspects of the task also make it very low risk.
The licensee indicated as part of response to IOLB-RAI 1e, which asked for information regarding the associated procedures and training for the human action, that all training for these tasks would be on the job training and qualification. This is appropriate given the low risk and complexity of this task although an operator performing it for the first time by themselves would likely need to have some sort of support.
Integrated Assessment In accordance with section 2.4.5 of NUREG-1764, based on the determinations from the qualitative assessment (discussed above), the NRC staff considered whether the licensees request warranted either an elevation or reduction of the level of the HFE review. Based upon the staffs evaluation of the RAIs, the NRC staff determined that the qualitative factors considered did not warrant a change in the level of the HFE review. Therefore, the NRC staff proceeded with a Level III review.
General Deterministic Review In accordance with section 2.5 of NUREG-1764, as part of the NRC staffs Level III review, the staff verified that current regulations will still be met with the proposed change in place. As discussed in section 2.3 of this safety evaluation, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) requires, in part, that TSs include limiting conditions for operation (LCOs), which are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of any equipment required for safe operation of the facility. The staff determined that modifications to the human action are not required to the licensees current LCOs as part of this LAR. The staff concludes that 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) continues to be met because the proposed revision to USAR section 9.2.5 and TS SR 3.7.1.1 to credit makeup to the SCT from two water sources and the resulting impacts on specific operator actions related to the circulating water flume makeup strategy will not negatively impact the licensees compliance with the requirements listed in. The NRC staff also determined that the procedures associated with the circulating water flume makeup strategy will remain in accordance with 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B.
3.1.4 Human Factors Conclusion The NRC staff reviewed the HFE aspects of the licensees LAR to River Bend USAR section 9.2.5 and TS SR 3.7.1.1, which will credit water makeup to the SCT basin and increase the minimum UHS cooling tower basin water level to maximize UHS inventory, respectively. The NRC staff determined that conditions for the proposed TS change will not constitute a significant change to the task, nor will implementation of the change entail a significant change to associated procedures or training.
Specifically, for the circulating water flume makeup strategy, controls established by the licensee will ensure that using the FLEX equipment and the fire protection system will be accessible and available for SCT basin replenishment. Also, operators will still be able to effectively perform the actions necessary within the nominal allotted time. Based on this determination, along with the fact that the procedures in providing makeup water to the SCT basin from the circulating water flume will still be controlled in accordance with the licensees quality assurance program, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B and 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) continue to be met. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed amendment to be acceptable.
3.2 Plant Systems Technical Evaluation 3.2.1 Inventory with Single Failure of EDG (Existing Licensing Basis)
Currently, the River Bend SCT basin is designed in accordance with RG 1.27, Revision 2 to maintain a 30-day inventory assuming the failure of an EDG, thereby limiting operations to one subsystem of SSW and its associated system leakage following a DBA.
The licensee stated that the 30-day water inventory requirement was evaluated with the immediate shutdown of one train of service water, which is the current bounding single failure, with loss of offsite power. However, the licensee has reevaluated a single failure of the NSW isolation valve and determined the 30-day supply without makeup will not be achievable with the reevaluated conditions. The licensee stated that, if failure of the EDG does not occur and both subsystems of SSW remain operational, the UHS inventory is depleted within approximately 21 days. Therefore, the licensee proposed to revise the licensing basis to credit makeup water to reach the 30-day UHS inventory.
3.2.2 Inventory Without Failure of Single EDG (New Licensing Basis)
The licensee indicates in the application that if failure of the EDG does not occur and both subsystems of SSW remain operational, the UHS inventory is depleted within approximately 21 days. The licensee further states that, Rather than securing an EDG and operating with a single SSW subsystem post-DBA, the preferred approach is to maintain all EDGs operational and instead replenish the UHS inventory as needed, and replenishment must start by day 10 into the event.
As indicated in the LAR, the licensees reevaluation has determined that, with no EDG failures, loss of power and both divisions of SSW in operation, the SCT basin inventory is depleted by day 21 following a DBA without any makeup available. The licensee further indicates that these calculations assume the proposed starting UHS inventory of 114 ft 5 inches (114 5), a system leakage loss rate of 15 gallons per minute (gpm or GPM) per SSW subsystem, a loss rate of 1.5 gpm to supply seal water to the MS-PLCS, and a single failure of one of the return header boundary isolation valves along with a 20-minute operator manual action to close the valve. The initial 30-day inventory demand of the UHS is estimated to be 6,778,000 gallons. To meet the 30-day mission time, replenishment must start by day 10 post-DBA at a minimum rate of 87.25 gpm makeup. The required calculated replenishment volume needed to reach 30 days is approximately 2,512,800 gallons. As discussed in response to SCPB-RAI 1, by letter dated September 24, 2025, actions are required in site procedure to initiated makeup by 10-days post-DBA at a rate of 125 gpm, which exceeds the required makeup rate of 87.5 gpm and is within the capacity of either of the proposed makeup source pump capacity.
It should be noted that this inventory is predicated on loss of offsite power and the need for an EDG, which consumes a large quantity of the water inventory. As indicated in section 9.2.5.2 of the River Bend USAR, the loss of power is assumed to last for the full 30 days post shutdown period. The NRC staff requested the licensee in Containment and Plant Systems Branch (SCPB)-RAI 2 to describe measures available to conserve water inventory. In its response to SCPB-RAI 2, by letter dated September 24, 2025, the licensee described site procedures containing actions performed to conserve water. These include steps such as piping configuration changes, reduction of diesel generator demand, minimize system operation relying on UHS cooling, as well as procedurally restoring diesel generators to standby mode, after offsite power is restored. When offsite power is restored and reliance on the EDG is eliminated,
the makeup requirement is reduced, thereby possibly extending the duration of the available inventory. Accordingly, in the unlikely scenario of prolonged offsite power loss requiring extended EDG operation, strategies exist to conserve UHS inventory such that maintaining the full 30-day capacity may not be required prior to offsite power restoration.
As described above, the licensee must utilize a makeup source to ensure continuous replenishment or makeup supply to meet the 30-day mission time. The proposed sources of makeup inventory are either deep well pumps or circulating water flume and fire protection piping. The licensee provided an evaluation of the makeup sources. The licensee indicates the makeup sources have rated capacity greater than the makeup demand. The makeup sources are further discussed below.
Although these makeup systems are non-safety related, the multiple makeup source options provide redundancy, and physical separation between the critical components, minimizing the risk of a single natural phenomenon affecting both makeup sources. In the unlikely event that both makeup sources are compromised, the existing UHS inventory provides reasonable time for repair prior to makeup being required.
The NRC staff finds the change in design basis related to bounding single failure reanalysis resulting in 22 days, while requiring makeup, does not result in any design change to the existing UHS design or inventory. The site contains sufficient water inventory, and plant remains capable of achieving the 30-day post-LOCA duration using existing UHS inventory and makeup from alternate sources described in this document. Therefore, the staff finds the replenishment approach using redundant and diverse sources provides a reasonable approach of assurance of the continuous capability of the UHS to perform its safety functions and remain consistent with the guidance in RG 1.27, Revision 2.
3.2.3 Use of Deep Well Pumps The licensee described the normal method of replenishing water in the SCT is performed using the installed deep well pumps (located within the yard), which are part of the makeup water treatment system. The two deep well pumps (MWS-P1A and MWS-P1B) are normally used to pump raw water into the SCT basin to maintain level. The plant has redundant deep well pumps that are both capable of meeting the required makeup flow.
In the LAR, the licensee stated, Currently, the RBS standby cooling tower (SCT) basin is designed in accordance with RG 1.27 Revision 2 to maintain a 30-day inventory assuming the failure of an Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG), thereby limiting operations to one subsystem of SSW and its associated system leakage following a design basis accident (DBA). However, if failure of the EDG does not occur and both subsystems of SSW remain operational, the UHS inventory is depleted within approximately 21 days. Rather than securing an EDG and operating with a single SSW subsystem post-DBA, the preferred approach is to maintain all EDGs operational and instead replenish the UHS inventory as needed.
In addition, the licensee concludes that the use of these pumps represents a highly reliable primary replenishment source.
Use of the deep well pumps as the makeup source for the UHS heightens the safety significance associated with their operational capability and reliability. The NRC staff requested the licensee to provide additional details of the deep well pumps such as inspection, maintenance, and performance testing or operating experience of the non-safety related makeup sources to ensure availability. In its response to SCPB-RAI 1, the licensee described the deep well pumps as original installed equipment, are classified as non-critical equipment and are normally used to replenish the well water storage tank which is used as the supply for plant demineralized water as well as makeup to the SCT. The licensees review of the maintenance history does not indicate any issue within the last 20 years for MWS-P1A. Pump MWS-P1B has had two instances since 2017 of failed control switches. The licensee indicated the deep well pumps will be screened under site preventative maintenance procedures to apply the appropriate maintenance to ensure they can perform their design function.
The NRC staff also requested discussion of actions taken if one or both makeup sources are found unavailable in the event of an accident. In response to SCPB-RAI 1, the licensee described its defense-in-depth approach with the two redundant and diverse makeup sources to the SCT. The primary source is the normal makeup consisting of one of two deep well pumps (MWS-P1A and B) and the secondary source being one of two portable fire pumps (FPW-P4 and FLX-P3). Each source has sufficient capacity to provide all required makeup to ensure a 30-day UHS inventory.
The NRC staff reviewed whether the proposed makeup sources can provide enough inventory.
The licensee calculated a value of 87.25 gpm required on day 10 post-DBA. The well pumps are capable to provide 150 gpm each. In the LAR, the licensee clarifies that the two deep well pumps draw water from the 1800 ft deep tertiary zone 3 aquifer. The licensee indicates that the available capacity of the aquifer has been evaluated and determined to have sufficient capacity with considerable margin to replenish the SCT with minimal drawdown of the aquifer. Therefore, the aquifer has sufficient water to replenish the SCT following a DBA.
The licensee provided discussion of protection from flooding, wind (hurricane and tornado),
seismic events, and potential dose concerns in the LAR. The licensee pointed out these deep well pumps cannot be assured to be available following these events.
The NRC staff finds that the likelihood of requiring a 30-day inventory, concurrent with a LOCA and a loss of offsite power, is seen as small and the use of deep well pumps provides a reasonable approach for makeup to ensure the continuous capability of the UHS to perform its safety functions.
3.2.4 Use of Circulating Water Flume and Fire Protection Piping The use of circulating water flume and fire protection piping for replenishment of the UHS capacity was described in the LAR. If the deep well makeup source is impaired, the circulating water flume remains as an alternative replenishment path for maintaining continuous capability of the UHS to support its safety functions.
In the LAR, the licensee describes the use of circulating water flumes, fire protection piping, and diesel driven Hale pumps stored in FLEX building. The circulating water flume inventory has two diverse flow paths using FHY29 or FHY1 route to provide makeup to the SCT. The licensee confirmed the required volume of makeup to support the 30-day mission time is 2,512,800 gallons. The licensee indicated that a starting flume level at the minimum operating level of 105 ft mean sea level provides available volume in the flume with at least 2,695,000 gallons.
Therefore, the flume has adequate volume to meet the 30-day makeup capacity for the SCT basin.
The circulating water pumps (Hale fire pumps) are designed with sufficient capacity to provide approximately 300 to 360 gpm from the circulating water flume to the SCT basin depending on the route using the fire protection piping, which bounds the required 87.25 gpm estimated by licensee.
In the LAR, the licensee provided a discussion of protection from flooding, wind (hurricane and tornado), seismic events, and potential dose concerns. Although the deep well pumps are not designed to withstand natural phenomena, the circulating water flume and piping used as backup is designed to withstand the effects of natural events. In addition, the pumps are stored in the protected FLEX building.
The NRC staff finds the use of circulating water flume as a defense-in-depth measure that provides a reasonable approach for alternate makeup source to ensure the continuous capability of the UHS to perform its safety functions, in event the deep wells pumps are unavailable.
3.2.5 Temperature Impact of Makeup RG 1.27, Revision 2, states sufficient conservatism should be provided to ensure that a safety-related water supply for a 30-day cooling capacity is available and that the design-basis temperatures of equipment that is important to safety are not exceeded.
The licensee indicated that the Circ water is 100 degrees Fahrenheit (°F), which exceeds the maximum design circulating water system temperature of 96°F and TS required UHS temperature of less than 88°F. The NRC staff has a concern related to potential impact of elevated temperature of the makeup water. In response to SCPB-RAI 4, by letter dated September 24, 2025, the licensee indicated the basin temperature conditions were analyzed separately under different limiting conditions. The licensee evaluation has determined the peak basin temperature of 92.64°F occurs at approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> into the event. This temperature is below the maximum service water temperature assumed in the accident analysis of 95°F as indicated in River Bend USAR section 9.2.5.2. It is clarified that the temperature is not affected by makeup flow introduced on day 10 since peak temperature occurs 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> into the event.
3.2.6 Shutdown Risk Insights In section 3.0 of the LAR, the licensee states that the UHS is not modified and remains capable of performing its safety function. The licensee states that, The SCT is designed to provide sufficient cooling water to permit the safe shutdown of the unit and cooldown of all units it serves and to maintain them in a safe shutdown condition. However, the licensee has determined the limiting failure with respect to inventory would be failure of one of the SSW return header isolation valves, with no EDG failures and both divisions of SSW in operation.
The licensees calculations have determined that, with no EDG failures and both divisions of SSW in operation, the SCT basin inventory is depleted by day 21 following a DBA. Therefore, this scenario requires additional makeup actions to provide cooling and remain in the shutdown condition to meet the 30 days post-LOCA criteria in RG 1.27, Revision 2.
In accordance with the response in SCPB-RAI 3, by letter dated September 24, 2025, the licensee described the bounding peak basin temperature is 92.64°F and occurs at approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> into the bounding event. This indicates the critical time of a LOCA in terms of cooling requirements is prior to the switchover to non-safety makeup sources. The maximum basin temperature and inventory conditions were analyzed separately under separate assumptions, including different single failure, to provide conservatism for each condition as appropriate.
Additionally, the calculated inventory is based on loss of offsite power, which results in a large quantity of water to cool EDGs. After offsite power is restored and the buses are reenergized from offsite power, the EDGs will be restored to standby mode, which will remove a major heat load, resulting in reduced inventory loss from the SCT basin for the remainder of the event as described in the SCPB-RAI 2 response.
It is seen that actions and options available provide reasonable assurance that makeup is adequate to meet the 30-day inventory criteria, as discussed above.
3.2.7 TS 3.7.1 Change The licensee has proposed a TS change to require increased water level in the cooling water basin, which adds additional inventory in event of an accident during operation. The NRC staff finds that the increase in minimum water level in the UHS basin provides additional inventory in the UHS basin and allows for the maximum time available to provide makeup to the UHS basin.
Therefore, the change is acceptable.
The NRC staff evaluated statements made by the licensee in the LAR and in RAI responses provided in its letter dated September 24, 2025, regarding the methodology for determining the uncertainty of measurement for the cooling tower basin water level instrumentation. The licensee stated that the instrument channel uncertainty allowance accounts for instrument accuracy errors, calibration errors, and environmental effect errors. These uncertainties are combined using the square root, sum of the squares, method. The licensees methodology for determining basin level indication uncertainty is based on a General Electric setpoint methodology that has been previously approved by the NRC staff. Therefore, the staff has reasonable assurance that the indicated basin level at the revised TS level of 114 ft, 9 inches (114 9) accounts for uncertainties of instrument channel measurement.
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Louisiana State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment on January 21, 2026. The State official had no comments.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, published in the Federal Register on April 15, 2025
(90 FR 15727), and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors: G. Curran, NRR R. Atienza, NRR C. Peres, NRR G. Armstrong, NRR D. Rahn, NRR J. English, NRR J. Drake, NRR Date: February 3, 2026
- by eConcurrence **via email OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL4/PM*
NRR/DORL/LPL4/LA*
NRR/DSS/SCPB/BC*
NRR/DRO/IOLB/BC*
NAME JDrake PBlechman MValentin JAnderson DATE 1/26/2026 1/28/2026 1/29/2026 1/30/2026 OFFICE NRR/DEX/EICB/BC(A)* NRR/DSS/STSB/BC*
NRR/DORL/LPL4/BC(A)* NRR/DORL/LPL4/PM*
NAME SDabali SMehta MMahoney JDrake DATE 1/30/2026 1/30/2026 2/3/2026 2/3/2026