Text

Markup of Proposed Technical Specification Bases Pages
	ML25357A077
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden, Peach Bottom, Clinton, Quad Cities, LaSalle
Issue date:	12/23/2025
From:	; Constellation Energy Generation
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML25357A073	List: ML25357A075; ML25357A076; ML25357A077; RS-25-164, Constellation - License Amendment Request to Eliminate Technical Specification for Automatic MSIV Closure on High Temperature and Add New Technical Specification, Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature;
References
	RS-25-164
	Download: ML25357A077 (0)
	v • d • e

ATTACHMENT 3a License Amendment Request Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-461 Markup of Proposed Technical Specification Bases Pages

Subject:

License Amendment Request for Proposed Changes to the Technical Specification Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation Tables and New Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature Technical Specification List of Bases pages:

B 3.7-39 B 3.7-40 B 3.7-41

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 CLINTON B 3.3-142 Revision No. 0 BASES APPLICABLE 1.d. Condenser Vacuum-Low SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The Condenser Vacuum-Low Function is provided to prevent APPLICABILITY overpressurization of the main condenser in the event of a (continued) loss of the main condenser vacuum. Since the integrity of the condenser is an assumption in offsite dose calculations, the Condenser Vacuum-Low Function is assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating closure of the MSIVs. The closure of the MSIVs is initiated to prevent the addition of steam that would lead to additional condenser pressurization and possible rupture of the diaphragm installed to protect the turbine exhaust hood, thereby preventing a potential radiation leakage path following an accident.

Condenser vacuum pressure signals are derived from four pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the condenser. Four channels of Condenser Vacuum-Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value is chosen to prevent damage to the condenser due to pressurization, thereby ensuring its integrity for offsite dose analysis. As noted (footnote (a) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), the channels are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, when all turbine stop valves (TSVs) are closed, since the potential for condenser overpressurization is minimized. Switches are provided to manually bypass the channels when all TSVs are closed.

1.e, 1.f. Main Steam Tunnel Ambient Temperature-High and Main Steam Line Turbine Building Temperature-High Ambient Temperature-High is provided to detect a leak in the RCPB, and provides diversity to the high flow instrumentation. The isolation occurs when a very small leak has occurred. If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached.

However, credit for these instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in the USAR, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as MSLBs.

Ambient temperature signals are initiated from thermocouples located in the area being monitored. Four channels of Main Steam Tunnel Temperature-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single (continued)

Insert "Deleted"

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 CLINTON B 3.3-143 Revision No. 1-1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.e, 1.f. Main Steam Tunnel Ambient Temperature-High SAFETY ANALYSES, and Main Steam Line Turbine Building Temperature-LCO, and High (continued)

APPLICABILITY instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

Each Function has one temperature element.

Twenty temperature modules (1E31-N559A, B, C, D; 1E31-N560A, B, C, D; 1E31-N561A, B, C, D; 1E31-N562A, B, C, D; and 1E31-N563A, B, C, D) and sensors are provided for monitoring the temperature of the main steam tunnel in the turbine building. Each channel consists of five temperature modules (those modules designated as "A" comprise one channel, those modules designated as "B" comprise a second channel, etc.)

and their associated sensors. The channel is considered OPERABLE only if all five temperature modules and associated sensors are OPERABLE.

The ambient temperature monitoring Allowable Value is chosen to detect a leak equivalent to 25 gpm.

1.g. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the MSL isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific USAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There are four push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation push button per division. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Four channels of Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE.

(continued)

CLINTON B 3.7-39 Revision No.

MSL Area Temperature B 3.7.8 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.8 Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature BASES BACKGROUND The temperature in areas around the Main Steam Lines (MSLs) are monitored to provide an indication of small leaks in the MSLs and as a backup to the main steam high flow instrumentation. Direct measurement of small amounts of MSL leakage is not practical, so monitoring the temperature near the MSLs can be used for indication of small MSL leakage. However, no credit is taken for the temperature monitoring function in any transient or accident analysis.

High temperature around the MSLs could indicate pressure boundary leakage from an MSL. However, MSL area temperature may also be elevated due to other reasons, such as hot weather, reduced ventilation efficiency or failure, and faulty temperature detectors.

APPLICABLE Monitoring of the temperature in the areas around the MSLs SAFETY ANALYSES is not credited in any design basis accident (DBA) or transient. MSL area temperature can be used to identify small MSL leakage below the ability to be detected by other means. Detection of small MSL leakage is also not credited in any DBA or transient. The bounding analyses are performed for large breaks, such as Main Steam Line Break (MSLB).

Monitoring of the temperature in the area around the MSLs is performed to detect small MSL pressure boundary leaks prior to cracks growing to a size which can propagate into a full pipe rupture(leak before break). Such failures are not expected in main steam piping due to the lack of a corrosive environment. As a conservative action, TS 3.7.8 provides assurance than an MSL leak would be promptly identified and corrected, eliminating the need to consider a small MSL leak as a preexisting condition in the DBA analysis. MSL Area Temperature satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii)

LCO The MSL area temperature for each area in Table 3.7.8-1 must be less than the limit. The temperature in the MSL areas listed in Table 3.7.8-1 are monitored to aid in detecting a pressure boundary leak in the MSLs.

MSL Area Temperature B 3.7.8 BASES CLINTON B 3.7-40 Revision No.

APPLICABILITY The LCO is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3, which is when the MSLs may be in service. In MODES 4 and 5, the MSLs are not required and monitoring for MSL leakage is not necessary.

ACTIONS The Required Actions provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate MSL areas. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each MSL area with temperature above the limit.

A.1 and A.2 If the temperature in an MSL area is above the limit in Table 3.7.8-1, immediate action must be taken to confirm there is no MSL pressure boundary leak. The MSL area temperature may be elevated due to reasons other than an MSL pressure boundary leak, such as hot weather, building ventilation reduced efficiency or failure, or faulty temperature detectors. Indications of a small MSL pressure boundary leak include, but are not limited to:

An unexpected, sudden rise in area temperature,

An unexpected increase in radiation monitor readings,

An unexpected rise in sump levels,

An unexpected decrease in plant electrical output, and

Visual and sound indications.

Main Steam Line (MSL) Pressure Boundary is main steam line piping located in the areas monitored by Tech Spec 3.8.7.

MSL Pressure Boundary leakage includes ASME SSC(s).

Leakage past gaskets, packing, and seals is not pressure boundary leakage. If MSL Pressure Boundary leakage is validated, aside from the prescribed actions in Tech Spec 3.8.7, Tech Spec 3.4.5 RCS Operational Leakage should also be assessed.

If it cannot be confirmed that an MSL pressure boundary leak does not exist, Action B must be followed.

If it is confirmed that there is no MSL pressure boundary leak, the verification must be performed periodically until the MSL area temperature is within its limit. The 12-hour Completion Time is acceptable considering the likelihood of an MSL leak occurring between verifications and the potential for elevated radiation levels and adverse environmental conditions in the MSL area.

(continued)

MSL Area Temperatures B 3.7.8 BASES CLINTON B 3.7-41 Revision No.

ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

If it cannot be confirmed that no there is no MSL pressure boundary leak or if the periodic verification of Required Action A.2 is not performed, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.8.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification that the MSL area temperature is less than the limit in Table 3.7.8-1 indicates that there are no MSL pressure boundary leaks. In order to ensure timely detection of an MSL pressure boundary leak, each MSL area must be monitored with sufficient detectors to ensure detection of an MSL pressure boundary leak within the monitored area.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES None

ATTACHMENT 3b License Amendment Request Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Docket No. 50-237 and 50-249 Markup of Proposed Technical Specification Bases Pages

Subject:

License Amendment Request for Proposed Changes to the Technical Specification Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation Tables and New Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature Technical Specification List of Bases pages:

iii B 3.3.6.1-2 B 3.3.6.1-10 B 3.3.6.1-11 B 3.7.9-1 B 3.7.9-2 B 3.7.9-3

Dresden 2 and 3 iii Revision 83 TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.7.5 Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (AC) System................................................................................. B 3.7.5-1 B 3.7.6 Main Condenser Offgas............................................................................................. B 3.7.6-1 B 3.7.7 Main Turbine Bypass System..................................................................................... B 3.7.7-1 B 3.7.8 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level........................................................................ B 3.7.8-1 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.1 AC SourcesOperating............................................................................................. B 3.8.1-1 B 3.8.2 AC SourcesShutdown............................................................................................. B 3.8.2-1 B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil and Starting Air.................................................................................. B 3.8.3-1 B 3.8.4 DC SourcesOperating............................................................................................. B 3.8.4-1 B 3.8.5 DC SourcesShutdown............................................................................................. B 3.8.5-1 B 3.8.6 Battery Parameters.................................................................................................... B 3.8.6-1 B 3.8.7 Distribution SystemsOperating.............................................................................. B 3.8.7-1 B 3.8.8 Distribution SystemsShutdown.............................................................................. B 3.8.8-1 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks................................................................................ B 3.9.1-1 B 3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock..................................................................... B 3.9.2-1 B 3.9.3 Control Rod Position.................................................................................................. B 3.9.3-1 B 3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication................................................................................. B 3.9.4-1 B 3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITYRefueling....................................................................... B 3.9.5-1 B 3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water LevelIrradiated Fuel...................................................................................... B 3.9.6-1 B 3.9.7 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water LevelNew Fuel or Control Rods........................................................................................ B 3.9.7-1 B 3.9.8 Shutdown Cooling (SDC)High Water Level............................................................. B 3.9.8-1 B 3.9.9 Shutdown Cooling (SDC)Low Water Level............................................................. B 3.9.9-1 B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS B 3.10.1 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing..................................................................... B 3.10.1-1 B 3.10.2 Single Control Rod WithdrawalHot Shutdown....................................................... B 3.10.2-1 B 3.10.3 Single Control Rod WithdrawalCold Shutdown..................................................... B 3.10.3-1 B 3.10.4 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD)

RemovalRefueling......................................................................................... B 3.10.4-1 B 3.10.5 Multiple Control Rod WithdrawalRefueling........................................................... B 3.10.5-1 B 3.10.6 Control Rod TestingOperating............................................................................... B 3.10.6-1 B 3.10.7 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) TestRefueling........................................................... B 3.10.7-1 B 3.10.8 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation.................................................... B 3.10.8-1 Insert "B 3.7.9 Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature..................... B 3.7.9-1

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.6.1-2 Revision 0 BASES BACKGROUND

1. Main Steam Line Isolation (continued)

The Reactor Vessel Water LevelLow Low, Main Steam Line PressureLow, and Main Steam Line PressureTimer Functions receive inputs from four channels. One channel associated with each Function inputs to one of four trip strings. Two trip strings make up a trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation of all main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), MSL drain valves, and recirculation loop sample isolation valves. Any channel will trip the associated trip string. Only one trip string must trip to trip the associated trip system. The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic to initiate isolation.

The Main Steam Line FlowHigh Function uses 16 flow channels, four for each steam line. One channel from each steam line inputs to one of the four trip strings. Two trip strings make up each trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation of all MSIVs, MSL drain valves, and recirculation sample isolation valves. Each trip string has four inputs (one per MSL), any one of which will trip the trip string. The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. This is effectively a one-out-of-eight taken twice logic arrangement to initiate isolation.

The Main Steam Line Tunnel TemperatureHigh Function receives input from 16 channels, four for each of the four tunnel areas. The logic is arranged similar to the Main Steam Line FlowHigh Function. One channel from each steam tunnel area inputs to one of four trip strings. Two trip strings make up a trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation.

MSL Isolation Functions isolate the Group 1 valves.

2. Primary Containment Isolation The Reactor Vessel Water LevelLow and Drywell Pressure-High Functions receive inputs from four channels.

One channel associated with each Function inputs to one of four trip strings. Two trip strings make up a trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation of the PCIVs identified in Reference 1. Any channel will trip the (continued)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.6.1-10 Revision 31 BASES APPLICABLE 1.d. Main Steam Line FlowHigh (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and the RPV water level decreases too far, fuel damage could APPLICABILITY occur. Therefore, the isolation is initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The Main Steam Line FlowHigh Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the main steam line break (MSLB) (Ref. 6). The isolation action, along with the scram function of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46 and offsite doses do not exceed the 10 CFR 50.67 limits.

The MSL flow signals are initiated from 16 differential pressure switches that are connected to the four MSLs (the differential pressure switches sense differential pressure across a flow restrictor). The differential pressure switches are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, all four connected to one MSL would be able to detect the high flow. Four channels of Main Steam Line FlowHigh Function for each MSL (two channels per trip system) are available and are required to be OPERABLE so that no single instrument failure will preclude detecting a break in any individual MSL.

The Allowable Value is chosen to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded due to the break.

This Function isolates the Group 1 valves.

1.e. Main Steam Line Tunnel TemperatureHigh Main steam line tunnel temperature is provided to detect a leak in the RCPB in the steam tunnel and provides diversity to the high flow instrumentation. Temperature is sensed in four different areas of the steam tunnel above each main steam line. The isolation occurs when a very small leak has occurred in any one of the four areas. If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. However, credit for these instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in the UFSAR, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks, such as MSLBs.

(continued)

Insert "Deleted"

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.6.1-11 Revision 31 BASES APPLICABLE 1.e. Main Steam Line Tunnel TemperatureHigh (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Main steam line tunnel temperature signals are initiated APPLICABILITY from temperature switches located in the four areas being monitored. Even though physically separated from each other, any temperature switch in any of the four areas is able to detect a leak. Therefore, sixteen channels of Main Steam Line Tunnel TemperatureHigh Function are available, but only eight channels (two channels in each of the four trip strings) are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Main Steam Line Tunnel TemperatureHigh Allowable Value is chosen to detect a leak of less than 1% rated steam flow.

These Functions isolate the Group 1 valves.

Primary Containment Isolation 2.a. Reactor Vessel Water LevelLow Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on low RPV water level supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water LevelLow Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the UFSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

Reactor Vessel Water LevelLow signals are initiated from differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water LevelLow Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

(continued)

MSL Area Temperature B 3.7.9 Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.7.9-1 Revision B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.9 Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature BASES BACKGROUND The temperature in areas around the Main Steam Lines (MSLs) are monitored to provide an indication of small leaks in the MSLs and as a backup to the main steam high flow instrumentation. Direct measurement of small amounts of MSL leakage is not practical, so monitoring the temperature near the MSLs can be used for indication of small MSL leakage. However, no credit is taken for the temperature monitoring function in any transient or accident analysis.

High temperature around the MSLs could indicate pressure boundary leakage from a steam line. However, MSL area temperature may also be elevated due to other reasons, such as hot weather, reduced ventilation efficiency or failure, and faulty temperature detectors.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Monitoring of the temperature in the areas around the MSLs is not credited in any design basis accident (DBA) or transient. MSL area temperature can be used to identify small MSL leakage below the ability to be detected by other means. Detection of small MSL leakage is also not credited in any DBA or transient. The bounding analyses are performed for large breaks, such as Main Steam Line Break (MSLB).

Monitoring of the temperature in the area around the MSLs is performed to detect small MSL pressure boundary leaks prior to cracks growing to a size which can propagate into a full pipe rupture.

Such failures are not expected in main steam piping due to the lack of a corrosive environment. As a conservative action, TS 3.7.9 provides assurance than an MSL leak would be promptly identified and corrected, eliminating the need to consider a small MSL leak as a preexisting condition in the DBA analysis.

MSL Area Temperature satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO The MSL area temperature for each area in Table 3.7.9-1 must be less than or equal to the limit. The temperature in the MSL areas listed in Table 3.7.9-1 are monitored to aid in detecting a pressure boundary leak in the MSLs.

(continued)

MSL Area Temperature B 3.7.9 Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.7.9-2 Revision BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The LCO is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3, which is when the MSLs may be in service. In MODES 4 and 5, the MSLs are not required and monitoring for MSL leakage is not necessary.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If the temperature in an MSL area is above the limit in Table 3.7.9-1, immediate action must be taken to confirm there is no MSL pressure boundary leak. The MSL area temperature may be elevated due to reasons other than an MSL pressure boundary leak, such as hot weather, building ventilation reduced efficiency or failure, or faulty temperature detectors. Indications of a small MSL pressure boundary leak include, but are not limited to:

An unexpected, sudden rise in area temperature,

An unexpected increase in radiation monitor readings,

An unexpected decrease in plant electrical output, and

Visual and sound indications.

If it cannot be confirmed that an MSL pressure boundary leak does not exist, Action B must be followed.

If it is confirmed that there is no MSL pressure boundary leak, the verification must be performed periodically until the MSL area temperature is within its limit. The 24-hour Completion Time is acceptable considering the likelihood of an MSL leak occurring between verifications and the potential for elevated radiation levels and adverse environmental conditions in the MSL area.

B.1 and B.2 If it cannot be confirmed that no there is no MSL pressure boundary leak or if the periodic verification of Required Action A.2 is not performed, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

MSL Area Temperature B 3.7.9 Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.7.9-3 Revision SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.9.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification that the MSL area temperature is less than or equal to the limit in Table 3.7.9-1 indicates that there are no MSL pressure boundary leaks. In order to ensure timely detection of an MSL pressure boundary leak, each MSL area must be monitored with sufficient detectors to ensure detection of an MSL pressure boundary leak within the monitored area.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES None.

ATTACHMENT 3c License Amendment Request LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket No. 50-373 and 50-374 Markup of Proposed Technical Specification Bases Pages

Subject:

License Amendment Request for Proposed Changes to the Technical Specification Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation Tables and New Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature Technical Specification List of Bases pages:

iii B 3.3.6.1-11 B 3.3.6.1-29 B 3.3.6.1-30 B 3.3.6.1-33 B 3.7.9-1 B 3.7.9-2 B 3.7.9-3

LaSalle 1 and 2 iii Revision 63 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System....................................B 3.7.1-1 B 3.7.2 Diesel Generator Cooling Water (DGCW) System........B 3.7.2-1 B 3.7.3 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)............................B 3.7.3-1 B 3.7.4 Control Room Area Filtration (CRAF) System..........B 3.7.4-1 B 3.7.5 Control Room Area Ventilation Air Conditioning (AC) System.......................................B 3.7.5-1 B 3.7.6 Main Condenser Offgas...............................B 3.7.6-1 B 3.7.7 Main Turbine Bypass System..........................B 3.7.7-1 B 3.7.8 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level.................B 3.7.8-1 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.1 AC SourcesOperating................................B 3.8.1-1 B 3.8.2 AC SourcesShutdown.................................B 3.8.2-1 B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil and Starting Air....................B 3.8.3-1 B 3.8.4 DC SourcesOperating................................B 3.8.4-1 B 3.8.5 DC SourcesShutdown.................................B 3.8.5-1 B 3.8.6 Battery Parameters..................................B 3.8.6-1 B 3.8.7 Distribution SystemsOperating......................B 3.8.7-1 B 3.8.8 Distribution SystemsShutdown.......................B 3.8.8-1 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks......................B 3.9.1-1 B 3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock...............B 3.9.2-1 B 3.9.3 Control Rod Position................................B 3.9.3-1 B 3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication.....................B 3.9.4-1 B 3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITYRefueling...................B 3.9.5-1 B 3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water LevelIrradiated Fuel.............................B 3.9.6-1 B 3.9.7 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water LevelNew Fuel or Control Rods..............................B 3.9.7-1 B 3.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)High Water Level........B 3.9.8-1 B 3.9.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)Low Water Level.........B 3.9.9-1 B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS B 3.10.1 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing...............B 3.10.1-1 B 3.10.2 Single Control Rod WithdrawalHot Shutdown..........B 3.10.2-1 B 3.10.3 Single Control Rod WithdrawalCold Shutdown.........B 3.10.3-1 B 3.10.4 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD)

RemovalRefueling.................................B 3.10.4-1 B 3.10.5 Multiple Control Rod WithdrawalRefueling...........B 3.10.5-1 B 3.10.6 Control Rod TestingOperating.......................B 3.10.6-1 B 3.10.7 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) TestRefueling................B 3.10.7-1 B 3.10.8 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation....B 3.10.8-1 Insert "B 3.7.9 Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature.......... B 3.7.9-1"

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.6.1-11 Revision 0 BASES APPLICABLE 1.d. Condenser VacuumLow (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The Allowable Value is chosen to prevent damage to the APPLICABILITY condenser due to pressurization, thereby ensuring its integrity for offsite dose analysis. As noted (footnote (a) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), the channels are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, when all turbine stop valves (TSVs) are closed, since the potential for condenser overpressurization is minimized. Switches are provided to manually bypass the channels when all TSVs are closed.

This Function isolates the Group 1 valves.

1.e Main Steam Line Tunnel Differential TemperatureHigh Differential TemperatureHigh is provided to detect a leak in a main steam line, and provides diversity to the high flow instrumentation. The isolation occurs when a very small leak has occurred. If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. However, credit for these instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in the UFSAR, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as MSLBs.

Eight thermocouples provide input to the Main Steam Line Tunnel Differential TemperatureHigh Function. The output of these thermocouples is used to determine the differential temperature. Each channel consists of a differential temperature instrument that receives inputs from thermocouples that are located in the inlet and outlet of the main steam line tunnel for a total of four available channels. Four channels of Main Steam Line Tunnel Differential TemperatureHigh Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The differential temperature monitoring Allowable Value is chosen to detect a leak equivalent to 100 gpm.

These Functions isolate the Group 1 valves.

(continued)

Insert "Deleted"

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.6.1-29 Revision 95 BASES APPLICABLE 5.c. Manual Initiation (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and There is no Allowable Value for this Function, since the APPLICABILITY channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

This Function isolates the Group 6 valves.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by four Notes. Note 1 allows penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.

Note 2 has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to primary containment isolation instrumentation channels.

Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channel.

Note 3 indicates that when automatic isolation capability is lost for Function 1.e, Main Steam Line Tunnel Differential TemperatureHigh (i.e., when both trip systems are inoperable for Function 1.e) due to required Reactor Building Ventilation System corrective maintenance, filter changes, damper cycling, or for performance of required Surveillances, entry into the associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Similarly, Note 4 indicates that when automatic isolation capability is lost for Function 1.e due to a loss of reactor building ventilation or for performance of SR 3.6.4.1.3 or SR 3.6.4.1.4, entry into the associated Conditions and (continued)

Insert "two"

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.6.1-30 Revision 95 BASES ACTIONS Required Actions may be delayed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Upon (continued) completion of the activities or expiration of the time allowance, the channels must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Conditions entered and Required Actions taken. These Notes are necessary so that testing and required Surveillances specified in LCO 3.6.4.1, "Secondary Containment," LCO 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIV)," and LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," can be performed without inducing an isolation of the MSIVs. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowances provide sufficient time to safely perform the testing. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowance also provides sufficient time to identify and correct minor reactor building ventilation system problems. Since the design of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor buildings is such that they share a common area of the refuel floor (i.e., the reactor buildings are not separated on the refuel floor), operation of either unit's ventilation system will affect the other unit's building differential pressure. Performance of testing to verify secondary containment integrity requirements and minor correctable problems could require a dual unit outage (without the Notes).

A.1 Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , depending on the Function (12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for those Functions that have channel components common to RPS instrumentation and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for those Functions that do not have channel components common to RPS instrumentation), has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 9 and 10) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status.

This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases).

Alternatively, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.

If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow (continued)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.6.1-33 Revision 95 BASES ACTIONS D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2 (continued) are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

E.1 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, plant operation may continue if the affected penetration flow path(s) is isolated. Isolating the affected penetration flow path(s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channels.

For some of the Area and Differential TemperatureHigh Functions, the affected penetration flow path(s) may be considered isolated by isolating only that portion of the system in the associated room monitored by the inoperable channel. That is, if the RWCU pump room A Area Temperature-High channel is inoperable, the A pump room area can be isolated while allowing continued RWCU operation utilizing the B RWCU pump.

Alternatively, if it is not desired to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s) (e.g., as in the case where isolating the penetration flow path(s) could result in a reactor scram), Condition H must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

The Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for plant operations personnel to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s).

(continued)

MSL Area Temperature B 3.7.9 LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.7.9-1 Revision XXX B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.9 Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature BASES BACKGROUND The temperature in areas around the Main Steam Lines (MSLs) are monitored to provide an indication of small leaks in the MSLs and as a backup to the main steam high flow instrumentation. Direct measurement of small amounts of MSL leakage is not practical, so monitoring the temperature near the MSLs can be used for indication of small MSL leakage. However, no credit is taken for the temperature monitoring function in any transient or accident analysis.

High differential temperature around the MSLs could indicate pressure boundary leakage from a steam line. However, MSL differential temperature may also be elevated due to other reasons, such as hot weather, reduced ventilation efficiency or failure, and faulty temperature detectors.

APPLICABLE Monitoring of the differential temperature in the areas around the SAFETY ANALYSES MSLs is not credited in any design basis accident (DBA) or transient.

MSL differential temperature can be used to identify small MSL leakage below the ability to be detected by other means. Detection of small MSL leakage is also not credited in any DBA or transient. The bounding analyses are performed for large breaks, such as Main Steam Line Break (MSLB).

Monitoring of the differential temperature in the area around the MSLs is performed to detect small MSL pressure boundary leaks prior to cracks growing to a size which can propagate into a full pipe rupture.

Such failures are not expected in main steam piping due to the lack of a corrosive environment. As a conservative action, TS 3.7.9 provides assurance that an MSL leak would be promptly identified and corrected, eliminating the need to consider a small MSL leak as a preexisting condition in the DBA analysis.

MSL Area Temperature satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii)

LCO The MSL area temperature for each area in Table 3.7.9-1 must be less or equal to than the limit. The temperature in the MSL areas listed in Table 3.7.9-1 are monitored to aid in detecting a pressure boundary leak in the MSLs (continued)

MSL Area Temperature B 3.7.9 LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.7.9-2 Revision XXX BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The LCO is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3, which is when the MSLs may be in service. In MODES 4 and 5, the MSLs are not required and monitoring for MSL leakage is not necessary.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If the temperature in an MSL area is above the limit in Table 3.7.9-1, immediate action must be taken to confirm there is no MSL pressure boundary leak. The MSL area temperature may be elevated due to reasons other than an MSL pressure boundary leak, such as hot weather, building ventilation reduced efficiency or failure, or faulty temperature detectors. Indications of a small MSL pressure boundary leak include, but are not limited to:

An unexpected, sudden rise in area temperature,

An unexpected increase in radiation monitor readings,

An unexpected rise in sump levels,

An unexpected decrease in plant electrical output, and

Visual and sound indications.

If it cannot be confirmed that an MSL pressure boundary leak does not exist, Action B must be followed.

If it is confirmed that there is no MSL pressure boundary leak, the verification must be performed periodically until the MSL area temperature is within its limit. The 12-hour Completion Time is acceptable considering the likelihood of an MSL leak occurring between verifications and the potential for elevated radiation levels and adverse environmental conditions in the MSL area.

B.1 and B.2 If it cannot be confirmed that there is no MSL pressure boundary leak or if the periodic verification of Required Action A.2 is not performed, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

MSL Area Temperature B 3.7.9 LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.7.9-3 Revision XXX SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.9.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification that the MSL differential temperature is less than or equal to the limit in Table 3.7.9-1 indicates that there are no MSL pressure boundary leaks. In order to ensure timely detection of an MSL pressure boundary leak, MSL differential temperature must be monitored with sufficient detectors to ensure detection of an MSL pressure boundary leak within the monitored area.

When Reactor Building Ventilation System is out of service, the differential temperature instrumentation cannot provide a valid signal.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES None.

ATTACHMENT 3d License Amendment Request Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2 Docket No. 50-277 Markup of Proposed Technical Specification Bases Pages

Subject:

License Amendment Request for Proposed Changes to the Technical Specification Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation Tables and New Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature Technical Specification List of Bases pages:

Iii B 3.3-142 B 3.3-149 B 3.3-149a B 3.3-162 B 3.7-31 B 3.7-32 B 3.7-33

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.7.6 Main Turbine Bypass System.......................... B 3.7-25 B 3.7.7 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level................. B 3.7-29 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS................................ B 3.8-1 B 3.8.1 AC Sources Operating............................... B 3.8-1 B 3.8.2 AC Sources Shutdown................................ B 3.8-40 B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air......... B 3.8-48 B 3.8.4 DC Sources Operating............................... B 3.8-58 B 3.8.5 DC Sources Shutdown................................ B 3.8-72 B 3.8.6 Battery Parameters.................................. B 3.8-77 B 3.8.7 Distribution Systems Operating..................... B 3.8-83 B 3.8.8 Distribution Systems Shutdown...................... B 3.8-94 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS.................................... B 3.9-1 B 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks...................... B 3.9-1 B 3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock............... B 3.9-5 B 3.9.3 Control Rod Position................................ B 3.9-8 B 3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication..................... B 3.9-10 B 3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY Refueling.................. B 3.9-14 B 3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level........... B 3.9-17 B 3.9.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) High Water Level....... B 3.9-20 B 3.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Low Water Level........ B 3.9-24 B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS...................................... B 3.10-1 B 3.10.1 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation.... B 3.10-1 B 3.10.2 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing............... B 3.10-5 B 3.10.3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal Hot Shutdown......... B 3.10-10 B 3.10.4 Single Control Rod Withdrawal Cold Shutdown........ B 3.10-14 B 3.10.5 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD)

Removal Refueling............................... B 3.10-19 B 3.10.6 Multiple Control Rod WithdrawalRefueling........... B 3.10-24 B 3.10.7 Control Rod Testing Operating...................... B 3.10-27 B 3.10.8 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test Refueling............... B 3.10-31 PBAPS UNIT 2 iii Revision No. 150 Insert "B 3.7.9 Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature.......... B 3.7-31"

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES BACKGROUND

1. Main Steam Line Isolation (continued)

Most MSL Isolation Functions receive inputs from four channels. The outputs from these channels are combined in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic to initiate isolation of the Group I isolation valves (MSIVs and MSL drains, MSL sample lines, and recirculation loop sample line valves).

To initiate a Group I isolation, both trip systems must be tripped.

The exceptions to this arrangement are the Main Steam Line Flow High Function and Turbine Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature High Functions. The Main Steam Line Flow High Function uses 16 flow channels, four for each steam line.

One channel from each steam line inputs to one of the four trip strings. Two trip strings make up each trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an MSL isolation. Each trip string has four inputs (one per MSL), any one of which will trip the trip string. The trip systems are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. This is effectively a one-out-of-eight taken twice logic arrangement to initiate a Group I isolation. The Turbine Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature-High Function receives inputs from twelve channels, four channels at each of the three different locations along the steam line. High temperature on any channel is not related to a specific MSL. The channels are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic for each location.

2. Primary Containment Isolation Most Primary Containment Isolation Functions receive inputs from four channels. The outputs from these channels are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. Isolation of inboard and outboard primary containment isolation valves occurs when both trip systems are in trip.

The exception to this arrangement is the Main Stack Monitor Radiation High Function. This Function has two channels, whose outputs are arranged in two trip systems which use a one-out-of-one logic. Each trip system isolates one valve per associated penetration. The Main Stack Monitor Radiation High Function will isolate vent and purge valves greater than two inches in diameter during containment purging (Ref. 2).

The valves isolated by each of the Primary Containment Isolation Functions are listed in Reference 1.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-142 Revision No. 48 is

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.e Turbine Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature-High SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The Turbine Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature Function APPLICABILITY is provided to detect a break in a main steam line and provides diversity to the high flow instrumentation.

Turbine Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature signals are initiated from resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) located along the main steam line between the Reactor Building and the turbine. Twelve channels of Turbine Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value is chosen to detect a leak equivalent to between 1% and 10% rated steam flow.

This Function isolates MSIVs, MSL drains, MSL sample lines and recirculation loop sample line valves.

1.f. Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature-High The Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature Function is provided to detect a break in a main steam line and provides diversity to the high flow instrumentation.

Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature signals are initiated from resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) located in the Main Steam Line Tunnel ventilation exhaust duct. Four channels of Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-149 Revision No. 134 Insert "Deleted" Insert "Deleted"

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.f Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature-High SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY The Allowable Value is chosen to detect a leak equivalent to between 1% and 10% rated steam flow.

This Function isolates MSIVs, MSL drains, MSL sample lines and recirculation loop sample line valves.

Primary Containment Isolation 2.a. Reactor Vessel Water LevelLow (Level 3)

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are not exceeded.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-149a Revision No. 75

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)

Entry into Condition B and Required Action B.1 may be necessary to avoid an MSL isolation transient resulting from a temporary loss of ventilation in the main steam line tunnel area. As allowed by LCO 3.0.2 (and discussed in the Bases of LCO 3.0.2), the plant may intentionally enter this Condition to avoid an MSL isolation transient following the loss of ventilation flow, and then raise the setpoints for the Main Steam Tunnel Temperature High Function to 250°F causing all channels of Main Steam Tunnel Temperature High Function to be inoperable.

However, during the period that multiple Main Steam Tunnel Temperature High Function channels are inoperable due to this intentional action, an additional compensatory measure is deemed necessary and shall be taken: an operator shall observe control room indications of the duct temperature so the main steam line isolation valves may be promptly closed in the event of a rapid increase in MSL tunnel temperature indicative of a steam line break.

C.1 Required Action C.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1. The applicable Condition specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1 is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previous Condition is completed. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of Condition A or B and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition C will be entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2). Alternately, the associated MSLs may be isolated (Required Action D.1),

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-162 Revision No. 45

MSL Area Temperature B 3.7.8 Peach Bottom Unit 2 B 3.7-31 Revision XXX B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.8 Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature BASES BACKGROUND The area temperature is monitored in vicinity of the Main Steam Lines (MSLs) to provide an indication of small leaks in the MSLs and as a backup to the main steam high flow instrumentation. Direct measurement of small amounts of MSL leakage is not practical, so monitoring the temperature near the MSLs can be used for indication of small MSL leakage. However, no credit is taken for the temperature monitoring function in any transient or accident analysis.

High temperature around the MSLs could indicate pressure boundary leakage from a steam line. However, MSL area temperature may also be elevated due to other reasons, such as hot weather, reduced ventilation efficiency or failure, and faulty temperature detectors.

APPLICABLE Monitoring of the area temperature in the vicinity of the MSLs is not SAFETY ANALYSES credited in any design basis accident (DBA) or transient. MSL area temperature can be used to identify small MSL leakage below the ability to be detected by other means. Detection of small MSL leakage is also not credited in any DBA or transient. The bounding analyses are performed for large breaks, such as Main Steam Line Break (MSLB).

Monitoring of the temperature in the area around the MSLs is performed to detect small MSL pressure boundary leaks prior to cracks growing to a size which can propagate into a full pipe rupture.

Such failures are not expected in main steam piping due to the lack of a corrosive environment. As a conservative action, TS 3.7.8 provides assurance than an MSL leak would be promptly identified and corrected, eliminating the need to consider a small MSL leak as a preexisting condition in the DBA analysis.

MSL Area Temperature satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii)

LCO The MSL area temperature for each area in Table 3.7.8-1 must be less than or equal to the limit. The temperature in the MSL areas listed in Table 3.7.8-1 are monitored to aid in detecting a pressure boundary leak in the MSLs (continued)

MSL Area Temperature B 3.7.8 Peach Bottom Unit 2 B 3.7-32 Revision XXX BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The LCO is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3, which is when the MSLs may be in service. In MODES 4 and 5, the MSLs are not required and monitoring for MSL leakage is not necessary.

ACTIONS The portions of the MSLs contained within the Reactor Building and Turbine Building are considered to be two separate areas for the purposes of this LCO. The Required Actions provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate MSL areas. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each MSL area with temperature above the limit.

A.1 and A.2 If the temperature in an MSL area is above the limit in Table 3.7.8-1, immediate action must be taken to confirm there is no MSL pressure boundary leak. The MSL area temperature may be elevated due to reasons other than an MSL pressure boundary leak, such as hot weather, building ventilation reduced efficiency or failure, or faulty temperature detectors. Indications of a small MSL pressure boundary leak include, but are not limited to:

An unexpected, sudden rise in area temperature,

An unexpected increase in radiation monitor readings,

An unexpected rise in sump levels,

An unexpected decrease in plant electrical output, and

Visual and sound indications.

If it cannot be confirmed that an MSL pressure boundary leak does not exist, Action B must be followed.

If it is confirmed that there is no MSL pressure boundary leak, the verification must be performed periodically until the MSL area temperature is within its limit. The 12-hour Completion Time is acceptable considering the likelihood of an MSL leak occurring between verifications and the potential for elevated radiation levels and adverse environmental conditions in the MSL area.

B.1 and B.2 If it cannot be confirmed that there is no MSL pressure boundary leak or if the periodic verification of Required Action A.2 is not performed, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

MSL Area Temperature B 3.7.8 Peach Bottom Unit 2 B 3.7-33 Revision XXX SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.8.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification that the MSL area temperature is less than or equal to the limit in Table 3.7.8-1 indicates that there are no MSL pressure boundary leaks. In order to ensure timely detection of an MSL pressure boundary leak, each MSL area must be monitored with sufficient detectors to ensure detection of an MSL pressure boundary leak within the monitored area.

REFERENCES None.

ATTACHMENT 3e License Amendment Request Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3 Docket No. 50-278 Markup of Proposed Technical Specification Bases Pages

Subject:

License Amendment Request for Proposed Changes to the Technical Specification Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation Tables and New Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature Technical Specification List of Bases pages:

Iii B 3.3-143 B 3.3-150 B 3.3-163 B 3.7-31 B 3.7-32 B 3.7-33

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.7.6 Main Turbine Bypass System.......................... B 3.7-25 B 3.7.7 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level................. B 3.7-29 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS................................ B 3.8-1 B 3.8.1 AC Sources Operating............................... B 3.8-1 B 3.8.2 AC Sources Shutdown................................ B 3.8-40 B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air......... B 3.8-48 B 3.8.4 DC Sources Operating............................... B 3.8-58 B 3.8.5 DC Sources Shutdown................................ B 3.8-72 B 3.8.6 Battery Parameters.................................. B 3.8-77 B 3.8.7 Distribution Systems Operating..................... B 3.8-83 B 3.8.8 Distribution Systems Shutdown...................... B 3.8-94 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS.................................... B 3.9-1 B 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks...................... B 3.9-1 B 3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock............... B 3.9-5 B 3.9.3 Control Rod Position................................ B 3.9-8 B 3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication..................... B 3.9-10 B 3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY Refueling.................. B 3.9-14 B 3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level........... B 3.9-17 B 3.9.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) High Water Level....... B 3.9-20 B 3.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Low Water Level........ B 3.9-24 B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS...................................... B 3.10-1 B 3.10.1 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation.... B 3.10-1 B 3.10.2 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing............... B 3.10-5 B 3.10.3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal Hot Shutdown......... B 3.10-10 B 3.10.4 Single Control Rod Withdrawal Cold Shutdown........ B 3.10-14 B 3.10.5 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD)

Removal Refueling............................... B 3.10-19 B 3.10.6 Multiple Control Rod WithdrawalRefueling........... B 3.10-24 B 3.10.7 Control Rod Testing Operating...................... B 3.10-27 B 3.10.8 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test Refueling............... B 3.10-31 PBAPS UNIT 3 iii Revision No. 146 Insert "B 3.7.8 Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature.......... B 3.7-31"

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES BACKGROUND

1. Main Steam Line Isolation (continued)

Most MSL Isolation Functions receive inputs from four channels. The outputs from these channels are combined in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic to initiate isolation of the Group I isolation valves (MSIVs and MSL drains, MSL sample lines, and recirculation loop sample line valves).

To initiate a Group I isolation, both trip systems must be tripped.

The exceptions to this arrangement are the Main Steam Line Flow High Function and Main Steam Tunnel Temperature High Functions. The Main Steam Line Flow High Function uses 16 flow channels, four for each steam line. One channel from each steam line inputs to one of the four trip strings.

Two trip strings make up each trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an MSL isolation. Each trip string has four inputs (one per MSL), any one of which will trip the trip string. The trip systems are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. This is effectively a one-out-of-eight taken twice logic arrangement to initiate a Group I isolation. The Main Steam Tunnel Temperature High Function receives input from 16 channels. The logic is arranged similar to the Main Steam Line Flow High Function except that high temperature on any channel is not related to a specific MSL.

2. Primary Containment Isolation Most Primary Containment Isolation Functions receive inputs from four channels. The outputs from these channels are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. Isolation of inboard and outboard primary containment isolation valves occurs when both trip systems are in trip.

The exception to this arrangement is the Main Stack Monitor Radiation High Function. This Function has two channels, whose outputs are arranged in two trip systems which use a one-out-of-one logic. Each trip system isolates one valve per associated penetration. The Main Stack Monitor Radiation High Function will isolate vent and purge valves greater than two inches in diameter during containment purging (Ref. 2).

The valves isolated by each of the Primary Containment Isolation Functions are listed in Reference 1.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-143 Revision No. 3 is

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.e. Main Steam Tunnel TemperatureHigh SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The Main Steam Tunnel Temperature Function is provided to APPLICABILITY detect a break in a main steam line and provides diversity (continued) to the high flow instrumentation.

Main Steam Tunnel Temperature signals are initiated from resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) located along the main steam line between the drywell wall and the turbine.

Sixteen channels of Main Steam Tunnel Temperature High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value is chosen to detect a leak equivalent to between 1% and 10% rated steam flow.

This Function isolates MSIVs, MSL drains, MSL sample lines and recirculation loop sample line valves.

This Function in Unit 3 combines Unit 2 Functions 1.e. and 1.f.

Primary Containment Isolation 2.a. Reactor Vessel Water LevelLow (Level 3)

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are not exceeded.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-150 Revision No. 119 Insert "Deleted"

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)

Entry into Condition B and Required Action B.1 may be necessary to avoid an MSL isolation transient resulting from a temporary loss of ventilation in the main steam line tunnel area. As allowed by LCO 3.0.2 (and discussed in the Bases of LCO 3.0.2), the plant may intentionally enter this Condition to avoid an MSL isolation transient following the loss of ventilation flow, and then raise the setpoints for the Main Steam Tunnel Temperature High Function to 250°F causing all channels of Main Steam Tunnel Temperature High Function to be inoperable. However, during the period that multiple Main Steam Tunnel Temperature High Function channels are inoperable due to this intentional action, an additional compensatory measure is deemed necessary and shall be taken: an operator shall observe control room indications of the duct temperature so the main steam line isolation valves may be promptly closed in the event of a rapid increase in MSL tunnel temperature indicative of a steam line break.

C.1 Required Action C.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1. The applicable Condition specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1 is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previous Condition is completed. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of Condition A or B and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition C will be entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2). Alternately, the associated MSLs may be isolated (Required Action D.1),

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-163 Revision No. 46

MSL Area Temperature B 3.7.8 Peach Bottom Unit 3 B 3.7-31 Revision XXX B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.8 Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature BASES BACKGROUND APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The area temperature is monitored in vicinity of the Main Steam Lines (MSLs) to provide an indication of small leaks in the MSLs and as a backup to the main steam high flow instrumentation. Direct measurement of small amounts of MSL leakage is not practical, so monitoring the temperature near the MSLs can be used for indication of small MSL leakage. However, no credit is taken for the temperature monitoring function in any transient or accident analysis.

High temperature around the MSLs could indicate pressure boundary leakage from a steam line. However, MSL area temperature may also be elevated due to other reasons, such as hot weather, reduced ventilation efficiency or failure, and faulty temperature detectors.

Monitoring of the area temperature in the vicinity of the MSLs is not credited in any design basis accident (DBA) or transient. MSL area temperature can be used to identify small MSL leakage below the ability to be detected by other means. Detection of small MSL leakage is also not credited in any DBA or transient. The bounding analyses are performed for large breaks, such as Main Steam Line Break (MSLB).

Monitoring of the temperature in the area around the MSLs is performed to detect small MSL pressure boundary leaks prior to cracks growing to a size which can propagate into a full pipe rupture.

Such failures are not expected in main steam piping due to the lack of a corrosive environment. As a conservative action, TS 3.7.8 provides assurance than an MSL leak would be promptly identified and corrected, eliminating the need to consider a small MSL leak as a preexisting condition in the DBA analysis.

MSL Area Temperature satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii)

LCO The MSL area temperature for each area in Table 3.7.8-1 must be less than or equal to the limit. The temperature in the MSL areas listed in Table 3.7.8-1 are monitored to aid in detecting a pressure boundary leak in the MSLs (continued)

MSL Area Temperature B 3.7.8 Peach Bottom Unit 3 B 3.7-32 Revision XXX BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The LCO is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3, which is when the MSLs may be in service. In MODES 4 and 5, the MSLs are not required and monitoring for MSL leakage is not necessary.

ACTIONS The portions of the MSLs contained within the Reactor Building and Turbine Building are considered to be one area for the purposes of this LCO.

A.1 and A.2 If the temperature in an MSL area is above the limit in Table 3.7.8-1, immediate action must be taken to confirm there is no MSL pressure boundary leak. The MSL area temperature may be elevated due to reasons other than an MSL pressure boundary leak, such as hot weather, building ventilation reduced efficiency or failure, or faulty temperature detectors. Indications of a small MSL pressure boundary leak include, but are not limited to:

An unexpected, sudden rise in area temperature,

An unexpected increase in radiation monitor readings,

An unexpected rise in sump levels,

An unexpected decrease in plant electrical output, and

Visual and sound indications.

If it cannot be confirmed that an MSL pressure boundary leak does not exist, Action B must be followed.

If it is confirmed that there is no MSL pressure boundary leak, the verification must be performed periodically until the MSL area temperature is within its limit. The 12-hour Completion Time is acceptable considering the likelihood of an MSL leak occurring between verifications and the potential for elevated radiation levels and adverse environmental conditions in the MSL area.

B.1 and B.2 If it cannot be confirmed that there is no MSL pressure boundary leak or if the periodic verification of Required Action A.2 is not performed, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

MSL Area Temperature B 3.7.8 Peach Bottom Unit 3 B 3.7-33 Revision XXX SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.8.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification that the MSL area temperature is less than or equal to the limit in Table 3.7.8-1 indicates that there are no MSL pressure boundary leaks. In order to ensure timely detection of an MSL pressure boundary leak, each MSL area must be monitored with sufficient detectors to ensure detection of an MSL pressure boundary leak within the monitored area.

REFERENCES None.

ATTACHMENT 3f License Amendment Request Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket No. 50-254 and 50-265 Markup of Proposed Technical Specification Bases Pages

Subject:

License Amendment Request for Proposed Changes to the Technical Specification Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation Tables and New Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature Technical Specification List of Bases pages:

iii 3.3.6.1-2 3.3.6.1-11 3.3.6.1-12 3.7.10-1 3.7.10-2 3.7.10-3

Quad Cities 1 and 2 iii Revision 68 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System.......................................... B 3.7.1-1 B 3.7.2 Diesel Generator Cooling Water (DGCW) System..................................................... B 3.7.2-1 B 3.7.3 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)........................................................................................... B 3.7.3-1 B 3.7.4 Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System............................................... B 3.7.4-1 B 3.7.5 Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (AC) System................................................................................. B 3.7.5-1 B 3.7.6 Main Condenser Offgas............................................................................................. B 3.7.6-1 B 3.7.7 Main Turbine Bypass System..................................................................................... B 3.7.7-1 B 3.7.8 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level........................................................................ B 3.7.8-1 B 3.7.9 Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump (SSMP) System......................................................... B 3.7.9-1 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.1 AC SourcesOperating............................................................................................. B 3.8.1-1 B 3.8.2 AC SourcesShutdown............................................................................................. B 3.8.2-1 B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil Properties and Starting Air................................................................. B 3.8.3-1 B 3.8.4 DC SourcesOperating............................................................................................. B 3.8.4-1 B 3.8.5 DC SourcesShutdown............................................................................................. B 3.8.5-1 B 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters............................................................................................. B 3.8.6-1 B 3.8.7 Distribution SystemsOperating.............................................................................. B 3.8.7-1 B 3.8.8 Distribution SystemsShutdown.............................................................................. B 3.8.8-1 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks................................................................................ B 3.9.1-1 B 3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock..................................................................... B 3.9.2-1 B 3.9.3 Control Rod Position.................................................................................................. B 3.9.3-1 B 3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication................................................................................. B 3.9.4-1 B 3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITYRefueling....................................................................... B 3.9.5-1 B 3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water LevelIrradiated Fuel...................................................................................... B 3.9.6-1 B 3.9.7 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water LevelNew Fuel or Control Rods......................................................................................... B 3.9.7-1 B 3.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)High Water Level..................................................... B 3.9.8-1 B 3.9.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)Low Water Level..................................................... B 3.9.9-1 B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS B 3.10.1 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing..................................................................... B 3.10.1-1 B 3.10.2 Single Control Rod WithdrawalHot Shutdown....................................................... B 3.10.2-1 B 3.10.3 Single Control Rod WithdrawalCold Shutdown..................................................... B 3.10.3-1 B 3.10.4 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD)

RemovalRefueling......................................................................................... B 3.10.4-1 B 3.10.5 Multiple Control Rod WithdrawalRefueling........................................................... B 3.10.5-1 B 3.10.6 Control Rod TestingOperating............................................................................... B 3.10.6-1 B 3.10.7 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) TestRefueling........................................................... B 3.10.7-1 B 3.10.8 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation.................................................... B 3.10.8-1 Insert "3.7.10 Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature.............................. B 3.7.10-1"

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.6.1-2 Revision 0 BASES BACKGROUND

1. Main Steam Line Isolation (continued)

The Reactor Vessel Water LevelLow Low, the Main Steam Line PressureLow, and the Main Steam Line PressureTimer Functions receive inputs from four channels. One channel associated with each Function inputs to one of four trip strings. Two trip strings make up a trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation of all main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), MSL drain valves, and recirculation loop sample isolation valves. Any channel will trip the associated trip string. Only one trip string must trip to trip the associated trip system. The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic to initiate isolation.

The Main Steam Line FlowHigh Function uses 16 flow channels, four for each steam line. One channel from each steam line inputs to one of the four trip strings. Two trip strings make up each trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation of all MSIVs, MSL drain valves, and recirculation sample isolation valves. Each trip string has four inputs (one per MSL), any one of which will trip the trip string. The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. This is effectively a one-out-of-eight taken twice logic arrangement to initiate isolation.

The Main Steam Line Tunnel TemperatureHigh Function receives input from 16 channels, four for each of the four tunnel areas. The logic is arranged similar to the Main Steam Line FlowHigh Function. One channel from each steam tunnel area inputs to one of four trip strings. Two trip strings make up a trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation.

MSL Isolation Functions isolate the Group 1 valves.

2. Primary Containment Isolation The Reactor Vessel Water LevelLow and Drywell Pressure-High Functions receive inputs from four channels.

One channel associated with each Function inputs to one of four trip strings. Two trip strings make up a trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an isolation of the PCIVs identified in Reference 1. Any channel will trip the (continued)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.6.1-11 Revision 23 BASES APPLICABLE 1.d. Main Steam Line FlowHigh (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and function is modified by a note that describes the APPLICABILITY instrument calibration methodology. The setting tolerance is the uncertainty of the calibration procedure allowances used by the technician in the calibration process and is a tighter band around the trip setpoint than the AV range.

Plant programs ensure that instrument channel and calibration setpoints will not be left outside the specific setting tolerance. This practice resets the as-left trip setpoint within the calculated setting tolerance and near the trip setpoint value.

This Function isolates the Group 1 valves.

1.e. Main Steam Line Tunnel TemperatureHigh Main steam line tunnel temperature is provided to detect a leak in the RCPB in the steam tunnel and provides diversity to the high flow instrumentation. Temperature is sensed in four different areas of the steam tunnel above each main steam line. The isolation occurs when a very small leak has occurred in any one of the four areas. If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. However, credit for these instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in the UFSAR, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks, such as MSLBs.

Main steam line tunnel temperature signals are initiated from bimetallic temperature switches located in the four areas being monitored. Even though physically separated from each other, any temperature switch in any of the four areas is able to detect a leak. Therefore, sixteen channels of Main Steam Line Tunnel TemperatureHigh Function are available, but only eight channels (two channels in each of the four trip strings) are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Main Steam Line Tunnel TemperatureHigh Allowable Value is chosen to detect a leak equivalent to between 1% and 10%

rated steam flow.

(continued)

Insert "Deleted"

I I

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.6.1-12 Revision 31 BASES APPLICABLE 1.e. Main Steam Line Tunnel TemperatureHigh (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and These Functions isolate the Group 1 valves.

APPLICABILITY Primary Containment Isolation 2.a. Reactor Vessel Water LevelLow Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on low RPV water level supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water LevelLow Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the UFSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

Reactor Vessel Water LevelLow signals are initiated from differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water LevelLow Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water LevelLow Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low scram Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since isolation of these valves is not critical to orderly plant shutdown.

This Function isolates the Group 2 valves.

2.b. Drywell PressureHigh High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside the primary containment. The isolation of some of the primary containment isolation valves on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are not exceeded. The Drywell PressureHigh Function, associated with isolation of the primary (continued)

MSL Area Temperature B 3.7.10 Quad Cities B 3.7.10-1 Revision XXX B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.10 Main Steam Line (MSL) Area Temperature BASES BACKGROUND The temperature in areas around the Main Steam Lines (MSLs) are monitored to provide an indication of small leaks in the MSLs and as a backup to the main steam high flow instrumentation. Direct measurement of small amounts of MSL leakage is not practical, so monitoring the temperature near the MSLs can be used for indication of small MSL leakage. However, no credit is taken for the temperature monitoring function in any transient or accident analysis.

High temperature around the MSLs could indicate pressure boundary leakage from a steam line. However, MSL area temperature may also be elevated due to other reasons, such as hot weather, reduced ventilation efficiency or failure, and faulty temperature detectors.

APPLICABLE Monitoring of the temperature in the areas around the MSLs is not SAFETY ANALYSES credited in any design basis accident (DBA) or transient. MSL area temperature can be used to identify small MSL leakage below the ability to be detected by other means. Detection of small MSL leakage is also not credited in any DBA or transient. The bounding analyses are performed for large breaks, such as Main Steam Line Break (MSLB).

Monitoring of the temperature in the area around the MSLs is performed to detect small MSL pressure boundary leaks prior to cracks growing to a size which can propagate into a full pipe rupture.

Such failures are not expected in main steam piping due to the lack of a corrosive environment. As a conservative action, TS 3.7.10 provides assurance that an MSL leak would be promptly identified and corrected, eliminating the need to consider a small MSL leak as a preexisting condition in the DBA analysis.

MSL Area Temperature satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii)

LCO The MSL area temperature for each area in Table 3.7.10-1 must be less than or equal to the limit. The temperature in the MSL areas listed in Table 3.7.10-1 are monitored to aid in detecting a pressure boundary leak in the MSLs (continued)

MSL Area Temperature B 3.7.10 Quad Cities B 3.7.10-2 Revision XXX BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The LCO is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3, which is when the MSLs may be in service. In MODES 4 and 5, the MSLs are not required and monitoring for MSL leakage is not necessary.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If the temperature in an MSL area is above the limit in Table 3.7.10-1, immediate action must be taken to confirm there is no MSL pressure boundary leak. The MSL area temperature may be elevated due to reasons other than an MSL pressure boundary leak, such as hot weather, building ventilation reduced efficiency or failure, or faulty temperature detectors. Indications of a small MSL pressure boundary leak include, but are not limited to:

An unexpected, sudden rise in area temperature,

An unexpected increase in radiation monitor readings,

An unexpected rise in sump levels,

An unexpected decrease in plant electrical output, and

Visual and sound indications.

If it cannot be confirmed that an MSL pressure boundary leak does not exist, Action B must be followed.

If it is confirmed that there is no MSL pressure boundary leak, the verification must be performed periodically until the MSL area temperature is within its limit. The 12-hour Completion Time is acceptable considering the likelihood of an MSL leak occurring between verifications and the potential for elevated radiation levels and adverse environmental conditions in the MSL area.

B.1 and B.2 If it cannot be confirmed that there is no MSL pressure boundary leak or if the periodic verification of Required Action A.2 is not performed, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

MSL Area Temperature B 3.7.10 Quad Cities B 3.7.10-3 Revision XXX SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.10.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification that the MSL area temperature is less than or equal to the limit in Table 3.7.10-1 indicates that there are no MSL pressure boundary leaks. In order to ensure timely detection of an MSL pressure boundary leak, each MSL area must be monitored with sufficient detectors to ensure detection of an MSL pressure boundary leak within the monitored area.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES None.

ML25357A077

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