CP-202000585, (CPNPP) - Supplement to License Amendment Request (LAR) 20-005, Revision to Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.8, Containment Sump
| ML21027A249 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 01/27/2021 |
| From: | Thomas McCool Luminant |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CP-202000585, LAR 20-005, TXX-20089 | |
| Download: ML21027A249 (42) | |
Text
m Luminant CP-202000585 TXX-20089 January 27, 2021 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Thomas P. McCool Site Vice President
Subject:
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP)
Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446 Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (Vistra Operations Company LLC)
P.O. Box 1002 6322 North FM 56 Glen Rose, TX 76043 T 254.897.6042 Ref 10 CFR 50.90 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) 10 CFR 50.91(b)(l)
SUPPLEMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST (LAR)20-005,
Reference:
REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.6.8, "CONTAINMENT SUMP"
- 1.
Letter TXX-20050 from Thomas P. McCool to the NRC "License Amendment Request (LAR)20-005, Revision to Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.8, "Containment Sump,"
dated August 31, 2020 (ML20244A338)
Dear Sir or Madam:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Vistra Operations Company LLC (Vistra OpCo) hereby submits a supplement to the exigent license amendment request for the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications in connection to LAR 20-005, Revision to TS 3.6.8, Containment Sump requested in Reference 1. provides an executive summary of the changes to the original submittal. provides a Table of Contents, addition of sections 2.2, System Design and Operation, 2.2.1, Recirculation Sump Design, and 2.2.2, Recirculation Sump Operation. These sections are presented in RED text to show the additions to the Enclosure to Reference 1.
Attachments l, 2, and 3 are presented with the TS and TSB Table of Contents removed as allowed by license amendment 150. Attachment 4 is added to provide figures supporting the newly added sections 2.2, 2.2.1, and 2.2.2.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b)(l), a copy of the supplement for the proposed license amendment is being forwarded to the State of Texas.
Vistra OpCo has determined that this supplement does not change the No Significant Hazards Consideration provided in the Enclosure submitted by Reference 1.
Should you have any questions, please contact Garry W Struble at (254) 897-6628 or garry.struble@luminant.com.
TXX-20089 Page 2 of 2 I state under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on January 27, 2021.
Sincerely, Jhomas~
Enclosure:
- 1.
Executive Summary of LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST (LAR)20-005 REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.6.8, "CONTAINMENT SUMP" SUPPLEMENT
- 2.
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST (LAR)20-005 REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.6.8, "CONTAINMENTSUMP" SUPPLEMENT Attachments: 1.
Proposed change to Technical Specification TS 3.6.8, "Containment Sump" (Markup) c (email)-
- 2.
Proposed change to Technical Specification Bases TSB 3.6.8, "Containment Sump" (Markup) [For Information Only]
- 3.
Proposed change to Technical Specification TS 3.6.8, "Containment Sump" (Clean)
- 4.
Proposed change to Technical Specification TS 3.6.8, "Containment Sump" (Supporting Figures)
Scott Morris, Region IV [Scott.Morris@nrc.gov]
Dennis Galvin, NRR [Dennis.Galvin@nrc.gov]
John Ellegood, Senior Resident Inspector, CPNPP Uohn.Ellegood@nrc.gov]
Neil Day, Resident Inspector, CPNPP [Neil.Day@nrc.gov]
Mr. Robert Free [robert.free@dshs.state.tx.us]
Environmental Monitoring & Emergency Response Manager Texas Department of State Health Services Mail Code 1986 P.O. Box 149347 Austin, TX 78714-9347
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST (LAR)20-005 REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.6.8, CONTAINMENT SUMP SUPPLEMENT Executive Summary The following items describe the supplemental changes to the original LAR submittal based on information discussed with the DORL Project Manager on September 30, 2020 between the Licensee (Vistra Operations Company LLC (Vistra Op Co)) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
- 1.
Technical Specification Table of Contents page adding the new TS 3.6.8, CONTAINMENT SUMP was included in original submittal. The Table of Contents page is removed as it is not required since approval of Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant License Amendment 150.
- 2.
Technical Specification Bases Table of Contents page adding the new TSB 3.6.8, CONTAINMENT SUMP was included in original submittal. The Table of Contents page is removed for consistency between TS and TSB submissions.
Also the TSB for B 3.6.8, CONTAINMENT SUMP is provided as information only.
- 3.
A Table of Contents for the LAR was included that was not in the original submittal for ease of review.
- 4.
Section 2.2, System Design and Operation was added to provide additional information regarding design and operation.
- 5.
Section 2.2.1, Recirculation Sump Design describes the physical design and layout of the sumps.
- 6.
Section 2.2.2, Recirculation Sump Operation describes the operations required to place the recirculation sumps in operation.
- 7.
Eight figures were added to support the new Section 2.2, System Design and Operation.
to TXX-20089 Page 1 of 1
COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ENCLOSURE - DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT
1.0 DESCRIPTION
2.0 ASSESSMENT
2.1 Applicability of Safety Evaluation 2.2 System Design and Operation 2.2.1 Recirculation Sumps Design 2.2.2 Recirculation Sump Operation 2.3 Variations
3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS
3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Analysis 3.2 Conclusion
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
S ATTACHMENTS
- 1.
Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Markup)
- 2.
Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes (Markup - For Information Only)
- 3.
Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Clean)
- 4.
Supporting Figures Figure 1: Sump Strainers Figure 2: Sump Strainer Design Figure 3: Sump Strainer Design Figure 4: Sump Strainer Design Figure 5: Containment Spray System Recirculation Figure 6: Emergency Core Cooling Cold Leg Recirculation Figure 7: Emergency Core Cooling Hot Leg Recirculation Figure 8: Sump Strainer Debris Interceptor
1.0 DESCRIPTION
Vistra Operations Company LLC (Vistra OpCo) requests adoption of TSTF-567, "Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues," which is an approved change to the Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS), into the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TS).
The proposed amendment adds a new Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.8, "Containment Sump," and adds an Action to address the condition of the containment sump made inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits. The Action provides time to correct or evaluate the condition in lieu of an immediate plant shutdown. This Action is placed in a new specification on the containment sump that otherwise retains the existing Technical Specifications requirements. An existing Surveillance Requirement (SR 3.5.2.8) is moved from TS 3.5.2 to the new specification. The requirement to perform SR 3.5.2.8 in TS 3.5.3 is deleted.
The proposed amendment also revises the Safety Function Determination Program to clarify its application when a supported system is made inoperable by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system.
2.0 ASSESSMENT
2.1 Applicability of Safety Evaluation Vistra OpCo has reviewed the safety evaluation for TSTF-567 provided to the Technical Specifications Task Force in a letter dated July 3, 2018 (ML18116A606).
This review included the NRC staff's evaluation, as well as the information provided in TSTF-567. As described herein, Vistra OpCo has concluded that the justifications presented in TSTF-567 and the safety evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to CPNPP Units 1 and 2 and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes to the CPNPP TS.
2.2 System Design and Operation 2.2.1 Recirculation Sump Design The design of the Containment spray recirculation sumps satisfies the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.82, Sumps for Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Containment Spray System. Two sumps are provided, one for each safety train. The sumps are physically separated and are located at the lowest elevation of the Containment Building exclusive of the reactor vessel cavity. Sump covers are provided to protect the sumps against falling debris. Stainless steel strainers are provided to preclude clogging of the recirculation lines and any of the system's components. The strainers have nominal 0.095 inch holes in perforated plate (Figure 1). The size of the opening ensures that the 3/8-in. diameter spray nozzle orifices and the grid assemblies in the reactor core do not clog. It is required that suction piping to the containment recirculation pumps be arranged such that vortexing does not occur (i.e., no vertical pipe with downward flow or horizontal pipe with inadequate submergence). To prevent the possibility of vortex formation, the suction is fitted with a conical opening and a grating cage. The sump strainer design provides natural vortex suppression in addition to the suction inlet design (Figures 2, 3 and 4). The arrangement of the recirculation sumps, includes design provisions for the prevention of vortex formation in the recirculation sump piping to the Residual Heat Removal System and the Containment
Spray System.
ECCS fluid collecting in the reactor refueling cavity is returned to the containment sump through the drain lines provided in the design of the refueling cavity. To prevent blockage in the main refueling cavity, debris strainers are provided for the 4-inch drain and debris screens are provided for the two 6 inch drains. The refueling cavity consists of an upper internals storage stand area (floor elevation 831'-0"), a central portion (floor elevation 834'-0 1/2") and the lower internals storage stand area (floor elevation 823'-0 1/2"). The upper internals storage stand area and the lower internal storage stand area communicate hydraulically through a 4-inch equalization line. This line is imbedded and not subject to mechanical damage. Following an accident, the ECCS fluid reaching the upper internals storage stand area will drain to the lower internals storage stand area from where it will be drained to the 808'-0" elevation through the drain lines. The fluids that reach the fuel transfer upender area will be drained to the 808'-0" elevation through a separate drain line. To prevent blockage in the upender area of refueling cavity, a debris strainer is provided for the 4-inch drain.
2.2.2 Recirculation Sump Operation In the initial phases the Containment Spray System injects water into the Containment from the Refuling Water Storage Tank (RWST). As the RWST is depleted the operator is required to manually swap the suction source over to the Containment Recirculation Sumps on the bottom floor of Containment. The Containment Recirculation Sump holds the volume of the RWST and whatever water has leaked out of the Reactor Coolant System. This stored volume of water provides a continuous source of water to continue Containment cooling after depletion of the RWST. During this phase the water is recirculated and cooled in the Containment Spray Heat Exchanger by Component Cooling Water. Chemicals are added in the injection phase to maintain sump pH in a region which is more conducive to absorption of radioactive fission products. Raising pH in the sump also reduces corrosion of components located in Containment following accident conditions, which minimizes hydrogen production.
The Containment Sump recirculation suctions for each train of Containment Spray System and RHR originate from a concrete pocket formed in the Containment baseplate at approximately 802' elevation. There is a sump for each train of RHR and Containment Spray that are physically separated from each other and from high energy piping to preclude damage to the sump intake strainers.
Two suction pipes/train (one for Containment Spray and one for RHR) penetrate the concrete and enter the sump pocket (Figures 5, 6, and 7). Each suction line is provided with a series of modular suction strainers that prevent the entry of particles large enough to block spray nozzles or damage recirculation components. The strainers are made of perforated stainless steel discs that are designed to maximize surface area ( 4000 ft2 for each suction). This design serves to reduce flow velocity that can lead to flow vortexing and loss of suction. In addition, as much as 50 percent of the surface can be blocked without causing excess flow velocities or adversely reducing pump flow. Extensive lab testing using debris similar to expected debris after a DBA in containment proved the effectiveness of the design.
The sump pocket is approximately 15' long and has a ladder for access during inspections. Sump covers approximately 6' high protect the sumps against falling debris. Sump covers are constructed of stainless steel with a solid top, steel frame,
and vertical trash racks on 3 sides. The trash racks are designed for protection against maintenance activities and do not perform a safety function. Each sump is also surrounded by a one-foot-tall debris interceptor to prevent washing of debris into the sump (Figure 8).
In addition to the sump design, the containment building also contains screens and debris interceptors and diverters to minimize the transport of containment debris to the sumps following an accident.
Following transfer to recirculation the potential exists for loss of pump suction due to debris blockage of the recirculation sump screens. Operators must be aware of the indications of sump blockage or loss of suction head. Symptoms of pump cavitation provide an indirect indication of sump blockage. The following indications can be monitored for containment sump clogging following establishment of recirculation flow:
- RHR pump current
- RHR injection flow
- RHR pump discharge pressure
- SI pump discharge flow
- SI pump discharge pressure
- Containment Spray pump flow
- Containment Spray pump discharge pressure Safety Injection Pumps and Centrifugal Charging Pumps may experience permanent damage within a short time of loss of suction. Operators should immediately stop these pumps if they observe symptoms of loss of suction. RHR and Containment Spray pumps can withstand effects of cavitation for a longer period of time, but not indefinitely without pump damage. If operators observe indication of cavitation on a RHR pump, action should be taken to stop the SI pumps and CCPs taking suction from the RHR pump discharge. The reason for stopping the SI pumps and CCPs first is twofold: 1) to protect the more vulnerable pumps from damage, and 2) this reduces the total flow through the RHR pump, which improves its net positive suction head conditions.
2.3 Variations Vistra OpCo is not proposing any variations from the TS changes described in the TSTF-567 or the applicable parts of the NRC staff's safety evaluation.
The CPNPP TS utilize different numbering than the Standard Technical Specifications on which TSTF-567 was based. Specifically, CPNPP will use TS number 3.6.8 for the new Containment Sump TS and TSTF-567 uses TS number 3.6.19 for the new Containment Sump TS. In the TS Bases where applicable containment sumps is used vice containment sump. The TS Bases also includes that the switchover of the Containment Spray System from the RWST to the containment recirculation sump occurs at 6 percent RWST level vice at the RWST low level alarm.
These differences are considered administrative and do not affect the applicability of TSTF-567 to the CPNPP TS.
The CPNPP Technical Specifications contain a Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Therefore, the Frequency for Surveillance Requirement 3.6.8.1 is "In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program."
3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS
3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Analysis The proposed amendment adds a new Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.8, "Containment Sump," and adds an Action to address the condition of the containment sump made inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits. The Action provides time to correct or evaluate the condition in lieu of an immediate plant shutdown. This Action is placed in a new specification on the containment sump that otherwise retains the existing Technical Specifications requirements. An existing Surveillance Requirement (SR 3.5.2.8) is moved from TS 3.5.2 to the new specification. The requirement to perform SR 3.5.2.8 in TS 3.5.3 is deleted.
The proposed amendment also revises the Safety Function Determination Program to clarify its application when a supported system is made inoperable by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system.
Vistra OpCo has evaluated whether a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed change by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:
- 1) Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No The proposed change adds a new specification to the TS for the containment sump.
An existing SR on the containment sump is moved to the new specification and a duplicative requirement to perform the SR in TS 3.5.3 is removed. The new specification retains the existing requirements on the containment sump and the actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable with the exception of adding new actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits. The new action provides time to evaluate and correct the condition instead of requiring an immediate plant shutdown.
The containment sump is not an initiator of any accident previously evaluated. The containment sump is a passive component and the proposed change does not increase the likelihood of the malfunction. As a result, the probability of an accident is unaffected by the proposed change.
The containment sump is used to mitigate accidents previously evaluated by providing a borated water source for the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Containment Spray System (CSS). The design of the containment sump and the capability of the containment sump assumed in the accident analysis is not changed. The proposed action requires implementation of mitigating actions while the containment sump is inoperable and more frequent monitoring of reactor coolant leakage to detect any increased potential for an accident that would require the containment sump. The consequences of an accident during the proposed
action are no different than the current consequences of an accident if the containment sump is inoperable.
The proposed change clarifies the Safety Function Determination Program when a supported system is made inoperable by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system. The Safety Function Determination Program directs the appropriate use of TS actions and the proposed change does not alter the current intent of the TS. The actions taken when a system is inoperable are not an assumption in the initiation or mitigation of any previously evaluated accident.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2) Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No The proposed change adds a new specification to the TS for the containment sump.
An existing SR on the containment sump is moved to the new specification and a duplicative requirement to perform the SR in TS 3.5.3 is removed. The new specification retains the existing requirements on the containment sump and the actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable with the exception of adding new actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits. The new action provides time to evaluate and correct the condition instead of requiring an immediate plant shutdown.
The proposed change does not alter the design or design function of the containment sump or the plant. No new systems are installed or removed as part of the proposed change. The containment sump is a passive component and cannot initiate a malfunction or accident. No new credible accident is created that is not encompassed by the existing accident analyses that assume the function of the containment sump.
The proposed change clarifies the Safety Function Determination Program when a supported system is made inoperable by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system. The Safety Function Determination Program directs the appropriate use of TS actions and the proposed change does not alter the current intent of the TS. The proposed change to the Safety Function Determination Program will not result in any change to the design or design function of the containment sump or a method of operation of the plant.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
- 3) Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No The proposed change adds a new specification to the TS for the containment sump.
An existing SR on the containment sump is moved to the new specification and a duplicative requirement to perform the SR in TS 3.5.3 is removed. The new specification retains the existing requirements on the containment sump and the
actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable with the exception of adding new actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits. The new action provides time to evaluate and correct the condition instead of requiring an immediate plant shutdown.
The proposed change does not affect the controlling values of parameters used to avoid exceeding regulatory or licensing limits. No Safety Limits are affected by the proposed change. The proposed change does not affect any assumptions in the accident analyses that demonstrate compliance with regulatory and licensing requirements.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, Vistra OpCo concludes that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.
3.2 Conclusion In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or a significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.
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The active ECCS components, along with the passive accumulators, the RWST, and the containment sump, are covered in LCO 3.5.1, "Accumulators," and LCO 3.5.4, "Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST),"
and LCO 3.6.8, "Containment Sump," and provide the cooling water necessary to meet GDC 35 (Ref. 1).
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The ECCS flow paths consist of piping, valves, heat exchangers, and pumps such that water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) and the containment sump can be injected into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) following the accidents described in Bases 3.5.2.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.8 Containment Sump BASES BACKGROUND The containment sumps provide a borated water source to support recirculation of coolant from the containment sumps for residual heat removal, emergency core cooling, containment cooling, and containment atmosphere cleanup during accident conditions.
The containment sumps supply both trains of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and the Containment Spray System during any accident that requires recirculation of coolant from the containment sumps. Each containment sump supplies a single ECCS train and a single Containment Spray train. The recirculation mode is initiated when the pump suction is transferred to the containment sump on low Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level for ECCS, and at 6% RWST level for the Containment Spray System which ensures the containment sumps have enough water to supply net positive suction head to the ECCS and Containment Spray System pumps. The Containment Spray System consists of two separate trains of equal capacity, each capable of meeting the design bases. Each train includes two containment spray pumps, heat exchangers, spray headers, nozzles, valves, and piping. Each train is powered from a separate ESF bus. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) supplies borated water to the Containment Spray System during the injection phase of operation. In the recirculation mode of operation, containment spray pump suction is transferred manually from the RWST to the containment sumps.
The containment sumps contain strainers to limit the quantity of the debris materials from entering the sump suction piping. Debris accumulation on the strainers can lead to undesirable hydraulic effects including air ingestion through vortexing or deaeration, and reduced net positive suction head (NPSH) at pump suction piping.
Containment Sump B 3.6.8 While the majority of debris accumulates on the strainers, some fraction penetrates the strainers and is transported to downstream components in the ECCS, Containment Spray System, and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Debris that penetrates the strainer can result in wear to the downstream components, blockages, or reduced heat transfer across the fuel cladding. Excessive debris in the containment sumps water source could result in insufficient recirculation of coolant during the accident, or insufficient heat removal from the core during the accident.
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BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS During all accidents that require recirculation, the containment sumps provide a source of borated water to the ECCS and Containment Spray System pumps. As such, it supports residual heat removal, emergency core cooling, containment cooling, and containment atmosphere cleanup during an accident. It also provides a source of negative reactivity (Ref. 1). The design basis transients and applicable safety analyses concerning each of these systems are discussed in the Applicable Safety Analyses section of B 3.5.2, "ECCS - Operating," B 3.5.3, "ECCS - Shutdown," and B 3.6.6, "Containment Spray System."
ER-ESP-001, Revision 3 (Ref. 2) describes evaluations that confirm long-term core cooling is assured following any accident that requires recirculation from the containment sumps.
The containment sumps satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
LCO Two containment sumps are required to ensure a source of borated water to support ECCS and Containment Spray System OPERABILITY.
A containment sump consists of the containment drainage flow paths, design features upstream of the containment sump that are credited in the containment debris analysis, the containment sump strainers, the pump suction trash racks, and the inlet to the ECCS and Containment Spray System piping. An OPERABLE containment sump has no structural damage or abnormal corrosion that could prevent recirculation of coolant and will not be restricted by containment accident generated and transported debris.
Containment Sump B 3.6.8 Containment accident generated and transported debris consists of the following:
a.
Accident generated debris sources - Insulation, coatings, and other materials which are damaged by the high-energy line break (HELB) and transported to the containment sumps. This includes materials within the HELB zone of influence and other materials (e.g.,
unqualified coatings) that fail due to the post-accident containment environment following the accident; b.
Latent debris sources - Pre-existing dirt, dust, paint chips, fines or shards of insulation, and other materials inside containment that do not have to be damaged by the HELB to be transported to the containment sumps; and c.
Chemical product debris sources - Aluminum, zinc, carbon steel, copper, and non-metallic materials such as paints, thermal insulation, and concrete that are susceptible to chemical reactions within the post-accident containment environment leading to corrosion products that are generated within the containment sump pool or are generated within containment and transported to the containment sumps.
Containment debris limits are defined in ER-ESP-001, Revision 3 (Ref. 2).
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BASES APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containment sump OPERABILITY requirements are dictated by the ECCS and Containment Spray System OPERABILITY requirements. Since both the ECCS and the Containment Spray System must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the containment sumps must also be OPERABLE to support their operation.
In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Thus, the containment sumps are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 or 6.
Containment Sump B 3.6.8 ACTIONS UA.1, A.2, and A.3 Condition A is applicable when there is a condition which results in containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits. Containment debris limits are defined in ER-ESP-001, Revision 3 (Ref. 2).
Immediate action must be initiated to mitigate the condition. Examples of mitigating actions are:
Removing the debris source from containment or preventing the debris from being transported to the containment sumps; Evaluating the debris source against the assumptions in the analysis; Deferring maintenance that would affect availability of the affected systems and other LOCA mitigating equipment; Deferring maintenance that would affect availability of primary defense-in-depth systems, such as containment coolers; Briefing operators on LOCA debris management actions; or Applying an alternative method to establish new limits.
While in this condition, the RCS water inventory balance, SR 3.4.13.1, must be performed at an increased Frequency of once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. An unexpected increase in RCS leakage could be indicative of an increased potential for an RCS pipe break, which could result in debris being generated and transported to the containment sumps. The more frequent monitoring allows operators to act in a timely fashion to minimize the potential for an RCS pipe break while the containment sumps are inoperable.
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BASES Containment Sump B 3.6.8 For the purposes of applying LCO 3.0.6 and the Safety Function Determination Program while in Condition A, the two containment sumps U
are considered a single support system for all ECCS and Containment Spray System trains because containment accident generated and transported debris issues that would render one sump inoperable would render all of the sumps inoperable.
The inoperable containment sumps must be restored to OPERABLE status in 90 days. A 90-day Completion Time is reasonable for emergent conditions that involve debris in excess of the analyzed limits that could be generated and transported to the containment sumps under accident conditions. The likelihood of an initiating event in the 90-day Completion ACTIONS (continued)
Time is very small and there is margin in the associated analyses. The mitigating actions of Required Action A.1 provide additional assurance that the effects of debris in excess of the analyzed limits will be mitigated during the Completion Time.
B.1 When the containment sumps are inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, such as blockage, structural damage, or abnormal corrosion that could prevent recirculation of coolant, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of an accident that requires the containment sumps occurring during this period.
Required Action B.1 is modified by two Notes. The first Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS
- Operating," and LCO 3.5.3, "ECCS - Shutdown," should be entered if inoperable containment sumps result in an inoperable ECCS train. The second Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.6, "Containment Spray System," should be entered if inoperable containment sumps result in an inoperable Containment Spray System train. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.
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BASES ACTIONS (continued)
UC.1 and C.2 If the containment sumps cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
Containment Sump B 3.6.8 USR 3.6.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Periodic inspections are performed to verify the containment sumps do not show current or potential debris blockage, structural damage, or abnormal corrosion to ensure the operability and structural integrity of the containment sumps (Ref. 1).
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
REFERENCES 1.
FSAR, Chapter 6 and Chapter 15.
2.
ER-ESP-001, Revision 3 Generic Letter 2004-02 Supplemental Response.
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