ML21308A056

SECY-78-220: Recommended Agency Plan for Nuclear Safety Evaluations of Future Space Programs

ML21308A056
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Issue date:	04/25/1978
From:	NRC/SECY
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SECY-78-220
Download: ML21308A056 (25)

Text

April 25, 1978 For:

f!.2!!!:

SECY*78-220 S9MM!!~I0NER ACTION Thru:

Subject:

I-Robert 8. Minogue, Director, Office of Standards Development Executive Director for Operations Ld"---P..,L-~~

RECOMMENDED AGENCY PLAN FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATIONS OF FUTURE SPACE PROGRAMS Cate~:.

Issue:

Discussion:

Contact:

M. Bernero 573

" tt This paper covers a minor policy issue.

How does the Commission plan to actively participate in the independent nuclear safety review of future space programs utilizing nuclear systems?

Origin of Review.

By memorandum dated February 17, 1978, the Executive Director for Operations requested the development o'f an NRC plan for the safety review of nuclear systems for future space programs.

This was in response to a letter from Benjamin Huberman, Office of Science and Technology Policy, to James Howard, U.S. General Accounting Office, dated January 5, 1978 1 which agreed with the GAO recommendation that NRC should part*ici-pate in all relevant nuclear safety evaluation processes for space launches.

The GAO reco111nendation was made in a letter to Frank Press, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy from Richard Gutmann, Director, GAO, dated December 7, 1977.

Background

In the 1960 1s and early 1970 1s, the former Atomic Energy Com-mission's Director of Regulation participated in nuclear safety evaluations of space nuclear power systems.

Reviews were per**

formed on an ad hoc basis with specific direction by the Com-mission on specific requests from the Division of Reactor Development ~nd Technology and the Division of Space Nuclear Systems.

In 1972. the Commission considered the need for Regulatory participation in space nuclear systems safety reviews.

In thE!

memo dated May 23, 1972, David Gabriel, Director, Division of

The Commissioners Alternatives:

2 Space Nuclear Systems (see Enclosure A), recommended that Regulatory should not participate in the safety review process since the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel provided this function.

In a subsequent Commission Paper, SECY-R-522, dated A~gust 25, 1972 (see Enclosure B), the Director of Regulation recommended that Regulatory should continue to participate in the review of space nuclear power systems.

The review was to be limited to identification and analysis of radiological and nuclear risks and to exclude participation in the benefit-risk decision-making process.

The Commission approved Regulatory's recommendation on August 30, 1972, but excluded the review of defense applicatfons.

Regulatory participation ended in early 1975 when the AEC was separated into ERDA and NRC.

Future Space Nuclear Systems Informal contact with DOE indicates that the next space nuclear system is on the Galileo mission which will be launched in January 1982.

This will be a space shuttle launch of the satel-lite with Multi-Hundred Watt RTGs~ onboard.

The Safety Analysis Report schedule is: Preliminary - March 1979, Updated -March 1980, and Final - March 1981.

The Safety Evaluation Report follows shortly after the Final Safety Analysis Report.

In 1983, a NASA and a DOD mission is planned.

The NASA Solar Polar satellite will have an RTG with a modular general purpose heat source onboard.

The DOD experimental satellite will have a dynamic conversion system with a Multi-Hundred Watt plutonium-238 heat source.

The alternatives considered for dealing with any forthcoming reviews are enumerated below with their pros and cons.

I.

Review Position:

The question of whether NRC should review, and if so, whether jointly or independently.

Alternative A.

NRC review not required since Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel provides this function.

Pro: The Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel already provides a comprehensive nuclear safety evaluation of space nuclear systems.

Con: 1.

An independent "third party" review is not performed.

Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators

The Commissioners 3

2.

Som.e members of the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel have direct interests in or responsibilities in either the development or the use of space nuclear systems which may influence their evaluation.

3.

Does not comply with GAO recommendation for an independent evaluation.

Alternative B.

Conduct review as a member of the lnteragency Nuclear Safety Review Panel.

Pro: Closest and most efficient working relationship with the other agencies involved.

Con: 1.

NRC would lose independent "third party" review status.

2.

NRC would be involved in benefit-risk decision for flight approval.

3.

Does not comply with GAO recommendation for an independent evaluation.

Alternative C.

Conduct an independent review as an observer to the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel process.

Pro: 1.

NRC can remain an independent reviewer.

2.

Staff colllllents and advice would be submitted in a timely fashion to the Interagency Panel during the course of the review.

3.

Complies with the GAO recoinmendation for an independent evaluation.

Con: NRC review position would be taken subsequent to Inter-agency Nuclear Safety Review Panel positions causing some delay in the review process.

II.

Review Scope:

The question of how broad or detailed the NRC review should be.

Alternative A.

Conduct a license type review of a broad and comprehensive nature which would parallel the nuclear safety evaluation performed by the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (see Enclosure C).

The Commissioners 4

Pro: 1.

Would provide greatest NRC and Office of Science and Technology Policy confidence in an independent "third party" review.

2.

Review would be comprehensive.

Con: 1.

Would require significant buildup of staff with special talents and possible contract support.

2.

Would be costly and inefficient for conducting occasional reviews.

Alternative a.

Conduct a moderate review covering a selected scope of principal safety related issues.

Pro: 1.

2.

3.

Major resource buildup not required.

Efficient utilization of Staff for conducting occa-sional reviews.

Would provide reasonable assurance of independent "third party" advice.

Con: Review selective and not comprehensive.

III. Review Group:

The questio~ of who in NRC would conduct the review.

Alternative A:

NMSS, Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety would conduct review.

Pro: 1.

Licensing organization set up to administer case reviews.

2.

Organization already exists with principal disciplines required for the review.

3.

Current space nuclear systems are all isotope units using plutonium-238; special nuclear material licensed by NMSS.

Con: Organization has fewer personnel with aerospace nuclear safety experience than other NRC organizations.

Alternative B:

HRR would conduct review.

Pro: 1.

Licensing organization set up to administer case reviews.

The Commissioners 5

2i Organization already exists with principal disciplines required for the review.

Con: Does not review materials licensing cases.

Alternative C:

Other NRC organization would conduct review.

Pro: Some organizations already exist with principal disciplines required for the review.

Con: Organizations other than licensing groups are not set up to administer case reviews.

Review Position Alternative IA is not appropriate since it is not responsiVE! to the GAO and Office of Science and Technology Policy position of having NRC participate in the nuclear safety evaluation proc:ess for space launches.

Alternative IB would make it difficult for NRC to be an indE!pen-dent reviewer as a member of the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel, since this panel prepares the Safety Evaluation Report and makes the risk-benefit judgment on whether the nuclear device should be launched.

Alternative IC would involve an NRC observer on the Interagt~ncy Nuclear Safety Review Panel who would be appointed by the assigned review group.

The NRC observer's function would be to attend the lnteragency Panel meetings to gather information and to provide NRC questions, comments and advice during the course of the review.

In this capacity NRC would be able to conduct an independent review.

At the completion of the review, which includes a review of the Interagency Panel Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC staff would submit a report to the Office of Science and Technology Pol'icy as recommended by t~e GAO.

This report would summarize the NRC review of the individual case and the comments and advice pre-sented to the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel.

Review Sco,ee Alternative IIA would establish a comprehensive review which would parallel and duplicate the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel review scope.

This would require a significant increase in staff with specific aerospace expertise for conduct-ing occasional reviews.

The Commissioners 6

Alternative 11B would establish a moderate review, the scope of which would be limited to areas where NRC has the expertise (structural, thermal, radiological consequences, materials selection, risk analyses, etc.}.

The review would exclude participation in the benefit-risk decision-making process.

For a mission which uses a nuclear system that had been previously approved for flight, the scope of the review may be limited to a critique of the Safety Evaluation Report.

The scope of each mission review could be set by the assigned review group.

Review Grou2 A licensing office is the logical choice for being the respon-sible organization since it is already set up to do this type of review.

In addition, since current space nuclear systems are all isotope units using plutonium-238, a special nuclear mate-rials handling and safety problem, NMSS, Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety, is the proper office for the review.

This division has staff expertise now in the principal disciplines of' interest, viz., structural, thermal, radiological, etc.

An Inter-national Programs observer should be included in the review group to a$sure that any international relations implications are properly addressed, including possible need for notification of safety problems under existing exchange agreements.

Review Advice Since the nature of the review may vary from case to case, the review group would have the option to call on other NRC sources for advice.

The review group may obtain advice from knowledge-able staff members with aerospace nuclear safety experience.

A recent canvass of the staff indicated over eighty personnel with this experience (see Enclosure D).

This advice may be _obtained on an informal basis by consulting with experienced individuals or on a more formal basis by setting up an ad hoc review panel.

The ad hoc panel could advise the review group on the scope of the review and could critique and advise the review group on its evaluation.

The review group could seek advice from other sources such as the ACRS.

Technical support contractors with special expertise could also be engaged.

Resources The resources needed for conducting a review of this type are greatly dependent on the system and flight chosen.

If one assumes the use of the current Multi~Hundred Watt RTG in any missions of the near future, we estimate that a relatively

The Commissioners Recommendation:

Coordination:

7 comprehensive NRC staff review assisted by a panel of NRC per-sonn~l ~ith aerospace nuclear safety experience can be per-formed at a cost of about 20 man-month's effort. This includes about 17 man-month's effort by the NMSS review group and about 1/2 man-month by each of a panel of six advisors.

(See Enclo-sure E for justification of resources.) The span of the review would probably run between 2 and 3 years. There are no resources in current budgets for work of this sort.

The Commission direct the Executive Director for Operations to organize the staff to perform reviews of future space nuclear programs as follows:

I Review Position: Alternative C Conduct an independent review as an observer to the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel process.

II Review Scoee:

Alternative B Conduct a moderate review covering a selected scope of principal safety related issues.

III Review Groue:

Alternative A NMSS, Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety would conduct review.

This paper has b~en concurred in by the Offices of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Regulatory Research, Inspection and Enforcement, and InternatiQnal Programs.

The Office of the Executive Legal Director has no legal objection.

1t:au1 ~

Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Standards Development

Enclosures:

See page 8

The Commissioners

Enclosures:

A. Memorandum dated 5/23/72 from David S. Gabriel, Director, Division of Space Nuclear Systems B.

Commission Paper SECY-R-522 dated 8

8/25/72, Regulatory Role in Safety Reviews of Space Nuclear Systems C.

Interagency Review D.

Staff Personnel With Aerospace Nuclear Safety Experience E.

Estimated Review Effort

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ENCLOSURE "A" SE~Y-2503

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R:/}ULATOR.Y PAR'rICIPA'l'ION IN SPACE NUCLEAR SYS'l'Ei-:S SAJi'ETY R::.vISWS N'oteby th'S! Secr;?tary l.. The General f,!anager has requested the attached memor*an~lum of: M:;.y 23. 1972 f'rom the Director or Spa~e Nuclear Syatcms be c!r~11la.~ad. as a. Consent. Calen:iar Item and ha~;; provided the rollowing d~;C3$t:

Co~miszion de~1s1on is r~que~ted as to t~e nee~

for R~gulation to particip~te in pre-flight sat~ty r!.views or space n11cle::ar syste:ns and a~:.C>*~iate1 AEC *

~tar: acti=ms.

2. 7:ie Co:r.missioners' apprav::ls or c~:n.":lents are requeated. by

,:.,.,.;.. of ':lusinesa, Monday, June 5, 1972.

0 W. B. McCool Secretary of the Commission NO. OF DI:.:'PI:!UT!~!;

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Syscc:iu on ti'tc: N:\\!A P::.::\\e-~r S?.:.Cecraf;/;vitl,,?anuary. 1972, an in~uiry wai =.z.d~*~y the C~aS:---4n ea co the need :or R~gula~ion1 $

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~eooranci.:.c. is to ?rese~t i~fc~:~t~on a~d reco:r.::.aa~t~cio~s ?ertain-ing to this suojece.

d.is-We w~ ~r.de~~c~nci tr.at i~ ciiscussions per:ain~~g ca R~gu.lacion's r~vi~w o: ~~c-o~nel r~Qctors, ~~~ Dc?~ty Ce~=rai ~a:iage: an~ the

,epu;y ~i::eccor of Regula:~o~ ~~::!eci t~t Regu~acion sho~li con.::::t:.:e ;;.a.:'cicipation in ::evie*.i o: is.:>co?ic pc*-,er syst,?,!:S.

reGu~st.::iat tno? sco;,e of c.h:.s ag:-eeoenc,;;i:h Regulation b~

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Enclosure "A"

R. £. ~ollin;s~ortht G2'!

pis advanta__ge~

l. Resulation lack& the S?~~1:1c aeros?~ce ~~?~rcis*

neccss.. ry fo-: & =c=.pletC/ ;:.-::rs;:ective review of S?ace nuclear syste~... :,.:'..:,ii'~=ations.

2. 2articif,.:. tiou could ?l~ce R.egul.:. :ion in the ?Osi tion of appearing to sanction e~posure levels aDove licensing standards in. cases wr.e:-e low probabilicy accidenc even~&

• are de~ed ?e:.nissi~le by th~ tlational sec~rity benefits of che u:~ssion.

3. Non-part:icip~tion by Reg,.:!.a_tion in. wea?ons &c:tivf.ties ms.kes ic anomalocs for Rezulacion to participate ia. SNS d~f*ns~ ~elated pro&r3~s.

4. The Intera&ency ~evie# Panel already and comments covered by Regulation.

should not be required.

provides for studies The Regulatory rev!e7 The Division of Space &uclear S;*str-s believes it would be to *the rri~ra ll advan~a.ge of t!::.e

• 1o~er2.~.;:ncy safety review prccass -if aegula;:ioa did* noc parti.cipsce in subject -review-activities.

The pre-fli3:tt safety :eview process. oiS presently constituted has.

bt:1.?fally worked out.. qui.te sat:,~!acto-:ily ii:; the _past.

• It i _s prc?ve~d to continue this procedur~ ess~n:ially as is. excepe for th~ eli~ination of Regulation's ?a:ticipation. There~ore, the overall A~C pa=ticipacion in the interagency revie~s will continue to i~clude the following.\\EC Divisions:

Sp~ce Rucle&r Systems>

31ology and r.~dicioe, Operational Sa~ety and any other division and AEC fiel:! *office with :;?p:-opriate* special e~;>ertise t.1hich.

i:ay be called upon by the ap?ointed AIC panel coordinator.*

Contact:

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Enclosure "A 11

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R!GULA.!ORY ROLE IN SAEETI REVIRWS OF SPAC£ NUCLEAR. SYSTEMS (SECY-R.-SZZl SECY:JlJ.

At R'eg.uia.tary Voiic:.,r Session. ¢! ~ August !O. I97Z,. the Comm.issicm.:.*

a..

Approved Regu.Izto:ryrs rota-iz:t th~ revi.~w. of non-iicensea space nu.clear power systems excluding defense applica.tionsr (i) limiting the review ta identifica.tioit and. analysis-of radiological and. nuclear risks. a.net (iil excluding. participation in. the bene£i1:--

• risk decision.*makin~ process;

b. Disc:.ussed. Regulatary' $ previous. participation in renew.u:g spaee nuclear systems, noting tha.t c:antinuec!

particip&tion m futur~ launches woul~ requir~

approximately one man-year of effort per lawtc:h. over the ne-xt three years;, and

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Reguested. an evaluation of Regulatory' S:* role when.

adequa.1:e expe~enc:e has been obtained.

!t' is our tutderstanding: you a.re-takini the-appropria.te acti.01t for the-nirectcr of Reg~ation and the General Manager. *

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D.ir,. !ztterna1:' l Prag: Dir Gov""t J:..i.a:isa:

Camm.ssianer Ra.y Asst GM for E&S Dir: Tech Acivisor General. Manager Dir~ Operational Safel:y.

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NCLOSURE "B" Au$USt ZS, 19/f?

SECY-R Sl.Z POl.lCY SESSION ITEi'I\\

R.EGULATORY ROLE IN SAFffi REVIEWS OF SPACE NUCLW SYSTEMS Note by the Secretary The Ofrector of Rt9Ul1t1on has request.ad h1s attadled. rei,ort be circulatld for-discussion a.t the Pot1c:y Session on Wtdnesda.y. August 30. l97?

and. hi&. pl"OYidli £iii following digest:

At COlll1ss1on-Policy Session 46 on-June-t, 1972. 1t was.

dtcidad t!lat Regulatory should continue to participate fn the NV1* of spaca nuclear power syst111s. At that t111e. it was requutld. that Regulatory define 1ts role 1n such reo,ie,s and dattnnin* whethtl" defenSt space nuclear powel" systems should be included fn the review. It 1s requested that the Collll1ss1011 approve th* proposed Regulatory role in reviews of space nuclear power syst11111. This role will be limit.ad ta those areas wnere the Regulatory staff has expert tedln1cal CQIIIPttenca; n... ty, *def1n1ng-and.eva1uating rad1olog1cal and nuclear r1sks.

The Reguta-c:ary staff would not pa.rt1c1pata in tha risk benaf1t dec1sfons concaming launches. It fs* also proposed that Regulatory revtew defense as well as nondafense systems.

DISiRIBUTION I Sec~ry~"-

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Dec,uty Gen. 1'!gr.

Exec. Asst. to Gen. Mgr.

General Counsel Controller Infonnation Services

[nspectfon Off. of Planning & Analysis Asst. GN for Admin.

Asst. GM for E&D ~rograms International Programs

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Asst. Gen. Counsel for L&R 1

1 01 rector* of R99. Standards

• 3 Z

01reetor of Reg. Operations 1

l 01:-ector-of L1ce:is~n; l

Z Deputy 01r. for Fuels~ Materials 3

l Dir., Off. of Gov't. Lla1son 1

1 01r.* Off. Of Teen. Ad'liSOI" l

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A1'0MIC ENERGY COMMISSION l!CIJLATOR'l ROU: tN SAFETY REVIEWS OF SPACE NUCt.W SYSTEMS leport to cb* Ca-iaaion by ch* Dir*ccor of Regulation

?BE PIOBLDt

1. to defi.zlao leplacory's ro1* 611d ~

requin111anta in ravi..,. of aon-liC91l**

fl'&e* mu:lur pow9r ayac_._

~"D All!)_ l)I_SC11SSlON

2.

At cba CoaiHion' * * &xec:utiv* Seaaloa on "t1** ot Iaotopic ~uclur Syac:... °" th*

WA l~oaeer Spacacraft," 1n Jenuary, 1972, *an inquiry vaa made by th* Chainiaa a* co tb.a need for Reaul,ac1on' 1 partid,pacion ui th* preflight: 1afec:y reviwa of space 11uclAar pO<hl."

,,ac.. 111d ill aaociatad 1caff actions, Regul&cory parc1c:i11ac10n 1n pHflighc *af*CT ravt.,.. o! space 11ucleu pover eyscau waa diacuaaed ac tbe* Commi1Sion.'1 Policy s... 1on-4~

on Jwe l, l972:9*t 'flu.ch time it vu dacidad chat Regul&tor:y should coutia.ua to pareieip&te ill suc:b UYi&va.

A. 1calf paper which d.llfinH aaaulacory's role us cbe rff'Lew of space llUCl&ar poYar ayacems waa requeated.

l. Reglllac~ nu bHD 1J:M>lvad in 1ahry review* of space n~l*ar power sy*~

over ch* pur: dec:ada-through th* Divuions of Lican.aiq and ltegulation. lluccor !J.cenai113.

au Hacertw Liceuing. lavieva were performed on ac.!!!, _!!.2s. beais in accoNanc* with

• specific d.incd.oll by, cu ~ion* or 1pec1.U.c: requaaai from the* D1v1a1oa. of lteactor Dw.io,unc. ad. TecJmoloST ad the Division at Space Nuclear Syacema. (SNS).

Ic conducd.ns

• • cm* ran...,., laplal:or,,* 1eaerally baa accad u a couultant by ravuwtas. early draf.t:

,i,ropoaala, partieipaciq 1n review board 111.. ciuga and preparing.a tin.al Regulatory r911oz'.e

-:i:in ch* propo*al,,r1or co review by cha National Aeronaucics and Space Caunc:11.

Th*

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0 ~ L Y accachment 11 a lilt of 1ysteaia which.a file ***rcn in¢1cates nave b**n cevieved by Rag1d..1tory, although the uc*ac of Rqulatory parcici;>at1on in eilu* uvi...,s has v.u*ied couid*rably over Che y*ars.

'-* legul.atory's pri*.1c:ipal technical. c:oapacuce is 1..1 ch* aru ot radiation,md auc:lear 1af.r;y. Therafof** laplatory propOMa co liaic its. review of apac:e 11.11d.ciar pouer *Y1c--. co-t1sa eval11&tio1r of cllo** parea or 1ub-,,otema wbic:.ll prueni: or cfJ.w:.cJ.r c:oatr1buca co. radiatioa or auc:lur hasarda aJld to th* c:oaaeq11ac1c:M ot poac:w..ited ac:ctd~ts-*

that C:Olllcl l'HUC ill IW::I\\ hasaru.

Ill parti.cU.lu, llqw.&COr," propo*** co exaia* itc...

sucll aa cbe cllemc:al &ad. phy11c:al. fora "f the radioac:cive ucer:taJ.. Che fabri"t1o11 anc1 catiq of th* fuel c:1p1ule and 1aaarator, cha procac:ciot1 al.forded the 1ena-acor acid. fuel c:apaule by ch* t.wsch vebic:la, &ml contiAgenc:y provitioua waic.\\ couU affec:c tile fi.Aal 4.upoaitioa of cba lauadl vellic:l* aad. coasaq1&e11cly, cba ra41aac:civ* macari&l in tht: e~*L capaul.o.

The hpalatory r.viev wolil.'1 eioc inc:lud* evaluatiOtl ot ac:cida1u: probabilitiu.

<**~*, l.auac:ll failua-probabilitiu) or risk ac:ceptanc:a detarm.11ad.oaa. Th* PUG'O*., of a.pJ,.atory r..,iew wou.14 i,. co determine th.e &ciequacy aa.cl valiciicy of th* safety analysis t'e,orca presut:ad. &ml to id*a.tify radiation or 11uc:lur aafacy 1.aauu-thac ara not. c&kast into ac:couac 1A tb* t>*,orca.

lqul.&cory woul¢ submit its t>*vi*v amt coannt1 on rad.i&tiatt and nuclear safety to th* AEC Coo"tdinacor on tb.* Intet'agenc:y ~uc:lu.r Safety Reviaw Panel.

tf legulacory requirH ad.41.tion&l Worciac1011 O't outside u:perc ueisca=a 1.0 c:ompl*t* !::s nviev, the requut tor such i.nfoniacion or &11istance would be ll&d* throu1h ch* A.EC Coordinator oat.be Panel.

S.

lf che-pl&l"pC)le of llagul&cory ' 1 partid.pacioa. ia cha r*1ri*w of space autie;ar pover tyacema 1.1 co p~ u. iadepeadcc "chir4 ;,arcy" evaluac.ion ud c.o assist.1.11 uc.sbl11hill1 cba* nacure of tile rilk. so Chae Womecl judpe&lts can be IIL&cie ch* <ra.w.

of such* reviaw is applicable* eqll&lly co d.t*aa* *ad noadaf*aa* proaram. Accordiaaly, d.efeas* ?44 sbou.ld -*

iAcluded. 1n* th* sc:ova of* llegulucny's pcrti.l:.1p*Uoa.

Ia; ll ll.£ 1. ~ 1. JL l. f Q 1£ 1. I Enclosure* *9*_

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0 P F t C t A L U S E O ~ L 1 undarcaking a rav1av of d*f*na* pro1r..., how*ver, the evaluation oi national 1acur1cy

~.na£ic1 chat e.L&nt accrue fra. Dilicary 1pace nucl~~r power 1y1ca111a is clearly beyond the scope of lql&l&cory 11 COIIIP*tence.

Raaulatol"/ ptopoaes to 1danc1ly actcl analyse rt.aka with =**~ct to cl4iat1oQ alld. nw:laar safacy for both dafanu &ad noctclal*M* pcocrama.

b1&C would. not panid.pat* ill tbe beuhc:-ruk Jl&dgmuc:a which ancu inco deucm.1A1A1,

• whechec- &AY l\\'.UU~ 111.Hioll 1holll.d 1'* uadarc:aua.

6. Dlanq. n 1971 &ad 1972, hfta,latory p~ipatecl ill the rw1.. of tbe tnmi.it.

ancl P1.oneH 1-paca aw:lau pons:' S)'lt.._. Accordiq co SHS, chert u* l 1.&Ulldl** plamiad over en nat fw yeua vltic:h ilmtlv* aev,,-c.. that b.ave yet: co be-nalu&t:K:

LES 8/'}

(l&Wld\\ ill l.974); Vilwaa (wmc:b ill 1975); &ad MIS (lawich in 1976 or 1977).

E&c:lt of theH sy1u111 u. l pnaaa ill th* rsvtav proca.., i.e., Prelim1nary Safacy Au&l.ysis-h9orc, Updaead P..*J1m1aary S&f*cy All&l.111.a h1)ore, &Dci F111al S&facy c\\Dal.Jlli.a Rallon.

Put r11Yievw of ~*c:* macJ.eu power syac:... by llep.l.acory bave sh.!Ml Chae uapouer nquira-CHCI au hiably variable.

Aa many u 3 prot H1oaala with ap~opri&ce clU'ic:al and suparriSO'l:J' affort 11ay be raquirad ac paalr. periou of cha revi.,1. a&aad or:t our p-t a:p*neiica &ad che les\\llacory role ill cbe raviev proc.. a aa 1c 11 definacl. ill tbia paper.,

it ii.. timacad tbac tacb ph&H ot th* rWiav procua for eac:I\\ dWic* \\/ill require abollt 4 lll&ll-acha, Sine* thare ar* 3 l.&unche1 pl.&lmecl i,ithilL tb.a 11ext 3 yurs and each sy11:n baa J phaa** ill cbe rtviav procua, ic appears that an amwal uf-,rc: of approximacal:, l.

UA-yur v1ll be naedtd ovar tbe nuc l yaars for 11.agulatory parcicipat1011 1n l:h* **fec.y rev:l.at18, Mlnpo11er requir*au t:o evaluate a r~cor 1paca 1111&.laar pover syac:ut woulci be:

coa*iderab.Ly gruter, buc.we. Be aoc avara.**of,my reac,i:ora tba~.u:a-p~ for --.,actt prop-a& in !:be* aaar luc:un. Mafovar requir...ata uadllel to evalu&Ce ruccor syac~

rlll be **c:&bll.tbed ill* tbe fucura U th* uecl an.sea.

STAIF JUDG.'f!MTS

7.

Th* Ot.fica of the G~*ral Coun,al and ti\\* Civiai.ons of Spaca ::uc:laar Syscus

~ad O?Arac:ia:awl Salecy c:onc:uc 1n c:be =-c:o-aaJ.irions of this paper.

0 F F t C t A L U S E O S L Y Enclosure "9*

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d.

The Division of Military Applic.ation was conault&d on the lqulatoey cal* as proi,oaed in this paper, and while it doa* not object co this role, OKA do** not balievc1 le: la appropriate to participate in the Staff Judguncs inc* space nuclear ?Over 1ysc1ims I

art outside their area of raaponaibWcy.

UCDHMpDATIONS

9.

The-Dinccor of ~ll r~. tut tit* Ataic: !nusr C:O.U.1.oar

a. Apprr* laplaco1:1 role 1:. ~: rm.av ~~., ":~:,::~~J::~ maeJ.ear p011t1r sysc.. (1) to illclu4e. bocb-4af~L_~ aoDClatau-;1pplic:a_c:1ou. {ii) to lilli~ the eavi-to ideatilicado11 and &llalysa of radtolosical and nuclear risks.. a.ad (111) to a:c:1114* pertidpation ta tb* benaftc-ru~ deciaioa-aalUDg proc....

b. !!!!!, that th1a ectivtt:y will involve an a=ul. effort by the raplacory 1c&ft of approzuuuily oae UA*y*ar over th* aa.c thrh* yaua.

ENCl.OSUU AIPEHDIX

• SPACE ll1JCLEil P011p SYSTnfS IEVIElm) BY ~JtECIJUTOU

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APPENDIX SPACE NUCLEAA POl.1:R SYSTEMS ll!V!EWED BY R£CUI,,\\TORY Radiouotope Thermeleec:1~ r.eneratots SNAP*JA S11A1*94 S?W-ll SHAt-19 SHU-27 tlAISI'f' PIOIIIR CHadUieii SMAP-19) l11accor1 SNAP-?

SWA.l'-8 SNAl'-104 Rover Kivt*A UWI*lll ltM-12,\\

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PLUTO Tory :U-A Tory n-c

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Enclosure "'.l"

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INTERAGENCY REVIEW The present interagency review is a comprehensive broad scope evalua-tion of the space nuclear system. The review is performed by the Inter-agency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP) composed of representatives from the Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Defense (DOD) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

The documents reviewed for each space nuclear system mission include the Safety Design Specification, Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, Updated Safety Analysis Report, Final Safety Analysis Report and the Safety Evaluation Report.

The Safety Design Specification, the Pre-liminary Safety ~nalysis Report, the Updated Safety Analysis Report, and the Final Safety Analysis Report are prepared by a DOE contractor.

The Safety Evaluation Report is prepared by 'INSRP.

The Safety Design Specifi-cation provides the basis for designing and evaluating the performance of the radioisotope heat sources and for verifying that such heat source designs fulfill the safety requirements.

The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report is issued within 90 days after a design concept is selected. It contains a description of the design, an analytical failure mode analysis and an analytical nuclear safety analysis.

This report is a three volume document with the following titles:

Volume 1, Reference Design Document; Volume 2, Accident Model Document; Volume 3, Nuclear Safety Analysis Document.

1 Enclosure C

1 The Updated Safety Analysis Report is issued within 60 days after the design freeze and is similar in fomat to the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report.

The Final Safety Analysis Report is issued approximately one year before the scheduled laun~h qnd is similar in fomat to the Updated Safety Analysis Report.

This report provides final system, mission, and safety assessment data factoring in the results of the verification and qualifi-cation test programs.

The Safety Evaluation Report, prepared by the INSRP, represents a sunvnary of the review and evaluation of the space nuclear system relative to the anticipated effect of the proposed mission on the public health and safety.

The Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel then makes the risk-benefit judgment of whether the nuclear device should be launched and so advises the user agency.

The user agency requests launch approval from the President's Office of Science and Technology Policy.

The broad scope review of this documentation will include a nuclear safety evaluation of the space nuclear system for normal operations and potential accident conditions for the entire mission.

The accident environments that the space nuclear system may be subjected will include:

shock _waves and high velocity fragments from explosion of the launch vehicle o~ the pad or during early ascent liquid propellant fireball and afterfire solid propellant fire 2

Enclosure C

aerodynamic heating and structural loading during reentry high velocity earth impact post impact exposure to weather and burial or long term immersion in seawater.

The response of the plutonium heat source when exposed to the acci-dent environments is evaluated to determine whether the heat source con-tainment will survive or fail. A failed heat source will result in the release of plutonium particles to the environment.

The source term, which is not only the quantity of plutonium released but also the particle size and chemical form, is determined.

The dispersion of the released pluton;um and the radiological consequences to the public and the environment is evaluated.

Numbers of people affected as well as the probability of being exposed are determined to indicate the risk involved.

3 Enclosure C

Or.9.anization RES NRR STAFF PERSONNEL WITH AEROSPACE NUCLEAR SAFETY EXPERIENCE Isoto,ees G~ry Bennett Warren Lyon Aleck Serkiz Herbert Berkow Delbert Bunch Kazimieras Campe Thomas Cox Donald Davis Charles Ferrell Robert Geckler James Glynn Walter Haass William Regan Raymond Scho 11 John Spraul 1

Ex,eerience Reactors William Farmer Carl Johnson James Richardson Clyde Jupiter Ralph Birkel Leon Engle Richard Froelich John Gilray Emanuel Licitra Oliver Lynch Sydney Miner Patrick O'Reilly Harry Rood Richard Vollmer James Watt Rene Audette Non Nuclear Aeros,eace Leo Beltracchi Charles Billups James Martin Enclosure D

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Organization Isotopes NRR Millard Wohl Harry Krug SD IE Fredric Anderson Robert Baker Robert Bernero Abraham Eiss Louis Frank James Mackin Michael Parsont George Rivenbark Frank Witt Jordan Davis Reg I Peter Knapp Reg I Robert McClintock Reg I Stewart Ebneter Reg I John Potter Reg II Wi 11 i am Grant Reg I II Robert Everett Reg IV 2

Reactors Morton Fleishman Non Nuclear Aerose,ace Donald Burke Reg II Leslie Gage Reg I William Fisher Reg III Andrew Cunningham Reg II Donald Miller Reg III John Rausch Reg II Thomas Tambling Reg III Joel Kohler Rei~ III Ronald Cook Reg III Ross Brown Reg IV Duane Danielson Reg III Ramon Hall Reg IV Thomas Vandel Reg III James Konklin Reg III Peter Verrios Reg IV Dolphus Whitesell Reg IV Enclosure D

Organization IE IP NMSS Isotoees Joseph LaFl eur James Powers Sheldon Meyers 3

Reactors Maynard Dickerson Reg IV Clifton Hale Reg IV Robert Stewart Reg IV Jessee Agee Reg IV Donald Anderson Reg IV Richard Brickley Reg IV Non Nuclear Aeroseace Wi 11 i am Lake Jerry Jackson James Mayor Enclosure D

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B.

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D.

E.

ESTIMATED REV1EW EFFORT Plan Review Conduct PreHminary Review Structural {blast, fragments and impact)

Thermal {pad/fireball, re-entry and post impact)

Materials Consequences Risk Assessment Preliminary Documentation and Comment Conduct Final Review (1/2 of preliminary review)

Final Documentation and Colllllent Total 1

NMSS 12 mandays 2 rnan months 2.5 man months 1 man month 3 man months l man month 1 man month 5 man months 1 man month Panel of 6 4 days= 24 mandays

• 3 days = 18 main days 3 days = 18 math days 17 man months 3 man months

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20 111an months 1E 11