ML23200A195
| ML23200A195 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 04/06/2023 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | DTE Energy |
| Bryan Bergeon | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML22007A057 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML23200A195 (1) | |
Text
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 1 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary NRC Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:
Fermi 2 Scenario #:
1 Source:
New Op Test #
2023 ILT Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Validating Operators:
A. Snowberger (CRS)
J. Walters (BOP)
D. Roberts (ATC)
Initial Conditions:
68%, no equipment out of service, Rod Pattern Adjust (RPA) is in progress Turnover:
Reactor Power is at 68% near the end of a Rod Pattern Adjustment. When you take the shift, you will be expected to withdraw control rods to achieve the target rod pattern in accordance with the rod pull sheets to be provided.
Critical Tasks:
(CT-1, SC-SCRAM) With reactor at power and with a primary system discharging into the secondary containment MANUALLY SCRAM the reactor, before any area exceeds the Maximum Safe Operating (MSO) levels.
(CT-2, SC-ED) With a primary system discharging into the secondary containment and area radiation/temperature/water levels exceed maximum safe operating levels in more than one area, INITIATE Emergency Depressurization.
Event No.
Malf No.
Event Type* /
Position Event Description 1
N/A R
ATC The exam team will brief the crew on the status of the plant, specifically regarding the rod pattern adjustment in progress.
The crew will take the shift and perform a short brief for the rod pull evolution. The crew will then complete the rod pull as briefed.
2 C51MF0197 I
ATC/SRO When the 12th rod, which is CR 06-31, is selected and withdrawn past position 20, RBM A will fail. The crew will need to respond using ARPs, which will send them to 23.607 to bypass the RBM. The CRS will evaluate Tech Specs and determine TS 3.3.2.1 is applicable.
TS SRO 3
D11MF0021 TS SRO East Fuel Pool Division 1 Radiation Monitor will fail downscale.
The crew will take action per ARP 3D27 to investigate the cause. This CRS will evaluate Tech Specs and determine that TS 3.3.6.2 and TS 3.3.7.1 are applicable.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 2 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary Event No.
Malf No.
Event Type* /
Position Event Description 4
Multiple C
ATC/SRO Loss of CRD Pump suction pressure caused by failure of the CRD Suction Pressure Control Valve will cause the running CRD pump to trip. If the standby pump is started, it will also trip. A CRD pump will be restored by directing field actions to manually bypass the CRD pump suction PCV and then starting a CRD pump 5
N30MF0051 C
BOP/SRO An event will occur that will cause a loss of the in-service pressure regulator to fail low. As a result, the system will swap to the backup regulator. The crew will take actions per the AOP to complete the swap to the backup pressure regulator.
6 E41MF0007 E41RF0033 M
ALL Steam leaking from the HPCI system will cause the crew to enter 20.000.02, Abnormal Release of Radioactive Material and 29.100.01 Sheet 5, Secondary Containment Control.
Attempts to isolate the steam leak will be unsuccessful and HPCI room temperatures will approach the Maximum Safe Operating (MSO) value 7
P603_A048_3 C
ATC/SRO With HPCI room temperatures approaching MSO, the SRO should direct the Mode Switch taken to Shutdown BEFORE the MSO is reached (CT-1, SC-SCRAM).
MC ATC 8
N30MF0070 N30MF0072 B21MF0030 C
BOP/SRO With the HPCI watertight door unable to be closed, the crew will attempt to anticipate emergency depressurization by opening Main Turbine Bypass Valves. Both BPVs will fail to operate.
Div 2 CSS Pump Room temperature will begin to rise and eventually exceed Maximum Safe Operating temperature of 210F. This will prompt the crew to emergency depressurize the plant using 5 SRVs, ADS preferred (CT-2, SC-ED).
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 3 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary A. INITIAL CONDITIONS / PRE-SHIFT BRIEFING:
Plant is at 68% power for Rod Pattern Adjustment, with the following:
The Core Monitor is inhibited.
Core flow is approximately 70%.
The Rod Line is approximately 85%.
GOP Section 5.0, Power Decrease, was completed through Step 5.2.13.
o Turbine Flow Limiter is 5% above reactor power.
o CFD H was removed from service.
o East HFP was shut down.
GOP 22.000.03 Section 4.0, Power Increase, is in progress currently at step 4.2.18 (next action to take is at 75% power).
The crew is to continue rod withdrawal when you take the shift.
The STA will perform duties as the Rx Management SRO.
The 3rd LNO will perform duties as the Rod Movement Verifier.
Signed, approved copies of the Reactivity Maneuvering Plan Step Sheets are available. In summary, withdrawal Group 10/1 rods as follows:
o Group 10/1 from 00 to 12. Predicted power increase is 2% total (0.5% per rod).
o Group 10/1 from 12 to 20. Predicted power increase is 2% total (0.5% per rod).
o Group 10/1 from 20 to 30. Predicted power increase is 2.5% total (0.6% per rod). RBM Upscale may occur during these rod pulls. Analyses for Thermal Limit verifications have been pre-performed.
o Group 10/1 from 30 to 48. Predicted power increase is 2.0% total (0.5% per rod).
Additional RMP Step Sheets, and guidance for raising Core Flow, will be provided after the above is complete.
Please conduct your Reactivity Management brief, and prepare all procedures to support rod withdrawal, prior to taking the shift.
No additional equipment is out of service.
All licensed operators are in the Main Control Room (MCR).
Normal shift complement of non-licensed operators are available.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 4 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary B.
SUMMARY
OF EVENTS Event 1:
Pull Rods to target rod pattern using provided pull sheets The exam team will brief the crew on the status of the plant, specifically regarding the rod pattern adjustment in progress. The crew will take the shift and perform a short brief for the rod pull evolution. The crew will then complete the rod pull as briefed.
Event 2:
On 3rd rod pull, RBM A failure will occur When the 12th rod, which is CR 06-31, is selected and withdrawn past position 20, RBM A will fail. The crew will need to respond using ARPs, which will send them to 23.607 to bypass the RBM. The CRS will evaluate Tech Specs and determine TS 3.3.2.1 is applicable.
Event 3:
FP Vent Exhaust Downscale East Fuel Pool Division 1 Radiation Monitor will fail downscale. The crew will take action per ARP 3D27 to investigate the cause. This CRS will evaluate Tech Specs and determine that TS 3.3.6.2 and TS 3.3.7.1 are applicable.
Event 4:
Loss of CRD Suction Loss of CRD Pump suction pressure caused by failure of the CRD Suction Pressure Control Valve will cause the running CRD pump to trip. If the standby pump is started, it will also trip. A CRD pump will be restored by directing field actions to manually bypass the CRD pump suction PCV and then starting a CRD pump Event 5:
Pressure Regulator Fault An event will occur that will cause a loss of the in-service pressure regulator to fail low. As a result, the system will swap to the backup regulator. The crew will take actions per the AOP to complete the swap to the backup pressure regulator.
Event 6:
HPCI Steam Leak to MSO Steam leaking from the HPCI system will cause the crew to enter 20.000.02, Abnormal Release of Radioactive Material and 29.100.01 Sheet 5, Secondary Containment Control. Attempts to isolate the steam leak will be unsuccessful and HPCI room temperatures will approach the Maximum Safe Operating (MSO) value
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 5 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary Event 7:
HPCI>MSO, Mode Switch fails, RPS push buttons work, Div 2 CS Pump area temp rising With HPCI room temperatures approaching MSO, the SRO should direct the Mode Switch taken to Shutdown BEFORE the MSO is reached (CT-1, SC-SCRAM).
When the Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown, the crew will be informed that the watertight door to the HPCI room is open and unable to be closed. This will cause rising temperatures in the Div 2 Core Spray Pump Room area Event 8:
Anticipate ED, BPV failure, 2 areas > MSO, ED With the HPCI watertight door unable to be closed, the crew will attempt to anticipate emergency depressurization by opening Main Turbine Bypass Valves. Both BPVs will fail to operate.
Div 2 CSS Pump Room temperature will begin to rise and eventually exceed Maximum Safe Operating temperature of 210F. This will prompt the crew to emergency depressurize the plant using 5 SRVs, ADS preferred (CT-2, SC-ED).
Termination Criteria Scenario is terminated following ED when plant is stable, at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 6 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary C. SIMULATOR SETUP SCENARIO SPECIFIC SETUP:
- 1. Initialize the simulator to IC-171 or use IC-20 and perform the following (~68% power):
- a. LOWER RR flow to 70% core flow (~57% Speed).
- b. FULLY INSERT Group 10/2 (from 10 to 00).
- c. FULLY INSERT 10/1 (from 48 to 00).
- d. SET Turbine Flow Limiter 5% above Rx Power.
- e. CHECK APRM Vs CTP. If >1.5% difference, ADJUST APRM 1/2/3/4 Gain using C51RF065/066/067/068) for the applicable APRM(s).
- f.
REMOVE CFDs, as necessary, to maintain CFD flow >2,000 gpm (Only CFD H was removed from service in IC-171).
- g. REMOVE one HFP from service (East removed in IC-171).
- i.
FREEZE the simulator and save the IC for later use (or in case something happens).
- 2. PLACE the simulator in RUN.
- 3. OPEN and EXECUTE lesson ILT 2023 Scenario 1.
- 4. TRIGGER Setup step
- 5. For ROD PULL Steps, PRINT and SIGN the following and place on CRSs desk:
- a. The first page of RMP Step Sheets for group 10/1 (from 00 to 12).
- b. Predictor sheet for the rod pulls.
- c. Maneuvering plan.
- 6. MARK GOP 22.000.03 complete through step 5.2.13 (Power Decrease section).
- 7. Turn GOP 22.000.03 to page 16, Step 4.2.18 (Power Increase section).
- 8. REMOVE red CRAM Array dots.
- 9. REMOVE CRAM Book from MCR.
GENERIC SETUP:
- 1. PROVIDE crew a list of available NOs
- 2. ENSURE that all annunciators are acknowledged and the plant is stable
- 3. ACKNOWLDGE DCS alarms
- 4. VERIFY GSW placard is in place and indicates INTERMITTENT.
- 5. VERIFY CFD placard has current dates (within the last 14 days is acceptable).
- 6. COMPLETE Attachment 1 of NTWI 5.12
- 7. ALLOW the operators to enter the room, provide them with a turnover in accordance with Section E, and allow them to walk down the panels
- 8. ENSURE simulator alarms are NOT silenced
- 9. TRIGGER steps as directed by the guide/Lead Evaluator
- 10. START Simulator data recorder
- 11. RECORD communications with crew members on NTWI 5.12 Attachment 3
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 7 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary D. CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASK EVALUATION CRITERIA SAT UNSAT NA CT-1, SC-SCRAM - With reactor at power and with a primary system discharging into the secondary containment, MANUALLY SCRAM the reactor before any area exceeds any Maximum Safe Operating (MSO) value.
Safety Significance: If temperatures in any one of the areas listed in in tables 11, 12, 13, or 14 of the Secondary Containment Control EOP approach their maximum safe operating value, adequate core cooling, containment integrity, safety of personnel, or continued operability of equipment required to perform EPG actions can no longer be assured. A reactor scram is initiated through entry of the RPV Control guideline to reduce the primary system discharge into secondary containment and in anticipation of possible RPV depressurization.
Safety significant boundary conditions: Defined by the BWROG EPGs/SAGs, appendix B, rev 4. This analysis requires that a reactor scram be initiated prior to any area radiation, water level, or temperature reaches its max safe value. If indicated parameters in any one of the areas listed in tables 11, 12, 13, or 14 of the Secondary Containment Control EOP approach their maximum safe operating value, adequate core cooling, containment integrity, safety of personnel, or continued operability of equipment required to perform EOP related actions can no longer be assured. Therefore, a manual scram is required prior to reaching any of these indicated values.
Failure Criteria reasoning: Crew will fail if the reactor is not scrammed BEFORE any secondary containment parameter (Radiation / Temperature / Water Level) reaches its max safe (MSO) value.
Initiating Cue: Primary system discharging into secondary containment and any area parameter is approaching maximum safe operating levels.
Measurable Performance Standard: Mode Switch is placed in Shutdown and/or RPS pushbuttons depressed prior to the MSO value being reached.
Performance Feedback: RPS actuates, all control rods indicate full in and reactor power decreasing.
Expected action: Reactor Mode Switch placed in Shutdown and/or RPS pushbuttons depressed.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 8 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary CRITICAL TASK EVALUATION CRITERIA SAT UNSAT NA CT-2, SC-ED - With a primary system discharging into the secondary containment and area radiation/temperature/water levels exceed maximum safe operating levels in more than one area, INITIATE Emergency Depressurization.
Safety Significance Should secondary containment temperatures exceed their maximum safe operating values in more than one area, the RPV must be depressurized to preclude further temperature increases.
Safety significant boundary conditions: Defined by the BWROG EPGs/SAGs, appendix B, rev 4. This analysis requires that an emergency depressurization be performed if secondary containment temperatures continue to increase and exceed their maximum safe operating values in more than one area. RPV depressurization places the primary system in its lowest possible energy state, rejects heat to the suppression pool in preference to outside the containment, and reduces the driving head and flow of primary systems that are un-isolated and discharging into the secondary containment.
Failure Criteria reasoning: Crew will fail if 2 SRVs or the Main Turbine Bypass valves are not open and area radiation/temperature/water levels exceed maximum safe operating levels in more than one area for greater than 6 minutes (2 x validated time).
Initiating Cue: Primary system discharging into the secondary containment and area temperatures exceed maximum safe operating levels in more than one area.
Measurable Performance Standard: Initiate emergency depressurization using SRVs - OR - anticipate emergency depressurization and depressurize using Bypass valves ignoring cooldown rates such that the reactor vessel is depressurized.
Performance Feedback: SRVs or BPVs indicate open and reactor pressure lowering.
Expected action: Open 5 SRVs - OR - fully open main turbine bypass valves.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 9 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary E. LIST OF MALFUNCTIONS The following malfunctions and/or remote functions are to be active/activated as indicated in the time line:
MF/RF/PO/LBL DESCRIPTION TARGET VALUE STEP NO.
RAMP DELAY insert C11RF0398 Mode SW Failure RESET S1 0
0 insert C71MF0006 ACTIVE 0
0 cd= P603_A048_1 EQ 1 AND H_P804_B002_2 EQ 0
East and West BPVs fail closed when MS in S/D N/A S2 0
0 insert N30MF0070 ACTIVE 0
5 insert N30MF0072 ACTIVE 0
5 Insert C51MF0197 cd= H_P603_A0550631_2 eq 1 and H_P603_B091_2 eq 1 and P603_A059_3 eq 1
RBM A Failure conditional on rod select ACTIVE 1A 0
0 insert D11MF0021 N010A Fuel Pool Vent D1 East Rad Mon Fail 0.0 3
0 0
insert C103N018ZNPCAP Loss of CRD Suction 30.0 4
0 0
insert C101F412TASTEM 0
0 0
insert C101F412ZMANTYP 1
0 0
insert C101F212ZDIREC TRUE 0
0 insert C97MF0298 Failed-On 0
0 insert C101F412TASTEM Manual CRD Suction Control 1.0 4a 0
0 insert C103N018ZNPCAP 0.001431 41 0
0 insert C97MF0298 Inactive 0
0 insert C11RF0210 Reset CRD High Temp RESET 4b 0
0 insert N30MF0051 Press Reg Fails LOW 900.0 5
60 0
insert EOPRF0022 Unisolable HPCI Steam Leak DEFEAT 6
0 0
insert E4BDK34TVSP 0
0 0
insert E41MF0007 25 700 0
insert E41MF0008 cd='H_P602_B112_2 EQ 1'
99 0
0
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 10 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary MF/RF/PO/LBL DESCRIPTION TARGET VALUE STEP NO.
RAMP DELAY insert E41RF0033 cd='H_P602_B206_2 EQ 1' OPEN 0
0 insert C71MF0006 cd=H_P603_B211_1 EQ 1 Clears scram MF with RPS Pushbuttons CLEAR 6A 0
0 P603_A048_1 Triggers Event 7/8 steps EQ 1 7/8 0
0 cd=NBKGANA_COND795 942OUT LE 350 AND H_P601_A197_2 EQ 0 Continues Temp Ramp if RPV < 350 psig BEFORE ED N/A 7/8 0
0 insert TA20TEN207TFASIS TRUE 0
0 insert TA20TEN207ZSOUT delay=0 ramp=on=0 off=0 225 300 0
insert TA20TEN206ZSOUT delay=0 ramp=on=0 off=0 225 360 0
cd= TA20TEN207ZSOUT GT 140 Ramps Temp in 2nd area N/A 0
0 insert TA20TEN206TFASIS TRUE 0
0 insert TA20TEN206ZSOUT 225 360 0
cd=H_P601_A197_2 EQ 1 Ramps down Room Temps after ED N/A 0
0 insert TA20TEN207TFASIS TRUE 0
0 insert TA20TEN206ZSOUT 100 600 0
insert TA20TEN207ZSOUT 100 600 0
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 11 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary F. REFERENCES The following is a list of expected Procedure References used in this scenario:
PROCEDURE TITLE 1D66 STEAM LEAK DETECTION AMBIENT TEMP HIGH 1D70 STEAM LEAK DETECTION DIFF TEMP HIGH 3D1 CRD PUMP A/B SUCTION PRESSURE LOW 3D5 CRD CHARGING H2O PRESSURE LOW 3D10 CRD ACCUMULATOR TROUBLE 3D13 CRD HYDRAULIC TEMPERATURE HIGH 3D18 IPCS MONITORED INPUTS ABNORMAL 3D27 DIV I/II FP VENT EXH RADN MONITOR DNSCL/INOP 3D34 SEC CONTM TEMP HIGH-HIGH EOP ENTRY 3D96 MOTOR TRIPPED 3D109 RBM UPSCALE/INOP 3D110 RBM DOWNSCALE 3D111 RBM TROUBLE 3D113 CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK 4D91 ELECTRIC GOVERNOR TROUBLE 5D126 NORMAL HOTWELL SUPPLY PUMP AUTO START 16D27 FIRE ALARM 20.000.02 ABNORMAL RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL 20.106.01 CRD HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE 20.109.02 REACTOR PRESSURE CONTROLLER FAILURE
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 12 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary PROCEDURE TITLE 23.106 CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 23.607 ROD BLOCK MONITORING SYSTEM 23.601 INSTRUMENT TRIP SHEETS 23.623 REACTOR MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM 29.ESP.21 DEFEAT OF TORUS WATER MANAGEMENT ISOLATIONS AND TORUS LEVEL CONTROL TS 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation TS 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation TS 3.3.7.1 Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System Instrumentation
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 16 Event 1 Rod pattern adjustment Type:
RX Event
Description:
The exam team will brief the crew on the status of the plant, specifically regarding the rod pattern adjustment in progress. The crew will take the shift and perform a short brief for the rod pull evolution. The crew will then complete the rod pull as briefed.
Symptoms/Cues: Crew begins rod pull after taking the shift.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 min Booth Action Trigger Event 1 and Event 2 placeholders. Step 1A will trigger automatically when CR 06-31 is withdrawn past position 20.
T0 +1 min CRS/ATC Will conduct brief of reactivity manipulation.
T0 +5 min ATC Continues rod withdrawal, as directed, per the approved rod pull sheets:
Turns on Rod Select Power.
Selects next Control Rod (CR) using Rod Select Matrix Push Button.
Verifies the correct CR is selected using the 4-Rod Display, the RWM, the Full Core Display, IPCS and the Rod Block Monitor.
Communicates selected CR, and target position, to the Rod Movement Verifier.
Withdraws selected CR to one notch shy of target position.
Withdraws selected CR to target position.
Communicates CR position to Rod Movement Verifier.
Selects the next CR for movement.
Completes the above actions for these rod movements:
Group 10/1 (30-55, 30-07, 54-31 and 06-31) from 00 to 12.
Group 10/1 (30-55, 30-07, 54-31 and 06-31) from 12 to 20.
Group 10/1 (30-55, 30-07, 54-31 and 06-31) from 20 to 30.
NOTE: When CR 06-31 is moved past position 20, Event 2 will automatically trigger.
SRO Provides oversight of CR withdrawals.
Acknowledges communications from the ATC.
Ensures BOP is monitoring secondary plant for power rise.
BOP Monitors secondary plant for power rise.
Assists ATC as necessary to support CR withdrawal.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of 16 Event 2 RBM A Failure Type:
I, TS Event
Description:
When the 12th rod, which is CR 06-31, is selected and withdrawn past position 20, RBM A will fail. The crew will need to respond using ARPs, which will send them to 23.607 to bypass the RBM. The CRS will evaluate Tech Specs and determine TS 3.3.2.1 is applicable..
Symptoms/Cues: Alarms 3D110, RBM DOWNSCALE and 3D113, CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCKED will be received. RBM A will indicate downscale.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +25 min ATC Responds to 3D110, RBM DOWNSCALE and 3D113, CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCKED:
Monitors RBM displays to determine cause.
Notes that RBM A power is 0.0% and reports to CRS.
May recommend bypassing RBM per 23.607.
May direct NO to Relay Room to investigate.
Role Play NO/STA:If contacted to walk down RBM A in the RR:
Wait 2 minutes and REPORT: RBM A shows downscale in the Relay Room. No obvious indications as to why.
SRO Acknowledges report from RO and:
Directs ATC to bypass RBM A per 23.607 section 5.1
May contact SNE to evaluate cause of alarm and actions to be taken.
Evaluates TS for INOPERABLE RBM.
Role Play SNE: If contacted about 3D110, 3D113 and RBM failure:
ACKNOWLEDGE report from the MCR.
ATC Acknowledges CRS direction to bypass the RBM.
Bypasses RBM IAW 23.607 Section 5.1:
Places RBM BYPASS joystick in position A
Verifies white RBM A Bypassed light is ON
Verifies BYPASS displayed on RBM A display
May direct NO to walk down RBM display in the Relay Room.
Role Play NO/STA:If contacted walk down RBM A in the RR after it has been bypassed.
Wait 1 minute and REPORT: RBM A shows bypassed.
SRO Conducts follow-up brief for actions to contact WWM, write CARD, etc., and TS Impact. LCO: TS 3.3.2.1, Control Rod Block Inst.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 3 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior TS Impact TS 3.3.2.1, Control Rod Block Instrumentation:
The control rod block instrumentation for each Function-in table 3.3.2.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One rod block monitor (RBM) channel inoperable A.1 Restore RBM channel to OPERABLE status 24 Hours
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 4 of 16 Event 3 East Fuel Pool Div 1 Rad Monitor downscale failure Type:
TS Event
Description:
East Fuel Pool Division 1 Radiation Monitor will fail downscale. The crew will take action per ARP 3D27 to investigate the cause. This CRS will evaluate Tech Specs and determine that TS 3.3.6.2 and TS 3.3.7.1 are applicable.
Symptoms/Cues: 3D27, Div I/II FP Vent Exh Rad Monitor Dnscl/Inop and downscale indication on the Div 1 East Fuel Pool Vent Exh Radiation Monitor (back of H11-P601).
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +40 min Booth Action:
Trigger Event 3 to initiate East FP Div 1 Rad Monitor Downscale Failure (D11MF0021).
ATC/BOP Responds to alarm 3D27, Div I/II FP Vent Exh Rad Monitor Dnscl/Inop.
Directs an NO/LNO/RTC to the H11-P606 panel to check Rad Monitors.
Role Play NO/LNO/RTC: If dispatched wait 3 minutes and REPORT: D11-K609A (Div 1 Fuel Pool East Vent Exh Duct Rad Monitor) is downscale (<0.01 mr/hr) with a white downscale light lit. All other Fuel Pool Rad Monitors indicate about 0.1 mr/hr.
NO/LNO/RTC: If asked (per ARP), Mode Switch is in OPERATE.
NO/LNO/RTC: If asked to attempt to clear the alarm (per the ARP), report that you depressed the RESET pushbutton and the indications are the same as before.
BOP Checks indications on back of P601.
Recognizes and reports Div 1 East Fuel Pool Vent Exh Rad Monitor is downscale.
SRO Acknowledges reports for Fuel Pool Rad Monitor failure.
Reviews 23.601 and Evaluates Technical Specifications Conducts follow up brief with crew.
May notify Work Control personnel of Rad Monitor failure.
TS Impact TS 3.3.6.2, Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation:
The secondary containment isolation instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3.6.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels inoperable A.1 Place channel in trip 24 Hours
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 5 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior TS Impact TS 3.3.7.1, Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System Inst.
The CREF System instrumentation for each Function in table 3.3.7.1-1 shall be OPERABLE CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required channels inoperable A.1 Enter condition referenced in table 3.3.7.1-1 for the channel.
Immediately B. As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in table 3.3.7.1-1 B.2 Place channel in trip.
24 Hours
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 6 of 16 Event 4 Failed CRD Suction Pressure Control Valve Type:
C Event
Description:
Loss of CRD Pump suction pressure caused by failure of the CRD Suction Pressure Control Valve. This will cause the running CRD pump to trip. If the standby pump is started, it will also trip. A CRD pump will be restored by directing field actions to manually bypass the CRD pump suction PCV and then starting a CRD pump.
Symptoms/Cues: 3D1, CRD Suction Pressure Low. Trip of the running CRD Pump.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +50 min Booth Action Trigger Event 4 to initiate Loss of CRD Pump Suction.
ATC Recognizes and reports trip of the running CRD Pump.
Recognizes and reports receipt of 3D1, CRD PUMP A/B SUCTION PRESSURE LOW.
SRO Acknowledges report of tripped CRD Pump:
Enters 20.106.01 - Loss of CRD Hydraulics AOP.
Makes plant announcement.
Reviews / discusses Immediate Actions (not applicable when RPV Pressure > 900 psig.
Directs monitoring for Override conditions.
Directs Condition A of AOP.
Directs verifying CRD suction pressure in accordance with 3D1.
ATC Directs NO to:
Investigate CRD Suction Control Valve indications locally.
Walkdown 64B-B11 Check CRD Suction Pressure locally (will have to valve in suction pressure gauge).
Isolate Reference Leg Backfill.
Monitors for accumulator trouble alarm(s) and informs CRS when 2nd one received, with at least one on a withdrawn control rod.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 7 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Role Play RB NO: If dispatched:
Wait 3 minutes REPORT: C11-F412 (CRD Suction PCV) is closed locally.
REPORT: Local CRD Suction Pressure is oscillating between 5 and 15 psig.
RB NO: If dispatched to investigate 64B-B11:
Wait 3 minutes REPORT: No abnormalities found at 64B-B11.
RB NO: If directed to isolate Ref Leg Backfill:
Wait 5 minutes REPORT: Ref Leg Backfill is isolated (no simulator actions necessary).
SRO Acknowledges receipt of accumulator trouble alarm.
Directs monitoring for 20 minutes per Override when 2nd alarm received, with at least one on a withdrawn control rod.
Acknowledges reports of status of CRD Suction Pressure PCV.
Directs bypassing CRD Suction PCV, per 3D1, IAW SOP 23.106.
NOTE:
Override for 20.106.01 - place mode switch in shutdown within 20 minutes if:
Reactor Pressure > 900 psig.
AND More than one accumulator trouble light received (at least one on a withdrawn control rod).
AND No CRD pump running.
ATC/BOP Coordinates / directs NO to bypass CRD Suction PCV IAW 23.106, Section 5.6:
Open C1100-F031, Suction PCV Bypass Valve, 2 to 3 turns.
Throttle open C11-R017A(B) East (West) CRD Pump Suction Pressure Indicator.
Maintain suction pressure to CRD Pumps at 30 to 40 psig by:
o Slowly close C1100-F028, PCV F412 Inlet Isolation Valve.
o Throttle C1100-F031, Drive Water Pump Suction Reducing Station Bypass Isolation Valve.
Close C1100-F029, PCV F412 Outlet Isolation Valve.
Close C11-R017A(B) East (West) CRD Pump Suction Pressure Indicator.
Reports actions taken and status of CRD to CRS.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 8 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Role Play RB NO: When directed to bypass CRD Suction Pressure Controller:
Repeat back steps, with 30 second delay, as directed.
RB NO: When directed to throttle open C1100-F031:
Wait 30 seconds
Trigger Step 4a - Manual CRD Suction Pressure Control.
Report: Final Pump Suction Pressure is 35 psig.
SRO Directs standby CRD Pump started IAW 20.106.01 Condition A.
ATC RO perform the following from 20.106.01, Condition A:
Direct NO to Isolate Reference Leg Backfill.
Start Standby CRD Pump
Adjust CRD flow and pressure.
Contact I&C to restore Reference Leg Backfill.
RO may dispatch NO to check pump ready for start prior to start.
RO inform NO of start of CRD Pump.
Role Play RB NO: If directed to check/report status of CRD Pump:
CRD Pump(s) ready for start.
CRD Pump looks good on start (when re-started after adjusting CRD suction pressure).
RB NO: When directed to isolate reference leg backfill:
WAIT 1 minute
REPORT Div 1 and 2 reference leg backfill isolated per 20.106.01 RB NO: When directed to clear 3D13:
TRIGGER Step 4b to clear 3D13 malfunction
REPORT CRD Hydraulic Temperature High has been reset RB NO: IF asked, report that you made an adjustment and CRD Suction pressure is 35 psig.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 9 of 16 Event 5 Pressure Regulator Fault Type:
C Event
Description:
An event will occur that will cause a loss of the in-service pressure regulator to fail low. As a result, the system will swap to the backup regulator. The crew will take actions per the AOP to complete the swap to the backup pressure regulator.
Symptoms/Cues: 4D91, ELECTRIC GOVERNOR TROUBLE with a slight rise (~3.5 psig) in reactor pressure and reactor power (~1%).
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +65 min Booth Action Trigger Event 5 to fail the in-service Pressure Regulator LOW.
ATC/BOP Recognizes and reports a rise in reactor power and reactor pressure.
Responds to 4D91, Electric Governor Trouble.
Diagnoses and reports failure of the in-service pressure regulator.
Diagnoses and reports that auto transfer to the backup pressure regulator.
May direct NO to the RR to investigate.
SRO Acknowledges report from RO.
Enters AOP 20.109.02, Pressure Controller Failure with a Crew Update.
Directs Actions of Condition B of 20.109.02.
BOP Acknowledge direction / performs Actions for 20.109.02 Condition B:
Verify the following:
o Backup Pressure Regulator takes control.
o Indicated Pressure Regulator Setpoints are the same as before the failure.
o Indicated Pressure controlling ~ 3.5 psi higher
Return Pressure Setpoint to value prior to failure by:
o Depress Regulator No. 1(2) pushbutton for Pressure Regulator in control.
o Depress Pressure Controls LOWER pushbutton to lower Regulator Pressure Setpoint.
Verify Reactor Pressure returns to value prior to Regulator failure.
SRO Acknowledges actions taken and status of the Pressure Regulator / Reactor Pressure.
Directs BOP to perform Actions of Condition C of 20.109.02.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 10 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges direction and directs/coordinates with NO/STA to perform Actions of Condition C of 20.109.02.
Relays information (status) of Reactor Pressure Regulator indications from the RR.
Role Play NO/STA: IF directed to the RR:
WAIT 3 minutes; Then REPORT the lamp test on all 3 alarm modules was sat. The Press. Ref. light is lit on the Pressure Control Module. No other alarm lights are lit.
SRO Directs Actions of Condition D of 20.109.02.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 11 of 16 Event 6 HPCI Steam Leak to MSO Type:
MAJ Event
Description:
Steam leaking from the HPCI system will cause the crew to enter 20.000.02, Abnormal Release of Radioactive Material and 29.100.01 Sheet 5, Secondary Containment Control.
Attempts to isolate the steam leak will be unsuccessful and HPCI room temperatures will approach the Maximum Safe Operating (MSO) value.
Symptoms/Cues: 16D27, FIRE ALARM, with no automatic start of the Electric or Diesel Fire Pumps.
Temperature and radiation levels in the HPCI Room will indicate a steam leak rather than a fire.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +75 min Booth Action Trigger Event 6 to initiate Unisolable HPCI Steam Leak.
BOP Responds to alarm 16D27, Fire Alarm, monitors for start of fire pumps and report to CRS.
Recognizes and reports fire alarm is from Zone 4, HPCI Quad.
Monitors and reports no Auto Start of EFP/DFP.
Monitors for and reports rising temperatures and radiation levels in the HPCI Quad.
May recommend entering AOP for Abnormal Release of Radioactive Material.
May recommend isolating the HPCI System.
SRO Enters 20.000.02, Abnormal Release of Radioactive Material with a crew update.
May direct RO to attempt to isolate HPCI.
Sounds plant area alarm and announces steam leak over the Hi-Com.
BOP Responds to 1D66, Steam Leak Detection Ambient Temperature High and 1D70, Steam Leak Detection Diff Temp High alarms.
Responds to 3D34, Sec Contm Temp High-High EOP Entry.
Directs an operator to the Steam Leak Detection Panel.
Recognizes and reports EOP entry condition on high HPCI Room Temp.
Role Play NO: IF directed to Steam Leak Detection Panel (RR):
WAIT 5 minutes; Then REFER to IPCS in the Booth
REPORT room temperatures as directed by the LNO.
SRO Enters 29.100.01 Sh 5, Secondary Containment Control, on high HPCI room temperature.
Directs isolating the HPCI System.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 12 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Attempts to isolate the HPCI system as directed
Recognizes and reports inability to isolate HPCI.
May respond to 2D73, HPCI MOVs Overload, and direct NO to investigate 2PB-1-11B.
Recognizes and reports HPCI Room Temperature still rising and approaching Max Safe Operating (MSO) Value of 210°F.
Role Play NO: IF directed to investigate 2PB1 Pos 11B:
WAIT 5 minutes; Then REPORT 2PB1-11B is tripped on Thermal Overload and there is an acrid odor in the area of the MCC.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 13 of 16 Event 7 HPCI>MSO, Mode Switch fails, RPS push buttons work, Div 2 CS Pump area temp rising Type:
C, MC Event
Description:
With HPCI room temperatures approaching MSO, the SRO should direct the Mode Switch taken to Shutdown BEFORE the MSO is reached (CT-1, SC-SCRAM).
When the Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown, the crew will be informed that the watertight door to the HPCI room is open and unable to be closed. This will cause rising temperatures in the Div 2 Core Spray Pump Room area Symptoms/Cues: HPCI room temperature approaches MSO, requiring shutdown.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +75 min Note Event 7/8 will automatically trigger when MS is taken to shutdown.
Be ready to give Role Play in Event 8 after the MS is taken to Shutdown.
SRO Directs Mode Switch to S/D prior to 210°F.
Enters EOP SH 1 for scram (from SH 5)
Announces events over the Hi-Com Requests scram reports ATC Places Mode Switch in S/D when directed.
Recognizes Failure to Scram and pushes manual scram push buttons.
Recognizes all rods are inserted.
CT-1, SC-SCRAM - With reactor at power and with a primary system discharging into the secondary containment, MANUALLY SCRAM the reactor before any area exceeds any Maximum Safe Operating (MSO) value.
Inserts IRMs and SRMs as Immediate Action.
Provides scram reports, including failure of the Mode Switch, when directed.
BOP Provides scram reports when directed.
SRO Acknowledges scram reports from panel operators.
Directs reports for isolations and actuations for Level as they occur.
Directs 173-214 level band.
Directs 500-700 psig pressure band.
Directs entry into/actions from the Scram AOP.
Directs monitoring for second area temperature rise and assigns as critical parameter.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 14 of 16 Event 8 Anticipate ED, Both BPVs fail, 2 areas > MSO, ED Type:
C Event
Description:
With the HPCI watertight door unable to be closed, the crew will attempt to anticipate emergency depressurization by opening Main Turbine Bypass Valves. Both BPVs will fail to operate.
Div 2 CSS Pump Room temperature will begin to rise and eventually exceed Maximum Safe Operating temperature of 210F. This will prompt the crew to emergency depressurize the plant using 5 SRVs, ADS preferred (CT-2, SC-ED).
Symptoms/Cues: Console operator will deliver Role Play following MS being taken to shutdown.
Temperature in Div 2 CSS Pump Room will begin to rise.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +75 min Role Play CALL on the radio and REPORT as RB Rounds: I was in the Reactor Building Southeast Sub-Basement. I heard a loud bang and saw a cloud of steam. I tried to close the watertight door to the HPCI area, but the door WOULD NOT close. I have left the area and am exiting the RB..
BOP Acknowledges report from RB rounds, relays information to CRS.
Attempts to lower pressure using the Bypass Valves.
Recognizes / reports failure of the East & West BPVs.
Recognizes / reports rising temperature in Div 2 CSS Pump Room.
Recognizes / reports when Div 2 CSS Pump Room > MSO temperature (210°F).
SRO Directs actions to Anticipate ED by fully opening MT BPVs (if above failure not yet detected).
Acknowledges report of Bypass Valve failure.
Directs monitoring for 2 areas >MSO temperature.
Transitions to ED leg when 2 areas >MSO.
Directs opening 5 SRVs, ADS preferred.
Directs bypassing and restoring Drywell Pneumatics.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 15 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP/ATC Opens 5 ADS SRVs and reports to CRS.
CT-2, SC-ED - With a primary system discharging into the secondary containment and area radiation/temperature/water levels exceed maximum safe operating levels in more than one area, INITIATE Emergency Depressurization.
Bypasses and restores Drywell Pneumatics and reports to CRS.
Places Div 1 Drywell Pneumatic Supply Isolation Bypass Keylock switch in ON.
Verifies open or opens T4901-F466, Div 1 DW Pneumatics N2 Supply Valve.
Opens T4901-F465, Div 1 DW Pneumatics Sply Otbd Iso Vlv.
Opens T4901-F601, Div 1 DW Pneumatics Sply Inbd Iso Vlv.
Places Div 2 Drywell Pneumatic Supply Isolation Bypass Keylock switch in ON.
Verifies open or opens T4901-F469, Div 2 DW Pneumatics N2 Supply Valve.
Opens T4901-F468, Div 2 DW Pneumatics Sply Otbd Iso Vlv.
Open T4901-F602, Div 2 DW Pneumatics Sply Inbd Iso Vlv.
Recognizes and reports EOP Entry Condition on High TWT and High TWL SRO Enters 29.100.01 Sheet 2, Primary Containment Control on High TWT/TWL with Crew Update.
Directs RO to place RHR in Torus Cooling, with cooling maximized.
Directs RO to lower TWL, using TWMS, defeating interlocks if necessary, using 29.ESP.21.
BOP/ATC Places RHR in Torus Cooling and maximizes cooling.
Contact RB Rounds for pump start and makes Hi-Com announcement Place E1150-F028A(B) Keylock in OPERATE and opens E1150-F028A(B)
Start E1102-C002A (B,C,D) Div 1(2) RHR Pump A(B,C,D)
Open E1150-F024A(B)
Places RHRSW in operation.
Contact RB Rounds for pump start and makes Hi-Com announcement Place E1150-F028A(B) Keylock in OPERATE and opens E1150-F028A(B)
Start E1102-C002A (B,C,D) Div 1(2) RHR Pump A(B,C,D)
Open E1150-F024A(B)
Evaluates RHRSW Temperature and places MDCT fans in service as applicable.
Refers to 29.ESP.21 to lower Torus Water Level.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 16 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Lead Evaluator Scenario is terminated following ED when plant is stable, at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 1 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary NRC Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:
Fermi 2 Scenario #:
2 Source:
New Op Test #
2023 ILT Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Validating Operators:
A. Snowberger (CRS)
J. Walters (BOP)
D. Roberts (ATC)
Initial Conditions:
94%, #4 GSW Pump Out Of Service for repairs Turnover:
Power is being held at 94%, pending evaluation for final rod pattern adjustment.
When you take the shift, you will shift operating CRD pumps from East CRD pump to West CRD pump due to higher than normal vibrations on East pump.
Critical Tasks:
(CT-1, PC-SCRAM) Upon failure of automatic scram due to High Drywell Pressure, insert control rods by placing the Mode Switch in shutdown (CT-2, RPV-HPCI) With a LOCA and loss of High Pressure feed and HPCI fails to automatically start, start HPCI to prevent RPV Water Level from dropping below Top of Active Fuel (TAF).
(CT-3, RPV-Injection) With a LOCA present and HPCI injecting, control injection systems to prevent from flooding the Main Steam Lines (~280 RPV Level).
Event No.
Malf No.
Event Type* /
Position Event Description 1
N/A N
ATC/SRO Shortly after taking the shift, the crew will shift operating CRD pumps from East CRD pump to West CRD pump due to higher than normal vibrations on East pump.
2 C93RF0001 C97MF1087 TS SRO A seismic event will occur, and operators will take actions per 20.000.01. The event will be below the threshold for EAL declaration. The CRS will evaluate TRM for impact and determine that TR 3.3.7.2 is applicable.
3 C51MF0006 I
ATC/SRO The flow unit for APRM #2 will fail upscale. The crew will investigate and subsequently determine that tracking LCOs are necessary for TS LCO 3.3.1.1 and TR LCO 3.3.2.1. The crew will bypass APRM #2 per 23.605
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 2 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary Event No.
Malf No.
Event Type* /
Position Event Description 4
C93RF0001 C97MF1087 E41MF0010 C
BOP/SRO A seismic aftershock will occur, which causes a spurious start of the HPCI system. Operators will verify that it was not a valid initiation signal and will shut down the HPCI system. SRO will verify TS 3.5.1 for HPCI being inoperable.
TS SRO 5
N20MF0019 R
ATC The North Condenser Pump will trip on overcurrent and will be unavailable due to oil leak. Crew will lower power <88% and verify power to flow map position 6
C71MF0001 M
ALL A 1% LOCA will occur. As drywell pressure rises, an auto scram failure will occur (high drywell pressure trip). The crew should recognize that the reactor does not scram automatically and will take manual action by placing the mode switch in shutdown. (CT-1, PC-SCRAM).
I ATC/SRO MC ATC 7
B31MF0066 C
BOP/SRO All condenser pumps trip and feed system will be unavailable for injection. HPCI was shut down in a previous event, so it will need to be manually started for it to inject (CT-2, RPV-HPCI).
Injection then needs to be controlled to maintain RPV level below Main Steam Lines (CT-3, RPV-Injection)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 3 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary A. INITIAL CONDITIONS / PRE-SHIFT BRIEFING:
Power was lowered to 80% at the start of the previous shift for performance of a rod pattern adjustment.
Power restoration to 100% is in progress with power currently being held at 94% pending an evaluation of the final rod pattern by Reactor Engineering.
- 4 GSW Pump is out of service for repairs with an expected return to service of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
When you take the shift, you will shift operating CRD pumps from East CRD pump to West CRD pump due to higher than normal vibrations on East pump No additional equipment is out of service.
All licensed operators are in the Main Control Room (MCR).
Normal shift complement of non-licensed operators are available.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 4 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary B.
SUMMARY
OF EVENTS Event 1:
Shift CRD pumps due to high vibes on East CRD pump Shortly after taking the shift, the crew will shift operating CRD pumps from East CRD pump to West CRD pump due to higher than normal vibrations on East pump.
Event 2:
Seismic event < OBE A seismic event will occur, and operators will take actions per 20.000.01. The event will be below the threshold for EAL declaration. The CRS will evaluate TRM for impact and determine that TR 3.3.7.2 is applicable.
Event 3:
APRM #2 flow unit fails upscale The flow unit for APRM #2 will fail upscale. The crew will investigate and subsequently determine that tracking LCOs are necessary for TS LCO 3.3.1.1 and TR LCO 3.3.2.1. The crew will bypass APRM #2 per 23.605 Event 4:
Seismic aftershock < OBE / spurious initiation of HPCI A seismic aftershock will occur, which causes a spurious start of the HPCI system. Operators will verify that it was not a valid initiation signal and will shut down the HPCI system. SRO will verify TS 3.5.1 for HPCI being inoperable.
Event 5:
North Condenser Pump trip, Lower power < 88%
The North Condenser Pump will trip on overcurrent and will be unavailable due to oil leak. Crew will lower power <88% and verify power to flow map position.
Event 6:
LOCA, Auto Scram Failure on High DWP, Mode Switch successful.
A 1% LOCA will occur. As drywell pressure rises, an auto scram failure will occur (high drywell pressure trip).
The crew should recognize that the reactor does not scram automatically and will take manual action by placing the mode switch in shutdown. (CT-1, PC-SCRAM)
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 5 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary Event 7:
Manually startup HPCI to prevent Level <TAF, control Systems to prevent flooding MS Lines.
HPCI was shut down in a previous event, so it will need to be manually started for it to inject (CT-2, RPV-HPCI). Injection then needs to be controlled to maintain RPV level below the Main Steam Lines (CT-3, RPV-Injection).
Termination Criteria Scenario is terminated following initiation of drywell spray or at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 6 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary C. SIMULATOR SETUP SCENARIO SPECIFIC SETUP:
- 1. INITIALIZE the simulator to IC-172 or similar IC with the following attributes:
- a. LOWER RR Flow to achieve 94% Power (approximately 69% speed on the RRMG Sets).
- 2. PLACE #4 GSW Pump CMC in OFF/RESET.
- 3. PLACE RT dot next to #4 GSW Pump CMC.
- 4. VERIFY East CRD Pump is operating.
- 5. PLACE the simulator in RUN.
- 6. TRIGGER Setup step GENERIC SETUP:
- 1. PROVIDE crew a list of available NOs
- 2. ENSURE that all annunciators are acknowledged and the plant is stable
- 3. ACKNOWLDGE DCS alarms
- 4. VERIFY GSW placard is in place and indicates INTERMITTENT.
- 5. VERIFY CFD placard has current dates (within the last 14 days is acceptable).
- 6. COMPLETE Attachment 1 of NTWI 5.12
- 7. ALLOW the operators to enter the room, provide them with a turnover in accordance with Section E, and allow them to walk down the panels
- 8. ENSURE simulator alarms are NOT silenced
- 9. TRIGGER steps as directed by the guide/Lead Evaluator
- 10. START Simulator data recorder
- 11. RECORD communications with crew members on NTWI 5.12 Attachment 3
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 7 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary D. CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASK EVALUATION CRITERIA SAT UNSAT NA CT-1, PC-SCRAM - Upon failure of automatic scram due to High Drywell Pressure, insert control rods by placing the Mode Switch in shutdown.
Safety Significance: High pressure inside the primary containment may indicate a break in the nuclear system process barrier. It is prudent to scram the reactor in such a situation, to minimize the possibility of fuel damage and to reduce energy transfer from the core to the coolant. With Primary Containment challenged and a reactor scram is required, manual action must be taken to place the reactor in a shutdown condition.
Failure Criteria reasoning: NUREG 1021 App D - D.1.c Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if all rods are not inserted within 10 minutes of LOCA initiation.
Initiating Cue: High Drywell Pressure automatic scram required and the reactor not shutdown.
Measurable Performance Standard: Mode Switch placed in shutdown.
Performance Feedback: Available control rod position indication shows all rods inserted, and reactor power is lowering.
Expected action: Place Mode Switch placed in shutdown.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 8 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary CRITICAL TASK EVALUATION CRITERIA SAT UNSAT NA CT-2, RPV-HPCI - With a LOCA and loss of High Pressure feed and HPCI fails to automatically start, start HPCI to prevent RPV Water Level from dropping below Top of Active Fuel (TAF).
Safety Significance: When High Pressure feedwater sources are not available and a LOCA is present, RPV water level will drop below Top of Active Fuel (TAF) Although adequate core cooling exists until the Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level (-25) is reached, fuel damage can still occur with fuel uncovered. Starting HPCI will prevent RPV Water Level from reaching TAF and uncovering fuel.
Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if HPCI is not started and RPV Water Level drops below TAF thereby preventing fuel from being cooled by core submergence.
Per the BWR EPGs/SAGs Appendix B Vol I, Submergence is the preferred method for cooling the core. The core is adequately cooled by submergence when it can be determined that RPV water level is at or above the top of the active fuel. All fuel nodes are then assumed to be covered with water and heat is removed by boiling heat transfer.
Initiating Cue: Indications of a LOCA are present along with loss of High Pressure feedwater sources and HPCI fails to automatically start with RPV Water Level lowering.
Measurable Performance Standard: HPCI is started and injects to prevent RPV Water Level dropping below TAF.
Performance Feedback: RPV Water Level rises after HPCI is manually started.
Expected action: Inject to the RPV using the HPCI system to prevent RPV Water Level from reaching TAF.
Note: Without operator action, TAF is reached in ~4.5 minutes in this scenario. TAF is reached in ~5.5 minutes if SBFW, SLC and a 2nd CRD pump are started.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 9 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary CRITICAL TASK EVALUATION CRITERIA SAT UNSAT NA CT-3, RPV-Injection - With a LOCA present and HPCI injecting, control injection systems to prevent from flooding the Main Steam Lines (~280 RPV Level).
Safety Significance: Controlling RPV Level below the Main Steam Lines ensures main steam line piping remains intact, precluding additional coolant inventory loss, and potential release outside primary containment and also prevents the transport of fission products through the secondary system, reducing radiation levels outside of Primary Containment.
Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if RPV Water Level rises above the elevation of the Main Steam Lines (~280 indicated RPV Level).
Initiating Cue: A LOCA exists, with sufficient injection from the HPCI System to maintain/recover RPV Water Lever, an ECCS initiation signal exists, and Reactor Pressure drops below Low Pressure ECCS injection pressure.
Measurable Performance Standard: Injection systems are controlled such that RPV Water Level is prevented from reaching 280 RPV Water Level.
Performance Feedback: RPV Water Level indication is controlled within the prescribed band and, in all cases,
<280.
Expected action: Operate available injection systems in accordance with station procedures to control RPV water level within the prescribed band.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 10 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary E. LIST OF MALFUNCTIONS The following malfunctions and/or remote functions are to be active/activated as indicated in the time line:
MF/RF/PO/LBL DESCRIPTION TARGET VALUE STEP NO.
RAMP DELAY cd=P807_A008_2 EQ 0
- 4 GSW Pump Blown Fuse N/A S1 0
0 PAACFU_01CC 1
0 0
PAACFU_02CC 1
0 0
C71MF0001 High DWP Scram Fail ACTIVE S2 0
0 C97MF1087 Seismic Event 1
Event 2 0
0 C97MF1087 2
0 60 C93RF0001 ON 0
0 C51MF0006 APRM #2 Flow Unit Failure 130 Event 3 0
0 C97MF1087 Seismic Aftershock - HPCI Spurious Start 1
Event 4 0
0 delia C97MF1087 2
0 60 C93RF0001 ON 0
0 E41MF0010 ACTIVE 0
0 N20MF0019 N. Cond Pump Trip ACTIVE Event 5 0
0 B31MF0067 1% LOCA 1.0 Event 6 300 0
N20MF0018 N20MF0020 Condenser Pump C/S Trip ACTIVE N/A 60s
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 11 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary F. REFERENCES The following is a list of expected Procedure References used in this scenario:
PROCEDURE TITLE 2D28 HPCI STEAM LINE DIFF PRESS HIGH 2D57 HPCI ISO TURBINE TRIP PUSHBUTTON ARMED POS 2D59 HPCI PUMP DISCH FLOW LOW 2D62 HPCI CNDR VAC TANK PRESSURE HIGH 2D64 HPCI OIL FILTER DIFF PRESSURE HIGH 2D93 HPCI TURBINE TRIPPED 3D18 IPCS MONITORED INPUTS ABNORMAL 3D111 RBM TROUBLE 3D113 CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK 3D115 APRM FLOW UPSCALE 3D164 FEEDWATER CONTROL DCS TROUBLE 5D144 MOTOR TRIPPED 6D69 SEISMIC SYSTEM EVENT/TROUBLE 20.000.01 ACTS OF NATURE 20.000.21 REACTOR SCRAM 20.107.01 LOSS OF FEEDWATER OR FEEDWATER CONTROL 23.106 CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 23.107 REACTOR FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMS 23.138.01 REACTOR RECIRCULATION SYSTEM 23.202 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM 23.206 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM 23.208 RHR COMPLEX SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS 23.413 CONTROL CENTER HVAC 23.601 INSTRUMENT TRIP SHEETS 23.605 AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITORING (APRM) SYSTEM 23.612 SEISMIC MONITORING 23.702 EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 12 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary PROCEDURE TITLE TR 3.3.7.2 Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation TR 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 16 Event 1 Shift CRD pumps due to high vibes on East CRD pump.
Type:
N Event
Description:
Shortly after taking the shift, the crew will shift operating CRD pumps from East CRD pump to West CRD pump due to higher than normal vibrations on East pump.
Symptoms/Cues: The following will be presented to the examinees prior to the start of shift:
When you take the shift, you will swap from East CRD pump to West CRD pump operating due to East exhibiting higher than normal vibrations. The RB Rounds NO has been briefed and is standing by, in the CRD Pump Room, with a copy of 23.106.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 min Booth Action After providing cue above and crew takes the shift, trigger Event 1 placeholder.
T0 +1 min CRS/ATC Will conduct a brief of the evolution.
T0 +5 min ATC Directs NO to perform actions per 23.106 Section 5.1.2:
Step 1: prepare standby (West) CRD Pump for starting.
Step 2: line up/vent the West CRD Pump Suction Filter Step 3: vent the West CRD Pump Role Play RB NO:
When directed to prepare West CRD Pump for starting (5.1.2.1):
WAIT 2 minutes REPORT: Step 5.1.2.1 is complete.
When directed to lineup/vent West CRD Pump Suction Filter (5.1.2.2):
WAIT 2 minutes REPORT: West CRD Pump Suction Filter has been vented and is in service.
When directed to vent West CRD Pump (5.1.2.3):
WAIT 2 minutes REPORT: West CRD Pump has been vented, West CRD Pump is ready for start.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Starts West CRD Pump:
Verifies cooling water is established.
Places CRD FCV controller in MANUAL.
Lowers system flow to ~30 gpm.
Makes plant announcement.
Notifies RB NO.
Starts West CRD Pump.
Stops East CRD Pump.
Adjusts CRD FCV to establish a flow rate of 37 to 63 gpm.
Verifies auto tracking, then places CRD FCV in AUTO.
Adjusts PCV to maintain 255 to 265 psid Drive Water D/P and 6 to 30 psid Cooling Water D/P.
SRO Provides oversight of CRD Pump Shift.
BOP Peer checks ATC. May handle communications.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of 16 Event 2 Seismic event < OBE Type:
TS Event
Description:
A seismic event will occur, and operators will take actions per 20.000.01. The event will be below the threshold for EAL declaration. The event will require evaluation of the TRM for impact.
Symptoms/Cues: 6D69, Seismic Event System / Trouble alarm with rumbling noises in the MCR.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +15 min Booth Action Trigger Event 2 to initiate a Seismic Event.
BOP Responds to 6D69, Seismic Event Trouble alarm and reports alarm to CRS.
Directs operator to investigate seismic alarm IAW 23.612.
Reviews control room indications for abnormalities SRO Acknowledges report of 6D69 and seismic activity.
Enters 20.000.01, Earthquake Makes plant announcement Directs 20.000.01 Condition AA:
Monitoring for abnormal indications.
Performing visual inspection of accessible plant areas.
ATC/BOP Monitor indications as directed by the CRS.
Relays information from the RR to the CRS.
Role Play NO:
When directed to investigate seismic alarm (per 23.612).
WAIT 3 minutes REPORT from the RR (via Hi-Com or phone): The Seismic Recorder has printed. Peak values reached are 0.02G Horizontal / 0.02G Vertical.
No error lights are lit.
If called to walk down spaces for damage:
WAIT 2 minutes REPORT as Lead NO: All operators were in the tagging center for a brief and acknowledge the order to walk down spaces.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 2 Page 4 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Acknowledges report of seismic magnitude.
Directs 20.000.01 Condition AC:
Inspect plant for structural damage and leaks.
Initiate a CARD to remove plates from Passive Seismic Detectors for data evaluation.
Attempt to confirm Seismic Event magnitude.
If necessary, reset the following.
Start and Stop all RHRSW MDCT Fans and check for proper running indication (23.208).
Review EP-101 for classifiable conditions (SM).
Inspect ISFSI MPCs and Storage Casks that contain fuel for damage.
Direct RP to verify ISFSI radiation levels consistent with previous surveys.
Verify proper Spent Fuel Pool parameters and take actions as required per 20.708.
BOP/ATC Performs/Directs the following as assigned from the CRS:
Inspect plant for structural damage and leaks.
Initiate a CARD to remove plates from Passive Seismic Detectors for data evaluation.
Confirm Seismic Event magnitude.
Reset of CCHVAC Purge Compressors.
Inspect ISFSI MPCs and Storage Casks that contain fuel for damage.
Direct RP to verify ISFSI radiation levels consistent with previous surveys.
Verify proper Spent Fuel Pool parameters and take actions as required per 20.708.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 2 Page 5 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Role Play If University of Michigan, National Earthquake Information Center, or Davis Besse are contacted:
As applicable organization, confirm seismic magnitudes reported above.
If contacted to reset CCHVAC Purge Compressors:
WAIT 5 minutes REPORT Division 1 and 2 CCHVAC purge compressors have been reset No booth actions required If contacted to walk down MDCT Cooling Tower Fans:
WAIT 5 minutes REPORT Good start on MDCT Cooling Tower Fans No booth actions required If contacted to inspect ISFSI:
WAIT 10 minutes REPORT No abnormal conditions noted at ISFSI, rad levels consistent with previous surveys No booth actions required BOP Starts and Stops Div 1 RHRSW MDCT Fans and checks for proper running indication (23.208):
Informs NO of fan start.
Depresses / holds E1156-M001(3) MDCT FAN A(C) VIB TRIP BYP PB.
Within 5 seconds, place E1156-C001A(C), Div 1 RHRSW MDCT Fan A(C), in LOW-SPEED.
After MDCT Fan current has stabilized at running current, release E1156-M001(3) MDCT FAN A(C) VIB TRIP BYP PB.
Starts and Stops Div 2 RHRSW MDCT Fans and checks for proper running indication (23.208):
Informs NO of fan start.
Depresses / holds E1156-M001(3) MDCT FAN A(C) VIB TRIP BYP PB.
Within 5 seconds, place E1156-C001A(C), Div 1 RHRSW MDCT Fan A(C), in LOW-SPEED.
After MDCT Fan current has stabilized at running current, release E1156-M001(3) MDCT FAN A(C) VIB TRIP BYP PB.
SRO Evaluates Tech Specs and TRM and determines TR 3.3.7.2 is applicable.
Conducts follow-up brief.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 2 Page 6 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior TRM Impact TRLCO 3.3.7.2, Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation:
The seismic monitoring instrumentation shown in table TR3.3.7.2-1 shall be OPERABLE CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. One or more seismic monitoring Functions inoperable due to actuation during a seismic event greater than or equal to 0.01 g.
C.1 Restore seismic monitoring instrument to OPERABLE status.
AND C.2 Perform TRSR 3.3.7.2.3 AND C.3 Data shall be retrieved from actuate instruments and analyzed to determine the magnitude of the vibratory ground motion.
AND C.4 Prepare and submit a Special Report per 10CFR50.4 24 Hours 5 Days 10 Days 10 Days
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 2 Page 7 of 16 Event 3 APRM #2 flow unit fails upscale Type:
I Event
Description:
The flow unit for APRM #2 will fail upscale. The crew will investigate and subsequently determine that tracking LCOs are necessary for TS LCO 3.3.1.1 and TR LCO 3.3.2.1.
The crew will bypass APRM #2 per 23.605.
Symptoms/Cues: Alarms 3D111, RBM Trouble, 3D113, Control Rod Withdrawal Blocked and 3D115, APRM Flow Upscale and upscale flow (130%) for APRM #2.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +50 min Booth Action Trigger Event 3 to initiate APRM Flow Unit Failure (C51MF0006) for APRM #2.
ATC Responds to ARPs 3D111, RBM Trouble, 3D113, Control Rod Withdrawal Blocked and 3D115, APRM Flow Upscale.
Determines that APRM #2 flow is upscale.
Reports indications to the CRS.
Recommends bypassing the affected APRM per ARP.
May report Tech Spec/TRM information from ARP to SRO.
May dispatch operator to the Relay Room.
Role Play NO/STA:
IF directed to the Relay Room to investigate APRM #2, WAIT 3 minutes then REPORT (via HICOM or Phone): ARPM #2 flow is reading 130.0%. All other APRMs flows indicate normally (~86%).
SRO Acknowledges report of APRM Flow Unit failure.
Announces event over Hi-Com.
Directs bypassing APRM #2 IAW 23.605.
Reviews Technical Specifications/TRM.
May contact RTC/WWM to write a CARD, commence troubleshooting, protect unaffected APRMs.
Tech Spec Impact (Tracking only)
LCO 3.3.1.1, RPS Instrumentation is MET per Table 3.3.1.1-1, Function 2.
Determines that a Tracking LCO is necessary for Condition A.1.
TRLCO 3.3.2.1, Control Rod Block Instrumentation is MET per Table TR3.3.2.1-1, Function 3. Determines that a Tracking LCO is necessary for Condition A.1.
Note: These Actions are tracking only since the required number of channels (3) is met in the current MODE.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 2 Page 8 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP May back up ATCs diagnosis of APRM #2 flow unit failure.
May handle communications for ATC.
May take over monitoring of Power, Pressure and Level.
Peer checks ATC when bypassing APRM #2.
ATC Bypasses APRM #2 IAW 23.605, Section 6.4:
Verifies no other APRMs are in bypass APRM Bypass Joystick to Position 2 Verifies the APRM indicates bypassed.
Directs operator to verify APRM #2 indicates bypassed in Relay Room.
Role Play NO:
When directed to Relay Room:
WAIT 3 minutes REPORT verified indications of APRM #2 being bypassed per 23.605 section 6.4 Step 3.
BOP May handle communications for bypassing APRM.
May take over monitoring of Power, Pressure and Level.
Peer checks 23.605, Section 6.4.
SRO Conducts follow-up brief to discuss APRM failure, impact, Tech Specs and actions going forward.
May contact RTC/WWM to write a CARD, commence troubleshooting, protect unaffected APRMs.
Role Play RTC/WWM:
If contacted:
ACKNOWLEDGE any reports or actions ordered.
No further action required
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 2 Page 9 of 16 Event 4 Seismic aftershock < OBE / spurious initiation of HPCI Type:
TS, C Event
Description:
A seismic aftershock will occur, which causes a spurious start of the HPCI system. Operators will verify that it was not a valid initiation signal and will shut down the HPCI system. SRO will verify Tech Specs for HPCI being inoperable.
Symptoms/Cues: Seismic aftershock and spurious initiation of HPCI system.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +50 min Booth Action Trigger Event 4 to cause a seismic aftershock and spurious start of the HPCI system.
BOP Responds to 2D28, HPCI System Actuated and evaluates the HPCI system.
Identifies the HPCI system is starting and informs CRS.
Verifies the HPCI system does not have a valid initiation signal:
Reactor Vessel Level > Level 2 Drywell Pressure 1.68 PSIG Informs CRS that no valid Actuation signal exists and recommends / shuts down the HPCI system.
Role Play NO:
If dispatched to testability to investigate HPCI spurious start:
WAIT 3 minutes REPORT: Everything looks normal at testability. I see nothing obvious that indicates why HPCI started If dispatched to Relay Room to investigate seismic monitor:
WAIT 3 minutes REPORT: The Seismic Recorder has printed. Peak values reached are 0.02G Horizontal / 0.02G Vertical. No error lights are lit.
SRO Makes plant announcement.
Acknowledges the HPCI system is injecting and without a valid initiation signal.
Acknowledges report on Reactor Power, RPV pressure, and RPV level.
Acknowledges / directs HPCI shutdown.
Directs Immediate verification that RCIC is OPERABLE.
Reviews Tech Specs.
Conducts brief to discuss TS implications / contingency actions due to HPCI INOPERABLE but available.
May contact SNE to discuss power increase and impact on Thermal Limits
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 2 Page 10 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior TS Impact TS 3.5.1, ECCS Operating:
Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function of five safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. HPCI System inoperable.
E.1 Verify by administrative means RCIC system is OPERABLE.
AND E.2 Restore HPCI system to OPERABLE status Immediately 14 Days Role Play Rx Eng:
If informed to check Thermal Limits:
Acknowledge direction No follow up is necessary.
RO Acknowledges direction to shutdown HPCI.
Secures HPCI per 23.202 Section 8.1 HPCI Shutdown.
Responds to 3D164, Feedwater Control DCS Trouble.
Returns DCS to 3-element control per 23.107, Reactor Feedwater & Condensate System.
Place Level Control Mode switch in 3 ELEM Verify DCS logic is in 3 ELEMENT on C32-K816 Verifies that RCIC is in a standby lineup using SLP dots or SOP lineup, as directed.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 2 Page 11 of 16 Event 5 North Condenser Pump trip, Lower power < 88%
Type:
RX Event
Description:
The North Condenser Pump will trip on overcurrent and will be unavailable due to oil leak. Crew will lower power <88% and verify power to flow map position.
Symptoms/Cues: 5D144 and trip of North Condenser Pump.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +75 min Booth Action Trigger Event 5 to cause of trip of the North Condenser Pump.
BOP Responds to alarm 5D144, Motor Tripped.
Recognizes and reports trip of the N. Condenser Pump.
May contact rounds NOs to investigate the pump and pump breaker (65D-D7).
Role Play NO:
If called to check pump:
REPORT that you will coordinate with RP WAIT 10 minutes REPORT: There is an oil puddle on the floor around the North Condenser Pump and the upper motor bearing is extremely hot. You will coordinate with plant cleaners to contain the oil.
If called to check pump breaker:
WAIT 5 minutes REPORT: 65D, Pos D7 (N. Condenser Pump) is open with a 51 device (overcurrent) showing tripped.
SRO Acknowledges report of Condenser Pump Trip.
Enters AOP 20.107.01, Loss of Feedwater or Feedwater Control.
Announces event over Hi-Com.
Directs ATC to lower reactor power to <88%, and HFP Suction Pressure >100 psig per Condition B.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 2 Page 12 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Adjusts speeds of RRMG Sets to lower power <88%, IAW 23.138.01:
Adjust North (South) RR MG Set speed using B31-R621A (B), N (S) RR MG Set Speed Controllers, as follows:
Verifies B31-R621A (B), N (S) RR MG Set Speed Controllers, in AUTO, or places N (S) RRMG Set Speed Controllers in MANUAL.
Note: If taken to Manual, verify the ATC adjusts Output of the N (S) RRMG Set Speed Controllers to obtain the desired speed.
Adjust setpoint (SP), or output if in MANUAL, of B31-R621A (B), N (S)
RR MG Set Speed Controllers to desired speed.
Adjusts RR MG Set speeds, to match Recirculation Loop Jet Pump flows on B21-R611A and B.
Verifies indicated RR MG Set speeds agree within 3%, as indicated on B31-R621A & B, N and S RR MG Set Speed Controller, process variable (PV) or if available, C32-816, FW & RR Flat Panel Display.
Informs CRS when power is <88% CTP.
Verifies position on the P/F map.
Note: When <88% Power, RRMG A/B Speeds should be about 62% and HFP Suction Pressure ~124 psig.
BOP Monitors HFP suction pressure.
Peer checks power/flow reduction.
May contact the following:
TB rounds to monitor CFD Flows and D/Ps.
CSS of power/load reduction.
Role Play NO:
If called, acknowledge direction and report that you will monitor CFDs and balance flows as necessary.
CSS:
If called, acknowledge report of load reduction. Ask how long Fermi 2 plans on staying at this reduced power?
SRO Monitors Power/Flow reduction.
May notify Work Control personnel of trip of N. Condenser Pump, requests a CARD be written, and a review of POD for activities that might affect current plant conditions.
May conduct follow up brief, review of GOP for current plant conditions.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 2 Page 13 of 16 Event 6 LOCA, Automatic Scram Failure on High DWP, Mode Switch to Shutdown successful.
Type:
Maj, I, MC Event 7 Manually startup HPCI to prevent Level <TAF, control Systems to prevent flooding MS Lines.
Type:
C Event
Description:
A 1% LOCA will occur. As drywell pressure rises, an auto scram failure will occur (high drywell pressure trip). The crew should recognize that the reactor does not scram automatically and will take manual action by placing the mode switch in shutdown. (CT-1, PC-SCRAM).
All condenser pumps trip and feed system will be unavailable for injection. HPCI was shut down in a previous event, so it will need to be manually started for it to inject (CT-2, RPV-HPCI). Injection then needs to be controlled to maintain RPV level below Main Steam Lines (CT-3, RPV-Injection).
Symptoms/Cues: LOCA, drywell pressure rising, reactor does not auto scram.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +75 min Booth Action Trigger Event 6 to initiate LOCA, auto scram failure was inserted in setup steps.
Event 7 does not require any action.
ATC Recognizes and reports rising Drywell Pressure.
Recognizes failure to scram on High Drywell Pressure.
Places MODE Switch in Shutdown.
CT-1, PC-SCRAM - Upon failure of automatic scram due to High Drywell Pressure, insert control rods by placing the Mode Switch in shutdown.
Inserts IRMs/SRMs.
Provide scram reports based on current plant conditions, which includes failure to automatically scram on High Drywell Pressure.
SRO Directs Mode Switch to S/D.
Makes reactor scram plant announcement.
Requests Scram Reports.
Acknowledges scram reports.
Enters EOP 29.100.01, Sheet 1, RPV Control.
Enters EOP 29.100.01, Sheet 2, Primary Containment Control Directs verification of Isolations and Actuations for Level.
Directs Level band of 173 to 214:
Directs Pressure band of 900-1050 psig.
May direct actions of Scram AOP 20.000.21.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 2 Page 14 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Starts HPCI manually and reports HPCI is injecting to control level.
CT-2, RPV-HPCI - With a LOCA and loss of High Pressure feed and HPCI fails to automatically start, start HPCI to prevent RPV Water Level from dropping below Top of Active Fuel (TAF).
May report inability to maintain 173-214 and, as directed:
May start and inject with SBFW.
May start and inject with 2nd CRD Pump.
May start and inject SLC.
Recognizes and reports RPV Level is recovering.
Maintains RPV water level with available systems.
CT-3, RPV-Injection - With a LOCA present and HPCI injecting, control injection systems to prevent from flooding the Main Steam Lines (~280 RPV Level).
Recognizes and reports inability to maintain 900-1050 psig pressure band.
SRO IF RO reports inability to maintain 173-214 level band, directs 0-214 level band and:
Reviews Table 1 and 2 Systems.
Directs starting SBFW.
Directs starting SLC.
Directs starting 2nd CRD Pump.
Directs attempt to restart Condenser Pumps.
If RPV Level drops <L1, directs Inhibit ADS.
Acknowledges report that level is recovering and, if applicable, directs 173-214 level band.
Directs shutting down SLC, if applicable.
Directs 500-1050 psig pressure band.
Directs actions of the Scram AOP to control Cooldown Rate.
Directs monitoring for and closing MSIVs at or before 500 psig.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 2 Page 15 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP / ATC Provides accurate Level 1 report, as applicable.
Inhibits ADS if directed.
Refers to Scram AOP to attempt to control Cooldown Rate.
Confirms RFPs are tripped.
Directs operator to H21-P258 (TB2) to place N30-K999 in setpoint setdown mode by depressing PB1 on N30-K999.
Starts a Mechanical Vacuum Pump.
Shuts down Steam Jet Air Ejectors.
Reports when 500-1050 psig band cannot be maintained.
Monitors for and reports when at or below 500 psig.
Closes MSIVs as directed.
Makes correct report when 461 psig (Reactor Pressure Low) is reached, including status of all Low Pressure Systems.
Acknowledges level band(s) directed by CRS.
Shuts down SLC, as directed.
SRO Directs RO to prevent injection from RHR and Core Spray not required for RPV injection BOP / ATC Uses hard card and prevents injection from Division 1 and 2 Core Spray.
Shuts down RHR Pumps and/or closes LPCI Injection valves, depending on status of LPCI timers.
Informs CRS of EOP entry conditions for:
High Drywell Pressure.
High Drywell Temperature.
High Torus Water Temperature.
High/Low Torus Water Level.
Monitors for and reports to CRS when Drywell Temperature is >242°F.
Monitors and reports to CRS when Torus Pressure is >9 psig.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 2 Page 16 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Acknowledges reports of EOP entry conditions and enters EOPs on:
High Drywell Pressure.
High Drywell Temperature.
High Torus Water Temperature.
High/Low Torus Water Level.
Directs confirmation of EECW initiation and isolation to the Drywell Directs restoring Cooling to CRD.
Directs S/D (verify) RR Pumps.
Directs Torus Cooling/ Torus Sprays (non-selected RHR Loop).
Provides override to secure Torus Sprays before 0 psig is reached.
Directs preparing to spray the DW.
Directs shut down of DW Fans.
Verifies within the DWSIL curve.
Directs spraying the DW.
Provides override to secure Drywell Sprays before 0 psig is reached.
Directs selected loop of RHR to Torus Cooling / Cooling maximized.
Directs isolating EECW to/from the DW when DWT>242°F.
Directs actions to control TWL, as applicable, using 29.ESP.21.
BOP / ATC Confirms EECW initiation and isolation to the Drywell.
Restores Cooling to CRD.
Verifies RR Pumps tripped.
Initiates Torus Sprays and informs CRS.
Places RHR in Torus Cooling w/ cooling maximized.
Contact RB Rounds for pump start and makes Hi-Com announcement Place E1150-F028A(B) Keylock in OPERATE / opens E1150-F028A(B)
Start E1102-C002A (B,C,D) Div 1(2) RHR Pump A(B,C,D)
Open E1150-F024A(B)
Acknowledges override to secure Torus Sprays and monitors Torus Pressure.
Prepares to spray the DW.
Shuts down DW Fans.
Sprays the DW when directed.
Acknowledges override to secure Drywell Sprays / monitors Drywell Pressure.
Evaluates/starts MDCT fans IAW 23.208.
May direct NO to walk down all 4 EDGs due to auto start.
Lead Evaluator Scenario is terminated following initiation of drywell spray or at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 1 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary NRC Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:
Fermi 2 Scenario #:
3 Source:
New Op Test #
2023 ILT Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Validating Operators:
A. Snowberger (CRS)
J. Walters (ATC)
D. Roberts (BOP)
Initial Conditions:
100%, South RFP West Lube Oil Pump B OOS for motor replacement Turnover:
After the crew takes the shift, the operating Steam Tunnel Cooler will be shifted from North to South due to High Vibes for North cooler Critical Tasks:
CT-1, ATWS-ADS - With a reactor scram required, reactor not shutdown, INHIBIT ADS to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization, and to prevent causing a significant power excursion.
CT-2, ATWS-Power - When directed by the EOPs, TAKE ACTION TO REDUCE POWER BELOW 3% by injecting SLC or Boron using the alternate means; -OR-lowering RPV water level; -OR-inserting control rods prior to exceeding the Heat Capacity Limit curve (HCL).
Event No.
Malf No.
Event Type* /
Position Event Description 1
N/A N
BOP/SRO The crew will perform the normal evolution of shifting the in-service Steam Tunnel Cooler, from the North to the South, in accordance with 23.414, Steam Tunnel Cooling.
2 C11MF0741 C
TS ATC/SRO SRO Control Rod 38-31 will drift out of the core requiring operators to enter AOP 20.106.07 and perform immediate actions to insert the drifting control rod. Operators will then disarm the control rod. The CRS will evaluate the impact on TS and determine that TS 3.1.3 is applicable.
3 T41MF0004 C
TS BOP/SRO SRO Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan will trip. The crew will identify the alarms associated with the failure and review the applicable ARPs. The CRS will enter AOP 20.413.01. The crew will start D2 CCHVAC and shutdown D1. The CRS will evaluate TS LCO 3.7.4 & 3.7.3.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 2 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary Event No.
Malf No.
Event Type* /
Position Event Description 4
P50MF0014 P502PSE_N415TF ASIS C
MC BOP/SRO BOP The unloader valve will fail for the in-service (West) Station Air Compressor (SAC) and the standby (Center) SAC will not auto start. The crew will recognize this failure and act, either directly or upon entry into AOP 20.129.01, Loss of Station and Control Air, to start the standby SAC to restore air system parameters.
5 NB06N2102C002_
PBTVBRVIB NB06N2102C015_
TB_BTVTBGVIB NB06N2102C015_
TB_CTVTBGVIB C
BOP/SRO High Vibration on the South Reactor Feedwater Pump (RFP) Pump and Turbine will cause the crew to evaluate alarms and indications. The BOP trips the pump per ARP 5D28 due to exceeding 6 mils for more than 15 seconds.
6 B31RF0031 B31RF0033 C
MC ATC/SRO ATC North (A) Recirculation pump fails to run back when the crew trips the South RFP. ATC should recognize the failure and manually run back the RRMG set.
7 N/A R
ATC The ATC will plot position on the P/F Map and insert the CRAM Rods to restore operation outside of the Stability Awareness Region.
8 C11MF0393 C11MF0207 C
ATC/SRO Multiple rod drifts will require a reactor scram per immediate actions of 20.106.07.
9 EOPRF0011/12/13/
14 P603_A019(20/21/
22)_3 0 C71MF0006 C41MF0002 M
ALL When the Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown, RPS will fail to actuate requiring performance of ATWS Actions. ARI will also fail to initiate, resulting in an electronic ATWS.
Operators inject SLC and determine failure to start. Crew will then start the opposite SLC pump and SLC will inject.
Per the EOPs, the crew will prevent Automatic ADS Initiation (CT-1, ATWS-ADS).
Manual rod insertion will be successful. Control rod insertion will occur when either the scram fuses are pulled or the scram air header is vented. BOP controls RPV water level and ATC steps through ESP to insert rods manually (CT-2, ATWS-Power)
C ATC/SRO
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 3 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary A. INITIAL CONDITIONS / PRE-SHIFT BRIEFING:
The plant is at 100% Power with the South RFPT West Lube Oil Pump B tagged out for motor replacement.
Expected return to service is 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
After the crew takes the shift, the operating Steam Tunnel Cooler will be shifted from North to South per SOP 23.414.
No additional equipment is out of service.
All licensed operators are in the Main Control Room (MCR).
Normal shift complement of non-licensed operators are available.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 4 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary B.
SUMMARY
OF EVENTS Event 1:
Steam Tunnel Cooler shift The crew will perform the normal evolution of shifting the in-service Steam Tunnel Cooler, from the North to the South, in accordance with 23.414, Steam Tunnel Cooling.
Event 2:
CR 38-31 drifts out of core Control Rod 38-31 will drift out of the core requiring operators to enter AOP 20.106.07 and perform immediate actions to insert the drifting control rod. Operators will then disarm the control rod. The CRS will evaluate the impact on TS and determine that TS 3.1.3 is applicable.
Event 3:
Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan trip Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan will trip. The crew will identify the alarms associated with the failure and review the applicable ARPs. The CRS will enter AOP 20.413.01. The crew will start D2 CCHVAC and shutdown D1. The CRS will evaluate TS LCO 3.7.4 & 3.7.3.
Event 4:
West SAC unloads and Center SAC fails to auto start The unloader valve will fail for the in-service (West) Station Air Compressor (SAC) and the standby (Center)
SAC will not auto start. The crew will recognize this failure and act, either directly or upon entry into AOP 20.129.01, Loss of Station and Control Air, to start the standby SAC to restore air system parameters.
Event 5:
RFP High Vibes, RFP fails to trip High Vibration on the South Reactor Feedwater Pump (RFP) Pump and Turbine will cause the crew to evaluate alarms and indications. The BOP trips the pump per ARP 5D28 due to exceeding 6 mils for more than 15 seconds.
Event 6:
North RRMG Set auto runback failure Event 7:
Evaluate P/F Map and insert CRAM array North (A) Recirculation pump fails to run back when the crew trips the South RFP. ATC should recognize the failure and manually run back the RRMG set.
The ATC will plot position on the P/F Map and insert the CRAM Rods to restore operation outside of the Stability Awareness Region
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 5 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary Event 8:
Multiple rods drift, place the Mode Switch in Shutdown Event 9:
Electric ATWS, SLC fails to start When the Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown, RPS will fail to actuate requiring performance of ATWS Actions.
ARI will also fail to initiate, resulting in an electronic ATWS. Operators inject SLC and determine failure to start.
Crew will then start the opposite SLC pump and SLC will inject. Per the EOPs, the crew will prevent Automatic ADS Initiation (CT-1, ATWS-ADS)
Manual rod insertion will be successful. Control rod insertion will occur when either the scram fuses are pulled or the scram air header is vented. BOP controls RPV water level and ATC steps through ESP to insert rods manually (CT-2, ATWS-Power)
Termination Criteria Scenario is terminated after all rods have been inserted or at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 6 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary C. SIMULATOR SETUP SCENARIO SPECIFIC SETUP:
- 1. Initialize the simulator to IC-173 or an IC set up with the following attributes: 100% power
- 2. PLACE the simulator in RUN.
- 3. OPEN lesson ILT 2023 Scenario 3.lsn.
- 4. EXECUTE the lesson.
- 8. TRIGGER Setup step to:
- c. Insert ATWS malfunctions
- 9. Verify the CRAM array book is correct and free from marks.
GENERIC SETUP:
- 1. PROVIDE crew a list of available NOs
- 2. ENSURE that all annunciators are acknowledged and the plant is stable
- 3. ACKNOWLDGE DCS alarms
- 4. VERIFY GSW placard is in place and indicates INTERMITTENT.
- 5. VERIFY CFD placard has current dates (within the last 14 days is acceptable).
- 6. COMPLETE Attachment 1 of NTWI 5.12
- 7. ALLOW the operators to enter the room, provide them with a turnover in accordance with Section E, and allow them to walk down the panels
- 8. ENSURE simulator alarms are NOT silenced
- 9. TRIGGER steps as directed by the guide/Lead Evaluator
- 10. START Simulator data recorder
- 11. RECORD communications with crew members on NTWI 5.12 Attachment 3
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Page 7 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary D. CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASK EVALUATION CRITERIA SAT UNSAT NA CT-1, ATWS-ADS - With a reactor scram required, reactor not shutdown, INHIBIT ADS to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization, and to prevent causing a significant power excursion.
Safety Significance: In order to effect a reduction in reactor power, actions may be taken to lower RPV water level to a level below the automatic initiation setpoint of ADS. This actuation imposes a severe thermal transient on the RPV and may significantly complicate efforts to restore and maintain RPV water level. Further, rapid and uncontrolled injection of large amounts of relatively cold, unborated water from low pressure injection systems may occur. This would quickly dilute in-core boron concentration and might add sufficient positive reactivity to cause a reactor power excursion large enough to severely damage the core.
Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if ADS is NOT inhibited within the 105 second time delay. If an automatic depressurization occurs without sufficient preparation, a severe thermal transient will occur.
Initiating Cue: ATWS, prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization.
Measurable Performance Standard: Inhibit ADS.
Performance Feedback: ADS inhibited white lights and alarm window.
Expected action: Inhibit ADS.
CRITICAL TASK EVALUATION CRITERIA SAT UNSAT NA CT-2, ATWS-Power - When directed by the EOPs, TAKE ACTION TO REDUCE POWER BELOW 3% by injecting SLC or Boron using the alternate means; -OR-lowering RPV water level; -OR-inserting control rods prior to exceeding the Heat Capacity Limit curve (HCL).
Safety Significance: The challenge to containment becomes the limiting factor that defines the requirement for reactor power reduction in an ATWS condition. Thus, reducing reactor power below 3% can preclude failure of containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant.
Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if reactor power is NOT reduced sufficiently to prevent operation in the DO NOT OPERATE IN THIS AREA region of the HCL curve of 29.100.01 sheet 6.
Initiating Cue: Reactor scram required and reactor not shutdown.
Measurable Performance Standard: Reduce reactor power using boron, control rods, or RPV level.
Performance Feedback: Reactor Power is decreasing until below 3%.
Expected action: Inject SLC; and/or insert control rods; and/or lower RPV water level while monitoring reactor power to ensure power is reduced <3%.
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Page 8 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 9 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary E. LIST OF MALFUNCTIONS The following malfunctions and/or remote functions are to be active/activated as indicated in the time line:
MF/RF/PO/LBL Description Target Value Step No.
Ramp Delay EOPRF0011 Electric ATWS DEFEAT S1 EOPRF0012 DEFEAT EOPRF0013 DEFEAT EOPRF0014 DEFEAT EOPRF0041 DEFEAT EOPRF0042 DEFEAT EOPRF0043 DEFEAT EOPRF0044 DEFEAT P603_A019_3 0
P603_A020_3 0
P603_A021_3 0
P603_A022_3 0
C41MF0003 SLC Pump A Trip (P603_B002_1 EQ 1 and C41MF0004 NE 1)
Active S3 30 C41MF0004 SLC Pump B Trip (P603_B002_3 EQ 1 and C41MF0003 NE 1)
Active S4 30 R11RF0321 S. RFP West LO Pump OFF S2 C11MF0741 CR 38-31 Drifts OUT ACTIVE 2
C11MF0741 Disarm CR 38-31 CLEAR 2a T41MF0002 Trip Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan 1
3 P50MF0014 West SAC Unloader Failure 1.0 4
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Page 10 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary MF/RF/PO/LBL Description Target Value Step No.
Ramp Delay P502PSE_N415T FASIS Stby SAC Fails to Start TRUE NB06N2102C015
_TB_BTVTBGVIB Turb Vibe MFs to 0.7 = 3.2 mils =>
above alarm 0.7 5
300 NB06N2102C015
_TB_CTVTBGVIB 0.7 320 NB06N2102C015
_TB_BTVTBGVIB Turb Vibe MF to 1.0 = 4.4 mils -- NOT enough to TRIP 1.0 5a 100 NB06N2102C015
_TB_CTVTBGVIB 1.0 100 NB06N2102C015
_TB_CZCTBGVIB Vibration Failure Intensity - To Trip 5.8 150 NB06N2102C002
_PBTVBRVIB Pump vibe MF to 0.7 = 3.0 mils 0.7 150 cd=P805_B028_2 EQ 1 AND P805_B028_3 EQ 1
Removes High Vibes AFTER Trip NB06N2102C015
_TB_BTVTBGVIB 0.1 30 NB06N2102C015
_TB_CTVTBGVIB 0.2 20 NB06N2102C015
_TB_CZCTBGVIB 0.0 30 NB06N2102C002
_PBTVBRVIB 0.0 10 B31RF0031 Set #2 and #3 Limiters to 64.79 for North RRMG 64.79 6
B31RF0033 64.79 C11MF0055 Multiple rod drifts ACTIVE 8
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Page 11 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary MF/RF/PO/LBL Description Target Value Step No.
Ramp Delay C11MF0219 ACTIVE C11MF0549 ACTIVE cd=P603_A048_1 eq 1 Clears Rod Drifts when MS in Shutdown C11MF0055 CLEAR C11MF0219 CLEAR C11MF0549 CLEAR EOPRF0007 29.ESP.11 defeat 8a EOPRF0010 defeat EOPRF0048 Remove Scram Fuses 1
8b 0
EOPRF0050 1
10 EOPRF0049 1
20 EOPRF0051 1
30 EOPRF0052 1
70 EOPRF0053 1
90 EOPRF0054 1
100 EOPRF0055 1
130 EOPRF0048 Install Scram Fuses 2
8b1 0
EOPRF0050 2
10 EOPRF0049 2
20 EOPRF0051 2
30 EOPRF0052 2
70 EOPRF0053 2
90
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 12 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary MF/RF/PO/LBL Description Target Value Step No.
Ramp Delay EOPRF0054 2
100 EOPRF0055 2
130 C103ANA_COND
_C11GAIN Vent Scram Air Header 0
8c
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Page 13 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary REFERENCES The following is a list of expected Procedure References used in this scenario:
PROCEDURE TITLE 3D18 IPCS MONITORED INPUTS ABNORMAL 3D80 CONTROL ROD DRIFT 3D110 RBM DOWNSCALE 3D113 CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK 5D28 SOUTH RFP/RFPT SHAFT TROUBLE 5D85 LOSS OF HEATER DRAINS 7D53 STATION AIR HEADER PRESSURE LOW 7D48 AUX BOILER CONTROL AIR PRESSURE LOW 7D50 DIV I/II CONTROL AIR COMPRESSOR AUTO START 7D57 STATION AIR ISOLATION VALVE CLOSED 7D59 CONTROL AIR ISOLATION VALVE CLOSED 7D60 RHR COMPLEX CONTROL AIR PRESSURE LOW 7D72 MOTOR TRIPPED 7D56 INTERRUPTIBLE CONTROL AIR DRYER TROUBLE 8D5 DIV I CONTROL ROOM A/C TROUBLE 8D72 MOTOR TRIPPED 8D10 DIV I MCR BUILDING PRESSURE HIGH/LOW 17D27 DIV II CONTROL ROOM A/C TROUBLE 17D55 DIV II MCR BUILDING PRESSURE HI/LO 20.106.07 CONTROL ROD DRIFT 20.107.01 LOSS OF FEEDWATER OR FEEDWATER CONTROL 20.107.02 LOSS OF FEEDWATER HEATING 20.413.01 CONTROL CENTER HVAC SYSTEM FAILURE 20.129.01 LOSS OF STATION/CONTROL AIR 23.413 CONTROL CENTER HVAC 23.414 STEAM TUNNEL COOLING
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 14 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary PROCEDURE TITLE 29.ESP.03 ALTERNATE CONTROL ROD INSERTION METHODS 29.ESP.11 DEFEAT OF RPV MSIV LEVEL 1 AND OFFGAS HIGH RAD ISOLATION SIGNALS 29.ESP.10 DEFEAT OF ARI LOGIC TRIPS TS 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY TS 3.7.3 Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System TS 3.7.4 Control Center Air Conditioning (AC) System
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 16 Event 1 Steam Tunnel Cooler shift Type:
N Event
Description:
The crew will perform the normal evolution of shifting the in-service Steam Tunnel Cooler, from the North to the South, in accordance with 23.414, Steam Tunnel Cooling.
Symptoms/Cues: This will be included with the initial conditions for this scenario.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 min Booth Action None T0 +5 min BOP May conduct a short brief of the evolution.
Shifts In-Service Steam Tunnel Coolers IAW 23.414, Section 5.0:
Verifies open P4200-F603, S Stm Tnl Clr RBCCW Outlet Iso.
Opens P4200-F602 S Stm Tnl Clr RBCCW Inlet Iso.
Starts T4100-B023B, Steam Tunnel Cooler B, by placing its CMC switch in RUN.
Shuts down T4100-B023A, Steam Tunnel Cooler A, by placing its CMC switch in OFF/RESET.
Closes P4200-F600, N Stm Tnl Clr RBCCW Inlet Iso.
Maintains open P4200-F601, N Stm Tnl Clr RBCCW Outlet Iso to allow for thermal expansion.
Informs CRS of completion of Steam Tunnel Cooler shift.
CRS Monitors and provides oversight of evolution.
ATC May provide peer check of evolution.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 16 Event 2 CR 38-31 drifts out of core Type:
C, TS Event
Description:
Control Rod 38-31 will drift out of the core requiring operators to enter AOP 20.106.07 and perform immediate actions to insert the drifting control rod. Operators will then disarm the control rod. The CRS will evaluate the impact on TS and determine that TS 3.1.3 is applicable.
Symptoms/Cues: 3D80, Control Rod Drift Alarm with accompanying indication that Control Rod 38-31 is drifting out of the core.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +15 min Booth Action Trigger Event 2 to initiate Control Rod 38-31 drifting out of the core.
ATC Responds to 3D80, Control Rod Drift and reports to CRS.
Turns on rod select power and selects the drifting rod.
Fully inserts CR 38-31 by holding Rod Out Notch Override Switch (RONOR) in EMER ROD IN (IMMEDIATE ACTION).
Reports status of CR 38-31 when fully inserted, with Reactor Power, to CRS.
Dispatches operator to HCU for CR 38-31.
BOP May assist ATC with detecting drifting Control Rod.
May handle communications to rounds operators for ATC.
SRO Enters 20.106.07, Control Rod Drift AOP with a Crew Update.
Ensures Immediate Actions are carried out.
Makes plant announcement.
Assigns critical parameter for 2nd Rod Drift.
Directs actions of 20.106.07, Condition B.
Evaluates LCO 3.1.3 for CR 38-31.
TS Impact TS 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability:
Each control rod shall be OPERABLE CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. One or more control rods inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B.
C.1 Fully insert 38-31 AND C.2 Disarm 38-31 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 4 hours
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 3 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC/BOP For HCU 38-31, Directs NO to close (in this order):
C11-F103.
C11-F105.
Releases ROD Out Notch Override Switch (H11-P603) and verifies rod stays at desired position.
Informs CRS of status of rod 38-31.
Places ROD DRIFT ALARM switch in RESET and verifies alarm clears.
Role Play NO:
When sent to HCU 38-31:
WAIT 3 minutes
REPORT On station at HCU for CR 38-31
RESPOND to directions to close C11-F103/F105 at HCU 38-31.
TRIGGER Step #2a to clear rod drift to simulate rod settling at 00 when the F103 is closed.
REPORT C11-F103/F105 are closed for HCU 38-31 SRO Conducts AOP Follow-up brief.
Briefs impact of CR 38-31 drifting on Tech Specs.
May contact RTC to direct tagging HCU for CR 38-31.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 4 of 16 Event 3 Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan trip Type:
C, TS Event
Description:
Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan will trip. The crew will identify the alarms associated with the failure and review the applicable ARPs. The CRS will enter AOP 20.413.01. The crew will start D2 CCHVAC and shutdown D1. The CRS will evaluate TS LCO 3.7.4 & 3.7.3.
Symptoms/Cues: Various alarms on H11-P808 with Tripped light lit on T4100-C031, Div 1 CCHVAC Return Air Fan.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +30 min Booth Action Trigger Event 3 to initiate a trip of Div 1 CCHVAC Return Air Fan.
BOP Identify 8D5, 8D72, 8D10, 17D55, and Division 1 CCHVAC Return Fan tripped and report to CRS Dispatch operator to investigate Trip of Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan Dispatch operator to check Division 1 CCHVAC Return Fan breaker for a cause of trip.
Role Play NO:
When dispatched to Investigate trip of Division 1 CCHVAC Return Fan,
WAIT 3 minutes
REPORT hot bearing on D1 CCHVAC Return Fan When dispatched to investigate Division 1 CCHVAC Return Fan Breaker at 72C-2A Pos 1B,
WAIT 3 minutes
REPORT thermal overload trip of 72C-2A Pos 1B SRO Acknowledge report from RO.
Enter AOP 20.413.01, Control Center HVAC System Failure.
Direct Actions of AOP 20.413.01 Condition A.
Announce event over Hi-Com.
Review impact on Technical Specifications.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 5 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior TS Impact TS 3.7.3, CREF System:
The CREF System shall be OPERABLE.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREF subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition B A.1 Restore CREF subsystem to OPERABLE status.
7 days TS 3.7.4, Control Center Air Conditioning (AC) System:
Two control center AC subsystems shall be OPERABLE.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One control center AC subsystem inoperable.
A.1 Restore control center AC subsystem to OPERABLE 30 days ATC Monitors reactor parameters.
May assist BOP with communications to NOs.
BOP Inform RB of starting Division 2 CCHVAC Start Division 2 CCHVAC using AOP 20.413.01 Condition A:
Shutdown the malfunctioning division of CCHVAC by placing the Mode Select Switch in ALL STOP.
Start the standby Division of CCHVAC by placing the Mode Select Switch in ALL AUTO.
Report Division 2 CCHVAC is running to CRS.
Monitor for correct operation of CCHVAC IAW 23.413.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 6 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Role Play NO:
IF contacted to walkdown Div 2 CCHVAC Rad Monitor:
WAIT 5 minutes
REPORT Rad Monitor walkdown is complete. No abnormalities noted.
If contacted to verify good start of Div 2 CCHVAC:
WAIT 2 minutes
REPORT Good start of Div 2 CCHVAC If asked to check parameters IAW 23.413:
WAIT 3 minutes
REPORT All parameters are in band.
SRO Monitors actions by panel operators.
Acknowledges status of Div 2 CCHVAC when started.
Conducts follow-up brief, including impact on Tech Specs.
May contact RTC for follow-up actions like troubleshooting, writing a CARD, etc.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 7 of 16 Event 4 West SAC unloads and Center SAC fails to auto start Type:
C, MC Event
Description:
The unloader valve will fail for the in-service (West) Station Air Compressor (SAC) and the standby (Center) SAC will not auto start. The crew will recognize this failure and act, either directly or upon entry into AOP 20.129.01, Loss of Station and Control Air, to start the standby SAC to restore air system parameters.
Symptoms/Cues: 7D53, Station Air Header Pressure Low, low amps on the running (West) SAC and lowering air header pressures.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +45 min Booth Action Trigger Event 4 to fail the in-service (West) Station Air Compressor Unloader valve AND cause an Auto-Start failure of the standby (Center) Station Air Compressor (P50MF0014, P502PSE_N415TFASIS).
NOTE: Triggering Event 4 also starts the ramp to increase vibrations on the S.
RFP Pump and Turbine, for added realism.
BOP Responds to 7D53 and reports to CRS.
Recognizes and reports lowering air header pressures.
Recognizes and reports lower than normal amps on the running (West) SAC.
Recognizes and reports failure of the standby (Center) SAC to auto start.
May inform SRO of start failure and manually start the Center SAC.
SRO Acknowledges reports from LNO.
Enters AOP 20.129.01, Loss of Station and Control Air with a Crew Update.
Makes a plant announcement using the Hi-Com.
Directs LNO to start any available SAC IAW 20.129.01 Condition A.
Monitors actions taken by the LNO and provides oversight.
BOP Manually starts the standby (Center) SAC by placing its CMC Switch in RUN.
May start the East SAC by placing its CMC to RUN.
Observes air system parameters and reports status to the CRS.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 8 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Monitors actions by the LNO.
Acknowledges status of air system parameters and status.
Conducts follow-up brief including:
Assigning Overrides to the ATC to monitor for degradation of the station and control air systems.
Assigning further actions that may be necessary, depending on air system status, due to how low pressure got before it was recovered.
May contact RTC for follow-up actions like troubleshooting, writing a CARD, etc.
Role Play WWM:
Acknowledge reports/orders from MCR
No further action required
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 9 of 16 Event 5 RFP High Vibes, RFP fails to trip Type:
C Event
Description:
High Vibration on the South Reactor Feedwater Pump (RFP) Pump and Turbine will cause the crew to evaluate alarms and indications. The BOP trips the pump per ARP 5D28 due to exceeding 6 mils for more than 15 seconds.
Symptoms/Cues: 5D28, South RFP/RFPT Shaft Trouble, and rising vibration for the S. RFP Turbine and Pump on N21-R837B, SRFP/RFPT Vib Mon Sys Chart Recorder.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +55 min Booth Action Trigger Event 5 to cause vibration on the S. RFP Pump and Turbine to rise above the alarm setpoint.
BOP Responds to ARP 5D28, South RFP/RFPT Shaft Trouble.
Verifies on N21-R837B, SRFP/RFPT Vib Mon Sys Chart Recorder:
o S RFP Turbine Vibes are >3 mils.
o S RFP Pump Vibes are <4 mils.
Reports vibration data to the CRS.
Informs CRS of ARP guidance to trip South RFP if vibes >6 mils or an unusual noise develops.
May direct NO to outside of RFP rooms to listen for unusual noise.
Role Play NO:
If dispatched to the South RFP:
WAIT 2 minutes.
REPORT that you are outside of the South RFP room and nothing sounds abnormal.
SRO Acknowledges report from LNO.
Conducts brief to cover contingency actions, critical parameters, etc.
Assigns critical parameter and actions following brief.
Booth Action AFTER brief and contingency monitoring / actions have been assigned (and with concurrence of the Lead Evaluator):
Trigger Step #5a to cause South RFPT Vibes ramp above 6 mils.
BOP Identifies and reports rising vibrations on S. RFP and RFPT.
Recognizes and reports when >6 mils.
Trips the South RFP.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 10 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Monitors actions and ensures S. RFP is tripped.
Enters AOP 20.107.01, with Crew Update.
Makes plant announcement.
Verifies RO carries out Immediate Actions
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 11 of 16 Event 6 North RRMG Set auto runback failure Type:
C, MC Event 7 Evaluate P/F Map and insert CRAM array Type:
R Event
Description:
The North RRMG Set fails to run back to Limiter 3 following trip of the S. RFP.
The ATC will recognize this failure and manually run back the RRMG set. The ATC will check rod line and insert the cram rods to lower rod line < 80%.
Symptoms/Cues: Trip of RFP with RRMG set failing to run back automatically. Insert CRAM array to < 80% rod line.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +60 min Booth Action NOTE: This event automatically triggers with Event 5 above, preventing the N.
RRMG Set from running back to the #2 Limiter when the S. RFP is tripped.
ATC Verifies #2 limiter is enforcing and monitors RRMG sets for runback.
Recognizes / reports that North RRMG Set failed to run back to the #2 Limiter.
Manually runs back the North RRMG Set.
Verifies the N. RFP restores Reactor Water Level to the normal band.
After runback, checks rod line.
Determines that the rod line is > 80%.
Informs CRS and inserts CRAM Array to reduce rod line < 80%.
SRO Conducts brief for RFP Trip.
Assigns panel operator(s) to perform 20.107.01 overrides and immediate actions with monitoring criteria.
BOP Recognizes and reports loss of Heater Drains.
SRO When CRAM array is inserted directs Subsequent Actions D of AOP 20.107.01:
Monitor Core Thermal Limits and notify SNE Enters 20.107.02, loss of Feedwater Heating.
Directs verification of Feedwater temperature reduction BOP Verifies Reactor Power 65%.
Shuts down or verifies SBFW shutdown.
Verifies feedwater temperature reduction is consistent with the power reduction, per 20.107.02, loss of Feedwater Heating and informs CRS.
SRO Conducts follow-up brief.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 12 of 16 Event 8 Multiple rods drift, place the Mode Switch in Shutdown Type:
C Event 9 Electric ATWS, SLC fails to start Type:
MAJ, C Event
Description:
When the Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown, RPS will fail to actuate requiring performance of ATWS Actions. ARI will also fail to initiate, resulting in an electronic ATWS.
Operators inject SLC and determine failure to start. Crew will then start the opposite SLC pump and SLC will inject. Per the EOPs, the crew will prevent Automatic ADS Initiation (CT-1, ATWS-ADS).
Manual rod insertion will be successful. Control rod insertion will occur when either the scram fuses are pulled or the scram air header is vented. BOP controls RPV water level and ATC steps through ESP to insert rods manually (CT-2, ATWS-Power)
Symptoms/Cues: 3D80, Control Rod Drift Alarm with accompanying indication that multiple (3)
Control Rods are drifting out of the core. RPS failure is indicated by 8 blue lights remaining lit and the Scram Air Header remaining pressurized.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +75 min Booth Action Trigger Event 8 to initiate multiple Control Rod Drifts with an electric (failure of RPS and ARI) ATWS. Event 9 was inserted as part of Setup Steps.
ATC Recognizes and reports multiple Control Rod Drifts.
Places Mode Switch in Shutdown.
Recognizes failure of RPS to actuate and depresses manual scram pushbuttons.
Reports Failure to Scram to CRS, with Reactor Power.
SRO When multiple control rod drifts are reported, directs ATC to place Mode Switch in Shutdown.
Acknowledges FTS and enters EOPs on FTS.
Directs ATWS Actions.
Announces event over the Hi-Com.
Provides oversight of ATWS Actions.
BOP Acknowledges ATWS Actions order.
Performs CRLNO ATWS Actions:
Takes RFP Controllers to Manual
Lowers Speed to STOP feed flow.
Reports when RPV level <114.
Re-establishes injection and maintains RPV Water level as directed.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 13 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Acknowledges BOP ATWS Actions report and:
When <114, directs RPV Level Band 50-100.
Directs RPV Pressure Band 900-1050 psig.
Directs confirm Isolations and Actuations for level as they occur ATC Acknowledges ATWS Actions order.
CT-2, ATWS-Power - When directed by the EOPs, TAKE ACTION TO REDUCE POWER BELOW 3% by injecting SLC or Boron using the alternate means; -OR-lowering RPV water level; -OR-inserting control rods prior to exceeding the Heat Capacity Limit curve (HCL).
Starts SLC pump
Identifies that first SLC pump failed to start and starts other SLC pump
Verifies SLC system parameters and determines SLC is injecting
Verifies RWCU isolation
Informs CRS of SLC injecting, SLC tank level, and SLC pump failure
Inhibits ADS CT-1, ATWS-ADS - With a reactor scram required, reactor not shutdown, INHIBIT ADS to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization, and to prevent causing a significant power excursion.
Orders out 29.ESP.11
Bypasses/Restores Drywell Pneumatics
Takes the following actions:
o HPCI Aux Oil Pump to OFF o SBFW CMC switches to OFF o Div 1&2 CS pumps to OFF o Div 1&2 RHR pumps to OFF
Completes SLC Hard Card.
When RPV Level is <Level 2:
o Recognizes ARI failure to initiate.
o Arms and initiates ARI manually.
o Trips RR Pumps.
o Reports FSQ 1-8 is complete, with current Reactor Power.
Role Play NO/RTC:
When directed to Perform 29.ESP.11:
WAIT 10 minutes
TRIGGER Step 8a.
REPORT 29.ESP.11 field actions are complete.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 14 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Acknowledges ATC ATWS Actions report Enters 29.100.01 SH1A and directs:
Confirm isolations and actuations for level as they occur.
Verifies ADS Inhibited. (May have already been reported)
Pressure Band of 900-1050 psig Directs order out 29.ESP.10 and insert Control Rods per 29.ESP.03.
Acknowledges report of SLC injecting, SLC tank level and RWCU isolation status.
Identifies EAL flag and reports to Shift Manager.
BOP Acknowledges direction to Confirm Isolations and Actuations for Level.
Verifies Isolations and Actuations for Level and reports completion to CRS.
Controls pressure using the MT Bypass Valves by depressing Low-Low Set logic Reset Pushbuttons as required by Pressure Control Leg of EOPs and ARP 1D38.
Verifies SRV(s) close and pressure is being controlled by Bypass Valves.
May report status of Low-Low set logic and Bypass Valves to CRS.
Recognizes failure of RPS and ARI to actuate.
Correctly transition 29.ESP.03 flowchart and directs:
29.ESP.03, Section 5.0 - De-energize Scram Solenoids AND/OR
29.ESP.03, Section 7.0 - Vent Scram Air Header.
Attempts to drift control rods IAW 29.ESP.03, Section 2.0 - Increase CRD Cooling Water Differential Pressure Aligns CRD and manually inserts Control Rods using 29.ESP.03, Section 3.0 -
Manual Control Rod Insertion.
Reports status of Control Rod insertion to CRS.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 15 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Role Play NO:
When directed to Perform 29.ESP.10:
ACKNOWLEDGE order.
No Simulator actions required IF directed to perform 29.ESP.03 section 5.0 - De-energize Scram Solenoids:
WAIT 6 minutes
TRIGGER Step 8b to De-energize Scram Solenoids.
When all fuses have been pulled (use Instructor Actions Summary, 130 seconds for last fuse), REPORT: 29.ESP.03 Section 5 is complete, all scram fuses are removed.
IF directed to re-install scram fuses:
WAIT 2 minutes.
TRIGGER Step 8b1.
When all fuses have been installed (use Instructor Actions Summary, 130 seconds for last fuse), REPORT: Scram fuses are installed.
IF directed to perform 29.ESP.03 section 7.0 - Vent Scram Air Header:
WAIT 5 minutes
TRGIGER Step 8c to Vent Scram Air Header.
REPORT: 29.ESP.03 Section 7 is complete, and you are venting the scram air header.
BOP Recognizes when power < 25% and transitions to the SULCV using hard card.
Maintains RPV Level using SBFW, HPCI or FW on the SULCV.
Monitors and reports RPV pressure.
Recognizes and reports when power <3%.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 16 of 16 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC IF 29.ESP.03 Section 5.0 being performed:
Places C1100-M018, SDV Iso Vlvs Switch, in TEST to close the SDV Vent and Drain Valves.
As scram fuses are being pulled, recognizes and reports control rod insertion.
When rod motion stops, directs scram fuses to be re-installed.
Places C1100-M018, SDV Iso Vlvs Switch, in NORMAL to open the SDV Vent and Drain Valves.
IF 29.ESP.03 Section 7.0 being performed:
As air header is being vented, recognizes and reports control rod insertion.
Verifies all rods in with RWM and full core display.
Informs CRS or Crew Update: All rods inserted.
May direct NO to re-install Scram Fuses per 29.ESP.03, Section 5.
SRO After all rods in, direct shutdown of SLC.
Transition to 29.100.01 Sheet 1.
Direct RO to restore and maintain RPV water level 173 to 214 inches.
Direct entry/performance of Scram AOP actions.
Restores RPV Level to 173 to 214.
Performs Scram AOP actions as directed Lead Evaluator Scenario is terminated after all rods have been inserted or at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 1 of 10 Simulator Scenario Summary NRC Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:
Fermi 2 Scenario #:
4 Source:
New Op Test #
2023 ILT Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Validating Operators:
A. Snowberger (CRS)
J. Walters (BOP)
C. McAllister (ATC)
Initial Conditions:
90%, maintenance completed on #2 GSW pump.
Turnover:
After taking the shift, swap GSW Pumps, then raise power to 100% using recirculation flow.
Critical Tasks:
CT-1 PC-Torus-Scram - With reactor at power and suppression pool water level cannot be maintained greater than -38, MANUALLY SCRAM the reactor before reaching -38 CT-2 PC-Torus ED - When suppression pool water cannot be maintained greater than -
38, ANTICIPATE ED and/or ED Event No.
Malf No.
Event Type* /
Position Event Description 1
N/A N
BOP/SRO GSW Pumps #3, #5 and #6 are in service. Work has been completed on GSW Pump #2 and it is desired to place that pump in operation. Transfer GSW Pumps in accordance with 23.131 Section 6.6 to place GSW Pump #2 in service and remove GSW Pump #6 from service. The outside rounds NO has been briefed and is standing by in the GSW pump house.
Chemistry has been previously contacted and NPDES requirements will not be exceeded by operating GSW strainers as specified in the SOP 2
N/A R
ATC The plant is at 90% power following a rod pattern adjustment and turbine valve testing. The crew will raise power to 100%
using Reactor Recirculation flow.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 2 of 10 Simulator Scenario Summary Event No.
Malf No.
Event Type* /
Position Event Description 3
C102SENSOR 571916TVNOISE C
MC ATC/SRO ATC The crew will identify a noisy CRD flow controller that is causing oscillations in CRD system flow. The crew will enter AOP 20.106.03, CRD Flow Control Valve Failure, and take manual control of the CRD Flow Control Valve controller and then restore CRD system parameters to normal. Manual CRD flow control will remain in effect for the remainder of the scenario 4
P41MF0006 C
BOP/SRO A trip of GSW pump #2 will occur. This will cause the crew to enter AOP 20.131.01, Loss of GSW AOP, and take actions to stabilize GSW header pressure.
5 P80MF0015 C
TS BOP/SRO SRO 5 seconds after the GSW pump trips, an EFP spurious start will occur. The crew will recognize the conditions and take action per 7D10 to shut down the pump. The CRS will evaluate the TRM and determine that TRLCO 3.12.2 is applicable.
6 C32MF0025 I
ATC/SRO The A Feedwater Flow Instrument will fail downscale, due to repositioning the flow element bypass valve. This will cause Feedwater DCS to transfer to Single Element. The crew will ensure the valve is restored closed and then restore Feedwater DCS to 3-Element Control.
7 B21MF0030 C
TS BOP/SRO SRO SRV H will fail open due to a fault with its control circuit. The crew will enter 20.000.25, SRV failure, and direct actions to pull fuses for SRV H. The crew will also place RHR in Torus Cooling to address rising Torus Water Temperature. When the fuses are pulled, SRV H will close. This will require follow-up actions in the AOP. The CRS will evaluate Tech Specs and determine that LCO 3.5.1 is applicable.
8 E11MF0047 G51RF0016 M
C MC ALL BOP/SRO BOP An unisolable leak from the Torus will occur. The leak will cause a high Torus Room Sump level condition, and both sump pumps to run, which is an EOP entry condition.
The operators will implement a leak isolation strategy; however, the torus leak is unisolable, requiring a reactor scram before Torus Water Level lowering below -38. (CT-1, PC-Torus)
TWMS will fail to isolate requiring operator action to isolate.
The crew will anticipate Emergency Depressurization (ED) by fully opening the Main Turbine Bypass Valves (CT-2, PC-Torus ED). The crew will eventually ED by opening 5 SRVs when TWL cannot be kept greater than -38
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 3 of 10 Simulator Scenario Summary A. INITIAL CONDITIONS / PRE-SHIFT BRIEFING:
The plant is at 90% following rod pattern adjustment and turbine valve testing. #2 GSW pump is ready for start following completion of maintenance. After the crew takes the shift, the crew will switch GSW pumps per the SOP.
After GSW pumps have been shifted, the crew will raise power to 100% using Reactor Recirculation Flow.
Currently in 22.000.03 through step 4.2.21.
No additional equipment is out of service.
All licensed operators are in the Main Control Room (MCR).
Normal shift complement of non-licensed operators are available.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 4 of 10 Simulator Scenario Summary B.
SUMMARY
OF EVENTS Event 1:
GSW Pump swap GSW Pumps #3, #5 and #6 are in service. Work has been completed on GSW Pump #2 and it is desired to place that pump in operation. Transfer GSW Pumps in accordance with 23.131 Section 6.6 to place GSW Pump #2 in service and remove GSW Pump #6 from service. The outside rounds NO has been briefed and is standing by in the GSW pump house. Chemistry has been previously contacted and NPDES requirements will not be exceeded by operating GSW strainers as specified in the SOP.
Event 2:
Raise power to 100% using flow The plant is at 90% power following a rod pattern adjustment and turbine valve testing. The crew will raise power to 100% using Reactor Recirculation flow.
Event 3:
Noisy CRD FCV controller The crew will identify a noisy CRD flow controller that is causing oscillations in CRD system flow. The crew will enter AOP 20.106.03, CRD Flow Control Valve Failure, and take manual control of the CRD Flow Control Valve controller and then restore CRD system parameters to normal. Manual CRD flow control will remain in effect for the remainder of the scenario.
Event 4:
GSW Pump trip A trip of GSW pump #2 will occur. This will cause the crew to enter AOP 20.131.01, Loss of GSW AOP, and take actions to stabilize GSW header pressure.
Event 5:
EFP spurious start, S/D 5 seconds after the GSW pump trips, an EFP spurious start will occur. The crew will recognize the conditions and take action per 7D10 to shut down the pump. The CRS will evaluate the TRM and determine that TRLCO 3.12.2 is applicable.
Event 6:
FW Flow Instrument failure, return to 3-element The A Feedwater Flow Instrument will fail downscale, due to repositioning the flow element bypass valve. This will cause Feedwater DCS to transfer to Single Element. The crew will ensure the valve is restored closed and then restore Feedwater DCS to 3-Element Control.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 5 of 10 Simulator Scenario Summary Event 7:
ADS SRV H fails open, close SRV via pulling fuses SRV H will fail open due to a fault with its control circuit. The crew will enter 20.000.25, SRV failure, and direct actions to pull fuses for SRV H. The crew will also place RHR in Torus Cooling to address rising Torus Water Temperature. When the fuses are pulled, SRV H will close. This will require follow-up actions in the AOP. The CRS will evaluate Tech Specs and determine that LCO 3.5.1 is applicable.
Event 8:
Torus Leak, ED, TWMS fails to isolate An unisolable leak from the Torus will occur. The leak will cause a high Torus Room Sump level condition, and both sump pumps to run, which is an EOP entry condition.
The operators will implement a leak isolation strategy; however, the torus leak is unisolable, requiring a reactor scram before Torus Water Level lowering below -38. (CT-1, PC-Torus-Scram)
TWMS will fail to isolate requiring operator action to isolate. The crew will anticipate Emergency Depressurization (ED) by fully opening the Main Turbine Bypass Valves (CT-2, PC-Torus ED). The crew will eventually ED by opening 5 SRVs when TWL cannot be kept greater than -38 Termination Criteria Scenario is terminated when ED is initiated properly or at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 6 of 10 Simulator Scenario Summary C. SIMULATOR SETUP SCENARIO SPECIFIC SETUP:
- 1. Initialize the simulator to IC-174 or an IC set up with the following attributes: 90% power
- 2. PLACE the simulator in RUN.
- 3. OPEN lesson ILT 2023 Scenario 4.lsn.
- 4. EXECUTE the lesson.
- 5. SET OUT and MARKUP GOP 22.000.03 Steps 4.2.20, 4.2.21
- 6. Verify the CRAM array book is correct and free from marks.
GENERIC SETUP:
- 1. PROVIDE crew a list of available NOs
- 2. ENSURE that all annunciators are acknowledged and the plant is stable
- 3. ACKNOWLDGE DCS alarms
- 4. VERIFY GSW placard is in place and indicates INTERMITTENT.
- 5. VERIFY CFD placard has current dates (within the last 14 days is acceptable).
- 6. COMPLETE Attachment 1 of NTWI 5.12
- 7. ALLOW the operators to enter the room, provide them with a turnover in accordance with Section E, and allow them to walk down the panels
- 8. ENSURE simulator alarms are NOT silenced
- 9. TRIGGER steps as directed by the guide/Lead Evaluator
- 10. START Simulator data recorder
- 11. RECORD communications with crew members on NTWI 5.12 Attachment 3
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 7 of 10 Simulator Scenario Summary D. CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASK EVALUATION CRITERIA SAT UNSAT NA CT-1, PC-Torus - With reactor at power and suppression pool water level cannot be maintained greater than -38, MANUALLY SCRAM the reactor before reaching -38.
Safety Significance: The -38 limit bounds the HCL and PSP Curves. If action to control suppression pool water level is ineffective, then initiation of a reactor scram, if one has not yet been initiated, assures the reactor is scrammed and shutdown before RPV depressurization is initiated.
Safety significant boundary conditions: Defined by the BWROG EPGs/SAGs, appendix B Vol. II, Rev 4.
Entering the RPV Control guideline at Step RC-1 before suppression pool water level drops to the limiting elevation ensures that, if possible, the reactor is scrammed before RPV depressurization is initiated.
While the increase in core void fraction following emergency RPV depressurization would temporarily shut down the reactor, a potential for subsequent core damage exists and sudden surges of cold water could result in power spikes as RPV pressure decreases below the shutoff head of low pressure injection systems. Emergency depressurization with the reactor at power should therefore be avoided.
Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if the reactor is not scrammed and TWL is -38 inches.
Initiating Cue: Suppression pool level is approaching the HCL and PSP bounding limit of -38.
Measurable Performance Standard: Initiate a reactor manual scram before pressure reduction.
Performance Feedback: Reactor Scram indications.
Expected action: Reactor scram is inserted with MODE SW.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 8 of 10 Simulator Scenario Summary CRITICAL TASK EVALUATION CRITERIA SAT UNSAT NA CT-2, PC-Torus ED - When suppression pool water cannot be maintained greater than -38, ANTICIPATE ED and/or ED.
Safety Significance: The -38 limit is used in conjunction with the HCL and PSP curves to preclude failure of the containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant, and to preclude loss of the suppression function of containment.
Safety significant boundary conditions: Defined by the BWROG EPGs/SAGs, appendix B Vol. II, Rev 4. If suppression pool water level cannot be maintained above the specified minimum value, steam may not be adequately condensed, and primary containment pressure could exceed allowable limits. Since the RPV may not be kept at pressure when pressure suppression capability is unavailable, Emergency RPV Depressurization is required.
Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if the Bypass Valves are not fully open, or 2 SRVs are not open prior to -44 (EPG containment tests indicate 95% steam condensation may be achieved from a vertical downcomer vent that discharges at a level six inches above the suppression pool surface.) Downcomer level is -
38 and falling to -44 would not ensure steam condensation.
Initiating Cue: Suppression pool level cannot be maintained greater than -38.
Measurable Performance Standard: Anticipate Emergency Depressurization, using the Main Turbine Bypass Valves and ignoring cooldown rate -OR-Initiate Emergency Depressurization using SRVs, such that Reactor Pressure Vessel depressurization is in progress when Torus Water Level reaches -38.
Performance Feedback: Main Turbine Bypass Valves and/or SRVs indicate open and Reactor Pressure is lowering.
Expected action: Depressurize the RPV by fully opening the Main Turbine Bypass Valves, ignoring cooldown rate, or Open SRVs, ADS Valves preferred.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 9 of 10 Simulator Scenario Summary E. LIST OF MALFUNCTIONS The following malfunctions and/or remote functions are to be active/activated as indicated in the time line:
MF/RF/PO/LBL DESCRIPTION TARGET VALUE STEP NO.
RAMP DELAY C102SENSOR571916TVNOISE (cd=P603_B087_4 EQ 0)
ONLY when in AUTO 0.4 3
delia C102SENSOR571916TVNOISE (cd=P603_B087_4 EQ 1)
Clears noise when in Manual 2
3a P41MF0006 Trip #2 GSW / Start EFP ACTIVE 4/5 P80MF0015 ACTIVE 5
P80RF0003 Local Actions to Shutdown EFP ACTIVE 5a delia P80MF0015 2
C32MF0025 A Feed Flow Inst Failure 1.0 6
delia C32MF0025 Restore A FW Flow Inst 2
6a B21MF0030 SRV H Fails Open 50.0 7
BAAQF3HCC Pull SRV H Fuses -
SRV Closes TRUE 7a BAAQF7HCC TRUE 30 B21MF0030 0.0 30 D123COMP513966REV RHRSW Rad Monitor Sample Pump in service TRUE 7b D123COMP513966REV FALSE 5
delia D123COMP513966REV 2
10 E11MF0047 Torus Leak / TWMS fail 40 8
120 G51RF0016 DEFEAT EOPRF0064 29.ESP.21 DEFEAT 8a EOPRF0062 DEFEAT G51RF0016 DEFEAT G5ATG51M416TVSP 1
EOPRF0063 DEFEAT EOPRF0061 DEFEAT
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 10 of 10 Simulator Scenario Summary F. REFERENCES The following is a list of expected Procedure References used in this scenario:
PROCEDURE TITLE 22.000.03 POWER OPERATION 25% TO 100% TO 25%
23.138.01 REACTOR RECIRCULATION SYSTEM 23.131 GENERAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 20.106.03 CRD FLOW CONTROL VALVE FAILURE 7D10 ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP AUTO START 7D72 MOTOR TRIPPED 20.131.01 LOSS OF GENERAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 23.501.01 FIRE WATER SUPPRESSION SYSTEM 3D164 FEEDWATER CONTROL DCS TROUBLE 23.107 REACTOR FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMS 1D61 SRV OPEN 1D38 DIV I/II LOW-LOW SET ARMED 1D57 ADS / SRV / EECW TCV POWER SUPPLY FAILURE 20.000.25 FAILED SAFETY RELIEF VALVE 2D82 REAC. BLDG. TORUS SUMP LEVEL HI-HI/LO-LO 2D83 REAC BLDG LEAKAGE TO TORUS SUMP HIGH 29.ESP.21 DEFEAT OF TORUS WATER MANAGEMENT ISOLATIONS AND TORUS LEVEL CONTROL TS 3.5.1 ECCS Operating TRM 3.12.2 Fire Suppression Water System
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of 17 Event 1 GSW Pump swap Type:
N Event
Description:
GSW Pumps #3, #5 and #6 are in service. Work has been completed on GSW Pump #2 and it is desired to place that pump in operation. Transfer GSW Pumps in accordance with 23.131 Section 6.6 to place GSW Pump #2 in service and remove GSW Pump #6 from service.
The outside rounds NO has been briefed and is standing by in the GSW pump house. Chemistry has been previously contacted and NPDES requirements will not be exceeded by operating GSW strainers as specified in the SOP.
Symptoms/Cues: The crew will shift in-service GSW Pumps.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +15 min The crew may conduct a brief of the GSW Pump transfer.
SRO Directs the BOP to transfer GSW pumps to place #2 in service and remove #6 from service.
Monitors and provides oversight of the evolution.
BOP Transfers in-service GSW Pumps in accordance with 23.131 Section 6.6:
Directs NO to place GSW Pump #2 Discharge Strainer Backwash Controller in CONTINUOUS.
Informs NO of GSW Pump Start.
Makes plant announcement for start of GSW Pump #2.
Places CMC switch for P4100-C002, GSW Pump #2, in RUN.
Places CMC switch for P4100-C006, GSW Pump #6, in OFF/RESET.
Directs NO to place GSW Pump #2 Discharge Strainer Backwash Controller in INTERMITTENT.
Directs NO to place GSW Pump #6 Discharge Strainer Backwash Controller in OFF.
Informs CRS of completion of evolution.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 17 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Role Play Outside Rounds NO:
When directed to place GSW Pump #2 Discharge Strainer Backwash Controller in CONTINUOUS:
WAIT 30 seconds
REPORT GSW Pump #2 Discharge Strainer Backwash Controller is in CONTINUOUS.
When informed of GSW pump start:
ACKNOWLEDGE report and REPORT GSW Pump #2 is ready for start.
When directed to place GSW Pump #2 Discharge Strainer Backwash Controller in INTERMITTENT:
WAIT 30 seconds
REPORT GSW Pump #2 Discharge Strainer Backwash Controller is in INTERMITTENT When GSW pump #2 is started:
WAIT 30 seconds
REPORT Good start on #2 GSW Pump. If informed, acknowledge that GSW Pump #6 will be shut down When directed to place GSW Pump #6 Discharge Strainer Backwash Controller in OFF:
WAIT 30 seconds
REPORT GSW Pump #6 Discharge Strainer Backwash Controller is OFF ATC May conduct peer check of the evolution.
May handle outside communications for the BOP.
SRO May conduct follow-up brief of evolution.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 4 Page 3 of 17 Event 2 Raise power to 100% using flow Type:
RX Event
Description:
The plant is at 90% power following a rod pattern adjustment and turbine valve testing. After the crew takes the shift, power will be raised to 100% using Reactor Recirculation flow.
Symptoms/Cues: Raise power to 100% using Reactor Recirculation flow.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 min The crew may conduct a short brief of the power ascension.
SRO Directs the ATC to raise power to 100%, using Reactor Recirculation flow, in accordance with 23.138.01, Reactor Recirculation System and 22.000.03.
Monitors power ascension.
Reviews GOP for impact of power rise.
May direct the BOP to contact the Central System Supervisor at the SOC of power rise.
ATC Adjust North (South) RR MG Set speed using B31-R621A (B), N (S) RR MG Set Speed Controllers, as follows:
Verifies B31-R621A (B) is in AUTO and setpoint (SP) is selected.
With B31-R621A (B) in AUTO, adjusts the setpoint (SP) of the speed controller to desired speed.
Adjusts RRMG set speeds to match Recirculation Loop Jet Pump flows indicated on B21-R611A, Jet Pumps 11-20 Loop A Flow and B21-R611B, Jet Pumps 1-10 Loop B Flow.
Verifies indicated North and South RR MG Set speeds agree within 3%,
as indicated on B31-R621A & B, N and S RR MG Set Speed Controller, process variable (PV) or if available, C32-816, FW & RR Flat Panel Display.
Repeats the above steps, as necessary, to achieve the target power.
Informs SRO of the final power level.
BOP Provides peer check of reactivity manipulation.
Monitors secondary plant.
May contact the SOC as directed.
SRO May conduct follow-up brief.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 4 Page 4 of 17 Event 3 Noisy CRD FCV controller Type:
C, MC Event
Description:
The crew will identify a noisy CRD flow controller that is causing oscillations in CRD system flow. The crew will enter AOP 20.106.03, CRD Flow Control Valve Failure, and take manual control of the CRD Flow Control Valve controller and then restore CRD system parameters to normal. Manual CRD flow control will remain in effect for the remainder of the scenario.
Symptoms/Cues: Oscillating CRD system flows and pressures.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +30 min Booth Action Trigger Event 3 to initiate Noisy CRD Flow Controller.
ATC Identifies and reports oscillating CRD parameters.
Recognizes and reports rapidly changing indications on C11-K612.
May inform the CRS and take Manual control.
May recommend entering 20.106.03, CRD Flow Control Valve (FCV) Failure.
Reports any actions taken to CRS.
SRO Acknowledges report from ATC.
Enters AOP 20.106.03:
Directs Condition A (if FCV not yet in Manual) or verifies actions are complete.
Briefs crew on impact of failure, including NOTE 1 (If Rx Scram occurs while in manual, the FCV must be closed by the ATC).
Contacts WWM/I&C to investigate.
Role Play WMM/I&C:
If contacted, acknowledge order to investigate ATC Performs actions as directed by the SRO.
If not already taken to manual, places CRD Flow Controller in Manual.
Recognizes that system parameters have stabilized in manual.
Adjusts CRD Flow Controller to establish 37-63 gpm.
Adjusts CRD PCV to establish Drive/Cooling Water D/Ps.
Acknowledges need to close FCV on a scram as briefed by the SRO.
Routinely check/adjusts C11-K612.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 4 Page 5 of 17 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Role Play RB NO: IF sent to investigate at the CRD Flow Control Station, WAIT 2 minutes REPORT as follows for applicable condition:
IF C11-K612 is still in AUTO: The CRD FCV is constantly changing position and local parameters are dancing around
IF C11-K612 is in MANUAL: Flows and pressures are stable locally. You cant see anything abnormal locally BOP Peer checks ATC operations and may handle communications to outside operators.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 4 Page 6 of 17 Event 4 GSW Pump trip Type:
C Event 5 EFP spurious start, S/D Type:
C, TS Event
Description:
A trip of GSW pump #2 will occur. This will cause the crew to enter AOP 20.131.01, Loss of GSW AOP, and take actions to stabilize GSW header pressure.
5 seconds after the GSW pump trips, an EFP spurious start will occur. The crew will recognize the conditions and take action per 7D10 to shut down the pump.
Symptoms/Cues: 7D72, Motor Tripped, lower than normal GSW header pressure. Tripped indication on the CMC for #2 GSW Pump. 7D10, EFP Auto Start annunciator and start indication of EFP.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +45 min Booth Action Trigger Event 4 to cause GSW Pump #2 to trip (P41MF0006).
NOTE: 5 seconds after the GSW pump trips, Event 5 will automatically trigger to initiate EFP spurious start.
BOP Announces Alarm 7D72, Motor Tripped.
Recognizes and reports trip of #2 GSW Pump.
Directs Outside Rounds NO to investigate trip of #2 GSW Pump at pump and breaker.
Responds to 7D10, EFP Auto Start.
Reports that the EFP is running.
Verifies GSW/Fire Header Pressures are >130 psig.
Check Fire Detection/Protection mimic for indications of a fire.
Directs NO to investigate.
Relays field report to the CRS.
Per ARP, recommends returning the EFP to normal standby status
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 4 Page 7 of 17 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Role Play Outside Rounds NO:
IF sent to investigate trip of #2 GSW Pump,
WAIT 3 minutes
REPORT (depending on direction given):
o Not sure why pump tripped. Strainer operation, lake level and intake conditions look normal.
o Good start on Number (X) GSW Pump.
o 64 Device (Ground Fault) tripped on #2 GSW Pump Breaker.
When dispatched to GSW Pump House to investigate:
WAIT 2 minutes
Call on the Radio and report Electric Fire Pump looks good on start. A plant cleaner in the area reports that P8000-F162 was bumped, and some water came out. This valve is the drain valve for pressure switch X80-N460. I verified the valve is closed. I have the cleaners name and sent them to their supervisor.
IF asked for local Fire Header Pressure (X80-RA03):
WAIT 30 seconds.
Report Pressure is 170 psig and steady.
IF asked for status of the Jockey Pump:
WAIT 30 seconds.
Report Jockey Pump is running normally.
SRO Acknowledges report from RO.
May enter AOP 20.131.01, Loss of GSW with Crew Update.
Makes plant announcement for trip of GSW pump.
Directs Condition B of AOP for starting of available GSW Pump.
Directs RO to restore the EFP to standby.
Conducts brief and revies TRM impact.
TRM Impact TRLCO 3.12.2 Fire Suppression Water System The fire suppression water system shall be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY: At all times CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One fire suppression pump inoperable A.1 Restore the inoperable pump to OPERABLE OR A.2 Provide an alternate backup pump 14 days for both
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 4 Page 8 of 17 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges order to start available GSW pump.
Starts an available GSW pump per AOP 20.131.01 Condition B:
o Start any available GSW Pump.
o Locally verify GSW Intake level.
o Monitor GSW Pump Strainers for proper operation.
o Verify Fire Header Pressure maintained.
Monitors plant and evaluates GSW header pressure.
Observes that GSW header pressure returns to normal.
Reviews 23.501.01 Section 5.5 to reset the EFP after Auto Start:
Informs CRS when EFP is in OFF/RESET.
Places EFP CMC in OFF/RESET.
Directs NO to depress Stop button for the EFP.
Verifies 7D10 is clear.
Verifies Fire Header Pressure is >135 psig.
Places EFP CMC in Auto.
Informs CRS that the EFP is back in standby.
Reports actions to the CRS.
Role Play NO:
When directed to depress local STOP button for the EFP:
WAIT 1 minute.
TRIGGER Step 2a REPORT I depressed the Stop button for the Electric Fire Pump locally. The Electric Fire Pump is shutdown.
SRO Acknowledges report from RO.
May conduct follow-up plant status brief.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 4 Page 9 of 17 Event 6 FW Flow Instrument failure, return to 3-element Type:
I Event
Description:
The A Feedwater Flow Instrument will fail downscale, due to repositioning the flow element bypass valve. This will cause Feedwater DCS to transfer to Single Element. The crew will ensure the valve is restored closed and then restore Feedwater DCS to 3-Element Control Symptoms/Cues: 3D164, Feedwater DCS Trouble, with corresponding information on the DCS Flat Panel display indicating that DCS has automatically transferred to Single Element and the A FW Flow instrument has failed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +65 min Booth Action Trigger Event 6 to the A Feedwater Flow Instrument to fail downscale and DCS to transfer to Single Element control.
T0 +66 min Role Play RB Rounds:
Call MCR and REPORT Im on RB-1. I was removing duct tape from the handwheel of a valve and I think I may have inadvertently cracked the valve open. There is no label for the valve, but it is the equalizing valve for C32-N002A, Feedwater to Reactor Pressure Vessel Flow Transmitter. Do you want me to close the equalizing valve?
If directed to close the valve:
TRIGGER step to close equalizing valve
REPORT I have closed the valve.
ATC Respond to 3D164, "Feedwater Control DCS Trouble."
Evaluate DCS, review status of feedwater and report status to CRS.
Places Level Control Mode Switch in 1 ELEM based on Level Control Alarm, 1-ELE-FORCED / 1 ELEMENT CONTROL FORCED on C32 K816, FW & RR Flat Panel Display (COP H11-P603).
Reports Level Control Mode Switch in 1 ELEM to CRS.
Refers to 23.107, Reactor Feedwater and Condensate Systems, Enclosure H, to determine the failure. Determines failure is C32-N002A / FW FLOW A and reports to CRS.
Acknowledge field report on status of equalizing valve for C32-N002A and reports status to CRS.
May direct checking the equalizing valve for C32-N002A closed.
If/When C32-N002A is returned to service reports status to CRS.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 4 Page 10 of 17 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Acknowledge report of 3D164, "Feedwater Control DCS Trouble."
Acknowledge report of Level Control Mode Switch in 1 ELEM.
Brief Crew on DCS failure and Level Control Mode Switch in 1 ELEM.
May direct operator to Evaluate DCS in RR.
May contact ENGINEER/FSS/WWM and direct actions for Feedwater DCS.
BOP May assist with communications / HiCOM announcements.
Role Play ENGINEER/FSS/WWM:
If contacted as OPERATOR/ENGINEER/FSS/WWM, acknowledge direction Booth Action If crew decides that more off crew involvement is required before returning C32-N002A, Feedwater to Reactor Pressure Vessel Flow Transmitter to service, provide the following roleplay to the CRS as the SM:
Inform the crew that time compression is being used the Tagging center has performed the following:
C32-N002A, Feedwater to Reactor Pressure Vessel Flow Transmitter, has been evaluated and is ready to be returned to service.
(If equalizing valve has not been closed) I/C will be returning C32-N002A to service and will call the control room shortly to inform you that it is in service.
If the Crew asks about returning to 3 element refer them to the GOP.
If necessary, Trigger step to close equalizing valve and report as I&C C32-N002A has been returned to service SRO Acknowledge report of C32-N002A has been returned to service or provides status to crew based on communication from tagging center.
Review GOP and 23.107 Reactor Feedwater and Condensate Systems.
May brief Crew per ODE-3 for transfer from Single Element Level Control to Three Element Level Control.
Direct P603 to transfer from Single Element Level Control to Three Element Level Control per 23.107 Section 5.7.
Acknowledge report of DCS is in Three Element Level Control.
ATC Acknowledge direction to transfer from Single Element Level Control to Three Element Level Control.
While monitoring RPV water level and Feedwater flow indications and place Level Control Mode switch in 3 ELEM.
On C32-K816, FW & RR Flat Panel Display verify DCS logic is in 3 ELEMENT.
Report to CRS DCS is in Three Element Level Control
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 4 Page 11 of 17 Event 7 ADS SRV H fails open, close SRV via pulling fuses Type:
C, TS Event
Description:
SRV H will fail open due to a fault with its control circuit. The crew will enter 20.000.25, SRV failure, and direct actions to pull fuses for SRV H. The crew will also place RHR in Torus Cooling to address rising Torus Water Temperature. When the fuses are pulled, SRV H will close. This will require follow-up actions in the AOP and an evaluation of Tech Specs by the SRO.
Symptoms/Cues: 1D61, SRV Open is received, with an open light lit for SRV H, generator MW will lower, a Steam Flow/Feed Flow mismatch (more feed than steam flow), and a rising Torus Water Temperature and Level trend.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +75 min Booth Action Trigger Event 7 to initiate SRV H failure malfunction.
BOP Respond to alarm 1D61, SRV Open.
Recognize and reports SRV H indicates open.
Depress OPEN and CLOSE pushbuttons (Immediate).
Report to CRS that SRV is still open.
ATC Use alternate indications (Steam Flow/Feed Flow mismatch, RPV level change, Generator MW) to verify SRV open.
SRO Acknowledge report of SRV open.
Verify Immediate Actions are carried out.
Enter AOP 20.000.25, Failed SRV.
Make plant announcement.
Conduct short transient brief for Stuck Open SRV AOP.
Direct the following from AOP 20.000.25 Failed SRV:
Pulling SRV fuses.
Monitor Torus Water Temperature.
Place RHR in Torus Cooling.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 4 Page 12 of 17 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledge direction to pull SRV fuses, monitor Torus Water Temperature, and place RHR in Torus Cooling.
Coordinate monitoring SRV Tailpipe Temperature.
May direct NO to come to Main Control Room to pull SRV fuses.
Place Div I/II RHR in torus cooling as directed per 23.205 Encl A:
Unlock and open E1150-F028A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Torus Iso Vlv.
Start one RHR Pump (A/B/C/D).
Throttle E1150-F024A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Torus Clg Iso to desired flow.
When flow is > 6900 gpm, verify E1150-F007A (B), Div 1 (2) RHR Pmps Min Flow Vlv, closes.
Role Play IF directed to report to the Main Control Room:
WAIT 3 minutes
REPORT to MCR for brief on pulling SRV fuses.
When directed to pull fuses for SRV H:
WAIT 3 minutes
CALL the MCR Standing by to pull fuses for SRV H When directed to pull fuses:
TRIGGER Step 7a
CALL the MCR Fuses for SRV H have been pulled
NOTE: The step above will close SRV H when triggered IF directed to check SRV Tailpipe Temperature:
REPORT SRV E Tailpipe Temperatures to MCR:
Obtained from Orchid ME drawing b21_i209501 BOP Monitor Torus Water Temperature as directed by CRS.
Brief NO/LNO to pull SRV fuses.
Direct NO/LNO to pull SRV fuses.
Direct NO/LNO to monitor SRV Tailpipe Temperature.
Recognize indications of SRV H closed and report to CRS.
SRO Acknowledge report of SRV closed.
Conduct brief for Stuck Open SRV AOP actions.
Enter and direct AOP 20.000.25, Condition E.
Directs Reset Low-Low Set.
Review GOP for plant shutdown.
Direct Performance of 24.402.01 surveillance within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 4 Page 13 of 17 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Tech Spec Impact LCO 3.5.1: ECCS - operating Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function of five safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3, except high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and ADS valves are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure 150 psig CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME G. One ADS valve inoperable G.1 Restore ADS valve to OPERABLE status 14 days BOP Acknowledge direction reset Low-Low Set Logic.
Reset Low-Low Set Logic by depressing Div I and Div II Low-Low Set Logic reset pushbuttons.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 4 Page 14 of 17 Event 8 Torus Leak, ED, TWMS fails to isolate Type:
MAJ, C, MC Event
Description:
An unisolable leak from the Torus will occur. The leak will cause a high Torus Room Sump level condition, and both sump pumps to run, which is an EOP entry condition. The operators will implement a leak isolation strategy; however, the torus leak is unisolable, requiring a reactor scram before Torus Water Level lowering below -38. TWMS will fail to isolate requiring operator action to isolate. The crew will anticipate Emergency Depressurization (ED) by fully opening the Main Turbine Bypass Valves. The crew will eventually ED by opening 5 SRVs when TWL cannot be kept greater than -38 Symptoms/Cues: 2D82, RB Torus Sump Level Hi-Hi/Lo-Lo and 2D83, RB Leakage to Torus Sump High.
CT-1, PC-Torus-Scram - With reactor at power and suppression pool water level cannot be maintained greater than -38, MANUALLY SCRAM the reactor before reaching -38.
CT-2, PC-Torus ED - When suppression pool water cannot be maintained greater than -38 inches, INITIATE ED.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +75 min Booth Action Trigger Event 8 to initiate an unisolable Torus Leak BOP Respond to 2D82, RB Torus Sump Level Hi-Hi/Lo-Lo and 2D83, RB Leakage to Torus Sump High Recognize both Torus Room Sump Pumps running and report to CRS as an EOP entry condition Identify and report indications of a Torus leak Identify TWMS Isolation failure (group 12) and verify closed or close the following valves as required per 2D82:
G5100-F604, TWMS Rtrn To RHR Inbd Iso Vlv
G5100-F606, TWMS Rtrn To CS Inbd Iso Vlv
G5100-F602, N TWMS Pump Inbd Suct Iso Vlv
G5100-F600, S TWMS Pump Inbd Suct Iso Vlv
G5100-F605, TWMS Rtrn To RHR Otbd Iso Vlv is open and closes
G5100-F607, TWMS Rtrn To CS Otbd Iso Vlv is open and closes
G5100-F603, N TWMS Pump Otbd Suct Iso Vlv is open and closes
G5100-F601, S TWMS Pump Otbd Suct Iso Vlv is open and closes
Respond to alarm 7D71, Torus Water Level Trouble and report EOP entry condition when TWL is <-2.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 4 Page 15 of 17 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Enter 29.100.01, Sheet 5 Secondary Containment Control Enter 29.100.01, Sheet 2 Primary Containment Control Announce event over the Hi-Com Direct lowering Torus Water Level actions of ODE10, to include
Align TWMS to add water.
Turn off Torus Room Sump Pumps.
Verify watertight doors closed.
Isolate systems from the Torus and monitor leakage using 29.ESP.27 Torus Leak Isolation.
Monitors actions during leak isolation process.
Assigns TWL as critical parameter.
BOP Direct performance of 29.ESP.21 to field operator Align TWMS for raising TWL IAW 29.ESP.21 Stop Torus room sump pumps Coordinate verification/closing watertight doors Perform leak isolation of systems taking a suction on the Torus (RHR, CS and TWMS) as directed Report leak isolation actions to the CRS Monitor and report that TWL continues to lower Role Play NO:
If directed to perform 29.ESP.21:
ACKNOWLEDGE direction.
TRIGGER Lesson Step to execute 29.ESP.21 (10 minute time delay).
REPORT to MCR that 29.ESP.21 field actions are complete.
If directed to verify watertight doors in the RB corner rooms are closed:
WAIT 10 minutes
REPORT doors are closed CRS Briefs reactor scram, prior to reaching -38, to allow RPV pressure control, anticipate ED and ED if necessary.
Enters 29.100.01 SH 1 RPV Control from 29.100.01 SH 2 Primary Containment Control for Reactor Scram.
When conditions are met, directs RO to place Mode Switch in Shutdown (before TWL reaches -38).
Announces event over Hi-Com.
Directs scram reports.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 4 Page 16 of 17 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Places Mode Switch in Shutdown before TWL reaches -38 CT-1, PC-Torus-Scram - With reactor at power and suppression pool water level cannot be maintained greater than -38, MANUALLY SCRAM the reactor before reaching -38.
Inserts all IRM/SRM.
ATC/BOP Provide scram reports based on current plant conditions SRO Acknowledge Scram reports and documents on EOP charts Enter EOPs on level 3 Direct the following from 29.100.01 SH 1:
Confirm isolations and actuations for level as they occur
RPV Level Band 173-214 inches
No Pressure Band due to anticipating ED.
Actions of the Scram AOP 20.000.21 BOP Acknowledge the following:
Confirm isolations and actuations for level as they occur
RPV Level Band 173-241 inches
No Pressure Band ATC Acknowledge direction to perform Actions of the Scram AOP Perform 20.00.21 actions:
Verify SDV Vent and Drain Valves closed.
Verify the following sealed in:
Post Scram Water Level Logic Setdown.
Directs operator to Physically verify integrity of Scram Discharge Volume SRO Anticipate ED per P-OR1 of 29.100.01, Sheet 1, RPV Control By:
Direct Manually opening Main Turbine Bypass valves to depressurize the RPV ignoring cooldown rate When TWL cannot be kept >-38 direct ED by:
Direct opening 5 SRVs, ADS preferred BOP Maintain RPV level in directed band with high pressure sources Acknowledges direction to open Main Turbine Bypass valves to depressurize the RPV ignoring cooldown rates Manually opens Main Turbine Bypass valves to lower pressure Reports to CRS that Bypass valves are open
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 4 Page 17 of 17 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO When TWL cannot be kept >-38 ED by:
Direct opening 5 SRVs, ADS preferred BOP Acknowledges direction to opening 5 SRVs, ADS preferred Opens 5 ADS SRVs and reports status to CRS.
CT-2, PC-Torus ED - When suppression pool water cannot be maintained greater than -38 inches, INITIATE ED.
Controls RPV water level to prevent over-feeding the RPV during depressurization.
Lead Evaluator Scenario is terminated when ED is initiated properly or at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.