RS-21-063, Application to Adopt TSTF-554, Revision 1, Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements
| ML21181A180 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom, Nine Mile Point, Byron, Braidwood, Limerick, Ginna, Clinton, Quad Cities, FitzPatrick, LaSalle |
| Issue date: | 06/30/2021 |
| From: | Simpson P Exelon Generation Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RS-21-063, TSTF-554, Rev 1 | |
| Download: ML21181A180 (141) | |
Text
4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 630 657 2000 Office RS-21-063 10 CFR 50.90 June 30, 2021 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457 Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455 Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69 NRC Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318 Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 NRC Docket No. 50-461 Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 NRC Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249 James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 NRC Docket No. 50-333 LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374 Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-39 and NPF-85 NRC Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 NRC Docket No. 50-410 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Subsequent Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 NRC Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 30, 2021 Page 2 Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 NRC Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-18 NRC Docket No. 50-244
Subject:
Application to Adopt TSTF-554, Revision 1, "Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements"
Reference:
TSTF-554, Revision 1, "Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements," dated December 18, 2020 [ADAMS Accession Nos. ML20168A396 and ML20154K606]
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC), is submitting a request for an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Braidwood Station (BWD), Units 1 and 2; Byron Station (BYR), Units 1 and 2; Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP), Units 1 and 2; Clinton Power Station (CPS), Unit 1; Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS), Units 2 and 3; James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF); LaSalle County Station (LSCS), Units 1 and 2; Limerick Generating Station (LGS), Units 1 and 2; Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMP),
Unit 2; Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3; Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (QCNPS), Units 1 and 2, and R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (RGNPP).
EGC requests adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler 554 (TSTF-554),
Revision 1, "Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements," which is an approved change to the Standard Technical Specifications (STS), into the TS for the plants listed above. The proposed changes revise the TS definition of "Leakage," to clarify the requirements when pressure boundary leakage is detected and adds a new Condition and Required Action when pressure boundary leakage exists. The change is requested as part of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP). EGC recognizes that the LGS TS are based on NUREG-0123, an earlier version of the STS than what is referenced in TSTF-554; however, in this case, the differences are administrative rather than technical in nature and do not significantly impact the TSTF-554 model safety evaluation wording. Should the NRC reach a different conclusion, then processing LGS separately from the other plants in order to keep them within the CLIIP would be acceptable to EGC. provides an evaluation of the proposed changes. Attachment 2 provides the existing TS pages marked up to show the proposed changes. Attachment 3 provides existing TS Bases pages marked to show the associated TS Bases changes and are provided for information only.
EGC has concluded that the proposed changes present no significant hazards considerations under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of Amendment."
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 30, 2021 Page 3 The proposed changes have been reviewed by each station's Plant Operations Review Committee in accordance with the requirements of the EGC Quality Assurance Program.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal.
EGC requests approval of the proposed amendments by January 30, 2022. Once approved, the amendments shall be implemented within 60 days except for the following spring outage sites - CCNPP, LSCS, LGS, NMP, and QCNPS - which request a 90 day implementation period.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, "Notice for public comment; State consultation,"
paragraph (b), a copy of this application, with attachments, is being provided to the designated State Officials.
If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Ms. Rebecca L.
Steinman at (630) 657-2831.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 30th day of June 2021.
Respectfully, Patrick R. Simpson Sr. Manager Licensing Exelon Generation Company, LLC Attachments:
- 1.
Evaluation of Proposed Changes
- 2.
Markup of Technical Specifications Pages 2a. Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 2b. Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 2c.
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 2d. Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 2e. Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 2f.
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant 2g. LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 2h. Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1 2i.
Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2 2j.
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 2k.
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2 2l.
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3 2m. Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 2n. R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 30, 2021 Page 4
- 3.
Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages - For Information Only 3a. Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 3b. Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 3c.
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 3d. Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 3e. Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 3f.
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant 3g. LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 3h. Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1 3i.
Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2 3j.
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 3k.
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2 3l.
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3 3m. Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 3n. R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant cc:
NRC Regional Administrator - Region I NRC Regional Administrator - Region III NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Braidwood Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Byron Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Clinton Power Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Dresden Nuclear Power Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector - James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant NRC Senior Resident Inspector - LaSalle County Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Limerick Generating Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector - R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Illinois Emergency Management Agency - Division of Nuclear Safety Director, Bureau of Radiation Protection - Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection A.L. Peterson, NYSERDA Bridget Frymire, NYSPSC S. Seaman, MD-DNR
ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes
Subject:
Application to Adopt TSTF-554, Revision 1, "Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements" 1.0
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION
2.0 ASSESSMENT
2.1 Applicability of Safety Evaluation 2.2 Variations
3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS
3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Analysis 3.2 Conclusions 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION
5.0 REFERENCES
ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 1 1.0
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC), is submitting a request for an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Braidwood Station (BWD), Units 1 and 2; Byron Station (BYR), Units 1 and 2; Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP), Units 1 and 2; Clinton Power Station (CPS), Unit 1; Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS), Units 2 and 3; James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF); LaSalle County Station (LSCS), Units 1 and 2; Limerick Generating Station (LGS), Units 1 and 2; Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMP),
Unit 2; Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3; Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (QCNPS), Units 1 and 2, and R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (RGNPP).
EGC requests adoption of TSTF-554, Revision 1, "Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements" (Reference 5.1), which is an approved change to the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) (References 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5), into the TS for the plants listed above.
The proposed changes revise the TS definition of "Leakage," to clarify the requirements when pressure boundary leakage is detected and adds a new Condition and Required Action when pressure boundary leakage exists. The change is requested as part of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP).
2.0 ASSESSMENT
2.1 Applicability of Safety Evaluation EGC has reviewed the Safety Evaluation for TSTF-554, Revision 1 provided to the Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) in a letter dated December 18, 2020 (Reference 5.1). This review included a review of the NRCs evaluation, as well as the information provided in TSTF-554, Revision 1. EGC has concluded that the justifications presented in TSTF-554, Revision 1 and the Safety Evaluation prepared by the NRC are applicable to BWD, Units 1 and 2; BYR, Units 1 and 2; CCNPP, Units 1 and 2; CPS, Unit 1; DNPS, Units 2 and 3; JAF; LSCS, Units 1 and 2; LGS, Units 1 and 2; NMP, Unit 2; PBAPS, Units 2 and 3; QCNPS, Units 1 and 2; and RGNPP and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes into the TS for each listed plant.
2.2 Variations The LGS TS are based on the NRC's Standard TS (NUREG-0123, Revision 2) (Reference 5.6) and, therefore, the wording and format varies from the NRC Improved Standard Technical Specifications shown in TSTF-554, Revision 1, and referenced in the applicable parts of the NRC's Safety Evaluation. These differences are administrative in nature and do not affect the applicability of TSTF-554 to the LGS TS.
CPS TS 3.4.5 Condition B (to be renumbered Condition C by this change) does not contain Action B.1 to reduce leakage to within the limit within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> as shown in NUREG-1434 (Reference 5.5). It only contains the single option to verify the source of unidentified leakage increase is not service sensitive type 304 or type 316 austenitic stainless steel within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Since the Completion Time and the follow-on action are the same as NUREG-1434 and
ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 2 Required Action B.1 is part of an OR statement, this difference is considered administrative in nature and does not affect the applicability of TSTF-554 to the CPS TS.
DNPS and QCNPS TS 3.4.4 Condition B.2 (to be renumbered Condition C.2) is worded differently than Condition B.2 in NUREG-1433 (Reference 5.4). Specifically, the DNPS and QCNPS TS uses the phrasing "intergranular stress corrosion cracking susceptible material" instead of "service sensitive type 304 or type 316 austenitic stainless steel." Since the intent of the action to quickly identify leakage from components susceptible to intergranular stress corrosion cracking is the same, this wording difference is considered administrative in nature and does not affect the applicability of TSTF-554 to the DNPS or QCNPS TS.
TSTF-554, Revision 1 and its corresponding Safety Evaluation discuss the applicable regulatory requirements and guidance, including the applicability of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC) 14 and 30. CCNP, Units 1 and 2; DNPS, Units 2 and 3; QCNPS, Units 1 and 2; and RGNPP were not licensed to the 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC. The CCNP, Units 1 and 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Appendix 1C, "AEC Proposed General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants" references the 1974 Final Safety Analysis Report for an assessment of the plant against the 70 draft GDC published in 1967. The DNPS, Units 2 and 3 and QCNPS, Units 1 and 2 UFSAR, Section 3.1, "Conformance with NRC General Design Criteria," provides an assessment against the 70 draft GDC published in 1967 and concluded that the plant specific requirements are sufficiently similar to the Appendix A GDC.
Similarly, RGNPP UFSAR Section 3.1, "Conformance with NRC General Design Criteria" evaluates the plant design against both the GDC used during original licensing and the 1972 version of the Appendix A GDC and concluded conformance with the intent of the Appendix A GDC. The plant-specific requirements at CCNP, DNPS, QCNPS, and RGNPP are unaffected by the proposed licensing change.
The LGS, CPS, DNPS, and QCNPS variations discussed above differ from the specific wording proposed in TSTF-554 and the GDC referenced for CCNP, DNPS, QCNPS, and RGNPP differ from those referenced in the NRC Safety Evaluation, but none of these variations affect the intent of the change, the basis for acceptability of the change, or the conclusions of the NRC Safety Evaluation dated December 18, 2020.
See the applicable site-specific markups in Attachments 2a through 2n for the proposed changes for each site's TS.
The TS Bases will be revised to describe the basis for the corresponding TS changes.
Attachments 3a through 3n provide these markups and are provided for information only.
3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS
3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Analysis Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) requests adoption of TSTF-554, Revision 1, "Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements," that is an approved change to the Standard Specifications (STS) into the Braidwood Station (BWD), Units 1 and 2; Byron Station (BYR),
Units 1 and 2; Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP), Units 1 and 2; Clinton Power Station (CPS), Unit 1; Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS), Units 2 and 3; James A.
ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 3 FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF); LaSalle County Station (LSCS), Units 1 and 2; Limerick Generating Station (LGS), Units 1 and 2; Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMP), Unit 2; Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3; Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (QCNPS), Units 1 and 2, and R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (RGNPP) Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed amendment revises the TS definition of "Leakage," clarifies the requirements when pressure boundary leakage is detected and adds a Required Action when pressure boundary leakage is identified.
EGC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:
- 1.
Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No The proposed amendment revises the TS definition of "Leakage," clarifies the requirements when pressure boundary leakage is detected and adds a Required Action when pressure boundary leakage is identified.
The proposed change revises the definition of pressure boundary leakage. Pressure boundary leakage is a precursor to some accidents previously evaluated. The proposed change expands the definition of pressure boundary leakage by eliminating the qualification that pressure boundary leakage must be from a "nonisolable" flaw. A new TS Action is created which requires isolation of the pressure boundary flaw from the Reactor Coolant System. This new action provides assurance that the flaw will not result in any accident previously evaluated.
Pressure boundary leakage, and the actions taken when pressure boundary leakage is detected, is not assumed in the mitigation of any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated are unaffected.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2.
Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated?
Response: No The proposed amendment revises the TS definition of "Leakage," clarifies the requirements when pressure boundary leakage is detected and adds a Required Action when pressure boundary leakage is identified. The proposed change does not alter the design function or operation of the RCS. The proposed change does not alter the ability of the RCS to perform its design function. Since pressure boundary leakage is an evaluated accident, the proposed change does not create any new failure mechanisms, malfunctions, or accident initiators not considered in the design and licensing bases.
ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 4 Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
- 3.
Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No The proposed amendment revises the TS definition of "Leakage," clarifies the requirements when pressure boundary leakage is detected and adds a Required Action when pressure boundary leakage is identified. The proposed change does not affect the initial assumptions, margins, or controlling values used in any accident analysis. The amount of leakage allowed from the RCS is not increased. The proposed change does not affect any design basis or safety limit or any Limiting Condition for Operation.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, EGC concludes that the proposed amendments present no significant hazards considerations under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.
3.2 Conclusions In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION The proposed amendments would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendments do not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.
5.0 REFERENCES
5.1 TSTF-554, Revision 1, "Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements," dated December 18, 2020 [ADAMS Accession Nos. ML20168A396 and ML20154K606]
5.2 NUREG-1431, Rev. 4, "Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants," dated April 2012 [ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12100A222 and ML12100A228]
ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes Page 5 5.3 NUREG-1432, Rev. 4, "Standard Technical Specifications, Combustion Engineering Plants," dated April 2012 [ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12102A165 and ML12102A169]
5.4 NUREG-1433, Rev. 4, "Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric BWR/4 Plants," dated April 2012 [ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12104A192 and ML12104A193]
5.5 NUREG-1434, Rev. 4, "Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric BWR/6 Plants," dated April 2012 [ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12104A195 and ML12104A196]
5.6 NUREG-0123, Rev. 2, "Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors," dated August 1979 [ADAMS Accession No. 7910020640]
ATTACHMENT 2a Markup of Technical Specifications Pages Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77 NRC Docket Nos. 50-456 and 50-457 Markup of Technical Specifications Page 1.1-4 3.4.13-1
Definitions 1.1 BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 1.1 4 Amendment 191/192 1.1 Definitions INSERVICE TESTING The INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM is the licensee PROGRAM program that fulfills the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(f).
LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:
- a. Identified LEAKAGE
- 1. LEAKAGE, such as that from pump seals or valve packing (except Reactor Coolant pump (RCP) seal water injection or leakoff),
that is captured and conducted to collection systems or a sump or collecting tank;
- 2. LEAKAGE into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE; or
- 3. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) LEAKAGE through a steam generator to the Secondary System (primary to secondary LEAKAGE);
- b. Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE (except RCP seal water injection or leakoff) that is not identified LEAKAGE;
- c. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE (except primary to secondary LEAKAGE) through a nonisolable fault in an RCS component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.
MASTER RELAY TEST A MASTER RELAY TEST shall consist of energizing each master relay and verifying the OPERABILITY of each relay. The MASTER RELAY TEST shall include a continuity check of each associated slave relay.
to LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
and
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.13 BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.13 1 Amendment 144 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
a.
No pressure boundary LEAKAGE; b.
1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE; c.
10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; and d.
150 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG).
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
RCS operational LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE.
A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B.
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.
OR Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
OR Primary to secondary LEAKAGE not within limit.
B.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND B.2 Be in MODE 5.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 36 hours B.
B.1 C.
C.1 C.2 A. Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
A.1 Isolate affected component, pipe, or vessel from the RCS by use of a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />
ATTACHMENT 2b Markup of Technical Specifications Pages Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66 NRC Docket Nos. 50-454 and 50-455 Markup of Technical Specifications Page 1.1-4 3.4.13-1
Definitions 1.1 BYRON UNITS 1 & 2 1.1 4 Amendment 197 1.1 Definitions INSERVICE TESTING The INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM is the licensee PROGRAM program that fulfills the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(f).
LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:
- a. Identified LEAKAGE
- 1. LEAKAGE, such as that from pump seals or valve packing (except Reactor Coolant pump (RCP) seal water injection or leakoff),
that is captured and conducted to collection systems or a sump or collecting tank;
- 2. LEAKAGE into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE; or
- 3. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) LEAKAGE through a Steam Generator to the Secondary System (primary to secondary LEAKAGE);
- b. Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE (except RCP seal water injection or leakoff) that is not identified LEAKAGE;
- c. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE (except primary to secondary LEAKAGE) through a nonisolable fault in an RCS component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.
MASTER RELAY TEST A MASTER RELAY TEST shall consist of energizing each master relay and verifying the OPERABILITY of each relay. The MASTER RELAY TEST shall include a continuity check of each associated slave relay.
to LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
and
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.13 BYRON UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.13 1 Amendment 150 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
a.
No pressure boundary LEAKAGE; b.
1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE; c.
10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; and d.
150 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG).
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
RCS operational LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE.
A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B.
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.
OR Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
OR Primary to secondary LEAKAGE not within limit.
B.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND B.2 Be in MODE 5.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 36 hours B.
B.1 C.
C.1 C.2 A. Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
A.1 Isolate affected component, pipe, or vessel from the RCS by use of a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />
ATTACHMENT 2c Markup of Technical Specifications Pages Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69 NRC Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318 Markup of Technical Specifications Page 1.1-4 3.4.13-1 3.4.13-2
Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 1.1-4 Amendment No. 320 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 298 LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:
- a.
Identified LEAKAGE
- 1.
LEAKAGE, such as that from pump seals or valve packing (except reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal leakoff), that is captured and conducted to collection systems or a sump or collecting tank;
- 2.
LEAKAGE into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE; or
- 3.
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) LEAKAGE through a steam generator to the Secondary System (primary to secondary LEAKAGE).
- b.
Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE (except RCP seal leakoff) that is not identified LEAKAGE;
- c.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE (except primary to secondary LEAKAGE) through a nonisolable fault in an RCS component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.
MODE A MODE shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of core reactivity condition, power level, average reactor coolant temperature, and reactor vessel head closure bolts specified in Table 1.1-1 with fuel in the reactor vessel.
to and LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.13 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.4.13-1 Amendment No. 278 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 255 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
- a.
- b.
1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;
- c.
10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; and
- d.
100 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG).
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
RCS operational LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE.
A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B.
B.1 A. Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
A.1 Isolate affected component, pipe, or vessel from the RCS by use of a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.13 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.4.13-2 Amendment No. 314 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 292 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.
OR Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
OR Primary to secondary LEAKAGE not within limit.
B.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND B.2 Be in MODE 5.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.13.1 ----------------- NOTES ----------------
- 1.
Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after establishment of steady state operation.
- 2.
Not applicable to primary to secondary LEAKAGE.
Verify RCS Operational LEAKAGE is within limits by performance of RCS water inventory balance.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program C.
C.1 C.2
ATTACHMENT 2d Markup of Technical Specifications Pages Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 NRC Docket No. 50-461 Markup of Technical Specifications Page 1.0-5 3.4-12 3.4-13
Definitions 1.1 CLINTON 1.0-5 Amendment No. 229 1.1 Definitions (continued)
END OF CYCLE The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP time interval from initial movement of the (EOC-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE associated turbine stop valve or turbine TIME control valve to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.
INSERVICE TESTING The INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM is the licensee PROGRAM program that fulfills the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(f).
ISOLATION SYSTEM The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RESPONSE TIME time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its isolation initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until the isolation valves travel to their required positions. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.
LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:
- a. Identified LEAKAGE
- 1. LEAKAGE into the drywell such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or
- 2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE;
- b. Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE;
- c. Total LEAKAGE Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE;
- d. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.
(continued) to and LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.5 CLINTON 3.4-12 Amendment No. 95 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.5 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.5 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
- a.
- b.
5 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;
- c.
30 gpm total LEAKAGE averaged over the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period; and
- d.
2 gpm increase in unidentified LEAKAGE within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period in MODE 1.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Unidentified LEAKAGE not within limit.
OR Total LEAKAGE not within limit.
A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B.
Unidentified LEAKAGE increase not within limit.
B.1 Verify source of unidentified LEAKAGE increase is not service sensitive type 304 or type 316 austenitic stainless steel.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (continued)
B.
B.1 C.
C.1 A. Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
A.1 Isolate affected component, pipe, or vessel from the RCS by use of a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.5 CLINTON 3.4-13 Amendment No. 192 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met.
OR Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
C.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND C.2 Be in MODE 4.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.5.1 Verify RCS unidentified LEAKAGE, total LEAKAGE, and unidentified LEAKAGE increase are within limits.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program D.1 D.2 D.
ATTACHMENT 2e Markup of Technical Specifications Pages Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 NRC Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249 Markup of Technical Specifications Pages 1.1-5 1.1-6 3.4.4-1 3.4.4-2
Definitions 1.1 Dresden 2 and 3 1.1-5 Amendment No. 266/259 1.1 Definitions DRAIN TIME
- c.
The penetration flow paths required to be (continued) evaluated per paragraph b) are assumed to open instantaneously and are not subsequently isolated, and no water is assumed to be subsequently added to the RPV water inventory;
- d.
No additional draining events occur; and
- e.
Realistic cross-sectional areas and drain rates are used.
A bounding DRAIN TIME may be used in lieu of a calculated value.
INSERVICE TESTING The INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM is the licensee PROGRAM program that fulfills the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(f).
LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:
- a.
Identified LEAKAGE
- 1. LEAKAGE into the drywell, such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or
- 2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE;
- b.
Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE; (continued) to
Definitions 1.1 Dresden 2 and 3 1.1-6 Amendment No. 266/259 1.1 Definitions LEAKAGE
- c.
Total LEAKAGE (continued)
Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE; and
- d.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.
LINEAR HEAT GENERATION The LHGR shall be the heat generation rate per RATE (LHGR) unit length of fuel rod. It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length.
LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL A LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be a test TEST of all logic components required for OPERABILITY of a logic circuit, from as close to the sensor as practicable up to, but not including, the actuated device, to verify OPERABILITY. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total system steps so that the entire logic system is tested.
MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER The MCPR shall be the smallest critical power RATIO (MCPR) ratio (CPR) that exists in the core for each class of fuel. The CPR is that power in the assembly that is calculated by application of the appropriate correlation(s) to cause some point in the assembly to experience boiling transition, divided by the actual assembly operating power.
MODE A MODE shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of mode switch position, average reactor coolant temperature, and reactor vessel head closure bolt tensioning specified in Table 1.1-1 with fuel in the reactor vessel.
OPERABLEOPERABILITY A system, subsystem, division, component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified safety function(s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency electrical power, cooling and seal water, (continued)
LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.4 Dresden 2 and 3 3.4.4-1 Amendment No. 185/180 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.4 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
a.
No pressure boundary LEAKAGE; b.
5 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE; c.
25 gpm total LEAKAGE averaged over the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period; and d.
2 gpm increase in unidentified LEAKAGE within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period in MODE 1.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
Unidentified LEAKAGE not within limit.
OR Total LEAKAGE not within limit.
A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B.
Unidentified LEAKAGE increase not within limit.
B.1 Reduce unidentified LEAKAGE increase to within limits.
OR 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (continued)
A. Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
A.1 Isolate affected component, pipe, or vessel from the RCS by use of a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B.
C.
B.1 C.1 delete underline on this word
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.4 Dresden 2 and 3 3.4.4-2 Amendment No. 237/230 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.
(continued)
B.2 Verify source of unidentified LEAKAGE increase is not intergranular stress corrosion cracking susceptible material.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> C.
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met.
OR Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
C.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND C.2 Be in MODE 4.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.4.1 Verify RCS unidentified and total LEAKAGE and unidentified LEAKAGE increase are within limits.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program C.
C.2 D.
D.1 D.2
ATTACHMENT 2f Markup of Technical Specifications Pages James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 NRC Docket No. 50-333 Markup of Technical Specifications Page 1.1-3 3.4.4-1 3.4.4-2
Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions <continued)
ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIME LEAKAGE JAFNPP The ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its isolation initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until the isolation valve receives the isolation signal (e.g., de-energization of the main steam isolation valve solenoids). The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential. overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.
In lieu of measurement. response time may be verified for selected components provided that the components and methodology for verification have been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC.
LEAKAGE shall be:
- a.
Identified LEAKAGE
- 1. LEAKAGE into the drywell, such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or
- 2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE:
- b. Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE;
- c. Total LEAKAGE Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE;
- d. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.
(continued) 1.1-3 Amendment 274 to and LEAKAGE past seals, packing, or gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.4 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM CRCS) 3.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.4 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
- a.
- b.
~ 5 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;
- c.
~ 25 gpm total LEAKAGE averaged over the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period; and
- d.
~ 2 gpm increase in unidentified LEAKAGE within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period in MODE 1.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Unidentified LEAKAGE A.l Reduce LEAKAGE to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> not within limit.
within limits.
OR Total LEAKAGE not within limit.
B.
Unidentified LEAKAGE 8.1 Reduce unidentified 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> increase not within LEAKAGE increase to limit.
within limits.
OR (continued)
JAFNPP 3.4.4-1 Amendment 274 B.
B.1 C.
C.1 A. Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
A.1 Isolate affected component, pipe, or vessel from the RCS by use of a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION B. (continued)
B.2 Verify source of unidentified LEAKAGE increase is not service sensitive type 304 or type 316 austenitic stainless steel.
C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE3.
associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met.
AND QB C.2 Be in MODE 4.
Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.4.1 JAFNPP Verify RCS unidentified and total LEAKAGE and unidentified LEAKAGE increase are within limits.
3.4.4-2 RCS Operational Leakage 3.4.4 COMPLETION TIME 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 12 hours 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> FREQUENCY In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program Amendment 301 I C.
C.2 D.
D.1 D.2
ATTACHMENT 2g Markup of Technical Specifications Pages LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374 Markup of Technical Specifications Pages 1.1-7 3.4.5-1 3.4.5-2
Definitions 1.1 LaSalle 1 and 2 1.1-7 Amendment No. 242/228 1.1 Definitions (continued)
LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:
- a. Identified LEAKAGE
- 1. LEAKAGE into the drywell such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or
- 2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE;
- b. Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE;
- c. Total LEAKAGE Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE; and
- d. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.
LINEAR HEAT GENERATION The LHGR shall be the heat generation rate per RATE (LHGR) unit length of fuel rod. It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length.
LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL A LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be a test TEST of all logic components required for OPERABILITY of a logic circuit, from as close to the sensor as practicable up to, but not including, the actuated device, to verify OPERABILITY. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total system steps so that the entire logic system is tested.
(continued) to LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.5 LaSalle 1 and 2 3.4.5-1 Amendment No. 147/133 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.5 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.5 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
a.
No pressure boundary LEAKAGE; b.
5 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE; c.
25 gpm total LEAKAGE averaged over the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period; and d.
2 gpm increase in unidentified LEAKAGE within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period in MODE 1.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
Unidentified LEAKAGE not within limit.
OR Total LEAKAGE not within limit.
A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B.
Unidentified LEAKAGE increase not within limit.
B.1 Reduce unidentified LEAKAGE increase to within limit.
OR 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (continued)
A. Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
A.1 Isolate affected component, pipe, or vessel from the RCS by use of a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B.
B.1 C.
C.1
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.5 LaSalle 1 and 2 3.4.5-2 Amendment No. 200/187 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.
(continued)
B.2 Verify source of unidentified LEAKAGE increase is not intergranular stress corrosion cracking susceptible material.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> C.
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met.
OR Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
C.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND C.2 Be in MODE 4.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.5.1 Verify RCS unidentified and total LEAKAGE and unidentified LEAKAGE increase are within limits.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program C.
C.2 D.
D.1 D.2
ATTACHMENT 2h Markup of Technical Specifications Pages Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-39 NRC Docket No. 50-352 Markup of Technical Specifications Page 1-3 1-5 3/4 4-9
DEFINITIONS END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 1.12 The END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker from initial movement of the associated:
- a.
Turbine stop valves, and
- b.
Turbine control valves.
This total system response time consists of two components, the instrumen-tation response time and the breaker arc suppression time. These times may be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping or total steps such that the entire response time is measured.
1.13 (Deleted) 1.14 (Deleted)
FREQUENCY NOTATION 1.15 The FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of Surveillance Requirements shall correspond to the intervals defined in Table 1.1.
HIGH (POWER) TRIP SETPOINT (HTSP) 1.15a The high power trip setpoint associated with the Rod Block Monitor (RBM) rod block trip setting applicable above 85% reactor thermal power.
IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE 1.16 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be:
- a.
Leakage into collection systems, such as pump seal or valve packing leaks, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank, or
- b.
Leakage into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of the leakage detection systems or not to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE.
INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM 1.16a The INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM is the licensee program that fulfills the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(f).
INTERMEDIATE (POWER) TRIP SETPOINT (ITSP) 1.16b The intermediate power trip setpoint associated with the Rod Block Monitor (RBM) rod block trip setting applicable between 65% and 85% reactor thermal power.
ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 1.17 The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its isolation actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the isolation valves travel to their required positions.
Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays where applicable. The response time may be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping or total steps such that the entire response time is measured.
LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN 1.18 A LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN shall be a pattern which results in the core being on a thermal hydraulic limit, i.e., operating on a limiting value for APLHGR, LHGR, OR MCPR.
LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE 1.19 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) shall be the heat generation per unit length of fuel rod. It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length.
LIMERICK - UNIT 1 1-3 Amendment No. 66, 225 to
DEFINITIONS OPERATIONAL CONDITION - CONDITION 1.26 An OPERATIONAL CONDITION, i.e., CONDITION, shall be any one inclusive combination of mode switch position and average reactor coolant tempera-ture as specified in Table 1.2.
PHYSICS TESTS 1.27 PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation and (1) described in Chapter 14 of the FSAR, (2) authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, or (3) otherwise approved by the Commission.
PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE 1.28 PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE shall be leakage through a nonisolable fault in a reactor coolant system component body, pipe wall or vessel wall.
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 1.29 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:
- a.
All primary containment penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
- 1.
Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE primary containment automatic isolation system, or
- 2.
Closed by at least one manual valve, blind flange, or deactivated automatic valve secured in its closed position, except for valves that are opened under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.
- b.
All primary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed.
- c.
The primary containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.
- d.
The primary containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2.
- e.
The suppression chamber is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.2.1.
- f.
The sealing mechanism associated with each primary containment penetration; e.g., welds, bellows, or O-rings, is OPERABLE.
PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM 1.30 The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP) shall contain the provisions to assure that the solidification or dewatering and packaging of radioactive wastes results in a waste package with properties that meet the minimum and stability requirements of 10 CFR Part 61 and other requirements for transportation to the disposal site and receipt at the disposal site.
With solidification or dewatering, the PCP shall identify the process parameters influencing solidification or dewatering, based on laboratory scale and full scale testing or experience.
LIMERICK - UNIT 1 1-5 Amendment No. 48, 66, 146 LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE.
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.3.2 Reactor coolant system leakage shall be limited to:
- a.
- b.
5 gpm UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE.
- c.
30 gpm total leakage.
- d.
25 gpm total leakage averaged over any 24-hour period.
- e.
1 gpm leakage at a reactor coolant system pressure of 950 +/-10 psig from any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve.**
- f.
2 gpm increase in UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE over a 24-hour period.
APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.
ACTION:
- a.
With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- b.
With any reactor coolant system leakage greater than the limits in b, c and/or d above, reduce the leakage rate to within the limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- c.
With any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve leakage greater than the above limit, isolate the high pressure portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one other closed manual, deactivated automatic, or check* valves, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- d.
With one or more of the high/low pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitors inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or verify the pressure to be less than the alarm setpoint at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />; restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- e.
With any reactor coolant system leakage greater than the limit in f above, identify the source of leakage within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- Which have been verified not to exceed the allowable leakage limit at the last refueling outage or after the last time the valve was disturbed, whichever is more recent.
- Pressure isolation valve leakage is not included in any other allowable operational leakage specified in Section 3.4.3.2.
LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 4-9 Amendment No. 28, 49, 172, 182 isolate affected component, pipe, or vessel from the reactor coolant system by use of a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Otherwise,
ATTACHMENT 2i Markup of Technical Specifications Pages Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-85 NRC Docket No. 50-353 Markup of Technical Specifications Page 1-3 1-5 3/4 4-9
DEFINITIONS END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 1.12 The END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker from initial movement of the associated:
- a.
Turbine stop valves, and
- b.
Turbine control valves.
This total system response time consists of two components, the instrumen-tation response time and the breaker arc suppression time. These times may be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping or total steps such that the entire response time is measured.
1.13 (Deleted) 1.14 (Deleted)
FREQUENCY NOTATION 1.15 The FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of Surveillance Requirements shall correspond to the intervals defined in Table 1.1.
HIGH (POWER) TRIP SETPOINT (HTSP) 1.15a The high power trip setpoint associated with the Rod Block Monitor (RBM) rod block trip setting applicable above 85% reactor thermal power.
IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE 1.16 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be:
- a.
Leakage into collection systems, such as pump seal or valve packing leaks, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank, or
- b.
Leakage into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of the leakage detection systems or not to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE.
INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM 1.16a The INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM is the licensee program that fulfills the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(f).
INTERMEDIATE (POWER) TRIP SETPOINT (ITSP) 1.16b The intermediate power trip setpoint associated with the Rod Block Monitor (RBM) rod block trip setting applicable between 65% and 85% reactor thermal power.
ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 1.17 The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its isolation actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the isolation valves travel to their required positions.
Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays where applicable. The response time may be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping or total steps such that the entire response time is measured.
LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN 1.18 A LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN shall be a pattern which results in the core being on a thermal hydraulic limit, i.e., operating on a limiting value for APLHGR, LHGR, or MCPR.
LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE 1.19 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) shall be the heat generation per unit length of fuel rod. It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length.
LIMERICK - UNIT 2 1-3 Amendment No. 48, 188 to
DEFINITIONS OPERATIONAL CONDITION - CONDITION 1.26 An OPERATIONAL CONDITION, i.e., CONDITION, shall be any one inclusive combination of mode switch position and average reactor coolant tempera-ture as specified in Table 1.2.
PHYSICS TESTS 1.27 PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation and (1) described in Chapter 14 of the FSAR, (2) authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, or (3) otherwise approved by the Commission.
PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE 1.28 PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE shall be leakage through a nonisolable fault in a reactor coolant system component body, pipe wall or vessel wall.
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 1.29 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:
- a.
All primary containment penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
- 1.
Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE primary containment automatic isolation system, or
- 2.
Closed by at least one manual valve, blind flange, or deactivated automatic valve secured in its closed position, except for valves that are opened under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.
- b.
All primary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed.
- c.
The primary containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.
- d.
The primary containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2.
- e.
The suppression chamber is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.2.1.
- f.
The sealing mechanism associated with each primary containment penetration; e.g., welds, bellows, or O-rings, is OPERABLE.
PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM 1.30 The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP) shall contain the provisions to assure that the SOLIDIFICATION or dewatering and packaging of radioactive wastes results in a waste package with properties that meet the minimum and stability requirements of 10 CFR Part 61 and other requirements for trans-portation to the disposal site and receipt at the disposal site. With SOLIDIFICATION or dewatering, the PCP shall identify the process parameters influencing SOLIDIFICATION or dewatering based on laboratory scale and full scale testing or experience.
LIMERICK - UNIT 2 1-5 Amendment No. 11, 48, 107 LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE.
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.3.2 Reactor coolant system leakage shall be limited to:
- a.
- b.
5 gpm UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE.
- c.
30 gpm total leakage.
- d.
25 gpm total leakage averaged over any 24-hour period.
- e.
1 gpm leakage at a reactor coolant system pressure of 950 +/-10 psig from any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve.**
- f.
2 gpm increase in UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE over a 24-hour period.
APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.
ACTION:
- a.
With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- b.
With any reactor coolant system leakage greater than the limits in b, c and/or d above, reduce the leakage rate to within the limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- c.
With any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve leakage greater than the above limit, isolate the high pressure portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one other closed manual, deactivated automatic, or check* valves, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- d.
With one or more of the high/low pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitors inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or verify the pressure to be less than the alarm setpoint at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />; restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- e.
With any reactor coolant system leakage greater than the limit in f above, identify the source of leakage within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- Which have been verified not to exceed the allowable leakage limit at the last refueling outage or after the last time the valve was disturbed, whichever is more recent.
- Pressure isolation valve leakage is not included in any other allowable operational leakage specified in Section 3.4.3.2.
LIMERICK - UNIT 2 3/4 4-9 Amendment No. 12, 134, 144 isolate affected component, pipe, or vessel from the reactor coolant system by use of a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Otherwise,
ATTACHMENT 2j Markup of Technical Specifications Pages Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 NRC Docket No. 50-410 Markup of Technical Specifications Page 1.1-6 3.4.5-1 3.4.5-2
Definitions 1.1 NMP2 1.1-6 Amendment 91, 123, 145, 168, 179 1.1 Definitions LEAKAGE
- 2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from (continued) sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE;
- b.
Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE; and
- c.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.
LINEAR HEAT GENERATION The LHGR shall be the heat generation rate per RATE (LHGR) unit length of fuel rod. It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length.
LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL A LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be a test TEST of all required logic components (i.e., all required relays and contacts, trip units, solid state logic elements, etc.) of a logic circuit, from as close to the sensor as practicable up to, but not including, the actuated device, to verify OPERABILITY. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total system steps so that the entire logic system is tested.
MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER The MCPR shall be the smallest critical power RATIO (MCPR) ratio (CPR) that exists in the core for each class of fuel. The CPR is that power in the assembly that is calculated by application of the appropriate correlation(s) to cause some point in the assembly to experience boiling transition, divided by the actual assembly operating power.
MODE A MODE shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of mode switch position, average reactor coolant temperature, and reactor vessel head closure bolt tensioning specified in Table 1.1-1 with fuel in the reactor vessel.
(continued) to LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.5 NMP2 3.4.5-1 Amendment 91 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.5 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.5 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
- a.
- b.
5 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;
- c.
25 gpm identified LEAKAGE averaged over the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period; and
- d.
2 gpm increase in unidentified LEAKAGE within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period in MODE 1.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
Unidentified LEAKAGE not within limit.
OR Identified LEAKAGE not within limit.
A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B.
Unidentified LEAKAGE increase not within limit.
B.1 Reduce unidentified LEAKAGE increase to within limit.
OR B.2 Identify source of unidentified LEAKAGE increase.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 4 hours (continued)
A. Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
A.1 Isolate affected component, pipe, or vessel from the RCS by use of a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B.
B.1 C.
C.1 C.2
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.5 NMP2 3.4.5-2 Amendment 91, 152 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met.
OR Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
C.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND C.2 Be in MODE 4.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.5.1 Verify RCS unidentified and identified LEAKAGE and unidentified LEAKAGE increase are within limits.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program D.
D.1 D.2
ATTACHMENT 2k Markup of Technical Specifications Pages Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-44 NRC Docket No. 50-277 Markup of Technical Specifications Page 1.1-3a 3.4-10 3.4-11
Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)
END OF CYCLE The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP time interval from initial signal generation by (EOC-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE the associated turbine stop valve limit switch or TIME from when the turbine control valve hydraulic oil control oil pressure drops below the pressure switch setpoint to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.
INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM The INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM is the licensee program that fulfills the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(f).
LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:
- a. Identified LEAKAGE
- 1. LEAKAGE into the drywell, such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or
- 2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE;
- b. Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE;
- c. Total LEAKAGE Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE;
- d. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.
LINEAR HEAT GENERATION The LHGR shall be the heat generation rate per RATE (LHGR) unit length of fuel rod. It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length.
(continued)
PBAPS UNIT 2 1.1-3a Amendment No. 317 to and LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.4 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.4 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
a.
No pressure boundary LEAKAGE; b.
5 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE; c.
25 gpm total LEAKAGE averaged over the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period; and d.
2 gpm increase in unidentified LEAKAGE within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period in MODE 1.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
Unidentified LEAKAGE not within limit.
OR Total LEAKAGE not within limit.
A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B.
Unidentified LEAKAGE increase not within limit.
B.1 Reduce LEAKAGE increase to within limits.
OR 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (continued)
PBAPS UNIT 2 3.4-10 Amendment No. 210 A. Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
A.1 Isolate affected component, pipe, or vessel from the RCS by use of a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B.
C.
B.1 C.1
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.4 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.
(continued)
B.2 Verify source of unidentified LEAKAGE increase is not service sensitive type 304 or type 316 austenitic stainless steel.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> C.
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met.
OR Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
C.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND C.2 Be in MODE 4.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.4.1 Verify RCS unidentified and total LEAKAGE and unidentified LEAKAGE increase are within limits.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
PBAPS UNIT 2 3.4-11 Amendment No. 278 C.
C.2 D.
D.1 D.2
ATTACHMENT 2l Markup of Technical Specifications Pages Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-56 NRC Docket No. 50-278 Markup of Technical Specifications Page 1.1-3a 3.4-10 3.4-11
Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)
END OF CYCLE The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP time interval from initial signal generation by (EOC-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE the associated turbine stop valve limit switch or TIME from when the turbine control valve hydraulic oil control oil pressure drops below the pressure switch setpoint to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.
INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM The INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM is the licensee program that fulfills the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(f).
LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:
- a. Identified LEAKAGE
- 1. LEAKAGE into the drywell, such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or
- 2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE;
- b. Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE;
- c. Total LEAKAGE Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE;
- d. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.
LINEAR HEAT GENERATION The LHGR shall be the heat generation rate per RATE (LHGR) unit length of fuel rod. It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length.
(continued)
PBAPS UNIT 3 1.1-3a Amendment No. 320 to and LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.4 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.4 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
a.
No pressure boundary LEAKAGE; b.
5 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE; c.
25 gpm total LEAKAGE averaged over the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period; and d.
2 gpm increase in unidentified LEAKAGE within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period in MODE 1.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
Unidentified LEAKAGE not within limit.
OR Total LEAKAGE not within limit.
A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B.
Unidentified LEAKAGE increase not within limit.
B.1 Reduce LEAKAGE increase to within limits.
OR 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (continued)
PBAPS UNIT 3 3.4-10 Amendment No. 214 A. Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
A.1 Isolate affected component, pipe, or vessel from the RCS by use of a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B.
B.1 C.
C.1
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.4 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.
(continued)
B.2 Verify source of unidentified LEAKAGE increase is not service sensitive type 304 or type 316 austenitic stainless steel.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> C.
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met.
OR Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
C.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND C.2 Be in MODE 4.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.4.1 Verify RCS unidentified and total LEAKAGE and unidentified LEAKAGE increase are within limits.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
PBAPS UNIT 3 3.4-11 Amendment No. 281 C.
C.2 D.
D.1 D.2
ATTACHMENT 2m Markup of Technical Specifications Pages Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 NRC Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265 Markup of Technical Specifications Pages 1.1-5 1.1-6 3.4.4-1 3.4.4-2
Definitions 1.1 Quad Cities 1 and 2 1.1-5 Amendment No. 279/274 1.1 Definitions DRAIN TIME
- c.
The penetration flow paths required to be (continued) evaluated per paragraph b) are assumed to open instantaneously and are not subsequently isolated, and no water is assumed to be subsequently added to the RPV water inventory;
- d.
No additional draining events occur; and
- e.
Realistic cross-sectional areas and drain rates are used.
A bounding DRAIN TIME may be used in lieu of a calculated value.
INSERVICE TESTING The INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM is the licensee PROGRAM program that fulfills the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(f).
LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:
- a. Identified LEAKAGE
- 1. LEAKAGE into the drywell, such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or
- 2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE;
- b. Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE;
- c. Total LEAKAGE Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE; and (continued) to
Definitions 1.1 Quad Cities 1 and 2 1.1-6 Amendment No. 279/274 1.1 Definitions LEAKAGE
- d. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE (continued)
LEAKAGE through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.
LINEAR HEAT GENERATION The LHGR shall be the heat generation rate per RATE (LHGR) unit length of fuel rod. It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length.
LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL A LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be a test TEST of all logic components required for OPERABILITY of a logic circuit, from as close to the sensor as practicable up to, but not including, the actuated device, to verify OPERABILITY. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total system steps so that the entire logic system is tested.
MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER The MCPR shall be the smallest critical power RATIO (MCPR) ratio (CPR) that exists in the core for each class of fuel. The CPR is that power in the assembly that is calculated by application of the appropriate correlation(s) to cause some point in the assembly to experience boiling transition, divided by the actual assembly operating power.
MODE A MODE shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of mode switch position, average reactor coolant temperature, and reactor vessel head closure bolt tensioning specified in Table 1.1-1 with fuel in the reactor vessel.
OPERABLE OPERABILITY A system, subsystem, division, component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified safety function(s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency electrical power, cooling and seal water, lubrication, and other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, division, component, or device to perform its specified safety function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s).
(continued)
LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.4 Quad Cities 1 and 2 3.4.4-1 Amendment No. 199/195 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.4 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
a.
No pressure boundary LEAKAGE; b.
5 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE; c.
25 gpm total LEAKAGE averaged over the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period; and d.
2 gpm increase in unidentified LEAKAGE within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period in MODE 1.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
Unidentified LEAKAGE not within limit.
OR Total LEAKAGE not within limit.
A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B.
Unidentified LEAKAGE increase not within limit.
B.1 Reduce unidentified LEAKAGE increase to within limits.
OR 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (continued)
A. Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
A.1 Isolate affected component, pipe, or vessel from the RCS by use of a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B.
B.1 C.
C.1
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.4 Quad Cities 1 and 2 3.4.4-2 Amendment No. 248/243 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.
(continued)
B.2 Verify source of unidentified LEAKAGE increase is not intergranular stress corrosion cracking susceptible material.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> C.
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met.
OR Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
C.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND C.2 Be in MODE 4.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.4.1 Verify RCS unidentified and total LEAKAGE and unidentified LEAKAGE increase are within limits.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program C.
C.2 D.
D.1 D.2
ATTACHMENT 2n Markup of Technical Specifications Pages R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-18 NRC Docket No. 50-244 Markup of Technical Specifications Pages 1.1-3 3.4.13-1
Definitions 1.1 LEAKAGE LEAKAGE from the RCS shall be:
- a.
Identified LEAKAGE
- 1.
LEAKAGE, such as that from pump seals or valve packing (except reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal water injection or return), that is captured and conducted to collection systems or a sump or collecting tank;
- 2.
LEAKAGE into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE; or
- 3.
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) LEAKAGE through a steam generator to the Secondary System (primary to secondary LEAKAGE);
- b.
Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE (except RCP seal water injection or return) that is not identified LEAKAGE;
- c.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE (except primary to secondary LEAKAGE) through a nonisolable fault in an RCS component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.
MODE
- MODES A MODE shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of core reactivity condition, power level, average reactor coolant temperature, and reactor vessel head closure bolt tensioning specified in Table 1.1-1 with fuel in the reactor vessel.
- OPERABILITY A system, subsystem, train, component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified safety function(s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency electrical power, cooling and seal water, lubrication, and other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its specified safety function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s).
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 1.1-3 Amendment 100 to LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
and
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.13 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
- a.
- b.
1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;
- c.
10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; and
- d.
150 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG).
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.4.13-1 Amendment 100 (Revised)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
RCS operational LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE.
A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B.
Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.
OR RCS pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
OR Primary to secondary LEAKAGE not within limit.
B.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND B.2 Be in MODE 5.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 36 hours B.
B.1 C.
C.1 C.2 A. Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
A.1 Isolate affected component, pipe, or vessel from the RCS by use of a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />
ATTACHMENT 3a Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages - For Information Only Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77 NRC Docket Nos. 50-456 and 50-457 Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Page B 3.4.13-3 B 3.4.13-4 B 3.4.13-5 B 3.4.13-6 B 3.4.13-7
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.4.13 3 Revision 64 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)
For the three intact SGs loops, primary to secondary coolant leakage transfers activity into the secondary coolant. This makes it available for release into the environment via steaming through the SG PORV.
For the coolant loop with the broken steam line (i.e.,
faulted SG), primary to secondary coolant leakage is assumed to be released from the RCS directly into the environment without passing through any secondary coolant. This is due to assumed "dry-out" conditions in the faulted SG.
The dose consequences resulting from the MSLB, SGTR, Control Rod Ejection and Locked Rotor accidents are within the limits defined in 10 CFR 50.67 (Ref. 4).
The RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
LCO RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
a.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, being indicative of material deterioration. LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE.
Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. LEAKAGE past seals, valve seats, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
Pressure prohibited RCPB
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.4.13 4 Revision 64 BASES LCO (continued) b.
Unidentified LEAKAGE One gallon per minute (gpm) of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the containment air monitoring and containment sump discharge flow monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB, if the LEAKAGE is from the pressure boundary.
c.
Identified LEAKAGE Up to 10 gpm of identified LEAKAGE is considered allowable because LEAKAGE is from known sources that do not interfere with detection of unidentified LEAKAGE and is well within the capability of the RCS Makeup System. Identified LEAKAGE includes LEAKAGE to the containment from specifically known and located sources, but does not include pressure boundary LEAKAGE or controlled Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal leakoff (a normal function not considered LEAKAGE).
Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of a component or system.
Separating the sources of LEAKAGE (i.e.,
LEAKAGE from an identified source versus LEAKAGE from an unidentified source) is necessary for prompt identification of potentially adverse conditions, assessment of the safety significance, and corrective action.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.4.13 5 Revision 64 BASES LCO (continued) d.
Primary to Secondary LEAKAGE through any one SG The limit of 150 gallons per day per SG is based on the operational LEAKAGE performance criterion in NEI 97-06, Steam Generator Program Guidelines (Ref. 5). The Steam Generator Program operational LEAKAGE performance criterion in NEI 97-06 states, "The RCS operational primary to secondary leakage through any one SG shall be limited to 150 gallons per day." The limit is based on operating experience with SG tube degradation mechanisms that result in tube leakage. The operational leakage rate criterion in conjunction with the implementation of the Steam Generator Program is an effective measure for minimizing the frequency of steam generator tube ruptures.
LCO 3.4.14, "RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage,"
measures leakage through each individual Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) and can impact this LCO. Of the two PIVs in series in each isolated line, leakage measured through one PIV does not result in RCS LEAKAGE when the other is leak tight. If both valves leak and result in a loss of mass from the RCS, the loss must be included as identified LEAKAGE.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greater due to RCS pressure.
In MODES 5 and 6, LEAKAGE limits are not required because the reactor coolant pressure is far lower, resulting in lower stresses and reduced potentials for LEAKAGE.
ACTIONS A.1 Unidentified LEAKAGE or identified LEAKAGE in excess of the LCO limits must be reduced to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
This Completion Time allows time to verify leakage rates and either identify unidentified LEAKAGE or reduce LEAKAGE to within limits before the reactor must be shut down. This Required Action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
B.1 Insert A here
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.4.13 6 Revision 64 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
B.1 and B.2 If any pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, or primary to secondary LEAKAGE is not within limit, or if unidentified or identified LEAKAGE cannot be reduced to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, the reactor must be brought to lower pressure conditions to reduce the severity of the LEAKAGE and its potential consequences. It should be noted that LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
The unit must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. This action reduces the LEAKAGE and also reduces the factors that tend to degrade the pressure boundary.
The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODE 5, the pressure stresses acting on the RCPB are much lower, and further deterioration is much less likely.
C.1 and C.2 any of the Required Actions and associated Completion Times cannot be met,
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.4.13 7 Revision 85 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.13.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying RCS LEAKAGE to be within the LCO limits ensures the integrity of the RCPB is maintained. Pressure boundary LEAKAGE would at first appear as unidentified LEAKAGE and can only be positively identified by inspection. It should be noted that LEAKAGE past seals, valve seats, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE. Unidentified LEAKAGE and identified LEAKAGE are determined by performance of an RCS water inventory balance.
The RCS water inventory balance must be performed with the reactor at steady state operating conditions and near operating pressure. The Surveillance is modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that this SR is not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after establishing steady state operation. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> allowance provides sufficient time to collect and process all necessary data after stable plant conditions are established.
Steady state operation is required to perform a proper inventory balance since calculations during maneuvering are not useful. For RCS operational LEAKAGE determination by water inventory balance, steady state is defined as stable RCS pressure (2150 psig), temperature, power level, pressurizer and makeup tank levels, makeup and letdown, and RCP seal injection and return flows.
An early warning of pressure boundary LEAKAGE or unidentified LEAKAGE is provided by the systems that monitor the containment atmosphere radioactivity and the containment sump level. It should be noted that LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE. These leakage detection systems are specified in LCO 3.4.15, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation."
Note 2 states that this SR is not applicable to primary to secondary LEAKAGE because LEAKAGE of 150 gallons per day cannot be measured accurately by an RCS water inventory balance.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
Insert A A.1 If pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the affected component, pipe, or vessel must be isolated from the RCS by a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. While in this condition, structural integrity of the system should be considered because the structural integrity of the part of the system within the isolation boundary must be maintained under all licensing basis conditions, including consideration of the potential for further degradation of the isolated location. Normal LEAKAGE past the isolation device is acceptable as it will limit RCS LEAKAGE and is included in identified or unidentified LEAKAGE. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
ATTACHMENT 3b Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages - For Information Only Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66 NRC Docket Nos. 50-454 and 50-455 Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Page B 3.4.13-3 B 3.4.13-4 B 3.4.13-5 B 3.4.13-6 B 3.4.13-7
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BYRON UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.4.13 3 Revision 59 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)
For the three intact SGs loops, primary to secondary coolant leakage transfers activity into the secondary coolant. This makes it available for release into the environment via steaming through the SG PORV.
For the coolant loop with the broken steam line (i.e.,
faulted SG), primary to secondary coolant leakage is assumed to be released from the RCS directly into the environment without passing through any secondary coolant. This is due to assumed "dry-out" conditions in the faulted SG.
The dose consequences resulting from the MSLB, SGTR, Control Rod Ejection and Locked Rotor accidents are within the limits defined in 10 CFR 50.67 (Ref. 4).
The RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
LCO RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
a.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, being indicative of material deterioration. LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE.
Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. LEAKAGE past seals, valve seats, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
Pressure prohibited RCPB
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BYRON UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.4.13 4 Revision 59 BASES LCO (continued) b.
Unidentified LEAKAGE One gallon per minute (gpm) of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the containment air monitoring and containment sump discharge flow monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB, if the LEAKAGE is from the pressure boundary.
c.
Identified LEAKAGE Up to 10 gpm of identified LEAKAGE is considered allowable because LEAKAGE is from known sources that do not interfere with detection of unidentified LEAKAGE and is well within the capability of the RCS Makeup System. Identified LEAKAGE includes LEAKAGE to the containment from specifically known and located sources, but does not include pressure boundary LEAKAGE or controlled Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal leakoff (a normal function not considered LEAKAGE).
Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of a component or system.
Separating the sources of LEAKAGE (i.e., LEAKAGE from an identified source versus LEAKAGE from an unidentified source) is necessary for prompt identification of potentially adverse conditions, assessment of the safety significance, and corrective action.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BYRON UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.4.13 5 Revision 58 BASES LCO (continued) d.
Primary to Secondary LEAKAGE through any one SG The limit of 150 gallons per day per SG is based on the operational LEAKAGE performance criterion in NEI 97-06, Steam Generator Program Guidelines (Ref. 5). The Steam Generator Program operational LEAKAGE performance criterion in NEI 97-06 states, "The RCS operational primary to secondary leakage through any one SG shall be limited to 150 gallons per day." The limit is based on operating experience with SG tube degradation mechanisms that result in tube leakage. The operational leakage rate criterion in conjunction with the implementation of the Steam Generator Program is an effective measure for minimizing the frequency of steam generator tube ruptures.
LCO 3.4.14, "RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage,"
measures leakage through each individual Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) and can impact this LCO. Of the two PIVs in series in each isolated line, leakage measured through one PIV does not result in RCS LEAKAGE when the other is leak tight. If both valves leak and result in a loss of mass from the RCS, the loss must be included as identified LEAKAGE.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greater due to RCS pressure.
In MODES 5 and 6, LEAKAGE limits are not required because the reactor coolant pressure is far lower, resulting in lower stresses and reduced potentials for LEAKAGE.
ACTIONS A.1 Unidentified LEAKAGE or identified LEAKAGE in excess of the LCO limits must be reduced to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
This Completion Time allows time to verify leakage rates and either identify unidentified LEAKAGE or reduce LEAKAGE to within limits before the reactor must be shut down. This Required Action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
B.1 Insert A here
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BYRON UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.4.13 6 Revision 58 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
B.1 and B.2 If any pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, or primary to secondary LEAKAGE is not within limit, or if unidentified or identified LEAKAGE cannot be reduced to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, the reactor must be brought to lower pressure conditions to reduce the severity of the LEAKAGE and its potential consequences. It should be noted that LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
The unit must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. This action reduces the LEAKAGE and also reduces the factors that tend to degrade the pressure boundary.
The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODE 5, the pressure stresses acting on the RCPB are much lower, and further deterioration is much less likely.
C.1 and C.2 any of the Required Actions and associated Completion Times cannot be met,
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BYRON UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.4.13 7 Revision 75 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.13.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying RCS LEAKAGE to be within the LCO limits ensures the integrity of the RCPB is maintained. Pressure boundary LEAKAGE would at first appear as unidentified LEAKAGE and can only be positively identified by inspection. It should be noted that LEAKAGE past seals, valve seats, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE. Unidentified LEAKAGE and identified LEAKAGE are determined by performance of an RCS water inventory balance.
The RCS water inventory balance must be performed with the reactor at steady state operating conditions and near operating pressure. The Surveillance is modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that this SR is not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after establishing steady state operation. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> allowance provides sufficient time to collect and process all necessary data after stable plant conditions are established.
Steady state operation is required to perform a proper inventory balance since calculations during maneuvering are not useful. For RCS operational LEAKAGE determination by water inventory balance, steady state is defined as stable RCS pressure (2150 psig), temperature, power level, pressurizer and makeup tank levels, makeup and letdown, and RCP seal injection and return flows.
An early warning of pressure boundary LEAKAGE or unidentified LEAKAGE is provided by the systems that monitor the containment atmosphere radioactivity and the containment sump level. It should be noted that LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE. These leakage detection systems are specified in LCO 3.4.15, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation."
Note 2 states that this SR is not applicable to primary to secondary LEAKAGE because LEAKAGE of 150 gallons per day cannot be measured accurately by an RCS water inventory balance.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
Insert A A.1 If pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the affected component, pipe, or vessel must be isolated from the RCS by a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. While in this condition, structural integrity of the system should be considered because the structural integrity of the part of the system within the isolation boundary must be maintained under all licensing basis conditions, including consideration of the potential for further degradation of the isolated location. Normal LEAKAGE past the isolation device is acceptable as it will limit RCS LEAKAGE and is included in identified or unidentified LEAKAGE. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
ATTACHMENT 3c Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages - For Information Only Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69 NRC Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318 Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Page B 3.4.13-2 B 3.4.13-3 B 3.4.13-4
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BASES CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.4.13-2 Revision 46 Except for primary to secondary LEAKAGE, the safety analyses do not address operational LEAKAGE. However, other operational LEAKAGE is related to the safety analyses for a LOCA; the amount of leakage can affect the probability of such an event. The safety analysis for an event resulting in steam discharge to the atmosphere assumes a 100 gpd/SG primary to secondary LEAKAGE as the initial condition.
Primary to secondary LEAKAGE is a major factor in the dose releases outside the Containment Structure resulting from a steam line break accident. To a lesser extent, other accidents, or transients such as, a SGTR, a seized rotor event, and a Control Element Assembly Ejection event, involve secondary contamination via primary to secondary leakage and subsequent secondary steam release to the atmosphere via the atmospheric dump valves and main steam safety valves.
Although the operational leakage rate limit applies to leakage through any one SG, Reference 5 requires that the leakage be apportioned between steam generators in such a manner that the calculated dose is maximized.
The analyses described in Reference 1 include appropriate apportioning of steam generator leakage to maximize the dose consequences.
Of the four secondary release accidents, the SGTR with a Preaccident Iodine Spike is the most limiting for offsite radiation releases.
Reactor Coolant System operational LEAKAGE satisfies 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), Criterion 2.
LCO Reactor Coolant System operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
a.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, being indicative of material deterioration. LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE.
Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE. LEAKAGE (except primary to secondary LEAKAGE) through a Pressure prohibited RCPB
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BASES CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.4.13-3 Revision 46 nonisolable fault in an RCS component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall is RCS pressure boundary LEAKAGE. Zero leakage in an isolated fault is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE. A fault is considered isolated with no pressure boundary LEAKAGE, if following the positioning of isolation device(s) it is verified that zero leakage exists.
b.
Unidentified LEAKAGE One gpm of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the containment air monitoring and containment sump level monitoring equipment, can detect within a reasonable time period. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB, if the LEAKAGE is from the pressure boundary.
c.
Identified LEAKAGE Up to 10 gpm of identified LEAKAGE is considered allowable because LEAKAGE is from known sources that do not interfere with the detection of unidentified LEAKAGE and is well within the capability of the RCS makeup system. Identified LEAKAGE includes LEAKAGE to the Containment Structure from specifically known and located sources, but does not include pressure boundary LEAKAGE or controlled RCP seal leakoff (a normal function not considered LEAKAGE). Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of a component or system.
d.
Primary to Secondary LEAKAGE through Any One Steam Generator The limit of 100 gpd per SG is based on a safety analysis assumption. Plant procedures further limit operational LEAKAGE to 50 gpd/SG to ensure the TS operational limit of 100 gpd/SG assumed in the accident analysis will not be exceeded as a result of additional LEAKAGE induced during the accident. This limit is more conservative than the 150 gpd/SG operational LEAKAGE performance criterion in Reference 3. The limit is based on operating experience with SG tube degradation mechanisms that result in tube leakage.
Separating the sources of LEAKAGE (i.e., LEAKAGE from an identified source versus LEAKAGE from an unidentified source) is necessary for prompt identification of potentially adverse conditions, assessment of the safety significance, and corrective action.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 BASES CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.4.13-4 Revision 46 The operational leakage rate criterion in conjunction with the implementation of the Steam Generator Program is an effective measure for minimizing the frequency of SG tube ruptures.
APPLICABILITY In MODEs 1, 2, 3, and 4, the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the RCS is pressurized.
In MODEs 5 and 6, LEAKAGE limits are not required because the reactor coolant pressure is far lower, resulting in lower stresses and reduced potentials for LEAKAGE.
ACTIONS A.1 Unidentified LEAKAGE or identified LEAKAGE in excess of the LCO limits must be reduced to within limits within four hours. This Completion Time allows time to verify leakage rates and either identify unidentified LEAKAGE or reduce LEAKAGE to within limits before the reactor must be shut down. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
B.1 and B.2 If any pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, or primary to secondary LEAKAGE is not within limit, or if unidentified or identified LEAKAGE cannot be reduced to within limits within four hours, the reactor must be brought to lower pressure conditions to reduce the severity of the LEAKAGE and its potential consequences. The reactor must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. This action reduces the LEAKAGE and also reduces the factors that tend to degrade the pressure boundary.
The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODE 5, the pressure stresses acting on the RCPB are much lower, and further deterioration is much less likely.
B.1 C.1 and C.2 Insert A any of the Required Actions and associated Completion Times cannot be met,
Insert A A.1 If pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the affected component, pipe, or vessel must be isolated from the RCS by a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. While in this condition, structural integrity of the system should be considered because the structural integrity of the part of the system within the isolation boundary must be maintained under all licensing basis conditions, including consideration of the potential for further degradation of the isolated location. Normal LEAKAGE past the isolation device is acceptable as it will limit RCS LEAKAGE and is included in identified or unidentified LEAKAGE. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
ATTACHMENT 3d Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages - For Information Only Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 NRC Docket No. 50-461 Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Page B 3.4-24 B 3.4-25 B 3.4-26 B 3.4-27
CLINTON B 3.4-24 Revision No. 0 RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.5 BASES BACKGROUND assumptions from being exceeded. The consequences of (continued) violating this LCO include the possibility of a loss of coolant accident.
APPLICABLE The allowable RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are based on SAFETY ANALYSES the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of pipe cracks. The normally expected background LEAKAGE due to equipment design and the detection capability of the instrumentation for determining system LEAKAGE were also considered. The evidence from experiments suggests, for LEAKAGE even greater than the specified unidentified LEAKAGE limits, the probability is small that the imperfection or crack associated with such LEAKAGE would grow rapidly.
The unidentified LEAKAGE flow limit allows time for corrective action before the RCPB could be significantly compromised. The 5 gpm limit is a small fraction of the calculated flow from a critical crack in the primary system piping. Crack behavior from experimental programs (Refs. 4 and 5) shows leak rates of hundreds of gallons per minute will precede crack instability (Ref. 6).
The low limit on increase in unidentified LEAKAGE assumes a failure mechanism of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) that produces tight cracks. This flow increase limit is capable of providing an early warning of such deterioration.
No applicable safety analysis assumes the total LEAKAGE limit. The total LEAKAGE limit considers RCS inventory makeup capability and drywell floor sump capacity.
RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
- a.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, being indicative of material degradation. LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE.
Violation of this LCO could result in continued (continued)
Pressure prohibited RCPB
CLINTON B 3.4-25 Revision No. 0 RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.5 BASES LCO
- a.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE (continued) degradation of the RCPB. LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
- b.
Unidentified LEAKAGE Five gpm of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the drywell atmospheric monitoring, drywell sump level monitoring, and drywell air cooler condensate flow rate monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period.
Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.
- c.
Total LEAKAGE The total LEAKAGE limit is based on a reasonable minimum detectable amount. The limit also accounts for LEAKAGE from known sources (identified LEAKAGE).
Violation of this LCO indicates an unexpected amount of LEAKAGE and, therefore, could indicate new or additional degradation in an RCPB component or system.
- d.
Unidentified LEAKAGE Increase An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period indicates a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated to determine the source and extent of the LEAKAGE. The increase is measured relative to the steady state value; temporary changes in LEAKAGE rate as a result of transient conditions (e.g., startup) are not considered. As such, the 2 gpm increase limit is only applicable in MODE 1 when operating pressures and temperatures are established. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the RCS operational LEAKAGE LCO applies because the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the reactor is pressurized.
In MODES 4 and 5, RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are not required since the reactor is not pressurized and stresses in the RCPB materials and potential for LEAKAGE are reduced.
(continued)
(continued)
Separating the sources of LEAKAGE (i.e., LEAKAGE from an identified source versus LEAKAGE from an unidentified source) is necessary for prompt identification of potentially adverse conditions, assessment of the safety significance, and corrective action.
BASES (continued)
CLINTON B 3.4-26 Revision No. 0 RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.5 ACTIONS A.1 With RCS unidentified or total LEAKAGE greater than the limits, actions must be taken to reduce the leakage.
Because the LEAKAGE limits are conservatively below the LEAKAGE that would constitute a critical crack size, 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is allowed to reduce the LEAKAGE rates before the reactor must be shut down. If an unidentified LEAKAGE has been identified and quantified, it may be reclassified and considered as identified LEAKAGE. However, the total LEAKAGE limit would remain unchanged.
B.1 An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period is an indication of a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated. Although the increase does not necessarily violate the absolute unidentified LEAKAGE limit, certain susceptible components must be determined not to be the source of the LEAKAGE increase within the required Completion Time. For an unidentified LEAKAGE increase greater than required limits, an alternative to reducing LEAKAGE increase to within limits (i.e., reducing the leakage rate such that the current rate is less than the 2 gpm increase in the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; either by isolating the source or other possible methods) is to evaluate RCS type 304 and type 316 austenitic stainless steel piping that is subject to high stress or that contains relatively stagnant or intermittent flow fluids and determine it is not the source of the increased LEAKAGE. This type of piping is very susceptible to IGSCC.
The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is needed to properly reduce the LEAKAGE increase or verify the source before the reactor must be shut down.
C.1 and C.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met or if pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be (continued)
B.1 C.1 D.1 and D.2 A.1 If pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the affected component, pipe, or vessel must be isolated from the RCS by a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
While in this condition, structural integrity of the system should be considered because the structural integrity of the part of the system within the isolation boundary must be maintained under all licensing basis conditions, including consideration of the potential for further degradation of the isolated location. Normal LEAKAGE past the isolation device is acceptable as it will limit RCS LEAKAGE and is included in identified or unidentified LEAKAGE. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
BASES CLINTON B 3.4-27 Revision No. 14-2 RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.5 ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.5.1 REQUIREMENTS The RCS LEAKAGE is monitored by a variety of instruments designed to quantify the various types of LEAKAGE. Leakage detection instrumentation is discussed in more detail in the Bases for LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation." Sump level and flow rate are typically monitored to determine actual LEAKAGE rates. However, any method may be used to quantify LEAKAGE within the guidelines of Reference 7. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
With regard to LEAKAGE values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref. 8).
REFERENCES
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 55.
- 4.
GEAP-5620, "Failure Behavior in ASTM A106B Pipes Containing Axial Through Wall Flaws," April 1968.
- 5.
NUREG-75/067, "Investigation and Evaluation of Cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactor Plants," October 1975.
- 6.
USAR, Section 5.2.5.5.3.
- 7.
Regulatory Guide 1.45, May 1973.
- 8.
Calculation IP-0-0033.
D.1 and D.2
ATTACHMENT 3e Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages - For Information Only Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 NRC Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249 Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages B 3.4.4-2 B 3.4.4-3 B 3.3.4-4 B 3.3.4-5
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.4.4-2 Revision 0 BASES (continued)
APPLICABLE The allowable RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are based on SAFETY ANALYSES the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of pipe cracks. The normally expected background LEAKAGE due to equipment design and the detection capability of the instrumentation for determining system LEAKAGE were also considered. The evidence from experiments suggests that, for LEAKAGE even greater than the specified unidentified LEAKAGE limits, the probability is small that the imperfection or crack associated with such LEAKAGE would grow rapidly.
The unidentified LEAKAGE flow limit allows time for corrective action before the RCPB could be significantly compromised. The 5 gpm limit is a small fraction of the calculated flow from a critical crack in the primary system piping. Crack behavior from experimental programs (Refs. 2 and 3) shows that leakage rates of hundreds of gallons per minute will precede crack instability.
The low limit on increase in unidentified LEAKAGE assumes a failure mechanism of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) that produces tight cracks. This flow increase limit is capable of providing an early warning of such deterioration.
No applicable safety analysis assumes the total LEAKAGE limit. The total LEAKAGE limit considers RCS inventory makeup capability and drywell floor sump capacity.
RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
LCO RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
a.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, being indicative of material degradation. LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE.
Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
(continued)
Pressure prohibited RCPB
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.4.4-3 Revision 0 BASES LCO b.
Unidentified LEAKAGE (continued)
The 5 gpm of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the drywell floor drain sump flow rate monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.
c.
Total LEAKAGE The total LEAKAGE limit is based on a reasonable minimum detectable amount. The limit also accounts for LEAKAGE from known sources (identified LEAKAGE).
Violation of this LCO indicates an unexpected amount of LEAKAGE and, therefore, could indicate new or additional degradation in an RCPB component or system.
d.
Unidentified LEAKAGE Increase An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period indicates a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated to determine the source and extent of the LEAKAGE. The increase is measured relative to the steady state value; temporary changes in LEAKAGE rate as a result of transient conditions (e.g., startup) are not considered. As such, the 2 gpm increase limit is only applicable in MODE 1 when operating pressures and temperatures are established. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the RCS operational LEAKAGE LCO applies, because the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the reactor is pressurized.
In MODES 4 and 5, RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are not required since the reactor is not pressurized and stresses in the RCPB materials and potential for LEAKAGE are reduced.
(continued)
Separating the sources of LEAKAGE (i.e., LEAKAGE from an identified source versus LEAKAGE from an unidentified source) is necessary for prompt identification of potentially adverse conditions, assessment of the safety significance, and corrective action.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.4.4-4 Revision 0 BASES (continued)
ACTIONS A.1 With RCS unidentified or total LEAKAGE greater than the limits, actions must be taken to reduce the leak. Because the LEAKAGE limits are conservatively below the LEAKAGE that would constitute a critical crack size, 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is allowed to reduce the LEAKAGE rates before the reactor must be shut down. If an unidentified LEAKAGE has been identified and quantified, it may be reclassified and considered as identified LEAKAGE; however, the total LEAKAGE limit would remain unchanged.
B.1 and B.2 An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period is an indication of a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated. Although the increase does not necessarily violate the absolute unidentified LEAKAGE limit, certain susceptible components must be determined not to be the source of the LEAKAGE increase within the required Completion Time. For an unidentified LEAKAGE increase greater than required limits, an alternative to reducing LEAKAGE increase to within limits (i.e., reducing the LEAKAGE rate such that the current rate is less than the "2 gpm increase in the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />" limit; either by isolating the source or other possible methods) is to verify the source of the unidentified leakage increase is not material susceptible to IGSCC.
The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable to properly reduce the LEAKAGE increase or verify the source before the reactor must be shut down without unduly jeopardizing plant safety.
C.1 and C.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met or if pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, (continued)
B.1 C.1 and C.2 D.1 and D.2 Insert A
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.4.4-5 Revision 55 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant safety systems.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.4.1 REQUIREMENTS The RCS LEAKAGE is monitored by a variety of instruments designed to provide alarms when LEAKAGE is indicated and to quantify the various types of LEAKAGE. Leakage detection instrumentation is discussed in more detail in the Bases for LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation." Sump level and flow rate are typically monitored to determine actual LEAKAGE rates; however, an alternate method which may be used to quantify LEAKAGE is calculating flow rates using sump pump run times. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
REFERENCES 1.
UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.4.1.
2.
GEAP-5620, "Failure Behavior in ASTM A106B Pipes Containing Axial Through-Wall Flaws," April 1968.
3.
NUREG-75/067, "Investigation and Evaluation of Cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactor Plants," October 1975.
D.1 and D.2
Insert A A.1 If pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the affected component, pipe, or vessel must be isolated from the RCS by a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. While in this condition, structural integrity of the system should be considered because the structural integrity of the part of the system within the isolation boundary must be maintained under all licensing basis conditions, including consideration of the potential for further degradation of the isolated location. Normal LEAKAGE past the isolation device is acceptable as it will limit RCS LEAKAGE and is included in identified or unidentified LEAKAGE. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
ATTACHMENT 3f Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages - For Information Only James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 NRC Docket No. 50-333 Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Page B 3.4.4-2 B 3.4.4-3 B 3.4.4-4
BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)
LCD RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 instrumentation for determining system LEAKAGE were also considered.
The evidence from experiments suggests that.
for LEAKAGE even greater than the specified unidentified LEAKAGE limits, the probability is small that the imperfection or crack associated with such LEAKAGE would grow rapidly.
The unidentified LEAKAGE flow limit allows time for corrective action before the RCPB could be significantly compromised.
The 5 gpm limit is a small fraction of the calculated flow from a critical crack in the primary system piping.
Crack behavior from experimental programs shows that leakage rates much greater than 5 gpm will precede crack instability (Refs. 4. 5. and 6).
The low limit on increase in unidentified LEAKAGE assumes a failure mechanism that produces relatively tight cracks in piping and components.
Intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) would be typical of tight cracks on stainless steel piping and components susceptible to IGSCC (Refs. 8 and 9).
Inspection programs (Refs. 10 and 11) are in place to detect cracking of piping and components.
No applicable safety analysis assumes the total LEAKAGE limit.
The total LEAKAGE limit considers RCS inventory makeup capability and drywell floor sump capacity.
RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) (Ref. 7).
RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
a.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed. because it is indicative of material degradation.
LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration. resulting in higher LEAKAGE.
Violation of this LCD could result in continued degradation of the RePB.
LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
b.
Unidentified LEAKAGE The 5 gpm of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system can detect within a reasonable time period.
Violation of this LCD could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.
(continued)
JAFNPP B 3.4.4-2 Revision 0 Pressure prohibited RCPB Separating the sources of LEAKAGE (i.e., LEAKAGE from an identified source versus LEAKAGE from an unidentified source) is necessary for prompt identification of potentially adverse conditions, assessment of the safety significance, and corrective action.
BASES LCO (continued)
APPLICABILITY ACTIONS RCS Operational LEAKAGE B3.4.4 c.
Total LEAKAGE The total LEAKAGE limit is based on a reasonable minimum detectable amount.
The limit also accounts for LEAKAGE from known sources (identified LEAKAGE which may be detected by the drywell equipment drain sump monitoring system).
Violation of this LCO indicates an unexpected amount of LEAKAGE and.
therefore. could indicate new or additional degradation in an RCPB component or system.
d.
Unidentified LEAKAGE Increase An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period indicates a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated to determine the source and extent of the LEAKAGE.
The increase is measured relative to the steady state value; temporary changes in LEAKAGE rate as a result of transient conditions (e.g.. startup) are not considered.
As such. the 2 gpm increase limit is only applicable in MODE 1 when operating pressures and temperatures are established.
Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.
In MODES 1. 2. and 3. the RCS operational LEAKAGE LCO applies. because the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the reactor is pressurized.
In MODES 4 and 5. RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are not required since the reactor is not pressurized and stresses in the RCPB materials and potential for LEAKAGE are reduced.
A.l With RCS unidentified or total LEAKAGE greater than the limits. actions must be taken to reduce the leak.
Because the LEAKAGE limits are conservatively below the LEAKAGE that would constitute a critical crack size. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is allowed to reduce the LEAKAGE rates before the reactor must be shut down.
If unidentified LEAKAGE has been identified and quantified. it may be reclassified and considered as identified LEAKAGE; however. the total LEAKAGE limit would remain unchanged.
(continued)
JAFNPP B 3.4.4-3 Revision 0 B.1 Insert A
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)
An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period is an indication of a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated.
Although the increase does not necessarily violate the absolute unidentified LEAKAGE limit, certain susceptible components must be determined not to be the source of the LEAKAGE increase within the required Completion Time.
For an unidentified LEAKAGE increase greater than required limits, an alternative to reducing LEAKAGE increase to within limits (i.e., reducing the LEAKAGE rate such that the current rate is less than the "2 gpm increase in the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />" limit; either by isolating the source or other possible methods) is to evaluate service sensitive type 304 and type 316 austenitic stainless steel piping that is subject to high stress or that contains relatively stagnant or intermittent flow fluids and determine it is not the source of the increased LEAKAGE. This type of piping is very susceptible to IGSCC.
The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable to properly reduce the LEAKAGE increase or verify the source before the reactor must be shut down without unduly jeopardizing plant safety.
C.1 and C.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met or if pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant safety systems.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.4.1 REQUIREMENTS The RCS LEAKAGE is monitored by a variety of instruments designed to provide alarms when LEAKAGE is indicated and to quantify the various types of LEAKAGE. Leakage detection instrumentation is discussed in more detail in the Bases for LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation." Sump level and flow rate are typically monitored to determine actual LEAKAGE rates; however, any method may be used to quantify LEAKAGE within the guidelines of Reference 8.
(continued)
JAFNPP B 3.4.4-4 Revision 30 C.1 and C.2 D.1 and D.2
Insert A A.1 If pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the affected component, pipe, or vessel must be isolated from the RCS by a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. While in this condition, structural integrity of the system should be considered because the structural integrity of the part of the system within the isolation boundary must be maintained under all licensing basis conditions, including consideration of the potential for further degradation of the isolated location. Normal LEAKAGE past the isolation device is acceptable as it will limit RCS LEAKAGE and is included in identified or unidentified LEAKAGE. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
ATTACHMENT 3g Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages - For Information Only LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374 Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages B 3.4.5-2 B 3.4.5-3 B 3.4.5-4
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.5 LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.4.5-2 Revision 0 BASES (continued)
APPLICABLE The allowable RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are based on SAFETY ANALYSES the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of pipe cracks. The normally expected background LEAKAGE due to equipment design and the detection capability of the instrumentation for determining system LEAKAGE were also considered. The evidence from experiments suggests, for LEAKAGE even greater than the specified unidentified LEAKAGE limits, the probability is small that the imperfection or crack associated with such LEAKAGE would grow rapidly.
The unidentified LEAKAGE flow limit allows time for corrective action before the RCPB could be significantly compromised. The 5 gpm limit is a small fraction of the calculated flow from a critical crack in the primary system piping. Crack behavior from experimental programs (Refs. 4 and 5) shows leak rates of hundreds of gallons per minute will precede crack instability (Ref. 6).
The low limit on increase in unidentified LEAKAGE assumes a failure mechanism of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) that produces tight cracks. This flow increase limit is capable of providing an early warning of such deterioration.
No applicable safety analysis assumes the total LEAKAGE limit. The total LEAKAGE limit considers RCS inventory makeup capability and drywell sump capacity.
RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
LCO RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
a.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, being indicative of material degradation. LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE.
Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
(continued)
Pressure prohibited RCPB
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.5 LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.4.5-3 Revision 0 BASES LCO b.
Unidentified LEAKAGE (continued)
Five gpm of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the drywell atmosphere monitoring, drywell sump flow monitoring, and drywell air cooler condensate flow rate monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period.
Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.
c.
Total LEAKAGE The total LEAKAGE limit is based on a reasonable minimum detectable amount. The limit also accounts for LEAKAGE from known sources (identified LEAKAGE).
Violation of this LCO indicates an unexpected amount of LEAKAGE and, therefore, could indicate new or additional degradation in an RCPB component or system.
d.
Unidentified LEAKAGE Increase An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of 2 gpm within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period indicates a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated to determine the source and extent of the LEAKAGE. The increase is measured relative to the steady state value; temporary changes in LEAKAGE rate as a result of transient conditions (e.g., startup) are not considered. As such, the 2 gpm increase limit is only applicable in MODE 1 when operating pressures and temperatures are established. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the RCS operational LEAKAGE LCO applies because the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the reactor is pressurized.
In MODES 4 and 5, RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are not required since the reactor is not pressurized and stresses in the RCPB materials and potential for LEAKAGE are reduced.
(continued)
Separating the sources of LEAKAGE (i.e., LEAKAGE from an identified source versus LEAKAGE from an unidentified source) is necessary for prompt identification of potentially adverse conditions, assessment of the safety significance, and corrective action.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.5 LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.4.5-4 Revision 0 BASES (continued)
ACTIONS A.1 With RCS unidentified or total LEAKAGE greater than the limits, actions must be taken to reduce the leak. Because the LEAKAGE limits are conservatively below the LEAKAGE that would constitute a critical crack size, 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is allowed to reduce the LEAKAGE rates before the reactor must be shut down. If an unidentified LEAKAGE has been identified and quantified, it may be reclassified and considered as identified LEAKAGE. However, the total LEAKAGE limit would remain unchanged.
B.1 and B.2 An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period is an indication of a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated. Although the increase does not necessarily violate the absolute unidentified LEAKAGE limit, certain susceptible components must be determined not to be the source of the LEAKAGE increase within the required Completion Time. For an unidentified LEAKAGE increase greater than required limits, an alternative to reducing LEAKAGE increase to within limits (i.e., reducing the leakage rate such that the current rate is less than the "2 gpm increase in the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />" limit; either by isolating the source or other possible methods) is to verify the source of the unidentified leakage increase is not material susceptible to IGSCC.
The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is needed to properly reduce the LEAKAGE increase or verify the source before the reactor must be shut down.
C.1 and C.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met or if pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
(continued)
B.1 C.1 and C.2 D.1 and D.2 Insert A
Insert A A.1 If pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the affected component, pipe, or vessel must be isolated from the RCS by a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. While in this condition, structural integrity of the system should be considered because the structural integrity of the part of the system within the isolation boundary must be maintained under all licensing basis conditions, including consideration of the potential for further degradation of the isolated location. Normal LEAKAGE past the isolation device is acceptable as it will limit RCS LEAKAGE and is included in identified or unidentified LEAKAGE. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
ATTACHMENT 3h Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages - For Information Only Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-39 NRC Docket No. 50-352 Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Page B 3/4 4-3e
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.3.2 OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE The allowable leakage rates from the reactor coolant system have been based on the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of cracks in pipes. The normally expected background leakage due to equipment design and the detection capability of the instrumentation for determining system leakage was also considered. The evidence obtained from experiments suggests that for leakage somewhat greater than that specified for UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE the probability is small that the imperfection or crack associated with such leakage would grow rapidly. However, in all cases, if the leakage rates exceed the values specified or the leakage is located and known to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, the reactor will be shutdown to allow further investigation and corrective action. The limit of 2 gpm increase in UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE over a 24-hour period and the monitoring of drywell floor drain sump and drywell equipment drain tank flow rate at least once every eight (8) hours conforms with NRC staff positions specified in NRC Generic Letter 88-01, "NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping," as revised by NRC Safety Evaluation dated March 6, 1990. The ACTION requirement for the 2 gpm increase in UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE limit ensures that such leakage is identified or a plant shutdown is initiated to allow further investigation and corrective action. Once identified, reactor operation may continue dependent upon the impact on total leakage.
The function of Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves (PIVs) is to separate the high pressure Reactor Coolant System from an attached low pressure system.
The ACTION requirements for pressure isolation valves are used in conjunction with the system specifications for which PIVs are listed in the Technical Requirements Manual and with primary containment isolation valve requirements to ensure that plant operation is appropriately limited.
The Surveillance Requirements for the RCS pressure isolation valves provide added assurance of valve integrity thereby reducing the probability of gross valve failure and consequent intersystem LOCA. Leakage from the RCS pressure isolation valves is not included in any other allowable operational leakage specified in Section 3.4.3.2.
3/4.4.4 (Deleted) INFORMATION FROM THIS SECTION RELOCATED TO THE TRM LIMERICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-3e Amendment No. 140,172,174,182, Associated with Amendment No. 205 Insert B Insert A
Insert A Separating the sources of LEAKAGE (i.e., LEAKAGE from an identified source versus LEAKAGE from an unidentified source) is necessary for prompt identification of potentially adverse conditions, assessment of the safety significance, and corrective action.
Insert B PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE is prohibited as the leak itself could cause further reactor coolant pressure boundary deterioration, resulting in higher leakage. If PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE exists, the affected component, pipe, or vessel must be isolated from the reactor coolant system by a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. While in this condition, structural integrity of the system should be considered because the structural integrity of the part of the system within the isolation boundary must be maintained under all licensing basis conditions, including consideration of the potential for further degradation of the isolated location. Normal leakage past the isolation device is acceptable as it will limit reactor coolant system leakage and is included in IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE or UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE. This ACTION is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. If the ACTION cannot be completed in the required time, then the reactor will be shutdown to allow further investigation and corrective action.
ATTACHMENT 3i Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages - For Information Only Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-85 NRC Docket No. 50-353 Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Page B 3/4 4-3e
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.3.2 OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE The allowable leakage rates from the reactor coolant system have been based on the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of cracks in pipes. The normally expected background leakage due to equipment design and the detection capability of the instrumentation for determining system leakage was also considered. The evidence obtained from experiments suggests that for leakage somewhat greater than that specified for UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE the probability is small that the imperfection or crack associated with such leakage would grow rapidly. However, in all cases, if the leakage rates exceed the values specified or the leakage is located and known to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, the reactor will be shutdown to allow further investigation and corrective action. The limit of 2 gpm increase in UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE over a 24-hour period and the monitoring of drywell floor drain sump and drywell equipment drain tank flow rate at least once every eight (8) hours conforms with NRC staff positions specified in NRC Generic Letter 88-01, "NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping," as revised by NRC Safety Evaluation dated March 6, 1990. The ACTION requirement for the 2 gpm increase in UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE limit ensures that such leakage is identified or a plant shutdown is initiated to allow further investigation and corrective action. Once identified, reactor operation may continue dependent upon the impact on total leakage.
The function of Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves (PIVs) is to separate the high pressure Reactor Coolant System from an attached low pressure system.
The ACTION requirements for pressure isolation valves are used in conjunction with the system specifications for which PIVs are listed in The Technical Requirements Manual and with primary containment isolation valve requirements to ensure that plant operation is appropriately limited.
The Surveillance Requirements for the RCS pressure isolation valves provide added assurance of valve integrity thereby reducing the probability of gross valve failure and consequent intersystem LOCA. Leakage from the RCS pressure isolation valves is not included in any other allowable operational leakage specified in Section 3.4.3.2.
3/4.4.4 (Deleted) INFORMATION FROM THIS SECTION RELOCATED TO THE TRM LIMERICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-3e Amendment No. 103, 134, 136, 144 Associated with Amendment No. 167.
Insert B Insert A
Insert A Separating the sources of LEAKAGE (i.e., LEAKAGE from an identified source versus LEAKAGE from an unidentified source) is necessary for prompt identification of potentially adverse conditions, assessment of the safety significance, and corrective action.
Insert B PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE is prohibited as the leak itself could cause further reactor coolant pressure boundary deterioration, resulting in higher leakage. If PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE exists, the affected component, pipe, or vessel must be isolated from the reactor coolant system by a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. While in this condition, structural integrity of the system should be considered because the structural integrity of the part of the system within the isolation boundary must be maintained under all licensing basis conditions, including consideration of the potential for further degradation of the isolated location. Normal leakage past the isolation device is acceptable as it will limit reactor coolant system leakage and is included in IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE or UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE. This ACTION is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. If the ACTION cannot be completed in the required time, then the reactor will be shutdown to allow further investigation and corrective action.
ATTACHMENT 3j Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages - For Information Only Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 NRC Docket No. 50-410 Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Page B 3.4.5-2 B 3.4.5-3 B 3.4.5-4 B 3.4.5-5
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.5 NMP2 B 3.4.5-2 Revision 0 BASES (continued)
APPLICABLE The allowable RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are based on SAFETY ANALYSES the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of pipe cracks. The normally expected background LEAKAGE due to equipment design and the detection capability of the instrumentation for determining system LEAKAGE were also considered. The evidence from experiments suggests, for LEAKAGE even greater than the specified unidentified LEAKAGE limits, the probability is small that the imperfection or crack associated with such LEAKAGE would grow rapidly.
The unidentified LEAKAGE flow limit allows time for corrective action before the RCPB could be significantly compromised. The 5 gpm limit is a small fraction of the calculated flow from a critical crack in the primary system piping. Crack behavior from experimental programs (Refs. 4 and 5) shows leak rates of hundreds of gallons per minute will precede crack instability (Ref. 6).
The low limit on increase in unidentified LEAKAGE assumes a failure mechanism of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) that produces tight cracks. This flow increase limit is capable of providing an early warning of such deterioration.
No applicable safety analysis assumes the identified LEAKAGE limit. The identified LEAKAGE limit considers RCS inventory makeup capability and drywell equipment tank capacity.
RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of Reference 7.
LCO RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
- a.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, being indicative of material degradation. LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE.
Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
(continued)
Pressure prohibited RCPB
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.5 NMP2 B 3.4.5-3 Revision 0 BASES LCO
- b.
Unidentified LEAKAGE (continued)
Five gpm of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the drywell atmospheric monitoring and drywell floor drain tank fill rate monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.
- c.
Identified LEAKAGE The identified LEAKAGE limit is based on a reasonable minimum detectable amount. The limit accounts for LEAKAGE from known sources (identified LEAKAGE).
Violation of this LCO indicates an unexpected amount of LEAKAGE and, therefore, could indicate new or additional degradation in an RCPB component or system.
- d.
Unidentified LEAKAGE Increase An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period indicates a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated to determine the source and extent of the LEAKAGE. The increase is measured relative to the steady state value; temporary changes in LEAKAGE rate as a result of transient conditions (e.g., startup) are not considered. As such, the 2 gpm increase limit is only applicable in MODE 1 when operating pressures and temperatures are established. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the RCS operational LEAKAGE LCO applies because the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the reactor is pressurized.
In MODES 4 and 5, RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are not required since the reactor is not pressurized and stresses in the RCPB materials and potential for LEAKAGE are reduced.
(continued)
Separating the sources of LEAKAGE (i.e.,
LEAKAGE from an identified source versus LEAKAGE from an unidentified source) is necessary for prompt identification of potentially adverse conditions, assessment of the safety significance, and corrective action.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.5 NMP2 B 3.4.5-4 Revision 0 BASES (continued)
ACTIONS A.1 With RCS unidentified or identified LEAKAGE greater than the limits, actions must be taken to reduce the leak. Because the LEAKAGE limits are conservatively below the LEAKAGE that would constitute a critical crack size, 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is allowed to reduce the LEAKAGE rates before the reactor must be shut down. If an unidentified LEAKAGE has been identified and quantified, it may be reclassified and considered as identified LEAKAGE. However, the identified LEAKAGE limit would remain unchanged.
B.1 and B.2 An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period is an indication of a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated. Although the increase does not necessarily violate the absolute unidentified LEAKAGE limit, certain components must be determined not to be the source of the LEAKAGE increase within the required Completion Time.
For an unidentified LEAKAGE increase greater than required limits, an alternative to reducing LEAKAGE increase to within limits (i.e., reducing the leakage rate such that the current rate is less than the "2 gpm increase in the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />" limit; either by isolating the source or other possible methods) is to identify the source of the leak. This will ensure the unidentified LEAKAGE increase is not due to pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is needed to properly reduce the LEAKAGE increase or identify the source before the reactor must be shut down.
C.1 and C.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met or if pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, (continued)
B.1 Insert A C.1 and C.2 D.1 and D.2
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.5 NMP2 B 3.4.5-5 Revision 0, 44 (A152)
BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.5.1 REQUIREMENTS The RCS LEAKAGE is monitored by a variety of instruments designed to provide alarms when LEAKAGE is indicated and to quantify the various types of LEAKAGE. Leakage detection instrumentation is discussed in more detail in the Bases for LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation." Drain tank level and flow rate are typically monitored to determine actual LEAKAGE rates. However, any method may be used to quantify LEAKAGE within the guidelines of Reference 8. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
REFERENCES
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 55.
- 4.
GEAP-5620, "Failure Behavior in ASTM A106B Pipes Containing Axial Through-Wall Flaws," April 1968.
- 5.
NUREG-75/067, "Investigation and Evaluation of Cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactors," October 1975.
- 6.
USAR, Section 5.2.5.5.3.
- 7.
- 8.
Regulatory Guide 1.45, May 1973.
D.1 and D.2
Insert A A.1 If pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the affected component, pipe, or vessel must be isolated from the RCS by a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. While in this condition, structural integrity of the system should be considered because the structural integrity of the part of the system within the isolation boundary must be maintained under all licensing basis conditions, including consideration of the potential for further degradation of the isolated location. Normal LEAKAGE past the isolation device is acceptable as it will limit RCS LEAKAGE and is included in identified or unidentified LEAKAGE. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
ATTACHMENT 3k Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages - For Information Only Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-44 NRC Docket No. 50-277 Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Page B 3.4-20 B 3.4-21 B 3.4-22 B 3.4-23
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 BASES (continued)
APPLICABLE The allowable RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are based on SAFETY ANALYSES the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of pipe cracks. The normally expected background LEAKAGE due to equipment design and the detection capability of the instrumentation for determining system LEAKAGE were also considered. The evidence from experiments suggests that, for LEAKAGE even greater than the specified unidentified LEAKAGE limits, the probability is small that the imperfection or crack associated with such LEAKAGE would grow rapidly.
The unidentified LEAKAGE flow limit allows time for corrective action before the RCPB could be significantly compromised. The 5 gpm limit is a small fraction of the calculated flow from a critical crack in the primary system piping. Crack behavior from experimental programs (Refs. 4 and 5) shows that leakage rates of hundreds of gallons per minute will precede crack instability.
The low limit on increase in unidentified LEAKAGE assumes a failure mechanism of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) in service sensitive type 304 and type 316 austenitic stainless steel that produces tight cracks. This flow increase limit is capable of providing an early warning of such deterioration.
No applicable safety analysis assumes the total LEAKAGE limit. The total LEAKAGE limit considers RCS inventory makeup capability and drywell floor sump capacity.
RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
- a.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, since it is indicative of material degradation. LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE.
Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
(continued)
PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-20 Revision No. 0 Pressure prohibited RCPB
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 BASES LCO
- b.
Unidentified LEAKAGE (continued)
The 5 gpm of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the containment air monitoring and drywell sump level monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.
- c.
Total LEAKAGE The total LEAKAGE limit is based on a reasonable minimum detectable amount. The limit also accounts for LEAKAGE from known sources (identified LEAKAGE).
Violation of this LCO indicates an unexpected amount of LEAKAGE and, therefore, could indicate new or additional degradation in an RCPB component or system.
- d.
Unidentified LEAKAGE Increase An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period indicates a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated to determine the source and extent of the LEAKAGE. The increase is measured relative to the steady state value; temporary changes in LEAKAGE rate as a result of transient conditions (e.g., startup) are not considered. As such, the 2 gpm increase limit is only applicable in MODE 1 when operating pressures and temperatures are established. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the RCS operational LEAKAGE LCO applies, because the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the reactor is pressurized.
In MODES 4 and 5, RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are not required since the reactor is not pressurized and stresses in the RCPB materials and potential for LEAKAGE are reduced.
(continued)
PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-21 Revision No. 0 Separating the sources of LEAKAGE (i.e., LEAKAGE from an identified source versus LEAKAGE from an unidentified source) is necessary for prompt identification of potentially adverse conditions, assessment of the safety significance, and corrective action.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 BASES (continued)
ACTIONS A.1 With RCS unidentified or total LEAKAGE greater than the limits, actions must be taken to reduce the leak. Because the LEAKAGE limits are conservatively below the LEAKAGE that would constitute a critical crack size, 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is allowed to reduce the LEAKAGE rates before the reactor must be shut down. If an unidentified LEAKAGE has been identified and quantified, it may be reclassified and considered as identified LEAKAGE; however, the total LEAKAGE limit would remain unchanged.
B.1 and B.2 An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period is an indication of a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated. Although the increase does not necessarily violate the absolute unidentified LEAKAGE limit, certain susceptible components must be determined not to be the source of the LEAKAGE increase within the required Completion Time. For an unidentified LEAKAGE increase greater than required limits, an alternative to reducing LEAKAGE increase to within limits (i.e., reducing the leakage rate such that the current rate is less than the "2 gpm increase in the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />" limit; either by isolating the source or other possible methods) is to evaluate service sensitive type 304 and type 316 austenitic stainless steel piping that is subject to high stress or that contains relatively stagnant or intermittent flow fluids and determine it is not the source of the increased LEAKAGE. This type piping is very susceptible to IGSCC.
The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable to properly reduce the LEAKAGE increase or verify the source before the reactor must be shut down without unduly jeopardizing plant safety.
C.1 and C.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met or if pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within (continued)
PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-22 Revision No. 0 B.1 C.1 and C.2 Insert A D.1 and D.2
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant safety systems.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.4.1 REQUIREMENTS The RCS LEAKAGE is monitored by a variety of instruments designed to provide alarms when LEAKAGE is indicated and to quantify the various types of LEAKAGE. Leakage detection instrumentation is discussed in more detail in the Bases for LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation." Sump level and flow rate are typically monitored to determine actual LEAKAGE rates; however, any method may be used to quantify LEAKAGE within the guidelines of Reference 6. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
REFERENCES
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
UFSAR, Section 4.10.4.
- 4.
GEAP-5620, "Failure Behavior in ASTM A106B Pipes Containing Axial Through-Wall Flaws," April 1968.
- 5.
NUREG-75/067, "Investigation and Evaluation of Cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactors," October 1975.
- 6.
Regulatory Guide 1.45, May 1973.
- 7.
Generic Letter 88-01, "NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping," January 1988.
PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-23 Revision No. 86 D.1 and D.2
Insert A A.1 If pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the affected component, pipe, or vessel must be isolated from the RCS by a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. While in this condition, structural integrity of the system should be considered because the structural integrity of the part of the system within the isolation boundary must be maintained under all licensing basis conditions, including consideration of the potential for further degradation of the isolated location. Normal LEAKAGE past the isolation device is acceptable as it will limit RCS LEAKAGE and is included in identified or unidentified LEAKAGE. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
ATTACHMENT 3l Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages - For Information Only Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-56 NRC Docket No. 50-278 Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Page B 3.4-20 B 3.4-21 B 3.4-22 B 3.4-23
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 BASES (continued)
APPLICABLE The allowable RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are based on SAFETY ANALYSES the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of pipe cracks. The normally expected background LEAKAGE due to equipment design and the detection capability of the instrumentation for determining system LEAKAGE were also considered. The evidence from experiments suggests that, for LEAKAGE even greater than the specified unidentified LEAKAGE limits, the probability is small that the imperfection or crack associated with such LEAKAGE would grow rapidly.
The unidentified LEAKAGE flow limit allows time for corrective action before the RCPB could be significantly compromised. The 5 gpm limit is a small fraction of the calculated flow from a critical crack in the primary system piping. Crack behavior from experimental programs (Refs. 4 and 5) shows that leakage rates of hundreds of gallons per minute will precede crack instability.
The low limit on increase in unidentified LEAKAGE assumes a failure mechanism of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) in service sensitive type 304 and type 316 austenitic stainless steel that produces tight cracks. This flow increase limit is capable of providing an early warning of such deterioration.
No applicable safety analysis assumes the total LEAKAGE limit. The total LEAKAGE limit considers RCS inventory makeup capability and drywell floor sump capacity.
RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
a.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, since it is indicative of material degradation. LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE.
Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
(continued)
PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.4-20 Revision No. 0 Pressure prohibited RCPB
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 BASES LCO b.
Unidentified LEAKAGE (continued)
The 5 gpm of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the containment air monitoring and drywell sump level monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.
c.
Total LEAKAGE The total LEAKAGE limit is based on a reasonable minimum detectable amount. The limit also accounts for LEAKAGE from known sources (identified LEAKAGE).
Violation of this LCO indicates an unexpected amount of LEAKAGE and, therefore, could indicate new or additional degradation in an RCPB component or system.
d.
Unidentified LEAKAGE Increase An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period indicates a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated to determine the source and extent of the LEAKAGE. The increase is measured relative to the steady state value; temporary changes in LEAKAGE rate as a result of transient conditions (e.g., startup) are not considered. As such, the 2 gpm increase limit is only applicable in MODE 1 when operating pressures and temperatures are established. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the RCS operational LEAKAGE LCO applies, because the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the reactor is pressurized.
In MODES 4 and 5, RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are not required since the reactor is not pressurized and stresses in the RCPB materials and potential for LEAKAGE are reduced.
(continued)
PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.4-21 Revision No. 0 Separating the sources of LEAKAGE (i.e., LEAKAGE from an identified source versus LEAKAGE from an unidentified source) is necessary for prompt identification of potentially adverse conditions, assessment of the safety significance, and corrective action.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 BASES (continued)
ACTIONS A.1 With RCS unidentified or total LEAKAGE greater than the limits, actions must be taken to reduce the leak. Because the LEAKAGE limits are conservatively below the LEAKAGE that would constitute a critical crack size, 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is allowed to reduce the LEAKAGE rates before the reactor must be shut down. If an unidentified LEAKAGE has been identified and quantified, it may be reclassified and considered as identified LEAKAGE; however, the total LEAKAGE limit would remain unchanged.
B.1 and B.2 An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period is an indication of a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated. Although the increase does not necessarily violate the absolute unidentified LEAKAGE limit, certain susceptible components must be determined not to be the source of the LEAKAGE increase within the required Completion Time. For an unidentified LEAKAGE increase greater than required limits, an alternative to reducing LEAKAGE increase to within limits (i.e., reducing the leakage rate such that the current rate is less than the "2 gpm increase in the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />" limit; either by isolating the source or other possible methods) is to evaluate service sensitive type 304 and type 316 austenitic stainless steel piping that is subject to high stress or that contains relatively stagnant or intermittent flow fluids and determine it is not the source of the increased LEAKAGE. This type piping is very susceptible to IGSCC.
The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable to properly reduce the LEAKAGE increase or verify the source before the reactor must be shut down without unduly jeopardizing plant safety.
C.1 and C.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met or if pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within (continued)
PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.4-22 Revision No. 0 B.1 C.1 and C.2 D.1 and D.2 Insert A
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant safety systems.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.4.1 REQUIREMENTS The RCS LEAKAGE is monitored by a variety of instruments designed to provide alarms when LEAKAGE is indicated and to quantify the various types of LEAKAGE. Leakage detection instrumentation is discussed in more detail in the Bases for LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation." Sump level and flow rate are typically monitored to determine actual LEAKAGE rates; however, any method may be used to quantify LEAKAGE within the guidelines of Reference 6. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
REFERENCES 1.
2.
3.
UFSAR, Section 4.10.4.
4.
GEAP-5620, "Failure Behavior in ASTM A106B Pipes Containing Axial Through-Wall Flaws," April 1968.
5.
NUREG-75/067, "Investigation and Evaluation of Cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactors," October 1975.
6.
Regulatory Guide 1.45, May 1973.
7.
Generic Letter 88-01, "NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping," January 1988.
PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.4-23 Revision No. 87 D.1 and D.2
Insert A A.1 If pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the affected component, pipe, or vessel must be isolated from the RCS by a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. While in this condition, structural integrity of the system should be considered because the structural integrity of the part of the system within the isolation boundary must be maintained under all licensing basis conditions, including consideration of the potential for further degradation of the isolated location. Normal LEAKAGE past the isolation device is acceptable as it will limit RCS LEAKAGE and is included in identified or unidentified LEAKAGE. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
ATTACHMENT 3m Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages - For Information Only Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 NRC Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265 Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages B 3.4.4-2 B 2.4.4-3 B 3.4.4-4 B 3.4.4-5
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.4.4-2 Revision 0 BASES (continued)
APPLICABLE The allowable RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are based on SAFETY ANALYSES the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of pipe cracks. The normally expected background LEAKAGE due to equipment design and the detection capability of the instrumentation for determining system LEAKAGE were also considered. The evidence from experiments suggests that, for LEAKAGE even greater than the specified unidentified LEAKAGE limits, the probability is small that the imperfection or crack associated with such LEAKAGE would grow rapidly.
The unidentified LEAKAGE flow limit allows time for corrective action before the RCPB could be significantly compromised. The 5 gpm limit is a small fraction of the calculated flow from a critical crack in the primary system piping. Crack behavior from experimental programs (Refs. 2 and 3) shows that leakage rates of hundreds of gallons per minute will precede crack instability.
The low limit on increase in unidentified LEAKAGE assumes a failure mechanism of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) that produces tight cracks. This flow increase limit is capable of providing an early warning of such deterioration.
No applicable safety analysis assumes the total LEAKAGE limit. The total LEAKAGE limit considers RCS inventory makeup capability and drywell floor sump capacity.
RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
LCO RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
a.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, being indicative of material degradation. LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE.
Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
(continued)
Pressure prohibited RCPB
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.4.4-3 Revision 0 BASES LCO b.
Unidentified LEAKAGE (continued)
The 5 gpm of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the containment atmospheric monitoring and drywell floor drain sump flow rate monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.
c.
Total LEAKAGE The total LEAKAGE limit is based on a reasonable minimum detectable amount. The limit also accounts for LEAKAGE from known sources (identified LEAKAGE).
Violation of this LCO indicates an unexpected amount of LEAKAGE and, therefore, could indicate new or additional degradation in an RCPB component or system.
d.
Unidentified LEAKAGE Increase An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of 2 gpm within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period indicates a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated to determine the source and extent of the LEAKAGE. The increase is measured relative to the steady state value; temporary changes in LEAKAGE rate as a result of transient conditions (e.g., startup) are not considered. As such, the 2 gpm increase limit is only applicable in MODE 1 when operating pressures and temperatures are established. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the RCS operational LEAKAGE LCO applies, because the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the reactor is pressurized.
In MODES 4 and 5, RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are not required since the reactor is not pressurized and stresses in the RCPB materials and potential for LEAKAGE are reduced.
(continued)
Separating the sources of LEAKAGE (i.e., LEAKAGE from an identified source versus LEAKAGE from an unidentified source) is necessary for prompt identification of potentially adverse conditions, assessment of the safety significance, and corrective action.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.4.4-4 Revision 0 BASES (continued)
ACTIONS A.1 With RCS unidentified or total LEAKAGE greater than the limits, actions must be taken to reduce the leak. Because the LEAKAGE limits are conservatively below the LEAKAGE that would constitute a critical crack size, 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is allowed to reduce the LEAKAGE rates before the reactor must be shut down. If an unidentified LEAKAGE has been identified and quantified, it may be reclassified and considered as identified LEAKAGE; however, the total LEAKAGE limit would remain unchanged.
B.1 and B.2 An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of 2 gpm within a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period is an indication of a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated. Although the increase does not necessarily violate the absolute unidentified LEAKAGE limit, certain susceptible components must be determined not to be the source of the LEAKAGE increase within the required Completion Time. For an unidentified LEAKAGE increase greater than required limits, an alternative to reducing LEAKAGE increase to within limits (i.e., reducing the LEAKAGE rate such that the current rate is less than the "2 gpm increase in the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />" limit; either by isolating the source or other possible methods) is to verify the source of the unidentified leakage increase is not material susceptible to IGSCC.
The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable to properly reduce the LEAKAGE increase or verify the source before the reactor must be shut down without unduly jeopardizing plant safety.
C.1 and C.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met or if pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, (continued)
B.1 C.1 and C.2 D.1 and D.2 Insert A
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.4 Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.4.4-5 Revision 43 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant safety systems.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.4.1 REQUIREMENTS The RCS LEAKAGE is monitored by a variety of instruments designed to provide alarms when LEAKAGE is indicated and to quantify the various types of LEAKAGE. Leakage detection instrumentation is discussed in more detail in the Bases for LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation." The drywell floor drain sump flow integrator is typically monitored to determine actual LEAKAGE rates; however, an alternate method which may be used to quantify LEAKAGE is calculating flow rates using sump pump run times. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
REFERENCES 1.
UFSAR, Sections 3.1.2.4 and 3.1.3.6.
2.
GEAP-5620, "Failure Behavior in ASTM A106B Pipes Containing Axial Through-Wall Flaws," April 1968.
3.
NUREG-75/067, "Investigation and Evaluation of Cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactor Plants," October 1975.
D.1 and D.2
Insert A A.1 If pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the affected component, pipe, or vessel must be isolated from the RCS by a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. While in this condition, structural integrity of the system should be considered because the structural integrity of the part of the system within the isolation boundary must be maintained under all licensing basis conditions, including consideration of the potential for further degradation of the isolated location. Normal LEAKAGE past the isolation device is acceptable as it will limit RCS LEAKAGE and is included in identified or unidentified LEAKAGE. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
ATTACHMENT 3n Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages - For Information Only R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-18 NRC Docket No. 50-244 Markup of Technical Specifications Bases Pages B 3.4.13-2 B 3.4.13-3 B 3.4.13-4 B 3.4.13-5
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 B 3.4.13-2 Revision 52 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Except for primary to secondary LEAKAGE, the safety analyses do not address operational LEAKAGE. However, other operational LEAKAGE is related to the safety analyses for LOCA; the amount of leakage can affect the probability of such an event (Ref. 2).
Primary to secondary LEAKAGE is a factor in the dose releases outside containment resulting from a steam line break (SLB) accident and other accidents or transients which involve secondary steam release to the atmosphere, such as a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), reactor coolant pump locked rotor (LR), and a rod ejection (RE) accident. The leakage contaminates the secondary fluid.
The UFSAR (Ref. 3) analysis for SGTR assumes that the intact SG primary to secondary LEAKAGE is 150 gallons per day, which is relatively inconsequential. The safety analysis for the SLB accident assumes 1 gpm primary to secondary LEAKAGE in each SG as a result of the accident. The LR and RE accidents are assumed to result in a 500 gallon per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE in each SG as a result of the accident. The dose consequences resulting from the accidents outside of containment are well within the limits defined in 10 CFR 50.67.
The RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
- 1.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, being indicative of material deterioration. LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE. LEAKAGE from an RCS branch connection component body or pipe wall is not considered Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE if the leak is isolated by a component that will not change position following an accident.
- 2.
Unidentified LEAKAGE One gallon per minute (gpm) of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the containment air monitoring and containment sump level monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period. Violation of this LCO Pressure prohibited RCPB Separating the sources of LEAKAGE (i.e.,
LEAKAGE from an identified source versus LEAKAGE from an unidentified source) is necessary for prompt identification of potentially adverse conditions, assessment of the safety significance, and corrective action.
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 B 3.4.13-3 Revision 52 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant could result in continued degradation of the RCPB, if the LEAKAGE is from the pressure boundary.
- 3.
Identified LEAKAGE Up to 10 gpm of identified LEAKAGE is considered allowable because LEAKAGE is from known sources that do not interfere with detection of unidentified LEAKAGE and is well within the capability of a charging pump operating at its low speed setting. Identified LEAKAGE includes LEAKAGE to the containment from specifically known and located sources, LEAKAGE through two in-series PIVs, and primary to secondary LEAKAGE, but does not include pressure boundary LEAKAGE or controlled reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal return (a normal function not considered LEAKAGE). Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of a component or system.
- 4.
Primary to Secondary LEAKAGE Through Any One SG The limit of 150 gallons per day per SG is based on the operational LEAKAGE performance criterion in NEI 97-06, Steam Generator Program Guidelines (Ref. 4). The Steam Generator Program operational LEAKAGE performance criterion in NEI 97-06 states, "The RCS operational primary to secondary leakage through any one SG shall be limited to 150 gallons per day." The limit is based on operating experience with SG tube degradation mechanisms that result in tube leakage. The operational leakage rate criterion in conjunction with the implementation of the Steam Generator Program is an effective measure for minimizing the frequency of steam generator tube ruptures.
A PORV which is leaking 10 gpm must also be declared inoperable per LCO 3.4.11, "Pressurizer PORVs."
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this LCO applies because the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the RCS is pressurized.
In MODES 5 or 6, the temperature is 200ºF and pressure is maintained low or at atmospheric pressure. Since the temperatures and pressures are far lower than those for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the likelihood of leakage and crack propagation is much smaller. Therefore, the requirements of this LCO are not applicable in MODES 5 and 6.
LCO 3.4.14, "RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage," measures leakage through each individual PIV and can impact this LCO. Of the in-series PIVs in each isolated line, leakage measured through one PIV does not result in RCS LEAKAGE when the other is leak tight. If both
RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 B 3.4.13-4 Revision 52 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant valves leak and result in a loss of mass from the RCS, the loss must be included in the allowable identified LEAKAGE.
ACTIONS A.1 Unidentified LEAKAGE or identified LEAKAGE in excess of the LCO limits must be reduced to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. This Completion Time allows time to verify leakage rates and either identify unidentified LEAKAGE or reduce LEAKAGE to within limits before the reactor must be shut down. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.
B.1 and B.2 If any RCS pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, or primary to secondary LEAKAGE is not within limits, or if the Required Action of Condition A cannot be completed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, the reactor must be brought to lower pressure conditions to reduce the severity of the LEAKAGE and its potential consequences. It should be noted that LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE. The reactor must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. This action reduces the LEAKAGE and also reduces the factors that tend to degrade the pressure boundary.
The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
In MODE 5, the pressure stresses acting on the RCPB are much lower, and further deterioration is much less likely.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.13.1 Verifying RCS LEAKAGE to be within the LCO limits ensures the integrity of the RCPB is maintained. Pressure boundary LEAKAGE which is not allowed by this LCO, would at first appear as unidentified LEAKAGE and can only be positively identified by inspection. Unidentified LEAKAGE and identified LEAKAGE are determined by performance of an RCS water inventory balance.
The RCS water inventory balance must be met with the reactor at steady state operating conditions (stable temperature, power level, pressurizer and makeup tank levels, makeup and letdown, and RCP seal injection and return flows). The Surveillance is modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that this SR is not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after establishing steady state operation. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> allowance provides B.1 C.1 and C.2 Insert A any of the Required Actions and associated Completion Times cannot be met,
B 3.4.13-5 Revision 77 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.13 sufficient time to collect and process all necessary data after stable plant conditions are established.
Steady state operation is required to perform a proper inventory balance; calculations during maneuvering are not useful. For RCS operational LEAKAGE determination by water inventory balance, steady state is defined as stable RCS pressure, temperature, power level, pressurizer and volume control tank levels, makeup and letdown, and RCP seal injection and return flows.
An early warning of pressure boundary LEAKAGE or unidentified LEAKAGE is provided by the automatic systems that monitor the containment atmosphere radioactivity and the containment sump level. It should be noted that LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE. Leakage detection systems are specified in LCO 3.4.15, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation."
Note 2 states that this SR is not applicable to primary to secondary LEAKAGE because LEAKAGE of 150 gallons per day cannot be measured accurately by an RCS water inventory balance.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.4.13.2 This SR verifies that primary to secondary LEAKAGE is less or equal to 150 gallons per day through any one SG. Satisfying the primary to secondary LEAKAGE limit ensures that the operational LEAKAGE performance criterion in the Steam Generator Program is met. If this SR is not met, compliance with LCO 3.4.17, "Steam Generator Tube Integrity," should be evaluated. The 150 gallons per day limit is measured at room temperature as described in Reference 5. The operational LEAKAGE rate limit applies to LEAKAGE through any one SG. If it is not practical to assign the LEAKAGE to an individual SG, all the primary to secondary LEAKAGE should be conservatively assumed to be from one SG.
The Surveillance is modified by a Note which states that the Surveillance is not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after establishment of steady state operation. For RCS primary to secondary LEAKAGE determination, steady state is defined as stable RCS pressure, temperature, power level, pressurizer and makeup tank levels, makeup and letdown, and RCP seal injection and return flows.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
Insert A A.1 If pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the affected component, pipe, or vessel must be isolated from the RCS by a closed manual valve, closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. While in this condition, structural integrity of the system should be considered because the structural integrity of the part of the system within the isolation boundary must be maintained under all licensing basis conditions, including consideration of the potential for further degradation of the isolated location. Normal LEAKAGE past the isolation device is acceptable as it will limit RCS LEAKAGE and is included in identified or unidentified LEAKAGE. This action is necessary to prevent further deterioration of the RCPB.