ML25052A149
| ML25052A149 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | University of Missouri-Columbia |
| Issue date: | 02/21/2025 |
| From: | Mccall S, Sanford M Univ of Missouri - Columbia |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk |
| References | |
| Download: ML25052A149 (1) | |
Text
February 21, 2024 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
REFERENCE:
Docket 50-186 University of Missouri-Columbia Research Reactor Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-103 1513 Research Park Drive Columbia, MO 65211-3400 Phone: 573.882.4211 Web: murr.missouri.edu
SUBJECT:
Submittal of annual operating report for the University of Missouri-Columbia Research Reactor as required by MURR Technical Specification 6.6.e Enclosed is a copy of the 2024 Reactor Operations Annual Report for the University of Missouri-Columbia Research Reactor (MURR). This document is being submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in accordance with the MURR Technical Specification 6.6.e.
If you have any questions regarding the contents of this report, please contact Russ Gibson at gibsonrw@missouri.edu or by calling (573) 882-0342.
S s:
incer b
- cly, d
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-1 Shannon P. McCall, for:
Russell W. Gibson Interim Reactor Manager RWG/spm Enclosure cc:
Mr. Andrew Waugh, U.S. NRC Mrs. Jessica Lovett, U.S. NRC ENDORSEMENT:
Reviewed and Approved, Matt Sanford Executive Director
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA RESEARCH REACTOR REACTOR OPERATIONS ANNUAL REPORT January 1, 2024 through December 31, 2024
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA RESEARCH REACTOR REACTOR OPERATIONS ANNUAL REPORT January 1, 2024 through December 31, 2024 Submitted by:
Reviewed and approved by:
Compiled by the Staff of MURR L-
\
Shannon P. McCall, for:
Russell W. Gibson Interim Reactor Manager Matthew R. Sanford Executive Director
i UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA RESEARCH REACTOR REACTOR OPERATIONS ANNUAL REPORT January 1, 2024 through December 31, 2024 INTRODUCTION The University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) is a multi-disciplinary research and education facility providing a broad range of analytical, materials science, and irradiation services to the research community and the commercial sector. Scientific programs include research in archaeometry, epidemiology, materials science, plant science, nuclear medicine, radiation effects, radioisotope studies, targeted radiotherapy, and nuclear engineering; as well as research techniques including neutron activation analysis, neutron scattering, and gamma-ray imaging. The heart of this facility is a pressurized, graphite and beryllium reflected, open pool-type, light water moderated and cooled, heterogeneous reactor designed for operation at a maximum steady-state power level of 10 Megawatts thermal
- the highest-powered university-operated research reactor in the United States.
The Reactor Operations Annual Report presents a summary of reactor operating experience for calendar year 2024.
Included within this report are changes to MURR Reactor Operations and Reactor Health Physics procedures, revisions to the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), facility modifications, new tests and experiments, reactor physics activities, and environmental and health physics data.
This report is being submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to meet the administrative requirements of MURR Technical Specification 6.6.e.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The success of MURR and its scientific programs is due to the dedication and hard work of many individuals and organizations. Included within this group are: the University of Missouri (MU) administration; the governing officials of the State of Missouri; the Missouri State Highway Patrol (MSHP); the City of Columbia Police Department (CPD);
the University of Missouri Police Department (MUPD); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); our regulators; those who have provided funding, including the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the NRC; Argonne National Laboratory (ANL);
Idaho National Laboratory (INL); Sandia National Laboratories (SNL); the researchers; the students; the Columbia Fire Department (CFD); the MU Campus Facilities organization; the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI); members of the National Organization of Test, Research and Training Reactors (TRTR); and many others who have made, and will continue to make, key contributions to our overall success. To these individuals and organizations, the staff of MURR wishes to extend its fondest appreciation.
Some of the major facility projects that were supported by Reactor Operations during the 2024 calendar year included:
(1) Replacement of Primary Coolant Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve 540B Diaphragm, (2) Replacement of Pool Coolant Pump Motor for P-508B,(3) Replacement of the Split Ring Flange Gasket, (4) Replacement of Uncompensated Ion Chamber for PRM-6, (5) Replacement of Primary Coolant Pump P533 Relief Valve, (6) Replacement of Compensated Ion Chamber for the Wide Range Monitor, (7) Replacement of the Fission Chamber for Signal Processor No. 1.
ii The facility continues to actively collaborate with the NNSA Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3)
Reactor Conversion Program and five other U.S. high-performance research and test reactor facilities, including one critical facility, that use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to find a suitable low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel replacement. Although each one of the five high-performance reactors is responsible for its own feasibility and safety studies, regulatory interactions, fuel procurement, and conversion, there are common interests and activities among all five reactors that will benefit from a coordinated, working-group effort. This past year, work focused on: (1) LEU fuel element fabrication specification impact assessment analyses, which evaluates the effect of fabrication parameter variations on key characteristics of fuel performance; (2) Design Demonstration Element (DDE), one without uranium and one with uranium, that will be flow tested at the Oregon State University Hydro-Mechanical Fuel Testing Facility and inserted into an experimental position at the INL Advanced Test Reactor to achieve prototypic MURR operating conditions; (3) LEU and DDE end fitting rigidity analysis to ensure the DDE test results are representative of the LEU element behavior, current results show no significant difference in response to the loads between the two elements; and (4) LEU preliminary design verification for thermal hydraulics, as well as LEU structural and fluid structure interaction (FSI) analysis are currently underway.
Reactor Operations management also wishes to commend five individuals who received their Reactor Operator certifications. These individuals participated in a rigorous training program of classroom seminars, self-study, and on-the-job training. The results of this training are confident, well-versed, decisive individuals capable of performing the duties of licensed staff during normal and abnormal situations.
iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Pages I.
Reactor Operations Summary............................................................................................. I-1 through 12 II.
MURR Procedures............................................................................................................. II-1 through 10 A.
Changes to Reactor Operations Procedures B.
Changes to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures C.
Changes to Radiological Control, Byproduct Material Shipping, and Preparation of Byproduct Material for Shipping Procedures III.
Revisions to the Safety Analysis Report............................................................................ III-1 through 2 IV.
Plant and System Modifications......................................................................................... IV-1 through 2 V.
New Tests and Experiments................................................................................................ V-1 through 2 VI.
Special Nuclear Material and Reactor Physics Activities.................................................. VI-1 through 2 VII.
Radioactive Effluent.......................................................................................................... VII-1 through 2 Table 1 - Sanitary Sewer Effluent Table 2 - Stack Effluent VIII.
Environmental Monitoring and Health Physics Surveys................................................. VIII-1 through 6 Table 1 - Summary of Environmental Set 103 - Spring 2024 Table 2 - Summary of Environmental Set 104 - Fall 2024 Table 3 - Environmental TLD Summary Table 4 - Number of Facility Radiation and Contamination Surveys IX.
Summary of Radiation Exposure to Facility Staff, Experimenters, and Visitors............................... IX-1
I-1 SECTION I REACTOR OPERATIONS
SUMMARY
January 1, 2024 through December 31, 2024 The following table and discussion summarize Reactor operations during calendar year 2024.
Month Full Power Hours Megawatt Days Full Power
(% of total time)
Full Power
(% of scheduled*)
January 649.07 270.55 87.24%
97.71%
February 613.33 255.66 88.12%
98.70%
March 651.38 271.53 87.55%
98.06%
April 599.22 249.83 83.23%
93.21%
May 667.85 278.36 89.76%
100.54%
June 439.16 183.23 60.99%
68.31%
July 649.08 270.59 90.15%
100.97%
August 627.30 271.55 84.31%
94.43%
September 621.34 258.99 86.30%
96.65%
October 640.46 267.13 86.08%
96.41%
November 622.19 259.01 86.42%
96.79%
December 646.49 269.52 86.89%
97.32%
Total for the Year 7,426.86 3,105.95 84.78%
94.96%
- MURR is scheduled to average at least 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> of full power operation per week. Total time is the number of hours in the month or year listed.
JANUARY 2024 The Reactor operated continuously in January with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.
Major maintenance items for the month included: performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with Reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200 Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D) for Control Blade A; completing CP-38 Verify I-131 Processing Hot Cells Charcoal Filter Efficiency; replacing the Primary Coolant Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve 540B diaphragm; performing a zero, span and calibration procedure on the Pool outlet temperature element TE-901D; replacing a transistor on the yellow leg of the Reactor Safety System Monitoring Circuit; installing jumpers on the Reactor Safety System Monitoring Circuit to fix the ground trace; cleaned and lubricated the auxiliary contacts for the Reactor Containment Building Return Fan RF-2; replacing the coil inside breaker A4 on Motor Control Center-4 for the Reactor Containment Building Return Fan RF-2; lowered Differential Pressure Sensor DPS 929 meter reading from 29.5 psi to 29.0 psi; replaced Actuator Speed Control Valve on In-Pool Heat Exchanger isolation valve 546A; replaced oil seal on valve S-1 hydraulic motor; and loaded new de-ionization bed I and placed on Pool Coolant System service.
I-2 FEBRUARY 2024 The Reactor operated continuously in February with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, two shutdowns for physics measurements, and two unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.
On February 5, with the Reactor operating at 2 below Estimated Critical Position in manual control mode, the Reactor was manually scrammed by the console watch Operator due to a fault indication on valve 524. This fault indication was caused by water intrusion from a leak from diaphragm valve 515P. At the time, the operating crew was conducting a normal Reactor startup per procedure OP-RO-210, Reactor Startup - Normal. Reactor management was notified of the valve failures, and an electronics technician and health physics technician were called in to assist with the repairs of both valves 524 and 515P. Permission was received from Reactor management and the Lead Senior Reactor Operator to take the Reactor critical. Subsequently the Reactor reached 10 MW operation.
On February 19, with the Reactor in a shutdown condition as part of the normal maintenance day, a neutron radiography experiment was set up on Beamport-E which involved installing a neutron camera into the beamport. The experiment plan was to have the camera installed into the beamport for the weekly run and then remove the camera, with health physics support, after the Reactor was shutdown for regular maintenance on February 26. On February 26, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, it was discovered that the experiment had been left in Beamport-E. The camera was inadvertently left in the beamport and was not removed, while the Reactor was shutdown for scheduled maintenance. At 16:39, on 02/26/2024, the Reactor was manually scrammed in accordance with operating procedure OP-RO-220, Reactor Shutdown or Power Reduction to remove the camera from Beamport-E. Following the removal of the camera, permission to restart the Reactor was given by the Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
Major maintenance items for the month included: replacing the diaphragm in the demineralizer System valve 515P; replacing the filter cartridges in Pool Coolant Demineralizer System inlet filter housing F-200; performing two reactivity worth measurement in accordance with Reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B); replacing bearings on the Reactor containment building supply fan SF-2; replacing sheer pins on the Truck Entry Door 101; replacing the south leaf spring on the Personnel Airlock Door 276; performing a zero and span procedure on Reactor inlet temperature element TE-901A as part of the instrument calibration; replacing the bucket on Motor Control Center-3 for the Freight Elevator; performing RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D) for Control Blade D.
MARCH 2024 The Reactor operated continuously in March with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, two shutdowns for physics measurements, and three unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.
On March 4, with the Reactor operating at 2 below Estimated Critical Position (ECP) in manual control mode, the Reactor was manually scrammed by the console watch Operator due to 1/M calculations not being with ECP limitations per procedure OP-RO-210, Reactor Startup - Normal Table 9.1, ECP Limitations. The 1/M calculation being outside of the ECP limitations was caused by two new fuel elements not being accounted for when calculating the ECP per procedure RP-RO-100, Fuel Movement. At the time, the operating crew was conducting a normal Reactor startup per procedure OP-RO-210, Reactor Startup - Normal. The Reactor Operator, performing the normal Reactor startup, was withdrawing control rods one-at-a-time to criticality when they realized the Reactor did not reach criticality within the ECP limits per Tabled 9.1, ECP Limitations. The Reactor Operator proceeded to insert control rods to 2 below ECP, and Reactor management was notified of the error. A new ECP calculation was performed, and permission was received from Reactor management and the Lead Senior Reactor Operator to take the Reactor critical.
Subsequently the Reactor reached 10 MW operation.
On March 20, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, the Reactor was manually scrammed by the console watch Operator due to receiving a Nuclear Instrumentation Anomaly from the Wide Range Monitor (WRM). Reactor management was notified of the alarm received and an electronics technician was called in for troubleshooting. Investigation power supply was reading 58 volts when it should have been approximately 730 volts.
I-3 The high voltage power supply was replaced with a spare that read 708 volts and the WRM drawer was retested satisfactory. Permission was received from Reactor management and the Lead Senior Reactor Operator to take the Reactor critical. Subsequently, the Reactor reached 10 MW operation.
On March 31, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, the Reactor was manually scrammed by the console watch Operator due to receiving a Nuclear Instrumentation Anomaly from the Wide Range Monitor (WRM). Reactor management was notified of the alarm received and an electronics technician was called in for troubleshooting. After investigation, no definitive issues could be determined. It was discovered that the high voltage power supply was making an unusual noise but tested satisfactory. After discussion, it was decided to replace the high voltage power supply with a spare and the WRM drawer was retested satisfactory. Permission was received from the Reactor Manager and the Lead Senior Reactor Operator to take the Reactor critical. Subsequently, the Reactor reached 10 MW operation.
Major maintenance items for the month included: performing two reactivity worth measurement in accordance with Reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17 (B); completing CP-31, Calibration of the Eberline Radiation Stack Monitor; zeroing the Fuel Element Failure Monitor as part of the calibration; replacing Door 504 solenoid-operated three-way valve; replacing Door 505 solenoid-operated three-way valve; replacing Truck Entry Door (Door 101) solenoid-operated three-way valve; and completing CP-38, Verify I-131 Processing Hot Cells Charcoal Filter Efficiency.
APRIL 2024 The Reactor operated continuously in April with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, two shutdowns for physics measurements, and four unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. An NRC inspector performed a routine scheduled inspection of Health Physics and Shipping.
On April 3, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, the Reactor was manually scrammed by the console watch Operator due to receiving multiple Nuclear Instrument Anomalies from the Wide Range Monitor (WRM). Reactor management was notified of the alarms received and the decision was made to conduct an Unplanned Shutdown, in accordance with operating procedure OP-RO-220, Reactor Shutdown or Power Reduction to further investigate the issue. An electronics technician was called in for troubleshooting, but, after investigation, no definitive issues could be determined. After discussion, it was decided to replace the WRM compensated ion chamber detector and cabling. Along with the electronics technician, a health physics technician was also called in to assist Reactor operations with the replacement of the compensated ion chamber. Following the replacement of the compensated ion chamber, the detector was response checked as post maintenance testing. The Reactor was refueled and permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Reactor Manger and Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
On April 5, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in manual control mode, an automatic Reactor scram was initiated from a Power Range Monitor 4, 5, or 6 High Power Rod Run-In. Upon receiving the scram, the console watch Reactor Operator performed all immediate actions of REP-2 Reactor Scram and then secured the Secondary Coolant System.
The high-power rod run-in occurred while the console watch Reactor Operator was attempting to shim the regulating blade out to the 60% withdrawn position to reset/recover power after receiving a Nuclear Instrument Anomaly from the Wide Range Monitor. Reactor power continued to decrease to approximately 1.1 MW before the rod run-in was reset and power was recovered and the Reactor was placed back into 10 MW operation per operating procedure OP-RO-212, Reactor Startup - Recovery from Temporary Power Reduction.
On April 8, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, an automatic Reactor scram was initiated from Primary Coolant circulation pump P501A securing. The immediate actions of REP-2 Reactor Scram and REP-3 Primary Coolant System Low Pressure or Low Flow Scram were completed. The Primary Coolant circulation pump P501A was inadvertently secured while a member of Reactor operations was attempting to make a cooling change to the Secondary Coolant System Cooling Tower Fan 3 and accidentally secured the Primary Coolant circulation pump P501A. The Reactor was refueled and permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
On April 19, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, the console watch Reactor Operator received a Nuclear Instrumentation Anomaly annunciation along with the Reactor going into manual control mode.
I-4 The console watch Reactor Operator then discovered that the Wide Range Monitor (WRM) drawer inoperative light was illuminated, and the WRM chart was indicating 0%. The console watch Reactor Operator then contacted Reactor management and called in an electronics technician for troubleshooting. While maintaining the Reactor in manual control mode, it was discovered that a power input fuse on the WRM had blown. The electronics technician replaced the blown fuse. During this time, the Reactor power drifted down to approximately 3.8 MW. With the Lead Senior Reactor Operators permission, the Reactor was returned to 10 MW operation per operating procedure OP-RO-212, Reactor Startup - Recovery from Temporary Power Reduction On April 19, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, the Reactor was manually scrammed by the console watch Reactor Operator due to receiving a Nuclear Instrumentation Anomaly from the Wide Range Monitor (WRM). Reactor management was notified of the alarm received and an electronics technician was called in for troubleshooting. After investigation, it was decided to replace both WRM high voltage power supplies and the 15V voltage regulator. The Reactor was refueled and permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Reactor Manager and Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
Major maintenance items for the month included: performing a zero and span procedure on Pool Coolant Heat Exchanger (HX521) Inlet (Th) - TE901C as part of the instrumentation calibration; adjusting Truck Entry Door (Door 101) pressure regulator up to approximately 21.5 psig.; replacing Wide Range Monitor compensated ion chamber detector and cabling; replacing Wide Range Monitor 217 trip unit; replacing Wide Range Monitor inoperative relay K4; cleaning and rebuilding the Wide Range Monitor selector switch; performing two reactivity worth measurements in accordance with Reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Woth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17 (B); repairing a break in the Secondary Coolant System blowdown line; completing CP-29, Calibration of the Lab Impex Radiation Stack Monitor; replacing both the high voltage power supplies on the Wide Range Monitor drawer; completing the biennial changeout of Control Blade B Offset Mechanism; performing SM-RO-025, Removal, Transfer, or Installation of an Offset Mechanism on Offset Mechanism B; performing SM-RO-625, Measuring Control Blade Pull Weight and Blade Drop Time with the Test Magnet Assembly, RTP-21 for Offset Mechanism B; performing reactivity worth measurements in accordance with Reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D) for Control Blade B; completing CP-38, Verify I-131 Processing Hot Cells Charcoal Filter Efficiency; performing a Cooling Tower peroxide sanitization; replacing the Secondary Coolant System circulating pump SP-2 knife switch.
MAY 2024 The Reactor operated continuously in May with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling and one shutdown for physics measurements. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.
Major maintenance items for the month included: performing chemical cleaning of Pool Coolant Heat Exchanger HX521; completing installation of new facility handheld radio System; replacing the motor for Pool Coolant System pump P508B; replacing Motor Control Center 5 (MCC-5) breaker for Pool Coolant System pump P508B; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with Reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17 (B)
JUNE 2024 The Reactor operated continuously in June with the following exceptions: three shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling and nine unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.
On June 15, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, an automatic Reactor scram was initiated due to receiving a momentary loss of electrical power. Immediate actions for REP-2 Reactor Scram as well as the immediate secondary System related actions of REP-10 Sustained Loss of Normal Electrical Power were completed.
The MU Power Plant was contacted and identified the issue was a failure of a switch that feeds the Research Park Loop. The Reactor was refueled and permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
I-5 On June 17, following a normal refuel evolution, the Reactor remained in a shutdown condition for approximately nine days. This shutdown time was unplanned due to debris discovered on top of the core during a normal refuel evolution. All the foreign material present in the core was retrieved and identified as part of the split ring flange gasket.
Management determined that replacement would occur, and maintenance activities commenced, using a draft version of procedure SM-RO-011, Beryllium Reflector Replacement per Standing Order 24-09, Transition Piece Gasket Replacement. A replacement split ring flange gasket was manufactured and analyzed under 50.59 Screen 24-31, New Style Split Ring Flange Gasket. Additional analysis of the operational impacts of the new style gasket material was conducted by an Engineering Manager. After discovery of the failure of the split ring flange gasket, Reactor Operations personnel and Health Physics personnel were divided into two teams working 12-hour shifts around the clock to complete maintenance and return the Reactor to operation. Activities commenced early that Monday morning, and the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation the following Monday, June 24.
On June 25, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, an automatic Reactor scram was initiated due to a Nuclear Instrument Anomaly from Power Range Monitor - Channel 6. Upon receiving the scram, the console watch Reactor Operator performed all immediate actions of REP-2 Reactor Scram and then secured the Secondary Coolant System. Permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Reactor Manager and Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
On June 25, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, an automatic Reactor scram was initiated due to a Nuclear Instrument Anomaly from Power Range Monitor - Channel 6. Upon receiving the scram, the console watch Reactor Operator performed all immediate actions of REP-2 Reactor Scram and then secured the Secondary Coolant System. An electronics technician was called in for troubleshooting and Reactor management was notified.
Electronics technicians tested the high voltage power supply and the 15V voltage regulator and both tested within specification. After discussion, both the high voltage power supply and the 15V voltage regulator were replaced with bench calibrated spares. The Reactor was refueled and permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Reactor Manager and Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
On June 25, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, an automatic Reactor scram was initiated due to a Nuclear Instrument Anomaly from Power Range Monitor - Channel 6. Upon receiving the scram, the console watch Reactor Operator performed all immediate actions of REP-2 Reactor Scram and then secured the Secondary Coolant System. An electronics technician was called in for troubleshooting and Reactor management was notified.
After investigation, it was decided to replace the Power Range Monitor - Channel 6 drawer with a spare. The spare drawer was installed with the original high voltage power supply voltage regulator, and 216 dual trip unit. Permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Reactor Manager and Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
On June 25, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, an automatic Reactor rod run-in was initiated due to a potentiometer failure on Power Range Monitor - Channel 6. Upon receiving the rod run-in, the console watch Reactor Operator manually scrammed the Reactor and performed all immediate actions of REP-2 Reactor Scram and then secured the Secondary Coolant System. An electronics technician was called in and Reactor management was notified of the failure. Electronics technicians replaced the R2 Power Range Monitor - Channel 6 potentiometer. The Reactor was refueled and permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Reactor Manager and Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
On June 27, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, an automatic Reactor scram was initiated due to a Nuclear Instrument Anomaly from Power Range Monitor - Channel 6. Upon receiving the scram, the console watch Reactor Operator performed all immediate actions of REP-2 Reactor Scram and then secured the Secondary Coolant System. An electronics technician was called in for troubleshooting and Reactor management was notified.
Electronics technicians replaced the high voltage power supply and 15V voltage regulator for Power Range Monitor
- Channel 6. The Reactor was refueled and permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Reactor Manager and Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
On June 28, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, an automatic Reactor scram was initiated due to a Nuclear Instrument Anomaly from Power Range Monitor - Channel 6. Upon receiving the scram, the console watch Reactor Operator performed all immediate actions of REP-2 Reactor Scram and then secured the Secondary Coolant System. An electronics technician was called in for troubleshooting and Reactor management was notified.
I-6 Electronics technicians replaced the high voltage power supply for Power Range Monitor - Channel 6. Permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Reactor Manager and Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
On June 28, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, the console watch Reactor Operator received indication of a Channel 4, 5, or 6 High Power Rod Run-In from Power Range Monitor - Channel 6 with no automatic rod run-in occurring. The console watch Reactor Operator then proceeded to manually scram the Reactor per REP-1 Scram or Rod Run-In Failure. Once all immediate actions of REP-1 Scram or Rod Run-In Failure was completed, the Lead Senior Reactor Operator verified that the Safety Limits or Limiting Safety System Settings were not exceeded, and Reactor management was notified. An electronics technician and health physics technician were called in to assist Reactor operations with the replacement of the uncompensated ion chamber. Electronics technicians also replaced the Z-17 dual trip unit in the Power Range Monitor - Channel 6 drawer. Electronic technicians then verified the previously installed Z-17 card providing the output trip was operable and would have provided a rod run-in trip should a high-power rod run-in signal been received. The Z-17 card has two separate outputs, one for annunciation and one for the rod run-in trip. It was determined that the output signal to the annunciation had failed and that if there were a rise in power to warrant a rod run-in, the trip would have occurred as intended. Permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Reactor Manager and Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
On June 29, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, an automatic Reactor rod run-in was initiated due to Power Range Monitor - Channel 6 high power indication. The console watch Reactor Operator did not receive an annunciation indicating the rod run-in occurred from a high-power rod run-in, but indication from the rod run-in monitoring System showed indication of a Power Range Monitor - Channel 6 High Power. Upon receiving the rod run-in, the console watch Reactor Operator manually scrammed the Reactor and performed all immediate actions of REP-2 Reactor Scram and then secured the Secondary Coolant System. An electronics technician was called in for troubleshooting and Reactor management was notified. Electronics technicians replaced the Power Range Monitor - Channel 6 drawer. For post-maintenance testing, a megger of the cabling from the junction box located at the top of the Reactor bridge to the drawer was completed satisfactorily and the detector was response checked. The Reactor was refueled and permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Reactor Manger and Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
Major maintenance items for the month included: performing a chemical cleaning of Primary Coolant Heat Exchanger HX-503A; replacing the filter cartridges in Pool Coolant Demineralizer System inlet filter housing F-200; performing a chemical cleaning of Primary Coolant Heat Exchanger HX-503B; replacing a Cooling Tower Fan 2 relay; loading new de-ionization bed P and placing on Pool Coolant System service; replacing the split ring flange gasket; placing de-ionization bed I on Pool Coolant System service; replacing power range monitor channel 6 high voltage power supply and 15V voltage regulator; replacing power range monitor channel 6 drawer, including the high voltage power supply, 15V voltage regulator, and Z16 dual trip unit; replacing power range monitor channel 6 R2 potentiometer; replacing nuclear instrumentation signal power range channel 6 uncompensated ion chamber detector; and replacing power range monitor channel 6 Z-17 dual trip unit.
JULY 2024 The Reactor operated continuously in July with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for physics measurements, four shutdowns for license examinations, and two unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. An NRC license examiner administered three senior Reactor Operators and two Reactor Operator licensing examinations.
On July 8, with the Reactor operating below 50 kW in manual control mode during a normal Reactor startup, the Reactor was manually scrammed by the console watch Reactor Operator due to receiving erratic Wide Range Monitor (WRM) indications. While performing a normal Reactor startup per operating procedure OP-RO-210, Reactor Startup - Normal during the approach to 50 kW, the console watch Reactor Operator noticed erratic indications on the WRM. The rod height was returned to two inches below the estimated critical position and both Reactor management and the electronic technicians were notified. The erratic indications from the WRM cleared before electronic technicians arrived at the control room and the issues could not be recreated. After further investigation, no
I-7 definitive issues were found and permission was received from the Reactor Manager and Lead Senior Reactor Operator to perform a normal Reactor startup per operating procedure OP-RO-210, Reactor Startup - Normal On July 8, with the Reactor operating below 50 kW in manual control mode during a normal Reactor startup, the Reactor was manually scrammed by the console watch Reactor Operator due to receiving erratic Wide Range Monitor (WRM) indications. While performing a normal Reactor startup per operating procedure OP-RO-210, Reactor Startup - Normal during the approach to 50 kW, the console watch Reactor Operator noticed erratic indications on the WRM. The rod height was returned to two inches below the estimated critical position and both Reactor management and the electronic technicians were notified. The WRM drawer was tested satisfactorily by the electronics technicians. A health physics technician was called in to assist Reactor operations and electronic technicians with the replacement of the WRM uncompensated ion chamber and cabling. Post-maintenance testing was completed by response checking the detector. The Reactor was refueled and permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Reactor Manger and Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
Major maintenance items for the month included: replacing Primary Coolant System charging pump P533 relief valve 557A; placing de-ionization bed P on Pool Coolant System service; completing CP-38, Verify I-131 Processing Hot Cells Charcoal Filter Efficiency; replacing Wide Range Monitor uncompensated ion chamber detector and cabling; performing reactivity worth measurements in accordance with Reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D) for Control Blade C; adjusting the anti-siphon tank high level rod run-in and low-pressure alarm from 28.6 psig to 31 psig; replacing the secondary Coolant sulfuric acid System acid addition pump and addition line; replacing the filter cartridges in Pool Coolant Demineralizer System inlet filter housing F-200; performing RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B); and replacing the secondary Coolant bleach addition pump.
AUGUST 2024 The Reactor operated continuously in August with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, two unscheduled/unplanned power reductions, and one shutdown for nuclear instrumentation adjustment.
On August 19, with the Reactor operating at 50 kW in manual control mode during a normal Reactor startup, the Reactor was manually scrammed by the console watch Reactor Operator to investigate potential air intrusion into the Primary Coolant System. While performing a normal Reactor startup per operating procedure OP-RO-210, Reactor Startup - Normal while at the 50 kW stopping point, the console watch Reactor Operator noticed erratic indications on the Wide Range Monitor. Reactor management was notified, and the decision was made to manually scram the Reactor to further investigate the cause. After investigation, it was determined that valve 527F diaphragm had failed and was allowing air to be injected into the Primary Coolant System. A health physics technician was called in to assist Reactor operations with the replacement of valve 527F diaphragm. The valve was removed and rebuilt with a spare two-inch diaphragm. The Primary Coolant System was placed on-line per operating procedure OP-RO-410, Primary Coolant System and the valve was verified operable as post-maintenance testing. Permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
On August 20, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, the Reactor was manually scrammed by the console watch Reactor Operator due to irregular indication from Power Range Monitor - Channel 4. The Power Range Monitor - Channel 4 was observed to have a ten percent swing in the up and down directions. All immediate actions of REP-2 Reactor Scram were completed and the Secondary Coolant System was secured. An electronics technician and a health physics technician were called in to assist Reactor operations with the replacement of the signal processor 1 fission chamber. Post-maintenance testing of the detector was performed by response checking the detector. Following the refuel, permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
Major maintenance items for the month included: completing CP-31, Calibration of the Eberline Radiation Stack Monitor; adjusting the Truck Entry Door (Door 101) air regulator down to approximately 20.5 psig; replacing Nuclear Instrumentation Signal Processor No. 1 fission chamber detector twice; relacing the Primary Coolant demineralizer System out valve 527F; adjusting the power range monitor - channel 4 dip switch; and performing reactivity worth
I-8 measurements in accordance with Reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D) for Control Blade A SEPTEMBER 2024 The Reactor operated continuously in September with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, four shutdowns for physics measurements, two shutdowns for training, and two unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. An NRC inspector performed a routine scheduled inspection of Reactor Operations.
On September 22, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, the Reactor was manually scrammed by the console watch Reactor Operator due to a power transient occurred after recovery attempts were made from a loss of secondary Coolant pumps. During a heavy storm, the secondary Coolant pumps lost power, and the console watch Reactor Operator attempted to recover secondary flow per REP-15 Complete or Partial Loss of Secondary Coolant Flow. While trying to recover flow, a power transient occurred. The console watch Reactor Operator then manually scrammed to Reactor to terminate the power transient. After manually scramming the Reactor, all immediate actions of REP-2 Reactor Scram were completed along with the remaining steps of operating procedure OP-RO-220, Reactor Shutdown or Power Reduction. Following the refuel, permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
Major maintenance items for the month included: performing RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B) six times; replacing the filter cartridges in Pool Coolant Demineralizer System inlet filter housing F-200; and completing CP-29, Calibration of the Lab Impex Radiation Stack Monitor.
OCTOBER 2024 The Reactor operated continuously in October with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for physics measurements, and two unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.
On October 2, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, the Reactor experienced a momentary interruption of normal electrical power. This momentary interruption caused the Secondary Coolant System pumps and Cooling Tower Fans to secure. The console watch Reactor Operator then reduced Reactor power to maintain Primary Coolant System temperatures per REP-15 Complete or Partial Loss of Secondary Coolant Flow. The console watch Reactor Operator then recovered the Secondary Coolant System pumps and Cooling Tower Fans successfully. Once the Secondary Coolant System was back in operation, the Reactor was returned to 10 MW operation per operation procedure OP-RO-212, Reactor Startup - Recovery from Temporary Power Reduction. The MU Power Plant was also contacted, and it was verified that there was a breaker failure on campus that had caused the momentary loss of electrical power.
On October 22, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, the Reactor was manually scrammed by the console watch Reactor Operator due to abnormal indications on the Pool Coolant System temperatures. After the Reactor reached 10 MW operation after performing a normal Reactor startup per operating procedure OP-RO-210, Reactor Startup - Normal the Pool Coolant System temperatures continued to increase and the differential temperature between the hot and cold leg of the Pool Coolant System continued to decrease. After receiving abnormal indications, the console watch Reactor Operator manually scrammed the Reactor. All immediate actions of REP-2 Reactor Scram were completed and the Secondary Coolant System was secured. Reactor management was notified and investigation commenced to determine the cause of the abnormal indications. After investigation, it was determined that the Pool Coolant System heat exchanger HX-521 was air bound restricting secondary Coolant flow through the heat exchanger. Reactor operations then proceeded by venting the Secondary Coolant System flow transmitters per special maintenance procedure SM-RO-110, Isolating, Restoring, and Venting Reactor Coolant System Transmitters and performing a backflush of the Pool Coolant Heat Exchanger HX-521 per operating procedure OP-RO-480, Secondary Coolant System. The Pool Coolant System temperatures were then verified to be normal and permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
I-9 Major maintenance items for the month included: completing SM-RO-500, Replacement of FIRST Support Rig; performing RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B) twice; completing CP-38, Verify I-131 Processing Hot Cells Charcoal Filter Efficiency; completing a biennial change out of Control Blade D Offset Mechanism; performing SM-RO-025, Removal, Transfer, or Installation of an Offset Mechanism on Offset Mechanism D; performing SM-RO-625, Measuring Control Blade Pull Weight and Blade Drop Time with the Test Magnet Assembly, RTP-21; performing reactivity worth measurements in accordance with Reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D) for Control Blade D; and replacing the isolator on signal processor-2.
NOVEMBER 2024 The Reactor operated continuously in November with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, three shutdowns for physics measurements, and five unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.
On November 19, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, the Reactor was manually scrammed by the console watch Reactor Operator due to the cooling tower low sump cutout switch failing. While operating at 10 MW, the console watch Reactor Operator received a Secondary Coolant Lo Flow annunciation on the control room console annunciator panel. It was verified that the secondary Coolant pumps had secured and there was no secondary flow going to the heat exchangers. The console watch Reactor Operator attempted to recover the Secondary Coolant System pumps but was unable to do so. Immediate actions of REP-15 Complete or Partial Loss of Secondary Coolant Flow were completed. The console watch Reactor Operator started to lower Reactor power to reduce heat generation in the Primary Coolant System. Primary Coolant temperatures were unable to be halted, and the console watch Reactor Operator manually scrammed the Reactor. Primary Coolant inlet temperature reached approximately 140 degrees Fahrenheit, but no automatic functions or administrative limits were reached. The console watch Reactor Operator then proceeded to complete all necessary steps of operating procedure OP-RO-220, Reactor Shutdown or Power Reduction. An electronics technician was called in to investigate and Reactor management was notified. It was determined that the cooling tower low sump cutout switch had failed, automatically securing the secondary Coolant pumps. The low sump cutout switch was then placed in bypass per Reactor Manger. Following the refuel, permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
On November 19, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, an automatic Reactor scram was initiated due to a high-power Scram signal from Power Range Monitor - Channel 6. Upon receiving the scram, the console watch Reactor Operator performed all immediate actions of REP-2 Reactor Scram and then secured the Secondary Coolant System. Indication showed that there was not actually high power on any of the power range monitors. An electronics technician was called in for troubleshooting and Reactor management was notified. After investigation, no definitive answers could be determined as the cause of the scram signal from Power Range Monitor
- Channel 6. It was then decided to change out the DC amplifier on Power Range Monitor - Channel 6. A short form startup checksheet per FM-58, Short Form Startup Checksheet was completed and permission was received to take the Reactor critical from the Reactor Manager and Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
On November 20, a member of Reactor operations and a health physics technician identified elevated readings on the frisker in the Containment Building lobby. Further investigation revealed a significant presence of Argon in the Containment Building, with readings of 1.84E-6 over a 10-minute count. The facility exhaust stack monitors were verified to have minimal to no indication of any release to the public. During this period, access to the Containment Building was restricted, and efforts to determine the cause began. After investigation, it was determined that two valves on the pneumatic tube System, which are typically in the open position, had been closed. This resulted in Argon accumulating in the stagnant air of the Lab 218 pneumatic tube System line and subsequently leaking into the Containment Building. Under the direction of the Reactor Manager and Health Physics Manager, the valves were repositioned to the open position, and Argon levels within the Containment Building returned to normal levels.
On November 22, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, an automatic Reactor rod run-in was initiated due to a high-power rod run-in signal from Power Range Monitor - Channel 6. Upon receiving the rod run-in, the console watch Reactor Operator verified all shim rods were moving in the inward direction, and power was
I-10 decreasing. The Secondary Coolant System was then secured once Reactor power was low enough. There were no attempts to reset the Power Range Monitor - Channel 6 drawer trip or the rod run-in trip actuator amplifiers to allow the electronics technicians to investigate the cause of the rod run-in signal. Electronic technicians were called in and Reactor management was notified. After investigation, electronic technicians could not find any definitive cause for the rod run-in signal. After discussions with Reactor management, the decision was made to replace the Power Range Monitor -Channel 6 drawer. Electronic technicians replaced the drawer and completed all post-maintenance testing with no issues. Permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Reactor Manger and the Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
On November 22, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, an automatic Reactor rod run-in was initiated due to a high-power rod run-in signal from Power Range Monitor - Channel 6. Upon receiving the rod run-in, the console watch Reactor Operator verified all shim rods were moving in the inward direction, and power was decreasing. The Secondary Coolant System was then secured once Reactor power was low enough. The only indication of the rod run-in signal coming from Power Range Monitor - Channel 6 was the extinguished light NI-3 on the blue leg of the scram/RRI monitor. There was no indication on the control room annunciator or the Power Range Monitor - Channel 6 drawer. An electronics technician and health physics technician was called in to assist Reactor operations with a Power Range Monitor -Channel 6 uncompensated ion chamber detector and cabling replacement. Post-maintenance testing of the detector was performed by response checking the detector and performing a CP-34, Nuclear Instrumentation Power Range Monitor - Channel 6. During the front panel checks during CP-34, the potentiometer inside the drawer had become loose. Electronic technicians were then able to create several drawer inoperative lights while performing the testing on the potentiometer. After discovery of the Power Range Monitor - Channel 6 drawer, it was decided to replace the drawer with the drawer that was already replaced previously the same day. A CP-34, Nuclear Instrumentation Power Range Monitor - Channel 6 was then completed satisfactorily. Permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Reactor Manager and the Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
On November 25, during a normal Reactor startup per operating procedure OP-RO-210, Reactor Startup - Normal the console watch Reactor Operator manually scrammed the Reactor due to the control blade selector switch 1S3 failing. The console watch Reactor Operator noticed that the 1S3 switch had failed when shifting from Control Rod Drive Mechanism-B to Control Rod Drive Mechanism-C. During this shimming evolution the control blade selector switch failed, and Control Rod Drive Mechanism-C would not shim in the inward or outward direction. All immediate actions of REP-2 Reactor Scram were completed and Reactor management was notified. Electronic technicians were called in to investigate and it was determined that the spring for the 1S3 control blade selector switch was broken.
Electronic technicians replaced the spring, and all post-maintenance testing was completed satisfactorily. Post-maintenance testing consisted of verifying all shim blades would move in the inward and outward direction individually and would also move in the inward and outward direction when in GANG rod control. Permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Reactor Facility Director and the Lead Senior Reactor Operator.
Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
Major maintenance items for the month included: performing reactivity worth measurements in accordance with Reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D) for Control Blade D; performing RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples RTP-17(B) twice; replacing the filter cartridges in Pool Coolant Demineralizer System inlet filter housing F-200; replacing Power Range Monitor - Channel 6 AR-15 Amp DC Amplifier; Loading new di-ionization bed Y and placing on Pool Coolant System service; and replacing the spring in the control blade selector switch 1S3.
DECEMBER 2024 The Reactor operated continuously in December with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for a physics measurement, one shutdown for license examination, and one unscheduled/unplanned power reduction. An NRC license examiner administered two senior Reactor Operators and two Reactor Operator licensing examinations.
I-11 On December 3, with the Reactor operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, the Reactor was manually scrammed by the console watch Reactor Operator due to abnormal indications on the Containment Building differential pressure indication. Containment Building differential pressure was steadily decreasing and immediate actions of REP-29, Differential Pressure Reduction Between the Containment and Laboratory Buildings were completed prior to reaching any administrative limits. While the Reactor was operating at 10 MW in automatic control mode, the console watch Reactor Operator received a containment annunciator on the Auxiliary Alarm Panel and verified that containment building differential pressure was decreasing. The console watch Reactor Operator first observed a reading of 0.44 differential pressure and then secured the Reactor by placing the master control switch 1S1 to the OFF position per REP-29, Differential Pressure Reduction Between the Containment and Laboratory Buildings.
The lowest reading the console watch Reactor Operator saw, prior to the Reactor being secured, was 0.34 differential pressure. After investigation, it was determined that supply fan-1 was in the tripped position. Operations management, facility operations, and electronic technicians were called in and determined that the freeze stat on Supply Fan-1 was tripped after reaching an internal temperature of 30 degrees Fahrenheit. It was then decided to jumper out the freeze stat to remove it from service, which would prevent Supply Fan-1 from tripping on low temperature unnecessarily. Permission to take the Reactor critical was received from the Reactor Manager and Lead Senior Reactor Operator. Subsequently, the Reactor returned to 10 MW operation.
Major maintenance items for the month included: performing RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B); replacing the Cooling Tower Fan 3 motor overload for fast setting; and performing reactivity worth measurements in accordance with Reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D) for Control Blade B.
II-1 SECTION II MURR PROCEDURES January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024 As required by administrative MURR Technical Specification (TS) 6.6.e(5), this section of the Reactor Operations Annual Report includes a summary of procedure changes. These procedure changes were reviewed by the Reactor Manager or Reactor Health Physics Manager, as applicable, and others to assure compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. These procedure changes were also reviewed by the Reactor Safety Procedure Review Subcommittee and/or the Isotope Use Procedure Review Subcommittee of the Reactor Advisory Committee to meet the requirements of TS 6.2.a(2).
A. CHANGES TO REACTOR OPERATIONS PROCEDURES As required by the MURR TS, the Reactor Manager reviewed the Reactor Operations procedures and found them to be adequate for the safe and reliable operation of the facility.
There were 33 revisions issued to the Reactor Operations policies, procedures, and forms. The majority of these revisions were strictly format or editorial in nature. No new documents were issued and one form was obsoleted. The following is a list of the revised and obsoleted procedures, forms, and operator aids:
Number Name Rev.
Rev. Date Notes AP-RO-110 Conduct of Operations 32 04-Apr-24 Minor Editorial AP-RO-130 Crane Operation 12 02-May-24 Minor Editorial AP-RR-005 Security of "For Official Use Only" Information 23 14-Nov-24 Minor Editorial EX-RO-105 Reactor Irradiation Experiments 29 04-Apr-24 Minor Editorial EX-RO-110 Pneumatic Tube System 5
04-Apr-24 Minor Editorial FB-SH-110 Type B Shipment of Spent Fuel Using the BEA Research Reactor Package 11 15-Feb-24 Minor Editorial FM-02 MURR Access Request Form 29 12-Jun-24 Minor Editorial FM-04 Visitor/After-Hours Access Request Form 22 11-Oct-24 Minor Editorial FM-08 Fuel Movement Sheet 10 18-Jul-24 Minor Editorial FM-136 MURR Aluminum Sample Welding Qualification Record 3
19-Aug-24 Minor Editorial FM-143 1/M Graph 5
21-Oct-24 Obsoleted FM-15 10 CFR 50.59 Qualified Reviewers List 31 11-Oct-24 Minor Editorial FM-21 ARMS Trip Setpoints 14 18-Jul-24 Minor Editorial FM-43 Nuclear and Process Data Sheet 34 16-Oct-24 Minor Editorial FM-45 Periodic Review Documentation Form 3
03-Oct-24 Minor Editorial FM-57 Long Form Startup Checksheet 37 24-Apr-24 Minor Editorial FM-63 DI Water Makeup Log 14 24-Apr-24 Minor Editorial
II-2 Number Name Rev.
Rev. Date Notes FM-90 Personal History Questionnaire (PHQ) and Self-Disclosure 13 24-Oct-24 Minor Editorial OP-RO-210 Reactor Startup - Normal 25 03-Oct-24 Minor Editorial OP-RO-212 Reactor Startup - Recovery from Temporary Power Reduction 17 20-Apr-23 Minor Editorial OP-RO-220 Reactor Shutdown or Power Reduction 15 01-Jun-23 Minor Editorial OP-RO-250 In-Pool Fuel Handling 26 04-Apr-24 Minor Editorial OP-RO-410 Primary Coolant System 23 06-Jun-24 Minor Editorial OP-RO-461 Pool Coolant System - One Pump Operation 23 02-May-24 Minor Editorial OP-RO-520 Emergency Power Generator 19 15-Feb-24 Minor Editorial OP-RO-710 Area Radiation Monitoring System 11 18-Jul-24 Minor Editorial OP-RO-720 Off-Gas (Stack) Radiation Monitor Operational Checks 18 21-Dec-23 Minor Editorial POL-17 MURR Training Manual 7
05-Sep-24 Minor Editorial RCP-PSO-035 Material and Document Control Program for Carbon Adsorbers Used in Association with Radioiodine (I-131) Production 4
13-Jun-24 Full Review REP-RO-100 Reactor Emergency Procedures 29 15-Feb-24 Minor Editorial RL-24 P-Tube Irradiation & Measurement of Short-Lived Isotopes 16 20-Mar-24 Minor Editorial RM-RO-405 Reactor Demineralizer System 26 05-Sep-24 Minor Editorial SM-RO-200 Manual Operation of Airlock Doors 276 and 277 10 21-Oct-24 Minor Editorial SM-RO-620 Control Blade Leak Test 8
21-Oct-24 Minor Editorial
II-3 B. CHANGES TO EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES As required by the MURR TS, the Reactor Manager reviewed the Emergency Plan implementing procedures and found them to be adequate for the safe and reliable operation of the facility.
There were ten revisions issued to the Emergency Plan implementing procedures. All these revisions were strictly format or editorial in nature. No Emergency Plan implementing procedures, forms, or operator aids were obsoleted.
Number Name Rev.
Rev. Date Notes EP-RO-002 Emergency Responsibilities 12 04-Jan-24 Minor Editorial EP-RO-004 Fire 11 04-Jan-24 Minor Editorial EP-RO-012 Reactor Isolation 7
18-Jul-24 Minor Editorial EP-RO-013 Facility Evacuation 14 04-Jan-24 Minor Editorial EP-RO-014 Emergency Planning Zone and Site Area Evacuations 12 18-Jun-24 Minor Editorial EP-RO-015 Emergency Notifications 22 01-Sep-22 Minor Editorial EP-RO-017 Emergency Air Sampling 12 30-Jul-24 Minor Editorial EP-RO-012 Reactor Isolation 7
30-Jul-24 Minor Editorial OA-10 Fire Extinguisher Locations and Types 19 04-Jan-24 Minor Editorial OA-20 Emergency Equipment 31 18-Jun-24 Minor Editorial
II-4 C. CHANGES TO RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL, BYPRODUCT MATERIAL SHIPPING, AND PREPARATION OF BYPRODUCT MATERIAL FOR SHIPPING PROCEDURES As required by the MURR TS, the Reactor Health Physics Manager reviewed the radiological control procedures and the procedures for the preparation for shipping and shipping of byproduct materials.
There were 68 revisions issued to the radiological control, byproduct materials shipping, and preparation for shipping byproduct material policies, procedures, forms, and operator aids. The majority of these revisions were strictly format or editorial in nature. Additionally, nine new procedures and two new forms were issued, while 36 procedures were obsoleted. The following is a list of the new, revised, and obsoleted procedures, forms, and operator aids:
Number Name Rev.
Rev. Date Notes ACG-NAA-1725 Analyzing Platinum in Silicone 8
15-Jul-20 Obsoleted AP-HP-115 Iodine 131 Bioassay 7
22-Apr-24 Minor Editorial AP-HP-129 Hot Cell HC-01 Control 21 10-Jun-24 Minor Editorial AP-HP-130 Reactor License Projects Annual Review 10 06-Aug-24 Minor Editorial AP-HP-135 Project Authorization Requests 3
10-Jun-24 Full Review AP-HP-135 Project Authorization Requests 4
30-Dec-24 Full Review AP-RR-017 Physical Security Program for Category 1 and/or Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Materials 2
14-Feb-24 Minor Editorial BPB-SH-019 Packaging of Type B Radioactive Material Using USA/9320/B(U)-96 (MIDUS) 0 25-Jan-22 Obsoleted BPB-SH-024 Type B USA/0697/B(U)-96 (F-458 Series)
Packaging of Type B Radioactive Material 11 09-Apr-24 Minor Editorial BPB-SH-028 Packaging of Type B Radioactive Material Using USA/9337/B(U)-96 (SAFKEG-LS) and USA/9338/B(U)-96 (SAFKEG-HS) 11 31-Oct-24 Minor Editorial BP-SH-005 Packaging of Type A Radioactive Material Using SAFKEG-LS and SAFKEG-HS 4
16-Oct-24 Minor Editorial BP-SH-011 Packaging of Type A Radioactive Material Using USA DOT 7A 55-Gallon 10 03-Oct-18 Obsoleted BP-SH-018 Packaging of Type A Radioactive Material Using USA DOT 7A NorthStar Medical Radioisotopes Package 9
12-Nov-19 Obsoleted BP-SH-031 Packaging of Type A Radioactive Material Using DOT 7A 20WC-1 6
29-Apr-24 Minor Editorial BP-SH-059 Spectratek Services Reusable Packaging of Type A Radioactive Material 8
03-Oct-18 Obsoleted EP-RO-017 Emergency Air Sampling 12 30-Jul-24 Minor Editorial FB-SH-110 Type B Shipment of Spent Fuel Using the BEA Research Reactor Package 11 09-Apr-24 Minor Editorial FM-131 Dissolution of Gadolinium Datasheet 3
07-Jul-20 Obsoleted FM-139 Lutetium Chloride Radiation Protection Data Sheet C 9
17-Jun-24 Minor Editorial
II-5 Number Name Rev.
Rev. Date Notes FM-141 Control Checksheet for Packaging of Type A Radioactive Material Using SAFKEG-LS and SAFKEG-HS 7
16-Oct-24 Minor Editorial FM-151 Control Checksheet for Packaging of Type A Radioactive Material Using USA DOT 7A 55-Gallon 14 03-Oct-18 Obsoleted FM-157 Control Checksheet for Type B USA/0697/B(U)-96 (F-458 Series)
Radioactive Material Package 13 23-Jan-24 Minor Editorial FM-165 Mo-99 Radiation Protection Data Sheet A 5
02-Jun-20 Obsoleted FM-170 Control Checksheet for Packaging of Type A Radioactive Material Using USA DOT 7A Northstar Medical Radioisotopes Package 7
00-Jan-00 Obsoleted FM-178 Control Checksheet for Hot Cell HC-01 Access 6
30-Apr-24 Minor Editorial FM-196 cMo-99 Radiation Protection Data Sheet A 0
02-Jun-20 Obsoleted FM-197 Control Checksheet for Packaging of Type B Radioactive Material Using USA/9320/B(U)-
96 (MIDUS) 0 25-Jan-22 Obsoleted FM-201 Control Checksheet for Documentation and Labeling of NorthStar Radioactive Material Shipment 2
26-Aug-21 Obsoleted FM-29 Dosimetry Request Packet 14 12-Jun-24 Minor Editorial FM-59 Control Checksheet for Spectratek Services Reusable Packaging of Type A Radioactive Material 11 03-Oct-18 Obsoleted FM-602 NCA Lutetium Chloride Radiation Protection Data Sheet A 1
06-Sep-24 Minor Editorial FM-603 NCA Lutetium Lu-177 Chloride Solution Radiation Protection Data Sheet B 1
05-Jan-23 Obsoleted FM-62 Radiation Instrument Certificate of Calibration 11 13-Mar-24 Minor Editorial GLP-NAA-1725 Analyzing Platinum in Silicone 0
23-Jul-04 Obsoleted GMP-BR-409 Concentrated Potassium Molybdate (cMo-
- 99) Final Intermediate Batch Record 3
08-Jan-21 Obsoleted GMP-BR-410 cMo-99 Process Cleaning and Line Clearance 3
00-Jan-00 Obsoleted GMP-BR-416 cMo-99 Process Pre-Cleaning 3
00-Jan-00 Obsoleted GMP-BR-419 cMo-99 Process Cleaning and Line Clearance for Variable Target Size 3
00-Jan-00 Obsoleted GMP-MCE-043 Operation and Maintenance of the Ocean Optics ISS UV-Vis Spectrophotometer 4
26-May-16 Obsoleted GMP-MCE-129 Operation and Maintenance for a Tuttnauer 3870 EA-B/L Electronic Tabletop Autoclave 11 05-Mar-24 Minor Editorial
II-6 Number Name Rev.
Rev. Date Notes GMP-PRC-201 Transfer of cGMP Lu-177 Chloride Product to Shipping 13 21-Mar-24 Minor Editorial GMP-PRC-400 Transfer of cGMP Potassium Molybdate Final Intermediate Solution to Customer 2
21-Aug-18 Obsoleted GMP-PRC-401 Transfer of cGMP Concentrated Potassium Molybdate (cMo-99) Final Intermediate Solution to Customer 0
02-Jun-20 Obsoleted GMP-QC-254 Activity Concentration Verification of Lu-177 Chloride Solution 5
06-Feb-24 Minor Editorial GMP-QC-254 Activity Concentration Verification of Lu-177 Chloride Solution 6
03-Oct-24 Minor Editorial GMP-QC-361 Determination of Long-Lived Radionuclidic Impurities in Y-90 Microspheres 2
13-Nov-24 Minor Editorial GMP-QC-603 Chloride Identification Test for NCA Lutetium Lu-177 Chloride Solution Final Product 2
21-Mar-24 Minor Editorial GMP-QC-604 Visual Inspection of NCA Lutetium Lu-177 Chloride Solution 2
31-Oct-24 Minor Editorial GMP-QC-608 Determination of the Metal Content and Specific Activity of NCA Lu-177 Chloride Solution 2
07-Aug-24 Minor Editorial GMP-QC-612 Determination Of the Mercury Content of NCA Lutetium Lu-177 Chloride Solution 4
07-Aug-24 Minor Editorial GXP-EPRT-031 Installation, Operation, and Performance Qualification Protocol for Capintec Model CRC 712 Dose Calibrator 3
14-Nov-17 Obsoleted GXP-MCE-134 Cleaning, Maintenance and Operation of HC-02 A/B 7
02-Feb-24 Minor Editorial GXP-MCE-137 Use of the Molybdenum Assay Canister 3
12-Jan-18 Obsoleted GXP-QC-405 Molybdenum Target Disk Qualification 3
03-Feb-21 Obsoleted GXP-QC-421 Radiochemical Purity of Concentrated Potassium Molybdate (cMo-99) Final Intermediate Radiochemical Solution 2
22-Jun-23 Obsoleted GXP-QC-422 Radionuclidic Purity and Identity Confirmation of Concentrated Potassium Molybdate (cMo-99) Final Intermediate Radiochemical Solution 1
10-Aug-20 Obsoleted GXP-QC-423 Determination of the Molybdenum and Iron Concentration and Activity Concentration in Concentrated Potassium Molybdate (cMo-99) Final Intermediate Radiochemical Solution 1
17-Sep-20 Obsoleted
II-7 Number Name Rev.
Rev. Date Notes GXP-QC-424 Concentrated Potassium Molybdate (cMo-
- 99) Final Intermediate Peroxide Concentration Verification 0
14-May-20 Obsoleted GXP-QC-425 Determination of Nitrate Normality in Concentrated Potassium Molybdate (cMo-
- 99) Final Intermediate Radiochemical Solution 0
00-Jan-00 Obsoleted GXP-QC-426 Batch Visual Inspection of Concentrated Potassium Molybdate (cMo-99) Final Intermediate Radiochemical Solution 0
00-Jan-00 Obsoleted HC-PSO-003 Glove Box Preparation of Radioactive Material for Shipment 13 20-Sep-19 Obsoleted IC-HP-300 Calibration - Radiation Survey Instruments 12 13-Mar-24 Minor Editorial IC-HP-352 Calibration - Lab Impex Stack Monitor -
Flow Calibration 10 24-Apr-24 Minor Editorial IC-HP-358 Calibration - Ludlum Model 12 Survey Meter 3
29-Apr-24 Minor Editorial IC-HP-362 Calibration - Eberline/Thermo Model AMS-4 Continuous Air Monitor: Radial or In-Line Sampling Head 5
10-Jun-24 Minor Editorial OA-192 Packaging of Type A Radioactive Material Using USA DOT 7A Model MURR MAX 2
31-Oct-24 Minor Editorial OA-25 Control Checksheet for Changing P-Tube Pre-Filters 5
30-Dec-24 Minor Editorial OP-HP-231 Respirator Cleaning and Care 4
02-Jul-24 Minor Editorial OP-HP-232 Respirator Storage, Maintenance and Inspection 4
02-Jul-24 Minor Editorial OP-HP-234 Physical Exam for Respirator Program 5
02-Jul-24 Minor Editorial OP-HP-235 Annual Respirator Training 3
08-Apr-24 Minor Editorial OP-HP-235 Annual Respirator Training 4
02-Jul-24 Minor Editorial OP-HP-236 Respirator Selection, Issuance, and Wearing 6
02-Jul-24 Minor Editorial OP-HP-305 Ordering or Transfer of Radioactive Materials 11 23-Jan-24 Minor Editorial OP-HP-306 Health Physics Daily Facility Checks 15 24-Apr-24 Minor Editorial OP-HP-306 Health Physics Daily Facility Checks 16 25-Sep-24 Minor Editorial OP-HP-352 Particulate and Iodine Filter - Analysis 7
08-Apr-24 Minor Editorial OP-HP-600 Europium Source Creation 5
02-Oct-17 Obsoleted PLAN-130 10 CFR 37 Security Plan for the University of Missouri Research Reactor 3
14-Aug-24 Minor Editorial POL-03 Radiation Protection Program 24 12-Mar-24 Minor Editorial POL-07 Laboratory Safety Manual 13 12-Mar-24 Minor Editorial POL-17 MURR Training Manual 7
14-Oct-24 Minor Editorial PRC-RRD-001 Preparing and Submitting a Radioactive Sample for Packaging 10 22-Feb-24 Minor Editorial
II-8 Number Name Rev.
Rev. Date Notes PRC-RRD-109 Opening Powder Targets 1
19-Jul-24 Minor Editorial PRC-RRD-320 Dissolve Yb Oxide Target 1
19-Jul-24 Minor Editorial PRC-RRD-414 Dissolution of Gadolinium Nitrate 9
01-Mar-24 Minor Editorial PRC-RRD-420 Rh-105 Processing 9
15-Aug-19 Obsoleted QAB-SH-007 Leak Testing the SAFKEG-HS or SAFKEG-LS Shipping Package Using the CALT Leakage Testing Device 8
23-Jan-24 Minor Editorial RCP-IDT-010 Iron-59 Process 0
19-Jul-24 Minor Editorial RCP-IDT-011 Iron-59 Distribution 0
19-Jul-24 Full Review RCP-IDT-020 Manganese-54 Process 0
19-Jul-24 Full Review RCP-PSO-035 Material and Document Control Program for Carbon Adsorbers Used in Association with Radioiodine (I-131) Production 4
17-Jun-24 Full Review RL-25-P RL-25 Personnel 15 26-Apr-24 Minor Editorial RL-25-P RL-25 Personnel 16 13-Nov-24 Minor Editorial RL-35-P RL-35 Personnel 33 12-Jul-24 Minor Editorial RL-35-P RL-35 Personnel 34 31-Dec-24 Minor Editorial RL-72 cGMP Lu-177 Chloride Processing 17 12-Jul-24 Minor Editorial RL-72-P RL-72 Personnel 19 12-Jul-24 Minor Editorial RL-72-P RL-72 Personnel 20 31-Dec-24 Minor Editorial RL-73 99Molybdenum (Mo-99) Production (n-Gamma Production) 11 12-Jul-24 Minor Editorial RL-74 Reflector and Bulk Pool Irradiation for Neutron Activation Analysis (NAA) 7 12-Jul-24 Minor Editorial RL-77 Pressure Cell for 2XC (RL-33), PSD (RL-61),
and TRIAX (RL-46) 8 12-Jul-24 Minor Editorial RL-81 Aliquoting of Potassium Molybdate (Mo-99)
Final Intermediate 12 25-Sep-23 Obsoleted RL-81-P RL-81 Personnel 9
21-Apr-22 Obsoleted RL-89-P RL-89 Personnel 5
03-Oct-24 Minor Editorial RL-95 Yttirum-90 (Eye90) Microspheres Processing 4
26-Apr-24 Minor Editorial RL-95 Yttirum-90 (Eye90) Microspheres Processing 5
01-Jul-24 Minor Editorial RL-95 Yttirum-90 (Eye90) Microspheres Processing 6
31-Dec-24 Minor Editorial RL-95-P RL-95 Personnel 2
01-Jul-24 Minor Editorial RL-95-P RL-95 Personnel 3
03-Oct-24 Minor Editorial RM-HP-102 Stack Monitor Preventative Maintenance -
Lab Impex 7
29-Apr-24 Minor Editorial RP-HP-125 Radiation Monitoring - Performing and Documenting a Survey 8
22-Apr-24 Full Review RP-HP-130 Receipt of Unirradiated Fuel 11 10-Jun-24 Minor Editorial
II-9 Number Name Rev.
Rev. Date Notes SV-HP-115 Building Exhaust Stack Effluent - Tritium Monitoring 9
22-Apr-24 Minor Editorial WM-SH-300 Exclusive Use Shipment of LSA or SCO Radioactive Waste 20 18-Jun-24 Minor Editorial
III-1 SECTION III REVISIONS TO THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT January 1, 2024 through December 31, 2024 During calendar year 2024, modifications or changes to the facility occurred that required the following revisions to the SAR, as submitted to the NRC in 2006 for relicensing. The following changes have been reviewed, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, by licensed staff and members of the Reactor Safety Subcommittee; determined not to involve a change to the MURR Technical Specifications; and approved by the Reactor Manager.
CHAPTER 1 - The Facility Section 1.2, Figure 1.2 (Page 1-6)
Update Figure 1.2, Grade Level Plan CHAPTER 6 - Engineered Safety Features Section 6.2.3.3, Figure 6.2 (Page 6-8)
Update Figure 6.2, Grade Level Floor Plan and rename to Grade Level Plan CHAPTER 7 - Instrumentation and Control Section 7.9.2.1 Figure 7.11 (Page 63/64)
Update Figure 7.11 Area Radiation Monitoring System with MURR 203 Sheet 1/1 revision No. 17, dated 8/28/24 CHAPTER 8 - Electrical Power Systems Section 8.1.3, Figure 8.2 (Page 8-5/6)
Update Figure 8.2, MURR Electrical Distribution System with MURR 522 Sheet 1/8 revision No. 61, dated 1/31/24 Section 8.2.8 (Page 8-10)
Update Figure 8.3, MURR Emergency Electrical Distribution System with MURR 522 Sheet 4/8 revision No. 5, dated 1/10/24
IV-1 SECTION IV PLANT AND SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS January 1, 2024 through December 31, 2024 For each facility modification described below, MURR has on file the safety screen or evaluation, as well as the documentation of review, performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.
MODIFICATION RECORD 72-05; Addendum 1 2024 Fuel Tool This modification record documents the redesign of the MURR fuel element handling tool. The tool is designed to fail in the latched condition to ensure constant positive control of a fuel element. Additionally, the tool is designed with a buoyancy assist tank to improve the maneuverability of the tool with and without a fuel assembly latched to the tool. The previous buoyancy tank contained two chambers, one that is always air filled, and one that can be drained for additional buoyancy. The tool was redesigned to simplify the construction for easier fabrication. This involved combining the two chambers and using a draw tube to set the constant air volume.
MODIFICATION RECORD 24-01 Electronic Log System This modification record documents the implementation of an electronic log system for Reactor Operations. The dedicated program replaces the paper logbooks utilized for recording licensed activities for the normal operation of the reactor.
MODIFICATION RECORD 88-07; Addendum 5 Iodine Filter Bank Modifications (3-1,3-2, and 3-3)
This modification detailed the change to filter banks 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3. Filter Bank 3-3 is one of several used to satisfy Technical Specification 3.10. As installed, filter bank 3-3 was bounded by a set of dampers that did not completely isolate on service filter train. As a result, a portion of exhaust flow was permitted to bypass the on-service bank and move through the standby bank. This modification replaced the dampers with a series of butterfly valves that allow the filter banks to be completely isolated thus ensuring the filters can meet their technical specification requirement.
Analysis also determined that of the two originally installed High Efficiency Particulate filters, 3-1 and 3-2, only one was required for the filtration of fine particulates in the exhaust stream. This modification removed the second filter, designated as 3-2 in both trains.
MODIFICATION RECORD 13-02, Addendum 1-LETTER TO FILE (August 22, 2024)
Secondary Chemistry Modification This letter to file documented a modification to the chemicals utilized in the secondary coolant system. As originally specified in Modification Record 13-02; Addendum 1, the NALCO water company utilized a Stabrex ST-70 as a liquid biocide. After several years of operational experience with the MURR cooling tower NALCO recommended utilizing bleach for the liquid biocide feed systems.
IV-2 MODIFICATION RECORD 23-02-LETTER TO FILE (May 16, 2024)
Fuel Element Failure Monitor Calibration Procedure This letter to file documented the calibration procedure to align with the steps described in Modification Record 23-
- 02. As written, it provides detailed steps to health physics and electronics technician staff to carry out the detailed calibration of the channel.
MODIFICATION RECORD 14-01, Addendum 1-LETTER TO FILE (September 24, 2024)
HC-11B Manipulator Replacement This letter to file documented a modification to the manipulators used in HC-11B. As originally installed, the manipulators utilized a through tube design that was not leak tight. Over time MURR staff realized this as an oversight in the original design. The original manufacturer identified an airtight version of the same style of manipulator that satisfied the same operation as the original equipment.
V-1 SECTION V NEW TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024 The following new and amended tests or experiments were approved during the calendar year 2024 under a Reactor Utilization Request (RUR):
RUR 464, NEW Irradiation of Advanced Metal Matrix Composite (AMMC) material containing neutron absorbing aluminum-boron carbide (B4C) mix This RUR authorizes the irradiation of up to a 3-inch by 3-inch by approximately 0.175-inch-thick sample of AMMC, consisting of approximately 63.5% aluminum (Al) and 36.5% boron-carbide (B4C) compressed powder, all in natural isotope abundances, with an aluminum 1100 alloy cladding. The experiment is not encapsulated and is authorized for a peak thermal neutron flux of 1.5E12 n/cm2/s in the graphite reflector or bulk pool irradiation positions which meets the flux limits.
RUR 465, NEW Irradiation of copper alloy GRCop-42 This RUR authorizes the irradiation of 30 nominal 21.3-millimeter by 8.2-millimeter tensile test specimens of copper alloy GRCop-42, consisting of approximately 93.9% copper (Cu), 3.25% chromium (Cr), and 2.85%
niobium (Nb) all in natural isotope abundances. The experiment is doubly encapsulated in aluminum (primary) and aluminum (secondary) and is authorized for a peak thermal neutron flux of the P-1 graphite reflector irradiation position.
RUR 465, AS AMENDED Irradiation of aluminum alloy 6061 and stainless-steel alloy 316H This RUR amendment authorizes the inclusion of aluminum alloy 6061 of up to 15 grams, and of stainless-steel alloy 316H of up to 70 grams for irradiation in a peak neutron thermal flux region of 1.2E14 n/cm2/s in the graphite reflector irradiation location which meets the flux limits. Under the prior RUR 408, aluminum alloy 6061 is authorized as a spacer material in mass quantities exceeding 15 grams. Reflector irradiations of stainless-steel alloy 316 are authorized under RUR 451 in a mass quantity of 219 grams and under RUR 462 in a mass quantity of 250 grams. No further thermal analysis was required to satisfy the Safety Analysis associated with this amendment.
RUR 411, AS AMENDED Reactivation of irradiation of gadolinium nitrate, enriched 97% Gadolinium-158 This RUR amendment reactivates RUR 411, authorizes the change in gadolinium (Gd) enriched to the isotope 158 from 90% to 97% to 97% to 100%, and lowers the mass of the Gd component from 5.0 mg to 1.0 mg. The increase in Gd-158 enrichment provides additional conservatism in the thermal analysis and provides congruency with the updated material certificate of analysis. The reduction in mass limits for the Gd component were implemented to establish consistency with RUR 425, which authorizes the irradiation of gadolinium enriched to the isotope 160.
RUR 464, AS AMENDED Irradiation of Advanced Metal Matrix Composite (AMMC) material containing neutron absorbing aluminum-boron carbide (B4C) mix
V-2 This RUR amendment authorizes the increase of peak neutron thermal flux to 1.5E14 n/cm2/s for the irradiation of AMMC material of up to a nominal 1-inch by 3-inch by approximately 0.175-inch-thick section in the graphite reflector positions which meet the flux limits. Additional thermal calculations were performed and added to the Safety Analysis.
VI-1 SECTION VI SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND REACTOR PHYSICS ACTIVITIES January 1, 2024 through December 31, 2024 INSPECTIONS The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted one routine inspection reviewing special nuclear material (SNM) activities during calendar year 2024. All records and activities were found to comply with NRC rules and regulations. No violations were noted.
REACTOR CHARACTERISTICS MEASUREMENTS Sixty-seven refueling evolutions were completed in 2024. Reactor core excess reactivity verifications were performed for each refueling. The largest measured excess reactivity was 4.60%. MURR Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.a requires reactor core excess reactivity above reference core condition to be less than 9.8%.
REACTIVITY MEASUREMENTS Eight differential blade-worth measurements of the shim control blades were performed either following a planned replacement of a control blade or to ensure compliance with TS 4.2.g.
Eight reactivity measurements were performed to estimate the total reactivity worth of the center test hole removable experiment sample canister, in addition to all samples loaded in the center test hole region of the reactor.
Nine reactivity measurements were performed to estimate the worth of various samples that are irradiated in the center test hole region of the reactor.
VII-1 SECTION VII RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT January 1, 2024 through December 31, 2024 TABLE 1 SANITARY SEWER EFFLUENT Descending Order of Activity Released for Nuclide Totals > 1.000E-02 mCi Nuclide Activity (mCi)
H3 8.78E+01 S35 3.97E+00 Co60 1.54E+00 Lu177 1.21E+00 Ca45 3.77E-01 P32 2.88E-01 Zn65 1.50E-01 Lu177m 3.59E-02 Sm153 2.95E-02 Sb124 1.20E-02 Total H-3 8.78E+01 Total Other 7.61E+00 Sanitary sewer effluents are in compliance with 10 CFR 20.2003, Disposal by Release into Sanitary Sewerage.
VII-2 TABLE 2 STACK EFFLUENT Ordered by % Technical Specification Limit Isotope Average Concentration (µCi/ml)
Total Release (µCi)
TS Limit Multiplier
% TS Ar41 2.30E-06 1.07E+09 350 65.8 I131 4.56E-12 2.12+03 1
2.28 H3 1.14E-08 5.29E+06 350 0.0324 C14 2.09E-11 2.48E-03 1
0.0070 Xe131m 3.19E-08 1.48E+07 350 0.00455 Hg203 1.91E-15 8.89E-01 1
0.000191 Br82 2.12E-12 9.92E+02 350 0.00012
- C-14 activity is calculated based on the ratio of argon to nitrogen in the air and the (n, p) reaction cross sections for the activation of N-14 to C-14.
Isotopes observed at < 0.0001% Technical Specification (TS) limit are not listed.
Stack Flow Rate = ~30,000 cfm Stack effluent releases are in compliance with University of Missouri-Columbia Research Reactor, Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-103 TS.
VIII-1 SECTION VIII ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND HEALTH PHYSICS SURVEYS January 1, 2024 through December 31, 2024 Environmental samples are collected two times per year at eight locations and analyzed for radioactivity. Soil and vegetation samples are also taken at each location. Water samples are taken at three locations, while subsurface soil samples are taken at six locations each period. Analytical results are shown in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 3 lists the radiation doses recorded by the environmental monitors deployed around MURR in 2024. All doses fluctuate around background with the exception of monitor numbers 14, 15, and 51. These monitors are located near a loading dock area where packages containing radioactive material are loaded or traversed prior to being placed on transport vehicles. The doses recorded by these monitors are considered to be the result of exposure to packages in transit. The environmental monitoring program confirms that minimal environmental impact exists from the operation of the MURR facility.
The number of radiation and contamination surveys performed each month is provided in Table 4.
TABLE 1
SUMMARY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 105 - SPRING 2024 Detection Limits*
Matrix Alpha pCi/g Beta pCi/g Gamma pCi/g Tritium pCi/mL Vegetation 2.14 3.83 1.37 2.96 Soil 0.68 1.95 0.93 N/A Water 0.53 2.00 184.74 2.83 Subsurface Soil 0.48 1.90 0.62 N/A Activity Levels - Vegetation Sample Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium (pCi/g)
(pCi/g)
(pCi/g)
(pCi/mL) 1V105
<MDA 17.91
<MDA
<MDA 2V105
<MDA 13.56
<MDA
<MDA 3V105
<MDA 19.02
<MDA
<MDA 4V105
<MDA 20.46
<MDA
<MDA 5V105
<MDA 22.12 4.13
<MDA 6V105
<MDA 26.04
<MDA
<MDA 7V105
<MDA 18.49
<MDA
<MDA 10V105
<MDA 17.95
<MDA
<MDA
VIII-2 TABLE 1 (Contd)
SUMMARY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 105 - SPRING 2024 Activity Levels - Soil Sample Alpha (pCi/g)
Beta (pCi/g)
Gamma (pCi/g) 1S105 2.06 12.18 4.07 2S105
<MDA 10.69 4.5 3S105 1.16 16.32 4.23 4S105 1.46 13.1 4.42 5S105
<MDA 14.79 5.47 6S105
<MDA 7.83 2.88 7S105
<MDA 12.05 3.25 10S105 0.73 14.37 5.83 Activity Levels - Water Sample Alpha (pCi/g)
Beta (pCi/g)
Gamma (pCi/L)
Tritium (pCi/mL) 4W105
<MDA 5.75
<MDA
<MDA 6W105
<MDA 3.87 233.76
<MDA 7W105
<MDA 3.12
<MDA
<MDA 10W105
<MDA 10.08
<MDA
<MDA Activity Levels - Subsurface Soil Sample Alpha (pCi/g)
Beta (pCi/g)
Gamma (pCi/g) 1 (NE105) 1.08 12.54 4.66 2 (E105) 0.95 12.18 4.94 3 (S105) 0.94 11.44 4.94 4 (SW105) 0.80 13.99 5.22 5 (W105) 1.09 11.68 4.78 6 (N105) 0.79 11.25 4.77 7 (NW105) 0.79 12.10 5.18
- Gamma and tritium analyses are based on wet weights while alpha and beta are based on dry weights. HPGe spectral analyses were performed on any sample with a gamma activity greater than minimum detectable activity (MDA).
TABLE 2
VIII-3
SUMMARY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 106 - FALL 2024 Detection Limits*
Matrix Alpha pCi/g Beta pCi/g Gamma pCi/g Tritium pCi/mL Vegetation 2.28 4.05 1.56 3.36 Soil 0.00 1.53 0.73 N/A Water 3.93 7.21 187.80 3.19 Subsurface Soil 1.85 2.98 0.61 N/A Activity Levels - Vegetation Sample Alpha (pCi/g)
Beta (pCi/g)
Gamma (pCi/g)
Tritium (pCi/mL) 1V106
<MDA 5.00
<MDA
<MDA 2V106
<MDA 4.69
<MDA
<MDA 3V106
<MDA 5.90
<MDA
<MDA 4V106
<MDA 12.86
<MDA
<MDA 5V106
<MDA 8.88
<MDA
<MDA 6V106
<MDA 5.29
<MDA
<MDA 7V106
<MDA 15.70 1.79
<MDA 10V106
<MDA 9.50 1.74
<MDA Activity Levels - Soil Sample Alpha (pCi/g)
Beta (pCi/g)
Gamma (pCi/g) 1S106 0.84 10.73 2.21 2S106 1.69 11.57 3.04 3S106 1.25 14.50 3.54 4S106 1.10 14.03 4.89 5S106 0.96 13.96 4.74 6S106 0.98 8.89 4.59 7S106 0.56 9.45 3.19 10S106 1.36 11.49 5.01
VIII-4 TABLE 2 (Contd)
SUMMARY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 106 - FALL 2024 Activity Levels - Water Sample Alpha (pCi/g)
Beta (pCi/g)
Gamma (pCi/g)
Tritium (pCi/mL) 4W106
<MDA 41.50
<MDA
<MDA 6W106
<MDA 9.84
<MDA
<MDA 7W106
<MDA 12.19
<MDA
<MDA 10W106
<MDA 11.50
<MDA 5.06 Activity Levels - Subsurface Soil Sample Alpha (pCi/g)
Beta (pCi/g)
Gamma (pCi/g) 1 (NE106)
<MDA 10.61 5.12 2 (E106)
<MDA 8.90 5.15 3 (SE106)
<MDA 9.43 5.42 4 (S106)
<MDA 6.63 4.49 5 (SW106)
<MDA 7.89 6.66 6 (W106)
<MDA 8.48 5.23 7 (NW106)
<MDA 10.15 5.71 8 (N106)
<MDA 11.03 5.86
- Gamma and tritium analyses are based on wet weights while alpha and beta are based on dry weights. HPGe spectral analyses were performed on any sample with a gamma activity greater than MDA.
VIII-5 TABLE 3 ENVIRONMENTAL TLD
SUMMARY
Badge Number Direction from MURR Meters from MURR Stack 1st Quarter (net mrem) 2nd Quarter (net mrem) 3rd Quarter (net mrem) 4th Quarter (net mrem)
Total (net mrem) 000 Control N/A*
24.9 29.9 22.6 61.3***
138.7 9
W 30
<MDA 1.6 5.1
<MDA 6.7 10 SW 59 2.2
<MDA 0.7**
<MDA 2.9 11 ENE 110
<MDA
<MDA**
<MDA
<MDA 0
12 NNE 84 1.8 7.5 4.1
<MDA 13.4 13 ENE 55
<MDA 1.5 0.8
<MDA 2.3 14 SW 32 7.9 12.4 9.2
<MDA 29.5 15 SSE 27 17.4 21 24.2 5.4 68 16 NE 139
<MDA
<MDA 0.2
<MDA 0.2 17 N
135
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA**
<MDA 0
18 NE 284 2.3 3.8 4.2
<MDA 10.3 19 NNE 305
<MDA
<MDA 0.8
<MDA 0.8 20 S
168 3.4 3.4 6
7.3 20.1 21 SSE 74
<MDA 0.0 0.1
<MDA 0
22 SE 113
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA**
<MDA 0
23 E
299
<MDA 1.1 1.3
<MDA 2.4 24 NE 453
<MDA
<MDA 0.9
<MDA 0.9 25 NE 673
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA 0
26 NE 893
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA**
4 27 SSE 239 1.5 2.3 3.0
<MDA 6.8 28 SE 158
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA 0
29 NW 89 7.2 2.8 5**
5**
20 30 SSW 308 4.7 2.6**
0.9 2.3 10.5 31 SSW 435
<MDA 1.6 0.4 0.1 2.1 32 SSW 365 0.6 1.3 0.6 8.6 11.1 33 SW 170
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA 0
34 NW 229 0.1 1.3**
3.8
<MDA 5.2 35 NW 260
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA 0
36 N
335
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA 8.5 8.5 37 NNE 677 0.8 1.8 1.3 0.4 4.3 38 NW 760
<MDA 2.3 5.0
<MDA 7.3 39 ESE 578
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA 0
40 ENE 596
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA 0
41 SSE 477 6.7 7.4 6.7 4.9 25.7 42 SE 446 0.6 0.6 0.3 20.2 21.7 43 NE 732
<MDA 0.3
<MDA
<MDA 0.3 44 NW 487 1.1 3.0 1.7 4.7 10.5 45 W
528 3.4
<MDA
<MDA 0.1 3.5 46 N
503
<MDA**
<MDA
<MDA
<MDA 0
47 NE 161 0.3 0.7 0.0
<MDA 1.0 48 In Building N/A 6
12.7 12.1 2
32.8 49 In Building N/A 4.2 4.6 3.3
<MDA 12.1 50 SW 102
<MDA 0.8 3.1 1.3**
5.2 51 SE 94 12.8 16.0 19.1 6.2 54.1 52 SE 105 5
4.2 5.1 5.4 19.7
- The control monitors are approximately 10 miles NW of MURR, and gross values are shown.
- Badges that were missing during read period (likely lost due to weather), average of other 3 quarters were used.
VIII-6 TABLE 4 NUMBER OF FACILITY RADIATION AND CONTAMINATION SURVEYS Month Radiation Surface Contamination*
Air Samples**
Radiation Work Permits Receipt of Radioactive Materials January 125 125 34 26 12 February 96 96 30 19 4
March 93 93 29 21 9
April 133 133 46 23 15 May 100 100 27 27 7
June 84 84 14 29 10 July 121 121 18 22 11 August 108 108 47 26 9
September 100 100 36 37 5
October 135 135 43 40 7
November 98 98 52 25 9
December 95 95 57 21 8
TOTAL 1,288 1,288 433 316 106
- In addition, general building contamination surveys are conducted each normal working day.
- Air samples include stack Ar-41, containment Ar-41, sump entries, and hot cell entries.
Miscellaneous Note During calendar year 2024, MURR shipped 3,137 cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste containing 5,480 mCi of activity.
BCS DO FOE HP IRR NA NS OPS PRD QA RES RP SH TEE Total January 0
0 83 355 178 0
4 1,344 133 34 10 3
27 0
2,171 February 0
0 66 279 158 4
5 844 138 72 12 6
23 5
1,612 March 0
0 84 365 157 6
1 1,060 251 49 17 3
18 3
2,014 April 0
0 76 661 236 2
2 1,152 260 92 4
2 41 0
2,528 May 0
8 15 412 190 4
23 1,117 339 144 9
3 46 1
2,311 June 4
4 70 677 113 0
0 4,636 208 81 36 11 22 4
5,866 July 0
0 32 570 209 0
3 1,397 266 97 3
18 32 7
2,634 August 0
0 57 416 124 1
8 1,070 277 71 12 1
23 0
2,060 September 0
0 21 307 169 0
2 1,205 258 79 7
7 28 0
2,083 October 0
0 56 352 195 0
19 1,036 381 113 21 0
70 0
2,243 November 3
23 25 261 216 13 27 1,011 282 118 8
0 32 1
2,020 December 121 29 1
277 149 30 42 1,257 525 17 4
7 41 4
2,504 Total for Year 128 64 586 4,932 2,094 60 136 17,129 3,318 967 143 61 403 25 30,046 Monthly Average 11 5
49 411 175 5
11 1,427 277 81 12 5
34 2
2,504 Highest WB 29 22 99 701 308 7
35 809 180 122 53 20 113 15 (annual)
High Extremity 0
NM 326 6,936 227 1,347 463 1,045 8,029 3,279 883 533 174 691 (annual)
BCS-Business & Central Services HP-Health Physics OPS-Operations RP-Radiopharmaceutical DO-Director's Office IRR-Irradiations PRD-Production SH-Shipping FOE-Facilities Operations & Engineering NA-Neutron Activation QA-Quality Assurance TEE-Trace Elemental Epidemiology NS-Neutron Scattering RES-Research WB-Whole Body NM-Not Monitored OB-Obsolete TR-Transfer to New Group Exposures in June for OPS are correlated to a non-routine reactor outage to replace the split-ring flange gasket.
Dosimetry services are provided byLandauer (except self-reading dosimetry).
December dosimeters exposed to external radiation on transit to Landauer which resulted in non-routine data. Reported values from Landauer are shown.
SECTION IX
SUMMARY
OF RADIATION EXPOSURE TO FACILITY STAFF, EXPERIMENTERS, AND VISITORS January 1, 2024 through December 31, 2024 Total Personnel Dose (mrem) by Dosimetry Group Analysis of personnel exposure levels indicates that exposures are significantly below the limits of 10 CFR 20.1201 and are generally maintained ALARA.
IX-1