ML23136A693

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Comment (1700) of Judy Lukasiewicz on Notice of Intent to Conduct Scoping Process and Prepare Environmental Impact Statement; Triso–X Special Nuclear Material License
ML23136A693
Person / Time
Site: Triso-X
Issue date: 02/13/2023
From: Lukasiewicz J
- No Known Affiliation
To:
Office of Administration
References
NRC-2022-0201, 87FR77146 01700
Download: ML23136A693 (1)


Text

SUNSI Review Complete Template=ADM-013 As of: March 08, 2023 E-RIDS=ADM-03 Received: February 13, 2023 PUBLIC SUBMISSION ADD: Jill Caverly, Robert Sun, Status: Pending_Post Antoinette Walker-Smith, Mary Tracking No. le2-zxif-amg0 Neely Comment (1700) Comments Due: February 14, 2023 Publication Date: 12/16/2022Submission Type: API Citation: 87 FR 77146 Docket: NRC-2022-0201 Notice of Intent to Conduct Scoping Process and Prepare Supplement to Draft Environmental Impact Statement TRISO-X Fuel Fabrication Facility

Comment On: NRC-2022-0201-0001 Notice of Intent To Conduct Scoping Process and Prepare Environmental Impact Statement; TRISO-X Special Nuclear Material License

Document: NRC-2022-0201-DRAFT-1700 Comment on FR Doc # 2022-27164

Submitter Information

Name: Judy Lukasiewicz Email: jsteel@cruzio.com

General Comment

TRISO-X, LLC is proposing a first-of-a-kind US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Category II licensed TRISO-based fuel fabrication facility. Therefore, all aspects of the facility must be disclosed.

I strongly and rightly oppose the opening of a new nuclear fuel fabrication factory, which would use near bomb-grade uranium.

According to the Environmental Report for the TRISO-X Fuel Fabrication Facility (September 2022), TRISO-X FFF manufacturing operations would consist of receiving HALEU in the form of triuranium octoxide (U3O8) powder enriched to less than 20 weight percent 235U; converting the U3O8 into a uranyl nitrate solution, into gel spheres, and then into fuel kernels; and processing the fuel kernels through coating, overcoating, fuel form pressing, and high temperature carbonization. These operations would be supported by shipping and receiving, laboratory, quality control, research and development, uranium recovery, and waste disposal processes. (Section 1.3).

Beginning with the High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU), at 20 weight percent 235U, this would be a new form of enriched uranium that is not now produced anywhere in the U.S. Where would the HALEU be obtained from? Provide background on how the HALEU is made, including its conversion ostensibly from uranium hexafluoride to triuranium octoxide powder, the source of the uranium and all environmental impacts of the production process, from mining to finished product. Would there be an alternate or backup source for HALEU?

How would the HALEU be shipped to and from the facility? What procedures would be in place to protect the general public during transport? What steps would be involved in handling it upon receipt? What procedures would be in place to protect workers?

What are the steps necessary to convert the HALEU into a uranyl nitrate solution Into gel spheres? Into fuel

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kernels? What are the safety and security procedures that would be in place to protect workers and prevent pollution of the environment? What chemicals would be used, how would they be obtained and disposed?

Describe the various steps, from a safety and security perspective, in processing the fuel kernels for coating, overcoating, form pressing and high temperature carbonization. Again, what chemicals would be used and how disposed? What other materials would be used in the process, how would they be handled and disposed?

Most importantly, how would the HALEU be handled throughout the entire process in order to prevent the possibility of criticality?

Concerning HALEU, the second sentence of the NOI states: TRISO-X is requesting a license to possess and use special nuclear material for the manufacture of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel at a fuel fabrication facility (FFF) to be located in Oak Ridge, Roane County, Tennessee. (Emphasis added). The use of the word manufacture would seem to suggest TRISO-X FFF intends to up blend or down blend 235U in order to arrive at 20 weight percent 235U HALEU. Explain what is meant by manufacture and whether TRISO-X FFF intends to alter the percentage of 235U in any way and if so, by how much and why?

A TRISO-X video indicates the TRISO fuel particles would last 60 years. Please explain why it lasts so long, what causes its degradation, the resulting waste and how it would be disposed. Would there be issues of criticality and if so, how would they be addressed? What would be the environmental impact and how would that be addressed? How would the fuel be stored both in the short term and once it has degraded? What step or steps within the process pose(s) the greatest risk of contamination and how would that be avoided/mitigated?

As for the facility itself, what procedures/safeguards would be in place to prevent the possibility of radioactive or chemical releases into the atmosphere and/or groundwater? What safeguards would be in place to prevent the possibility of fires throughout the fabrication process? What are the safeguards against direct terrorist attacks or other possible assaults against the facility such as cyber-terrorism? Identify the stages in the process that could jeopardize human health or safety should there be a total loss of power onsite?

How would a serious accident be handled...especially one with widespread offsite contamination? What is the financial ability of TRISO-X, LLC to address such a catastrophic accident? Identify the quality assurance requirements applicable to the facility, who would be responsible and how would they operate?

What are the various steps in the uranium recovery process? Identify all security and risk safeguards. Provide the step-by-step procedures in the waste disposal processes and all safeguards involved.

Would the perimeter of the facility be monitored for radioactive and chemical contamination...how often and if not, why not? Will rainwater be retained onsite and monitored for contaminants?

Please address. Thank you.

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