ML20248C555
| ML20248C555 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 08/02/1989 |
| From: | Hunger G PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248C560 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8908100087 | |
| Download: ML20248C555 (56) | |
Text
-
I PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY j
NUCLEAR GROUP HEADQUARTERS 955-65 CHESTERBROOK BLVD.
WAYNE PA 19087 5691 (215) 640-6000 August 2, 1989 Docket Nos.
50-352 50-353 License Nos. NPF-39 NPF-84 I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555
SUBJECT:
Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Consideration of Severe Accident Mitigation Design Alternatives - Additional Supplemental Information Gentlemen:
NRC letter dated May 23, 1989, requested Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo) to provide additional information concerning Severe Accident Mitigation Design Alternatives (SAMDAs) for the Limerick Generating Station (LGS).
The requested additional information was submitted to the NRC by our letter dated June 23, 1989, and was revised by our letter dated July 20, 1989.
By letter dated July 26, 1989, we provided supplemental information concerning the cost estimates for the SAMDAs evaluated in the attachment to our June 23, 1989 letter.
A meeting was held on July 27, 1989, between representatives of the NRC and PECo, to further discuss the information we had provided to the NRC.
As discussed during this meeting, and documented in the NRC letter dated July 31, 1989, several follow-up questions were identified.
The questions from the July 31, 1989 NRC letter, and our responses, are provided in the attachment and associated enclosures.
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Augunt'2 ~1989 Page~2
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If you have further' questions ~, or require.~ additional:
'information, please. contact us.
Very truly yours,
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G.
. Hunger, Jr.
Director-Licenslag Section Nuclear Support Division Attachment Enclosures cc:
W. T. Russell, Administrator, Region I, USNRC T. J. Kenny, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, LGS
ATTACHMEN.T RESPONSE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS REGARDING CONSIDERATION OF SEVERE ACCIDENT MITIGATION DESIGN ALTERNATIVES (SAMDAs)
NRC QUESTION 1 With regard to the contr.ibution of fire initiated sequences to core damage frequency estimates, do the cables for both trains of safety-related systems have three hour fire ratings?
RESPONSE
As stated in the attachment to our June 23, 1989 letter, the Limerick Generating Station (LGS) Core Damage Frequency (CDF) due to fire initiated sequencas was updated to reflect the plant fire protection design as duacribed in the LGS Fire Protection Evaluation Report (EPER), revision 31.
Revision 12 of the FPER, issued in June, 1989, while reflecting the most current plant fire protection design, does not impact the fire initiated sequences that contribute significantly to core damage.
Specific information concerning the fire-ratings of fire protection for safety-related systems cables is given below.
FPER pages 3-53, 3-54b, 3-81, and 3-82, provided in Enclosure 1, describe in general terms the methods employed to ensure that a safe shutdown capability is maintained.
In addition, FPER pages 5-8, 5-9, and 5-83 through 5-96, also provided in Enclosure 1, describe the fire areas of significance (i.e.,
fire areas #2-13-kV Switchgear Area, #44-Safeguard System Access Area, #45-Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Equipment Area and Neutron Monitoring System Area, and $47-Reactor Water Clean Up System Compartments, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup Compartment, and General Equipment Area).
NRC QUESTION 2 For the severe accident mitigation design alternatives considered in the June 23, 1989 submittal, what occupational exposure would be incurred in installation and in recurring operation and maintenance?
Please provide the bases for the estimates including work hour estimates, location of the work performed, and applicable radiation dose rates.
O
.n Attachment.
Page 2
-RESPONSE With respect to' installation of.the SAMDAs, the~ estimated radiation exposures incurred as a result.of~ installing each SAMDA in
. LGS are provided in tabular. form in Enclosure 2,. Table 1-1.
The methodology used to estimate the radiation. exposures is' summarized below.
o-Each'SAMDA design' concept, described in the report provided by our. July 26, 1989 letter, was reviewed to identify the various plant-locations where installation work would result in. radiation exposure..
o Estimated dose rates for each of the' locations were based on radiation surveys performed at LCS Unit 1 during the first and second refueling outages,'and on experience in dose rate reduction which can be achieved by practices such as the use of temporary shielding and decontamination.
l.
o Installation man-hours spent in each of the locations were estimated.
1 o
Radiation exposures were calculated based on the installation man-hours and dose rates for each location.
With respect to ongoing exposure due to maintenance of installed SAMDAs, the. estimated radiation exposures which are due to recurring LGS operational and maintenance activities are also provided in, Table 1-2.
The assumptions upon which these estimates are based are summarized below.
The average 40 year dose rate was calculated assuming 1) o the initial dose rate is the same as the SAMDA installation dose rates given in Table 1-1, and 2) the initial dose rates are increased by 20% per year for the first eight years, and then'are assumed to remain constant.
This l
assumption is based on actual operating experience.-
NRC OUESTION 3 Please provide a reference to drawings for the drywell head assembly and the associated HVAC systems in the immediate area.
1 Attachment Page 3
RESPONSE
The drawings provided in Enclosure 3 (M-1162 and M-1183), show the Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system components in the location of interest.
Specifically, these drawings show an HVAC duct in place in the LGS Unit 2 reactor well (the same duct exists in the LGS Unit 1 reactor well).
As shown in location F-8 of each drawing, blind flanges are installed during refueling outagen prior to flooding the reactor cavity.
These flanges are removed prior to operation in order to prov!de ventilation to that portion of the reactor well.
The elevation of the drywell head seal is 328 feet 4 inches, while the elevation of the top of the drywell head is 343 feet 7 inches, approximately the same elevation as the HVAC duct, i.e, 344 l
feet 3 inches.
I NRC QUESTION 4 In the consideration of mitigation alternatives, one potential alternative would be leaving Unit 2 idle and providing replacement power from other sources.
If Unit 2 was idle, what would be the source (s) of the replacement power, including a description of the type of power source and whether the source would be from inside or outside the utility's system?
What would be the environmental impacts which would result from the use of these other sources?
RESPONSE
Philadelphia Electric Company is a part of the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) System.
An analysis was performed to evaluate f
the relative environmental effects of replacing the energy equivalent to the LGS Unit 2 first fuel cycle's energy production with power j
sources inside and outside the PJM System.
A report providing a detailed description of the analysis methodology, data, and results is provided in Enclosure 4.
Two alternative mixes of replacement energy sources were used in this analysis.
The first mix is represented by l
mix of " marginal" PJM System (and beyond) coal-and oil-fired capacity, since this is the best estimate of the actual energy sources likely to be required to replace power that would be generated by LGS Unit 2.
The second alternative mix was based on the 1988 mix of energy sources used in 1988 by PJM member utilities, excluding purchases of outside power.
This mix represents the risks of the more usual mix of energy sources, including nuclear.
The conclusions from this analysis are that an additional 1.5 to 2 worker deaths and 80 to 100 worker injuries, and more than 10 projected public fatalities and 24 injuries, would result from the use of replacement energy sources for the first LGS Unit 2 fuel cycle.
This analysis also shows that an estimated 8 to 16 million tons of carbon dioxide would be created by the burning of replacement fuel
Attcchment
.Page 4 sources, and approximately~105'to 145 thousand tons of uulfur and nitrogen oxides.would be created.
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KRC OUESTION S What capacity factor was assumed for Unit 2 in terms of replacement energy costs and what variability was assumed in that factor as a function of plant-life?
RESPONSE
l Replacement power costs cited in.the report submitted to the~NRC by our letter dated July. 26, 1989, were calculated based on a daily.
cost of an extended plant outage (i.e., greater than 13 weeks).
A capacity factor of 100% was assumed in deriving the daily replacement energy cost, with no variability in this factor as a function of plant life.
The use of this capacity factor is based on the assumed SAMDA installation schedule provided by our July 26, 1989 submittal, i.e.,
(the outage work associated with installation of the SAMDAs was estimated to occur during either the second or third LGS Unit 2 refueling outage.
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Linierick ' Generating Station-Fire. Protection Evaluation Report Pages 3-53, 3-54b, 3-81, 3-82, 5-8, 5-9, 5-83 through 5-96 1
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applications is necessary because of its electrically insulating
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properties.
P'r+;ic materials are also used for electrical conduit, but only ewhea embeddad within poured concrete walls and floor slabs.
Item 85 BTP Guideline Only metallic tubing should be used for conduit.
Thin-wall metallic tubing should not be used.
LGS Desion Exposed conduit used for the routing of safety-related cables is rigid steel conduit.
Conduit embedded in poured concrete walls and slabs may be either rigid steel or PVC.
Conduits used for the routing of-exposed nonsafety-related cables may be either rigid steel or EMT.
Item 88 BTP Guideline
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Redundant safety-related cable systems outside the cable spreading room should be separated from eacn other and from potential fire exposure hazards in nonsafety-related areas by fire barriers with a minimum fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
LGS Desion Fire exposure hazards in nonsafety-related areas are separated from safety-related areas by 3-hour rated fire barriers.
Eeparation by distance or by fire barriers between redundant divisions of electrical cabling is provided as necessary to ensure safe shutdown capability in the event of a fire.
Item 89 BTP Guideline These cable trays should be provided with continuous line-type Eeat detectors.
LGS Design Fire detection capability for safety-related cables routed in
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cable trays is provided by smoke detectors (either ionization or 3-53 REV. 5, 03/84
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l (7) Southeast' corner of fire area 67 (at elevation 217 feet in the Unit:2 reactor enclosure).
The area of high cable tray j_
concentration is protected by a pre-action sprinkler system.
(8) Northwest corner of fire area'68 (at elevation 253 feet in 10 the Unit 2 reactor enclosure).
The area of high cable tray
-l concentration is protected by a pre-action sprinkler system.
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(9) Northwest corner of fire area 70 (at elevation 283 feet in the Unit 2 reactor enclosure).
The area of high cable tray concentration is protected by a pre-action sprinkler system.
I Item 94 j
1 BTP Guideline i
In other areas where it may not be possible because of other overriding design features necessary for reasons of nuclear safety to separate redundant safety-related cable systems by 3-hour-rated fire barriers, cable trays should be protected by an automatic water system with open-head deluge or open directional spray nozzles arranged so that adequate water coverage is provided for each cable tray.
Such cable trays should also be i
protected from the effects of a potential exposure fire by providing automatic water suppression in the area where such a fire could occur.
LGS Desion In areas that contain redundant divisions of safety-related cable trays that are not separated by 3-hour fire barriers, those specific trays that contain cables needed for safe shutdown are provided with separation by means of distance or by lesser-rated fire barriers (minimum 1-hour rating) and provided with automatic water suppression.
Where separation alone is deemed sufficient to ensure safe shutdown capability in the event of fire, due to low combustible loading in the area, automatic water suppression to protect the cable trays is not provided.
Item 96 BTP Guidelin_e Electric cable construction should, as a minimum, pass the flame test in the current IEEE Std 383.
LGF Design Electrical cable insulation and jacketing systems pass the IEEE Std 383 flame test except ior cables associated with the t
3-54b REV. 11, 02/89
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k As'shown in' Table A-1,.the combustible' loading.in'the.various compartments of the' spray. pond pump structure is low enough.
that portable. fire. extinguishers are sufficient"to extinguish 4
I any' postulated fire.
Those compartmentsEthat.contain.
combustible materials are.provided with fire; detectors that.
annunciate'in the control room.
In addition, the; spray pond pump structure is divided into two' separate fire areas _by a
- i 3-hourJrated fire wallLalong the centerline of the structure.
. Components needed for shutdown method A are located on.the l
west side of this-wall and components needed-for shutdown
-method B are located on the east side of:the wall, so that.a
- postulated
- fire in either fire area will leave at'least one method available to safely shut the plant down.
Item 18 L
Appendix'R Guideline 2.
Except as provided for in paragraph G.3 of:this section, where' cables or equipment, including associated non-1 safety' circuits lthat could prevent operation or;cause j
maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits,-or shorts to ground, of~ redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions are' located within the same. fire area outside of primary
)
containment, one of the following means of ensuring that 1
, o:C' one of the redundant trains is free of fire, damage shall be provided:
a.
Separation of' cables and equi'pment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating.
Structural steel forming a part.of or supporting such fire barriers shall be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier; b.
Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards.
In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area; or c.
Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one redundant train in a
' fire barrier having a 1-hour rating.
In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.
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%v 3-81 REV.
4, 10/83
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. ano l To the greatest extent practical, redundant trains of systems
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necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown are located in l
different fire areas, so that the redundant trains are
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separated by 3-hour fire barriers.
In fire areas where this is not possible due to restrictions on equipment location and electrical cable routing, the capability to achieve hot shutdown is maintained by one of the following alternate means:
a.
Enclosing the equipment and cabling of one redundant train in a 3-hour rated fire barrier.
b.
Enclosing the equipment and cabling of one redundant train in a 1-hour rated fire barrier, and providing fire detection and automatic fire suppression in the fire area.
c.
Dividing a fire area into two portions so'that a fire is postulated to occur in only one portion at a time.
Division of a fire area is accomplished by establishing a 20-foot wide zone that is free of combustible materials, and providing a water curtain suppression system within the combustible-free zone.
Components and equipment of redundant trains of systems that are necessary to achieve hot shutdown are located on opposite sides of the combustible-free zone.
Cables that,are needed for operation of one redundant train and are routed through the portion of the fire area that contains equipment of the other redundant train are enclosed in a 3-hour rated fire barrier.
Fire detection capability is provided on both sides of the combustible-free zone.
d.
Methods alternative to the foregoing are utilized in certain fire areas; these individual. fire areas are discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
3-82 REV.
4, 10/83
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-l (d)' Consequences of fire with active fire suppression:
I The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual.
annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control-room. -Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire.
(e) Effect of fire on safe shutdown:
Due to the provision of fire walls at El. 200'-0" within fire area 1, a postulated fire cannot affect both loops of the control structure chilled water system simultaneously.
-A 3-hour rated fire wall is located between the loop A.and loop B control structure water chiller areas, and the north, south, and east walls of the loop B water chiller area are also fire rated.
Therefore, at least one of the chilled water loops will remain available to provide cooling for the control structure in the event of a fire in this area.
(The control structure chilled water system is not considered to be necessary for safe shutdown of the plant.)
l No equipment associated with any of the four shutdown methods is located in this fire area.
However, electrical raceways I X:
that contain cables associated with shutdown methods A, B, C, and D are routed through this fire area.
All raceways within this fire area that are associated with shutdown method B will be enclosed by a 3-hour rated fire barrier.
This supplementary fire protection ensures that shutdown method B will remain available to safely shut down both units of the plant.
5.3.2 Fire Area 2:
13-kV Switchgear Area (El. 217'-0")
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6):
Construction Rating Walls:
N-Reinforced concrete 3 hr E-
-Concrete masonry unit - (part 3 hr adjacent to battery rooms)
E-Reinforced concrete - (remainder) 3 hr S-Reinforced concrete 3 hr W-Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W-Concrete masonry unit (part 3 hr adjacent to battery rooms)
W-Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 7)
Floor:
Reinforced concrete 3 hr*
5-8 REV. 5, 03/84
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LGS FPER
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' VI j Ceiling:
Reinforced concrete 3 hr*
Access:
Door connecting to stairwell no. 7
' 1. 5 ' hr i
Doors connecting to areas 3, 3 hr.
4, 5, and 6 Double steamtight doors ce nnecting to 3 hr**
areas 94, 107, and 113
'(b) Major safety-related components in fire area:
(1)
Emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets OAV118 and OBV118 and associated ventilation dampers (c) Postulated fire in areas Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray.
(As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of'a fire source external to the cabling.)
(d) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression:
-The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual
,ct annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the L.t.
control room.
Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish.the fire.
(e).Effect of fire on safe shutdown:
This fire area contains conduits carrying electrical cabling associated with shutdown methods A, B, C, and D for Units 1 and 2.
All conduits located within this fire area that are 1
associated with shutdown method A will be enclosed by a d
3-hour rated fire barrier.
This supplementary fire j
protection ensures that shutdown method A will remain JI available to safely shut down both units of the plant.
As noted in item (b)(1) above', this fire area contains the emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets (OAV118 i
and OBV118).
Loss of both these fans will not affect the J
ability to achieve safe shutdown.
If ventilation is required i
due to ambient conditions in the battery rooms and switchgear
)
compartments, and both fans have been disabled, temporary ventilation can be provided with portable fans.
This will allow continued operation of the electrical equipment in these areas.
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Il 5-9 REV. 5, 03/84 j
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LGS FPER
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significant quantities of combustible materials into The factors discussed above preclude the this space.
occurrence of a fire, involving either in-situ combustibles or transient combustibles, that could simultaneously affect the capability for valves HV-C51-1F04BA and HV-C51-1F048B to be opened when it is necessary to place the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode of operation.
~ The measures described above for physical sepatation and k"~~
provision of iire barriers ensure that the plant can be safely shut down using shutdown method D in the event of a fire in the western portion of fire area 43 and using shutdown method C in the event of a fire in the eastern portion of fire area 43.
5.4.16 T're Area 44:
Safeguard System Access Area (El. 217'-0")
Structural and architectural design features of fire
( i area (see Figure B-6):
Ratina Construction 2 hr Walls:
N
- Reinforced concrete (parts adjacent to stairwell c.
nos. I and 4)
N
- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr 2 hr E
- Reinforced concrete (part adjacent to stairwell no. 1)
E
- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr 2 hr S
- Reinforced concrete (part adjacent to stairwell no. 3) 3 hr S
- Reinforced concrete (part adjacent to fire area 124)
None S
- Reinforced concrete (part, exterior wall) 2 hr W
- Reinforced concrete (part adjacent to stairwell nos. 3 and 4)
W
- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr 3 hr Interior boundary (part) -
Reinforced concrete and concrete masonry unit walls None Interior boundary (part)
Reinforced concrete (primary containment wall) 3 hr*
Floor:
Reinforced concrete 3 hr*
Ceiling:
Reinforced concrete 1
5-83 REV.
8, 11/86 i
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LGS FPER
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. Access:
Doors' connecting to stairwell 1.5~hr nos.
1, 3, and 4 Two steamtight-doors connecting to 3 hr area-43 Hissile-resistant door connecting to 3 hr**
area 76
-l Equipment airlock door -
None 1
0.75 hr Elevator door Suppression chamber access hatches None Hm"N.
" Equipment hatchway'in ceiling None-(200 ft2 opening; protected by water curtain suppression system)
(b)
Major safety-related components in fire area:
(1). Core spray full. flow test' recirculation valves (HV-52-1F015A&B)
(2). Containment atmospheric control system containment' isolation valves (HV~57-104, HV-57-105, HV-57-112, HV-57-118, and.HV-57-162)
(3)
RHR system valves:
HV-51-125A&B (containment isolation for recirculation to suppression chamber)
HV-51-1F027A&B (containment isolation.for suppression chamber spray)
F' '
HV-51-1F010A&B (loops C and D recirculation to suppression chamber)
HV-51-1F024A&B (loops A and B recirculation to suppression chamber)
(4)
Instrument racks 10C001 (core spray loop A) and 10C019 (core spray loop B)
(5)
Instrument racks 10C015, 10CO25, 10C041, and 10C042 (main steam and reactor recirculation flow)
(6)
Instrument racks 10C016 and 10C036 (HPCI)
(7)
Instrument racks 10C035 and 10C038 (RCIC)
(8)
Instrument racks 10C006, 10C009, 10C010, and 10CO22 (reactor recirculation system pressure and jet pump flow)
(9)
RHR flow transmitters (FT-51-1N015A,B,C&D and FT-51-1N052A,B,C&D) 5-84 REV. 8, 11/86
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' - O (10) Motor" control' center 10B211, which serves the.
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.i" following~ components: _
- i RHR loop "A" valves a.
RHR compartment' unit coolers 1 AV210 and 1EV210 b.
l Core spray', loop "A" valves l
c.
Core spray compartment unit coolers 1AV211 and-r0
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'RHRSW inlet: valve to RHR "A" heat'exchangeri e.'
(HV-51-1F014A)
'f.
--Reactor head spray ~ inboard-l isolation valve.
j
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1 (HV-51-1F022)
RHR shutdown cooling suction inboard isolation g.
valve'- (HV-51-1F009 ).
.h.
RCJC compartment.u' nit coolers-1AV208 and
.I 1BV208 n
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Reactor water cleanup inboard isolation valve r
(HV-44-1F001) j.
Main steam drain line inboard isolation valve (HV-41-1F016) k.
Drywell unit cooler fans 1A1V212, 1C1V212, 1E1V212, and 1G1V212 (11) Motor control center 10B212, which serves the following components:
a.
RHR loop "B" valves b.
RHR compart' ment unit coolers 1BV210 and 1FV210 c.
Core spray loop "B" valves d.
Core spray compartment unit coolers 1BV211 and 1FV211 e.
RHRSW inlet valve to RHR "B" heat exchanger (HV-51-1F014B) f.
RHR shutdown cooling return isolation valve (HV-51-1F015A) g.
Reactor recirculation pump suction valve (HV-43-1F023B) h.
HPCI compartment unit coolers 1AV209 and IBV209 1.
Drywell unit cooler fans 1Bly212, 1DIV212, 1F1V212, and 1HIV212 (12) Motor control center 10B215, which serves the following components:
['*
a.
RHR loop "A" valves b.
RCIC system valves c.
MSIV leakage control outboard system blowers and valves d.
Suppr'ession pool cleanup pump suction isolation valve (HV-52-127) e.
Drywell pressure tap isolation valve (HV-42-147A) f.
Drywell floor drain and equipment drain containment isolation valves (HV-61-112 and l
HV-61-132) l (13) Motor control center 10B216, which serves the following components:
I a.
RHR loop "B" valves l
b.
HPCI system valves i
c.
MSIV leakage control inboard system blower and j
valves
)
d.
Suppression pool cleanup pump isolation valve l
(HV-52-128)
I e.
Drywell pressure tap isolation valve l
(HV-42-147B) i f.
Suppression pool level tap isolation valves l
(HV-55-120 and HV-55-121) l g.
Reactor head spray outboard isolation valve j
(HV-51-1F023) i h.
RHR shutdown cooling suction outboard I
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isolation valve (HV-51-1F008) i 5-85 REV. 7, 01/85 i
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RWCU outboard isolation valve:(HV-44-1F004)
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j.
Hain steam drain line outboard isolation valve
'(HV-41-1F019)
(14) DC motor control center 10D201, which serves the following components:.
a.
RCIC system b.
Div. 1.RPS and UPS static inverter (15)'DC motor control center 10D202, which serves the HPCI system (16) DC motor control center 10D203, which serves the following components:
a.
HPCI system b.
Div. 2 RPS and UPS static inverter (c)
Postulated fire in area:
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray.
(As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of. electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.)
(d)
Consequences of fire with active fire suppression:
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the. smoke detectors, which will-cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room.
If the fire occurs within the coverage area of one of the two pre-action sprinkler systems in this fire area, the system will provide automatic suppression of the fire.
When the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water.
At 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire.
The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished.
(e)
Effect of fire on safe shutdown-This fire area contains valves, motor control centers, instrument racks, and locally-mounted instrumentation associated with shutdown methods A, B, C, and D.
In general, the components associated with shutdown methods A and C are located in the western portion of the fire area, and the ccmponents associated with shutdown methods B and D are located in the eastern portien of the fire area.
Shutdown methods A and D will be relied on in the event of a fire in this fire area, because the raceways that contain cabling associated i
with shutdown methods A and D are separated from each other by greater distances than the raceways that t
5-86 REV. 7, 01/85
LGS FPER
,7%
contain cabling associated with shutdown methods B and C.
j The horizontal separation between components associated with shutdown method A and those associated with shutdown method D is approximately 84 feet, and the only combustible materials in the intervening space are electrical cables in cable tray.
A 20 foot wide zone that is free of combustibles will be created at two locations in fire area 44 by using 1-hour rated fire barriers to enclose the cable trays that pass through the zones.
A fixed suppression system of the water.
curtain type is located within each combustible-free zone to provide assurance that a postulated fire due to transient combustibles can be prevented from propagating through the combustible-free zones.
The two combustible-free zones, one located in the southwest quadrant of the fire area and one located in the northeast quadrant of the fire area, divide fire area 44 into a western portion and an eastern portion.
The western portion does not contain any components or raceways associated with shutdown method D.
The eastern portion contains no components associated with shutdown method A, but does contain a number of raceways associated with shutdown method A.
These latter raceways will be enclosed by 1-hour r ated fire barriers.
The encapsulated portions of these raceways are located within the coverage zones of the pre-action sprinkler systems in this fire area.
The locations of pre-action sprinkler systems and water curtain suppression systems in fire area 44 are shown in Figure B-6.
The measures described above for physical separation, fire suppression, and provision of fire barriers ensure that the plar.; can be safely shut down using shutdown method D in the event of a fire in the western portion of fire area 44 and using shutdown method A in the event of a fire in the eastern portion of fire area 44.
5.4.17 Fire Area 45:
CRD Hydraulic Equipment Area and Neutron Monitoring System Area (El. 253'-0")
(a)
Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7):
Construction Rating Walls:
N - Reinforced concrete (parts 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. 1 and 4)
N - Reinforced concrete (part)
L hr E - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr 5-87 REV.
7, 01/85 l
b_,
LGS FPER adjacent to stairwell no. 1)
_l E - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete (part adjacent 2 hr to stairwell no. 3)
S - Reinforced concrete (part, None exterior wall)
W - Reinforced concrete (parts 2 hr l
adjacent to stairwell nos.
1 3 and 4)
W - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr Interior boundary (part adjacent 3 hr to main steam tunnel) - Reinforced concrete Interior boundary (part) - Reinforced None concrete (primary containment wall)
Floor:
Reinforced concrete 3 hr*
.j Ceiling:
Reinforced concrete 3 hr*
Access:
Doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos.
1, 3, and 4 Elevator door 0.75 hr Drywell access hatches None Watertight door connecting to 3 hr**
area 46 Equipment hatchways in floor and None ceiling (200 ft2 openings; protected by water curtain suppression systems) j (b)
Major safety-related components in fire area:
(1)
Drywell chilled water system valves HV-87-122, i
HV-87-123, HV-87-128, and HV-87-129 (supply and j
return line containment isolation).
(2)
Control rod drive system master control station j
(3)
Control rod drive system hydraulic control units i
(4)
Containment. combustible gas analyzer sample package d
10S206 j
(5)
Load center 10B203 (Div. 3) j (6)
MSIV leakage control system blowers 10K208, 1AK209,
,l and 1EK209 (7)
Instrument racks 10C004, 10C005, 10C026, and 10CO27 (RPV instrumentation and LPCI injection valve AP 1
transmitters)
(8)
Standby liquid control injection line containment i
isolation valves (HV-48-1F006A&B)
(9)
Motor control center 10B223, which serves the following components:
LPCI injection containment isolation valve a.
(HV-51-1F017C) i 5-88 REV. 7, 01/85
,., ~..
.m
.<,m u,. m.
I LGS FPER
)
m 1
b.
RHR loop "C" minimum flow recirculation isolation valve (HV-51-105A) c.
RCIC system valves d.
Standby liquid control pump 1AP208 e.
Standby liquid control injection outboard isolation valve (HV-48-1F006) i f.
Drywell pressure tap isolation valve (HV-42-147C) g.
Drywell unit cooler fans 1A2V212 and-1E2V212 h.
Reactor recirculation pump cooling water isolation valves (HV-13-106 and HV-13-107)
(10) Motor control center 10B224, which serves the following components:
a.
LPCI injection containment isolation valve (HV-51-1F017D) b.
RHR loop "D" minimum flow recirculation isolation valve (HV-51-105B) l c.
HPCI system valves d.
Standby liquid control pump 1BP208 c.
Drywell pressure tap isolation valve (HV-42-147D) f.
Reactor recirculation pump cooling water source select valves (HV-13-108, HV-13-109, HV-13-110, and HV-13-111) g.
Drywell unit cooler fans 1B2V212 and 1H2V212
(^
(c)
Postulated fire in area:
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray.
(As, discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire
. source external to the cabling.)
(d)
Consequences of fire with active fire suppression:
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protecti'on panels in the~ control room.
If the fire occurs within the coverage area of the pre 2 action sprinkler system in this fi.re area, the system will provide automatic suppression of the fire.
When the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water.
At 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire.
The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished.
(e)
Effect of fire on safe shutdown:
l
\\
11l' 5-89 REY.
7, 01/85 i
]
~ ~ ~. ~.
. ~
n._
LGS FPER This fire area contains instruments, two motor control I
centers, and one load center that are associated with shutdown methods A, B, C, and D.
The components associated with shutdown methods A and B are' fewer in-number and are separated from each other by greater distances than the components associated with shutdown' methods C and D.
Therefore, shutdown methods A and B will be relied on in the event of a fire in this fire area.
The components associated with shutdown method A are located in the western portion of the fire area, and the components associated with shutdown method B are. located in the eastern portion of the fire area.
The minimum horizontal separation between components associated with shutdown method A and those associated with shutdown method B is approximately 130 feet.
Because these components are located on opposite sides of the primary containment, the separation distance is measured around the outer. circumference of the primary containment.
The only combustible materials in the intervening space between these components are electrical cables in cable tray.
A 20 foot wide zone that is free of combustibles will be created by using 1-hour rated fire barriers to enclose the cable trays that pass through the zone.
A fixed suppression system of the water curtain type is located within the combustible-free zone to provide assurance that a postulated fire due to transient combustibles can be prevented from propagating through the combustible-free zone.
The combustible-free zone divides the fire area into a western portion and an eastern portion.
The western portion does not contain any components or raceways associated with shutdown method B.
The eastern portion contains no components associated with shutdown method A, but does contain a number-of raceways associated with shutdown method A.
These latter raceways will be enclosed by fire barriers.
The fire barriers will have a 1-hour rating for raceway runs that are within the area protected by a pre-action sprinkler system, and will have a 3-hour rating for raceway runs that are not within the area protected by a pre-action sprinkler system.
For raceway runs that cross the boundary of the pre-action system's coverage the transition point between 1-hour and 3-hour
- zone, ratings of the fire barrier will be located at least 10 feet within the pre-action system's coverage zone.
The locations of the pre-action sprinkler system and the water curtain suppression system in fire area 45 are i
l shown in Figure B-7.
Cables associated with the two redundant divisions of ADS are routed through the eastern portion of fire area 5-90 REV. 7, 01/85
a-s,2 -
t
.g s
LGS FPER D' '
~;
45.
Since the ADS valves are needed for shutdown methods A and B, at least one of the divisions of ADS cabling must be capable of operating properly.
The' raceways that contain one division of ADS cabling will be enclosed by 1-hotar rated fire barriers for their-l entire run within the eastern portion of fire area 45.
The encapsulated portions of these raceways are located within the coverage zone of the pre-action sprinkler system in this fire area.
These fire' barriers will l
prevent a postulated fire ~from causing damage to both divisions of ADS cables concurrently.
The measures described above for physical separation, i
fire suppression, and provision of fire barriers ensure that the plant can be safely shut down using shutdown method B in the event of a fire in the western portion of fire area 45 and using shutdown method A in the event of a fire in the castern portion of fire area 45.
5.4.18 Fire Area 46:
Main Steam Tunnel (El. 253'-0")
(a)
Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-7, B-8, B-9, and B-10):
Construction Ratina y,
Walls:
N-Reinforced concrete (contains 3 hr 188 ft2 of unrated metal blowout panels)
E-Reinforced concrete 3 hr S-Reinforced concrete (part, None primary containment wall)
S-Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W-Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor:
Reinforced concrete 3 hr*
Ceiling:
Reinforced concrete (part at 3 hr*
El. 295'-3")
Reinforced concrete (part None at El. 365' roof slab) i Access:
Watertight door connecting to 3 hr**
area 45 Steamtight doors connecting to areas 3 hr 28 and 47 (b)
Major safety-related components in fire area:
(1)
Main steam line outboard containment isolation valves (HV-41-1F028 A,B,C&D) 5-91 REV. 7, 01/85
)
1
LGS FPER y
(2)
Feedwater line outboard containment isolation valves (HV-41-1F032ALB and HV-41-1F074A&B)
(3)
Main steam drain line outboard containment i
isolation valve (HV-41-1F019)
(4)
MSIV-LCS outboard containment' isolation. valves (HV-40-1F001B,F,K&P and HV-40-1F002B,F,K&P)
(5)- RCIC injection valve (HV-49-1F013)
(6)
Steam line radiation sensors (RE-41-1N006A,B,C&D)
(c)
Postulated fire in area:
Since no combustible materials are located in this area, the origin of a postulated fire is indeterminate.
(d)
Consequences of fire with active fire suppression:
Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to elevations 253 and/or 283 feet in the reactor enclosure and will enter the main steam tunnel through doors at those elevations.
The fire brigade will extinguish the fire using portable fire extinguishers or hoses from hose stations located outside the entrances to the main steam tunnel.
(e)
Effect of fire on safe shutdown:
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods B, C, or D is located in this fire area, all three of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down.
5.4.19 Fire Area 47:
RWCU Compartments, FPCC Compartment, and General Equipment Area (El. 283'-0" and 295'-3")
(a)
Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-8):
~
Construction Rating Walls:
N-Reinforced concrete (parts 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. 1 and 4)
N-Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E-Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 1)
E-Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S-Rei.nforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 3)
S-Reinforced concrete (part, None exterior wall)
W-Reinforced concrete (parts 2 hr 5-92 REV. 7, 01/85
i LGS FPER I
adjacent to stairwell nos.
3 and 4)
W-Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr Interior boundary (east and west 3 hr walls of area 46) - Reinforced concrete Interior boundary (primary None containment wall) - Reinforced concrete Floor:
Reinforced concrete 3 hr*
Ceiling:
Reinforced concrete 3 hr*
Accecs:
Doors connnecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos.
1, 3, and 4 Stenmtight door connecting to 3 hr area 46 0.75 hr Elevator coor Equipment hatchways in floor and None ceiling (200 ft2 openings; protected by water curtain suppression systems)
(b)
Major safety-related components in fire area:
(1)
Containment hydrogen recombiner packages 1AS403 and 4
1BS403 (2)
Standby liquid control system components:
Storage tank 10T204 Injection pumps 1AP208, 1BP208, and 1CP208 Explosive valves XV-48-1F004A,B&C (3)
Core spray loop "A" injection valves (HV-52-1F004A and HV-52-1F005)
(4)
Core spray loop "B" injection valves (HV-52-1F0045, HV-52-1F037, and HV-52-108)
(5)
RER system valves:
HV-51-1F017A,B,C&D (LPCI injection line containment isolation)
HV-51-1F021A&B (drywell spray line containment isolation) i HV-51-1F016A&B (drywell spray line shutoff)
(6)
HPCI system injection valve (HV-55-1F006)
(7)
RWCU supply line containment isolation valve (HV-44-1F004)
(8)
Containment atmospheric control system purge line containment isolation valves (HV-57-111, HV-57-115, l
HV-57-114, and HV-57-161)
(9)
Containment combustible gas analyzer sample cabinet 10S205 l
(10) Load center 10B204 (Div. 4) 5-93 REV. 8, 11/86 t
'e, E
LGS FPER 1
m,
(11-) Motor control center 10B213, which serves the following components:
a.
RHR loop."A". valves b.
Core. spray loop "A" valves c..
Feedwater startup recirculation valves (HV-41-109A&B) d.
Shutoff valves for main steam to miscellaneous steam-drivenLcomponents (HV-01-108, HV-01-109, HV-01-111, and HV-01-150)
Drywell chilled water source select valves 4
e..
f.
SGTS heater 0AE188 g.
SGTS exhaust fan OAV109 (12) Motor control center 10B214, which serves the following' components:
a.
RHR loop "D" valves b.
Core spray loop "B" valves MSIV leakage control inboard system pipe c.
heaters and isolation valves d.
Drywell-cooling water containment isolation valves-e.
SGTS heater OBE188 f.
SGTS exhaust fan OBV109 (c)
Postulated fire in' area:
(As i
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray.
discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical l
cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.)
l (d)
Consequences of fire with active fire suppression:
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate i
the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual
, annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room.
If the fire occurs within the coverage area of the pre-action sprinkler system in this fire area, the system will provide automatic suppression of the fire.
When the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water.
At 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire.
The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished,.
(e)
Effect of fire on safe shutdown:
Valves, motor control centers, and a load center associated with shutdown methods A, B, C, and D are located within this fire area.
The components associated with shutdown methods A and B are separated 5-94 REV.
7, 01/85 i.
^1
. P w... h e h..m LGS FPER
,9 from each other by greater distances than the components associated with shutdown methods C and D.
Therefore, i
shutdown methods A and B will be relied on in the event of a fire in this fire area.
i Other than valves HV-51-1F016A and HV-51-1F016B (which are discussed in the following paragraph), the components associated with shutdown method A are located in the western portion of the fire area, and the components associated with shutdown method B are located in the eastern portion of the fire area.
The minimum horizontal separation between components associated with shutdown methods A and B is approximately 99 feet.
Because these components are located on opposite sides of the primary containment, the separation distance is measured around the outer circumference of the primary containment.
The only combustible materials in the intervening space between these components are electrical cables in ceble tray.
A 20 foot wide zone that is free of combustible materials will be maintained between the method A and method B components; no cable trays are located within this combustible-free zone.
Valve liv-51-1F016A is located east of the combustible-free r.one, and valve HV-51-1F016B is located on the west side of a fire-rated wall that separates the western and eastern portions of fire area 47.
Both of these valves are normally closed and are required to stay closed while the RHR system is being used for achieving safe shutdown.
The electrical chbles routed between these valves and their respective motor control centers are not needed for safe shutdown since the motor operators on the valves do not need to remain operable.
The cables that, if damaged, could cause these two valves to open incavertently are protected (through the use of fire barriers on raceways) as necessary to ensure that postulated fires do not damage the cables.
The combustible-free zone divides fire area 47 into a western portion and a'n eastern portion.
The western portion does not contain any components associated with shutdown method B (other than valve HV-51-1F016B), but it does contain a single conduit associated with shutdown method B.
This conduit will be enclosed by a 3-hour rated fire barrier.
The eastern portion of the fire area does not contain any components associated with shutdown method A (other than valve HV-51-1F016A),
but it does contain a number of raceways associated with shutdown method A.
These latter raceways, all of which are located within the area protected by a pre-action sprit *.ler system, will be enclosed by 1-hour rated fire 5-95 REV.
7, 01/85
s a ;.
LGS FPER barriers.
The location ot' the pre-action sprinkler system in fire area 47 is shown'in Figure B-8.
Exclusive of the raceways enclosed by fire barriers, the horizontal separation between raceways associated with shutdown method A and racewr.ys associated with shutdown method B is approximately 96 feet.
This separation distance is sufficient to ensure that a postulated fire in this fire area will not affect the operability of shutdown methods A and B simultaneously.
Cables associated with the two redundant divisions of ADS are routed through the western and eastern portions of fire area 47.
Since the ADS valves are needed for shutdown methods A and B, at least one of the divisons of ADS cabling must be capable of operating properly.
In the western portion of the fire area, raceways that contain cables for one of the ADS divisions will be enclosed by 3-hour rated fire barriers.
In the eastern portion of the fire area, raceways that contain cables for one of the ADS divisions will be enclosed by 1-hour rated fire barriers; these latter raceways are located within the area protected oy a pre-action sprinkler system.
These fire barriers will prevent a postuleted fire from causing damage to both divisions of ADS cables concurrently.
The measures described above for physic."1 separation, fire suppression, and provision of fire barriers ensure that the plant can be safely shut down using shutdown method B in the event of a fire in the western portion of fire area 47 and using shutdown method A in the event of a fire in the eastern portion of fire area 47.
5.4.20 Fire Area 48:
RWCU Holding Pump Compartments, RERS Fan Area, and Corridors (El. 313'-0")
(a)
Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-9):
Construction Rating Walls:
N-Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 4)
N-Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E-Reinforced concrete 3 hr S-Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S-Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 3)
W-Reinforced concrete (part, None exterior wall)
W-Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr 5-96 REV. 7, 01/85
g g
L j
J I
l-l' 1
i l
l ENCLO.SURE 2
Limerick Generating. Station l'
Estimated Occupational. Exposures-Table 1-1:
SAMDA Installation Table 1-2i SAMDA Maintenance
_ _1_ _ n_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
01 Aug>89.
TABLE 1 1 OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE EVAL'JATION
~
MANHOUtt : DOSE RATE l EXPOSURE l TOTAL OPTION EXPOSUR l
OPTION AREA /ELEV.
LOCATION lcmWREM: l l
i I
c 1
1 1
I I
.A1 HEAT REMOVAL. POOL l18/177 RHR COMPARTMENT l
5300 I
$MR/HR l 26.5 l
l
! 18/201 RNR COMPARTMENT M00 2MR/hR l 17.6 l
l
' 18/201 PIPE TUNNEL t#00 2MR/HR l 13.8 l
57.9 MAM REM i
1 I
i i
l i
l,A2 HEAT REMOVAL.$ PRAY
! 18/177 RHR COMPARTMENT l
$300 SMR/NR l 26.5 l
l i
l (NEW DW $ PRAT NDR.)
18/201 RHR COMPAF.TMENT l
8800 l 2MA/HR l 17.6 l
.l l18/201 PIPE TUNNEL l
6900 l 2MR/HR 13.8 l
l18/217283 REACTOR ENCL. AREA l
6000 l 3MR/HR 18.0 l
l DRYWELL l 34000l10MR/HR 340.0 l
415.9 MAN REM h
l i
A3 HEAT REMOVAL SPRAY l]18/177 RHR COMPARTMENT l
5300, SMR/HR l 26.5 l
(USE EXISTING DW l18/201 RHR COMPARTMENT l
14670 l 2MR/HR l 29.3 l
$ PRAY HDR.)
l18/201 PIPE TUNNEL l
6900 '
2MR/HR l 13.8 l
69.6 MAN REM i
l i
81 ATWS CLEAN VENT l13/217 REACTOR ENCL AREA j
6000 1.5MR/hRl 9.0 j13/253 REACTOR ENCL. AREA i
1800 1.0MR/HR]
1.8
, 13/283 REACTOR ENCL. AREA l
2200 l,0.5NR/NRl 1.1 l
13/313 REA & NORTH STACK l
5000 l 0.5NR/NR l 2.5 l
i l
i 52 FILTEREDVENT.CRAVELBEDl16/198 P!PE TUNNEL l
9LO 0.2MR/HRl 0.1 l
l17/198 P!PE TUNNEL l
600 0.2MR/HR 0.1 J17/201 REACTCt ENCL. AREA l
1800 0.5MR/HR 0.9 i
- 17/201 RHR COMPARTMENT l
700l 2.0MR/HR 1.4 l
l l
17/217 RHR VALVE COMPARTMENT l 1300 '
O.2MR/HR 0.3 l
2.9 MAN REM l
l 17/238 RHRVALVECOMPARTMENTl 100 i0.ZAR/HR I
I P!PE TUNNEL l
1100 0.2MR/HR 0.7 l
j B3 FILT. VENT.MULT. VENTURI 16/198 l
17/198
- !PE TUNNEL 700l0.2MR/HRl 0.1 l
l l
j17/201 REACTOR ENCL. AREA 2100l0.5MR/HR 1.1 l
l j17/201 RHR COMPARTMENT 900l2.0MR/HR i
1.3 l
, 17/217 RHRVALVECOMPARTMENTl 1700i0.2MR/HRl 0.3 l
[
3.5 MAN REN 17/238 RMRVALVECOMPAR1 MENT l 100 0.2MR/HRl I
i lD1 CORE CATCHER CRY CRUC!sLE INSIDE PEDESTAL l 56000 0.2MR/NR 11.20 WETWELL j
8000l0.2MR/HR 1.6 l
l CRYWELL l 16000.10.0MR/HR l 160.0 l 172.8 MAN REM i
i I
I I
l02 CORE CATCHER RUBBLE BED l INstCE PEDESTAL l
18900 l0.2MR/HR 3.8 l
l l
BELOW RPV l
2000 l 5.0MR/HR l 10.0 l
13.8 MAN REM l
..................................................................l..........................................................]
l I
f 4
__________________.__________.____.____________m______.__
h
. 02 AuB 89 TABLE 1 - 2 0 & M EXPOSURE EVALUATION a
.....o......................................................................,..........................,..........................
l OPTION l AREA /ELEV.
LOCATION.
l MANHOURS DOSE RATE lEX/CSURE[ (CTAL OPTION EXPOSURE [
.l
-l.
l l(40 YEAR)l(40 TR, AVC.)l(MAN REM) l (40 YEAR) l i
i I
l 3200l 12.2MR/HR l 39.0 l
[
I I
I I
I i
lA1 NEAT REMOVAL P0OL l18/177 RHR COMPARTMENT i
l18/201 RHR COMPARTMENT l
3200l 4.9MR/HR l
15.7 l
l l
l l18/201 PIPE TUNNEL l
l l
l 54.7 MAN REM l
I I
i 1
I I
I i
lA2 HEAT REMOVAL
- SPRAY l18/177 RNR COMPARTMENT l
3200l 12.2MR/HR l 39.0 l
l l
(NEW DH SPRAY HOR.)
l18/201 RHR COMPARTMENT l
3200l 4.9MR/HR l 15.7 l
l l
l l18/201 PIPE TUNNEL l
j l
l l
l
.l.
l15/217-283 REACTOR ENCL. AREA l
9600l 7.3MR/HR l 70.1 l
l l
l
+ DRYWELL l
l l
l 124.8 MAN REN l
i 1
I I
I I
i 1
lA3 HEAT REMOVAL SPRAY l18/177 RHR COMPARTMENT l
3200l 12.2MR/HR l 39.0 l
l l
(USE EXISTING DW l18/201 RHR COMPARTMENT l
9600 l 4.9MR/HR l 47.0 l
l l
SPRAY HDR.)
l18/201 PIPE TUNNEL l
l l
l 86.0 MAN REM l
l
'l i
I I
I i
i lB1 ATWS CLEAK VENT l13/217 REACTOR ENCL. AREA l 72000l 3.7MR/HR l 118.4 l
j j
l l13/253 REACTOR ENCL. AREA l
l l
l l
l l13/283 REACTOR ENCL. AREA l
l l
l l
l l
l13/313 REA & NORTH STACK l
l l
l 118.4 MAN REM
[
l l
i I
I I
l l
1 lB2 FILTEREDVENTGRAVELBEDl16/198 P!PE TUNNEL l
l l
l l
l l17/198 PIPE TUNNEL l
l
[
l l
l l17/201 REACTOR ENCt. AREA l
l l
l-l l
l17/201 RHR COMPARTMENT l
l l
l
[
l.
[17/217 RHRVALVECOMPARTMENTl 40000l 0.5MR/HR l
20.0 l
l l
l17/238 RHRVALVECOMPARTMENTl l
l l
20.0 MAN REM
[
l i
I I
I I
I ls3 FILT. VENT MULT. VENTURI l16/198 PIPE TUNNEL l
l l
j l
l l17/198 PIPE TUNNEL l
l l
l l
l l
l17/201 REACTOR ENCL. AREA l
l l
l l
l l17/201 RHR COMPARTMENT l
l l
l l
l l17/217 RHR VALVE C:MPARTMENTl 40000l 0.5Mk/HR l
20.0 l
l l
l17/238 RHRVALVECOMPARTMENTl
]
l l
20.0 MAN REM j
l i
I I
i 1
1
'lD1 CL 1 CATCHER CRT CRUCIBLE l INS!DE PEDESTAL l
l l
l l
l 1
WETWELL l
l j
l l
l l
ORrdLL l
6400l 24.4MR/HR l 156.2 l 156.2 MAN REM l
1 I
l l
t i
I l02 CORE CATCHER RUEBLE BED l INSIDE PEDESTAL l
l l
}
j
.l l
BELOW RPY 7
l l
0.0 MAN REM
..................................................................i...................................l.........................l; e
E I4 C T.,O S U R E 3
Limerick Generating Station Drawings:
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ENCLOSURE 4
Liraerick GeneraVing Station
._ Analysis of the Relative Environmental Effects of Replacing the Energy Equivalent to the LGS Unit 2 First Fuel Cycle Energy Production i
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This is an eval.uatic~n,'of the incremental' environmental' effects-of
- replacing energy equivalent to one-fuel cycle's energy production j
by. Limerick Unit 2.
1 1I. REPLACEMENT ENERGY MIX' I
.The incremental environmental impacts of replacing. energy from
~$
i Limerick Unit 2-with that from other' sources will vary with the relative contributions to the overall mix of replacement energy l-by the various generating facilities which together'would supply it.
Older, less efficient oil-and coal-fired stations which would be: called into such service would have significantly greater ~
effects than, for. example, energy.from hydroelectric facilities.
The particular sources from which any needed replacement energy would be obtained can be assumed, but not-known with certainty
-unt11'the need arisea and available alternatives assessed.
'For purposes of this analysis, two alternatives mixes of' replace'-
ment energy sources were examined:
the first is represented by a.
mix.of marginal pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland (PJM) system'(and beyond) coal-and oil-fired capacity (referred.to as the " margin-l al mix") which is.the best estimate of the_ actual plants likely to be required to make up.the shortfall in capacity.
A second evaluation was made based on the 1988 mix of generation sources (exclusive of purchases) used in 1988 by PJM utilities-(referrec to hereafter as the "1988 mix") as' representative of the; risks of the.more usual. mix of energy sources, including nuclear genera-tion.
The " marginal mix".was determined from an analysis of replacement capacity within p3M and beyond, as presented in summary form in Table 3-1.
Those alternatives were simplified by combining all coal-and all oil-supplied energy, and combining non-utility gen-eration with hydroelectric in one category having the same impact.
Thus., the " marginal mix" replacement energy for Limerick Unit 2 assumed for this analysis'was that presented in the following tabulation.
Limerick Unit 2 Replacement Energy,
" Marginal Mix", % Contribution Coal Q11 Hydro 48.7 50.7 0.6 t
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assembled and analyzed. Table 3-2 presents.the' total megawatt-i hours distributed by PJM (also identified as the Mid-Atlantic Area Council, MAAC) utilities in 1988 by energy-source, based on a-information supplied by the UDI Utility Data-Dase.
Of the elev-
{
trical energy distributed within the PJM system in that year, 55.6%.was derived from fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas), 27.2%
from nuclear,.2,.0% from hydro and 15.0% imported from beyond the PJM system.
No breakdown within the fossil fuels is available from this data-set.
To make that breakdown into the mix of fuels used for generation within PJM, and determine-their airborne emissions, unit-by-unit generating data:for fossil and nuclear-steam-electric units in MAAC' utilities were compiled by UDI for 1987 (the latest data available).
These data permit the derivation of the individual fuel contributions to MAAC energy generation as a basis for emis-sions and risk estimates.
The fossil fuel use data for each MAAC utility-are presented in Table 3-3, together with estimates of I
emissions of sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides and carbon dioxide, I
and are summarized in the following tabulation:
I
)
Percent Generation by Fuel.in MAAC, 1987 Coal Q1L (ifJL Nuclear l
61.3 3.9 2.1 32.7 of the total fuel-generated electric energy generated in 1987, fossil fuels generated about twice as much as did nuclear (67% to 1
33%), essentially the same ratio as-that in 1988 (55.6% to l
27.2%).
On this basis, the ratio of' generation by oil and gas relative to coal-for 1988 was assumed to be the same in 1988 as in 1987.
Since the 1988 data (Table 3-2) show no gas generation, l
the relatively minor gas-derived energy usage identified for 1987 was assumed to be contributed by. oil in 1988.
Accordingly, the hypothesized "1988 mix" was assumed to be distributed as follows within the 85% of the internally-generated PJM sources:
i Hypothesized Limerick Unit 2 Replacement Energy, f
"1988 Mix", % Contribution Coal QLL Nuclear Hydro 59.9 5.8 31.9 2.3 Based on these two energy source 3*strioutions, incremental risks were determined as the total of the risks per unit energy gener-ated by each source weighted by its respective contribution to the total of DJN-generated energy (i.e., the total lezn that purchased), minus the risks of Limerick Unit 2.
Mathematically, l
this is represented by the relationships described below.
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- Incremen'tal-risk = Incremental unit risk x units of replacement
]4 energy.
a Incremental unit risk =.(Replacement energy' unit risk - nucitar energy unit. risk)
Replacement energy unit risk - ! (unit risk (C) x fraction)...z
+- (unit risk 101 x fraction).tz
+ (unit risk IN) x fraction)nu.s..,
+ (unit risk IB) x fraction)ny... }
For the "1988 mix":
Incremental unit risk =
(0.599xc+0.058xo+.319xN+0.023xH} - 1xN 0.599C + 0.0580 + 0.023H - 0.681N
=
For the " marginal mix":
Incremental unit risk =
{0.487xC+0.507xo+0.006xH) 1xN III.
UNIT RISK FACTORS
' Generic analyses for both the nuclear and non-nuclear alterna-tives were used.to provide a consistent basis for determining the differential or incremental effects.
Host of these analyses were published in the mid-to late-1970s and compared the environmen-tal and health risks of nuclear-and coal-fueled energy.
For the most part, these analyses were concerned with comparing the
' health risk aspects of the environmental impact.
occupational risks are by far the best known, since they are usually documented for fatalities and induries from both acci-dents and occupational diseases.
Both mine accidents and miner respiratory disorders are well publicized, as are the accidents involving oil platforms and uranium miner lung cancers.
Some public injuries resulting from segments of the various fuel cy-cles are also documented, such as those involving coal train or truck accidents injuring or killing members of the public.
How-ever, the risks to public health from the pollutants emitted by various energy facilities are much more uncertain.
The pollutants emitted fron fossil plants include particulate, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, carcinogenic polycyclic organic matter (poM), and trace metals including ar-senic, cadmium and mercury, much more so in the case of coal plants than from those burning oil or gas.
Although no specific I
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mates of the disease component of public health risk.
Oil was usually not included in these evaluations and comparisons because of its relative cleanliness compared with coal, its de-clining role'in electricity generation and its non-competitive nature relative to uranium or coal as a fuel for large base-load generating stations.
Although several estimates of occupational risks from oil extraction, processing, transport and use have been reported, public health effects have been estimated by only a single ' author, and would provide a mean public health risk estimate greater than that for coal, which is unreasonable.
Accordingly, although no public health risks are assigned to oil-fired generating facilities in this analysis, it is expected that such effects should lie between these of nuclear and coal genera-tion.
Hydropower was also essentially excluded from these comparisons for similar reasons, and with the view that there were no sub-stantial emissions or other enviroranental impacts other than thef flooding of large land and wetland areas.
Accordingly, no health' risks are assigned to hydroelectric generation.
However, it should be noted that, based on dam failures in the U.S. between 1928 ard 1958, a major disaster rate of 1.'3 x 10-d per dam-year has been estimated, and that 1680 persons were killed by such failures over that period (9).
However, there is no existing correlation of these deaths with hydroelectric generation, and those risks are also ignored in this analysis.
A number of generic evaluations were examined to select several which provided more complete comparisons of risks of nuclear generation with other energy sources; an earlier site-specific coal / nuclear evaluation by the author (2) was miso included for comparability with other generic values in the literature.
The fuel-specific analyses are tabulated in the Appendix for both occupational and public health risks, together with the refer-ences from w3;ch.they were obtained.
A summary of these health risk effects for each fuel is presented in Table 3-4.
Despite the ranges of risks in the individual estimates of com-ponents of the overall risk displayed in the supporting tables in the Appendix, as Table 3-4 indicates, there is a very substantial difference in total risk per unit energy between coal and nuclear fuel generation in both worker and public health effects.
Oil genaration would appear to lie between coal and nuclear fuel in its unit occupational rish impacts and presumably in its public health risks as wes1.
For example, if the public health risks from oil were only one-tenth those from coal, they wo.11d still substantially exceed those from nuclear power plants - by a fac-tor of almost 5 in public fatalities per GW(e)-yr, and by about a factor of 10 in injuries to the public.
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The sulfur oxide estimates'in' Table
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3-3 were based on the. annual fuel burn, average heat content'and l
sulfur' content.repoited, as well as reductions appropriate for any scrubbers 'in use.
Nitrogen oxide estimates were made by UDI using the emission f actors of AP42 for the relevant boiler types.
The generation and emission data in Table 3-3 were combined to produce the unit emission rates by fuel which are presented in Table 3-5.
IV.
INCREMENTAL UNIT RISKS FROM REPLACEMENT ENERGY.
Using the relationships for incremental unit risk presented in Section II for each of the alternative replacement fuel " mixes" for Limerick Unit 2, and the health risks presented in Table 3 '
incremental. unit risks were calculated for worker and public deaths and injuries and are presented in Table 3-6 for each re-placement fuel mix.
As indicated in that table, 1 GW(e)-yr of "1988 mit' r) placement energy for Limerick Unit 2 would result in an incre ;atal risk of more than 1 worker fatality and about 7 additional pt511c fatali-ties from disease and accidents in excess of those that would be calculated to accrue from the operation of a nuclear power plant to generate the same energy.
Further, incremerbs above nuclear energy of about 61 occupational and 18 public~ injuries are esti-mated to result, per GW(e)-yr of replacement energy.
Similar values for the " marginal mix" replacement energy indicate occupational risks to be about 30% greater than for the "1988 mix" due to the absence of the low-risk nuclear option in the former.
However, the public health ris'k is substantially under-stated for the " marginal mix" because of the absence of a unit risk value for oil generation, and the significant fractional contribution of oil-fired generation in that mix.
It would be reasonable to expect that the incremental public health z.isk for that mix would increase in roughly the same proportion over the "1988 mix" risk as does the occupational value, i.e.,
by about 30%, although no quantitative support can be provided for that estimate.
The unquantified impacts rom the emitted gaseous precursors of
" acid-rain" and " greenhouse" are all increments beyond the nua-lear option (except for the energy for uranium enrichment assui. sed to come from coal-fired capacity).
These were calculated in the in Table 3-5 same'way as for the health risks above from the data and are ; esented below.
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INCREMENTAL ACID-2AIN AND CREENHOUSE GASEOUS PRECURSORS fi EMISSIONS, 1000 T PER GW(e)-YR 0F REPLACEMENT. ENERGY 4
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59.3 19.4 6163 "Margidai" 72.1 30.2 11989 i
1 INCREMENTAL RISKS OF REPLACEMENT ENERGY FOR LIMERICK 2 V.
i i
The final step in the. estimation of the incremental risks arising fuel from the replacement of energy from Limerick Unit 2 for one l
cycle is the determination of the magnitude of the energy requir-ed.
The estimate of the first-cycle energy output to be expect-ed from Limerick Unit 2, and hence to be replaced by alternative is based on the first cycle experience of Limerick Unit That unit's net generation during its first cycle was 465
- sources, 1.Effective Full Power Days (EFPD); at a net capacity of 1055 MW(e), the' energy generated tothled 490,575 MW-days, or 1.344 GW(e)-yr.
Thus, the total incremental risk of the replacement energy for is determined as 1.344 times the fuel-weighted unit Limerick 2 These are summarized in Table 3-7 for the two al-risk values.
ternative fuel mixes.
As indicated in that table, replacement.of l
the nuclear energy from Limerick Unit 2 by either the 1988 MAAC l
mix of fossil and nuclear generation, or the marginal unit mix likely to be required, is estimated to result in an additional 1.5 - 2 worker deaths and B3 - 10' worker injuries, and more than 10 projected public fatalities and 24 in$uries from such replace-ment energy.
it is estimated that additions of about B - 16 million
- Further, tons of carbon dioxide would be made to the atmospheric reservoir
[
as well as of this " greenhouse" gas by this replacement energy,
- 145 thousand tons of the suitur and nitrogen oxides about 105 which contribute, in part, to acid rain and which would not be produced by Limerick Unit 2 operation.
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REPLACEMENT ENERGY BY FUEL TYPE 0
.g LIMERICK UNIT 2 - FUEL CYCLE 1
,~
FJJIL. TYPE -
CW-HE PERCENT t
l PEco coal (Low Sulfur) 279 2.8 Oth;r Coal
- 4655
' 4 5.9,
if 0.1 & Cas (Steam) 4547 44.8;
- b. 0,1 & Gas (Comb. Turb.)
601 5.9 Nrt 3ydro 22 0.2 Non-Utility Generation 43 0.4 TOTAL.
10148 100.0 1
'd Note:. Analysis also includes replacement of precommercial l
enetgy.
Other coal includes energy sources inside ana outside the'PJM Interconnection Source: System Planning Division, PEco, 7/31/63 S
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-9 TABLE 3-2 1988 TOTAL GIGAWATT YE.ARS BY ENERGY SOURCE FOR HAAC (PJM) UTILITIES
.s 30TAL NUCLEAR TOSSIL HYDRO /
PURCHASED /
ENERGY STEAM STEAM OTHER INTERCHANGE UTILITY DISTRIBUTED GENERAff0N GENERATION GENERATION GEN _ERATION ACE 0.922 0.152 0.411 0.106 0.252 BG&E 2.946 1.339 1.516 0.019 0.071 DELMARVA P&L 1.235 0.112 1.100 0.004 0.019 JCP&L 2.096 0.559 0.355 0.115 1.067 HET ED 1.204 0.310 0.$59 0.019 0.250 PENN ELEC 1.628 0.155 1.336 0.118 0.019 PP&L 4.111 1.469 3.515 0.072
-0.945 PECO 3.971 1.412 1.157
-0.042 1.435 2.326 0.021 0.406 PEPC0 2.753 PSFAG 4.513 1.399 1.816 0.065 1.232 TOTALS 25.378 6.908 14.102 0.498 3.813 Source: UDI Utility Data Base, 7/B9 8
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1987 EEI FUEL DATA FOR'MAAC (PJM) FOSSIL PL7NTS-a l
COAL OIL GAS
. Ental nona n HR01 su gueri l
ACE 651 1225 BO&E 2580 2262 2451 DEEPWATER 414 229 2276 nELMARVA P&L 2451 2902 6451 390 1433 DOVER ELEC 419
' 10191 1
JCP&L HET ED 1250 39 PFNN ELEC 15117 232 PP&L 9706 7114 PECO 1245 4440 36B PEPCO 6130 2349 6834 PSE&G 1955 4121 40831 UGI/LUZERNE 194 2
TOTALS 41793 25724 70835
. GENERATION (GW-yr) 13.03 0.82 0.44
'SO: EMITTED (1000 T) 1225.8 42.7 NOx EMITTED (1000 T) 383 26 15 CO: EMITTED b (1000 T) 114931 12509 2113 Data from UDI EEI POWER STATISTICS Data Esse except for 002 a
NOx estimates assume AP42 emission fe-tors S0s emissions include FCD systems Where applicable 32.7% (5.95 GW-yr) generated by nuclear" plants emissions assume 75 wt% C in coal, 85 wt% C in fuel oil, b
Con and 75 wtt C in gas 9
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SUMMAllY ALTERNATIVE ELECTRIC GENERATION i..
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HEALTH RISK PER GW(e)-YR l
FUEL M-COAL' NUCLEAR E
Occupational.
Deaths-2.35 0.44-0.64 Injuries 114 13 46 Public Deaths 13.
0.27 a-Injuries 31 0.29-b 2
a Hean literature.value too high b No' estimates in literature 10
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UNIT EHISSION RATES BY FUEL a
(1000 Tons /GW-yr) l FUEL EMISSION CR QE, E
S02 94.1 51.B 0
Co=
8620 15176 4752 NOx 29.4 31.3 33.0 a
Based on Table 3-3 generation and emission estimates 11
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.INCREI(ENTAL FUEL-WEIGHTED HEALTH RISKS FUEL MIX "1988
" MARGINAL RI.gg. TYPE
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Occupational Deaths 1.15 1.47 Injuries 62.10 78.84.
Public Deaths.
7.60 6.33 c Injuries 18.37 15.10 c Replacement fuel mix is 59.9% coal, 5.8% oil, a
31.9% nuclear and 2% hydroelectric b R5 placement fuel mix is 46.7% coal, 50.7% oil, and 0.6% hydroelectric c Public risks and injuries are greatly under-estimated due to the absence of risk assigned to oil; if the public risk from oil were half that from coal, these risks would be 50% greater 12
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9 TOT.AL.-FUEL-WEIGHTED HEALTH RISXS '
FROM 1.344 GWie)-YR. REPLACEMENT ENERGY FOR LIHERICK UNIT 2 i
j FUEL HIX "1988 "HARGINAL RIE.'fYPE ti g " a till" k Occupational Deatha 1.54 1.97 Injuries 83.46 105.96 l
Public' Deaths 10.22 6.51 e i
Injuries 24.69' 20.29 c 1
Atmospheric Emissions (1000 Tons) e Acid Rain Precursors SO:
80.5 96.9 NO.
26.1 40.6 Creenhouse Effect Precursor con 8283 16113 Replacement fuel mix is 59.9% coal, 5.8% oil, a
31.9% nuclear and 2% hydroelectric b'
Replacement fuel mix is 48.7% coal, 50.7% oil, and 0.6% hydroelectric c Public risks and injuries are greatly under-estimated due to the absence of risk assigned to cil; li the public risk from oil were half that from cos1, these rinks would be 50% greater 1
i' 13
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APPENDIX UNIT HEALTH RISKS TO WORKERS AND PUBLIC SY FUEL
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3 OCCUPATIONAL DEATHS AND INJURIES PER'GW(e)-YR
,3
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COAL DEATHS (Accidents and Diseases) aj (Reference)
RISK SOURCE (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(7)
AVERI.GE Fuel Extraction 1.30 a 0.96 b 1.38 c L1.83 e 3.245 f 0.06 0.08
'O.035-Processing
. O.03 0.55 6 0.54 d.
1.225 Transportation 0.07' Power Generation 0.'05 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.02 TOTAL 1.42 1.09 2.12 2.59 4.53 2.35 NON-FATAL CASES Fuel Extraction 54 a 98 b-134 c 146 e 75 f 4
4 3
Processing Transportation 7
3 00 8d 12 Power Generation 2
3 5
5
'1 TOTAL 63 104 149 165 91 114 Includes accidents only in both mining and preparation; a
assumes 50% underground /50% surface extraction b Includes both mining and processing,.but excludes CWP; assumes 54.5% underground /45.5% surface extraction Assumes 75% underground, 25% surface extraction and c
includes CWP; means of ran'ges from Table 10 d Assumes 1/3 rail, 1/3 barge and 1/3 tr.uck transport Assun as 75% underground, 25% surf ace extraction and e
includes CWP; means of ranges given f Includes accidents and disease; means of ranges given Pace A-1
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OCCUPATIONAL DEATHS AND INJURIES PER OW(e)-YR NUCLEAR DEATHS (Accidents and Diseases)-
(Reference)
RILK SOURCE (1)
(2)
(4)
(5)
(7)
AVERAGE j
Fuel. Extraction 0.13 'a 0.18 b 0.51 c 0.30 b 0.15 c I
. Processing 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.27 d A
' Transportation 0.002 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.004
' Power Generation 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.06 TOTAL 0.15 0.40 0.72 0.47 0.49 0.44 1
J 1
NON-FATAL CASES Fuel Extraction 6.9 a 6.1 11.4 c 9.4 6 5.9 o 1
Processing.
6.4
- 1. 7 1.6 1.1 Transportation 0.1 5.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 i
Power Generation 1.7 1.8 1.5 3.5 1.3 TOTAL 8.7 19.6 14.7 14.6 B.3' 13 Includes nin'wg and processing; includes accidents only a
l b Includes both accidents and sadiogenic cancers l
Includes accidents, rtdiogenic cancers and other diseases c
d Based on means of ranges given Page A-2
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OCCUPATIONS DEATHS AND INJURIES j
PER GW(e)-YR i
OII.
DEATHS (Accidents and Diseases)
(Reference)
RISK SOURCE (1)
(6)
(7)
AVERAGE Fuel Extraction 0.15 a
'O.18-b 0.67 Processing Transportation 0.04 0.09 Power Generation 0.05
.0.03 TOTE 0.24 0.97 0.72 c 0.64 NON-FATE CASES Fuel Extraction 13.3 a 19.0 43.3 Processing Transportation 1.5 6.7 Power Generation 2.0 1.4 TOTE 16.7 70.5 51 c 45 Includes mining and processing; includes accidents only L.
a l.:
Based on means of ranges given
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Only totals for effect given, mean of range listed c
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..PUBLIC DEATHS AND INJURIES f
. ' ~ '
PER OW(e)-YR COAL 1
DEATHS-(Accidents and Diseases)
.j (Reference)
RISK SOURCE
( 2.)
(3)
(4)
(7)
AVERAGE f
L Fuel Extraction 5.50 be q
l4 Processing L
Transportation 0.36 a 0.58 b 1.21 b 0.93 Power Ceneration 7.53.
15.60 c 15.00 151.50 TOTAL 7.89 16.18 16.21 157.93 50 f
NON-FATAL CASES ji o
- t d
Fuel Extraction-Processing-Transportation 1
7b 7 b.
77 Power. Generation TOTAL 1
7 84 31
/
4 1
a Rail transportation assumed b Assumes 1/3 rail,1/3 barge and 1/3 truck transport 1
c Represents nean of ranges d No non-fatal effects listed 4
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Table 3-PN
.~
PUBLIO DEATHS AND INJURIES PER GW(e)-YR NUCLEAR I
DEATHS (Accidents'and Diseases)
(Reference)
EISK SOURCE (2)
(4)
(5)
(7)
AVERAGE Fuel Extraction 0.001 0.050 0.142 b Processing 0.370 a 0.013 0.204 Transportation-0.002 0.011 c
Power Generation 0.011 0.120 0.053 0.085 d TOTAL 0.385 0.194 0.399 0.085 0.256
'I NON-FATAL CASES 0.010 0.160 b e
Fuel Extraction Processing 0.135 0.003 0.280 Transportation 0.350 0.100 c
Power Generation 0.001 0.020 0.082 TOTAL 0.486 0.133 0.521 0.000 0.285 Pre?cminantly from assumed coal-energy used for U r.nrichment a
Represents mean of ranges; only cancer mortality included b
No transportation mortality risks presented c
d Public mortality risks only for generation No non-f atal ef fects listed e
Page A-5
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ll PUBLIC DEATHS AND INJURIES L
PER GW(e)-YR I.
DIL.
i DEATHS.
)
(Accidents and Diseaser)
)
I (Reference) i i
~ RISK SOURCE (6)
(*l) i Fuel Extraction Processing Transportation Power Generation 50.50 a.
TOTAL 50.50 50.50 a I
~. t
}
NON-FATAL CASES I
b Fuel Ext'raction b
Processing Transportation Power Generation TOTAL 0.0 0.0 l
1 a Presents a range of 1 - 100 fatalities, based on Reference (B) b No non-f tal effects listed j
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Page A-6
4 n g.w e
.c n
m 3 HEALTH RISK REFEREHCES l
" Health Effects of Alternative Means of Electrical Generation",
(1)
K. A. Hab and R. A, Schlenker, in " Population Dose Evaluation and Standardn fn Man and His Environment", IAEA-SM-184/18, 1976
" Comparative Health Effects of Generating Electricity at Erie (2)
Nuclear Plut and a Coal-Fired Alternative *, Testimony of Horton I.
Goldman, July 21, 1978, Ohio Public Service Commission
" Health Rit.ks of Coal Energy Technology", S. C. Harris, in (3)
" Health Elsks r.f En:rgy Technologies", C.C. Travis and E.E. Etnier, Eds.
1981, AAAS Selected Symposium 82, Westview Press, Boulder, CD
- Health and Environmental Risks of Energy Systems", L.D. Hamilton, (4) in " International Symposium on the Risks and Penefits of Energy Systems", I AEA-SH-273, April 1984
" Health kisits from the Nuclear Fuel Cycle", R.L. Gotchy, in (5)
" Health Risks of Energy Technologies", C.C. Travis and E.E. Etnier, Eds, I
1981, AAAS Selected Symposium E2, Westview Press, Boulder, CD
" Health Effects of Energy Production and Conversion", C.L. Ccmar (6) and L. A. Sagan, in " Annual Review of Energy",1976
" Health E'taluation of Energy-Generating Sources", Report of the
)
(7)
Council of Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association,.1978 "The Health and Environmental Effects of Electricity Generation -
(8)
A Preliminary Report", h.D. Hamilton, Ed., Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1974 I
" Energy in Transition, 1965 - 2010*,
Final Report of the Con:mit-(9) tee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems, rstienal Research Council", National Academy of Sciences, pp. 459 460, 1960 O
i l
l i
1 Page A-7
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