ML24312A005
| ML24312A005 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/2024 |
| From: | Kimberly Green Plant Licensing Branch II |
| To: | Erb D Tennessee Valley Authority |
| Green K | |
| References | |
| EPID L-2024-LLA-0050 | |
| Download: ML24312A005 (1) | |
Text
December 23, 2024 Delson Erb Vice President, OPS Support Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street, LP 4A-C Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
SUBJECT:
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 171 REGARDING EXTENSION OF FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE EXPIRATION DATE TO RECAPTURE LOW-POWER OPERATING LICENSE TESTING TIME (EPID L-2024-LLA-0050)
Dear Delson Erb:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 171 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1. This amendment is in response to your application dated April 17, 2024.
The amendment revises the expiration date of Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 such that it expires 40 years from the date of issuance of the full-power operating license.
A copy of our related safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of issuance will be included in the Commissions Federal Register notice.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kimberly J. Green, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-390
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No. 171 to NPF-90
- 2. Safety Evaluation cc: Listserv
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-390 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 171 License No. NPF-90
- 1.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, the licensee) dated April 17, 2024, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended, as indicated in the attachment to this amendment, by amending paragraph 2.I of Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 to read as follows:
I.
This license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on February 7, 2036.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, and shall be implemented within 30 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION David Wrona, Chief Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Operating License and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: December 23, 2024 DAVID WRONA Digitally signed by DAVID WRONA Date: 2024.12.23 11:41:16 -05'00'
ATTACHMENT TO AMENDMENT NO. 171 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-90 DOCKET NO. 50-390 Replace page 6 of Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 with the attached revised page 6. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change.
6 I.
This license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on February 7, 2036.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION William T. Russell, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Appendices:
- 1. Appendix A -
Technical Specifications
- 2. Appendix B -
Environmental Protection Plan Date of Issuance: February 7, 1996 ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
Amendment No. 171 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 171 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-90 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-390
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By application dated April 17, 2024 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML24108A015), the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, the licensee), submitted a license amendment request (LAR) for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (Watts Bar), Unit 1. The proposed amendment would extend the expiration date of Facility Operating License NPF-90 from November 9, 2035, to February 7, 2036.
On November 9, 1995, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) issued facility operating license (FOL) NPF-20, for the operation of Watts Bar, Unit 1 (ADAMS package ML082420462). This low-power operating license (LPOL) authorized operation of Watts Bar, Unit 1, at reactor core power levels not in excess of 170 megawatts thermal or 5 percent of design thermal power. The expiration date of FOL NPF-20 was midnight on November 9, 2035, which was 40 years from the date of issuance of the license.
On February 7, 1996, the NRC issued FOL NPF-90 (ADAMS Package ML073460320). This full-power operating license (FPOL) authorized operation of Watts Bar, Unit 1, at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3,411 megawatts thermal. The expiration date of FOL NPF-90 remained midnight on November 9, 1995, rather than 40 years from the date of issuance, i.e.,
February 7, 2036.
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
Under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.92(a), determinations on whether to grant an applied-for license amendment are to be guided by the considerations that govern the issuance of initial licenses to the extent applicable and appropriate. Both the common standards for licenses in 10 CFR 50.40(a) (regarding, among other things, consideration of the operating procedures, the facility and equipment, the use of the facility, and other technical specifications, or the proposals) and those specifically for issuance of operating licenses in 10 CFR 50.57(a)(3), provide that there must be reasonable assurance that the activities at issue will not endanger the health and safety of the public, and that the applicant will comply with the Commissions regulations.
Section 103c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, states that a license is to be issued for a specific period not to exceed 40 years. Section 50.51, Continuation of license, of 10 CFR also specifies that each license will be issued for a fixed period of time, not to exceed 40 years from the authorization to commence operations.
In Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) for SECY-98-296, Staff Requirements - SECY 296 - Agency Policy Regarding License Recapture of Low-Power Testing or Shutdown Time for Nuclear Power Plants, dated March 30, 1999 (ML20205C095), the Commission approved the staffs plans to grant a Grand Gulf license amendment to amend the expiration date of the license to recover the time spent in low-power testing before receiving the FPOL, and approved the granting of similar requests from other licensees provided that the 40-year license term began with issuance of an LPOL and a separate FPOL was issued. In SECY-98-296, Agency Policy Regarding Licensee Recapture of Low-Power Testing or Shutdown Time for Nuclear Power Plants, dated December 21, 1998 (ML992870025), the staff requested the Commissions approval of a policy issue concerning the recapture of low-power testing or shutdown time for nuclear power plants not in commercial operation because of unusual, unforeseen, or exigent circumstances. The final Grand Gulf license amendment is available from ADAMS at Accession No. ML021490195.
The current licensed term for Watts Bar, Unit 1, ends at midnight on November 9, 2035. This is 40 years from the date when the LPOL was issuedNovember 9, 1995. In the LPOL, the licensee was only authorized to operate the plant up to 170 megawatts thermal (i.e., 5 percent of 3,411 megawatts). On February 7, 1996, the NRC issued FOL NPF-90 to allow the licensee to operate Watts Bar, Unit 1, up to 100-percent rated power or 3,411 megawatts thermal, with an expiration date of midnight on November 9, 2035. Thus, the 40-year license term began with issuance of an LPOL and a separate FPOL was issued, which makes the situation within the scope of the Commissions approval in the SRM for SECY-98-296.
In addition to the guidance cited above, the following NRC regulations were considered in the NRC staffs review of the LAR:
The regulation at 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and standards, requires that systems and components of boiling and pressurized water-cooled nuclear power reactors must meet the requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and the ASME Operation and Maintenance Code, as specified paragraph (b) of the regulation, except the NRC has granted relief in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a paragraphs (f)(6), (g)(6), or authorized alternatives in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z).
The regulation at 10 CFR 50.61, Fracture toughness requirements for protection against pressurized thermal shock events, requires pressurized-water reactors to project reference temperature at the end of license (RTPTS) to satisfy pressurized thermal shock (PTS) screening criteria thereby the fracture toughness of the reactor vessel is maintained below the threshold throughout the operating life of the reactor vessel.
Appendix A, General Design Criteria [GDC] for Nuclear Power Plants, to 10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, establishes the minimum requirements for the principal design criteria for water-cooled nuclear power plants. The principal design criteria establish the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements for structures, systems, and components important to safety.
According to section 3.1.1 of the Watts Bar Dual-Unit Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), the plant was designed to meet the intent of the Proposed General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Construction Permits, published in July 1967. The Watts Bar construction permits were issued in January 1973. The Watts Bar plant, in general, meets the intent of the NRC GDC published as Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 in July 1971, as discussed in UFSAR section 3.1.2 (ML23346A225).
The regulation at 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants, provides the requirements for a quality assurance program.
The regulation at 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, Fracture Toughness Requirements, specifies the fracture toughness requirements for ferritic materials of pressure retaining components of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, including reactor pressure vessels (RPVs).
The regulation at 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements, specifies the requirements to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of ferritic materials in the RPV.
The regulation at 10 CFR 50.49, Environmental qualification of electric equipment important to safety for nuclear power plants, specifies the requirements for establishing a program for qualifying electrical equipment.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
The sections below provide the NRC staffs technical evaluation of the safety issues associated with the proposed amendment, which would add 90 days to the license duration. The licensee has not requested any physical changes to the design features or operation of Watts Bar, Unit 1, nor has it requested any changes to any programs.
The NRC staff reviewed the impact that the proposed extension of the operating license will have on the RPV, structures, mechanical equipment, electrical equipment, and quality assurance and maintenance programs. The NRC staffs evaluation is consistent with the approach used for the Grand Gulf amendment in the attachment to SECY-98-296. The main safety issues being evaluated are any effects of aging on plant systems, structures, and components and neutron fluence on the RPV during the period that the license would be extended.
3.1 Staff Evaluation of Reactor Pressure Vessel The NRC staff evaluated the impact of the proposed 90-day extension of the operating license request with respect to the structural integrity of the RPV. The staff evaluated the structural integrity of the RPV in terms of pressure/temperature (P/T) limits, the RPV material surveillance capsule withdrawal schedule, upper shelf energy (USE) of RPV shell material, the pressurized thermal shock (PTS) rule, and neutron fluence as discussed below.
=
Background===
The licensee stated that Watts Bar, Unit 1, was designed, licensed, and constructed for 40 years of operation as discussed in the Watts Bar UFSAR. The licensee further stated that this 40-year design life presumed operation at a rated thermal power level of 3,459 megawatts thermal with a cumulative lifetime capacity factor of 80 percent, or 32 effective full-power years (EFPY). As of the end of Cycle 18 in spring 2023, the Watts Bar, Unit 1, RPV had accumulated an exposure of 24.3 EFPY, which is equivalent to a cumulative lifetime capacity factor of greater than 89 percent up to that point. According to the licensee, based on the operating history and the expected future operation of the plant, an exposure of 32 EFPY will be achieved prior to the end of the FPOL, without the proposed 90-day license extension.
The Watts Bar, Unit 1, RPV was designed and fabricated in accordance with the requirements of Section III, Class 1, of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code edition, addenda, and Code Cases applicable at the time of plant design and construction. Operating limitations of the ASME Code and of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G also apply. The RPV and the reactor coolant system (RCS) were designed to allow inspections in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
Neutron Fluence The NRC staff notes that the issues related to the P/T limits, material surveillance capsule withdrawal schedule, USE, and PTS rule depend on the adequate prediction of the neutron fluence values.
The NRC staffs evaluation regarding the structural integrity of RPV shell material through year 2036 is based on updated analyses of neutron fluence which the licensee submitted to NRC in its March 20, 2023, LAR [ML23079A270, requesting to increase the number of tritium producing burnable absorber rods (TPBAR) based on a plant-specific analysis in WCAP-18769-NP, Revision 1, Watts Bar Units 1 & 2 Reactor Vessel Integrity Evaluations for the 2,496 TPBAR Implementation Project.]. The NRC staff approved the TPBAR LAR by letter dated April 15, 2024 (ML24072A005). In the LAR to recapture the LPOL testing time, the licensee stated that the updated neutron fluence analyses in WCAP-18769-NP, Revision 1, for the effects of ultra-low-leakage core designs will continue to be used for the remainder of plant life.
The NRC staff has determined that the neutron fluence values used by the licensee to evaluate the P/T limits, material surveillance capsule withdrawal schedule, USE, and PTS rule, discussed below, cover the proposed license term extension. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the neutron fluence values used are acceptable because they cover the period of the proposed 90-day extension of the operating license.
Pressure/Temperature Limits Ferritic materials of the RPV shell exposed to neutron irradiation will undergo changes in material properties and a decrease in fracture toughness. The decrease in fracture toughness affects the ability of RPV shell materials to resist crack propagation. The licensee stated that it has developed a RPV material surveillance program in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, to monitor the fracture toughness of the RPV. The material surveillance program helps ensure RPV integrity by monitoring changes in the fracture toughness properties of the RPV beltline materials. The licensee uses input from the RPV material surveillance program to develop P/T limit curves, which ensure an adequate margin regarding brittle failure of the RPV and piping of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
The P/T limits are in the pressure temperature limit report (PTLR) of the plant technical specifications (TSs). The Watts Bar, Unit 1, PTLR is described in TS 5.9.6, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS REPORT (PTLR). The specification in TS 5.9.6: (1) identifies the NRC reviewed and approved analytical methods that are required to be used to determine the RCS temperature P/T limits and Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS) setpoints, and (2) requires the PTLR be provided to the NRC upon issuance for each reactor vessel fluence period and for any revision or supplement. The PTLR contains the RCS heat up and cooldown curves and NRC-approved schedule for removal of reactor vessel surveillance capsules.
The licensee stated that the current P/T limits are based on an assumed RPV exposure of 32 EFPY, which will be exceeded prior to the end of the current FPOL, even without the proposed 90-day extension of the operating license. The licensee stated that it will update the Watts Bar, Unit 1, P/T limits in the PTLR prior to the reactor achieving an actual exposure of 32 EFPY, and will bound the 40-year FPOL period, including the proposed 90-day extension of the operating license.
As required by TS 5.9.6, the licensee will update the P/T limits prior to reaching 32 EFPY, which will bound the proposed 90-day extension of the operating license. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has adequate controls in place to address the P/T limits inclusive of the proposed 90-day extension of the operating license.
Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Capsules The licensee stated that it has maintained a comprehensive RPV material surveillance program in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, which requires periodically removing surveillance capsules from the Watts Bar, Unit 1, RPV. The licensee removed the first surveillance capsule from the Unit 1 RPV at the end of the first fuel cycle, which corresponds to 1.20 EFPY, as documented in WCAP-15046, Revision 0, Analysis of Capsule U from the Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program (ML073240615).
The licensee removed the second capsule after the third fuel cycle at 3.88 EFPY, as documented in the BWXT Services, Inc., report, Analysis of Capsule W from the Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program (ML012900048 and ML013060166), which represented the combined results of the standard and low leakage core design.
The third capsule was removed from the RPV after the fifth fuel cycle at 6.63 EFPY, as documented in a TVA letter to the NRC, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 - Reactor Vessel Surveillance Capsule X Test Results and Reactor Vessel Fracture Toughness (J-R) Test Results (ML043000348).
The fourth capsule was removed from the RPV after the seventh fuel cycle at 9.37 EFPY, as documented in WCAP-16760-NP, Revision 0, Analysis of Capsule Z from the Tennessee Valley Authority, Watts Bar Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program (ML073200241).
In the TPBAR LAR, dated March 20, 2023, the licensee proposed to withdraw Capsule V after 24.1 EFPY of plant operation with a predicted neutron fluence of 5.44 x 1019 neutrons per square centimeter (n/cm2) for the surveillance capsule. By letter dated January 18, 2024 (ML24008A246), the NRC staff approved the capsule schedule change request. In its safety evaluation, the NRC staff concluded that the withdrawal and testing of surveillance Capsule V are acceptable and supplements the requirements of the reactor vessel material surveillance program for the current license period at Watts Bar, Unit 1. The NRC staff notes that a report containing the test results for surveillance Capsule V must be reported to the NRC within 18 months of the capsule withdrawal in accordance with Section IV.A of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50.
Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the RPV material surveillance program at Watts Bar, Unit 1, is up to date, having considered the proposed 90-day extension of the operating license, and the licensee has satisfactorily addressed the revised RPV material surveillance capsule withdrawal schedule.
Upper-Shelf Energy The regulation in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, Section IV.A.1, requires that USE values of all RPV beltline and extended beltline materials be projected to remain above the USE screening criterion of 50 foot-pound (ft-lb) throughout the life of the vessel. The licensee stated that the Watts Bar, Unit 1, RPV beltline and extended beltline materials are projected to remain above the 50 ft-lb criterion through end-of-license (32 EFPY) and end-of-license-extension (48 EFPY),
except for RPV intermediate shell forging 05, which is projected to have a USE value of 46 ft-lb at the end-of-license (32 EFPY) and 45 ft-lb at the end-of-license-extension (48 EFPY), as shown in Tables 7-1 and 7-2, respectively, of WCAP-18769-NP, Revision 1 (ML23079A270).
Westinghouse submitted a generic evaluation of USE that provided technical basis demonstrating that structural integrity of the RPV can still be maintained with a USE value lower than the 50-ft-lb screening criterion as shown in WCAP-13587, Revision 1, Reactor Vessel Upper Shelf Energy Bounding Evaluation for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors (ML090440295). Westinghouse performed an equivalent margins analysis and proposed a 43 ft-lb lower bound USE screening criterion, in lieu of the 50 ft-lb USE, through end-of-life for 4-loop Westinghouse-designed plants such as Watts Bar, Unit 1. By letter dated April 21, 1994 (ML090580069), the NRC staff approved the minimally acceptable USE value of 43 ft-lb in its assessment of WCAP-13587, Revision 1.
As noted above, the RPV intermediate shell forging 05 is projected to have a USE value of less than the required ft-lb value. However, the projected values at the end-of-license (32 EFPY) and end-of-license-extension, which would include the proposed 90-day extension of the operating license, are above the 43 ft-lb USE value approved in WCAP-13587, Revision 1. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has satisfactorily addressed the USE of RPV materials for the proposed 90-day extension of the operating license.
Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS)
The regulation at 10 CFR 50.61 requires that the reference temperature for pressurized thermal shock (RTPTS) values of the RPV beltline and extended beltline materials be lower than the RTPTS screening criteria of 270 degrees Fahrenheit (°F) for the base metal and/or longitudinal welds, and 300 °F for circumferentially oriented welds at the end of operating license.
As part of its submittal dated March 20, 2023, the licensee performed a PTS evaluation as provided in WCAP-18769-NP, Revision 1. Based on the licensees evaluation, the NRC staff determined that the Watts Bar, Unit 1, limiting RTPTS value for base metal or longitudinal weld materials is 235.9 °F at 48 EFPY, which corresponds to the intermediate shell forging 05. The limiting RTPTS value for circumferentially oriented welds is 57.2°F at 48 EFPY, which corresponds to the lower shell-to-bottom head ring circumferential weld seam W04. The RTPTS value would be 34.1 °F less than the screening criterion of 270 °F for plates, forgings, and longitudinal welds, and 242.8 °F less than the screening criteria for circumferentially oriented welds. The NRC staff has determined that Watts Bar, Unit 1, RPV would not exceed the PTS screening criteria through the current end of license, when accounting for the proposed 90-day license extension period. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has satisfactorily addressed the PTS rule for the proposed 90-day extension of the operating license.
Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the Watts Bar, Unit 1, RPV will continue to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G and Appendix H, and 10 CFR 50.61.
Therefore, the NRC staff finds that there is reasonable assurance that the structural integrity of the Watts Bar, Unit 1, RPV will be maintained through the end of the FPOL, including the proposed 90-day extension of the operating license.
3.2 Staff Evaluation of Structures The Watts Bar, Unit 1, shield building is a reinforced concrete structure surrounding the steel containment structure and is designed to provide radiation shielding from accident conditions, radiation shielding from parts of the RCS during operation, and protection of the steel containment vessel from adverse atmospheric conditions and external missiles propelled by tornado winds.
In the LAR, the licensee stated that the reinforced concrete shield building complies with the American Concrete Institute (ACI)-ASME (ACI-359), Code for Concrete Reactor Vessels and Containment, except the allowable tangential shear stresses in walls where the ACI 318-71 code is used. The reinforcing around opening of circular walls is based on the ACI Chimney Code (ACI 307-69), and the reinforcing steel conforms to the requirements of ASTM Designation A615-72, Grade 60. The structural design of the interior concrete structures complies with the ACI 318-71, Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete, and ACI-ASME (ACI 359) Article CC-3000 document, Standard Code for Concrete Reactor Vessels and Containments.
Section 3.8.1 of NUREG-0847, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (ML072060490), states that the criteria that were used in the analysis, design, and construction of seismic Category 1 structures at Watts Bar, Unit 1, account for anticipated loading and postulated conditions that may be imposed on the structure during its service lifetime.
Based on the licensees use of the indicated codes, standards, guides, and specifications in the plants design, analyses, and construction and the licensees quality assurance program, required by Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, as approved by NUREG-0847 and its supplements, the NRC staff finds that there is reasonable assurance that the concrete and steel structures will, for the proposed 90-day extension of the operating license, be in conformity with the applicable provisions of Commission rules and regulations, and the Watts Bar, Unit 1, license.
3.3 Staff Evaluation of Mechanical Equipment In the LAR, the licensee stated that it has surveillance, maintenance, and testing requirements for mechanical equipment in place at Watts Bar, Unit 1, to verify operability or to detect degradation and ensure that equipment that degrades is replaced or other corrective actions are taken. These requirements include compliance with the applicable NRC regulations.
The NRC staff acknowledges that at the time of the initial licensing of Watts Bar, Unit 1, the inservice testing (IST) of pumps, valves, and snubbers was performed in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI. With the subsequent updates to the NRC regulations, the IST of pumps, valves, and snubbers is required to be performed in accordance with the ASME Operation and Maintenance (OM) of Nuclear Power Plants, Division 1, OM Code: Section IST (OM Code), as incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a, during the proposed 90-day extension of the operating license at Watts Bar, Unit 1.
Watts Bar, Unit 1, TS 5.7.2.19, Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, states that a program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program is required to be performed in accordance with the guidelines contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 94-01, Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Revision 3-A, dated July 2012 (ML12221A202), and Section 4.1, Limitations and Conditions for NEI TR 94-01, Revision 2, of the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) in NEI 94-01, Revision 2-A, dated October 2008 (ML100620847), as modified in TS 5.7.2.19.
Based on its review of the information in the LAR, and the above, the NRC staff finds that the current licensing basis already requires compliance with applicable codes, standards, and other regulatory requirements that provide reasonable assurance, and the licensee is not proposing any changes to those requirements. Further, the addition of 90 days on the license does not present any unconsidered challenges to the structural integrity of equipment important to safety.
3.4 Staff Evaluation of Electrical Equipment In the LAR, the licensee stated that it has performed an aging analysis for all safety-related electrical equipment in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49 and has identified the qualified lifetimes for the equipment. The licensee has incorporated the lifetimes into its plant equipment maintenance and replacement practices and schedules the replacement of components that have a qualified life of less than 40 years through its maintenance program.
Based on its review of the information in the LAR, the NRC staff finds that the proposed 90-day extension of the operating license will have no adverse impact on the Watts Bar, Unit 1, environmental qualification program or its ability to continue to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49.
3.5 Staff Evaluation of Quality Assurance and Maintenance Programs This amendment does not change the quality assurance (QA) and maintenance programs at Watts Bar, Unit 1. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that there is reasonable assurance that the licensees QA program and the maintenance procedures and instructions, therein, will continue to be appropriately implemented during the proposed 90-day extension of the operating license, and that the licensees QA program will continue to meet 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commissions regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment on November 1, 2024. The State official had no comments.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.21, 51.32, and 51.35, an environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact regarding this license amendment was published in the Federal Register on November 26, 2024 (89 FR 93358). Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission has determined that issuance of this amendment will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors: J. Tsao, NRR G. Bedi, NRR T. Scarbrough, NRR K. Green, NRR Date: December 23, 2024
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