ML25204A056

Comment (2) of Alan Blind on Holtec Palisades, LLC; Palisades Nuclear Plant; License Amendment Application

ML25204A056
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	07/23/2025
From:	Blind A - No Known Affiliation
To:	Office of Administration
References
NRC-2025-0313, 90FR34019 00002
Download: ML25204A056 (1)

Text

PUBLIC SUBMISSION As of: 7/23/25, 9:27 AM Received: July 23, 2025 Status: Pending_Post Tracking No. mdf-vds4-8r0z Comments Due: August 18, 2025 Submission Type: Web Docket: NRC-2025-0313 Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, on behalf of Holtec Palisades, LLC; Palisades Nuclear Plant; License Amendment Request Comment On: NRC-2025-0313-0001 Holtec Palisades, LLC; Palisades Nuclear Plant; License Amendment Application Document: NRC-2025-0313-DRAFT-0002 Comment on FR Doc # 2025-13501 Submitter Information Name: Alan Blind Address:

Baroda, MI, 49101 Email:a.alan.blind@gmail.com Phone:269-303-6396 General Comment I am submitting comments concerning the NRC Staffs preliminary findingbased on Holtecs safety evaluationthat there are no significant safety issues associated with the proposed license amendment. I disagree with this conclusion. The attached document provides a more detailed explanation of my evaluation and the reasons I believe the safety issues are significant and warrant further review Attachments FRN Comments 7/23/25, 9:29 AM NRC-2025-0313-DRAFT-0002.html file:///C:/Users/BHB1/Downloads/NRC-2025-0313-DRAFT-0002.html 1/1 SUNI Review Complete Template=ADM-013 E-RIDS=ADM-03 ADD: Justin Poole, Susan Lent, Mary Neely Comment (2)

Publication Date:

7/18/2025 Citation: 90 FR 34019

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20 To: Office of Administration, ATTN: Program Management, Announcements and Editing Staff Via: https://www.regulations.gov, Docket ID NRC-2025-0313

Subject:

Public Comment Opposing NRCs Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination for Palisades LAR (ML25181A005)

Date: August 1, 2025

Dear NRC Staff,

This comment is submitted in direct response to the NRCs preliminary finding of no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) for Holtec Palisades June 24, 2025 License Amendment Request (LAR), as published in the Federal Register and docketed under ML25181A005.

This public comment is submitted in conjuction with a Petition for Hearing and Leave to Intervene under 10 CFR 2.309. The submission of both filings is a procedural step intended to preserve the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards (ASLB) opportunity to consider the §2.309 contentions and requested actions before the NRC finalizes its NSHC determination. The ASLB is being asked to consider, among other contentions, whether Holtecs License Amendment Request fails to meet

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20 the submittal requirements of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.92, including the obligation to provide a complete and accurate basis for the proposed change and an adequate safety evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.9(a).

As stated in the NRCs Federal Register Notice:

If a hearing is requested and the Commission has not made a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration, the Commission will make a final determination, taking into account the hearing request, and any comments received, which will serve to establish when the hearing is held.

Accordingly, by filing both this public commentaddressing the NRC Staffs preliminary determination of no significant hazards consideration and the Petition for Hearing and Leave to Intervene at the same time, while the NSHC finding remains preliminary, I respectfully request that the NRC Staff defer any final action on both the NSHC determination and the associated license amendment. This deferral is necessary to preserve meaningful public participation, as contemplated by NRC regulations, and to ensure that the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) is not preempted from exercising its authority to consider and act upon the

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20 contentions raised in the §2.309 petition, before any licensing decision by the Staff is finalized.

Scope and Purpose of This Comment This comment challenges the technical and regulatory basis for the NRC staffs preliminary determination of no significant hazards consideration but only as it pertains to Item S2-15, the delayed completion of the Reactor Head and Pressurizer Vent Valve modification required by NFPA-805 and NUREG-0737.

To be clear: I do not oppose the entire license amendment request, nor do I comment on the NSHC determination related to S2-13 (the Component Cooling Water modification). This comment is narrow in scope and focused exclusively on whether Holtecs justification for its NSHC conclusion is consistent with NRC regulatory requirements and precedent, specifically with respect to Item S2-15.

Furthermore, while this comment is procedurally distinct from the additional §2.309 petition, the arguments presented herein directly support and inform the contentions raised in that petition. In particular, I will assert via the §2.309 petition that Holtec has made two critical errors:

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20 1.

It incorrectly determined that the proposed deferral of S2-15 does not involve a significant safety hazard, the focus of these comments; and 2.

It failed to submit a deterministic safety evaluation, as required, to demonstrate continued compliance with NRC regulations and Technical Specifications during the period of delay.

Licensing Basis for the Reactor Head and Pressurizer Vent Valves The current Palisades licensing basis (CLB) requirements trace their origin to two pivotal events in nuclear safety regulation:

the 1975 fire at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant, and the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Power Plant.

These events led the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to impose deterministic safety requirements that remain in effect for all Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs), including Palisades. As a direct result, two interdependent regulatory frameworks were established:

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20 1.

The TMI Action Plan (NUREG-0737), which requires operable reactor vessel head and pressurizer vent valves to support natural circulation cooling during a loss of forced flow; and 2.

10 CFR 50, Appendix R (and its Palisades-specific NFPA-805 successor), which requires plants to achieve and maintain safe shutdown following a fireassuming loss of offsite power.

Together, these frameworks mandate that the vent valves remain operable during both accident and fire conditions. The required modification identified in S2-15 serves this dual license basis and license condition purpose. The term "operable" is defined in accordance with the Technical Specifications definition of Operable and is further clarified by NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 9900, Technical Guidance for Assessing Operability Determinations and Resolution of Degraded and Non-Conforming Conditions.

As documented in NRC correspondence, Consumers Power Company (CPCo) formally committed to installing and operating the Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System (RCGVS) following the TMI accident. In its March 12, 1985 letter to the NRC, CPCo stated:

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20 Item II.B.1, CPCo committed to install a Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System (RCGVS) designed to remotely vent gases from the reactor vessel head and pressurizer steam space during post-accident situations and to issue procedures on the use of the RCGVS Additionally, CPCo committed to routinely cycle the RCGVS valves only during testing and to conduct the testing only in cold shutdown condition.

CPCo Letter, B. D. Johnson to NRC, March 12, 1985 This commitment was incorporated into the Palisades Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). In FSAR Update No. 28 (2006), Palisades explicitly documented its licensing obligation under NUREG-0737, Item II.B.1. That same commitment remains incorporated in FSAR Revision 35, which is also cited in Holtecs own LAR submittals for restart. FSAR Chapter 4.8 states:

The Primary Coolant Gas Vent System (PCGVS) is designed to vent steam or noncondensible gases from the reactor vessel head and pressurizer areas of the Primary Coolant System. This is done to assure core cooling during natural circulation is not inhibited. This system was installed pursuant to NUREG-0737, Topic II.B.1.

FSAR Chapter 4, Rev. 31, p. 4.8-1

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20 Holtec has confirmed that FSAR Rev. 35 forms the basis for its planned restart:

The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), now titled the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR), will be updated to reflect the docketed version that was in effect prior to the 10 CFR 50.82(a)

(1) certifications, PNP UFSAR Revision 35 The DSAR change back to the PNP POLB UFSAR will be accomplished under the 10 CFR 50.59 process and be implemented coincident with the associated license amendments.

Holtec LAR, ML23348A148, Section 3.2.3.1 Thus, these valves and their supporting control systems are not enhancementsthey are required safety systems forming part of the deterministic licensing basis. Their operability under both fire and accident conditions is essential for compliance with the current NRC licensing basis for Palisades.

Regulatory Significance of License Conditions and the High Bar for NRC Staff Review This comment also respectfully reminds the NRC Staff that the Commissions decision to incorporate requirements from NUREG-0737, 10

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20 CFR 50 Appendix R, and NFPA-805 into the Palisades licenseby making them enforceable license conditionswas not arbitrary. It reflects the NRCs formal judgment that these safety functions are essential to plant safety and must be met in full unless properly revised through an amendment or exemption.

As the NRC itself has stated:

Once a license condition is imposed, it becomes part of the licensing basis and is legally binding on the licensee. Any modification, removal, or relaxation of the license condition requires prior NRC approval through a license amendment under 10 CFR 50.90 or an exemption under 10 CFR 50.12.

Regulatory Guide 1.174, Rev. 3, Section 2.2.1, ADAMS Accession No. ML19342C905 Because these requirements have been elevated to license condition status, the threshold for NRC approval of any delay or change is, by design, high. The license condition at issue (Amendment 254, Paragraph 2.C.(3)) is not satisfied by meeting one criterion alone. It clearly states that any proposed change must not affect other license conditions, must

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20 preserve defense-in-depth, and must maintain adequate safety margins. These are cumulative requirements.

Accordingly, as NRC Staff evaluates Holtecs justification for concluding that the proposed deferral of the S2-15 modification presents no significant safety hazard, it must do so with the same rigor the Commission applied when the license condition was originally imposed.

The public and the licensing basis both depend on this level of scrutiny.

The use of simplified screening criteriawithout addressing the full scope of the license conditionfalls short of that standard.

For these reasons, I respectfully urge the NRC Staff to apply the full weight of the license conditions criteria in its review and to reject any conclusion of no significant hazards consideration that does not clearly meet all the required safety thresholds.

Rebuttals to Holtecs NSHC Statements Holtec Claim:

This change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems

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Response

This is inaccurate. The S2-15 modification is necessary to ensure post-accident venting of non-condensable gases and to support natural circulation coolingfunctions explicitly credited in the Palisades Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and required under NUREG-0737. These safety functions remain enforceable through the plants Current Licensing Basis (CLB). Delaying the fire-qualified upgrade directly affects accident analysis assumptions by undermining the operability of the Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System (RCGVS) during fire-induced loss of offsite power (LOOP) scenarios.

Importantly, NUREG-0737 Item II.D.1 that Implements NUREG-0578, TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report: requires that:

All PWR licensees and applicants shall provide a vent path from the reactor vessel head and from the pressurizer steam space to permit removal of noncondensable gases that may inhibit natural circulation.

These paths shall have adequate flow capacity and be capable of being remotely operated from the control room.

NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, November 1980

of 11 20 This requirement remains in force and is directly relevant to the S2-15 modification, which involves upgrading the control circuitry and cable routing to ensure that the valves can be reliably operated remotely from the control room under fire and accident conditions. Holtecs delay of this upgrade impacts not only the safety function but also the required method of actuation.

Moreover, Holtec has failed to acknowledge that its proposed change impacts an existing license conditionspecifically, Amendment 254, DPR-20, Paragraph 2.C.(3)which requires that any fire protection program change must not affect a license condition, must preserve defense-in-depth, and must maintain safety margins. These criteria are cumulative, and Holtecs NSHC justification does not evaluate any of them.

Holtec Claim:

The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents

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Response

Holtec acknowledges that S2-15 is incomplete. Without fire-hardened cabling and control systems, the RCGVS valves may not function during a fire-induced loss of offsite power (LOOP)a condition specifically required by both Appendix R and NUREG-0737 license basis and license conditions. In particular, failure to complete the S2-15 modifications undermines the control room operability requirement found in NUREG-0737, Item II.D.1, which explicitly states that the vent paths shall be capable of being remotely operated from the control room. This requirement is not fulfilled until the full S2-15 modification is complete.

The performance capability of the RCGVS is therefore not theoreticalit is a functional safety requirement tied to both post-accident heat removal and fire protection. The S2-15 modification exists to satisfy that dual requirement, and its deferral materially affects system readiness and licensing basis compliance.

Holtec Claim:

This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident

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Response

Incorrect. A new failure mode is introduced: the simultaneous loss of forced cooling and loss of primary coolant system venting during a fire-induced LOOP. Without reliable venting, natural circulation cooling fails, and the plant cannot reach or maintain safe shutdown. This is a previously unanalyzed accident scenario under current license basis conditions.

Holtec Claim:

This change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Response

It does. These valves are credited support functions for Primary Coolant System operability. Fire-hardened control systems and remote operability from the control roomexplicitly required by NUREG-0737are part of the definition of operable to ensure availability under design-basis conditions. Their absence compromises a defense-in-depth feature for core cooling. Yet Holtec has not submitted a deterministic safety evaluation or 10 CFR 50.12 exemption as required by NRC regulation.

Conclusion

of 14 20 The NRCs proposed finding that Holtecs LAR involves no significant hazards consideration is both procedurally flawed and substantively unsupported. The proposed deferral of NFPA-805 modification S2-15:

Alters accident analysis assumptions Undermines required system operability Introduces a previously unexamined failure scenario Reduces the safety margin for natural circulation under fire/accident conditions Fails to meet the remote operability requirement explicitly imposed by NUREG-0737, Item II.D.1 We respectfully request that this comment be entered as formal input under 10 CFR § 50.92(c) and be considered in conjunction with the concurrently submitted Petition for Hearing and Leave to Intervene under 10 CFR § 2.309. As acknowledged in the Federal Register Notice:

If a hearing is requested and the Commission has not made a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration,

of 15 20 the Commission will make a final determination... which will serve to establish when the hearing is held.

We therefore request that the NRC withhold final action on the NSHC finding and associated license amendment until the ASLB has reviewed and resolved the safety and regulatory issues raised in this comment and the separate §2.309 hearing petition.

Impact of NRC Fast-Track Review Schedule and Request to Defer Final Action In a June 27, 2025 acceptance letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML25181A808), the NRC Staff acknowledged Holtecs request to expedite review of the subject license amendment request (LAR) and stated a target completion date of October 24, 2025. While the NRC agreed to pursue an accelerated review schedule, it also emphasized that the forecasted completion timeline may change due to several factors, including hearing-related activities. By filing this public comment and the related

§2.309 Petition for Hearing and Leave to Intervene concurrentlywhile the NRCs NSHC determination remains preliminaryI respectfully invoke one such hearing-related activity that, per the NRCs own guidance, must be factored into its review schedule.

of 16 20 Accordingly, I request that the NRC Staff defer final action on both the NSHC finding and the license amendment itself until the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) has reviewed the safety and regulatory contentions raised in the §2.309 filing. Allowing the LAR to proceed under an expedited scheduledespite the pendency of a properly filed §2.309 petitionwould undermine public participation rights and short-circuit the Boards authority to evaluate whether Holtecs LAR satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 50.90, 50.92, and 50.9(a).

Respectfully submitted, Alan Blind 1000 West Shawnee Road Baroda, Michigan 49101 a.alan.blind@gmail.com Addendum - References and Citations Supporting This Comment The following references support the technical, regulatory, and legal arguments presented in this public comment. Each document is cited in either the body of this comment or the concurrently submitted Petition for Hearing and Leave to Intervene:

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Federal Register Notice License Amendment Request to Change NFPA 805 Full Compliance Date 89 Fed. Reg. 54012 (July 18, 2025), Docket ID NRC-2025-0313 2.

Holtec License Amendment Request (LAR)

License Amendment Request to Change the Full Compliance Implementation Date for the Fire Protection Program Transition License Condition ADAMS Accession No. ML25175A275 3.

NRC Acceptance Letter for LAR Review Acceptance of Proposed License Amendment Request to Change NFPA 805 Implementation Date ADAMS Accession No. ML25181A808 4.

NUREG-0737 Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements ADAMS Accession No. ML051400209 5.

NUREG-0578 TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report (December 1979), Section 2.1.2 - Reactor Coolant System Vents

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Palisades FSAR Revision 35 Final Safety Analysis Report - Current Licensing Basis ADAMS Accession No. ML23031A292 7.

Holtec LAR Supporting Document Technical Specifications and Bases - Holtec Palisades ADAMS Accession No. ML23348A148 8.

Regulatory Guide 1.174, Rev. 3 An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis ADAMS Accession No. ML19342C905 9.

Regulatory Guide 1.205, Rev. 2 Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection for Existing Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants ADAMS Accession No. ML21048A448

10. NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 9900 Technical Guidance for Operability Determinations and Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions ADAMS Accession No. ML11300A069

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11. NEI 96-07, Revision 1 Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations ADAMS Accession No. ML003771157

12. NEI 04-02, Revision 3 Guidance for Implementing a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Under 10 CFR 50.48(c)

ADAMS Accession No. ML19351D277

13. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for License Amendment No. 254 Transition to NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program ADAMS Accession No. ML15007A191

14. NRC Enforcement Discretion Letter (2008)

Extended Enforcement Discretion for Fire Protection Deficiencies During NFPA 805 Transition ADAMS Accession No. ML083260577

15. Consumers Power Company Letter (1985)

Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System Commitment to NRC ADAMS Accession No. ML062400216

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16. NUREG-1424 Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Full-Term Operating License for Palisades Nuclear Plant ADAMS Accession No. ML18057A616

17. 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R Fire Protection Program Requirements

18. 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.12 License Amendment and Exemption Request Procedures

19. 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2)(viii)

Method of Evaluation Requirements