ML21064A166

Enclosure 1 - Safety Evaluation Report for the Special Nucler Material License Application

ML21064A166
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Site:	07007029
Issue date:	05/20/2021
From:	Division of Fuel Management
To:	US Dept of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency
TDNaquin - NMSS/DFM/FFL - 301.415.7352
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ML21064A164	List: ML21064A165 ML21064A166 ML21064A167
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Safety Evaluation Report for the Special Nuclear Material License Application Defense Threat Reduction Agency Ft. Belvoir, Virginia Docket Number 70-7029 Division of Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Enclosure 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION....1 II. SCOPE OF REVIEW..1 1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION......2 2.0 STAFF QUALIFICATIONS.......4 3.0 INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS.......5 4.0 RADIATION PROTECTION.6 5.0 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY........23 6.0 FIRE SAFETY....30 7.0 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT......31 8.0 DECOMMISSIONING.......32 9.0 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT....32 10.0 PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND PHYSICAL SECURITY....34 11.0 MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING.40 12.0 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT REVIEW.43 III. CONCLUSION........44 IV. PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS.44 V. REFERENCES....44 i

I. INTRODUCTION The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is a Combat Support Agency and a Defense Agency with a three-pronged mission:

- to counter the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives;

- counter the threats posed by the growing, evolving categories of improvised threats, including improvised explosive devices, car bombs and weaponized consumer drones, as well as the tactics, technologies and networks that put them on the battlefield;

- ensure the U.S. military maintains a safe, secure, effective and credible nuclear weapons deterrent.

The combat support mission requires preparedness to address consequential and non-conventional weapon threats to national security. The DTRA has had a byproduct material license (License number: 45-25551-01, Docket 030-35668) through Region I for several years, most recently renewed in 2011 (DTRA, 2011). The byproduct material license authorizes possession of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) limited to the quantities identified in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 150.11. The materials are used in calibration, instrument detection, and training in multiple locations worldwide.

Training needs of the organization have expanded. On February 11, 2019, the DTRA submitted a Letter of Intent (DTRA, 2019) requesting to meet with staff to discuss Part 70 SNM licensing.

DTRA stated that it was considering submission of a Part 70 application in Fiscal Year 2020.

On August 21, 2020, the DTRA submitted an application (DTRA, 2020) to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), requesting an SNM license. The applicants request was made pursuant to the requirements in 10 CFR Part 70, Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material. The applicant requests an NRC license for possession and use of SNM in quantities greater than critical mass as defined in 10 CFR 70.4, for analytical or scientific research and development, and training as described in the license application (LA). The NRC accepted the DTRAs application on September 24, 2020 (NRC, 2020a). A request for additional information (RAI) was sent on November 16, 2020 (NRC, 2020b). The applicant responded to NRCs RAI in a letter dated January 22, 2021 (DTRA, 2021). DTRA requested a 10-year license term.

II. SCOPE OF REVIEW The NRC staff conducted its safety and safeguards review in accordance with 10 CFR as follows:

- Part 19, Notices, Instructions and Reports to Workers: Inspection and Investigations;

- Part 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation;

- Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance;

- Part 51, Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions;

- Part 70, Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material; 1

- Part 73, Physical Protection of Plants and Materials; and

- Part 74, Material Control and Accounting of Special Nuclear Material.

The NRC staff used the guidance documents listed in Section V, References, herein to conduct its safety review. A Notice of Opportunity to Request a Hearing on the LA was published in the Federal Register on October 28, 2020 (85 FR 68374). No requests for a hearing were received.

1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION The applicant is an agency within the Department of Defense whose research, development, testing and evaluation and training capabilities support a variety of United States Government departments, agencies, and government-sponsored enterprises. The material requested by the LA will be used to support testing of nuclear detection technologies. The applicant is requesting approval to use the SNM listed in Table 1 below for its research and development programs.

The quantity of SNM is greater than a critical mass as defined in 10 CFR 70.4, and is within the quantity limits of SNM of low-strategic significance as defined in 10 CFR 73.2.

The applicant will continue Byproduct Radioactive Materials License Number 45-25551-01.

Activities associated with the byproduct materials license are independent of the SNM license requested by the DTRA and are not discussed in this safety evaluation report (SER).

1.1 Facility Layout.

The DTRA has established facilities at locations on military bases to meet the mission requirements based on location and capability. There are two main facilities described in Chapter 10.0 of the LA that are the permanent storage locations for the DTRAs SNM. The primary facilities are located at Fort Belvoir, VA and Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. The staff participated in site visits at these locations. These were at Fort Belvoir, Virginia on January 29, 2020 and Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico on February 11, 2020. The site visits focused primarily on physical security and material storage. A third site of routine temporary storage is located at Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. These are more fully described in Chapter 10.0 of the application and reviewed in Chapter 10.0 of this report. Additionally, the DTRAs mission requires the use of SNM at other facilities and temporary locations.

1.2 Descriptive Summary of Licensed Materials and Possession Limits In accordance with 10 CFR 70.22(a)(2) and (4), the DTRA described the types, quantities, and forms of licensed material to be permitted at their facilities. The applicant is requesting approval to use the SNM listed in the table below for its research and development programs. The quantity of SNM is greater than a critical mass as defined in 10 CFR 70.4, and the quantity of SNM is within the limits of SNM of low-strategic significance as defined in 10 CFR 73.2. The licensed material is defined as follows:

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MAXIMUM RADIOACTIVE CHEMICAL/PHYSICAL AMOUNT MATERIAL FORM UNDER THIS LICENSE A. Uranium (U-233) A. Solid metal or A. XX grams enriched up to XX.XX oxide form in

% sealed sources B. Solid metal or B. XXX grams B. Uranium (U-235) oxide form in enriched up to XX %

sealed sources C. Neptunium-237 (Np) C. Solid metal or C. X grams oxide form in sealed sources E. Solid metal or D. XXX grams D. Plutonium (Pu) oxide form in sealed sources G. Solid metal E. XXX F. Uranium (U-238) kilograms (Depleted Uranium)

Table 1. Requested SNM Maximum Amount Limits Item E of Table 1, Being depleted in the isotope U-235, is a very weak source and does not present a radiation exposure hazard. This material is not described as sealed material but is handled with precautions for heavy metal contamination. There are two types of Material E, Depleted Uranium (DU) described in the application:

- Cladded DU - There is DU used as shielding.

- Unclad DU Shells - These were manufactured by the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

The DTRA proposes an overall SNM license possession limitation of Category III quantities that will normally be distributed and stored between two permanent fixed facilities with smaller quantities used at satellite facilities or at temporary locations as discussed in Chapter 10.0. The proposed limits are based on the sources necessary for mission requirements while maintaining an overall criticality safety program where keff < 1.

1.3 Authorized Uses Requested The material being requested by this application is necessary for the DTRA to execute its mission which includes the following:

1. Training of military and other federal, state and local responders in the detection and identification technologies and techniques in the response to the threat of a radiological or nuclear device of mass destruction.

2. Preparing physical scientists to provide advice and assistance to designated search forces.

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3. Development, testing and evaluation of advanced radiation detection and identification technologies.

4. Demonstration events for users, guests and dignitaries.

Training in detection of SNM is in the form of Radiation Signature Training Devices (RSTD), as assemblies of sealed sources of different isotopes of uranium and plutonium. The RSTDs are also used for performance characterization of radiation sensors and algorithms that are currently in use or under consideration for use in the countering WMD mission area.

1.4 Period of Time for Which the License is Requested.

The DTRA has requested that the license expiration be set to a 10-year term. A renewal application would be submitted if continued possession and use is required beyond 10 years.

1.5 Basis for Review The LA described the characteristics and composition of the SNM to be used in the testing program. It also included drawings illustrating containers, the facility locations and floor plans where the proposed activities would take place, and where materials would be stored. The information that must be included in a 10 CFR Part 70 LA is set forth in 10 CFR 70.22. After review, the NRC staff determined that the DTRAs LA contained the information required by 10 CFR 70.22. Using the information provided in the LA, NRC staff conducted a detailed technical evaluation and documented its findings in this SER.

2.0 STAFF QUALIFICATIONS 2.1 Regulatory Requirements The regulatory basis for the review of the DTRAs staff qualifications is contained in 10 CFR Paragraph 70.23(a)(2), which requires the applicant to be qualified by reason of training and experience to use the SNM. The staff reviewed the applicants organization and the qualifications of administrative and radiation protection personnel, generally described in Chapter 7 of the LA, against the acceptance criteria in NUREG-1520, Rev. 2, Section 4.4.3.3 (NRC, 2015). The administration of the facility involves operations, organizational structure, and facility security. In addition, an application must present information on the facilitys organization, training programs, operational reviews and audits, radiation protection procedures and actions, recordkeeping and reports. The following discussion summarizes the staffs evaluation as to whether the information provided by the applicant meets the criteria.

2.2 Staff Review and Analysis The DTRA utilizes the Radiation Safety Committee (RSC) as the governing body for the licensed use of radioactive materials and other DTRA ionizing radiation sources to ensure the possession and use of radioactive materials is compliant with all regulations and license conditions. The RSCs composition of principal members include an appointed Chairperson, the Directors representative (currently the Director, Environmental, Safety and Occupational Health (ES&OH)), the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) and senior representatives of the Defense Nuclear Weapons School, Nuclear Enterprise Contingency Operations (NECO) Department, 4

Research and Development (RD) Nuclear Technology Department , and RD Test Science and Technology Department.

The RSCs Chairperson is appointed by the Director for an indefinite term based on professional qualification. The RSC Chairperson is responsible for overseeing the RSOs implementation of the Radiation Safety Program and conducts annual audits to ensure the adequacy and effectiveness of the program. The level of oversight required will be evaluated during the annual audits. The RSC Chairperson recommends additional staff as needed.

The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) manages the Radiation Protection (RP) Program at the DTRA. The LA describes the responsibilities and qualifications of the RSO and the Site Radiation Safety Officers (SRSO). In addition to the RSO, activities involving the material under this license will be performed by Authorized Users (AUs). The RSO is responsible for the oversight of radioactive materials, package receipt surveys and delivery, shipping activities, personnel dosimetry and training, maintenance of radiation monitoring and survey equipment, closeout surveys, and records management. The RSO has expertise in the principles and practices of the control of hazards from the use of radioisotopes and radiation detection equipment. The RSO will administer the SNM license and is responsible for licensing and regulatory compliance, including compliance with State and NRC licenses.

The applicant provided a description of the RP program used at the facility, including personnel monitoring and training practices, procedures for leak-testing sources, procedures for maintaining doses as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA), and waste disposal. The LA also discussed the roles and responsibilities of the different individuals implementing the RP program.

2.3 Evaluation Findings

After reviewing the LA, the NRC staff concluded that those individuals with access to the SNM at the DTRA are appropriately trained and experienced in using and properly handling SNM.

This conclusion is based on the description of the RSOs qualifications, roles and responsibilities, and the description of the DTRAs radiation protection program and procedures.

In accordance with 10 CFR 70.23(a)(2), the NRC staff concludes that the information provided by the DTRA adequately demonstrates that the DTRA is qualified to use the material for the purpose requested and is therefore acceptable.

3.0 INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS The NRC staff reviewed the LA to determine whether the DTRA was required to provide Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary information, pursuant to the provisions in 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, Additional Requirements for Certain Licensees Authorized to Possess a Critical Mass of Special Nuclear Material. The proposed activities for which the SNM would be used do not meet the criteria in 10 CFR 70.60. The applicant will be authorized to possess SNM in an amount greater than critical mass, but an ISA Summary is not necessary under 10 CFR 70.60 because the DTRA will not be engaged in enriched uranium processing, fabrication of uranium fuel or fuel assemblies, uranium enrichment, enriched uranium hexafluoride conversion, plutonium processing, fabrication of mixed-oxide fuel or fuel assemblies, scrap recovery of SNM or any other activity that the Commission determines could significantly affect public health and safety. The NRC staff determined that the DTRAs 5

proposed activity is not one of the listed activities requiring an ISA summary. Therefore, 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, is not applicable to the LA. As a result, the NRC staff concludes that the DTRA is not required to submit an ISA Summary in support of its LA.

4.0 RADIATION PROTECTION 4.1 Purpose of Review and Regulatory Requirements The NRC staff conducted this review to determine whether the radiation protection program described in the DTRA license application is adequate to protect the health and safety of staff and protect public health and safety and the environment, and to comply with the associated regulatory requirements in 10 CFR Part 19, Notices, Instructions and Reports to Workers:

Inspection and Investigations; 10 CFR Part 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation; and 10 CFR Part 70, Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material.

Specifically, 10 CFR 70.23(a)(3) and (4), require, prior to the approval of an application, a determination that the proposed equipment and facilities are adequate to protect health and minimize danger to life or property; and that the applicant's proposed procedures to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property are adequate.

4.2 Staff Review and Analysis The NRC staff used the acceptance criteria in Chapter 4 of NUREG-1520 Standard Review Plan for Fuel Cycle Facilities and License Applications,(NRC, 2015) as the primary guidance document for this review. The NRC staff also used NUREG-1556 Volume 17, Revision 1, Consolidated Guidance About Materials Licenses: Program-Specific Guidance About Special Nuclear Material of Less than Critical Mass Licenses, (NRC, 2018). The NUREG states on page 1-1, Purpose of Report, that it is not strictly applicable for a greater than a critical mass application. However, much of the guidance is applicable for sealed source applications, for which this application seeks license. The information to support this review was obtained from the LA (DTRA, 2020), along with responses to requests for additional information and a revised application (DTRA, 2021).

4.3.1 Commitment to Radiation Protection Program Implementation In accordance with 10 CFR 20.1101(a), each licensee must develop, implement, and document an RP program commensurate with the scope and extent of licensed activities. An applicant demonstrates compliance with this by ensuring that the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 are addressed regarding the applicants requested materials or procedures. The discussion below identifies each acceptance criterion from NUREG-1520, Section 4.4.1.3 and summarizes the NRC staffs evaluation as to whether the information provided by the applicant is consistent with the criterion.

(1) A documented management commitment to keep exposures As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA);

Senior management has established the RP program for the DTRA and commits in Chapter 10.0 to maintain occupational doses and doses to members of the public to be ALARA. The 6

DTRA has significant experience with radiation protection and the maintenance of a program for byproduct materials, License 030-35668 (DTRA, 2011). The DTRA has established a radiation safety committee, chaired by appointment of the facility director in Chapter 7.1 of the LA. The RSC Chairperson serves as the Directors representative and is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the radiation safety program described in Chapter 10.0 and ensuring adequacy and effectiveness of the program.

(2) A trained and qualified radiation protection organization with independence from the facilitys operations, well-defined responsibilities, and sufficient authority to carry out those responsibilities; The Chairperson of the RSC is currently the Director of ES&OH. The Chairperson supervises the RSOs implementation of the radiation safety program and conducts annual audits to ensure its adequacy. Figure 1 of the LA provides an organizational chart showing the physical sites where material is stored and used, as well as the relationship of the RSO and the RSC Chairperson to the DTRA Facility Director. The immediate supervisor for the Director, ES&OH, is the DTRA Director. According to the DTRA, this ensures independence of the RSC Chairperson and the RSO from the actual users of licensed materials.

(3) Adequate facilities, equipment, and procedures to effectively implement the program; The application adequately describes the facility, materials requested, equipment, and procedures pertinent to the radiation safety program in support of the material requested.

Chapter 9.0 of the LA provides detailed descriptions of the sites, physical security features, and material uses for the three locations where materials will be used and stored. There are two main sites that will be used for permanent material storage at the DTRA NECO at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, and the Technical Evaluation Assessment Monitoring Site (TEAMS) at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. NRC staff have conducted site visits of these two locations, with trip report provided April 6, 2020 (NRC, 2020). A detailed summary of the adequacy of the facilities described in the LAR is provided in Chapter 10 of this report.

(4) The review, at least annually, of the RP Programs content and implementation, as required by 10 CFR 20.1101(c). The review should consider facility changes, new technologies, and other process enhancements that could improve the effectiveness of the overall program.

Chapter 10.1 of the application states the RSC provides oversight and support to the Radiation Safety Program. The committee is charged by the DTRA Director with auditing responsibilities for the standing byproduct material license and will continue that for an SNM license. In that capacity the committee annually reviews various ionizing radiation programs, to evaluate the level of oversight needed to maintain adequacy and effectiveness of the Radiation Safety Program. The DTRA has committed to using supporting guidance, as found in a suggested audit checklist in Appendix E of NUREG-1556, Volume 17, Revision 1, Consolidated Guidance About Materials Licenses: Program-Specific Guidance About Special Nuclear Material of Less Than Critical Mass Licenses (NRC, 2018).

The RSO conducts annual audits, ensures the results of audits, deficiencies, and recommendations are documented and maintained for at least 3 years. These are provided to the RSC Chairperson, who will brief the RSC on results and corrective actions taken. As 7

indicated above, 10 CFR 20.1101(a) requires an applicant to have a program commensurate with the scope of activities requested. Based on the NRC staffs evaluation of the application commitments pertaining to the acceptance criteria in NUREG-1520, Section 4.4.1.3, the NRC staff finds that the radiation safety program is consistent with the NUREG-1520 criterion and that the DTRA will satisfy the requirements in 10 CFR 20.1101(a). The application describes an adequate organizational structure, providing appropriate management oversight of materials, ensuring the radiation safety organization is adequately trained and staffed, with sufficient independence to safely carry out work, and is annually reviewed by key management personnel as required by 10 CFR 20.1101(c). Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the radiation protection program is acceptable.

4.3.2 Commitment to As Low As Reasonably Achievable Program In accordance with 10 CFR 20.1101(b), a licensee must use, to the extent practical, procedures and engineering controls to achieve occupational doses and doses to the members of the public that are ALARA. The staff reviewed the applicants ALARA program commitments against the acceptance criteria in NUREG-1520, Section 4.4.2.3. The following discussion identifies each acceptance criterion from NUREG-1520 and provides the staffs evaluation as to whether the information provided by the applicant meets the criterion:

(1) Establish a written, comprehensive, and effective ALARA program; Chapter 10.0 of the application identifies the management commitment established by senior management, as well as the responsibilities of the RSC, the RSO, AUs, and individuals.

Training, dose limits, documentation, and programmatic review are specified. The DTRA Director, has signed the delegation of authority memorandum granting authority to the RSO to stop work whenever health and safety may be compromised, or where an action may result in regulatory non-compliance.

(2) Prepare policies and procedures to ensure occupational exposures are maintained ALARA, and that such exposures are consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1101; Chapter 10.6 of the application states the DTRA is committed to the development and utilization of written procedures for normal operations and emergency procedures for the safe and secure use of materials. These procedures will address applicable radiation safety requirements found in 10 CFR Parts 19, 20, 70, and 71. Chapter 10.2 states the DTRA policy requiring monitoring of all individuals working with radiation sources who are likely to exceed 10 percent of the allowable annual limit described in 10 CFR 20.1201. Additionally, Chapter 10.5 states public dose is monitored and documented to ensure that all doses are ALARA. Monitoring of other individuals is at the discretion of the RSO, who oversees the dosimetry program. The applicant commits to conducting radiation surveys to verify radiation levels in Chapter 10.2. The radiation surveys and radiological assessments that will be conducted as needed are described in Chapter 10.2 of the application. All organizational components shall keep radiation exposures to employees and to the general public ALARA.

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(3) Outline specific ALARA program goals, establish an ALARA program organization and structure, and have written procedures for its implementation in the facility design and operations; Chapter 6.1 describes the variety of uses of the material requested by the application. These uses include training of military, Federal, State, and local responders in the detection and identification technologies in response to the threat of a radiological or nuclear device. Also included are the use of RSTDs in performance characterization of radiation sensors and evaluation efforts in development of emerging nuclear detection technologies. All of these are planned with radiation protection and physical security in place to ensure any exposure to staff and members of the public are kept ALARA and in accordance with ALARA principles. The applicant requires personnel-monitoring devices for all individuals working with radiation sources if the individual is likely to exceed 10 percent of the occupational exposure limits of 10 CFR Part 20.

(4) Establish an ALARA Committee, or equivalent organization, with sufficient staff, resources, and clear responsibilities to ensure that the occupational radiation exposure dose limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20 are not exceeded under normal operations; The DTRA has established an RSC, chaired by appointment of the Facility Director in Chapter 7.1 of the LA. The principal members of the RSC include the RSO and senior representatives of the Defense Nuclear Weapons School, NECO Department, RD Nuclear Technology Department, and Test Science and Technology Department. The RSC is responsible for oversight of the uses of radioactive materials and the implementation of the radiation protection program. The RSC meets at least quarterly, and as needed to prepare for upcoming events utilizing radioactive materials that are of sufficient scope to be presented to the RSC. Chapter 10.1 addresses the audit program, which is within the scope of the committees responsibilities.

The DTRA has committed to the use of Appendix E, Suggested Audit Checklist, of NUREG-1556, Volume 17, Rev. 1, Consolidated Guidance about Material Licenses:

Program-Specific Guidance About Special Nuclear Material of Less Than Critical Mass (NRC, 2018). The results of this audit are presented to the RSC by the RSC Chairperson.

(5) Use the ALARA program as a mechanism to facilitate interaction between RP and operations personnel; The DTRA is committed to the development and use of written procedures for normal operations. Chapter 10.6 states that procedures for the use of materials will address radiation safety requirements. When written procedures are not sufficient, a radiation work permit or equivalent will be utilized. Chapter 7.3 of the application describes the role of authorized users (AUs), their access to radioactive material at DTRA facilities, and their supervisory roles in the use and control of radioactive materials. These personnel are the operational staff appointed by SRSOs and approved by the DTRA RSO. Their primary responsibilities are to ensure appropriate physical security and safe use of materials. The AU is responsible for ensuring that procedures and engineering controls are used to keep occupational doses and doses to members of the public ALARA.

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(6) Regularly review and revise, when appropriate, the ALARA program goals and objectives and to incorporate, when appropriate, new approaches, technologies, operating procedures or changes that could reduce potential radiation exposures at a reasonable cost.

Chapter 7.1 of the application states the RSC will meet on at least a quarterly basis. The committee reviews events from the previous quarter as well as upcoming developments utilizing radioactive material. The committee will review occupational exposures at least annually and will analyze program status for trends and abnormalities. The RSO ensures the results of audits, identification of deficiencies, and recommendations for changes are provided to the RSC. Chapter 9.4 describes the review process used to approve all new work and technology development at the DTRA. The process identifies, assesses, and mitigates risks in the use of radioactive materials. Once a work package is developed by one of the DTRA activities, it is briefed and approved by site leadership. Once that review is completed, the work package is submitted to the DTRA Radiation Safety Office for independent review. Finally, it is forwarded to the RSC Chairperson for evaluation and distribution to RSC members.

Based on the NRC staffs evaluation of the application information pertaining to the acceptance criteria in NUREG-1520, Section 4.4.2.3, the NRC staff finds that the radiation protection program is consistent with the NUREG-1520 criterion and that the DTRA will satisfy the requirements in 10 CFR 20.1101(b). Use of specifically licensed radioactive material at the DTRA is regulated by the RSC using radiation protection procedures under the license. The DTRA commits to ensuring that the uses of radioactive material and the exposure of people to ionizing radiation be kept ALARA. The NRC staff finds that the commitment to this ALARA program is acceptable because the procedures are based upon sound radiation protection principles to achieve occupational doses and doses to members of the public that are ALARA, as required by 10 CFR 20.1101(b).

4.3.3 Organization and Personnel Qualifications In accordance with 10 CFR 70.22(a)(6), each application for a license must contain the technical qualification, including training and experience of the applicant and members of his staff to engage in the proposed activities in accordance with NRC regulations. The NRC staff reviewed the applicants organization and personnel qualifications against the acceptance criteria in NUREG-1520, Section 4.4.3.3. The following discussion identifies each acceptance criterion from NUREG-1520 and summarizes the NRC staffs evaluation as to whether the information provided by the applicant is consistent with the criterion:

(1) Appoint radiation protection personnel and identify their authority and responsibilities for implementing the radiation protection program functions; Chapter 7 identifies the structure of the radiation protection organization, including an organizational chart in Figure 1. The primary authority for radiation protection is the RSO, who is who is appointed by letter from the DTRA Director, providing the delegation of authority, including authority to stop any unsafe activities and shut down operations as needed to maintain radiation safety and compliance. There are three primary sites for material storage and use.

Each site has a SRSO and is backed up by an alternate site radiation safety officer, trained to 10

the same requirements in the absence of the SRSO. The SRSOs are responsible for all aspects of the radiation protection program and follow the guidance of the DTRA RSO.

(2) Establish clear organizational relationships among the individual positions responsible for the RP Program and other line managers; Chapter 7.1 of the application outlines organizational relationships and authority for the Radiation Safety Program. This section also identifies where the RSO is aligned in the organizational structure. Figure 1 provides an organizational chart illustrating the lines of accountability and responsibility from the SRSOs to the DTRA Director. Each SRSO serves as the primary authority for the site radiation safety program. Chapter 7.2 states the SRSOs are appointed by site leadership with concurrence of the DTRA RSO. Authorized users are described in Chapter 7.2, and primary responsibilities are to ensure appropriate physical security and safe use of radioactive materials under their custody. Authorized users are appointed by SRSOs and approved by the DTRA RSO to ensure that procedures and engineering controls are used to keep occupational doses and doses to members of the public ALARA.

(3) Appoint a suitably educated, experienced, and trained RP Program director (typically referred to as the radiation safety officer) who (1) has direct access to the plant manager, (2) is skilled in the interpretation of data and regulations pertinent to RP, (3) is familiar with the operation of the facility and RP concerns of the site, (4) participates as a resource in radiation safety management decisions, and (5) will be responsible for establishing and implementing the RP Program; Chapter 7.1 provides the detailed training and education of the appointed RSO. This states the RSO is appointed by letter from the DTRA Director once training and experience requirements have been reviewed and approved. The letter provides the delegation of authority to safely implement the radiation safety program and authorization to stop any unsafe activities and shut down operations needed to ensure safety and compliance. The RSO has direct access to the DTRA Director and executive management team as needed. The RSO is not supervised or directed by any directorate that owns or utilizes licensed materials. This ensures the independence of ES&OH and the RSO from the actual users of the licensed radioactive materials. The RSO ensures appropriate written operating and emergency procedures are developed, maintained, and implemented to ensure all licensed material are used in accordance with licensed activities, control and accountability are maintained, and radiation doses received by occupational workers and members of the public are ALARA and compliant with regulatory limits. The review and approval of these procedures is accomplished through the DTRA review and approval process described in Chapter 9.4.

(4) Describe the minimum training requirements and qualifications for the radiation protection staff.

Chapter 8.0 describes the training requirements for all DTRA staff working in or frequenting restricted areas involving the handling and use of radioactive materials. The minimum training requirements for the primary radiation protection staff, that being the AUs and the SRSOs are prescribed. Authorized user training subjects include material control, material security, notification requirements, instrumentation, and radiation protection principles. Chapter 7.3 11

states that AUs also require a Department of Defense Secret Security Clearance. Site RSOs must complete all training requirements specified for AUs and additionally complete in excess of 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> of training in radiation safety, hazardous materials, and transportation. Refresher training is required for all staff.

Based on the NRC staffs evaluation of the application commitments pertaining to the acceptance criteria in Section 4.4.3.3 of NUREG-1520, the NRC staff finds the commitments are consistent with the NUREG-1520 criterion and therefore provide reasonable assurance that during the license term the radiation safety organization will adequately protect health and minimize danger to life and property in accordance with 10 CFR 70.23(a)(4), and that RP staff will be qualified by reason of training and experience to use the licensed material for the purpose requested in accordance with 10 CFR 70.23(a)(2). Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the organization and personnel qualifications are acceptable.

4.3.4 Commitment to Written Procedures In accordance with 10 CFR 70.22(a)(8), each application for a license must contain proposed procedures to protect health and minimize danger to life or property (such as procedures to avoid accidental criticality, procedures for personnel monitoring, waste disposal, and emergency procedures). The NRC staff reviewed the applicants written procedure commitments against the acceptance criteria in NUREG-1520, Section 4.4.4.3. The following discussion identifies each acceptance criterion from NUREG-1520 and summarizes the NRC staffs evaluation as to whether the information provided by the applicant is consistent with the criterion:

(1) Prepare written, approved procedures to carry out activities related to the RP Program. Procedures should address applicable RP requirements found in 10 CFR Parts 19, 20, 70, and 71 and any other applicable regulations; In Chapter 10.6, the DTRA provides commitment to the development and utilization of written procedures for normal operations and emergency procedures for safe and secure use of radioactive materials. Procedures for emergencies have also been developed or will be developed before receipt of licensed material. The DTRA stated that these procedures will address applicable radiation safety requirements found in 10 CFR 19, 20, 70, and 71 and any other applicable regulations. The DTRA utilizes the RSC as the governing body for the licensed use of radioactive materials and other DTRA ionizing radiation sources to ensure the possession and use of radioactive materials is compliant with regulations and license conditions.

(2) Establish a process for procedure generation or modification, authorization, distribution, and training, such that changes in technology or practices are communicated effectively and in a timely manner. Review and revise procedures, as necessary, to incorporate any facility or operational changes, including changes in the ISA. The RSO, or an individual who has the qualifications of the RSO, should approve all procedures related to RP.

The DTRAs research, development, testing, and evaluation capabilities and training support a variety of United States Government departments, agencies, and government-sponsored entities. The RSTDs are generally used for performance characterization of radiation sensors 12

that are currently in use or under consideration for use in countering weapons of mass destruction. The RSTDs are utilized in test and evaluation efforts to support the development of nuclear detection technologies. These processes are well developed and carried out under written and DTRA-approved procedures. The RSO ensures appropriate written operating and emergency procedures are developed, maintained, and implemented to ensure all licensed materials are used in accordance with licensed activities, control and accountability are maintained, and radiation doses received by occupational workers and members of the public are ALARA and compliant with regulatory limits. The review and approval of these procedures is accomplished through the DTRA review and approval process.

Chapter 9.4 of the application describes the review process for new work and technology. The DTRA Risk Management Process is intended to identify and assess risks and monitor and/or mitigate them in proportion to the degree of their consequences and their likelihood of occurrence. It is a process used to review and approve all new work and technology development at the DTRA, including the use of radioactive materials. The SRSOs are responsible for ensuring the local operations are compliant with regulations, Agency requirements, and procedures to ensure safe operations. The SRSO is responsible for receiving authorization for all acquisitions of radioactive materials and operations utilizing licensed radioactive materials.

(3) Specify written, approved radiation work permits (RWPs) for activities involving licensed material that are not covered by written radiation protection procedures.

Radiation work permits should define the authorized activities, the level of approval required (a radiation specialist, as a minimum), information requirements, period of validity, expiration and termination times, and recordkeeping requirement.

Chapter 10.6 addresses the use of RWPs, in that when written and approved procedures are not sufficient, a RWP or equivalent will be utilized. The RWP will define the authorized activities, level of supervision required, period of validity, and expiration and termination times.

Procedures may be revised only if the changes are reviewed and approved by the RSO in writing. The affected staff members are provided training in the revised procedures prior to implementation. According to the DTRA, any changes are in compliance with NRC regulations and the license conditions and the changes would not degrade the effectiveness of the program.

The procedures used by DTRA staff are reviewed by the appropriate radiation safety authority and the RSC supervises and manages the staff. Safety and technical concerns are evaluated under appropriate operating and quality procedures. Based on the NRC staffs evaluation of the application commitments pertaining to the acceptance criteria in Section 4.4.4.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2015), the NRC staff finds the commitments to written procedures are consistent with NUREG-1520 criteria and are adequate to protect health and minimize danger to life or property (such as procedures to avoid accidental criticality, procedures for personnel monitoring, waste disposal, and emergency procedures) in accordance with 10 CFR 70.23(a)(4). Therefore, the NRC staff finds these proposed procedures acceptable.

4.3.5 Radiation Safety Training In accordance with 10 CFR 70.22(a)(6), each application for a license must contain the technical qualifications, including training and experience of the applicant and staff to engage in the proposed activities in accordance with the NRC regulations. More specifically, 10 CFR 13

19.12(a) specifies training requirements for all individuals who in the course of employment are likely to receive in a year an occupational dose in excess of 100 millirem (1 mSv). The NRC staff reviewed the applicants training commitments against the acceptance criteria in NUREG-1520, Section 4.4.5.3. The following discussion identifies each acceptance criterion from NUREG-1520 and provides the NRC staffs evaluation as to whether the information provided by the applicant is consistent with the criterion:

(1) Design and implement an employee RP training program that complies with the requirements of 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20; In Chapter 8.0 of the application, the DTRA commits to the development and implementation of a training program for personnel that complies with the requirements of 10 CFR 19 and 20. This chapter describes the generic training requirements for those individuals who are assigned duties that involve exposure to radiation and/or radioactive materials, and who may, in the course of a year receive an occupational dose of radiation greater than 100 millirem (1 mSv).

General employee training conforms to 10 CFR 19.12.

(2) Provide training to all personnel and visitors entering restricted areas that is commensurate with the health risk to which they may be exposed, or provide trained escorts; Chapter 8.0 states that all personnel and visitors that enter restricted areas will receive training commensurate with the health risk to which they may be exposed or will be escorted by personnel with appropriate training. All trainings are conducted by DoD certified instructors, private industry, or in-house training. All in-house training is provided by the RSO, SRSO or a qualified RSO designee who has appropriate training and experience. Trainings may be conducted by lecture, demonstrations, video, and/or self-study.

If an untrained individual (a visitor or DTRA employee/contractor that is not controlled access area trained) requires access to a Controlled Access Area (CAA) or material storage area, a CAA trained staff member is required to maintain a line-of-sight escort of the untrained individual or individuals. The CAA trained staff ensures material security and that all potential radiation doses are maintained well below the public dose limits and consistent with ALARA principles. Because of the relatively weak radiation levels and sealed form of the sources being requested, in addition to the limited access to them that the escort requirement provides, the DTRA stated that no additional training is required for administrative or facility staff.

(3) Provide a level of training commensurate with the potential radiological health risks associated with that employees work responsibilities; Chapter 8.0 states that all personnel that enter restricted areas will receive training commensurate with the health risk to which they may be exposed. Training requirements are scaled to match the job description. General employee training is described for staff who are likely to receive in a year an occupational dose greater than 100 millirem. Additional training requirements are described for staff involved with transportation of radioactive material. Only AUs are allowed unsupervised access to the licensed materials and require additional radiological and material security training. The SRSOs and alternate SRSOs require all of the training required by the AUs, as well as specific radiation safety training specified in the chapter.

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(4) Conduct refresher training, at least every 3 years that will accurately address changes in policies, procedures, requirements, and the facility ISA; Chapter 8.0 states all employees will receive refresher training at least every three years that appropriately addresses changes in policies, procedures, requirements and facility safety requirements.

(5) Incorporate into the RP training program the provisions of 10 CFR 19.12 and additional relevant topics such as: correct handling of radioactive materials; the storage, transfer, or use of radioactive material as relevant to the individuals activities; minimization of exposures to radiation and/or radioactive materials; access and egress controls and escort procedures; radiation safety principles, policies, and procedures; monitoring for internal and external exposures; radiation exposure reports available to workers; monitoring instruments; contamination control procedures, including protective clothing and equipment; ALARA and exposure limits; radiation hazards and health risks; emergency response; and responsibility to report promptly any condition that may lead to, or cause, a violation of regulations and licenses or create unnecessary exposure; General employee radiation training (with annual refresher) topics include:

- Correct handling of radioactive materials.

- Storage, transfer, or use of radiation or radioactive material as relevant to the individuals activities.

- Minimization of exposures to radiation or radioactive materials.

- Access and egress controls and escort procedures.

- Radiation safety principles, policies and procedures.

- Monitoring for internal and external exposures.

- Radiation exposure reports available to workers.

- Radiation detection and instrumentation.

- Contamination control procedures, including protective clothing and equipment.

- ALARA and exposure limits.

- Radiation hazards and health risks.

- Emergency response.

- Responsibility to report promptly any condition that may lead to, or cause, a violation of regulations and licenses or create unnecessary exposure.

(6) Review and evaluate the accuracy, effectiveness, and adequacy of the RP training program curriculum and instructors, as applicable, at least every 3 years.

Chapter 8.0 states the training program, curriculum, and instructor will be reviewed and evaluated for accuracy, effectiveness and adequacy at least every three years.

Based on the NRC staffs evaluation of the application commitments pertaining to the acceptance criteria in Section 4.4.5.3 of NUREG-1520, the NRC staff finds that the DTRA training program is consistent with the NUREG-1520 criterion and that personnel will be 15

qualified by reason of training and experience to safely use licensed material in accordance with 10 CFR 70.23(a)(2). Therefore, the NRC staff finds that this program is acceptable.

4.3.6 Ventilation and Respiratory Protection Programs In accordance with 10 CFR 70.22(a)(7), each application for a license must contain a description of equipment and facilities which will be used by the applicant to protect health and minimize danger to life or property. The requirements in Subpart H of 10 CFR Part 20 state that the licensee shall use, to the extent practical, process or other engineering controls to control the concentration of radioactive material in air. Chapter 5.2 of the LA request states that the application is only for sealed sources. Consequently, these sources do not present an internal hazard therefore an evaluation of ventilation capability or a respiratory protection program is not required.

4.3.7 Radiation Surveys and Monitoring Programs In accordance with 10 CFR 70.22(a)(8), each application for a license must contain proposed procedures to protect health and minimize danger to life or property (such as procedures to avoid accidental criticality, procedures for personnel monitoring and waste disposal, post-criticality accident emergency procedures, etc.). The NRC staff reviewed the applicants radiation survey and monitoring program commitments against the acceptance criteria in NUREG-1520, Section 4.4.7.3. The following discussion identifies each acceptance criterion from NUREG-1520 and summarizes the NRC staffs evaluation as to whether the information provided by the applicant is consistent with the criterion:

(1) Provide radiation survey and monitoring programs that are necessary to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and that are reasonable to evaluate the magnitude and extent of radiation levels, the concentrations or quantities of radioactive material, and the potential radiological hazards.

Table 4 of Chapter 10.2 of the LA provides a list of instrumentation used by the DTRA. It is not an inventory but represents the examples of radiation detection/measurement instruments that are maintained, calibrated, and available to conduct the surveys and radiological assessments described in the application. This list of instruments to be used by the DTRA are adequate to support the work described in the application for monitoring the materials requested in the application.

(2) Prepare written procedures for the radiation survey and monitoring programs that include an outline of the program objectives, sampling procedures, data-analysis methods, types of equipment and instrumentation to be used, frequency of measurements, recordkeeping and reporting requirements, and actions to be taken when measurements exceed regulatory limits in 10 CFR Part 20 or administrative levels established by the applicant.

Chapter 10.2 commits to the specifications of Appendix F, Model Radiation Survey Instrument Calibration Program, of NUREG-1556, Vol. 17, Rev. 1 (NRC, 2018). Authorized users and radiation safety staff receive training in the use of instruments as a part of their qualification identified in Chapter 8.0. The applicant stated that it does not have a sampling program, nor is there a regulatory requirement to document frequency of surveys. Instrument use is part of 16

training or as part of a process of verification that no contamination is found in the use and placement of the materials requested in the application in package surveys and sealed source leak tests.

(3) Design and implement a personnel monitoring program for external occupational radiation exposures that outlines methods or procedures to do the following:

a. Identify the criteria for worker participation in the program;

b. Identify the types of radiation to be monitored;

c. Specify how exposures will be measured, assessed and recorded;

d. Identify the type and sensitivity of personal dosimeters to be used, when they will be used, and how the collected data will be processed and evaluated; and

e. Identify the plants administrative exposure levels or the levels at which actions are taken to investigate the cause of exposures exceeding these levels.

Monitoring of an individuals external radiation exposure is required if the external occupational dose is likely to exceed 10 percent of the annual dose limit appropriate for the individual. The DTRA utilizes a National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) accredited dosimetry vendor to provide Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD) whole body and extremity monitors. The TLDs measure dose from photonic (x and gamma ray), beta, fast neutron and thermal neutron radiation sources and have a lower limit of detection of 3 mrem photon and 5 mrem neutron. Monitoring of additional individuals for particular environments is at the discretion of the RSO, who oversees the dosimetry program. Posted dosimetry is utilized to accumulate integrated dose in workspaces adjacent to source storage areas.

The NVLAP accredited dosimetry vendor processes all issued dosimeters and provides the DTRA with reports that document the measured deep dose equivalent and shallow dose equivalent. The DTRAs dosimetry monitors workers for neutron, gamma and shallow dose. An annual dosimetry report is provided to anyone monitored during a calendar year. The DTRA does not currently utilize secondary dosimeters in addition to the primary whole body and extremity monitors. The DTRA reserves the right to change dosimetry and processors as needed to support mission requirements. The DTRA stated that it will ensure that any changes are consistent with the current measurement capabilities and processing or calibration standards.

(4) Design and implement a personnel monitoring program for internal occupational radiation exposures based on the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1201, 20.1204, and 20.1502(b), that outlines methods or procedures to do the following:

a. Identify the criteria for worker participation in the program;

b. Identify the type of sampling to be used, the frequency of collection and measurement, and the minimum detection levels;

c. Specify how worker intakes will be measured, assessed, and recorded;

d. Specify how the data will be processed, evaluated, and interpreted;

e. Identify the plants administrative exposure levels or the levels at which actions are taken to investigate the cause of exposures exceeding these levels.

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Chapter 10.2 states that a personnel-monitoring program is in place to ensure that the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 20.1201 are met. Because the LA is only for sealed sources that do not present an internal hazard, the NRC staff finds an evaluation of internal exposures or bioassay under 10 CFR 20.1502(b), and further explained in 10 CFR 20.1204, is not necessary.

(5) Design and implement an air-sampling program in areas of the plant identified as potential airborne-radioactivity areas to conduct airflow studies and to calibrate and maintain the airborne sampling equipment in accordance with the manufacturers recommendations.

The LA request is only for sealed sources that do not present an internal hazard therefore an evaluation of ventilation capability or air sampling program is not required.

(6) Implement additional procedures, as may be required by 10 CFR Part 20 and the ISA Summary to control exposure to airborne radioactive material (e.g., control of access, limitation of exposure times to licensed materials, and use of respiratory protection equipment).

Due to the material description found in Chapter 5.1, the NRC staff finds the applicant is not required to have an ISA. In addition, the staff finds that the LA request is only for sealed sources that do not present an internal hazard therefore additional procedures to control exposure to airborne radioactive material are not required.

(7) Conduct a contamination survey program in areas of the facility most likely to be radiologically contaminated; the program must include the types and frequencies of surveys for various areas of the facility and the action levels and actions to be taken when contamination levels are exceeded.

Verification surveys will be conducted for packages and in the use and handling of the materials. Material requested under this application are sealed materials which will not contribute to surface contamination. These sealed sources will be leak tested semi-annually and analyzed by an organization authorized by the NRC or an Agreement State to provide leak test services. In Chapter 10.2 the DTRA commits to conducting facility compliance contamination surveys because of sealed material qualities.

(8) Implement the facilitys corrective action program when the results of personnel contamination monitoring exceed the applicants administrative personnel contamination levels.

The NRC staff finds the applicant is not required to have a formal corrective action program as a 10 CFR Part 70 licensee, due to the nature of the limited materials and uses. These materials are sealed sources and one of the RSOs responsibilities is to ensure radiation surveys are conducted where indicated and to keep records of such surveys, including summaries of corrective measures recommended and/or instituted.

(9) Implement the facilitys corrective action program when any incident results in either unplanned occupational exposures exceeding the facilitys administrative limits or unplanned airborne contamination exceeding the applicable concentration in Appendix 18

B of 10 CFR Part 20 for 1 week. Note that applicants utilizing soluble uranium may be more restricted by the soluble uranium intake limit in 10 CFR 20.1201(e) than the values in Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 20.

As discussed above, the DTRA is not required to have a formal corrective action program due to the nature of the limited materials and uses. The application is for sealed sources with no potential for airborne contamination. There is no request to use materials that could cause airborne contamination or to use uranium in a soluble form.

(10) Use equipment and instrumentation with sufficient sensitivity for the type or types of radiation being measured and calibrate and maintain equipment and instrumentation in accordance with manufacturers recommendations or applicable American National Standards Institute standards.

Table 4 of Chapter 10.2 identifies the instrumentation used for the survey program. The inventory consists of a variety of equipment the NRC staff finds is adequate to evaluate all aspects of the survey program for the DTRA. The inventory includes ion chambers, Geiger-Mueller detectors, Sodium Iodide detectors, Alpha-Beta Scintillations, Proportional Counters, neutron detection, and Liquid Scintillation Counting. This equipment is adequate because the radiation survey meters are calibrated on an annual frequency using National Institute of Standards and Technology traceable sources.

(11) Establish policies to ensure that equipment and materials removed from restricted areas to unrestricted areas are not contaminated above the release levels presented in Appendix A, Acceptable Surface Contamination Levels, to Regulatory Guide (RG) 8.24 (NRC, 2012).

The application request is only for sealed sources that do not present an internal hazard requiring an evaluation of surface contamination. In Chapter 10.2, the applicant commits to maintain calibrated equipment, decontamination, and sampling supplies to protect health and minimize danger to property and the environment.

(12) Leak-test all sealed sources consistent with direction provided in Appendix C, Leak Test Requirements, to RG 8.24 or the applicable regulations for the materials involved (e.g., 10 CFR 31.5[c][2] has direction for leak testing of certain byproduct devices).

In Chapter 10.7 of the application, the DTRA commits to leak testing sources identified in the application semi-annually. Leak tests will be performed consistent with the guidance in the Agency Branch Technical Position, Leak Testing of Sealed Sources (NRC,1993).

Demonstration and documentation of compliance with the conditions for uranium and plutonium sealed sources is achieved through methods and guidance specified in Appendix J, Model Leak Test Program, NUREG-1556, Vol. 17, Rev. 1, Consolidated Guidance About Materials Licenses: Program-Specific Guidance About Special Nuclear Material of Less Than Critical Mass Licenses, (NRC, 2018) and consistent with Regulatory Guide 8.24, Health Physics Surveys During Enriched U-235 Processing and Fuel Fabrication, (NRC, 2012).

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(13) Establish and implement an access control program that ensures that (1) signs, labels, and other access controls are properly posted and operative; (2) restricted areas are established to prevent the spread of contamination and are identified with appropriate signs; and (3) step-off pads, change facilities, protective clothing facilities, and personnel-monitoring instruments are provided in sufficient quantities and locations.

Chapter 9.1 of the application describes physical access restrictions to the DTRA facilities with further detail provided regarding access to the material storage area. Adequacy of physical security is addressed in Chapter 10.0 of this report. Material storage is identified as a Vault-Type Room (VTR) and treated as a CAA in accordance with Regulatory Guide 5.59 (NRC, 1983). During the site visit, the NRC staff confirmed that the DTRA areas where radioactive materials are used or stored are so designated and posted with appropriate caution signs.

The LA request is only for sealed sources that do not present a surface or spreadable contamination hazard requiring an evaluation.

(14) Establish a radiation reporting program consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20.

The DTRA will maintain records of the radiation safety program (including program provisions, audits, and reviews of the program content and implementation), radiation survey results (bioassays, external exposure data from monitored individuals, internal intakes of radioactive material), results of corrective action program referrals, radioactive work packages, and planned special exposures.

Based on the NRC staffs evaluation of the application commitments and the material uses requested to follow the acceptance criteria in Section 4.4.7.3 of NUREG-1520 (NRC, 2015), the staff finds application provides reasonable assurance that the proposed equipment and procedures to be used in the radiation survey and monitoring programs will continue to adequately protect health and minimize danger to life and property as required by 10 CFR 70.23(a)(3) and (a)(4). Therefore, the NRC staff finds that these programs are acceptable.

4.3.8 Control of Radiological Risk Resulting from Accidents In accordance with 10 CFR 70.22(a)(8), each application for a license must contain proposed procedures to protect health and minimize danger to life or property (such as procedures to avoid accidental criticality, procedures for personnel-monitoring and waste disposal, post-criticality accident emergency procedures). The NRC staff reviewed the applicants additional program commitments against the acceptance criteria in NUREG-1520, Section 4.4.8.3.

The regulatory basis for emergency management is found in 10 CFR 70.22(i)(1), which states that Each application to possess enriched uranium or plutonium for which a criticality accident alarm system is required, uranium hexafluoride in excess of 50 kilograms in a single container or 1000 kilograms total, or in excess of 2 curies of plutonium in unsealed form or on foils or plated sources, must contain either: (i) An evaluation showing that the maximum dose to a member of the public offsite due to a release of radioactive materials would not exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium, or (ii) An emergency 20

plan for responding to the radiological hazards of an accidental release of special nuclear material and to any associated chemical hazards directly incident thereto. The applicant does not possess any uranium hexafluoride in any quantity, nor does it possess in excess of 2 curies of plutonium in unsealed form or on foils or plated sources. Therefore, the NRC staff determined that this regulatory requirement does not apply to the DTRA.

In Chapter 10.6 the DTRA commits to the development and utilization of written procedures for normal operations and stated that emergency procedures for safe and secure use of materials and emergencies have been developed or will be developed before receipt of licensed material.

According to the DTRA, these procedures will address applicable radiation safety requirements found in 10 CFR 19, 20, 70, and 71 and any other applicable regulations. Procedures may be revised only if:

• The changes are reviewed and approved by the RSC Chairman and the RSO in writing;

• The affected staff members are provided training in the revised procedures prior to implementation;

• The changes are in compliance with NRC regulations and the license conditions; and

• The changes do not degrade the effectiveness of the program.

4.3.9 Additional Program Requirements Each licensee must maintain records of the RP program, including the provisions of the program, survey records, audits and other records identified in Subpart L of 10 CFR Part 20.

Each licensee must make reports and notifications, including theft or loss, notification of incidents, and other reports as required by Subpart M of 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff reviewed the applicants additional program commitments against the acceptance criteria in NUREG-1520, Section 4.4.9.3. The following discussion identifies each acceptance criterion from NUREG-1520 and summarizes the NRC staffs evaluation as to whether the information provided by the applicant is consistent with the criterion.

(1) Maintain records of the RP Program (including program provisions, audits, and reviews of the program content and implementation), radiation survey results (air sampling, bioassays, external-exposure data from monitoring of individuals, internal intakes of radioactive material), and results of its corrective action program referrals, RWPs, and planned special exposures.

In Chapter 10.10, the DTRA commits to maintain records of the radiation safety program (including program provisions, audits, and reviews of the program content and implementation),

radiation survey results (bioassays, external exposure data from monitored individuals, internal intakes of radioactive material), results of corrective action program referrals, radioactive work packages, and planned special exposures.

(2) Establish a program to report to the NRC, within the time specified in regulations, incidents specified in 10 CFR 20.2202, Notifications of Incidents, and safety significant events specified in 10 CFR 70.74. Refer reportable incidents or events to the facilitys corrective action program and report to the NRC both the corrective action(s) taken (or planned) to protect against a recurrence and any proposed schedule to achieve compliance with applicable license conditions.

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In Chapter 10.10, the DTRA commits to establish a program to report to the NRC, within the timeframe for incidents specified in 10 CFR 20.2202, Notification of incidents, and safety significant events specified in 10 CFR 70.74, Additional reporting requirements.

(3) Prepare and submit to the NRC an annual report of the results of individual monitoring required by 10 CFR 20.2206(b). Establish a program that will assure shipment and receipt of radioactive materials consistent with regulations in 10 CFR 20, 10 CFR 71, 49 CFR, and others, as applicable. This includes having (a) qualified personnel performing these operations, (b) procedures to implement the program and generate and maintain appropriate records, and (c) a supporting quality assurance function.

The application from the DTRA is not for a reactor, nor is it for spent fuel or the materials listed in 10 CFR 20.2206(b). Therefore, this reporting requirement is not applicable. In Chapter 10.8, the DTRA commits to the establishment of a program that will assure shipment and receipt of radioactive materials consistent with regulations in 10 CFR 20, 10 CFR 71, 49 CFR, and others, as applicable. Transportation and reporting requirements are addressed in Chapter 10.0 of this safety evaluation.

Based on the NRC staffs evaluation of the application information pertaining to the acceptance criteria in Section 4.4.8.3 of NUREG-1520, the NRC staff finds the commitments are consistent with applicable criteria in NRUEG-1520 and provide assurance that the DTRA will comply with 10 CFR 20.2202. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that these program commitments are acceptable.

4.4 Evaluation Findings

The applicant has committed to an acceptable RP Program that includes the following:

• an effective, documented program to ensure that occupational radiological exposures are ALARA;

• an organization with adequate qualification requirements for the RP personnel;

• approved, written radiation protection procedures; and

• radiation protection training for all personnel who have access to restricted areas.

• a radiation survey and monitoring program that includes requirements for controlling radiological contamination within the facility and monitoring external radiation exposures.

• other programs to maintain records; report to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20; and appropriately respond to, investigate, and prevent incidents and accidents involving radiological exposures.

The NRC staff concludes based on the review and analysis provided in the previous sections that there is reasonable assurance that during the license term the applicants radiation protection program will meet the regulatory requirements of Parts 19, 20, and 70 as discussed in Section 4.2 above.

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5.0 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY 5.1 Purpose of Review The DTRAs Application for Materials License requests authorization to possess, use, and store a combination of uranium, plutonium, and neptunium RSTDs designed to emulate the photon and spectroscopic signature of much higher quantities of SNM than contained within the RSTD.

The overall requested quantity for each isotope described above is provided in Table 1.

The RSTDs include a 300-gram equivalent U-233 device with an actual U-233 mass of approximately XX grams; two 2.5-kilogram equivalent U-235 devices with an actual U-235 mass of about XX and XX grams, respectively; two 25-kilogram equivalent U-235 devices with an actual U-235 mass of about XXX grams each; three 200-gram equivalent Pu-239 devices with an actual Pu-239 mass of XX grams each; and a Np-237 device (equivalent mass not specified) with an actual Np-237 mass of X grams or less.

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 70.4 provides thresholds for which inadvertent criticality becomes a concern, defining critical mass of SNM as a quantity exceeding 700 grams of contained U-235, 520 grams U-233, 450 grams Pu, 1500 grams of contained U-235 for enrichments of 4 weight percent (wt. %) or less, 450 grams of any combinations thereof, or one-half such quantities if massive moderators made of graphite, heavy water, or beryllium may be present. These thresholds are further emphasized by 10 CFR 70.24, which requires the use of a criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) based on the same values.

The DTRAs request includes a total of 765 grams SNM, which is in excess of the 10 CFR 70.4 and 10 CFR 70.24 450-gram combination threshold. However, the DTRA information to demonstrate that licensed activities with the requested materials do not present a credible criticality concern and should, therefore, be exempt from the applicable 10 CFR Part 70 requirements (specifically, 10 CFR 70.24). The DTRA also stated that an exemption is in the public interest by increasing public safety in support of national security.

In the Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment in Appendix B of the LA the DTRA stated, that The presence of massive moderators or reflectors to include graphite, heavy water, or beryllium such that they would represent a potential source of moderation or reflection more effective than that of light water is not credible at the DTRA long-term storage and use locations. Further, that for short-term storage and use locations, the arrangement of a massive moderator/reflector such that it would represent a source of moderation or reflection more effective than light-water is not credible short of a concerted effort. In chapter 5.2 of the license application the DTRA further commits to limit the material used or stored at short-term locations to 350 grams of combined SNM.

5.2 Regulatory Requirements Although the DTRAs request involves the possession, use, and storage of SNM, its planned activities do not include enriched uranium processing, fabrication of uranium fuel or fuel assemblies, uranium enrichment, enriched uranium hexafluoride conversion, plutonium processing, fabrication of mixed-oxide fuel or fuel assemblies, or scrap recovery of SNM.

Therefore, many of the criticality safety-related 10 CFR 70 requirements (primarily those in Subpart H) do not apply. The request is subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24, and 23

given that the DTRA has requested an exemption from 10 CFR 70.24, 10 CFR 70.17 is also applicable.

The regulations in 10 CFR 70.24 require, in part, that licensees authorized to possess a quantity exceeding 700 grams of contained U-235, 520 grams U-233, 450 grams Pu, 1500 grams of contained U-235 for enrichments of 4 wt. % or less, 450 grams of any combinations thereof, or one-half such quantities if massive moderators made of graphite, heavy water, or beryllium may be present, to maintain a criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) capable of detecting an absorbed dose in soft tissue of 20 rads (combined neutron and gamma radiation) at an unshielded distance of 2 meters within 1 minute for all areas in which licensed SNM is handled, used, or stored. Such areas must be covered by two detectors.

This section of the SER also discusses the applicants requested exemption from the criticality monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a). Section 70.17 of 10 CFR Part 70 states that the NRC may grant an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 70 as it determines it is authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest.

5.3 Staff Review and Analysis As part of the DTRA Application for Materials License, the DTRA provided a criticality safety evaluation in Appendix B, Criticality Assessment for DTRA [NRC] License Application. The evaluation considered three basic groups of configurations with and without various reflectors and under varying moderated conditions. All three configurations were also evaluated with and without the presence of Np-237. The configurations that were considered are summarized below in Table 2.

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Interstitial Reflector Configuration Geometry Arrangement Moderator (1 meter)

(kg H2O)

Bare Homogenized Source Homogeneous Water with and without Sphere (SNM) 0 Heavy Water Reflector Graphite Beryllium Pu - U None U - Pu None Pu - U - Np None Pu - Np - U None Np - Pu - U None Np - U - Pu None Nested Shells Sphere(s) 0 U - Pu - Np None U - Np - Pu None Pu - U - Np Beryllium Pu - U - Np Water Pu - U - Np Graphite Pu - U - Np Heavy Water 1

5 10 20 Homogeneous 25 Homogeneous Slurry Sphere Bare (SNM and H2O) 30 40 50 100 200 Table 2. DTRA Analyzed Configurations The results of the DTRAs evaluation demonstrated that the most reactive configuration analyzed was a homogeneous slurry consisting of an SNM (without Np-237) and 25 kilograms water mixture (keff + 2 = 0.82505). The DTRA noted in their evaluation that all the evaluated configurations, including the most reactive configuration, represented highly contrived scenarios that would be extremely difficult to produce without considerable effort and design, and certainly not plausible as a scenario of an accident. Likewise, in their RAI responses that stated in part, that in order to bring the SNM together and mix it would require an extreme amount of effort to disassemble the sealed source container which is strictly prohibited.

Consequently, the DTRA concluded that the requested materials and associated activities discussed in the Application for Materials License do not present a credible criticality concern and should, therefore, be exempt from the applicable 10 CFR Part 70 requirements.

The NRC staff performed an independent analysis using the SCALE/KENO-VI Monte Carlo N-Particle application with various continuous energy cross section libraries. The staffs evaluation focused on the requested materials as individual units and as a homogeneous mixture. These were evaluated under conditions of no moderation, interspersed moderation, 25

and interstitial moderation, and under varying degrees of light-water reflection. The staff used a volume additive approach with a fixed weight percent composition based on the applicants requested materials and possession limits described below and summarized in Table 3.

Arrangement of Individual Units - No Moderation/Reflection The staff first performed a series of calculations to determine whether the requested materials could be arranged into a critical configuration without any degree of moderation. The staff evaluated the requested materials as individual solid spheres in various arrangements, including a planar array, cuboid, and pyramid; all with varying degrees of pitch between units. The staff determined that all these configurations were substantially subcritical, suggesting that either the various sources of SNM would have to be homogeneously mixed into one large geometry or some degree of moderation (interspersed or interstitial) would have to be introduced, or both.

Arrangement of Individual Units - Interspersed Moderation The staff then performed a series of calculations to evaluate the effects of interspersed moderation. As before, the staff evaluated the requested materials as individual solid spheres in various arrangements (planar array, cuboid, and pyramid), all with varying degrees of pitch between units, but now introduced light-water moderation between units (i.e., interspersed moderation). The staff determined that all these configurations were substantially subcritical, suggesting that the various sources of SNM would have to be homogeneously mixed into one large geometry or some degree of interstitial moderation would have to be introduced, or both.

Bare and Reflected Homogeneous Sphere - No Interstitial Moderation The staff performed a series of calculations to determine whether the requested materials could be arranged into a critical configuration when combined into one large homogeneous unit. To accomplish this the staff used a volume additive approach with a fixed weight percent composition based on a conservative mixture of the applicants requested materials and possession limits as summarized below. In this case a lower mass value for Np-237 was used to generate the weight percentages of the homogeneous mixture of SNM, as will be shown later ignoring or reducing the amount of Np-237 increases the reactivity of the most reactive configurations.

Material Mass (g) Weight Percent (%)

(mx / mtotal)

U-233 XX X.XX U-235 XXX XX.XX Pu-239 XXX XX.XX Np-237 X X.XX Table 3. SNM Weight Percent Composition for SNM Mixture The staff evaluated the large homogeneous unit under conditions of no reflection (i.e., bare), 1-inch reflection, and infinite reflection. The staff determined that all these configurations were substantially subcritical, suggesting that some degree of interstitial moderation would have to be introduced in addition to the various sources of SNM being mixed into one large homogeneous geometry for criticality to occur.

Bare and Reflected Homogeneous Sphere - Interstitial Moderation 26

The staff then performed a series of calculations to evaluate the effects of interstitial moderation. As before, the staff evaluated all the requested materials mixed into one large homogeneous unit but now introduced interstitial moderation. The effects of varying light-water reflector thicknesses were also evaluated. The staff performed several independent calculations to estimate the minimum critical mass of combined SNM as a function of SNM concentration for configurations involving both 1-inch and infinite tight-fitting, light-water reflection as well as no reflection with a keff + 2 0.95 criterion. As before, Spherical Critcal Mass (g SNM) 10000 Infinite Reflector 1000 1" Reflector 100 0.01 0.1 1 10 SNM Concentration (kg SNM/L)

Figure 1. Critical SNM Mass as a Function of SNM Concentration The staff determined that some degree of reflection is required for criticality with this material as the cases involving no reflection (i.e., bare) were all substantially subcritical. However, the staff determined that for a spherical geometry consisting of the weight percent composition detailed in Table 3, a combined SNM mass as low as XXX grams and XXX grams was sufficient for criticality when interstitial light-water moderation was introduced with infinite and 1-inch reflection, respectively. The corresponding mass of each material is summarized below in Table 4. The results of these calculations are plotted below in Figure 1.

Requested Mass (g) Mass (g) Mass (g)

Material Possession Limit (g) 1-inch Reflection (Infinite Reflection) (No Reflection)

U-233 XX XX.X XX.X U-235 XXX XXX XXX.X Pu-239 XXX XXX XXX.X N/A Np-237 X X.XX X.X Total XXX XXX XXX Table 4. Corresponding Mass to Calculated Minimum Critical SNM Mass 27

The results of additional staff calculations are shown below. These results show that a criticality is possible when all licensed SNM is combined into a reflected and moderated homogenous sphere.

Configuration Moderation Reflection keff + 2 None None 0.2886 None Individual Spheres (other than that Interspersed provided by 0.3189 (Optimum Pitch)

Interspersed moderation)

None 0.3080 None Homogeneous SNM Full 0.4156 Sphere Interstitial None 0.8775 (Optimum) Full 1.0235 Table 5. Results of Calculation with 765 Grams Combined SNM Staff Weighted SNM Composition - Optimally-Moderated, Fully-Reflected Sphere In order to determine whether a more reactive configuration could be created using the requested materials, the staff evaluated the most reactive conditions from Table 4 above (optimum interstitial moderation with infinite reflection) but with an SNM composition weighted in favor of the most reactive materials. This was done by taking the minimum critical mass found for the optimum interstitial moderation with infinite reflection from Table 4, and filling it with the most reactive isotopes first to create a more reactive composition for that mass. The corresponding mass of each material is summarized in Table 6 below.

Material Mass (g) Weight Percent (%)

(mx / mtotal)

U-233 XX X.XX Pu-239 XXX XX.X U-235 XXX XX.X

• Total mass does not match Table 4 due to rounding.

Table 6. SNM Weight Percent Composition for Altered SNM Mixture The staff determined that the altered SNM composition was slightly more reactive than previously evaluated, yielding a keff + 2 value approximately 1% higher. However, based on the fact that the results from both cases showed a minimum critical mass, lower than the requested possession limits for each material individually as well as in total, the valuable conclusion was that the requested materials and their associated possession limits would provide more than enough mass to achieve criticality under the conditions described above.

The staff also determined, though, that the requested materials could not possibly meet the conditions required for criticality without the occurrence of a number of significant, difficult, and unauthorized changes in process conditions. Specifically, all or most of the various sources of SNM would have to be collected, disassembled, and arranged into a homogeneous unit. The unit would then have to be homogeneously mixed with liquid moderator, shaped into an 28

optimum or near optimum geometry, and then surrounded with additional neutron reflectors.

These analyzed configurations were highly contrived, did not represent realistic (or credible) arrangements, and could not credibly be achieved short of a willful, concerted effort.

In order for the various sources of SNM to be placed into such a configuration, all the available SNM would first need to be collected into a single location in direct violation of established DTRA procedures, training, and storage/use practices. The SNM sources would then need to be physically modified in such a way that allowed for each material to be mixed into a uniform, isotropic spatial distribution. This would not only be in direct violation of established DTRA procedures, training, storage/use practices, and the authorized use of the requested license, it would be physically difficult to achieve and would require a concerted effort. Once arranged into a uniform, isotropic spatial distribution, the material would then have to be configured into a spherical geometry with liquid moderator included. This, too, would be extremely difficult as the amount of moderator that would need to be mixed in with SNM in the requested amounts to achieve criticality would be approximately 10.5 liters of water (for fully-reflected conditions) and 15 liters of water (for 1-inch reflection conditions), likely resulting in a wet slurry that would be difficult to maintain in a spherical form. Given that reflection would also be required (as determined by the staffs independent analysis discussed above), at least an additional 2.5 liters of water, or some equivalent that provides a level of reflection consistent with that provided by full encapsulation of a sphere and its surface area-to-volume ratio, would need to be introduced.

This, too, would be physically difficult to achieve and would require a concerted effort. In addition, the DTRA plans to distribute the requested materials between various long-term storage and use locations, as well as short-term storage and use locations based on mission needs. This further challenges the likelihood that all of the requested material could be collected into one location and the subsequent actions discussed above performed. The staff determined that, although somewhat contrived and unrealistic as well, the scenarios discussed above regarding the effects of interspersed moderation would reasonably bound the credible scenarios presented by the requested materials and associated activities, and that any scenarios beyond that point would be highly contrived and not credible.

The staff reviewed the effect of the possible presence of massive moderators or reflectors of materials that may be more effective than light water at increasing the neutron reactivity of a configuration of SNM. Such massive moderators could be present at short-term locations, however, similar barriers to criticality that are discussed above for light water would apply to configurations involving massive moderators. This is because the steps to manufacture a critical assembly out of the SNM sources and massive moderators would be similar. The primary difference being that configurations with massive moderators could require somewhat less SNM. This can be seen in Table 28 of LA-10860-MS (LANL, 1986). However, the licensees commitment to limit SNM at short-term locations to 350 grams mitigates this factor by reducing the amount of SNM that may be at the same site as massive reflectors. The staff determined that no credible accident scenario exists in which the requested materials could achieve criticality, notwithstanding willfulness, based on the physical challenges presented by the required material composition and distribution, geometry, moderation, and reflection conditions. Because accidental criticality is not credible, a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) would provide no benefit while burdening the DTRA and inhibiting them from completing their mission in support of national security. Therefore, the staff concluded that the requested materials and associated activities discussed in the DTRA Application for Materials License do not present a credible criticality concern and can reasonably be exempted from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 because such an exemption is in the public interest.

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Special Exemptions or Authorizations In chapter 5.4, the applicant requested an exemption from the criticality monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 70.24. The proposed SNM license limits requested would allow for flexible site possession of SNM in quantities that exceed those specified in 10 CFR 70.24(a). However, the DTRAs criticality safety evaluation, which is addressed in depth in Chapter 5.0 by NRC staff, demonstrates that criticality accident scenarios are not credible given the types and amount of SNM authorized by the license.

Under 10 CFR 70.17, the Commission may grant exemptions from the requirements of the regulations as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the publics interest. The NRC staff determined that the installation of a criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) at the applicants facilities would not reduce the risk to the workers or the public because there is no credible criticality accident associated with the SNM test objects. Therefore, the lack of a criticality alarm system will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and is in the public interest. The NRC staff determined that the exemption will be in the publics interests because it will reduce unnecessary regulatory burden, the DTRAs and the NRCs regulatory resources for evaluating and inspecting the systems. Therefore, the staff recommends granting the requested exemption.

The following license condition will be imposed in the license to address the exemption from the criticality monitoring regulatory requirements:

The applicant is granted an exemption to the requirements of the Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 70.24 to maintain a criticality accident alarm system.

5.4 Evaluation Findings

The NRC staff reviewed the DTRAs LA and response to NRC requests for additional information. Based on the review discussed in this report, the NRC staff concludes that the requested materials and associated activities do not present a credible criticality concern and therefore, the requested exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest.

6.0 FIRE SAFETY 6.1 Regulatory Requirements The regulatory basis for the fire safety review can be found in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Sections 70.23(a)(3) and (4), which require that determination that the applicants proposed equipment, facilities, and procedures be adequate to protect public health and safety.

6.2 Staff Review and Analysis The DTRA-established facilities at locations on military bases comply with the applicable building code regulations. The sealed sources discussed in the LA are qualified as a special 30

form of radioactive material that meet the provisions of 10 CFR 71.75, including the heat test requirements which state that a specimen may not melt or disperse when heated in air to a temperature of not less than 800°C (1475°F), held at that temperature for a period of 10 minutes, and then allowed to cool. The sealed sources are only authorized to be left unattended in storage locations specified in the application. The LA states that the sealed sources will be stored within a vault type room (VTR). The portion of each facility where the sealed sources are stored has no appreciable combustible loading and is constructed of non-combustible materials. Material storage precautions will be used to minimize potential for airborne radioactivity from exposure to fire hazards. The VTR at each base is located within a building equipped with fire detection systems that are continuously monitored. All DTRA storage sites are on military installations with continuously manned fire departments. The DTRAs AUs of the sealed sources will receive training and have experience identifying potential fire hazards. The AUs will survey areas for use of the sealed sources to ensure any fire hazards are identified, assessed, and mitigated.

The DTRA may also use the sealed sources in temporary locations for training scenarios. The DTRAs AUs will survey areas for use of the sealed sources to ensure any fire hazards are identified, assessed, and mitigated. When in use at any temporary locations, the sealed sources will be under constant surveillance and clear of potential fire hazards. Any temporary storage of the sealed sources at a temporary location will have installed fire detection systems that are continuously monitored. If the remoteness of a temporary location would prevent a reasonable response time from a fire department, additional precautions will be taken to ensure a rapid response to an incipient fire.

The NRC staffs review and site visits determined that the applicants program is consistent with applicable guidance provided in NFPA 45, Standard for Fire Protection in Laboratory Facilities (NFPA, 2019), as well as NFPA 801, Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Material, (NFPA, 2020). The NRC staff notes that a complete release of the licensed material would be highly unlikely since the material at risk is in the form of sealed sources that are unlikely to volatilize or otherwise readily disperse as a result of a fire. The NRC staff further determined that given the low risk to public health and safety of the materials covered by the proposed license, a formal fire hazards analysis is not necessary.

6.3 Evaluation Findings

The NRC staff reviewed the DTRAs fire protection program and determined that it maintains an adequate level of fire protection to protect public health and safety. The staff concludes that the applicants equipment, facilities, and procedures provide a reasonable level of assurance that adequate fire protection will be provided consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.23(a)(3) and (4).

7.0 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT The regulatory basis for emergency management is found in 10 CFR 70.22(i)(1) which states that Each application to possess enriched uranium or plutonium for which a CAAS is required, uranium hexafluoride in excess of 50 kilograms in a single container or 1000 kilograms total, or in excess of 2 curies of plutonium in unsealed form or on foils or plated sources, must contain either (ii) An emergency plan for responding to the radiological hazards of an accidental release of special nuclear material and to any associated chemical hazards directly incident thereto.

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The applicant does not possess uranium hexafluoride in any quantity, will be exempt from the requirement to possess a criticality alarm, and does not possess in excess of 2 curies of plutonium in unsealed form or on foils or plated sources. Therefore, the DTRA is not required to have an Emergency Plan.

8.0 DECOMMISSIONING The regulatory basis for financial assurance and decommissioning funding requirements are found in 10 CFR 70.22(a)(9) and 70.25. The applicant is requesting authorization to possess and use SNM in the form of sealed sources, which pose less risk to the health and safety of the workers and the environment than unsealed SNM. Paragraph 70.22(a)(9) and 70.25(a) of 10 CFR require an applicant for a specific license for a uranium enrichment facility or authorizing possession and use of unsealed SNM in certain quantities to submit a decommissioning funding plan or certification of financial assurance for decommissioning. As previously indicated, the DTRA will only possess and use sealed SNM. Thus, the NRC staff concludes that the requirements in 10 CFR 70.22(a)(9) and 70.25 do not apply to the proposed activities, and that the DTRA is not required to provide decommissioning financial assurance in support of its LA.

9.0 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT The DTRA requests authorization to possess a combination of uranium and plutonium RSTDs and to use sealed sources of SNM for research, training, and development. The proposed SNM license limits would allow for flexible site possession of SNM in quantities that exceed those specified in 10 CFR 70.24(a). The DTRA proposes an overall SNM license possession limitation of Category III quantities that will normally be distributed and stored between two permanent fixed facilities with smaller quantities used at satellite facilities or at temporary locations. The proposed limits are based on the sources necessary for the licensees mission requirements while maintaining an overall subcritical program associated with the licensed material.

9.1 Categorical Exclusion for the Facility The licensees use of the material during training events will vary in location and scope based on its customers location, mission and experience. These events can occur on or off federal facilities or lands and, at times, in public locations, to train responders in unique, realistic, and relevant scenarios that cannot be accomplished only within the confines of governmental lands and facilities. Physical protection, physical security, and minimization of public dose in accordance with ALARA principles were addressed in the application in this report. The DTRA application states all use scenarios shall be for the purposes of research, training, and development and will be nondestructive.

Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(14)(v) and consistent with the criteria in NUREG-1748, Environmental Review Guidance for Licensing Actions Associated with NMSS Programs (NRC, 2003), Section 2.2.7.5, this licensing action is categorically excluded from the need to prepare an environmental assessment (EA) or an environmental impact statement.

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9.2 Categorical Exclusion for Exemptions to Material Quantities The proposed SNM license limits requested would allow for flexible site possession of SNM in quantities that exceed those specified in 10 CFR 70.24(a). For an exemption to qualify for a categorical exclusion, the exempted regulatory activity must meet the criteria of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(i)-(vi). Specifically, 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25) states that an exemption is categorically excluded provided that: (i) There is no significant hazards consideration; (ii) There is no significant change in the types or no significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; (iii) There is no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) There is no significant construction impact; (v)

There is no significant increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological accidents; and (vi) The requirements from which the exemption is sought involve specified activities.

In Chapter 5.0 of this report, the NRC staff conducted a nuclear criticality safety review of the activities to be performed on the SNM sources. As a result of that review, the NRC staff found that there was no credible criticality accident scenario possible given the types and total amount of SNM authorized by the license. The NRC staff verified the assessment of the criticality limits for three different scenarios with the entire mass of all the SNM on the license.

The exemption sought by the applicant from the requirement to have a CAAS satisfies each of these criteria. As discussed in Section 5.0, there will be no criticality or criticality-related gamma or neutron radiation resulting from the research activities using SNM sources. Accordingly, there is no significant hazards consideration; no significant change or increase in the types or amounts of effluents released offsite; no significant increase in individual, cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; and no significant increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological accidents. Additionally, because there are no construction activities associated with this request, there is no significant construction impact. Also, the exemption involves the types of activities enumerated in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(vi). Specifically, this exemption pertains to inspection or surveillance requirements as well as recordkeeping and reporting requirements; 10 CFR 70.24 requires installation of a CAAS which would provide continuous monitoring and surveillance for criticality events, and the CAAS provides continuous recordkeeping. Accordingly, the requirements in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(i)-(vi) are met.

9.3 Evaluation Findings

Because the requirements under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(14)(v) have been met, the NRC staff finds that the DTRA activities described in the application are categorically excluded from the requirement to prepare an EA or EIS. In addition, because an exemption from 10 CFR 70.24 meets the provisions identified in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), the NRC staff also finds that the exemption from this regulatory requirement is categorically excluded from the requirement to prepare an EA or EIS.

10.0 PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND PHYSICAL SECURITY 10.1 Regulatory Requirements The purpose of this review is to determine whether the DTRAs application to possess and use more than a critical mass of SNM meets the requirements in 10 CFR 73.67 Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate and Low Strategic Significance. In conducting its 33

review, the NRC staff used the guidance in Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.59 Standard Format and Content for a Licensee Physical Security Plan for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate or Low Strategic Significance (NRC, 1983).

10.2 Staff Review and Analysis The NRC staff reviewed the DTRAs initial application (DTRA, 2020) for SNM and its subsequent revision in response to RAIs (DTRA, 2021) against the requirements in 10 CFR 73.67(a), (f), and (g). Chapter 9.1 of DTRAs application. Facilities, describes the three long-term facilities where the SNM will be used and stored - 1) the Nuclear Enterprise Contingency Operation, Headquarters at Fort Belvoir, in Fairfax County, VA, 2) the Technical Evaluation Assessment Monitoring Site at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, NM, and 3) the Pacific Technical Support Group at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickman in Oahu, Hawaii. DTRAs congressionally mandated mission to train first responders under the NIMBLE ELDER program requires realistic, high-fidelity and challenging scenarios that require the use of SNM in public locations. To meet this requirement, SNM will be used in locations other than at the three long-term facilities that will include locations on government lands and public locations. Chapter 9.1 of DTRAs application also describes the use and storage configurations at other government locations and public locations.

The regulations in 10 CFR 73.67(a) require that the licensee establish and maintain a physical protection system that will achieve the following objectives: (i) minimize the possibilities for unauthorized removal of special nuclear material consistent with the potential consequences of such actions; and (ii) facilitate the location and recovery of missing special nuclear material. To achieve these objectives, the physical protection system shall provide: (i) early detection and assessment of unauthorized access or activities by an external adversary within the controlled access area containing special nuclear material; (ii) early detection of removal of special nuclear material by an external adversary from a controlled access area; (iii) assure proper placement and transfer of custody of special nuclear material; and (iv) respond to indications of an unauthorized removal of special nuclear material and then notify the appropriate response forces of its removal in order to facilitate its recovery.

Chapter 9.3 of the application, Physical Protection and Physical Security, commits to meeting requirements in 10 CFR 73.67(f), and 10 CFR 73.67(a). The DTRA states that the combination of the physical security features employed, and written security procedures will meet the general performance objectives specified in 10 CFR 73.67(a). The DTRAs security relies on the host base on-site security force or, if appropriate or needed, local law enforcement to respond to indications of unauthorized penetration or removal of SNM in order to facilitate its prompt recovery. The DTRA will ensure that the physical protection system and/or procedures provide an early detection (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) and assessment of unauthorized access or activities by an external adversary.

The NRC staff has reviewed the applicants description of the physical protection of SNM in Chapter 9.3 of the LA and finds that it meets the general requirements of 10 CFR 73.67(a) because it applies adequate physical protection measures to minimize the possibilities for unauthorized removal and facilitate prompt recovery of any missing material.

The regulations in 10 CFR 73.67(f)(1) require licensees to store or use the SNM only within a CAA. Chapter 6.1.1 of the LA, Use at Technical Evaluation Assessment Monitoring Site, 34

states that SNM will be used inside permanent and temporary CAA on government owned or controlled facilities or lands. Chapter 9.1.1 of the LA, Long-term Storage and Use Locations, describes the features of the long-term CAAs.

At the NECO facility, SNM is used within the CAAs, including the 8-foot tall chain link perimeter fence and Building XXXX, shown in Figures 4 and 5 of the application. Storage of SNM within Building XXXX is in safes within a vault-type room (VTR). Access is controlled by a single compound access point for normal ingress and egress using a coded badging system that identifies authorized personnel. A closed-circuit television system is used to monitor the perimeter by personnel centrally located within the compound. Video and intercom are used to verify identity and purpose of non-badged personnel prior to entry through the access gate.

At the TEAMS, SNM is used in open areas and structures within the CAA encompassed by a barbed wire-topped, 8-foot chain-link fence shown in Figure 11 of the application. Storage of SNM is in safes within the SNM locker that meets the criteria for a VTR type room. Access is controlled by two compound access points for normal ingress and egress using a coded badging system that identifies authorized personnel. If needed, watchmen can be stationed at each access gate, or one access gate may be disabled, and a watchman is posted at the only functioning access gate.

At the Pacific Technical Support Group (PTSG) site, the compound includes chain link fencing surrounding its northern corner and concrete blast walls surrounding its eastern corner, shown in Figure 7 of the application. The remainder of the compounds perimeter is made up of exterior building walls with portions of chain link fencing connecting each building. The SNM is used within open areas and two buildings (Buildings 1232 and 1716). Storage of SNM is in Building 1232 in safes within a vault-type room (see Figure 8 of the application). Access is controlled by two compound access points for normal ingress and egress using a coded badging system that identifies authorized personnel.

Chapter 9.1.2 of the LA, Short-term Storage and Use Locations, describes the features of the short-term CAAs including other government and public locations. Other government locations are government owned or contracted lands, lands or facilities that are closed to public access.

In Chapter 9.1.2.1 of the LA, Other Government Locations, the DTRA commits to establishing temporary CAAs for the use and/or storage of materials at these short-term locations.

Temporary CAAs will provide a boundary or barrier that clearly demarcates the temporary CAA utilizing one or more of the following: (1) use of permanent barriers (preferred method); (2) office partitions, (3) cordons, or (4) other devices or personnel to warn passersby of the restricted nature of the area.

In Chapter 9.3.2 of the LA, Short-term Storage and Use Locations, the DTRA states that short-term storage of SNM will be on secure military bases or government facilities, in a location that provides isolation of the SNM and access control. A temporary CAA will be established based on the following conditions: (1) when in facilities with an in-house, continuous security force or security watch, the SNM will be placed in a limited access location for which only security forces/watch or the DTRA AUs have access; (2) the SNM may be stored in a location with limited access and monitored by a motion alarm, with remote alerting capabilities, covering the area immediately surrounding the SNM; or (3) in facilities with base/compound security, increasing the resistance of existing barriers (e.g., locking doors and windows, placing the SNM in a locked drawer or supply room). Access is controlled by limiting the CAA to a single access 35

that is supervised by an AU. If the CAA is sufficiently small and configured such that a single watchperson can maintain positive control of personnel or vehicular access or, for more complex configurations, each access or area where unauthorized personnel may access the CAA will be supervised by a dedicated watchperson.

In Chapter 9.3.2 of the LA, the DTRA states that the SNM will not be stored in public locations.

In public locations, the SNM may be used within stationary temporary CAAs. Examples include a parked and locked vehicle or placed in an open area, carried in a backpack by an AU or the backpack is placed at a stationary location. The SNM will be under the constant surveillance of two AUs when in use at a public location.

Chapter 9.3 of DTRAs LA states that all DTRA employees, military and civilian, and contractors are required to possess and maintain a minimum of a Secret security clearance. This security clearance requires fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation background investigation. An employer of any visitor must pass their Secret or above security clearance prior to the visit. All personnel or visitors without a Secret or above clearance require continuous escort by a DTRA employee to access the DTRAs facilities.

The NRC staff has reviewed the applicants description of the physical protection of SNM in Chapters 6.1.1, 9.1.2, 9.1.2.1, 9.3, 9.3.1, and 9.3.2 of DTRAs LA, with respect to the storage or use the SNM within a CAA. In general, the measures proposed by the DTRA exceed the measures described in Regulatory Guide 5.59 (NRC, 1983). An example in the application is the storing of SNM within a locked container within a vault-type room. Furthermore, given the risk of using the SNM in public locations compared to Government facilities, the NRC staff considers the proposed measures to be appropriate and adequate. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the measures proposed by the DTRA meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.67(f)(1).

The regulations in 10 CFR 73.67(f)(2) require licensees to monitor with an intrusion alarm or other device or procedures the controlled access areas to detect unauthorized penetrations or activities.

Chapter 9.3.1 of the DTRAs application states that for long-term locations, when the SNM is in storage, the base security will perform periodic (approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or less) patrols. Lockers used for SNM storage are monitored with intrusion detection systems (IDS) that automatically notify the base operations center (dispatch office) or directly to the base security office. When SNM is in use, the custodial or Lead AUs are responsible to identify any act to violate the CAA or attempted theft of the SNM and either secure the SNM to prevent the theft and/or contact the appropriate local law enforcement.

At the NECO facility, all external openings to the building are controlled by alarmed doors with coded badge access and spin dial locks. Interior areas of the building are monitored by motion sensors and remotely monitored cameras. Building alarms are received by the base dispatch office that is manned 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s/day, 7 days/week. The VTR has externally monitored motion and propped-door alarms, and the storage safe is equipped with an alarmed, balanced magnetic switch that triggers an externally monitored alarm when the safe is opened.

At the TEAMS site, the SNM locker is armed with an IDS including volumetric sensors of the inside of the SNM locker and door alarms.

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At the PTSG site, each building on the compound is equipped with an IDS that reports directly to base security dispatch. In addition, the two doors of Building 1232 leading to the outside of the compound are in the direct sight line of a continuously manned guard shack providing security for the adjacent Navy pier.

Chapter 9.3.2 of DTRAs LA states that for short-term locations, when SNM is in storage, the base security or an AU will perform periodic (approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or less) patrols. When SNM is in use, the custodial or Lead AUs are responsible to identify any act to violate the CAA or attempted theft of the SNM and either secure the SNM to prevent the theft and/or contact the appropriate local law enforcement. Based on the complexity of the CAA and communications availability, the Lead AU may assign a watchman to contact the appropriate local law enforcement.

The NRC staff has reviewed the applicants description of the physical protection of SNM in Chapters 9.3.1, and 9.3.2 of the LA with respect to detection and assessment of malicious acts associated with SNM. The DTRA has provided diverse and redundant methods including IDS, surveillance, patrols, and procedures for the various configurations and areas that SNM will be used and stored. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that it meets the requirements of 10 CFR 73.67(f)(2).

The regulations in 10 CFR 73.67(f)(3) require licensees to assure that a watchman or offsite response force will respond to all unauthorized penetrations or activities, Chapter 9.3 of DTRAs LA states that the DTRA security organization consists of a combination of the DTRA and the host bases personnel and response forces. Each long-term storage location has a Security Manager who is responsible for the sites physical security and assists the AUs with security measures for storage and use a short-term location. Chapter 8 of the DTRA application, Training for Individuals Working in or Frequenting Restricted Areas, states that only AUs are allowed unsupervised access to the licensed material. If a non-AU visitor or DTRA employee/contractor requires access to the CAA or material storage area, an AU is required to maintain a line-of-sight escort of the non-AUs. Chapter 8.1 of the DTRA application, Authorized Users, describes the security training for AUs, including notification of security forces or local law enforcement during SNM use. During storage in response to IDS alarms, the base dispatch office will initiate the response force and notify site personnel on the recall roster.

The base security force will respond, evaluate the situation and act to protect the SNM and facility.

The NRC staff has reviewed the applicants description of the physical protection of SNM in Chapters 8, 8.1, and 9.3 of the application and finds that it meets the requirements of 10 CFR 73.67(f)(3) because the DTRA has provided an adequate description of response procedures, training of security forces, and an acceptable means of monitoring for intrusion within a CAA.

The regulations in 10 CFR 73.67(f)(4) requires licensees to establish and maintain response procedures for dealing with threats of thefts or thefts of SNM. Licensees shall retain a copy of the current response procedures as a record for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license for which the procedures were established. Copies of superseded material must be retained for 3 years after each change.

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Chapter 9.3 of DTRAs LA states DTRA response procedures will deal with threats of theft and thefts of licensed material. Examples of the types of incidents that have been addressed in the response procedures are: (1) possible situations that could lead to theft of SNM (i.e., civil disturbance, emergency events, etc.); (2) entry of an unauthorized person into a CAA or transport vehicle; (3) discovery that the security system has failed, been degraded, or breached; and (4) discovery that SNM is missing or unaccounted for. Response procedures are maintained on file and will be made available for inspection as long as licensed materials are possessed and for 3 years following the transfer or disposal of all material authorized by this license. They are enumerated as controlled documents and all superseded documents are retained for a minimum of three years from the date of any changes. The DTRA security response procedures ensure:

1) an appropriate response is initiated based on any identified safeguards events;

2) the responsibilities of DTRA personnel, the security organization and management involved are well defined;

3) the NRC Operations Center is notified, per 10 CFR 73.71(a)(2), (3), (4), and (5) requirements, by telephone within one hour of discovery, followed by a written report within 60 days, of all applicable safeguards events described in paragraph I of Appendix G to 10 CFR 73, Reportable Safeguards Events; and

4) applicable safeguard events described in paragraph II of Appendix G to 10 CFR 73, Reportable Safeguards Events, are recorded in the DTRA Safeguards Event Log within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery.

Based on its review of this information, the NRC staff has reviewed the applicants description of the physical protection of SNM in Chapter 9.3 of DTRAs LA and finds that it meets the requirements of 10 CFR 73.67(f)(4), because the application has established adequate response procedures for dealing with threats or thefts of material and committed to maintaining copies of superseded procedures for a period of three years.

The regulations in 10 CFR 73.67(g)(1) require licensees to: (i) provide advance notifications to the receiver of any planned shipment, (ii) receive confirmation from the receiver prior to commencement of a planned shipment, (iii) transport material in a tamper indicating sealed container, (iv) check the integrity of the container and seal is checked prior to the shipment, and (v) arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the material in accordance with 10 CFR 73.67(g)(3), unless the receiver is a licensee and has agreed in writing to arrange for the in-transit physical protection.

In Chapter 10.8 of the application, Transportation, the DTRA states its implementing documents have been developed based on the recommendations in Part II of Regulatory Guide 5.59 (NRC, 1983) to meet 10 CFR 73.67(g) in-transit requirements. The DTRA commits prior to each shipment of SNM, the receiver will be notified and provided information with respect to the shipment that includes mode of transport, estimated arrival time, location of transfer points, name of carrier and mode of transport. This information will facilitate the recipients proper handling of the shipment when it arrives at the destination.

The DTRA commits to confirming that the receiver is ready to accept the shipment, the receiver understands details of the shipment such as mode of transport, time/location the shipment will be delivered.

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The DTRA commits to applying a tamper indicating seal to a SNM container that aids the receiver to detect any tampering as recommended in Regulatory Guide 5.80 (NRC, 2010).

Additionally, the DTRA will inspect the container and seal prior to shipment to ensure the container has not been compromised.

The DTRA commits to confirming, the receivers responsibility to report if the shipment was compromised or missing to the shipper and the receiver acknowledges any responsibility associated with the physical protection of the shipment.

The DTRA commits to having response procedures in place that deal with threats of theft/diversion of SNM while in transit and suspicious vehicle activity. Furthermore, the DTRA committed to make arrangements with the receiver so that DTRA would immediately be notified of the arrival of the shipment at its destination or of any lost/unaccounted shipment. For any lost/unaccounted shipment, the DTRA would notify the NRC and conduct a trace investigation.

Based on its review of this information, the NRC staff has determined that information described in Chapter 10.8 of the LA meets the requirements in 10 CFR 73.67(g)(1) and is therefore acceptable, providing adequate commitments in shipment notifications and receipt confirmation, as well as using tamper indicating seals to ensure package integrity.

The regulations in 10 CFR 73.67(g)(2) require licensees, who receive quantities and types of SNM of low-strategic significance, to: (i) verify the integrity of the container and seals, (ii) notify the shipper that the material has been received by the recipient, and (iii) arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the material in accordance with 10 CFR 73.67(g)(3), unless the shipper is a licensee and has agreed in writing to arrange for the in-transit physical protection.

In Chapter 10.8 of the LA, Transportation, the DTRA states its implementing documents have been developed based on the recommendations in Part II of Regulatory Guide 5.59 (NRC, 1983) to meet 10 CFR 73.67(g) in-transit requirements. The DTRA commits upon receiving SNM to: (1) verify the integrity of the container and seal, (2) the shipper will receive a notification from the receiver of receipt of the shipment and the integrity of the container seal, (3) the receiver will notify the shipper if the container has been compromised and any material is missing, including DTRA conducting a trace investigation if needed, (4) notify the NRC about the loss/recovery of the material, and (5) notify the shipper of any transfers of SNM via form NRC-741.

The DTRA commits to having response procedures in place that deal with threats of theft/diversion of SNM while in transit and suspicious vehicle activity. Furthermore, the DTRA committed to make arrangements with the receiver so that the DTRA would be notified of the arrival of the shipment at its destination or of any lost/unaccounted shipment. For any lost/unaccounted shipment, the DTRA would notify the NRC and conduct a trace investigation.

Based on its review of this information, the NRC staff has determined that that information described in Chapter 10.8 of the application meets the requirements in 10 CFR 73.67(g)(2) and is therefore acceptable.

The regulations in 10 CFR 73.67(g)(3) require the entity who arranges for the physical protection of special nuclear material of low-strategic significance while in transit or who takes delivery of such material free on board (f.o.b.) the point at which it is delivered to a carrier for 39

transport to: (i) establish and maintain response procedures for dealing with threats or thefts of SNM, (ii) makes arrangements with the receiver to be immediately notified when the shipment arrives or is lost/unaccounted for after its estimated time of arrival, and (iii) conduct immediately a trace investigation for any shipment lost or unaccounted for after the estimated arrival time and notify the NRC within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after the discovery of the loss of the shipment and within one hour after recovery of or accounting for such lost shipment in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71.

In Chapter 10.8 of the LA, Transportation, the DTRA states its implementing documents have been developed based on the recommendations in Part II of Regulatory Guide 5.59 (NRC, 1983) to meet 10 CFR 73.67(g) in-transit requirements. The DTRA commits to having response procedures in place that deal with threats of theft/diversion of SNM while in transit and suspicious vehicle activity. Furthermore, the DTRA committed to make arrangements with the receiver so that the DTRA would be notified of the arrival of the shipment at its destination or of any lost/unaccounted shipment. For any lost/unaccounted shipment, the DTRA would notify the NRC and conduct a trace investigation.

Based on its review of this information, the NRC staff has determined that that information described in Chapter 10.8 of DTRAs LA meets the requirements in 10 CFR 73.67(g)(3) and is therefore acceptable.

10.3 Evaluation Findings The NRC staff reviewed the DTRAs application, dated August 21, 2020, and its subsequent revisions provided on January 22, 2021, to determine if the revised application satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 73.67(a), (f) and (g) for the physical protection of SNM at a fixed site and during transport. For the reasons set forth above, the NRC staff finds that the revised application meets the requirements in 10 CFR 73.67(a), (f) and (g). Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the revised application is acceptable and provides reasonable assurance that the requirements for the physical protection of SNM of low strategic significance at fixed sites and during transport will be met.

11.0 MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING 11.1 Regulatory Requirements The LA states that all of the special nuclear material in the DTRAs possession will be in the form of sealed sources. Consistent with 10 CFR 70.22(b), the DTRA is not required to submit a Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan because 10 CFR 70.22(b) exempts applications for use of SNM in the form of sealed sources from submitting this plan. The requirements in 10 CFR 70.22(b) thus do not apply to the DTRAs proposed operations.

The applicable requirements to maintain SNM inventory records and for reporting are contained in 10 CFR 74.11, 74.13, 74.15, and 74.19. Section 74.11 of 10 CFR requires the licensee to notify the NRC Operations Center in the event of any lost, stolen, or unlawfully diverted SNM, including attempts, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of discovery. Section 74.13 of 10 CFR requires licensees to prepare Material Balance Reports concerning SNM that the licensee has received, produced, possessed, transferred, consumed, disposed or lost. Section 74.15 of 10 CFR requires a licensee who transfers or receives SNM in certain quantities, or who adjusts its inventory of SNM, to submit a Nuclear Material Transaction Report. Section 74.19 of 10 CFR requires a 40

licensee to maintain records of the receipt, inventory, acquisition, transfer and disposal of all SNM. This section also requires a licensee to perform an annual physical inventory of the SNM in its possession.

11.2 Staff Review and Analysis The information to support this review was obtained from the LA and supplemental information provided in the response to RAIs and revised application (DTRA, 2021). A teleconference was held with the applicant to discuss the need for supplemental information. The following discussion identifies each of the applicable Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) requirements and summarizes the NRC staffs evaluation as to whether the information provided by the applicant meets the requirement.

11.2.1 Reports of Loss or Theft or Attempted Theft In accordance with 10 CFR 74.11, each licensee possessing one gram or more of contained U-235, U-233, or Pu must notify the NRC Operations Center within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of discovery of any loss or theft or other unlawful diversion of SNM which the licensee is licensed to possess, or any incident in which an attempt has been made to commit a theft or unlawful diversion of SNM.

In Chapter 9.3 of the LA, Physical Protection and Physical Security, the applicant states that the security posture and physical security features in the use and storage of the SNM described in previous sections constitute the main elements of the physical protection used to secure the SNM possessed by the DTRA. Furthermore, the applicant affirms in Chapter 10.3, Material Receipt and Accountability, that notifications any loss or theft or unlawful diversion of its SNM or attempted theft or unlawful diversion of its SNM, will be reported to the NRC within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of discovery.

The NRC staff reviewed the applicants description of its security response activities as provided in the application. The NRC staff has determined that the applicants security practices include procedures to ensure that the NRC is notified within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of discovery of a loss, theft, or unlawful diversion, or attempted theft or unlawful diversion of its SNM. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the applicant meets the requirement of 10 CFR 74.11.

11.2.2 Material Status Reports In accordance with 10 CFR 74.13, each licensee possessing SNM in a quantity totaling 1 gram or more of contained U-235, U-233, or Pu must complete and submit, in computer-readable format, Material Balance Reports concerning SNM that the licensee has received, produced, possessed, transferred, consumed, disposed, or lost.

In Chapter 10.3 of the LA, Material Receipt and Accountability, the applicant affirms that the MC&A program utilizes procedures to ensure all Material Balance Reports and Physical Inventory Listings are filed and retained in accordance with 10 CFR Part 74 requirements.

The NRC staff reviewed the description for material status reports. The LA provides a description of the actions that are taken concerning Material Balance Reports and Inventory Listing Reports. Based on the review, the NRC staff has determined that the applicants MC&A 41

practices include procedures to ensure that material balances and physical inventory listings are reported as required. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the applicant meets the requirement of 10 CFR 74.13.

11.2.3 Nuclear Material Transaction Reports In accordance with 10 CFR 74.15, each licensee who transfers or receives SNM in a quantity of 1 gram or more of contained U-235, U-233, or Pu must complete, in computer-readable format, a Nuclear Material Transaction Report. In addition, each licensee who adjusts the inventory in any manner, other than for transfers and receipts, must submit a Nuclear Material Transaction Report, in computer-readable format, to coincide with the submission of the Material Balance Report. Each licensee who transfers SNM must submit a Nuclear Material Transaction Report no later than the close of business the next working day. Each licensee who receives SNM must submit a Nuclear Material Transaction Report within 10 days after the material is received.

In Chapter 10.3 of the LA, Material Receipt and Accountability, the applicant affirms that the MC&A program utilizes procedures to ensure all Nuclear Material Transaction Reports (NRC/DOE Form 741) are filed and retained in accordance with 10 CFR Part 74 requirements.

The NRC staff reviewed the applicants description of its Nuclear Material Transaction Report activities as provided in the application. Based on the review, the NRC staff has determined that the applicants MC&A practices include procedures to ensure that Nuclear Material Transaction Reports are completed and submitted as required. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the applicant meets the requirement of 10 CFR 74.15.

11.2.4 Recordkeeping In accordance with 10 CFR 74.19(a), each licensee must keep records showing the receipt, inventory (including location and unique identity), acquisition, transfer, and disposal of all SNM in its possession regardless of its origin or method of acquisition. Each record relating to material control or material accounting must be maintained and retained for the period specified by the appropriate regulation or license condition. Each record of receipt, acquisition, or physical inventory of SNM must be retained as long as the licensee retains possession of the material and for 3 years following transfer or disposal of the material. Each record of transfer of SNM to other persons must be retained by the licensee who transferred the material until the Commission terminates the license authorizing the licensees possession of the material.

In Chapter 10.3.1 of the LA, Records Management Program, the applicant affirms that records of receipt, inventory, acquisition, transfer, and disposal of all SNM in its possession are maintained. Furthermore, the applicant affirms that each record relating to material control or material control and accounting is maintained in accordance with the applicable regulation or license condition. The applicant affirms that each record of receipt, acquisition, or physical inventory of SNM is retained as long the material is possessed and for 3 years following transfer or disposal of the material. The applicant affirms that unless otherwise specified by regulation or license condition, each record of transfer of SNM to other persons is retained until the license authorizing the possession of the material is terminated by the Commission.

The NRC staff reviewed the applicants description for material control records as provided in the LA. The description included completing all of the material balance, inventory listing, and 42

material transaction reports, and maintaining records of receipt, transfer, and disposal of licensed material. Based on the review, the NRC staff has determined that the applicants MC&A practices include procedures to ensure that material control records are completed and maintained as required. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the applicant meets the requirement of 10 CFR 74.19(a).

11.2.5 Physical Inventory In accordance with 10 CFR 74.19(c), certain licensees who are authorized to possess SNM in a quantity greater than 350 grams of contained U-235, U-233 or Pu, must conduct a physical inventory of all SNM in its possession under license at intervals not to exceed 12 months. The results of these physical inventories must be retained in records by the licensee until the Commission terminates the license authorizing the possession of the material.

In Chapter 10.3 of the LA, Material Receipt and Accountability, the applicant affirms that physical inventories of all SNM to be authorized under the requested license are conducted at intervals not to exceed one year. Furthermore, the applicant affirms that records associated with the physical inventories are maintained until the license authorizing possession of the material is terminated by the Commission.

The NRC staff reviewed the applicants description of the actions that are taken concerning physical inventory of its SNM. The description included the minimum inventory frequency and completion and submittal of all required material balance and inventory listing reports. Based on the review, the NRC staff has determined that the applicants MC&A practices include procedures to ensure physical inventories of its SNM are completed within the required frequency and the results are reported. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the applicant meets the requirement of 10 CFR 74.19(c).

11.3 Evaluation Findings Based on the review of the LA and the supplemental information submitted by the DTRA, the NRC staff finds that the applicants MC&A practices as described provides assurance that the applicant will satisfy the applicable requirements found in 10 CFR 74.11, 74.13, 74.15, and 74.19 during the requested license term. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the applicants MC&A practices are acceptable.

12.0 National Environmental Policy Act Review In accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(a), licensing, regulatory, and administrative actions eligible for categorical exclusion are those actions that belong to a category of actions which the Commission, by rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion, after first finding that the category of actions does not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. Paragraph 51.22(c)(14)(v) and 51.22(c)(25) of 10 CFR provides categorical exclusion for the category actions under the DTRA license. The NRC has determined that the issuance of materials licenses issued under 10 CFR Part 70, for research and development and for training purposes, and an exemption from inspection or surveillance requirements as well as recordkeeping and reporting requirements, does not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.

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Therefore, because the DTRA license is a categorically excluded action, the preparation of an EA or environmental impact statement is not required.

III. CONCLUSION Based on the review provided above, the NRC staff concludes that the information provided by the DTRA in their LA and supplement provides reasonable assurance of adequate safety and security of the proposed operations. The NRC staff concludes that the proposed operations at the DTRA will not have an adverse impact on the public health and safety, the common defense and security, or the environment; and meet the applicable requirements in 10 CFR Parts 19, 20, 51, 70, 73, and 74.

Therefore, the NRC staff recommends granting the SNM license for a 10-year period in accordance with the LA. It is also recommended that the exemption requested by the DTRA from the requirements for a CAAS be granted.

IV. PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS Suzanne Ani Tanner Boone Jill Caverly James Downs Tim Harris Jeremy Munson Tyrone Naquin Alexander Sapountzis Tim Sippel V. REFERENCES (DTRA, 2011) 45-25551-01 574678 Department of Defense (Renewal) dated August 19, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System [ADAMS] Accession Number ML110760548)

(DTRA, 2019) DTRA Letter of Intent 02112019 dated February 11, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21061A002).

(DTRA, 2020) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Special Nuclear Materials Application dated August 21, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20254A189).

(NRC, 2020a) Acceptance Review Of Part 70 Application For Special Nuclear Materials License dated September 24, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20258A275).

(NRC, 2020b) Requests for Additional Information for Defense Threat Reduction Agency License Application dated November 16, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20309A898).

(NRC, 2020c) Trip Report for Defense Threat Reduction Agency Site Visits, dated April 6, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21061A103).

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(DTRA, 2021) DTRA Response to RAIs and Revised Application dated February 26, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21057A037).

(NRC, 2015) NUREG-1520, Standard Review Plan for Fuel Cycle Facilities License Applications, Revision 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15176A258).

(NRC, 2018) NUREG-1556, Volume 17, Revision 1, Program Specific Guidance About Special Nuclear Material of Less Than Critical Mass,, (ML18190A207).

(NRC, 2020c) Trip Report For Defense Threat Reduction Agency Site Visits dated April 6, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20076B039).

(NRC, 1993) Branch Technical Position, Guidelines for Decontamination of Facilities and Equipment Prior to Release for Unrestricted Use or Termination of License for Byproduct, Source, or Special Nuclear Material, License Condition for Leak-testing Sealed Sources.

(ADAMS Accession No. ML061980584)

(NRC, 2012) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 8.24, Heath Physics Surveys During Enriched Uranium-235 Processing and Fuel Fabrication, (ADAMS Accession No. ML110400305).

(NRC, 1983) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 5.59, Standard Format and Content for a Licensee Physical Security Plan for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate or Low Strategic Significance, (ADAMS Accession No. ML100341301).

(LANL, 1986) LA-10860-MS, Critical Dimensions of Systems Containing 235U, 239Pu, and 233U, 1986 Revision, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM.

(NFPA, 2015) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 45, Standard on Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals, 2019.

(NFPA, 2014) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 801, "Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials," 2020.

(NRC, 2003) NUREG-1748, Environmental Review Guidance for Licensing Actions Associated with NMSS Programs (ADAMS Accession No. ML032450279).

(NRC, 1983) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 5.59, Standard Format and Content for a Licensee Physical Security Plan for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate or Low Strategic Significance, (ADAMS Accession No. ML100341301).

(NRC, 2010) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 5.80, Pressure-Sensitive and Tamper-Indicating Device Seals for Material Control and Accounting of Special Nuclear Material, (ADAMS Accession No. ML100800504).

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