ML23017A149
| ML23017A149 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hermes File:Kairos Power icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/10/2023 |
| From: | Benjamin Beasley NRC/NRR/DANU/UAL1 |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| Download: ML23017A149 (1) | |
Text
5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM THIS NRC STAFF DRAFT SE HAS BEEN PREPARED AND IS BEING RELEASED TO SUPPORT INTERACTIONS WITH THE ACRS. THIS DRAFT SE HAS NOT BEEN SUBJECT TO FULL NRC MANAGEMENT AND LEGAL REVIEWS AND APPROVALS, AND ITS CONTENTS SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS OFFICIAL AGENCY POSITIONS.
For the Hermes non-power test reactor, the reactor coolant system consists of the primary heat transport system (PHTS) that circulates coolant through the reactor core to a radiator that rejects energy to the atmosphere.
This chapter of the Kairos Power, LLC (Kairos) Hermes test reactor construction permit (CP) safety evaluation (SE) describes the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staffs (the staffs) technical review and evaluation of the preliminary information regarding the Hermes PHTS.
This information is presented in Chapter 5, Heat Transport Systems, of the Hermes preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR), Revision XX. The staff reviewed PSAR Chapter 5 against applicable regulatory requirements using regulatory guidance and standards to assess the sufficiency of the preliminary information Kairos provided regarding the Hermes facility PHTS for the issuance of a CP in accordance with Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities. As part of this review, the staff evaluated descriptions and discussions of the Hermes PHTS, with special attention to design and operating characteristics, unusual or novel design features, and principal safety considerations. The staff evaluated the preliminary design of the Hermes PHTS to ensure the design criteria, design bases, and information relative to construction is sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design basis. In addition, the staff reviewed Kaiross identification and justification for the selection of those variables, conditions, or other items which are determined to be probable subjects of technical specifications (TS) for the facility, with special attention given to those items which may significantly influence the final design.
The staffs reviews and evaluations for areas relevant to PSAR Chapter 5, including regulations and guidance used, summaries of the application information reviewed, and evaluation findings and conclusions, are discussed in the SE section below for the major area of review (the reactor coolant system) covered in this SE chapter. A summary and overall conclusions on the staffs technical evaluation of Hermes PHTS are provided in SE Section 5.2, Summary and Conclusions on Reactor Coolant System.
5.1 Primary Heat Transport System Introduction The PHTS transfers heat from the reactor core by circulating reactor coolant between the reactor core and the heat rejection radiator (HRR) subsystem during normal operations. The PHTS includes a primary salt pump (PSP), heat rejection system, and associated piping. The PHTS also includes thermal management features to maintain the reactor coolant in the liquid phase when the reactor core is not generating heat and the capability to drain external piping and the HRR to allow cooldown, inspection, and maintenance. The PHTS performs non-safety related functions as described in PSAR Section 5.1.1, Description. The PHTS interfaces with various systems, including the reactor thermal management system, inert gas system, tritium management system, and inventory management system as described in PSAR Chapter 9.
Regulatory Evaluation
The applicable regulatory requirements for the evaluation of the Hermes non-power test reactor PHTS design criteria are as follows:
10 CFR 50.34, Contents of applications; technical information, paragraph (a), Preliminary safety analysis report.
o 10 CFR 50.34(a)(3)(ii) requires The design bases and the relation of the design bases to the principal design criteria o 10 CFR 50.34(a)(3)(iii) requires Information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and approximate dimensions, sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design bases with adequate margin for safety.
o 10 CFR 50.34(a)(4) which requires A preliminary analysis and evaluation of the design and performance of structures, systems, and components [SSCs] of the facility 10 CFR 50.35, Issuance of construction permits.
10 CFR 50.40, Common standards.
The applicable guidance for the evaluation of Hermes Reactor Coolant System is as follows:
NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, Part 1, Format and Content, and Part 2, Standard Review Plan and Acceptance Criteria, Chapter 5, Reactor Coolant Systems. Based on the role of the PHTS in the Hermes design, the staff evaluated the system using the applicable acceptance criteria in Section 5.2, Primary Coolant System for a non-light water reactor.
Technical Evaluation PSAR System Description PSAR Section 5.1.1 states that the PHTS is a non-safety related system which serves the function of the reactor coolant system. The PSAR states that the PHTS is used to remove heat from the reactor core and transfer the heat to the HRR subsystem, which functions as the ultimate heat sink. If the PHTS is not available to remove heat from the core, the decay heat removal system (DHRS) is the safety-related system which will remove the heat to maintain the core within proper temperature limits.
PSAR Section 5.1.3 states that the PHTS piping and supports are designed to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) B31.3 Code, Process Piping, and the primary heat exchanger is designed to ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC)Section VIII standards. PSAR Section 5.1.1.4 states that the PHTS piping is made of austenitic stainless steel.
PSAR Section 5.1.1.1 states that the reactor coolant is a mixture of fluorine, lithium, and beryllium (i.e.,
Flibe) in a composition that is described in KP-TR-005-NP-A, Revision 1 Reactor Coolant for the Kairos Power Fluoride SaltCooled HighTemperature Reactor. PSAR Section 5.1.1.1 states that the safety functions of the coolant are to support reactivity control and to serve as a fission product barrier.
PSAR Chapter 14 contains a proposed TS LCO to maintain the reactor coolant composition within allowable limits to ensure that the thermophysical properties are maintained.
The staff notes that while the PHTS piping is not credited as a fission product retention barrier, as is typically assumed in light water reactors, the reactor coolant is credited for fission product retention.
Additionally, the staff notes that it is important for the Flibe coolant to maintain the expected thermophysical properties needed for natural circulation heat transfer. Flibe purity and its effect on corrosion is evaluated by the staff in SE Section 4.3.
Staff Evaluation of Design Basis and System Design PSAR Section 3.1.1, Design Criteria, describes the principal design criteria (PDC) that are applicable to the Hermes reactor. These PDC were reviewed and approved by the staff in KP-TR-003-NP-A, Revision 1, Principal Design Criteria for the Kairos Power Fluoride Salt-Cooled, High Temperature Reactor. PSAR Section 5.1.2, Design Basis, identified the design bases for the PHTS. The PSAR states that the following PDCs are applicable to the PHTS:
PDC 2, Design bases for protection against natural phenomena, which requires safety significant SSCs be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena.
PDC 10, Reactor design, which requires the reactor core be designed to ensure specified acceptable system radionuclide release design limits (SARRDLs) are not exceeded.
PDC 12, Suppression of reactor power oscillations, which requires the reactor core be designed to ensure power oscillations that can result in conditions that exceed SARRDLs are not possible or can be reliably and readily detected and suppressed.
PDC 16, Containment design, which requires a functional containment to control the release of radioactivity to the environment.
PDC 33, Reactor coolant inventory maintenance, which requires a system to maintain coolant inventory to protect against small breaks in the safety significant elements of the reactor coolant boundary.
PDC 60, Control of releases of radioactive materials to the environment, which requires the plant design to control the release of radioactive materials, including during postulated events.
PDC 70, Reactor coolant purity control, which requires systems to maintain reactor coolant purity considering chemical attack, fouling and plugging of passages, radionuclide concentrations, and air or moisture ingress.
PSAR Section 5.1.3, System Evaluation, relates the design bases to the design criteria and identifies how the PHTS satisfies the PDC applicable to the design of the PHTS. In the following paragraphs, the staff addresses each PDC by summarizing the information presented in the PSAR and explaining the staff evaluation of the adequacy of the preliminary information in the Kairos PSAR relative to NUREG-1537 acceptance criteria.
PDC 2, Design bases for protection against natural phenomena:
PSAR Section 5.1.3 states that the design of the nonsafety-related PHTS SSCs is such that a failure of PHTS SSCs would not affect the performance of safety-related SSCs due to a design basis earthquake. The nonsafety-related PHTS pipe connections to the reactor vessel nozzles have sufficiently small wall thickness such that, if loaded beyond elastic limits, an inelastic response would occur in the nonsafety-related PHTS piping prior to any impacts to the safety-related SSCs, such as the reactor vessel or DHRS.
PSAR Section 6.3 states that a failure of the PHTS piping or HRR does not lead to inadequate heat removal because the safety-related DHRS or parasitic heat loss removes the residual heat.
PSAR Section 5.1 describes how adequate reactor coolant inventory is maintained following a failure in the PHTS by anti-siphon design features on the hot and cold legs. This aspect of the design is described and evaluated under PDC 33 below.
The staff notes that the ability of the Hermes design to remove residual heat following a failure in the PHTS is consistent with the guidance given in NUREG-1537, Part 2, Section 5.2, which states, the primary coolant system (of a forced-convection coolant flow) should be designed to convert in a passive or fail-safe method, to natural-convection flow sufficient to avoid loss of fuel integrity. Therefore, the staff finds there is reasonable assurance that the anti-siphon features of
the design will ensure sufficient heat removal and maintain reactor coolant inventory if a failure in the PHTS piping or HRR occurs due to a natural phenomenon.
Because failures in the PHTS would not affect the ability of safety-related SSCs to perform their safety function, the staff finds there is reasonable assurance that the preliminary design of the PHTS is consistent with PDC 2 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.34(a). Further, the preliminary design of the PHTS is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-1537, Part 2, Section 5.2, which states the primary coolant system should be designed to ensure sufficient heat removal to maintain fuel integrity and prevent uncontrolled leakage or discharge of contaminated coolant to the unrestricted environment.
PDC 10, Reactor design:
PSAR Section 5.1.3 states that thermal hydraulic analysis of the core ensures adequate coolant flow is maintained to ensure SARRDLs are not exceeded. PDC 10 has two components: (1) normal operation, which is evaluated by the staff in SE Sections 4.3 and 4.6, and (2) during postulated events, when the normal PHTS heat removal path is unavailable, which is evaluated by the staff in SE Section 6.3.
Relative to the PHTS design, the staff notes that it is important for the Flibe coolant to maintain the expected thermophysical properties needed for natural circulation heat transfer. In order for the reactor coolant to maintain the thermophysical properties specified in KP-TR-005-NP-A, Revision 1, the staff finds that the composition of the coolant needs to be controlled. The staff finds there is reasonable assurance that the preliminary design will allow the composition of the coolant to be controlled because the chemistry control system (CCS) provides means for adjusting salt chemistry, as needed. Additionally, the proposed TS in PSAR Chapter 14 include a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) to maintain the reactor coolant composition within allowable limits to ensure that the thermophysical properties are maintained. This will allow the coolant to maintain the thermophysical properties needed to achieve adequate heat removal.
Based on the conclusions documented in the preceding paragraphs and in SE Sections 4.3, 4.6 and 6.3, the staff finds there is reasonable assurance that the preliminary design provides adequate heat removal during normal operation and postulated events and is consistent with PDC 10 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.34(a). This is also consistent with the guidance and associated acceptance criteria in NUREG-1537, Part 2, Section 5.2, which state that the system should be designed to remove sufficient heat from the fuel without exceeding SARRDLs.
PDC 12, Suppression of reactor power oscillations:
PSAR Section 5.1.3 states that the reactor coolant is designed, in part, to ensure power oscillations can't exceed SARRDLs consistent with PDC 12. The PHTS supports this design objective through its ability to detect and suppress, if needed, inlet temperature and mass flow rate oscillations, limiting entrained gas in the coolant (via a proposed TS LCO in PSAR Chapter 14), maintaining coolant specifications, and the resistance of the coolant to thermal-hydraulic instability events. PSAR Section 4.5 describes the inherent features of the nuclear design which tend to limit flow-and inlet temperature-induced power oscillations, including a small core height and diameter and a long neutron diffusion length. PSAR Chapter 7 further details the Hermes instrumentation and controls, including the reactor coolant auxiliary control system. SE Chapter 7 provides the staff evaluation of the Hermes instrumentation and controls, including the reactor coolant auxiliary control system.
SE Chapter 4 evaluates PSAR Section 4.5 and finds that the inherent features of the nuclear
design, including a small core height and diameter and long neutron diffusion length, make uncontrolled power oscillations unlikely. The proposed TS LCO to limit air in the reactor coolant provides further assurance that voiding in the coolant will be limited such that power oscillations exceeding SARRDLs are not possibly or can be detected and suppressed. Based on these inherent features and the proposed TS LCO, the staff finds there is reasonable assurance the preliminary design of the reactor coolant is consistent with PDC 12 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.34(a).
PDC 16, Containment design; and PDC 60, Control of releases of radioactive materials to the environment:
PSAR Section 5.1.3 states that the Flibe reactor coolant provides retention of fission products that may escape the fuel. These retention properties are credited in the safety analysis as a barrier to release of radionuclides accumulated in the coolant. PSAR Section 5.1.3 notes that the design aspects of the Flibe reactor coolant are discussed in KP-TR-005-NP-A, Revision 1.
PSAR Chapter 14 states that a proposed TS LCO related to limiting circulating activity in the Flibe will be established.
The staff previously evaluated the ability of Flibe to serve as a fission product barrier in KP-TR-012-NP-A, Revision 1, Mechanistic Source Term Methodology for the Kairos Power Fluoride SaltCooled HighTemperature Reactor. Based on the evaluation in KPTR012NP-A, Revision 1, the staff finds there is reasonable assurance the Flibe will perform consistent with PDCs 16 and 60 because the reactor coolant can retain certain radionuclides in a salt-soluble form, as described in the referenced topical report. The staff finds there is reasonable assurance this preliminary design will be consistent with PDCs 16 and 60 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.34(a) because the proposed TS LCO on circulating activity will provide assurance that key assumptions in the topical report (KPTR012NP-A, Revision 1) are maintained (e.g., to limit positive deviations from ideal vapor pressures). As per Appendix A to this SE, the staff will review the thermodynamic data used to model radionuclide retention and release in Flibe during the OL review.
The full analysis of the functional containment is contained in SE Section 6.2 and tritium transport and processing are described in SE Section 9.1.3. In addition to the proposed TS LCO related to limiting circulating activity in the Flibe, additional proposed TS LCOs related to Flibe performance that support PDCs 16 and 60 include LCOs to maintain the Flibe coolant composition, limit the radionuclide inventory of the reactor coolant in steady state conditions within an upper bound limit, to maintain PHTS pressure and flow rate within an upper bound limit, and to maintain air in the reactor coolant within an acceptable limit based on considerations for voiding and corrosion.
PDC 33, Reactor coolant inventory maintenance:
PSAR Sections 4.3 and 5.1 state that there are anti-siphon features to limit loss of reactor coolant in the event of breaks in the PHTS cold leg. The hot leg anti-siphon design feature is formed by the elevation difference between the pump inlet and DHRS natural circulation flow path allowing air or cover gas to break the siphon. On the cold leg, a cut-out in the core barrel allows air or cover gas to expand into the downcomer, breaking the syphon as the cold leg inventory drains down.
The staff notes that adequate reactor coolant inventory is maintained following a failure in the PHTS by anti-siphon design features on the hot and cold legs. The designs ability to remove residual heat following a failure in the PHTS is consistent with the guidance given in NUREG-
1537 which states, the primary coolant system (of a forced-convection coolant flow) should be designed to prevent coolant loss and convert, in a passive or fail-safe method, to natural-convection flow sufficient to avoid loss of fuel integrity. Accordingly, the staff finds there is reasonable assurance that this preliminary information for the PHTS design is consistent with PDC 33 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.34(a) and with the relevant guidance in NUREG-1537.
PDC 70, Reactor coolant purity control:
The staff evaluated the PHTS ability to maintain reactor coolant purity considering fouling and plugging of passages, radionuclide concentrations, chemical attack, and air or moisture ingress.
PSAR Section 5.1.3 states that fouling or plugging of the reactor coolant flow path is not expected as a result of a reduction in coolant purity, but the temperature of the reactor coolant in the downcomer and core can be monitored to determine if coolant purity affects heat removal capability as a result of fouling or plugging.
The staff finds there is reasonable assurance that the information provided regarding temperature monitoring in the downcomer and core will allow Kairos to design the system to detect potential fouling or plugging, and, if detected, coolant purity can be restored by the CCS as described in PSAR Section 9.1.1 and SE Chapter 9. The staff finds there is reasonable assurance that the preliminary information regarding monitoring and the CCS is consistent with the PDC 70 criteria to control coolant purity based on the potential for fouling or plugging.
The ability of the reactor coolant to retain radionuclides is discussed in KP-TR-005-NP-A, Revision 1 and PSAR Section 5.1.3. Based on the evaluation in KP-TR-005-NP-A, Revision 1, the staff finds that there is reasonable assurance the Flibe is consistent with PDC 70 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.34(a) with respect to radionuclide retention, because, as described in the referenced topical report, the reactor coolant can retain certain radionuclides in a salt-soluble form. Further discussion of this topic can be found above under PDCs 16 and 60.
KPTR013PNP, Revision 4, Metallic Materials Qualification for the Kairos Power Fluoride Salt Cooled HighTemperature Reactor, and KPTR014NP, Revision 4, Graphite Material Qualification for the Kairos Power Fluoride SaltCooled HighTemperature Reactor both address the issue of chemical attack or corrosion of primary system components within the broader discussion of materials qualification. PSAR Section 9.1.1 describes the CCS and its ability to adjust Flibe purity.
The staff evaluated the impact of Flibe as a coolant on the corrosion of primary system components as described in PSAR Chapter 5, as well as KPTR013NP, Revision 4 and KP TR014NP, Revision 4. The staff finds there is reasonable assurance that Flibe purity can be maintained in a manner that minimizes corrosion, consistent with NUREG-1537, Part 2, Section 5.2. This finding is based on the following: (1) Kairos will perform qualification testing that will quantify degradation rates of high carbon 316 austenitic stainless steel (316H SS) and graphite in contact with Flibe, and (2) the CCS, as described in PSAR Section 9.1.1 and evaluated in SE Chapter 9, will be able to adjust Flibe purity, if needed.
PSAR Section 5.1.3 states that air ingress could affect the purity and inventory of the reactor coolant in the vessel, but significant forced air ingress into the PHTS is excluded by the design basis due to design features of the HRR and reactor trip system. PSAR Chapters 4 and 13 discuss air entrapment events which are considered separate from forced air events. The response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Package 350, Question 410 (ML22251A400) states that structural integrity of metallic and graphite components will remain
within bounding conditions as per the KP material qualification programs described in KPTR 013PNP, Revision 4, and KPTR014NP, Revision 4. Additionally, PSAR Chapter 14 contains a proposed TS LCO to limit the quantity of air in the reactor coolant during operations.
The staff notes that material qualification programs will provide data to analyze degradation of both metallic materials in the PHTS, as well as the graphite reflector, for postulated air ingress events. This data can be used to ensure these components can maintain their safety functions because it will allow for appropriate corrosion and oxidation allowances to be incorporated into the design. Additionally, the staff notes that the response to RAI Package 350, Question 410 describes design features to limit forced air ingress and the availability of compensatory measures after the anticipated seven day postulated accident time to ensure that the material qualification programs bound postulated air ingress scenarios. Therefore, the staff finds there is reasonable assurance that the PHTS will be able to be designed consistent with PDC 70, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.34(a), with respect to air ingress. The full staff assessment of the structural integrity of safety-related components is documented in Chapter 4 of this SE.
Based on the preliminary information provided in PSAR Chapter 5 and the referenced topical report, the staff finds there is reasonable assurance that the final design will be consistent with PDC 70 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.34(a) and the guidance in NUREG-1537, Part 2, Section 5.2, such that the quality of the primary coolant will be maintained to limit corrosion of fuel components, control rod cladding, vessel material, and other essential components in the primary system.
10 CFR Part 20 PSAR Section 5.1.3 states that because the reactor coolant contains radiological contaminants, the system will be designed to minimize contamination and support eventual decommissioning as described in PSAR Chapter 11. PSAR Sections 4.4 and 11.1.5 further discuss radiation shielding considerations.
The broader staff evaluation of radiation protection and waste management, including radiation shielding, is provided in SE Chapter 11.
Testing and Inspection PSAR Section 5.1.4 states that any tests and inspections of the PHTS will be included with the submission of the OL. The testing and surveillance program will be submitted as part of the Hermes FSAR and evaluated at the OL stage. These programs will be tracked in Appendix A of this SE and evaluated during the OL review.
Technical Evaluation Summary The staff evaluated the sufficiency of the preliminary information on the design of the Hermes PHTS, as described in PSAR Chapter 5 and other relevant portions of the PSAR, using the guidance and acceptance criteria from Section 5.2 of NUREG-1537, Parts 1 and 2. As part of its review, the staff evaluated if PSAR Section 5.1 identifies the appropriate PDC and offers sufficient information and design description to provide reasonable assurance that the design bases will be met at the OL stage; that evaluation is described above in the Design Basis and System Evaluation section.
Based on the information provided by Kairos and the staff evaluation documented above, the staff finds that the applicant provided sufficient preliminary information in accordance with 10 CFR 50.34 to develop a primary coolant system design that staff has reasonable assurance will be able to
accomplish the design functions of fuel integrity and sufficient heat removal, coolant loss prevention, conversion to passive natural-convection flow, limited corrosion of essential components, and sufficient radiation shielding for limiting personnel exposures. Accordingly, the staff finds that there is reasonable assurance that Hermes reactor will comply with applicable requirements.
Conclusion Based on its findings above, the staff concludes the information in Hermes PSAR Chapter 5 is sufficient and meets the applicable guidance and regulatory requirements identified in this chapter for the issuance of a CP in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50. Further information as may be required to complete the review of Hermes reactor coolant system can reasonably be left for later consideration at the OL stage since this information is not necessary for the review of a CP application.
5.2 Summary and Conclusions on the Reactor Coolant System The staff evaluated the descriptions and discussions of the Hermes reactor coolant system as described in PSAR Chapter 5 and finds that the preliminary information and design criteria of the reactor coolant system, including the PDC, design bases, and information relating to materials of construction and coolant composition and properties: (1) provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design bases, and (2) meet all applicable regulatory requirements and acceptance criteria discussed in NUREG-1537. Based on these findings, the staff makes the following conclusions regarding issuance of a CP in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50:
Kairos has described the proposed facility design criteria for the reactor coolant system, including, but not limited to, the principal engineering criteria for the design, and has identified the major features or components incorporated therein for the protection of the health and safety of the public.
Such further technical or design information as may be required to complete the safety analysis of the reactor coolant system, and which can reasonably be left for later consideration, will be provided in the FSAR as noted in Appendix A to the staff SE.
There is reasonable assurance that: (i) safety questions will be satisfactorily resolved at or before the latest date stated in the application for completion of construction of the proposed facility, and (ii) taking into consideration the site criteria contained in 10 CFR Part 100, the proposed facility can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the construction of the Hermes facility will not endanger the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that construction activities can be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations.
The issuance of a permit for the construction of the Hermes facility would not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
References ASME B31.3 ASME Section VIII Kairos Power, LLC. Hermes Non-Power Reactor Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, Revision 0.
September 2021. ADAMS ML21272A375 or XXXXX
. "Principal Design Criteria for the Kairos Power Fluoride-Salt Cooled, High Temperature Reactor."
KPTR003NP-A. June 2020. ADAMS Accession No. ML20167A174.
. Enclosure 2: Response to NRC Request for Additional Information 350, September 2022, ADAMS Accession No. ML22251A400 (redacted version).
. Reactor Coolant for the Kairos Power Fluoride Salt-Cooled High Temperature Reactor Topical Report. KP-TR-005-NP-A, Revision 1. July 2020. ADAMS Accession No. ML20219A591. (redacted version)
. Mechanistic Source Term Methodology for the Kairos Power Fluoride SaltCooled High Temperature Reactor. KPTR012NP-A, Revision 1. May 2022. ADAMS Accession No. ML22136A288. (redacted version)
. Metallic Materials Qualification for the Kairos Power Fluoride SaltCooled HighTemperature Reactor. KPTR013NP, Revision 4. September 2022. ADAMS Accession No. ML22263A456.
(redacted version)
. Graphite Material Qualification for the Kairos Power Fluoride SaltCooled HighTemperature Reactor. KPTR014NP, Revision 4. September 2022. ADAMS Accession No. ML22259A142 (redacted version).
NRC, NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, Part 1, Format and Content, and Part 2, Standard Review Plan and Acceptance Criteria. NRC: Washington, D.C. February 1996. ADAMS Accession Nos. ML042430055 and ML042430048.