ML23215A126
| ML23215A126 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/2023 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML23215A126 (1) | |
Text
Facility:
Sequoyah K/A Catalog Rev. 3 Rev.
dd/mm/yyyy Date of Exam:
2/1/2023 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*
Total A2 G*
Total
- 1.
Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1
3 5
3 1
3 3
18 2
2 0
1 3
1 1
8 Tier Totals 5
5 4
4 4
4 26
- 2.
Plant Systems 1
2 2
3 2
3 2
3 3
3 2
3 28 2
1 0
1 1
0 1
0 1
1 2
1 9
Tier Totals 3
2 4
3 3
3 3
4 4
4 4
37
- 3.
Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories CO EC RC EM 6
CO EC RC EM 2
2 1
1
- 4. Theory Reactor Theory Thermodynamics 6
3 3
Notes: CO
=
EM =
Conduct of Operations; EC = Equipment Control; RC = Radiation Control; Emergency Procedures/Plan These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample when Revision 2 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.
These systems/evolutions are only included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 2 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.
ES-4.1-PWR Sequoyah Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)
Item E/APE # / Name /
Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR Q#
1 (000007) (EPE 7; BW E02 & E10; CE E02) Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery X
(000007EA1.06) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to (EPE 7) REACTOR TRIP, STABILIZATION, RECOVERY: CRDS 3.5 1
2 (000008) (APE 8)
Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident X
(000008) (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident (G2.4.51) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of emergency operating procedure exit conditions (e.g.,
emergency condition no longer exists or severe accident guideline entry is required) 3.0 2
3 (000009) (EPE 9)
Small Break LOCA X
(000009EA2.38) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (EPE 9) SMALL-Break LOCA:
Existence of head bubble 4.0 3
(000011) (EPE 11)
Large Break LOCA 4
(000015) (APE 15)
Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions X
(000015AK2.07) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE 15) REACTOR COOLANT Pump Malfunctions and the following systems or components: RCP seals 3.8 4
5 (000022) (APE 22)
Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup X
(000022AK1.04) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (APE 22) LOSS OF REACTOR Coolant Makeup: Changing from manual to automatic control of charging flow valve controller 3.3 5
(000025) (APE 25)
Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (000026) (APE 26)
Loss of Component Cooling Water 6
(000027) (APE 27)
Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction X
(000027AK2.13) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE 27) PRESSURIZER PRESSURE Control System Malfunction and the following systems or components: PZR master pressure controller 3.9 6
7 (000029) (EPE 29)
Anticipated Transient Without Scram X
(000029) (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient Without Scram (G2.4.12) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of operating crew responsibilities during emergency and abnormal operations 4.0 7
8 (000038) (EPE 38)
Steam Generator Tube Rupture X
(000038EK1.06) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (EPE 38) STEAM GENERATOR Tube Rupture: Initiating an RCS cooldown before isolating the ruptured S/G 4.1 8
(000040) (APE 40; BW E05; CE E05; W E12) Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer
9 (000054) (APE 54; CE E06) Loss of Main Feedwater X
(000054AK2.09) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE 54) LOSS OF Main Feedwater and the following systems or components: AFW 3.9 9
10 (000055) (EPE 55)
Station Blackout X
(000055EA2.08) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (EPE 55) Station Blackout: In-core thermocouple temperatures 3.6 10 11 (000056) (APE 56)
(000056AK2.12) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power and the following systems or components: RCS 3.9 11 12 (000057) (APE 57)
Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus X
(000057) (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus (G2.1.3)
CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Knowledge of shift or short-term relief turnover practices 3.7 12 13 (000058) (APE 58)
Loss of DC Power X
(000058AK2.03) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE 58) LOSS OF DC Power and the following systems or components: Battery 3.7 13 14 (000062) (APE 62)
Loss of Nuclear Service Water X
(000062AK1.01) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (APE 62) LOSS OF SERVICE WATER: Effect on loads cooled by service water 3.8 14 15 (000065) (APE 65)
Loss of Instrument Air X
(000065AK3.05) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to (APE 65) LOSS OF Instrument Air: Checking electric loads on a running compressor 2.5 15 16 (000077) (APE 77)
Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances X
(000077AK3.02) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to (APE 77)
GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRIC Grid Disturbances: Actions contained in AOPs for voltage and grid disturbances 3.5 16 17 (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment X
(WE04EK3.06) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment: Identifying and isolating the break 4.3 17 (W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation 18 (BW E04; W E05)
Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink X
(WE05EA2.07) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (W E05) Loss of Secondary Heat Sink: Condensate storage tank level 3.7 18 K/A Category Totals:
3 5
3 1
3 3
Group Point Total:
18
ES-4.1-PWR Sequoyah Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)
Item E/APE # / Name /
Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR Q#
(000001) (APE 1)
Continuous Rod Withdrawal 000003 (APE 3)
Dropped Control Rod
/ 1 (000005) (APE 5)
Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod 000024 (APE 24)
Emergency Boration
/ 1 000028 (APE 28)
Pressurizer (PZR)
Level Control Malfunction / 2 19 (000032) (APE 32)
Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation X
(000032AA2.07) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 32) LOSS OF SOURCE RANGE Nuclear Instrumentation: Maximum allowable channel disagreement 3.5 19 000033 (APE 33)
Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 000036 (APE 36; BW/A08) Fuel-Handling Incidents /
8 000037 (APE 37)
Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 (APE 51)
Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 20 (000059) (APE 59)
Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release X
(000059) (APE 59) Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release (G2.1.4) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, no-solo operation, and maintenance of active license status, 10 CFR Part 55 3.3 20 000060 (APE 60)
Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release /
9 000061 (APE 61)
Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms / 7 000067 (APE 67)
Plant Fire On Site / 8
000068 (APE 68; BW A06) Control Room Evacuation / 8 (000069) (APE 69; W E14) Loss of Containment Integrity (000074) (EPE 74; W E06 & E07)
Inadequate Core Cooling 000076 (APE 76)
High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 000078 (APE 78*)
RCS Leak / 3 21 (W E01 & E02)
Rediagnosis & SI Termination X
(WE02EK3.13) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to (W E02) SI TERMINATION: Initiating emergency boration (reference potential) 3.7 21 (W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure / 4 22 (W E15)
Containment Flooding X
(WE15EK1.04) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (W E15) Containment Flooding:
Design-basis flood level in containment 3.1 22 23 (W E16) High Containment Radiation X
(WE16EA1.06) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to (W E16) HIGH Containment Radiation: ARM system 3.4 23 (BW A01) Plant Runback / 1 (BW A02 & A03)
Loss of NNI-X/Y/7 (BW A04) Turbine Trip / 4 (BW A05)
Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 (BW A07) Flooding /
8 (BW E03)
Inadequate Subcooling Margin /
4 24 (BW E08; W E03)
LOCA Cooldown -
Depressurization X
(WE03EA1.15) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to (W E03) LOCA COOLDOWN AND Depressurization: ECCS 3.9 24 25 (BW E09; CE A13**;
W E09 & E10)
Natural Circulation X
(WE09EK1.05) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (W E09) NATURAL CIRCULATION OPERATIONS: Loss of RCP seal cooling 3.1 25 (BW E13 & E14)
EOP Rules and Enclosures
26 (CE A11**; W E08)
RCS Overcooling -
Pressurized Thermal Shock X
(WE08EA1.16) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to (W E08) Pressurized Thermal Shock: AFW system 3.5 26 (CE A16) Excess RCS Leakage / 2 (CE E09) Functional Recovery (CE E13*) Loss of Forced Circulation /
LOOP / Blackout / 4 K/A Category Totals:
2 0
1 3
1 1
Group Point Total:
8
ES-4.1-PWR Sequoyah Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)
Item System / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR Q#
27 (003) (SF4P RCP)
REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SYSTEM X
(003K1.02) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the (SF4P RCP)
REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SYSTEM and the following systems: RCP motor cooling and ventilation 3.4 27 28 (004) (SF1; SF2 CVCS) CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM X
(004A1.10) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the (SF1; SF2 CVCS) CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM, including: Reactor power 3.8 28 29 (005) (SF4P RHR)
RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM X
(005K5.04) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (SF4P RHR)
RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM: Heat load on the RHRS during shutdown, cooldown, and refueling operations 3.5 29 30 (006) (SF2; SF3 ECCS)
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM X
(006K2.02) Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: (SF2; SF3 ECCS)
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM Valve operators for safety injection tanks 3.2 30 31 (007) (SF5 PRTS)
PRESSURIZER RELIEF/QUENCH TANK SYSTEM X
(007A1.05) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the (SF5 PRTS)
PRESSURIZER RELIEF/QUENCH TANK SYSTEM, including:
Containment radiation levels 3.2 31 32 (008) (SF8 CCW)
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM X
(008K6.09) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the (SF8 CCW) COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM:
SWS 3.8 32
33 (010) (SF3 PZR PCS)
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM X
(010K4.01) Knowledge of (SF3 PZR PCS) PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Spray valve warmup 2.8 33 34 (012) (SF7 RPS)
(012A4.03) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF7 RPS) REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM in the control room: Channel blocks and bypasses 3.8 34 35 (013) (SF2 ESFAS)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM X
(013K5.20) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (SF2 ESFAS)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM: Main steamline break 4.2 35 36 (022) (SF5 CCS)
CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM X
(022) (SF5 CCS)
CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM (G2.1.44) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Knowledge of RO duties in the control room during fuel handling, such as responding to alarms from the fuel handling area, communicating with fuel handling personnel, operating systems from the control room to support fueling operations, or supporting instrumentation 3.9 36 37 (022) (SF5 CCS)
CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM X
(022K2.01) Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: (SF5 CCS)
CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM CCS fans 3.6 37 38 (025) (SF5 ICE) ICE CONDENSER SYSTEM X
(025) (SF5 ICE) ICE CONDENSER SYSTEM (191001K1.03) VALVES: The relationship of valve position to flow rate and back pressure 2.9 38 39 (026) (SF5 CSS)
CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM X
(026K1.05) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the (SF5 CSS)
CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM and the following systems: ESFAS 4.1 39 40 (026) (SF5 CSS)
CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM X
(026K3.01) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SF5 CSS)
CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters: CCS 3.8 40
41 (039) (SF4S MSS)
MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM X
(039A3.03) Ability to monitor automatic features of the (SF4S MSS) MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM, including: Atmospheric relief valves 3.7 41 053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*) INTEGRATED CONTROL SYSTEM 42 (059) (SF4S MFW)
MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM X
(059A2.12) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF4S MFW) MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Failure of feedwater regulating valves 3.9 42 43 (061) (SF4S AFW)
AUXILIARY /
(061A2.07) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF4S AFW)
AUXILIARY/EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Air-operated valve, solenoid-operated valve, or motor-operated valve failure 4.0 43 44 (061) (SF4S AFW)
AUXILIARY /
(061K3.02) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SF4S AFW)
AUXILIARY/EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters: S/G system 4.3 44 45 (062) (SF6 ED AC)
AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM X
(062A3.05) Ability to monitor automatic features of the (SF6 ED AC) AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, including: Safety-related actuations 4.1 45 46 (062) (SF6 ED AC)
AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM X
(062A3.10) Ability to monitor automatic features of the (SF6 ED AC) AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, including: Automatic transfer from auxiliary to reserve transformer 3.3 46
DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM X
(063K3.03) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SF6 ED DC) DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters: AC distribution system 4.0 47 48 (064) (SF6 EDG)
EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM X
(064A4.02) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF6 EDG) EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM in the control room:
Adjustment of exciter voltage (using voltage control switch) 3.8 48 49 (073) (SF7 PRM)
PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM X
(073A1.01) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the (SF7 PRM)
PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM, including: Radiation levels 3.5 49 50 (076) (SF4S SW)
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM X
(076K4.05) Knowledge of (SF4S SW) SERVICE WATER SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Service water train flow and discharge pressure when service water flow to heat exchanger for CCW is throttled 3.3 50 51 (078) (SF8 IAS)
INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM X
(078A2.03) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF8 IAS) INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations:
Cooling water malfunction 2.5 51 52 (078) (SF8 IAS)
INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM X
(078K5.04) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (SF8 IAS)
INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM:
High moisture content in instrument air 2.9 52 53 (103) (SF5 CNT)
CONTAINMENT SYSTEM X
(103) (SF5 CNT)
CONTAINMENT SYSTEM (G2.1.32) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to explain and apply system precautions, limitations, notes, or cautions 3.8 53
54 (103) (SF5 CNT)
CONTAINMENT SYSTEM X
(103K6.15) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the (SF5 CNT)
CONTAINMENT SYSTEM:
MRSS 3.1 54 K/A Category Totals:
2 2
3 2
3 2
3 3
3 2
3 Group Point Total:
28
ES-4.1-PWR Sequoyah Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (RO/SRO)
Item System / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR Q#
001 (SF1 CRDS)
CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM 55 (002) (SF2; SF4P RCS) REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM X
(002A4.04) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF2; SF4P RCS) REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM in the control room: The filling/draining of LPI pumps during refueling 3.0 55 (011) (SF2 PZR LCS)
PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM 56 (014) (SF1 RPI) ROD POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM X
(014A4.05) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF1 RPI) ROD POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM in the control room: RPI accuracy mode selection (W) 3.1 56 015 (SF7 NI)
NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM 016 (SF7 NNI)
NONNUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM 017 (SF7 ITM) IN CORE TEMPERATURE MONITOR SYSTEM 027 (SF5 CIRS)
CONTAINMENT IODINE REMOVAL SYSTEM
(028) (SF5 HRPS)
HYDROGEN RECOMBINER AND PURGE CONTROL SYSTEM 029 (SF8 CPS)
CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM 033 (SF8 SFPCS)
SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM 57 (034) (SF8 FHS)
FUEL HANDLING EQUIPMENT SYSTEM X
(034K1.02) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the (SF8 FHS) FUEL HANDLING EQUIPMENT SYSTEM and the following systems: RHRS 2.9 57 035 (SF4P SG)
STEAM GENERATOR SYSTEM 58 (041) (SF4S SDS)
STEAM DUMP/TURBINE BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM X
(041K3.04) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SF4S SDS) STEAM DUMP/TURBINE BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters: Reactor power 4.1 58 59 (045) (SF4S MTG)
MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR SYSTEM X
(045A2.13) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF4S MTG) MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations:
Opening of the steam dumps at low pressure 2.9 59 (050) (SF9 CRV*)
CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION
60 (055) (SF4S CARS)
CONDENSER AIR REMOVAL SYSTEM X
(055) (SF4S CARS)
CONDENSER AIR REMOVAL SYSTEM (191006K1.14) HEAT EXCHANGERS AND CONDENSERS: Reasons for noncondensable gas removal 2.6 60 61 (056) (SF4S CDS)
CONDENSATE SYSTEM X
(056A3.09) Ability to monitor automatic features of the (SF4S CDS) CONDENSATE SYSTEM, including: Automatic protection of MFW pump low suction pressure 3.6 61 068 (SF9 LRS)
LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEM 62 (071) (SF9 WGS)
WASTE GAS DISPOSAL SYSTEM X
(071K4.06) Knowledge of (SF9 WGS) WASTE GAS DISPOSAL SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following:
Sampling and monitoring of waste gas release tanks 3.0 62 072 (SF7 ARM)
AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM 075 (SF8 CW)
CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM 079 (SF8 SAS**)
STATION AIR SYSTEM 63 (086) (SF8 FPS)
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM X
(086K6.01) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the (SF8 FPS)
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM:
Fire pump failure 3.4 63 K/A Category Totals:
1 0
1 1
0 1
0 1
1 2
1 Group Point Total:
9
Form 4.1-COMMON Common Examination Outline ES-4.1-COMMON COMMON Examination Outline (Sequoyah)
Facility:
Sequoyah Date of Exam:
2/1/2023 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) (RO/SRO)
Category K/A #
Topic RO SRO-Only Item #
IR Q#
IR Q#
- 1.
Conduct of Operations G2.1.15 (G2.1.15) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary management direction, such as standing orders, night orders, or operations memoranda 64 2.7 64 G2.1.19 (G2.1.19) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to use available indications to evaluate system or component status 65 3.9 65 Subtotal N/A 2
N/A
- 2.
Equipment Control G2.2.17 (G2.2.17) EQUIPMENT CONTROL: Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during power operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, and coordination with the transmission system operator 66 2.6 66 G2.2.6 (G2.2.6) EQUIPMENT CONTROL: Knowledge of the process for making changes to procedures 67 3
67 Subtotal N/A 2
N/A
- 3.
Radiation Control G2.3.5 (G2.3.5) RADIATION CONTROL: Ability to use RMSs, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms or personnel monitoring equipment 68 2.9 68 Subtotal N/A 1
N/A
- 4.
Emergency Procedures /
Plan G2.4.42 (G2.4.42) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of emergency response facilities 69 2.6 69 Subtotal N/A 1
N/A Tier 3 Point Total N/A 6
N/A
Form 4.1-COMMON Common Examination Outline ES-4.1-COMMON COMMON Examination Outline (Sequoyah)
Facility:
Sequoyah Date of Exam:
2/1/2023 Theory (Tier 4) (RO)
Category K/A #
Topic RO Item #
IR Q#
Reactor Theory 192006 (192006K1.10) FISSION PRODUCT POISONS: Plot the curve and explain the reasoning for the reactivity insertion by xenon-135 versus time for the following: -- reactor startup with xenon-135 already present in the core 70 3.2 70 192007 (192007K1.01) FUEL DEPLETION AND BURNABLE POISONS:
Define burnable poison and state its use in the reactor 71 2.5 71 192008 (192008K1.23) REACTOR OPERATIONAL PHYSICS:
(REACTOR RESPONSE ON A TRIP) Explain the shape of a curve of reactor power versus time after a trip 72 3.1 72 Subtotal N/A 3
Thermodynamics 193003 (193003K1.17) STEAM: Define the following term: -- subcooling 73 3.2 73 193004 (193004K1.15) THERMODYNAMIC PROCESS: (THROTTLING AND THE THROTTLING PROCESS) Determine the exit conditions for a throttling process based on the use of steam and/or water 74 2.8 74 193009 (193009K1.03) CORE THERMAL LIMITS: Explain local peaking factor 75 2.7 75 Subtotal N/A 3
Tier 4 Point Total N/A 6
- 1. Given the following:
Initial Conditions
- Unit 1 is at 50% RTP
- Reactor Trip breaker RTB is closed
- Bypass breaker BYA is racked in and closed Current Conditions
- An automatic Reactor trip signal is generated due to Low S/G level
- RTB and BYA UV trip coils are deenergized but fail to actuate Which one of the following completes the statements below?
In response to the reactor trip signal, __(1)__ will open.
Demand Step Counters __(2)__ read 000.
(1) (2) only RTB will only RTB will NOT BYA and RTB will BYA and RTB will NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Correct, (1)The shunt trip coil (STB) in parallel with the UV coil on RTB will be energized to trip RTB. However BYA STB coil does not recieve a signal, so the SSPS trip functions only de-energize the UV relay for the BYA. Therefore, the BYA will not open.
(2) These Demand Step counters on reset to 000 when Rod Control startup counter reset is operated C.
Incorrect, (1) plausible because the RTB will open and the BYA would open if the breakers had been equipped with the shunt trip coil contained on the RT breakers.
(2) plausible because the Rods have tripped and are in the bottom of the core D.
Question Number:
1 Tier:
1 Group 1
K/A:
007EA1.06) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to (EPE 7) REACTOR TRIP, STABILIZATION, RECOVERY: CRDS Importance Rating:
3.5 10 CFR Part 55:
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6).7 / 45.5 / 45.6 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
K/A is met because candiadte must identify response of CRDS after a reactor trip Technical
Reference:
- RPS/RxTripbreakersUVcoils&TC
- 1,247w611991R11, 1-1296H46-13B R1, 1,2-45N699-1 R11
- 0GO2,UnitStartupfromHotStandbytoreactorCritical, Rev.(page21)
- 0SI0OPS0085011.0,ReactivityControlsystemsMoveable Control Assemblies,Rev.47(page48)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.RPS (OBJ: 4a, 4d, 4e & 5b)
Question Source:
New X
COG level: High Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 2. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is Mode 3
- RCS pressure is 2235 psig Subsequently,
- PZR PORV 1-HS-68-340AA Red Light Illuminates
- Lowest RCS pressure observed is 2200 psig Which one the following completes the statements below?
In accordance with AOP-I.04, Pressurizer Instrument and Control Malfunctions, closing the PORV Block Valve (1) an immediate operator action.
Entry into E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, (2) required.
(1) (2) is is is is NOT is NOT is is NOT is NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Correct (1) this is an IOA if required by the Operator (2) RCS pressure did not go low enough to require a RX trip C.
Incorrect (1) Plausible because the Block Valve is a backup isolation and not all procedures contain IOA's (2) plausible because RCS pressure is 135# below normal pressure and a PORV has opened D.
Question Number:
2 Tier:
1 Group 1
K/A:
000008) (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident (G2.4.51) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of emergency operating procedure exit conditions (e.g.,
emergency condition no longer exists or severe accident guideline entry is required)
Importance Rating:
3.0 10 CFR Part 55:
41.10 / 43.5 /45.13 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must determine that because of operator action the accident has terminated and entry into the ERG network is not required Technical
Reference:
AOPI.04,PressurizerInstrumentandControlMalfunctions, Rev.19(page4)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPL271AOP-I.04 (OBJ: 3 & 9)
Question Source:
New Cog level: HIGH Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 3. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is performing ECA-3.1, SGTR and LOCA - Subcooled Recovery
- RCPs are NOT running
- Containment pressure is 0.8 psig and stable
- RCS pressure reduction is in progress Subsequently,
- PZR level begins to rise rapidly
- Containment pressure is 0.8 psig and stable Which one of the following completes the statements below?
The depressurization will be completed using (1).
Pressurizer level rising rapidly is due to (2).
(1) (2) one PZR PORV PZR steam space break one PZR PORV void formation in the Reactor head normal PZR Spray PZR steam space break normal PZR Spray void formation in the Reactor head A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Correct (1) Pressure reduction will be completed using 1 PORV (2) Note in procedure warns this is a possible condition C.
Incorrect (1) Plausible becuse Spray would normally be used, wrong because the RCPS are not running and Normal spray is not available D.
Question Number:
3 Tier:
1 Group 1
K/A:
(000009EA2.38) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (EPE 9) SMALL-Break LOCA:
Existence of head bubble Importance Rating:
4.0 10 CFR Part 55:
43.5 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must identify the reason for the indications is the formation of a bubble in the head region Technical
Reference:
2FR0Unit2StatusTrees,Rev.10(page4)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPL271ECA-3.1 (OBJ: 5 & 6)
Question Source:
New Cog level: High Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 4. Given the following plant conditions:
Unit 1 is at 100%
- 1-FCV-62-93, Charging Flow Control Valve is in Manual 1-FCV-62-89, Charging Seal Water Flow Control Valve, is operating at 60%
open Due to a positioner failure, 1-FCV-62-89 throttles close, and sticks at the 30% open position What effect will this malfunction have on charging pump discharge pressure and RCP seal injection flow?
Charging Pump RCP Seal Discharge Press Injection Flow Lowers Rises Rises Lowers Rises Rises Lowers Lowers A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate thinks that FCV-62-89 is located in the RCP seal supply line such that opening the valve would cause more flow and closing the valve would decrease flow, thus causing CCP discharge pressure to lower due to increased flow. Also plausible since the second part is correct.
B.
Incorrect, Plausible since the first part is correct, the increased backpressure on the system would cause CCP discharge pressure to increase. Also the second part is plausible if the candidate thinks that FCV-62-89 is located in the RCP seal supply line such that opening the valve would increase flow and closing the valve would decrease flow.
C.
Correct, the 1-FCV-62-89 valve is inline with the charging flow control valve and seal injection is supplied by a connection between the two valves. FCV-62-89 provides sufficient backpressure that RCP seals are supplied by charging. By increasing the position of FCV-62-89, less backpressure is provided, RCP seal injection will lower as charging flow increases and CCP discharge pressure would lower. Thus if FCV-62-89 closes down, it would provide more backpressure to the CCP, raising its discharge pressure and forcing more flow to the RCP seals.
D.
Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate thinks that FCV-62-89 is located in the RCP seal supply line such that opening the valve would cause more flow and closing the valve would decrease flow, thus causing CCP discharge pressure to lower due to increased flow. Also the second part is plausible if the candidate thinks that FCV-62-89 is located in the RCP seal supply line such that opening the valve would increase flow and closing the valve would decrease flow.
Question Number:
4 Tier:
1 Group:
1 K/A:
(000015AK2.07) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE 15) REACTOR COOLANT Pump Malfunctions and the following systems or components: RCP seals Importance Rating:
3.8 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.7 10CFR55.43.b:
Not applicable K/A Match:
K/A is met because the question requires knowledge of the how an RCP seal supply malfunction will affect charging pump operation and seal injection flow to the RCPs Technical
Reference:
RCPsealinjection Print147W8091R86 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.CVCS (OBJ: 4d & 5b)
Cognitive Level:
Higher X
Lower Question Source:
New Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 5. Given the following:
- Unit 1 was operating at 100% power
- FCV-62-93, Charging Flow Control, is in MANUAL Subsequently,
- FCV-62-93, Charging Flow Control, is placed in Automatic and sticks at 65gpm
- Normal letdown is in service using a 75 gpm orifice
- Identified leakage is 10 gpm
- Unidentified leakage is 1 cc/hr
- RCP seal leak-off is 3 gpm per pump If no operator actions are taken, approximately how much time will elapse before the "PZR LVL Low Heater OFF and Letdown Secured" alarm is received?
(Assume PZR is 62 gal/%)
63 minutes 83 minutes 116 minutes 133 minutes A.
B.
C.
D.
The correct answer is B Justification:
A,B, C Incorrect. plausible is PZR level at 100% power is not correct, Setpoint for heater OFF is not correct, or various other math errors D. Correct.
PZR level @ 100% power = 60%
Letdown isolates @ 17%
60 - 17 = 43% x 62 gal/% = 2666 gallons Delta charging & letdown = 10 gpm Identified leakage = 10 gpm Unidentified leakage = 1 cc/hr (negligible)
RCP seal leakoff = 4x3= 12 gpm into VCT Total flow out of RCS = 10 + 10 + 12 + 0 = 32 gpm 2666 / 32 = 83 minutes
Question Number:
5 Tier:
1 Group 1
K/A:
000022AK1.04) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (APE 22) LOSS OF REACTOR Coolant Makeup: Changing from manual to automatic control of charging flow valve controller Importance Rating:
3.3 10 CFR Part 55:
41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3 / 45.5 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because given a flow control valve malfunction the candidate must determine the effect on the system Technical
Reference:
1ARM5A,ReactorCoolant-STM-FW1XA555A, Rev44Alarmsetpoint(page42)
IsolationofletdownonlowPZRlevel147W611682 R4 SQNUnit1TS3.4.13RCSOperationalLeakagelimits LCO3.4.13Amendment334(page3.14.131)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.PZR-PRT (OBJ: 4d, 4e, 4h, & 5b)
Question Source:
New X
Cog level High Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 6. Given the following:
Unit 2 is at 80% power when a step load change in power occurs.
Pressurizer pressure drops to 2205 psig.
Automatic pressure control responds as designed.
As pressure rises to 2214 psig, 2-PIC-68-340A, PZR Pressure Controller, output is observed to be 10% and not responding.
The controller is placed in MANUAL with the controller output reading 10%.
Assuming NO further operator action, which one of the following identifies the system response?
All Heater banks remain ON and pressure will be controlled by PZR Spray valves.
Heater banks C & D remain ON, Heater Banks A & B turn OFF and pressure will be controlled by PZR Spray valves.
All Heater banks remain ON and pressure will be controlled by PZR PORVs.
Heater banks C & D remain ON, Heater Banks A & B turn OFF and pressure will be controlled by PZR PORVs.
A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect, Plausible since the the first part is correct, at 2205 psig all PZR heaters will be energized. However with the Master controller in Manual, the spray valves will not automatically open. Candidate may select this answer if they do not recognize that the spray valves are being controlled in manual and will not respond to high pressure signal.
B.
Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate does not recognize that all heaters will remain on since the master pressure controller was placed in manual after all heaters were energized. Also the spray valves are being controlled in manual and will not respond to high pressure signal.
C.
Correct, With Pressurizer pressure dropping to 2205 psig, all PZR heater banks will be energized in an attempt to return RCS pressure to its normal value. Also with the master pressure controller in Manual, the spray valves will not function to control pressure, however PORV 68-334 is not controlled by master controller output. PORV will open at setpoint to control pressure.
PORV 68-340 is controlled by master controller in manual and will not open to control pressure. Student may confuse PORVs.
D.
Incorrect, Plausible since the second part is correct, the PZR pressure will be controlled by PORV 68-334 when the master pressure controller is in Manual.
However if the candidate does not recognize that all heaters will remain on since the master pressure controller was placed in manual after all heaters were energized, then the candidate may select this answer.
Question Number:
6 Tier:
1 Group 1
K/A:
000027AK2.13) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE 27) PRESSURIZER PRESSURE Control System Malfunction and the following systems or components: PZR master pressure controller Importance Rating:
3.9 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.7 10CFR55.43.b:
not applicable K/A Match:
This question matches the K/A by having the candidate determine how the output of the master pressure controller, in automatic or manual, will affect the operation of the PZR heaters and/or spray valves.
Technical
Reference:
AOPI.04,PressurizerInstrumentandControl Malfunctions,Rev.19 PZRPressureControlSystem(page111)
MasterPressureControllerprogram(page113)
Proposed references to be provided:
None Learning Objective:
OPT200.PZR-PRT (OBJ: 4d, 4e, & 4g)
Question Source:
New Cog level High Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 7. Given the following on Unit 1:
FR-S.1, "Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS" is being performed EA-68-4, "Emergency Boration" is being performed using the BAT as the boration source
- When the OATC releases the 1-HS-62-138A, EMERGENCY BORATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE switch, boric acid flow is at 45 gpm 2 minutes after EA-68-4 has been initiated, plant conditions are as follows:
Tave is 553°F and slowly lowering No RCS dilution is in progress All rod bottom lights are LIT Which one of the following completes the statement below?
The boric acid flow (1) greater than minimum required flow AND Emergency Boration (2) be terminated under given condtions.
(1) (2) is can is can NOT is NOT can is NOT can NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A Correct (1) >40 gpm is required for given condtions (2) Because rods are on bottom, procedure allows for termination B.
C.
D.
Incorrect (1) plausible because if Boration was from RWST flow IS NOT adequate (2) plausible because if Control Rods were not fully inserted criteria would not be met
Question Number:
7 Tier:
1 Group 1
K/A:
(000029) (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient Without Scram (G2.4.12)
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of operating crew responsibilities during emergency and abnormal operations Importance Rating:
4.0 10 CFR Part 55:
41.10 / 45.12 10CFR55.43.b:
Not applicable K/A Match:
K/A is met because candidate must determine crew actions after an ATWS Technical
Reference:
EA684,EmergencyBoration,Rev.18 BAflowrequirementsduringATWS(Noteon page12)
FRS.1,NuclearPowerGeneration/ATWS,Rev.28 Emergencyborationterminationcriteria(page14,step20.b)
Proposed references to be provided:
None Learning Objective:
OPL271FR-S.1 (OBJ: 6)
Question Source:
New X
Cog level: High Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 8. Given the following:
A Steam Generator Tube Rupture occurred on Unit 2
- Offsite power was lost The crew is performing E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Which one of the following completes the statements below?
The initial RCS cooldown will be controlled using (1) temperatures.
The cooldown will be performed using (2).
(1) (2)
RCS hot leg steam dumps RCS hot leg ARVs Core Exit Thermocouples steam dumps Core Exit Thermocouples ARVs A.
B.
C.
D.
The correct answer is D Justification:
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect (1) Plausible becuase Hot leg temps are used to control subsequent cooldowns (2) Plausible because if Offsite power were not lost this is a correct answer B.
C.
D.
Correct (1) E-3 uses CETC for the inital cooldown (2) Because offsite power was lost only the ARV's are available
Question Number:
8 Tier:
1 Group 1
K/A:
00038EK1.06) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (EPE 38) STEAM GENERATOR Tube Rupture: Initiating an RCS cooldown before isolating the ruptured S/G Importance Rating:
4.1 10 CFR Part 55:
41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8 / 45.9 10CFR55.43.b:
Not applicable K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must determine what is avalible for RCS cooldown and how it will be controlled Technical
Reference:
E3,SteamGeneratorTubeRupture,Rev.29(pages13&
15)
TI28,ATT9Unit1&2CycleDataSheet,EffectiveDate:
11302022(page9)
Proposed references to be provided:
None Learning Objective:
OPL271E-3 (OBJ: 6)
Question Source:
New Cog level: High Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 9. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is at 90% RTP Subsequently,
- 1A MFPT Trips Which one of the following completes the statements below?
The TDAFW pump (1) automatically start.
An automatic Main Turbine runback (2) occur.
(1) (2) will will will will NOT will NOT will will NOT will NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
correct (1) above 76.6% power the TDAFWP will auto start (2) above 76% power with a MFP trip a auto runback will occur B.
C.
D.
incorrect (1) plausible bacuse at a lower power this is a correct answer (2) plausible bacuse at a lower power this is a correct answer
Question Number:
9 Tier:
1 Group 1
K/A:
000054AK2.09) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE 54) LOSS OF Main Feedwater and the following systems or components: AFW Importance Rating:
3.9 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.7 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must determine AFW system response after a loss of a MFP pump Technical
Reference:
TI28,ATT9Unit1&2CycleDataSheet,EffectiveDate:
11302022(page11)
AOPS.01,MainFeedwaterMalfunctions,Rev.36(page12)
Proposed references to be provided:
none Learning Objective:
OPT200.AFW (OBJ: 4e)
OPT200.MFW (OBJ: 4e)
Question Source:
New X
Cog level: Low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 10. Given the following:
- Station Blackout has occurred
- Unit 1 entered ECA-0.0 Which one of the following completes the statements below?
Prior to any restoration of power...
Rod bottom light indications on M-4 (1) be available.
Core Exit Thermocouple indications on M-4 (2) be available.
(1) (2) will will will will NOT will NOT will will NOT will NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
incorrect (1) plausible because this indiction is used to verify the RX tripped and therfore has high importance (2) plausible because the main data display is an ICS screen and most computers lose power in this condition C.
correct (1) this indication loses power and will be restored when a DG starts (2) this indication is from Vital AC and has battery power D.
Question Number:
10 Tier:
1 Group 1
K/A:
000055EA2.08) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (EPE 55) Station Blackout: In-core thermocouple temperatures Importance Rating:
3.6 10 CFR Part 55:
43.5 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
Ka is met because candidate must evaluate availablity of CETC after a station blackout Technical
Reference:
ECA0.0,LossofAllACPower,Rev.38(page24)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPL271ECA-0.0 (OBJ: 5 & 6)
Question Source:
New X
Cog Level: Low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 11. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is 100%
Subsequently,
- A loss of Offsite Power occurs Which one of the following completes the statements below?
Momentary core cooling (1) be provided by RCPs, immediately after the RX trip.
After the EDGs start, RCPs (2) available to be restarted.
(1) (2) will are will are NOT will NOT are will NOT are NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Correct (1) RCP flywheel does provide monetary flow (2) RCP busses are not restored by the EDG C.
Incorrect (1) plausible because the RCP has tripped and has no power (2) plausible because EDGs do restore some busses D.
Justification:
A. Correct: The purpose of the RCP Flywheel is to increase the pump coast down time, to extend the period of forced flow following a pump trip.
B. Incorrect: Not enough time has elapsed for natural circulation flow to have been established.
C. Incorrect: ECCS flow will not have been established at this time.
D. Incorrect: Cooling is still required at this power level, AFW flow is insufficient to provide enough cooling at this power level.
Question Number:
11 Tier:
1 Group 1
K/A:
000056AK2.12) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power and the following systems or components:
RCS Importance Rating:
3.9 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.7 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must identify RCPs flywheel desing provides momentary cooling as RX power is decreasing after a tip/los of offsite power.
Technical
Reference:
RCPflywheelprovidesadequateflowforcorecooling duringcoastdown.
FSAR,ReportAmendment31,section5.5.1.1RCP DesignBases(page5.51) 1SO682,Att.1,ReactorCoolantPumpsPower Checklist1682.01,EffectiveDate:02032022,(page2)
Prints 1,245N713R26 145N7211R27 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.RCS(OBJ:4a&4c)
Question Source:
New X
Cog Level Low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 12. Given the following:
A reactor startup is in progress Reactor power is 8 X 10-3%
Vital Instrument Power Bd. 1-II is lost Which ONE of the following choices completes the statement below?
The reactor trips due to loss of ___(1)___ and only ___(2)___ can be reinstated.
(1)
(2)
IR N-35 SR N-31 IR N-35 SR N-32 IR N-36 SR N-31 IR N-36 SR N-32 A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect, Wrong channel of IR NI, but SR response is correct for other SR NI (31)
B.
Incorrect, Wrong channel of IR NI, but SR response is correct for other SR NI (31)
C.
Correct, Channel 2 feeds N-36. With power lost, SR N31 will still energize below P-6 if it has power D.
Incorrect, Correct channels, but N-31 will energize because it has power, and loss of power fails N-36 low, so P-6 will be satisfied.
Question Number:
12 Tier:
1 Group 1
K/A:
(000057) (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus (G2.1.2) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Knowledge of operator responsibilities during any mode of plant operation Importance Rating:
4.1 10 CFR Part 55:
41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must determine based on a system malfunction and lineup how the system will respond Technical
Reference:
AOPI.01,NuclearInstrumentMalfunction,Rev.19(page 13) 1,245N6924R2 Proposed references to be provided:
None Learning Objective:
OPL271AOP-I.01 (OBJ: 3 & 12)
Question Source:
New Cog Level: High Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 13. Given the following:
- Both Units are at 100% RTP Subsequently the following alarm is received:
- 125V DC VITAL CHGR III FAIL / VITAL BAT III DISCHARGE ( 1-M1-C, C-4)
Which one of the following completes both statements below?
In accordance with 1-SI-OPS-000-003.W, "Weekly Shift Log," the maximum allowable Tech Spec limit for the Vital Battery Board DC voltage is __(1)__.
In accordance with 1-AR-M1-C, C-4, 125V DC VITAL CHGR III FAIL / VITAL BAT III DISCHARGE," Downscale (zero or below) deflection of EI-57-94, Vital Battery BD III Amps, indicates current flow from the __(2)__.
(1) (2) 140V DC battery 140V DC charger 144V DC battery 144V DC charger A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
correct (1) this is the required voltage for weekly shift log (2) This is a NOTE in the AR on how to read this meter C.
Incorrect, (1) Plausible because this is just above the high voltage alarm setpoint in the ARP (2) Plausible because if the indication were upscale this would be a correct answer D.
Question Number:
13 Tier:
1 Group 1
K/A:
000058AK2.03) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE 58) LOSS OF DC Power and the following systems or components:
Battery Importance Rating:
3.7 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.7 10CFR55.43.b:
N/A K/A Match:
The KA is met because candidate must determine system response after a DC Vital charger failure alarm Technical
Reference:
2SIOPS000003.WWeeklyShiftLog,Rev.88(page20) 2ARM1C,AC/DCControlPower2XA551C,Rev.
66(page32)
Proposed references to be provided:
None Learning Objective:
OPL271AOP-P.02 (OBJ: 6 & 8)
Question Source:
New X
Modified Bank Bank Cog Level: low Question History:
Comments:
- 14. Given the following:
Both Units are at 100% power ERCW is in normal alignment ERCW headers 1A & 2A are indicating LOW flow The following MCR alarms are LIT:
1-M-15A Window B-6, MECH EQUIP SUMP LVL HI 0-M-27A Window A-1, UNIT 1 HEADER A PRESSURE LOW 0-M-27A Window B-3, UNIT 2 HEADER A PRESSURE LOW NO OTHER alarms are lit associated with the ERCW system.
Which one of the following ERCW conditions accounts for the above indications?
Supply header 1A/2A has ruptured in the Yard Area.
A discharge header has ruptured in the Yard Area.
A rupture has occurred upstream of the 2A strainer.
A rupture has occurred in the CCW Intake Pumping Station.
A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect, Plausible since these would also be indications of a supply header rupture, however there would be High system flow associated with this failure not Low flow.
B.
Incorrect, Plausible since a pipe rupture would cause system pressure to do down, but a rupture is this location would be accompanied with high system flow, not low flow.
C.
Correct, The diagnostic section (Section 2.1 ) of AOP-M.01, "Loss of ERCW," uses the annunciators and indications listed in the stem to indicate that a supply header has ruptured upstream of a train A supply strainer. Since both Unit 1 and Unit 2 supply headers are cross connected upstream of the strainers a leak or rupture on one strainer will affect the other train.
D.
Incorrect, Plausible since a pipe rupture would cause system pressure to do down, but a rupture is this location would be accompanied with high system flow, not low flow. The main ERCW headers go right through the CCW pumping station.
Question Number:
14 Tier:
1 Group 1
K/A:
000062AK1.01) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (APE 62) LOSS OF SERVICE WATER: Effect on loads cooled by service water Importance Rating:
3.8 10 CFR Part 55:
41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3 10CFR55.43.b:
Not applicable K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must locate a leak location to determine what loads will be effected Technical
Reference:
1ARM15A,ServiceWater-CCW-HPFP1XA15A, Rev.44(page22) 0ARM27A,EssentialRawCoolingWater0XA5527A,Rev.
22(pages3&12 AOPM.01,LossofEssentialRawCoolingWater,Rev.37 (pages8&139) 1,247W8455R63 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPL271AOP-M.01 (OBJ: 4)
Question Source:
New Cog level High Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 15. Given the following:
Unit 1 observes the following condtions:
- Control Air pressure is 40 psig and lowering slowly
- Aux control air headers A and B is 85 psig and stable Which one of the following describes the plant response.
FCV-62-73, Letdown Orifice Isolation fails (1).
FCV-62-93, Charging Flow Control Valve fails (2).
(1) (2) open open open closed closed open closed closed A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Incorrect (1) plausible because aux control air still has pressure (2) plausible because aux control air still has pressure C.
Correct (1) this valve fails closed on loss of control air (2) this valve fails open on loss of control air D.
Question Number:
15 Tier:
1 Group 1
K/A:
00065AK3.03) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to (APE 65) LOSS OF Instrument Air: Knowing effects on plant operation of isolating certain equipment from instrument air Importance Rating:
3.6 10 CFR Part 55:
41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must determine what part of system is effected and determine how the plant will respond to the air malfunction Technical
Reference:
1-47W611-62-1 R9 1-47W611-62-4 R27 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.CVCS (OBJ: 4d & 6b)
Question Source:
New X
Cog level high Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 18. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is performing FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Which one of the following completes the statements below?
In accordance with FR-H.1 Foldout Page, when CST level is less than (1) the AFW suction source is required to be swapped to ERCW.
The automatic swapover of AFW supply from the CSTs to ERCW uses (2) to initiate.
(1) (2) 5% CST level instruments 5% suction pressure instruments 27% CST level instruments 27% suction pressure instruments A.
B.
C.
D.
The correct answer is B Justification:
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Correct (1) this is the level when the suction souce is required to be swapped (2) suction pressure is used to generate the signal C.
Incorrect (1) plausible because another tank uses this setpoint in the FO page (2) plausible becuase procedurally it is required at a certain level but incorrect because it is not driven from the level instrument D.
Question Number:
18 Tier:
1 Group 1
K/A:
WE05EA2.07) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (W E05) Loss of Secondary Heat Sink: Condensate storage tank level Importance Rating:
3.7 10 CFR Part 55:
41.10 10CFR55.43.b:
Not applicable K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall how CST is operated in FR-H.1 and recall desing feature associated with CST Technical
Reference:
FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Rev. 25 (page 52) 1-SO-3-2, Auxillary Feedwater System, Rev. 62 (page 8)
Proposed references to be provided:
None Learning Objective:
OPL271FR-H.1 (OBJ: 5 & 6)
OPT200.AFW (OBJ: 4e)
Question Source:
New X
Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 19. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is preparing for a reactor startup
- Shutdown banks are fully withdrawn
- Level trip bypass switch for N31 is in the Bypass position for maintenance Which one of the following completes the statements below?
A reactor trip (1) occur due to a loss of Control Power fuses.
A reactor trip (2) occur due to a loss of Instrument Power fuses.
(1) (2) will will will will NOT will NOT will will NOT will NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Correct (1) a RX trip will occour if Control power is lost (2) instrument power will not cause a RX trip in this condition C.
Incorrect (1) (2) plausible because one set of fuses will and the other will not cause the RX trip D.
Question Number:
19 Tier:
1 Group 2
K/A:
000032AA2.06) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 32) LOSS OF SOURCE RANGE Nuclear Instrumentation: Confirmation of reactor trip Importance Rating:
3.7 10 CFR Part 55:
43.5 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall how SRNI drawers effect a reactor trip with different blown fuses Technical
Reference:
1,2-45N692-1 R7 1,2-45N692-2 R3 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.NIS EXCORE INSTR (OBJ: 4e, 4g, 5b)
Question Source:
New X
Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 21. Given the following:
- Unit 2 is performing EA-68-4, Emergency Boration for a cooldown in ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization
- Rod C-7 is stuck at 200 steps
- The BAT will be boration source Which one of the following completes the statements below?
To place RHR in service at the maximum allowable temperature, the total required boration volume is (1).
In accordance with ES-1.2 the reason for the emergency boration is (2).
REFERENCE PROVIDED (ignore effects of xenon)
(1) (2) 5300 the stuck rod 5300 maintain shutdown margin 6280 the stuck rod 6280 maintain shutdown margin A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect (1) plausible is max RHR inservice temperature is not known (2) plausible because this would be correct if 2 rods or more were stuck out B.
C.
D.
Correct (1) RHR temp is 350 which yields 6280 per the reference (2) with only 1 rod out shutdown margin is reson for emergency boration
Question Number:
21 Tier:
1 Group 2
K/A:
(WE02EK3.13) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to (W E02) SI TERMINATION: Initiating emergency boration (reference potential)
Importance Rating:
3.7 10 CFR Part 55:
41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
Technical
Reference:
EA-68-4, Emergency Boration, Rev. 18 (page 17)
ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, Rev. 23 (page 14)
Proposed references to be provided:
Att3 EA-68-4 Learning Objective:
OPL271ES-1.2 (OBJ: 5)
Question Source:
New X
Cog Level High Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 22. Given the following:
The STA reports an ORANGE condition on the CONTAINMENT (FR-Z)
Status Tree due to high level in the containment sump.
Which one of the following...
(1) describes the actions that will be directed by FR-Z.2, Containment Flooding, and (2) what is the concern if these actions are not successful?
(1) Divert RHR flow from the Containment Sump to the RWST to lower the Containment Level.
(2) High water levels could result in components needed for plant recovery being damaged and rendered inoperable.
(1) Identify and isolate the source of excess water.
(2) Water levels could reach the bottom of the reactor vessel resulting in thermal shock and vessel failure.
(1) Identify and isolate the source of excess water.
(2) High water levels could result in components needed for plant recovery being damaged and rendered inoperable.
(1) Divert RHR flow from the Containment Sump to the RWST to lower the Containment Level.
(2) Water levels could reach the bottom of the reactor vessel resulting in thermal shock and vessel failure.
A.
B.
C.
D.
Containment design basis flood level takes into account the entire water contents of the RCS, RWST, Ice condenser ice bed melt, and SI accumulators, plus the added mass of a LOCA and a steam line or feedline break inside containment. ERCW and CCW may be major contributors to exceeding "flood" level and causing a loss of equipment required for long term cooling.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect. Water is not pumped out of containment using the RHR pumps.
B.
Incorrect, Water reaching the Reactor vessel would not cause thermal shock or vessel failure.
C.
Correct, D.
Incorrect, Water is not pumped out of containment using the RHR pumps.
Water reaching the Reactor vessel would not cause thermal shock or vessel failure.
Question Number:
22 Tier:
1 Group 2
K/A:
WE15EK1.04) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (W E15) Containment Flooding:
Design-basis flood level in containment Importance Rating:
3.1 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.7 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall operational implications of a design bases containment flooding event Technical
Reference:
FR-Z.2, Containment Flooding, Rev. 8 (page 3)
EPM-3-FR-Z.2 Basis Document for FR-Z.2 Containment Flooding, Rev. 4 (page 4)
Proposed references to be provided:
None Learning Objective:
OPL271FR-Z.2 (OBJ: 4 & 5)
Cognitive Level:
Higher Lower X
Question Source:
New Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:Modified From Previous Exam 2003 (2 exams ago)
- 23. Given the following plant conditions:
Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.
A lower containment purge is in progress in accordance with 0-SO-30-3, Lower Containment Purge Operation.
Which one of the following identifies...
(1) the minimum required logic to initiate an automatic Containment Ventilation Isolation signal and (2) whether the 1-RM-90-106, Lower Containment Radiation Monitor control board indication remains valid after the isolation signal?
Note: 1-RM-90-130 & 131, Containment Purge Rad Monitors (1) Both rad monitors (90-130 & 131) must reach the high setpoint; (2) VALID (1) Both rad monitors (90-130 & 131) must reach the high setpoint; (2) NOT VALID (1) ONLY one rad monitor (90-130 OR 131) must reach the high setpoint; (2) VALID (1) ONLY one rad monitor (90-130 OR 131) must reach the high setpoint; (2) NOT VALID A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect, (1) Plausible because some actuations are 2/2 which would make both a correct answer (2) Plausible because not all actuations driven by RAD monitors make the indication invalid B.
C.
D.
Correct, (1)The HI RAD condition sensed by either Containment Purge Rad Monitor 1-RM-90-131 or 130 will result in the containment vent isolation which isolates the purge and causes the 1-RM-90-106 flowpath to isolate.
(2) With the flowpath isolated, 1-RM-90-106 indication will not be valid.
Question Number:
23 Tier:
1 Group 2
K/A:
0WE16EA1.06) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to (W E16) HIGH Containment Radiation: ARM system Importance Rating:
3.4 10 CFR Part 55:
41.5 10CFR55.43.b:
Not applicable K/A Match:
Applicant must predict how radiation monitors increasing will affect the containment purge system and determine the resulting effect on a radiation monitor due to the containment isolation signal being generated.
Technical
Reference:
CVI Logic prints 1,2-47W611-30-1 R4 1-47W611-88-1 R15 1,2-47W610-90-3 R37 Proposed references to be provided:
None Learning Objective:
OPT200.CNTMTSTRUCT (OBJ: 3)
OPT200.RM (OBJ: 3b)
Question Source:
New Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 24. Given the following plant conditions:
The crew is implementing ES-1.2, "Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization".
The 1A-A Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) is running.
Both Safety Injection Pumps (SIPs) are running.
The crew has determined that one SIP can be stopped.
Which one of the following completes the statements below?
After the SIP is stopped, the subcooling value will stabilize at a (1) value when break flow and ECCS flow equalize.
If subcooling is adequate, the next required procedure action is to (2).
(1) Lower (2) establish normal charging (1) Higher (2) establish normal charging (1) Lower (2) stop the second SIP (1) Higher (2) stop the second SIP A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect, The first part is correct. The second part is plausible because the SI reduction sequence begins with stopping a charging pump, goes on to an SI pump and it is logical to assume that if further pump reduction is required to go back to a charging pump.
B.
Incorrect, Plausible some events (SG Fault, LBLOCA) will have RCS temperature rise in securing an SIP due to reduce cooling from reduced ECCS flow. On a SG Fault, the dynamics of the SG blowing dry and not being a heat sink causes RCS temperature and pressure to rise reducing ECCS flow with the result of subcooling lowering. The second part is plausible because the SI reduction sequence begins with stopping a charging pump, goes on to an SI pump and it is logical to assume that if further pump reduction is required to go back to a charging pump.
C.
Correct, Subcooling will lower in this situation as RCS pressure lowers and stabilize at a lower value when break flow and ECCS flow equal. The next pump to be secured is the second SIP as the procedure will try to keep a CPP in service to establish h normal charging.
D.
Incorrect, Plausible some events (SG Fault, LBLOCA) will have RCS temperature rise in securing an SIP due to reduce cooling from reduced ECCS flow. On a SG Fault, the dynamics of the SG blowing dry and not being a heat sink causes RCS temperature and pressure to rise reducing ECCS flow with the result of subcooling lowering. The second part is correct.
Question Number:
24 Tier:
1 Group 2
K/A:
WE03EA1.15) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to (W E03) LOCA COOLDOWN AND Depressurization: ECCS Importance Rating:
3.9 10 CFR Part 55:
41.5 to 41.8 / 45.5 to 45.8 10CFR55.43.b:
Not applicable K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall procedure actions and determine how subcooling will effect operation of ECCS Technical
Reference:
ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, Rev. 23 (pages 24 - 26)
EPM-3-ES-1.2, Basis Document for ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, Rev. 10 (page 55)
Proposed references to be provided:
None Learning Objective:
OPL271ES-1.2 (OBJ: 4 & 6)
Question Source:
New Cog level High Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 25. Given the following:
- ES-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vessel (With RVLIS) is in progress
- RCP seal flow is 8 gpm to each pump
- RCP thermal barrier isolation has occured Which one of the following completes the statements below in accordance with ES-0.3?
RCP seal cooling (1) considered ESTABLISHED and RCS cooldown rate is limited to a maximum of (2).
(1) (2) is 50oF/hour is NOT 50oF/hour is 100oF/hour is NOT 100oF/hour A.
B.
C.
D.
UPDATE DA DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A B
Incorrect (1) plausible because candidate may use the cooldown rate of 50F/hr that is initially required during the performance of ES-0.4, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vessel (Without RVLIS)
(2) plausible because candidate may determine a RCP start with voids could lead to RCP damage and disrupt further natural circulation.
C Correct (1) ES-0.3 is intended to provide a faster cooldown/depressurization than outlined in ES-0.2. For this reason the maximum RCS cooldown rate of 100F/hr is allowed (2) Starting a RCP establishes forced convection cooling to allow faster cooldown with less potential for upper head voiding D
Question Number:
25 Tier:
1 Group 2
K/A:
(WE09EK1.05) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (W E09)
NATURAL CIRCULATION OPERATIONS: Loss of RCP seal cooling Importance Rating:
3.1 10 CFR Part 55:
41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8 10CFR55.43.b:
na K/A Match:
K/A is met because aplicant must determine with is seal cooling is adequate for a NC cooldown Technical
Reference:
ES-0.3 Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vessel (With RVLIS), Rev. 20 (page 6)
EA-68-2, Establishing RCP Start Conditions, Rev. 4 (page 7)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPL271ES-0.3 (OBJ: 4 & 5)
Question Source:
Cog level: High New X
Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 26. Given the following:
Unit 1 is performing FR-P.1, Pressurized Thermal Shock Current plant conditions are:
- ALL SGs are Faulted
- RCS Tcold is 250°F and slowly lowering
- RCS pressure is 700 psig
- PZR level is 90% and rising
- CCPs are injecting via the CCPIT
- Total AFW flow is 300 gpm Which one of the following identifies the FIRST required action that will reduce the potential for damage to the reactor vessel in accordance with FR-P.1?
Raise total AFW flow to greater than 440 gpm Reduce AFW flow to no greater than 50 gpm per SG Reset SI and stop both CCPs Reset SI, stop one CCP, and isolate the CCPIT A.
B.
C.
D.
The correct answer is B Justification:
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect Plausible because this is the Minimum to preclude a RED path on Heatsink B.
Correct Because all S/G are faulted this is the First action directed by the procedure C.
Incorrect plausible because PZR level is 90% and rising D.
Incorrect plausible because this is an action take but it is NOT the First action taken
Question Number:
26 Tier:
1 Group 2
K/A:
(WE08EA1.16) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to (W E08) Pressurized Thermal Shock: AFW system Importance Rating:
3.5 10 CFR Part 55:
41.8 10CFR55.43.b:
Not applicable K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must determine how AFW will be operated during a PTS condition Technical
Reference:
FR-P.1, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Rev. 20 (page 5)
Proposed references to be provided:
None Learning Objective:
OPL271FR-P.1 (OBJ: 4 & 5)
Question Source:
New X
Coglevel High Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 27. Which one of the following completes the statements below?
The RCP oil coolers are cooled by (1).
The RCP motor coolers are cooled by (2).
(1) (2)
CCS CCS CCS ERCW ERCW CCS ERCW ERCW A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Correct (1) CCS cools RCP oil coolers (2) ERCW cools RCP Motor Coolers C.
Incorrect (1)(2) Plausible because they are both cooling mediums for the RCPs D.
Question Number:
27 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(003K1.02) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the (SF4P RCP) REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SYSTEM and the following systems: RCP motor cooling and ventilation Importance Rating:
3.4 10 CFR Part 55:
41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 / 45.8 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
Ka is met because candidate must identify cooling mediums for RPC (physical connections)
Technical
Reference:
Prints 1-47W845-3 R43 1-47W859-2 R33 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.RCS (OBJ: 3a)
Question Source:
New Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 28. Given the following:
Unit 2 is at 100%
Rod control is in Manual Tavg has decreased 1.5°F over the last hour Which one of the following will result in these conditions?
CVCS letdown heat exchanger temperature control valve failed open 2-FCV-62-138, Emergency Boration Flow Control valve is leaking by Primary water makeup flow was set at 70 gpm during the last manual makeup to the VCT A CVCS mixed bed demineralizer with new resin was put in service before being borated A.
B.
C.
D.
The correct answer is B Justification:
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect, Plausible if candidate does not realize that a mixed bed ion exchanger that was saturated would be at the current RCS boron concentration and would not add more boron to the system.
B.
Correct, If the emergency boration valve was leaking it would add boron directly into the suction of the charging pump and would cause RCS temp to drop due to Rods in manual. As RCS temperature goes down so would Pressure due to the outsurge of water from PZR.
C.
Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate does not remember that primary water makeup is 70 gpm during every makeup. The boric acid flow is what is varied to get proper blended flow.
D.
Incorrect, Plausible if candidate does not realize that a putting new mixed bed ion exchanger in service would reduce RCS boron not cause it to increase.
Question Number:
28 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
004A1.10) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the (SF1; SF2 CVCS) CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM, including: Reactor power Importance Rating:
3.8 10 CFR Part 55:
41.5 to 41.7 / 45.5 10CFR55.43.b:
Not applicable K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must determine what caused a change in power/temperature based on a fault in the CVCS system Technical
Reference:
AOP-C.02, Uncontrolled RCS Boron Concentration Changes, Rev 6 Proposed references to be provided:
None Learning Objective:
OPT200.CVCS (OBJ:3a, 4d, & 6a)
OPL271AOP-C.02 (OBJ: 4)
Question Source:
New Cog level High Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 29. Given the following:
Unit 1 is in Mode 4 RHR Train "A" is in service per 0-SO-74-1, Residual Heat Removal System Which one of the following malfunctions will result in a REDUCTION in RHR flow through the RHR Heat Exchanger 1A?
A loss of air to 1-FCV-74-32, RHR HTX Bypass air to 1-FCV-74-16, RHR HTX "A" Outlet 120V AC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-II 480V Shutdown Board 1A1-A A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
CORRECT. 1-FCV-74-32 fails open on loss of air, causing RHR flow to bypass the RHR HX, resulting in less flow through the RHR HX.
B.
Incorrect. 1-FCV-74-16 fails open on loss of air, causing more flow through the RHR HX. Plausible if applicant reverses the failure position of valve(s) or misapplies the effect of the failure.
C.
Incorrect. Loss of 120V AC 1-II will not have any effect on RHR flow through the RHR HX. Plausible because examinee may reverse the trains.
D.
Incorrect. Loss of 480V shutdown board will not change flow rate through the A RH HX (MOVs fail as is). Plausible because 480V SD BD 1A1-A does provide power to train A RHR components.
Question Number:
29 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(005K5.04) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (SF4P RHR)
RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM: Heat load on the RHRS during shutdown, cooldown, and refueling operations Importance Rating:
3.5 10 CFR Part 55:
41.5 / 45.7 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met becuase the candidate must determine cause effect relationship on a system malfunction and the effect on RHR system Technical
Reference:
Flow path & failure positions of RHR HX outlet valves 1-47W611-74-2 R8 AOP-P.03, Loss of Unit 1 Vital Instrument Power Board, Rev. 41 Appendix N Effects on RHR System (page 145)
Impacts from loss of VIPB 1-II (page 92)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.RHR (OBJ: 4d, 5b, & 6b)
Question Source:
New Cog level High Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 30. Given the following:
- A small break LOCA has occurred on Unit 1.
- Reactor MOV Board 1A1-A has lost power.
- The crew is performing ES-1.2, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION.
- ES-1.2 directs closing Cold Leg Accumulators (CLA) isolation valves The Crew will isolate CLAs (1) and vent CLAs (2).
(1) 2 and 4 (2) 1 and 3 (1) 1 and 3 (2) 2 and 4 (1) 2 and 3 (2) 1 and 4 (1) 1 and 4 (2) 2 and 3 A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Correct Accum 1 1-FCV-63-118 1A1-A Accum 3 1-FCV-63-80 1A1-A Accum 2 1-FCV-63-98 1B1-B Accum 4 1-FCV-63-67 1B1-B B.
Incorrect All are plausible because there are four accumulators with each vital bus providing power to two MOVs.
C.
Incorrect D.
Incorrect
Question Number:
30 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(006K2.02) Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: (SF2; SF3 ECCS) EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM Valve operators for safety injection tanks Importance Rating:
3.2 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must determine effect of loss of power on inection tank isolation valve Technical
Reference:
ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, Rev. 23 (pages 33 & 51)
EA-201-1 480 Board Room Breaker Alignments, Rev. 4 (page 8)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPL271ES-1.2 (OBJ: 4)
OPT200.ECCS (OBJ: 4c)
Question Source:
New Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 31. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is at 100%
- Annunciator TS-62-75 LOW PRESSURE LETDOWN RELIEF TEMP HIGH (1-M-6 Window C-4) is in alarm.
- RCS leakrate is calculated at 3 gpm Initially, Containment radiation level (1) expected to increase.
The leakrate (2) exceed LCO 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE requirements.
(1) (2) is does is does NOT is NOT does is NOT does NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect.
(1) plausible because a leak into containment is in progess (2) plausible because there are different numbers for various types of leakage, if it is not recognized as identified leakage, this answer would be selected B.
C.
D.
Correct (1) relief goes to PRT and not to containment, although if not attended to could rupture PRT eventually (2) Does not exceed identified leakage of 10GPM
Question Number:
31 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(007A1.05) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the (SF5 PRTS) PRESSURIZER RELIEF/QUENCH TANK SYSTEM, including: Containment radiation levels Importance Rating:
3.2 10 CFR Part 55:
41.5/45.5 10CFR55.43.b:
na K/A Match:
KA met, applicant must diagnose plant condition and predict changes in containment radiation levels CVCS malfunction Technical
Reference:
Flow path for letdown relief line 47W809-1 R86 47W813-1 R59 SQN Unit 1 TS 3.4.13 RCS Operational Leakage LCO 3.4.13 Amendment 334 (page 3.14.13-1)
LCO 3.4.13 Bases rev. 45 (page B 3.4.13-1 &
3 Proposed references to be provided:
None Learning Objective:
OPT200.CVCS (OBJ: 3a, 4g, & 4h)
OPT200.RCS (OBJ: 8a, 8b, 8c, & 8d)
Question Source:
Cog level: HIgher New Modified Bank Bank x
Question History:
Comments:
- 32. Given the following:
- Both CCS Surge Tank levels are at 87% and increasing
- All CCS Liquid Effluent Radiation Monitors are reading normal and stable
- Surge tank makeup valves 1-FCV-70-63 and 2-FCV-70-63 are closed
- Both trains of CCS are at 100 psig
- ERCW system pressure is at the top of its allowable control band Which one of the following describes the cause of the high CCS surge tank levels?
RCS leak into a CCS heat exchanger ERCW leak into a CCS heat exhanger 1A and 1B CCS pumps are operating in parallel CCS flow is not properly balanced between trains and units A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect. Rad monitors are reading normally; therefore, a leak from RCS into CCS did not occur. Plausible because RCS pressure higher than CCS pressure for thermal barrier Hx and Letdown Hx.
B.
Correct. Rad monitors are reading normally; therefore, water addition to the CCS is occuring from a source other than RCS. Makeup valves from primary makeup water are closed; therefore PMW is not source. Only other source is ERCW; Therefore, a leak from ERCW into CCS has occurred.
C.
Incorrect. Operation of both "A" train CCS pumps would only result in a level transiet when started and then would return to original level.
D.
Incorrect. Unbalanced flow between trains/units would cause one level to increase and the other to decrease.
Question Number:
32 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(008K6.09) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the (SF8 CCW)
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM: SWS Importance Rating:
3.8 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 54.7 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must determine system response given a malfunction between the CCS/ERCW systems Technical
Reference:
0-AR-M27B-B Component Cooling 0-XA-5527B-B, rev.
23 (page 20) 1,2-47W859-1 R57 1,2-47W845-2 R117 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.CCS (OBJ: 3a, 3g, & 6a)
Question Source:
New Cog level High Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 35. Given the following:
A Safety Injection occurred on Unit 1 Safety Injection is being terminated The OATC has pressed both SI Reset pushbuttons Subsequently,
- A main steamline break occurs downstream #2 MSIV Which one of the following completes the statments below?
The MSIVs (1) automatically close.
An automatic SI (2) actuate.
(1) (2) will will will will NOT will NOT will will NOT will NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Correct (1) Pressure Rate closure is still active for MSIVs (2) SI will not auto actuate until RX trip breakers have been cycled C.
Incorrect (1) plausible because the Auto SI will not actuate, this would normally cause an SI (2) plausible because this condition would normally cause an SI but because of system alignment it will not D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A. Correct, The automatic SI is not enabled until the reactor trip breakers are closed. The low steam line pressure MSIV closure signal is not blocked by the reset function (refer to 1-47W611-63-1)..
B. Incorrect, The automatic SI is disabled until the reactor trip breakers are closed.
Plausible since the low steam line pressure MSIV closure signal is not blocked by the SI reset.
C. Incorrect, The automatic SI is not enabled until the reactor trip breakers are closed. Plausible since the low steam line pressure MSIV closure signal is not blocked by the SI reset.
D. Incorrect, Plausible, since the automatic SI is not enabled until the reactor trip breakers are closed.
The low steam line pressure MSIV closure signal is disabled (blocked).
Question Number:
35 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
013K5.20) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (SF2 ESFAS)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM: Main steamline break Importance Rating:
4.2 10 CFR Part 55:
41.3 / 41.4 / 41.5 / 45.7 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must determine ESFAS system response for given plant conditions and a steamline break Technical
Reference:
SIS Reset logic 1-47W-611-63-1 R4 MSIV close logic 1,2-47w611-1-1 R19 1-AR-M4-A, Bypass and Permissive 1-XA-55-4A, Rev.
19 (page 20)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.MS (OBJ: 4e)
OPT200.RPS (OBJ: 4g)
Question Source:
New Cog level High Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 36. Given the following :
Refueling is in progress on Unit 1 when a report is made to the control room that an irradiated fuel assembly has been dropped.
The following is the status of alarms on 0-XA-55-12A:
RA-90-112A CNMT BLDG UP COMPT AIR MON HIGH RAD is Lit.
RA-90-59A RX BLDG AREA RAD MON HIGH RAD is Lit.
RA-90-131A CNTMT PURGE AIR EXH MON HIGH RAD is NOT Lit Which one of the following correctly completes the statements below?
A Containment Ventilation Isolation _(1)_ automatically occur.
In accordance with AOP-M.04, Refueling Malfunctions, Containment Closure (2) required.
(1) (2) will is will is NOT will NOT is will NOT is NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Incorrect (1) plausible because 112A RM is in alarm (2) plausible because if the ROD were dropped in SPF area this would be a correct answer C.
Correct (1) CVI is driven from 130/131 RMs, conditions do not support an auto CVI (2) Closure is required because of where the ROD was dropped, based on RM reading you can determine it is in containment D.
Question Number:
36 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(022) (SF5 CCS) CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM (G2.1.44)
CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Knowledge of RO duties in the control room during fuel handling, such as responding to alarms from the fuel handling area, communicating with fuel handling personnel, operating systems from the control room to support fueling operations, or supporting instrumentation Importance Rating:
3.9 10 CFR Part 55:
41.10 / 43.7 / 45.12 10CFR55.43.b:
Not applicable K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must determine how sysyem responds to a dropped fuel assembly and procedure requirements for the condition Technical
Reference:
CVI Logic prints 1,2-47W611-30-1 R4 1-47W611-88-1 R15 0-AR-M12-A, Unit 1 and Common Radiation Monitor 0-XA-55-12A, Rev. 60 (pages 29 & 31)
AOP-M.04, Refueling Malfunctions, Rev. 16 (page 13)
Proposed references to be provided:
None Learning Objective:
OPT200.CNTMTSTRUCT (OBJ: 4e)
OPL271AOP-M.04 (OBJ: 5 & 7)
Question Source:
New X
Cog level High Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 37. Which electrical board is the 2C Lower Containment Cooling Fan directly powered from?
480V C&A Vent Board 2A1-A 480V Shutdown Board 2A2-A 480V Reactor Vent Board 2B-B 480V Reactor MOV Board 2A1-A A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Plausible because this is a power supply board B.
Correct, 480V Shutdown Board C.
Plausible because this is a power supply board D.
Plausible because this is a power supply board
Question Number:
37 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
022 CCS Containment Cooling System K2.01 Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: CCS Fans Importance Rating:
3.6 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall power supply Technical
Reference:
0-SO-30-5 ATT 1, Lower Compartment Cooling Units Power Checklist 1-30-5.01, Effective Date: 04-21-2022 (page 2)
Proposed references to be provided:
none Learning Objective:
OPT200.CNTMTCLG&PURGE (OBJ: 4c)
Question Source:
New X
Cog Level: Memory Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 39. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is at 100% power Subsequently,
- A LOCA occurred
- ES-1.3, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump, is in progress
- Containment pressure peaked at 3.0 psig
- Current containment pressure is 1.8 psig and stable In accordance with ES-1.3, which one of the following identifies the MINIMUM action(s) necessary to allow 1B-B Containment Spray Pump to be stopped and placed in A-AUTO?
Reset the Train B Phase B signal and then the Train B Containment Spray signal Reset the Train B Containment Spray signal ONLY Simultaneously Reset BOTH Trains of Phase B Reset the Train B Phase B ONLY A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect, Plausible since the setpoint for Phase B and CNMT spray is at the same value the candidate would think that a Phase B signal would cause a CNMT spray actuation. However Phase B is independant of CNMT spray.
B.
Correct, In accordance with ES-1.3 when realigning Containment Spray pumps from RWST to sump recirculation if Containment pressure is not greater then 2.0 psig operators are directed to Reset just the CNMT spray actuation signal for the train being realigned. Thus, the minimum action would be to reset just CNMT spray actuation to secure the B CNMT spray pump.
C.
Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate thinks that the reset logic is the same as the initiation logic which requries the operator to use 2 hands for CNMT spray actuation.
D.
Incorrect, Plausible that the candidate would think that by resetting the Phase B signal that it would allow the Train B CNMT spray pump to be shutdown and remain off since the setpoint for Phase B is the same as CNMT Spray.
Question Number:
39 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(026K1.05) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the (SF5 CSS) CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM and the following systems: ESFAS Importance Rating:
4.5/4.3 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
This question matches the K/A by asking the how the logic for CNMT spray reset is configured and how the reset is accompished.
Technical
Reference:
ES-1.3, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump, Rev. 24 (page 4)
Cont Spray Pump reset logic 1-47W611-72-1 R.12 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.CS (OBJ: 3b & 4g)
Question Source:
Cog level: high New Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
From Previous Exam 2003 (2 exams ago)
Comments:
- 40. Given the following:
- Unit 2 is in MODE 4
- The 2A Containment Spray Pump is declared INOPERABLE Which one of the following completes the statements below?
LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray System, is (1) because (2).
(1) Met (2) Only 1 train of Containment Spray is required (1) Met (2) RHR spray is available (1) NOT Met (2) 2 trains of Containment Spray are required (1) Not Applicable (2) the Unit is in MODE 4 A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect (1) (2) Plausible because in this low mode RHR spray is not required (per above the line NOTE in TS) therefore one could believe 1 train is not required B.
Incorrect (1) (2) Plausible because RHR spray is available and could be confused as meeting one of the required trains C.
Correct (1) (2) 2 trains of CS are required in MODE 4 D.
Incorrect (1) (2) Plausible because this is a correct answer if Stem was Mode 5
Question Number:
40 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(026K3.01) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SF5 CSS) CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters: CCS Importance Rating:
3.8 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.6 10CFR55.43.b:
na K/A Match:
KA is met because candidte must recall effect on containment cooling avalibility and determine if LCO is met (above the line information)
Technical
Reference:
SQN Unit 2 TS 3.6.6 Containment Spray System LCO 3.6.6 Amendment 352 (page 3.6.6-1)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.CS (OBJ: 8a & 8b)
Question Source:
New X
Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 41. Given the following:
Unit 2 is in Mode 3 RCS pressure is 2235 psig Steam dumps in Steam Pressure Mode Atmospheric relief valves have been set per 2-SO-1-1, Main Steam System All RCP's are running Subsequently, A complete loss of Condenser vacuum occurs Which one of the following identifies the value at which Tave should stabilize, assuming no operator action?
547oF 549oF 552oF 554oF A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect Plausible Steam Dumps on RX trip controller Temp B.
Correct Failure of steam dump (C-9, Loss of vacuum) causes heat removal by ARVs.
The following derived from steam tables: 1025 psig + 15 psi = 1040 psia (1025 psig is the nominal setpoint for S/G ARVs)
Tsat for 1040 psia = 549oF.
C.
Incorrect Plausible Steam Dumps on Load Reject Controller Temp D.
Incorrec Plausible if interpolation not done for Steam tables
Question Number:
41 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(039A3.03) Ability to monitor automatic features of the (SF4S MSS) MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM, including:
Atmospheric relief valves Importance Rating:
3.7 10 CFR Part 55:
41.5 / 45.5 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
Ka is met because candidate must determine where ARVs will be controlling temperature based on system alignment Technical
Reference:
2-SO-1-1 Main Steam System, Rev. 42 (page 24)
Combustion Steam Tables Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.MS (OBJ: 3a & 4h)
OPT200.SDCS (OBJ: 6b)
Question Source:
New Cog level High Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 42. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is 70% RTP
- #1 SG level begins lowering at 10%/min AR-M3-B (D-1) DCS Transfer to Manual 1-M-3 Alarms Which one of the following completes the statements below?
(1) is/are expected to Transfer to Manual.
Immediate Operator action (1) required for this event.
(1) (2)
All FRV's is All FRV's is NOT Only #1 FRV is Only #1 FRV is NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Incorrect (1) plausible because it is a common alarm also other DCS transfers effect multiple componets (2) Plausible because the system takes part of the IOA for you by placing in manual, but wrong because the operator will need to adjust flowrate to stabilize the system C.
Correct (1) Only the effected valve transfers to Manual (2) this has an IOA for MFW valve failure D.
Question Number:
42 Tier:
1 Group 2
K/A:
(059A2.12) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF4S MFW) MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Failure of feedwater regulating valves Importance Rating:
3.9 10 CFR Part 55:
41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must evaluate FRV failure and determine system response and recall if IOAs apply Technical
Reference:
1-AR-M3-B, Main Feedwater Pumps 2-XA-55-3B, Rev.
26 (page 31) 1-AR-DCS-98, Distributed Control system Alarm Response, Rev. 12 (pages 39 & 40)
AOP-S.01, Main Feedwater Malfunctions, Rev. 36 (page 4)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.MFW (OBJ: 4d & 4g)
OPL271AOP-S.01 (OBJ: 3)
Question Source:
New X
Cog Level low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 44. Given the following:
Unit 2 is in Mode 1 The TDAFW Pump is tagged out of service A Loss of Feedwater causes a reactor trip Concurrent with the trip, 2B-B 6.9kV SDBD de-energizes on Differential fault Assuming NO operator actions have been taken, which one of the following describes the Auxiliary Feedwater alignment and approximate flowrate?
1 and 2 S/Gs being fed at 220 GPM each 1 and 2 S/Gs being fed at 440 GPM each ALL S/Gs being fed at 110 GPM each ALL S/Gs being fed at 220 GPM each A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Correct, With a loss of 2B-B SD Board, Only A MDAFW Pump is available. It has a capacity of 440 GPM, and it is aligned to automatically feed 1 and 2 SGs.Thus approximately 220 gpm to each SG.
B.
Incorrect, Plausible, since the alignment is correct, however the capacity (440 gpm) is the capacity of the Turbine driven pump, not the motor driven.
C.
Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate does not realize that only the A MDAFW is available and it only provides flow to SGs 1 & 2. The capacity would be correct if only one MD AFW pump was running and supplying all 4 SGs.
D.
Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate does not realize that 2B-B SDBD will not be re-energized by the EDG, thus only the "A" MDAFW is available and it only provides flow to SGs 1 & 2. The capacity would be correct if the candidate gets the flow of the TD AFW pump confused with the MD AFW pump and supplying all 4 SGs.
Question Number:
44 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(061K3.02) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SF4S AFW) AUXILIARY/EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters: S/G system Importance Rating:
4.3 10 CFR Part 55:
41.5, 41.7 / 45.6 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
This question matches the K/A by having the candidate determine the effect that a loss of AFW pumps will have during an malfunction.
Technical
Reference:
2-SO-3-2 ATT 1 Auxiliary Feedwater System Power Checklist, Effective Date: 04-24-2020 (page 6) 1,2-47W803-2 R79 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.AFW (OBJ: 3 & 5)
Question Source:
New Cog level High Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
From previous exam 2003 (2 exams ago)
Comments:
- 45. Given the following:
- Unit 1 was operating at 100% RTP
- A loss of Vital Instrument Power Board 1-I occurred Subsequently,
- A unit trip and safety injection occurred
- 1A-A EDG trips immediately after starting Which one of the following describes the status of ECCS loads?
Both trains of ECCS actuations occurred normally Neither train of ECCS actuations occurred normally Train A ECCS actuations occurred normally, but various train B actuations failed to function due to loss of power to slave relays Train B ECCS actuations occurred normally, but various train A actuations failed to function due to loss of power to slave relays A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
incorrect Plausible because if this were an inverter failure this would be a correct answer as power would still be available to the board B.
incorrect Plausible because the A train DG tripped after starting C.
Correct The board that failed is an B train board that provides power to various slave relays D.
Incorrect Plausible because this is a correct answer for the 1-I Power Board
Question Number:
45 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(062A3.05) Ability to monitor automatic features of the (SF6 ED AC) AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, including: Safety-related actuations Importance Rating:
4.1 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.5 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must identify the effect on safety related actuations with a loss of a 120VAC power board with complicating conditions.
Technical
Reference:
AOP-P.03, Loss of Unit 1 Vital Instrument Power Board, Rev. 41 (page 90)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.RPS (OBJ: 3, 4e, & 6a)
OPT200.AC120V (OBJ: 5)
Question Source:
New Modified Bank Bank X
Cog Level: CA Question History:
Comments:
- 46. Given the following:
- All 480V Unit Boards are aligned normally Subsequently,
- The 6900/480V transformer for the normal supply to 480V Unit Board 1A fails.
Which of the following completes the statements below?
The 480V Unit Board 1A (1) automatically transfer to alternate.
By procedure, the Common Emergency Transformer (2) supply more than one 480V Unit Board.
(1) (2) will can will can NOT will NOT can will NOT can NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Correct (1) this board has an auto transfer (2) Procedurally, after 1 board is transfered all the other boards are blocked (placed in manual) to preclude powering more than 1 board on the Emergency Transformer C.
Incorrect (1) plausible as not all boards have an auto transfer feature (2) plausible because the system is capable (no interlocks) but wrong because the procedure precludes it D.
Question Number:
46 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(062A3.10) Ability to monitor automatic features of the (SF6 ED AC) AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, including: Automatic transfer from auxiliary to reserve transformer Importance Rating:
3.3 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.5 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall transformer automatic features Technical
Reference:
45N777-1 R9 1-SO-201-5, 480V Unit Boards, Rev. 26 (page 7)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.AC480V (OBJ: 3a & 4e)
Question Source:
New X
Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 47. Given the following:
- Both Units are at 100% power
- All Offsite power is lost to both Units
- 1B-B and 2A-A diesel generators start and load
- 1A-A and 2B-B diesel generators do NOT start
- NO operator action has been taken Which one of the following describes status of the 125V Vital Boards?
Vital boards I and II are energized by their battery Vital boards I and IV are energized by their battery Vital boards II and III are energized by their battery All Vital 125V DC boards are energized by their battery charger A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate gets the power supplies to the DC board(s) confused. Vital Battery Board I is powered from the 1A-A DG, but VBB II is powered from its battery.
B.
Correct, Vital Battery Board I and VBB IV is powered from thier battery because the 1A-A and 2B-B EDGs did not start.
C.
Incorrect, With the 1A-A EDG supplying its associated bus then Battery charger I is powered from the 1-A Shutdown Board and with 2B-B EDG powering its associated bus then Battery Charger 4 is powered from bus 2-B Shutdown Board. Battery chargers II and III would be powered from their normal source D.
Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate thinks that Battery Charger I & III would be powered from an 'A' train EDG and chargers II & IV would be powered from a 'B' train EDG. All boards could be powered by the running DGs via the 1-S or 2-S Transfer switches, but each switch can only supply one source at a time.
Question Number:
47 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(063K3.03) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SF6 ED DC) DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters: AC distribution system Importance Rating:
4.0 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.6 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because battery chargers have lost power and candidate must identify the effect on Vital AC boards Technical
Reference:
1,2-45N700-1 R52 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.DC (OBJ: 4c & 5a)
Question Source:
Cog level: high New Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 48. Given the following:
- The 1A-A EDG is being synchronized to the 1A-A Shutdown Board
- The Voltage Regulator is being adjusted Which one of the following completes the statements below in accordance with 0-SO-82-1, Diesel Generator 1A-A?
The Voltage Regulator will be adjusted in the (1) position.
Incoming Voltage will be adjusted to (2) Running Voltage.
(1) (2)
MANUAL match MANUAL be slightly lower than PULL-P-AUTO match PULL-P-AUTO be slightly lower than A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Incorrect (1) plausible because you are making a MANUAL adjustment (2) plausible because this is a correct answer for frequency on the running board C.
Correct (1) adjustment is made in Pull-P-Auto (2) procedure requires votlages matched D.
Question Number:
48 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(064A4.02) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF6 EDG) EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM in the control room: Adjustment of exciter voltage (using voltage control switch)
Importance Rating:
3.8 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall how to manually operate the EDG voltage regulator Technical
Reference:
0-SO-82-1, Diesel Generator 1A-A, Rev. 64 (page 61)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.DG (OBJ: 4f & 4g)
Question Source:
New X
Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 49. Given the following:
Both Units operating at 100% RTP All systems are in a normal alignment A tube leak occurs in the Unit 2 Letdown Heat Exchanger Assuming no operator action, which one of the following describes the effects on CCS?
Radiation Monitor 2-RM-90-123A indication rises. Surge Tank vent valves 1-FCV-70-66 and 2-FCV-70-66 close when the monitor reaches the HIGH rad setpoint.
Radiation Monitor 2-RM-90-123A indication rises. Surge Tank vent valve 2-FCV-70-66 and Surge tank ISO valve 2-FCV-70-63 closes when the monitor reaches the HIGH rad setpoint. The 1-FCV-70-66 will remain open.
Unit 2 Surge Tank level lowers. The 2A and C-S CCS pumps will both lose suction when the surge tank empties.
Unit 2 Surge Tank level lowers. The 2A CCS pump will lose suction when the surge tank empties.
A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Correct, A leak on the Letdown Heat exchanger due to the pressure differences on the fluid mediums will cause leakage into the CCS system. Both surge Tank vents will isolate, if setpoint is reached on any of the radiation monitors on the CCS system.
B.
Incorrect, A leak on the Letdown Heat exchanger due to the pressure differences on the fluid mediums will cause leakage into the CCS system. Both surge Tank vents will isolate, if setpoint is reached on any of the radiation monitors on the CCS system. The suge tank ISO valve does not close ensuring an incorrect answer Plausible if student thinks the Rad Monitor is train specific and only close the associated units vent valve.
C.
Incorrect, A leak will cause a leak into the CCS system. Plausible if student believes CCS is at a higher pressure and CCS surge tank level lowers.
D.
Incorrect, A leak will cause a leak into the CCS system. Plausible if student believes CCS is at a higher pressure and CCS surge tank level lowers.
Question Number:
49 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(073A1.01) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the (SF7 PRM) PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM, including: Radiation levels Importance Rating:
3.5 10 CFR Part 55:
41.5 / 8-9 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must evaluate and predict system response based on increasing radiation levels due to a leak Technical
Reference:
0-AR-M12-D, Unit 2 and Plant Liquid Discharge Radiation Monitiors 0-XA-55-12D, Rev. 47 (page 18)
CCS surge tank vent logic 1,2-47W610-70-1 R25 1,2-47W611-70-1 R26 1,2-47W611-70-2 R48 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.CCS (OBJ: 4e, 4g, & 6a)
Question Source:
New Cog level High Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 50. Given the following:
Boths units are at 100% rated thermal power with all components in normal alignment
- A Safety injection occurs on Unit 1 Which one of the following predicts the automatic response of the following ERCW System valves?
Note:
0-FCV-67-151, CCS Heat Exchanger '0B1' Disch to Header A 0-FCV-67-152, CCS Heat Exchanger '0B2' Disch to Header B 0-FCV-67-151, automatically travels to 100% open.
0-FCV-67-152, automatically throttles to 35% open.
0-FCV-67-151, remains as is.
0-FCV-67-152, automatically travels to 100% open.
0-FCV-67-151, remains as is.
0-FCV-67-152, automatically throttles to 35% open.
0-FCV-67-151, automatically travels to 100% open.
0-FCV-67-152, automatically travels to 100% open.
A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect, During normal plant operation 0-FCV-62-151 is closed and 152 is open, Plausible if the candidate does not recognize that 0-FCV-62-151 will remain as is (closed) but 0-FCV-62-152 will go open to the 35% position.
B.
Incorrect, Plausible since the normal position of 0-FCV-62-151 is closed, however 0-FCV-62-152 will go the 35% open position.
C.
Correct, 0-FCV-62-151 will remain as is (closed with the power removed from valve motor) and 0-FCV-62-152 will automatically go the the 35% throttled position.
D.
Incorrect, Plausible if candidate thinks that 0FCV-62-151 will go open on an Unit 1 SI signal (it does not), 0-FCV-62-152 will go to the 35% open position.
Question Number:
50 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(076K4.05) Knowledge of (SF4S SW) SERVICE WATER SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Service water train flow and discharge pressure when service water flow to heat exchanger for CCW is throttled Importance Rating:
3.3 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 10CFR55.43.b:
na K/A Match:
This is a K/A match because it requires the operator to be able recognize the emergency alignment of ERCW given that the system would be aligned for normal operation.
Technical
Reference:
1,2-47W611-67-5 R39 1,2-45N779-38 R7 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.ERCW (OBJ: 4e)
Question Source:
New Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 51. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is MODE 1
- A partial loss of Raw Cooling Water has occurred
- Raw Cooling Water pressure is 40 psig
- ERCW supply header temperature is 73 degrees on both trains
- Both ERCW trains are OPERABLE Which one of the following identifies the required action (if any) in accordance with EA-32-2, Establishing Control and Service Air?
No action is required Align ERCW to the station air compressors Place station air compressors in HALF LOAD Place station air compressors in SAFE/STOP A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect plausible because you still have some cooling water flow, at a higher supply pressure this is a correct answer B.
Correct This is the procedural action required for this condition C.
Incorrect plausible because this would reduced heat load on the Air Compressor D.
Incorrect plausible because at lower supply pressure this would be a correct answer
Question Number:
51 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(078A2.03) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF8 IAS) INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Cooling water malfunction Importance Rating:
2.5 10 CFR Part 55:
41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recognize plant conditions and determine procedural requirement to mitigate the event Technical
Reference:
AOP-M.05, Loss of Raw Cooling Water, Rev. 11 (page 7)
EA-32-2, Establishing Control and Service Air, Rev. 5 (pages 3-6)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.CSA (OBJ: 6)
Question Source:
New X
Cog level High Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 52. Which one of the following completes the statments below in accodance with 0-SO-32-1, Control Air System, precautions and limitations?
(1) is(are) a symptom of excessive moisture in the Control Air System.
Control Air Dryer moisture alarms are located (2).
(1) (2)
Pressure perturbations locally Pressure perturbations in the Main Control Room Ice formation in air lines locally Ice formation in air lines in the Main Control Room A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Correct (1) this is a note in the procedure (2) Control air does not have alarms in the MCR, locally only B.
C.
D.
Incorrect (1) plausible because iceing is a reasonable concern but not one listed in the SO procedure (2) plausible because the Instrument Air system does have MCR alarms and would be correct for that system
Question Number:
52 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(078K5.04) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (SF8 IAS)
INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM: High moisture content in instrument air Importance Rating:
2.9 10 CFR Part 55:
41.5 / 45.7 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met candidate must recall operational implications of moisture in air system Technical
Reference:
0-SO-32-1, Control Air System, Rev. 114 (page 12)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.CSA (OBJ: 3a & 4F)
Question Source:
New X
Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 53. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is MODE 1 Subsequently,
- A steam line break occurs
- Containment pressure is monitored
- 09:01:00.51 psid
- 09:03:00 1.51 psid The Containment Vacuum Relief isolation valves FCV-30-46, 47, and 48 will automatically close at (1).
The Containment Vacuum Relief isolation valves use (2) air to operate.
(1) (2)
~ 0901 essential
~ 0901 non-essential
~ 0903 essential
~ 0903 non-essential A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Incorrect (1) plausible because other system actuation occur at.5 psid (2) plausible because both air systems are in containment C.
Correct (1) This is a note in the procedure and listed at 1.5 psid (2) these valves use essential air D.
Question Number:
53 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(103) (SF5 CNT) CONTAINMENT SYSTEM (G2.1.32) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to explain and apply system precautions, limitations, notes, or cautions Importance Rating:
3.8 10 CFR Part 55:
41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met candidate must recall and apply note in 0-SO-30-8 related to the containment system Technical
Reference:
0-SO-30-8, Containment Pressure Control, Rev. 39 (page 9)
Prints for Essential Air 1,2-47W848-1 R54 1,2-47W848-12 R51 1,2-47W848-12-A R1 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.CNTMTSTRUCT (OBJ: 3b & 6a)
Question Source:
New X
Cog Level Low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 54. Given the following:
- Phase B was inadvertently manually actuated Which one of the following actions will NOT occur during a manual Phase B?
Containment Spray Pumps start Main Steam Isolation Valves close Containment Vent Isolation Signal initiated Essential Control Air to Containment isolates A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect - Containment Spray Pumps start on an Automatic or Manual Phase B isolation.
B.
Correct - Main steam isolation valves will only close on a H-Hi Containment pressure signal.
C.
Incorrect - CVI will only occur on a Manual Phase A or B isolation.
D.
Incorrect - Essential Control Air will isolate on a manual or automatic Phase B isolation.
Question Number:
54 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
(103K6.15) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the (SF5 CNT)
CONTAINMENT SYSTEM: MRSS Importance Rating:
3.1 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.7 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must determine effect of inadvertant operation of Phase B (malfuanction) on the MRSS Technical
Reference:
TI-28, ATT9 Unit 1 & 2 Cycle Data Sheet, Effective Date: 11-30-2022 (page 7) 1,2-47W611-1-1 R19 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.MS (OBJ: 4e)
Question Source:
New Cog Level Low Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
USE of NOT in the stem, while not normal, enhances this question by not needing a legthy stem to explain all the other conditions. No complaints from validators
- 55. Given the following:
- Unit 2 is in Mode 6
- Train A RHR cooling was placed in service at 2500 gpm Subsequently,
- RCS water level begins to lower
- The crew enters AOP-R.03, RHR System Malfunction
- RCS water level is 6970 and slowly lowering Which of the following completes the statements below, in accordance with AOP-R.03?
RHR flow (1) required to be reduced to 2000 gpm.
If RHR pump exhibits signs of cavitation, the operating crew will (2).
(1) is (2) place RHR pump in P-T-L (1) is (2) restore RCS level to normal band (1) is NOT (2) place RHR pump in P-T-L (1) is NOT (2) restore RCS level to normal band A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Correct (1) procedure requires a reduaction in flow (2) the cavitating pump will be secured B.
C.
D.
Incorrect (1) plausible because this will reduce core cooling which is undesireable (2) plausible becuase this would correct the issue but is wrong because the pump is cavitating
Question Number:
55 Tier:
2 Group 2
K/A:
(002A4.04) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF2; SF4P RCS) REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM in the control room:
The filling/draining of LPI pumps during refueling Importance Rating:
3.0 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall how to operate LPI (RHR) pumps during refueling with a system malfunction Technical
Reference:
AOP-R.03, RHR System Malfunction, Rev. 38 (pages 4
& 5)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPL271AOP-R.03 (OBJ: 13 & 15)
Question Source:
New Cog Level Low Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 56. Given the following:
- The OATC withdrew Shutdown Bank A rods 50 steps
- The following indications are observed
- SHUTDOWN BANK A GROUP 1 and 2 Demand Counters are 050
- Rod M2 RPI is 63 steps
- Rod E5 RPI is 37 steps
- Rod L5 RPI is 62 steps
- Rod E4 RPI is 61 steps
- ALL other rods in SHUTDOWN BANK A RPIs are 49 steps Which of the following completes the statement below?
In accordance with LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, position(s) is(are) exceeding accuracy requirements.
Rod M2 ONLY Rod E5 ONLY Rods M2 and L5 ONLY Rods M2 and E5 ONLY A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect does not include Rod E5 plausible because it is the only rod that is Higher B.
Incorrect does not include Rod M2 plausible because it is the only rod that is Lower C.
Incorrect plausible if candidate believes the 12 steps is from the bank position of 49 this answer would be selected D.
Correct M2 and E5 are >12 steps from demand counter
Question Number:
56 Tier:
2 Group 2
K/A:
(014A4.05) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF1 RPI) ROD POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM in the control room:
RPI accuracy mode selection (W)
Importance Rating:
3.1 10 CFR Part 55:
41.6 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall and apply accuracy requirements for the RPI system Technical
Reference:
SQN Unit 1 Tech Specs LCO 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits, Amendment 334 (page 3.1.4-1)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.RDCNT-RPI (OBJ: 8b)
Question Source:
New X
Cog Level High Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 57. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is MODE 6
- Water level is 22 feet above the vessel flange
- Both Trains of RHR are OPERABLE
- A Train RHR is in service Which one of the following completes the statement below, in accordance with LCO 3.9.6, Residual Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level?
One Train of RHR can be INOPERABLE for up to (1) to support (2).
(1) (2) 15 minutes maintenance 15 minutes surveillance testing 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> maintenance 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> surveillance testing A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect (1) plausible because this is the time allowance for Train swaps (2) plausible because maintenance is a frequent occourence B.
C.
D.
Correct (1) 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> allowance per TSs (2) Surveillance testing is the allowance
Question Number:
57 Tier:
2 Group 2
K/A:
(034K1.02) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the (SF8 FHS) FUEL HANDLING EQUIPMENT SYSTEM and the following systems: RHRS Importance Rating:
2.9 10 CFR Part 55:
41.2 to 41.7 / 41.9 / 43.6 / 43.7 / 45.7 / 45.8 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall operational allowance for RHR during refueling Technical
Reference:
SQN Unit 1 Tech Specs LCO 3.9.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level, Amendment 334 (page 3.9.6-1)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.RHR (OBJ: 8a)
Question Source:
New X
Cog Level Low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 58. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is 35% RTP Subsequently,
- All Steam Dumps fail full open Which one of the following completes the statements below?
Based on system design, with all steam dumps open, Reactor Power will be (1).
Main Turbine MWe will (2).
(1) (2) 75% lower 75% remain the same 85% lower 85% remain the same A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Correct (1) system design is 40% for steam dumps 40=35=75 (2) because steam demand rise, steam pressure is lower, less work from turbine because of the lower pressure, MWe go down B.
C.
D.
Incorrect (1) plausible because system design has 10% for rods in addition to SDs 40%,
however its wrong because rods will not move out to add 50%
Question Number:
58 Tier:
2 Group 2
K/A:
(041K3.04) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SF4S SDS) STEAM DUMP/TURBINE BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters: Reactor power Importance Rating:
4.1 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.6 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall system design parameter and apply the failure to RX power and MWe Technical
Reference:
0-SO-1-2, Steam Dump System, Rev. 19 (pages 6 & 7)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.SDCS (OBJ: 1 & 5b)
Question Source:
New X
Cog Level High Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 59. Given the following:
- Unit 2 is at 92% power
- ONE Condenser Steam Dump valve fails open
- Control Rods are in MANUAL Which one of the following describes the effect on the unit and the MINIMUM action required in accordance with AOP-S.05, Main Steam or Feedwater Line Break/Leak?
Tave will rise; Place Steam Dump Control, 2-HS-1-103A and 103B to OFF Tave will rise; Trip the reactor and close the MSIVs Tave will lower; Place Steam Dump Control, 2-HS-1-103A and 103B to OFF Tave will lower; Trip the reactor and close the MSIVs A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Incorrect (1) plausible because RX power will increase (2) plausible because if RX power were higher and exceeding 100% this action could be taken, wrong because 1 steam dump will not exceed 100% at this power level C.
Correct (1) Steam demand increases Tave lowers (2) this action will close the Steam Dump D.
AOP-S.05 step 3 RNO directs IF...failed open, then Close using MCR switch.
Justification:
A. Correct; reactor power follows steam demand-leak causes reactor power to go up; placing the affected Condenser Steam Dump Interlock Switch, 2-HS-103A or 103B to OFF will achieve SDS valve closure per RNO.
B. Incorrect; Not per AOP-S.05 step 3 C. Incorrect; reverse of 'A'.
D. Incorrect; same as 'C' regarding power; correct regarding action.
OPL271AOP-S.05 Obj 3 Verified 6/9/17 - JCD
Question Number:
59 Tier:
2 Group 2
K/A:
(045A2.13) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF4S MTG) MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Opening of the steam dumps at low pressure Importance Rating:
2.9 10 CFR Part 55:
41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall effect and procedural guidance to mitigate a Steam Dump opening at high power (low steam pressure)
Technical
Reference:
AOP-S.05, Steam or Feedwater Leak, Rev. 23 (pages 5
& 28)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.SDCS (OBJ: 1 & 5b)
OPL271AOP-S.05 (OBJ: 6)
Question Source:
New Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 60. Given the following:
- Unit 2 is at 60% RTP
- Condenser vacuum pumps "A" and "B" are in service
- Condenser vacuum pump "C" is in standby
- Condenser inleakage is 17 SCFM
- Condenser backpressure is 0.9 psia
- Condenser vacuum pump "B" just tripped Which one of the follwoing completes the statements below?
Condenser backpressure will (1).
Condenser vacuum pump "C" (2) auto start immediately when Condenser vacuum pump "B" trips.
(1) (2) rise will rise will NOT remain constant will remain constant will NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Correct (1) In this condition backpressure will rise (2) the pump does not have an electrical based auto start, it start based on pressure C.
Incorrect (1) plausible because if inleakage were lower this would be a correct answer (2) plausible because this pump has an auto start on backpressure D.
Question Number:
60 Tier:
2 Group 2
K/A:
(055) (SF4S CARS) CONDENSER AIR REMOVAL SYSTEM (191006K1.14) HEAT EXCHANGERS AND CONDENSERS: Reasons for noncondensable gas removal Importance Rating:
2.6 10 CFR Part 55:
41.4 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must determine system response with a loss of a CARS pump and determine how the system will automatically respond (Reason is implied with the loss of the pump back pressure in the condenser increases)
Technical
Reference:
1-SO-2-9, Condenser Vacuum and Turbine Steam Seal System Operation, Rev. 43 (page 17)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.COND (OBJ: 3a, 4e, & 5b)
Question Source:
New X
Cog level High Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 61. Which one of the following would cause the Main Feedwater Pump 2A to trip automatically?
Condenser Vaccum 4 psia MFP turbine speed of 4900 RPM Injection Water pressure of 240 psig MFP Suction Valve drifting to 60% Open A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect plausible because this would trip the Main turbine B.
Incorrect plausible because this would trip the MDAFW pump C.
Incorrect plausible because this is an actual trip but pressure would need to be less than 220 psig D.
Correct valve position <75% open will trip the MFP
Question Number:
61 Tier:
2 Group 2
K/A:
(056A3.09) Ability to monitor automatic features of the (SF4S CDS) CONDENSATE SYSTEM, including: Automatic protection of MFW pump low suction pressure Importance Rating:
3.6 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.5 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall automatic feature to protect MFP for a low suction pressure event.
Technical
Reference:
TI-28, ATT9 Unit 1 & 2 Cycle Data Sheet, Effective Date: 11-30-2022 (page 12) 2-AR-M3-B, Main Feedwater Pumps 2-XA-55-3B, Rev.
25 (page 4) 1,2-45N646-1 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.MFW (OBJ: 4e)
Question Source:
New X
Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 63. Given the following:
- The Unit 1 Hydrogen Seal Oil System Water Fog HPFP System is required due to a fire
- 1-HS-26-72A, H2 SEAL OIL UNIT FOG CONTROL on 1-M-15 is placed in ON The following indications are observed:
- Amber Light is LIT
- White Light is LIT
- Red Light is NOT LIT Which one of the following completes the statements below?
The system is...
Operating as expected NOT Operating as expected, the Red Light should be LIT NOT Operating as expected, the White Light should NOT be LIT ONLY NOT Operating as expected the White light should NOT be LIT AND the Red Light should be LIT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect plausible because this sytem indications are abnormal to most indicating lights B.
Correct The Red light indicates adequate pressure in the system, therfore this indicates a Pump Failure and is NOT normal C.
Incorrect plausible because the white light on a majority of controls means a demand different from actual position and yields an annoying buzzer D.
Incorrect plausible becuase white light explination in answer C, Red light LIT is correct
Question Number:
63 Tier:
2 Group 2
K/A:
(086K6.01) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the (SF8 FPS) FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM: Fire pump failure Importance Rating:
3.4 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.7 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall that system pressure (pump operation) is indicated by the red light and determine the red light should be LIT Technical
Reference:
1,2-47W610-26-1 R25 1,2-47W611-26-2 R26-2 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.HPFP (OBJ: 3a)
Cognitive Level:
Higher X
Lower Question Source:
New Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 64. In accordance with OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations, which one of the following completes the statements below?
Operations Trainees in license class are allowed to operate the controls as an under instruction if they are designated in (1).
The Qualified Operator and his/her under instruction watch together (2) sign for 1st and 2nd party on a Concurrent Verification (CV) step.
(1) (2)
LMS can LMS can NOT Standing Orders can Standing Orders can NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect (1) plausible because LMS tracks qualifications (2) plausible because a CV is 2 personnel to complete and the under instruction can operate the equiment for the step, wrong because they cannot sign for the step B.
C.
D.
Correct (1) This allowance is listed in the Standing Orders (2) This is prohibited by procedure
Question Number:
64 Tier:
3 Group K/A:
(G2.1.15) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary management direction, such as standing orders, night orders, or operations memoranda Importance Rating:
2.7 10 CFR Part 55:
41.10 / 45.12 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall this particular use of a standing order for ILT candidates Technical
Reference:
OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations, Rev. 55 (page 52)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPL271C209 OPDP-1 (OBJ: 10)
Question Source:
New X
Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 65. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is at 100% Power
- PZR PORV 68-340A fails open
- 1-HS-68-340AA is taken to close, the PORV closes, and the plant stabilizes
- The lowest RCS pressure recorded for the event was 2215 psig Closing the PZR PORV (1) an immediate action per AOP-I.04, PZR Instrument and Control Malfunctions, and RCS pressure (2) fall below the DNB pressure limit of LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow DNB Limits.
(1) Is (2) did NOT (1) Is (2) did (1) Is NOT (2) did NOT (1) Is NOT (2) did A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Correct (1) with plant conditions IOAs are appropriate (2) this pressure does not exceed DNB limit (2220 psia)
B.
C.
D.
Incorrect (1) plausible because not all procedures contain IOA (2) plausible becuase if psig is not converted to psia this anwer would be selected
Question Number:
65 Tier:
3 Group K/A:
G2.1.19) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to use available indications to evaluate system or component status Importance Rating:
3.9 10 CFR Part 55:
41.10 / 45.12 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must evaluate plant conditions and determine status of an LCO (above the line)
Technical
Reference:
AOP-I.04 Pressurizer Instrument and Control Malfunctions, Rev. 19 (page 4)
SQN Unit 1 TS 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB),
Amendment 356 (page 3.4.1-1)
SQN Unit 1 Cycle 26 COLR, Rev 0 (page 8)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPL271AOP-I.04 (OBJ: 3)
OPT200.RCS (OBJ: 8b)
Question Source:
New Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 66. Given the following:
- The Unit 1 Main Generator Voltage regulator must be placed in Manual for maintenance Which of the following completes the statements below?
The maximum allowed time to notify the Transmission operator when the Voltage regulator is placed in Manual is (1).
When in Manual, the MVAR Limit is (2) restrictive.
(1) (2) 30 min less 30 min more 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> less 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> more A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Correct (1) per procedure note this is the max allowable time (2) the control band gets smaller in Manual C.
Incorrect (1) plausible because other time limits are 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (2) plausible because normally a system in manual has a wider control band (set by the NUSO) to account for a human controlling vs a controller D.
Question Number:
66 Tier:
3 Group K/A:
(G2.2.17) EQUIPMENT CONTROL: Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during power operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, and coordination with the transmission system operator Importance Rating:
2.6 10 CFR Part 55:
41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall time limit when communication with Grid Operator Technical
Reference:
GOI-6 Apparatus Operation, Rev. 200 (pages 62 & 62)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPL271GOI-6 (OBJ: 15)
Question Source:
New X
Cog Level Low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 67. The Unit 2 RO is performing a technical procedure in the control room. The next step is a conditional step and the condition is NOT met.
Which one of the following completes the statements below, in accordance with NPG-SPP-22.207, Procedure Use and Adherence?
The step shall be (1).
A supervisor's inital (2) required.
(1) marked N/A (2) is (1) marked N/A (2) is NOT (1) circled, but NOT slashed (2) is (1) circled, but NOT slashed (2) is NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Correct (1) this is the requirement per procedure (2) NOT required unless it is a NON conditional step C.
Incorrect (1) plausible because this is the normal method for placekeeping a procedure (2) plausible because this is a correct answer for a NON conditional step D.
Question Number:
67 Tier:
3 Group K/A:
G2.2.6) EQUIPMENT CONTROL: Knowledge of the process for making changes to procedures Importance Rating:
3.0 10 CFR Part 55:
41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall what procedure changes can be done without supervisor review and how this would be implimented Technical
Reference:
NPG-SPP-22.207, Procedure Use and Adherence, Rev.
11 (pages 9 & 10)
Proposed references to be provided:
TBD Learning Objective:
Question Source:
New X
Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 68. Given the following plant conditions:
A source check is to be performed on CCS radiation monitor 1-RE-90-123.
Which one of the following completes the statements below?
The source check is verified by observing the (1) on 0-M-12.
The isolation function of 1-RE-90-123 (2) be manually blocked during the source check in accordance with 1-SO-90-1, Liquid Process Radiation Monitors.
(1) analog rate meter trending upscale (2) can (1) analog rate meter trending upscale (2) can NOT (1) bargraph display responds upscale (2) can (1) bargraph display responds upscale (2) can NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect, Plausible since observing the rate meter trending upscale is correct for different radiation monitors and because some radiation monitrors outputs can be blocked during the performance of a source check but not this one.
B.
Incorrect, Plausible since observing the rate meter trending upscale is correct for different radiation monitors and because the isolation function can not be blocked on this meter during the source check is correct.
C.
Incorrect, Plausible since a succeesful source check being determined by observing the bargraph trending upscale is correct and some radiation monitors' outputs can be blocked during the performance of a source check but not this one.
D.
Correct, a successful source check is determined by observing the bargraph trending upscale. Also the isolation function is not available on this type monitor thus the valves could automatically isolate during the source check requiring them to be checked open after the source check is performed.
Question Number:
68 Tier:
3 Group n/a K/A:
(G2.3.5) RADIATION CONTROL: Ability to use RMSs, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms or personnel monitoring equipment Importance Rating:
2.9 10 CFR Part 55:
41.11 10CFR55.43.b:
Not applicable K/A Match:
This question matches the K/A by requiring the applicant to identify how to perform a source check on fixed radiation monitoring equipment and to determine how functions performed by the monitor are affected by the source check.
Technical
Reference:
1-SO-90-1 Liquid Process Radiation Monitors, Rev. 14 (page 12) 1,2-45N657-18 R15 1,2-45N670 R7 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.RM (OBJ: 3a, 4e)
Question Source:
New Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Original question used on Feb 2010 NRC exam Comments:
- 69. Which one of the following completes the statements below for a NOUE Classification, in accordance with EPIP-2 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT?
Assembly/Accountability (1) required.
TSC activation (2) required.
(1) (2) is is is is NOT is NOT is is NOT is NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect (1) (2) These are correct answers at higher levels of classification B.
C.
D.
Correct (1) (2) this is NOT required for a NOUE
Question Number:
69 Tier:
3 Group K/A:
(G2.4.42) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of emergency response facilities Importance Rating:
2.6 10 CFR Part 55:
41.10 / 45.11 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall what facilities are staffed during an NOUE Technical
Reference:
EPIP-2, Notification of Unusual Event, Rev.41 (page 11)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPL271REP (OBJ: 3 & 4)
Question Source:
New X
Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 70. A reactor startup is being performed 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after a reactor trip from 100 percent power with equilibrium xenon-135. The reactor is currently at 10 percent power, and is being returned to 100 percent power at 2.0 percent per minute instead of the normal rate of 0.5 percent per minute.
At the faster rate of power increase, the minimum amount of xenon-135 will occur
__________ than normal; and the amount of equilibrium xenon-135 at 100 percent power will be __________.
sooner; the same sooner; smaller later; the same later; smaller A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Correct (1) as flux increases Xe will burn out sooner (2) the amout of Xe total will reach same equalibrium reguardless of how fast it gets there B.
C.
D.
incorrect (1) plausible if production term is believed to exceed burnout (2) plausible because it is taking less time and therfore producing less total
Question Number:
70 Tier:
4 Group K/A:
(192006K1.10) FISSION PRODUCT POISONS: Plot the curve and explain the reasoning for the reactivity insertion by xenon-135 versus time for the following: -- reactor startup with xenon-135 already present in the core Importance Rating:
3.2 10 CFR Part 55:
41.4 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because the candidate must recall and apply Xe behavior Technical
Reference:
TOPIC: 192006 KNOWLEDGE: K1.10 [3.1/3.2]
QID: P128 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
GFES Question Source:
New Cog level High Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 71. A major reason for installing burnable poisons in a reactor is to decrease the amount of fuel required to produce a given amount of heat.
decrease the amount of fuel required to produce a given duration of plant operation.
allow more fuel to be loaded to prolong a fuel cycle.
absorb neutrons that would otherwise be lost from the core.
A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
incorrect plausible because it changes the fuel to poisin ratio of core B.
incorrect plausible because because this would change the total fuel avalible for the cycle (which it doesnt)
C.
correct allows for more fuel for a given core size D.
incorrect plausible because posins do absorb neutrons but this is not the reason for adding them
Question Number:
71 Tier:
4 Group K/A:
(192007K1.01) FUEL DEPLETION AND BURNABLE POISONS: Define burnable poison and state its use in the reactor Importance Rating:
2.5 10 CFR Part 55:
41.1 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must reacll why burnable poisin is used Technical
Reference:
TOPIC: 192007 KNOWLEDGE: K1.01 [2.1/2.5]
QID: P671 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
GFES Question Source:
New Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 72. Shortly after a reactor trip, reactor power indicates 5.0 x 10-2 percent when a stable negative startup rate is attained.
Approximately how much additional time is required for reactor power to decrease to 5.0 x 10-3 percent?
90 seconds 180 seconds 270 seconds 360 seconds A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Plausible for a different -SUR assumption B.
Correct based on -1/3 DPM SUR decay after a trip C.
Plausible for a different -SUR assumption D.
Plausible for a different -SUR assumption
Question Number:
72 Tier:
4 Group K/A:
(192008K1.23) REACTOR OPERATIONAL PHYSICS:
(REACTOR RESPONSE ON A TRIP) Explain the shape of a curve of reactor power versus time after a trip Importance Rating:
3.1 10 CFR Part 55:
41.4 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
Ka is met because candidate must recall and apply SUR behavior after a rx trip Technical
Reference:
TOPIC: 192008 KNOWLEDGE: K1.23 [2.9/3.1]
QID: P71 (B72)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
GFES Question Source:
New Cog level High Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 73. A reactor is shut down with reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure at 1,000 psia and core decay heat is being removed via the steam generators (SGs). What pressure must be maintained in the SGs to obtain a 50°F subcooling margin in the reactor coolant leaving the SGs? (Assume the reactor coolant leaves the SGs at the SG saturation temperature.)
550 psia 600 psia 650 psia 700 psia A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Plausible based on interpolation and calculation errors B.
Plausible based on interpolation and calculation errors C.
Correct for given conditions D.
Plausible based on interpolation and calculation errors
Question Number:
73 Tier:
4 Group K/A:
193003K1.17) STEAM: Define the following term: -- subcooling Importance Rating:
3.2 10 CFR Part 55:
41.14 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must determine subcooling Technical
Reference:
TOPIC: 193003 KNOWLEDGE: K1.17 [3.0/3.2]
QID: P675 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
GFES Question Source:
New Cog level High Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 74. A pressurizer relief valve is leaking by with the leakage being collected in a pressurizer relief tank. The pressurizer pressure is 2,200 psia and the relief tank pressure is 5 psig.
With dry saturated steam in the pressurizer vapor space, which one of the following is the condition of the fluid just downstream of the relief valve?
Superheated steam Subcooled liquid Dry saturated steam Wet vapor A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Plausible based on errors in calcualtions and reading mollier diagram B.
Plausible based on errors in calcualtions and reading mollier diagram C.
Plausible based on errors in calcualtions and reading mollier diagram D.
Correct for given conditions
Question Number:
74 Tier:
4 Group K/A:
(193004K1.15) THERMODYNAMIC PROCESS: (THROTTLING AND THE THROTTLING PROCESS) Determine the exit conditions for a throttling process based on the use of steam and/or water Importance Rating:
2.8 10 CFR Part 55:
41.14 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
Ka is met because candidate must using mollier diagram determine the status of a fluid Technical
Reference:
TOPIC: 193004 KNOWLEDGE: K1.15 [2.8/2.8]
QID: P148 Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
GFES Question Source:
New Cog level High Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 16. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is at 75%
- CRO reports Grid Frequency is 60.3 Hz Which one of the following completes the statements below?
The DGs (1) automatically tie to the Shutdown Boards.
The reason for the transfer of DGs to the Shutdown Boards is based on (2).
(1)
(2) will exceeding steadystate limit for off-frequency operation of LP turbine will violating safety analysis due to impact on speed of safety-related motors will NOT exceeding steadystate limit for off-frequency operation of LP turbine will NOT violating safety analysis due to impact on speed of safety-related motors A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A Incorrect (1) Plausible because DGs automatically tie on for many conditions, this just isnt one of them (2) Plausible since this is a basis listed in Appendix B, but for a different frequency.
B C
D Correct (1) IAW AOP-P.07, Degraded Grid or Abnormal Voltage Conditions the 6.9 kV SDBDs would be transferred to the DGs, this requires operator action (2) This is the basis listed for this action on AOP-p.07, APP B
Question Number:
16 Tier:
1 Group:
1 K/A:
000077AK3.02) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to (APE 77)
GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRIC Grid Disturbances: Actions contained in AOPs for voltage and grid disturbances Importance Rating:
3.5 10 CFR Part 55:
41.4, 41.5, 41.7, 41.10 / 45.8 10CFR55.43.b:
na K/A Match:
KA is met because applicant must recall setpoint and apply setpoint to determine reason for actions, and recall if actions are automatic or not Technical
Reference:
AOP-P.07, Degraded Grid or Abnormal Voltage Conditions, Rev. 20 (pages 3, 9, & 57)
Proposed references to be provided:
None Learning Objective:
OPL271AOP-P.07 (OBJ: 8)
Question Source:
Cog level : high New X
Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 17. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is performing ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment A mitigation strategy for ECA-1.2 in accordance with EPM-4, User's Guide, is to.
check if break is isolated maintain RCS heat removal raise/conserve RWST level try to add makeup to RCS from an alternate source A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Correct IAW EPM-4 this is a mititgation strategy B.
Incorrect, plausible because this is a reason for ECA-3.1 and is related to a LOCA C.
Incorrect, plausible because this is a reason for ECA-3.1 and is related to a LOCA D.
Incorrect, plausible because this is a reason for ECA-1.1 and is related to a LOCA
Question Number:
17 Tier:
1 Group:
1 K/A:
WE04EK3.06) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment: Identifying and isolating the break Importance Rating:
4.3 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6 10CFR55.43.b:
Not applicable K/A Match:
This question matches the K/A by having the candidate determine the correct actions given a LOCA outside CNMT and the expected plant response for the actions taken.
Technical
Reference:
EPM-4 Att. 1, Users Guide, Effective date: 11-07-2014 (page 2)
Proposed references to be provided:
None Learning Objective:
OPL271ECA-1.2 (OBJ: 4 & 6)
Question Source:
New X
Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 20. Given the following:
Annunciator "0-RA-90-212A STA SUMP DISCH HIGH RADIATION" in alarm and valid Station sump pumps operating in automatic and maintaining level in the sump Which one of the following completes the statements below concerning required system alignment would prevent an accidental liquid radioactive release?
Turbine Building Sump pump discharge shall be aligned to the (1).
The LVWT pond "L valve", 0-40-783, shall be (2).
(1) (2)
Yard Drainage Pond "cattail pond" Open Yard Drainage Pond "cattail pond" Closed LVWT pond Open LVWT pond Closed A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Incorrect Plausible because this is an avalible algnment of the system and the "L valve" position is plausible depending on where in the system it is believed to be C.
D.
Correct, The ARP directs alignment of the Turbine Building Sump to the LVWT pond and isolates the "L valve" to isolate the LVWT Pond from the Diffuser pond
Question Number:
20 Tier:
1 Group:
2 K/A:
00059) (APE 59) Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release (G2.1.31) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications and to determine whether they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup Importance Rating:
4.6 10 CFR Part 55:
41.10 / 45.12 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must determin correct system lineup with an accidental release Technical
Reference:
0-AR-M12-A, Unit 1 and Common Radiation Monitor 0-XA-55-12A, Rev. 60 (page 39)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.RM (OBJ: 3a & 4e)
Question Source:
New Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 34. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is at 40% Reactor power Which one of the following completes the statements below?
(consider each statement seprately)
If one RCP trips the RX (1) automatically trip.
If the Main Turbine trips the RX (2) automatically trip.
(1) (2) will will will will NOT will NOT will will NOT will NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Correct (1) P-8 >35% power a single RCP trip trips the reactor (2) P-9 >50% below P-9 but above P-7 (P and P-13) 10%
C.
Incorrect (1) plausible because these could be correct answers at a different power level D.
Question Number:
34 Tier:
2 Group:
1 K/A:
(012A4.03) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF7 RPS) REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM in the control room:
Channel blocks and bypasses Importance Rating:
3.8 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8 10CFR55.43.b:
Not applicable K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall channel block setpoint and apply how it is effected by plant conditons and how it conditions affects plant response Technical
Reference:
TI-28, ATT9, effective date: 11-30-2022
- P8 & P9 interlocks (page 9)
- Rx trips (page 6)
Proposed references to be provided:
None Learning Objective:
OPT200.RPS (OBJ: 4e)
Question Source:
New X
Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 38. Which one of the following identifies a provision of the containment ice condenser design that increases the ice condenser's ability to remove heat during a small break LOCA?
Melted ice is directed away from the inlet doors and toward drain lines by turning vanes.
One out of every two ice bays has a drain which directs melted ice away from the inlet doors. (Only half of the total have drains)
Inlet doors have proportioning springs to modulate door opening which equalizes air/steam flow through each ice bay.
All Ice Condenser units automatically start which provides forced air flow through the ice beds.
A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect, Turning vanes direct air/steam flow not water drainage. Plausible if candidate confused the purpose of the turning vanes. From FSAR test results show that containment final peak pressure is not affected by drain performance.
B.
Incorrect, All of the bays do not have drains but more than half does. Plausible if the candidate believes only half of the bays have drains. From FSAR test results show that containment final peak pressure is not affected by drain performance.
C.
Correct, The door panels are provided with tension spring mechanisms that produce a small closing torque on the door panels as they open. The zero load position of the spring mechanisms is set such that, with zero differential pressure across the door panels, the gasket holds the door slightly open. This setting provides assurance that all doors will be open slightly, upon removal of cold air head, therefore eliminating significant inlet maldistribution for very small incidents.
D.
Incorrect, the springs are on the inlet doors, not the intermediate doors. Plausible because the intermediate doors do open when pressure builds up in the ice condenser bay.
Question Number:
38 Tier:
2 Group:
1 K/A:
(025) (SF5 ICE) ICE CONDENSER SYSTEM (191001K1.03) VALVES: The relationship of valve position to flow rate and back pressure Importance Rating:
2.9 10 CFR Part 55:
41.3 10CFR55.43.b:
na K/A Match:
KA is met because the doors (acting as valves) operate based on differential pressure generated when energy is added to containment Technical
Reference:
SQN Living FSAR Amendment 31, Section 6.5.9.1 Lower Inlet Doors Design Basis (page 6.5-35)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.ICE (OBJ: 4a)
Question Source:
New Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 43. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is performing a surveillance test on the TDAFW pump when the following alarm is received on 1-M-3C:
- AUX FWP TURBINE 1A-S MECHANICAL OVERSPEED TRIP (Window A-4)
Which one of the following completes the statements below?
The setpoint for the overspeed trip is (1).
After the Mechnical Overspeed mechanism is RESET and LATCHED, in accordance with 1-SO-3-2, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Hold 1-HS-1-51A-S, Trip/Throttle Valve, (2) for 10 seconds to clear the overspeed alarm?
(1) (2) 4300 rpm open 4300 rpm closed 4900 rpm open 4900 rpm closed A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect (1) plausible because the is the setpoint for the Main Turbine (2) plausible because you are reopening the valve, incorrect because this action just alignes the motor with the valve B.
C.
D.
Correct (1) 4900 rpm is the setpoint of the mechanical overspeed trip device.
(2) this is the required action to clear the alarm
Question Number:
43 Tier:
2 Group:
1 K/A:
(061A2.07) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF4S AFW) AUXILIARY/EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Air-operated valve, solenoid-operated valve, or motor-operated valve failure Importance Rating:
4.0 10 CFR Part 55:
41.5 / 45.6 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
Question matches KA by having candidate determine the procedural action necessary after a malfunction to restore the TDAWF Technical
Reference:
1-AR-M3-C, Feedwater and SG Levels 1-XA-55-3C, Rev. 24 (page 11) 1-SO-3-2. Auxiliary Feedwater System, Rev. 62 (pages 45 & 81)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.AFW (OBJ: 4e & 4g)
Question Source:
New Cog Level low Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
- 62. Given the following:
Waste Gas Decay Tank A is "IN SERVICE" Waste Gas Decay Tank D is in "STANDBY MODE" An automatic transfer occurs from WGDT A to WGDT D An AUO dispatched to respond to the transfer reports the following:
WGDT A pressure is 100 psig WGDT D pressure is 20 psig Which one of the following complets the statements below?
The transfer occurred (1).
WGDT D pressure (2) above minimum pressure to be "IN SERVICE".
(1) (2) early is early is NOT normally is normally is NOT A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
B.
Incorrect (1) plausible 150 psig is the relief valve setpoint, this setpoint would make the transfer early (1) plausible because N2 pressurization regulator is set to 30 psig (page 22of35) 0-SO-77-12 C.
Correct (1) transfer occurred when the tank pressure reached 100 psig (2) Cover gas required is >13 psig D.
Question Number:
62 Tier:
2 Group:
2 K/A:
(071K4.06) Knowledge of (SF9 WGS) WASTE GAS DISPOSAL SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Sampling and monitoring of waste gas release tanks Importance Rating:
3.0 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall and apply the auto transer design feature and recall the min cover gas pressure for the system Technical
Reference:
0-SO-77-12, Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation, Rev. 21 (pages 6 & 12)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.GRW (OBJ: 3a & 4e)
Question Source:
New X
Cog Level High Modified Bank Bank Question History:
Comments:
- 75. Given the following:
- Unit 1 startup is in progress
- Operators are withdrawing Control Bank A rods Which one of the following completes the statement below?
Control Bank B rods will begin to withdraw when Control Bank A is at (1), and the design bases of the bank overlap is (2).
(1) 64 steps (2) To prevent a radial flux tilt from occurring during rod-withdrawal (1) 128 steps (2) To prevent a radial flux tilt from occurring during rod-withdrawal (1) 64 steps (2) To provide a more uniform flux distribution during rod withdrawal and insertion, to ensure local power peaking does not exceed limits (1) 128 steps (2) To provide a more uniform flux distribution during rod withdrawal and insertion, to ensure local power peaking does not exceed limits A.
B.
C.
D.
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect (1) plausible because 64 is rod speed and half of 128 (2) plausible because flux tilting is a concern but not for this type ROD pull B.
C.
D.
correct (1) this is the rod height for CBA when CBB begins to withdraw (2) this is the reason for bank overlap
Question Number:
75 Tier:
4 Group:
K/A:
(193009K1.03) CORE THERMAL LIMITS: Explain local peaking factor Importance Rating:
2.7 10 CFR Part 55:
41.14 10CFR55.43.b:
n/a K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall the reason for Bank overlap (peaking factor)
Technical
Reference:
0-SO-85-1, Control Rod Drive System, Rev. 59 (page 54)
SQN Living FSAR Amendment 31, Section 4.3.2.2.6 Limiting Power Distribution (pages 4.3 14)
Proposed references to be provided:
Learning Objective:
OPT200.RDCNT-RPI (OBJ: 3a & 4a)
Question Source:
New Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
QUESTIONS REPORT for Ilt complete
- 33. Given the following:
Unit 1 is in Mode 3 RCS Tavg is 547°F and pressurizer pressure is 2235 psig
- All control systems are in automatic Which one of the following would result in annunciator, TS-68-316, 317 PRESSURIZER SPRAY LINES TEMP LOW, being actuated?
RCS Tavg dropping to 534°F Pressurizer pressure dropping to 1900 psig Degraded RCS flow in Loop 4 Insufficient flow through the PZR spray bypass valves A.
B.
C.
D.
The correct answer is D Justification:
DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
A.
Incorrect, alarm does not come in until 510°F.
B.
Incorrect, saturation temperature would remain much greater than 510°F.
C.
Incorrect, the opposite of what causes the alarm.
D.
Correct, the alarm would be caused by insufficient flow through the pressurizer spray bypass line.
Wednesday, February 1, 2023 4:12:59 PM 33
QUESTIONS REPORT for Ilt complete Question Number:
33 Tier:
2 Group 1
K/A:
010 K4.01 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)
Knowledge of PZR PCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
Spray valve warm-up Importance Rating:
2.8 10 CFR Part 55:
41.7 10CFR55.43.b:
Not applicable K/A Match:
KA is met because candidate must recall alarm setpoint for spray valve line and apply how it applies for a given set of conditions Technical
Reference:
1-AR-M5-A, Reactor Coolant - STM - FW 1-XA-55-5A, Rev 44 (page 20)
Proposed references to be provided:
None Learning Objective:
OPT200.PZR-PRT (OBJ: 3g & 3h)
Question Source:
New Cog level Low Modified Bank Bank X
Question History:
Comments:
Wednesday, February 1, 2023 4:12:59 PM 34