ML20246P037
| ML20246P037 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 03/17/1989 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8903280094 | |
| Download: ML20246P037 (20) | |
Text
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DUKE POWER GOMPANY l
P.O. Box 33189 CHARLOTTE. N.O. 28242 HALB.TUCKEH TELEPHONE
- ne rammiuser (704) 373-4tb31
- mies.aan emontiovion March 17, 1989 U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk l
Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Duke Power Company McGuire Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-369, 370
~k Gentlemen:
In a left"t dated November 2, 1988 the NRC staff indicated that deviations-3 to several Human Engineering Discrepancies (HED) we proposed did not have sufficient technical justification. Those deviations were described in my April 5, 1988 letter.
Thic matter was discussed with NRC staff personnel during a meeting' held at'the McGuire site on January 18, 1989. During the meeting,'we committed to providing an updated and more comprehensive justification for deviating i
from the original IEJ) associated with rearranging the annunciators;in the McGuire control room. This justification. was due to be submitted to the NRC within 60 days from the January 18th meeting date and is hereby provided as an attachment to this letter.
Very truly yours, l
(_.,
7 be:c /h, / c Hal B. Tucker JSW/353/lcs xc:
Mr. S. D. Ebneter Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. P.K. Van Doorn NRC Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station.
Mr. Darl Hood U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ih J' Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation r p' Mashington,;DC 20555 8903280094 890317 gDR ADOCK 05000369 PDC.
Q.
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McGuire Nuclear Station Annunciator HED Modifications Submittal l
I INTRODUCTION The McGuire Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) was conducted in three phases, (1) Review Phase, (2) Assessment Phase, and (3) Implementation Phase.
The DCRDR was completed in 1983.
During the Review Phase, Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) were identified from:
(1) a Task Analysis of Emergency Procedure Guidelines-and selected normal operating procedures, (2) an Operator Experience Review, consisting of a written questionnaire for all licensed operators and those in license training, and a one-on-one interview for a selected number of operators, and (3) a Control Room Survey using the NUREG-0700 guidelines as a reference.
During the Assessment Phase, each HED previously identified during the' Review Phase was evaluated to determine whether the HED was truly a' deficiency ("significant HED"), or merely a deviation from
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J a human factors guideline which, in the context of the operational task being performed, did not impede or degrade operator
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performance.
Recommended solutions were developed for significant
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HEDs, as well as, cost estimates fur the solutions.
It was also the intent of the DCRDR program to select cost-effective solutions, using a cost / benefit analysis, for implementation.
1 The Implementation Phase consisted of the detailed design of each i
l HED solution, and the installation of the HED solutions.
REVIEW PHASE RESULTS During the Review Phase of the DCRDR 51 HEDs were identified concerning the annunciator and status light systems.
The HEDs were identified as follows:
24 HEDs from Task Analysis 7 HEDs from the Operating Experience Review 20 HEDs from the Control Room Survey 51 HEDs Total i
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4 ASSESSMENT PHASE RESULTS
.Rather than individually assest. as.ch of the 51' identified HEDs, an administrative decision was made
..o perform a "special study" of the annunciator and status light systems to develcp a total solution package for review by the Review Team.
A study team,
.which included a McGuire Nuclear Station SRO, was formed.
.The study team decided to use a " clean sheet" approach to the review of the annunciators, and to develop a comprehensive rearrangement which would also include the resolution of the identified HEDs.
The solution package which the study team recommended went far beyond resolving tha 51 HEDs and included the rearrangement of 688 windows, the re-engraving of 429 tiles, conversion of some status windows to annunciator windows and vice versa, conversion of 2 status panels to annunciator panels, etc.
The solution package was reviewed by.the Review Team and a' cost estimate was prepared.
However, while it was the judgement of tha Review Team that some benefit would be gained from the comprehensive rearrangement, the benefit to operator performance could not be quantitatively assessed and a cost-benefit analysis could not be performed.
However, the Review Team decided to.
schedule the modifications even though an explicit level of benefit-could not be determined.
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STATUS OF MODIFICATIONS During the planning for the installation of the annunciator modifications, the operating staff at McGuire became concerned that the Review Team had underestimated the impact of such an extensive modification on an operating station in terms of the impact to operator training and performance.
In addition, the current plant environment was quite different from the environment during the DCRDR.
At the time of the DCRDR the plant was in its initial operation ? nase, operating experience was relatively low, many operator complaints were expressed concerning nuisance alarms, etc.
due to calibration and other instrument problems, and staffing roles and responsibilities for areas outside the Control Room, such
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as chemistry, etc. were being determined.
A review of the modifications to be implemented determined that many changes had already been implemented through other HEDs or through other plant changen and that these changes had alleviated most of the operator concerns expressed in the Operating Experience Review portion of the DCRDR.
In addition, many problems parceived during the Task Analysis and Control Room Survey portions of the DCRDR were due to the DCRDR reviewer not having had the final operating procedures which in some cases used different instrumentation or different steps to accomplish a functional task.
Considering these factors, a decision was made to return to the original HED scope and to individually evaluate the original 51 HEDs on the annunciator and status light systems.
A review team, l
including several members of the original DCRDR Review Team, was i
appointed and an assessment of the 51 HEDs was performed.
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v RESULTS OF REVIEW TEAM EVALUATION The results of the assessment of the 51 HEDs identified during the DCRDR for the annunciator and status light systems were as follows:
13 HEDs determined to be non-deficiencies 33 HED Solutions Completed, which break down as follows:
16 HEDs have been resolved by the installation of recommended HED solutions 2 HEDs were resolved by Plant Procedure Changes 15 HEDs were resolved by the installation of another HED's solution j
5 HED Solutions to be Implemented (plus a minor portion of 2 HEDs determined to be non-deficiencies) l l
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HEDS CONSIDERED TO BE NON-DEFICIENCIES l
Out of the 51 annunciator / status light system HEDs, 13 were determined to be non-deficiencies.
The following discussion provides a description of each of the 13 HEDs and the justification for the categorization as a non-deficiency 1
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HED M-1-0004 This HED was written during the Task Analysis walkthrough of the Westinghouse Reactor Trip / Safety Injection Procedure Guideline (E-0, step 4).
The reviewer, while verifying Safety Injection i
Actuation, noted that the Safety Injection Reactor Trip windows l
(3-6, 4-5, and 5-5) were not grouped together within the Reactor Trip First-Out Panel (FOl) on Control Board MCl, so that they could be easily identified from the location of the Safety Injection System on Control Board MCll.
JUSTIFICATION: The Westinghouse Procedure Guidelines, were used for Task Analysis at the time of the Control Room Review.
Plant specific procedures were not available at that time.
The response l
for Reactor Trip and Safety Injection were combined in the l
Westinghouse procedure, but are now separate plant procedures.
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Step 4 of the current Reactor Trip Procedure asks if Safety Injection is required, not if it is actuated.
The need for Safety j
i Injection is verified using the Pressurizer, Containment, and Main Steam Pressure indicators on the Control Boards.
If Safety Injection is required, the operator goes to the Safety Injection Procedure, where he is asked to verify Safety Injection actuation.
The operator can verify Safety Injection with the following indications:
(1) The SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status window (window 7-2 on status panel SI18).
(2) The correct valve alignment for Safety Injection on the ESF Monitor Light Panel.
(3) Indicator lights for the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pumps on the Control Boards (showing that the pumps are running).
(4) The SAFETY INJECTION FLOW indicators on Control Board MCll.
(5) The LOCA SEQUENCER ACTUATED TRAIN A(B) status lights (windows 4-1 and 4-2 on status panel SI14).
The alarms listed in the HED are for "First-out" use during a Reactor Trip, and are neither the primary nor only indic. tion of Safety Injection Actuation.
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HED M-1-0021 This HED was written during the Task Analysis Review of the Westinghouse Reactor Trip / Safety Injection Procedure Guideline (E-0, step 17).
It was noted that the CONTAINMENT PRESSURE, SPRAY, and ISOLATION annunciator windows (windows 1-8, 2-8, 3-8, 4-8, 5-8, and 6-8 on annunciator panel AD9) were located on Control Board l
MC7.
Control Board MC7 is a vertical panel located behind one end l
of benchboard MC11.
The CONTAINMENT PRESSURE indicators are located on the opposite end of MC11.
JUSTIFICATION: During a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) scenario, the various levels of protection engage automatically, based on CONTAINMENT PRESSURE:
CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ALARM OR ACTION l
l 5 PSIG CONTAINMENT.5 PSIG ALERT alarm 1 PSIG CONTAINMENT HI PRESSURE alarm Safety Injection actuation 3 PSIG CONTAINMENT HI-HI PRESSURE alarm Containment Spray actuation These alarms are located in a centralized location relative to the various systems that the operator must monitor (Reactor and Steam systems, Safety Injection, Containment Spray, etc.).
The CONTAINMENT PRESSURE indicators aid the operator in diagnosing the reasons for the alarm and in shutdown /cooldown of the plant, especially in a small-break LOCA scenario.
The indicators are located with and used in the operation of the Containment Spray System.
Close operator coordination between the alarms and the CONTAINMENT PRESSURE indicators is not necessary.
Considering the difference in the way the alarms and the indicators are used, it would not be beneficial to relocate either the alarms or the indicators.
HED M-1-0087 During the Task Analysis review of the westinghouse Reactor Trip / Safety Injection Procedure Guideline (E-0, step 10), the reviewer noted that the SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light is on Control Board MC1 (window 7-2 on status panel SIl8).
However the operator was at Control Board MC11.
JUSTIFICATION: During step 10 of the Westinghouse Procedure Guideline, the operator verifies Safety Injection valve alignment and if necessary, manually initiates Safety Injection from Control Board MCll.
However, as discussed in the response to HED M-1-0004, the SAFETY. INJECTION ACTUATED status light on Control Board MCl is not the only indication used to verify that Safety Injection has actuated.
The operator has SAFETY INJECTION PUMP RUNNING and SAFETY INJECTION FLOW indication on Control Board MCll, as well as the ESF Monitor Light Panel to assist in verifying valve alignment.
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a During manual actuation, the operator would not necessarily need to i
see the SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light since he knows he has actuated the system, but he would need to see the other i
indications which are on MC11 or nearby.
During normal operation, I
if Safety Injection actuates automatically, the operator can see the SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light from his normal workstation at MC1.
The operator will most likely not be in front of Control Board MCll at that time.
HED M-1-0094 This HED was written during the Task Analysis review of the Westinghouse Procedure Guideline for Reactor Trip Recovery (ES-0.1, step 14).
It was noted that the plant has a computer alarm only for NC OIL LEVEL.
The reviewer felt an annunciator alarm was needed in addition to the computer alarm.
JUSTIFICATION: Indication of NC OIL LEVEL is needed so that damage l
to the NC Pumps can be avoided.
The Operator Aid Computer has an l
alarm for this, which provides sufficient information.
A hard-wired alarm would not provide additional or more reliable information.
With a single NC OIL LEVEL alarm, the operator will still rely on the computer to determine if oil level is in alarm for an individual pump.
Plant experience has shown that sufficient oil remains in the oil reservoirs to allow pump operation several weeks after the low oil level alarm is received.
1 HED M-1-0389 This HED concerned alarms that appeared to the reviewer to be located on panels with unrelated alarms.
The list gives the panel where the alarm is located with the general system designation for the panel, and the window coordinates with the system the window belongs to:
ALARM PANEL / SYSTEM WINDOWS / SYSTEM AD1 Turbine &
5-1 H2-KG Panel Generator AD3 Main Steam 1-6 Plant Heating Boiler l
2-6, 3-6 CB Elec. Blr.
AD5 Feedwater 6-4, 7-4 SA Drn. Pot.
7-6, 8-6 Inner / Outer Doghouse 1-6, 2-6, 3-6, 4-6 Nitrogen supply for Main Steam Isolation Valves AD6 Reactor Coolant 1-11 Electrical system Page 7
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AD9 Cafety Injection, 2-7, 1-5, 2-5 Ice Condenser
- omponent Cooling, 1-6, 2-6, 3-6 Glycol system
& Residual Heat 4-6, 5-6, 6-6 Glycol' system Removal 3-7, 4-7 miscellaneous alarms 5-7, 6-7 Miscellaneous alarms (Variouc)
Containment Pressure &
Isolation alarms AD12 Nuclear Service (Various)
Includes Instrument &
Water & Liquid Station Air Waste AD13 Containment Spray &
(Various)
Miscellaneous alarms Containment Air Release / Addition JUSTIFICATION: (The alarms given on the HED are discussed here on a case-by_ case basis):
PANEL / ALARM (S)
AD1 / 5-1: H2 - KG PANEL TROUBLE This window alerts the operator to problems with hydrogen and stator water cooling on the j
main electrical generator.
Panel'AD1 contains alarms for abnormal turbine and electrical generator conditions; therefore, AD1 is'the logical location for this alarm.
AD3 / l-6: PLANT HEATING BOILER PANEL TROUBLE This annunciator was removed when the boiler was removed by an NSM modification (MG-11408).
AD3 / 2-6, 3-6: CB ELECT BLR A(B) PANEL TRdUBLE These windows alert the operator to problems with either Auxiliary Electric Boiler.
The windows are grouped off to the side of AD3, which contains alarms associated with the Main Steam System.
There are no other alarms for the Auxiliary Electric Boilers in the Control Room, and no dedicated system panel.
Although these alarms are not directly associated with the Main Steam System, they are in a reasonable location for their use and do not detract from the other alarms on the panel.
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AD5 / 6-4, 7-4: SA DRAIN POT SA/48 (49) LVL HI SA-48 and SA-49 provide Main Steam to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.
Although the system designation is SA, the alarms are logically associated with the Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA), and
<therefore, are located on the appropriate annunciator panel.
AD5 / 7-6, 8-6: INNER (OUTER) DOGHOUSE LEVEL HI These alarms are provided to alert the operator to a potential Main Feedwater line break in the Doghouses, therefore, their location on AD5 with other Main Feedwater system alarms is logical.
i AD5 / 1-6, 2-6: CF-35(30) S/G A(B) LO N2 PRESS 3-6, 4-6: CF-2 8 (2 6) S/G C(D) LO N2 PRESS 1
These alarms indicate an abnormal condition with the Main Feedwater Isolation valves, and are logically located on ADS, which contains Main Feedwater System alarms.
AD6 / l-11: IEVDA-1 POWERED FROM SSF This alarm refers to swapping control ability for the Train A Reactor Head Vents from the Control Room to the SSF.
Annunciator Panel j
AD6 is o the vertical board directly behind the Reactor Coolant System controls, therefore, the alarm is in the correct location.
AD9/2-7, 1-5, 2-5, These alarms are associated with the Ice 1-6, 2-6, 3-6, Condenser and Refrigeration / Glycol Systems.
4-6, 5-6, 6-6, They are all located on AD9, and do not have 3-7, 4-7, 5-7, a dedicated system panel, but are reasonably 6-7 located for their function.
AD9 also contains alarms for the Residual Heat Removal and Safety Injection systems, along with Containment Pressure and Containment Isolation alarms.
AD12/(Various AD12 contains alarms for the Instrument and windoaa)
Station Air systems (windows 1-1, 2-1, 3-1, 4-1, 5-1, 6-1).
These systems do not have dedicated system panels in the Control Room, but are reasonably located for their function, and do not detract from other alarms on AD12.
AD12 also contains the Nuclear Service Water and Refueling Water Storage system alarms.
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AD13/(Various AD13'contains HVAC Panel Trouble alarms windows)
(windows 1-1, 1-2, 1-3), Fire Protection D
system alarms (4-3, 5-3, 3-4, 4'4, 5-4, 5-6),
Operator Aid Computer alarms-(3-6, 4-6, 5-6, 6-6), and an alarm for the seismic event
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detection equipment (5-7).
These systems do
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not have dedicated system panels.in the
-Control Room, but are reasonably located for their function.
AD13 also contains the Waste Disposal system alarms.
HEDs M-1-0439 & M-2-0259 These HEDs (M-1-0439 for Unit 1 and M-2-0259 for Unit 2) concerned alarms that refer operators to other panels (panel trouble alarms) :
PANEL WINDOWS ENGRAVING-AD1 5-1 H2-KG PANEL TROUBLE AD2 2-7 PCS PWR SUPPLY FAILURE CONTROL CAB 3-7, 4-7 PCS PWR SUPPLY FAILURE PROT CAB 1(2) 5-7, 6-7 PCS PWR SUPPLY FAILURE PROT CAB 3 (4)
AD3 1-6 PLANT HEATING BOILER PNL TBL 2-6, 3-6 CB ELEC BLR A(B) PANEL TROUBLE AD8
'5-5, 5-6 HTR CONTROL PNL A(B) TROUBLE 6-2, 6-3 (Removed by NSM since DCRDR)
AD11 1-3, 4-3 ETA (ETB) 600V / 120V TROUBLE l
1-6, 4-6 D/G A(B) PANEL TROUBLE 8-5 120 VAC REG PWR.KRP TRBL AD13 1-1 HVAC PNL CRITICAL TROUBLE
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1-2 HVAC PNL TROUBLE' l
1-4 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CTRL PNL TRBL l
1-6, 1-8 (Removed by NSM since LCRDR) l 3-8, 4-8 (Removed by NSM since DCRDR) 5-8, 6-8 (Removed by NSM since DCRDR) l JUSTIFICATION: The alarms listed on the HED refer an operator to i
local panels to answer local alarms which are located with local controls.
The plant design philosophy was to not bring lower priority local alarms into the Control Room while minimizing the use of alarms referring the operator to local panels.
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____NN._---_'_____-----._.---___-----__--.-----__._----~_-
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HEDs M-1-0484 & M-2-0305 These HEDs (M-1-0484 for Unit 1 and M-2-0305 for Unit 2) concerned alarms that have multiple inputs and did not appear to have reflash capability.
The following alarms were listed on the HED as having multiple inputs:
PANEL WINDOWS AD1 5-1 AD2 2-1, 2-2, 3-7, 4-7, 5-7, 6-7 AD3 1-6, 2-6, 3-6 AD4 1-7 AD6 2-6, 2-10, 6-7, 6-9 AD7 4-2, 7-1, 7-2, 10-3, 11-3 AD8 5-5, 5-6, 6-5, 6-7 AD9 2-5, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4 AD10 1-1, 1-2 AD11 1-3, 1-6, 4-3, 4-6, 8-5, 10-8, 12-4 l
AD12 5-2, 5-3 AD13 1-5, 2-5, 1-1, 1-2, 1-4, 1-6, 1-8, 3-8, 4-8, 5-8, 6-8 SI2 4-1, 1-4, 2-4 JUSTIFICATION: (The alarms listed on the HED are categorized and discussed here by categories) :
AD2 / 2-1: P/R LOWER DET. HI FLUX DEV. OR AUTO DEFEAT AD2 / 2-2: P/R UPPER DET. HI FLUX DEV. OR AUTO DEFEAT These alarms indicate a condition of Quadrant Power Tilt in the reactor core.
This Technical Specification applies when the unit is greater than 50% power.
The alarm will also illuminate when < 50% power i9 indicate defeat of the alarm since it does not apply.
The l
operator can obtain positive indication of Stich condition exists by checking the bistables on the frent of the Nuclear Instrumentation Cabinets located in the rear of the Control Room.
AD2 / 3-7: PCS PWR SUPPLY FAILURE PROT CAB 1 AD2 / 4-7: PCS PWR SUPPLY FAILURE PROT CAB 2 AD2 / 5-7: PCS PWR SUPPLY FAILURE PROT CAB 3 AD2 / 6-7: PCS PWR SUPPLY FAILURE PROT CAB 4 These alarms indicate loss of power supply in the indicated cabinet.
Controlling channels are procedurally swapped out of this cabinet until the problem is corrected.
This receives immediate attention and is corrected quickly.
The chance and consequence of receiving multiple failures in one ca5inet is small.
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l AD6 / 6-9: NC-1,2, OR 3 FLOW DETECTED This detection is a single input detected from an acoustic monitor located on the common relief valve discharge pipe, downstream of where the lines tie together.
It detects flow in a pipe that is common to all three valves.
AD11 / 10-8: OSCILLOGRAPH 1 OR 2 TPOUBLE This alarm is indicated on both Unit 1 and 2, and is i
Unit specific, not having multiple inputs.
The I
engraving will be changed to " OSCILLOGRAPH 1 TROUBLE" for Unit 1, and " OSCILLOGRAPH 2 TROUBLE" for Unit 2 i
t (See "HEDs REMAINING TO BE IMPLEMENTED").
AD11 / 12-4: PCB 8,9,11, OR 12 FAULT TRIP This alarm indicates that a breaker has a fault trip.
j It is used with other indications to indicate why the I
breaker (s) have opened.
l AD13 / 1-4: SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CTRL PNL TRBL This alarm indicates Low Skimmer Loop Flow with the pump j
running, and not panel trouble.
The engraving will be j
changed to " FUEL POOL SKIMMER LOOP LOW FLOW" (See "HED l
REMAINING TO BE IMPLEMENTED").
J The following. alarms were found to have a single input, upon further review, therefore the HED is not applicable to these j
alarms.
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AD4 / 1-7, AD6 / 2-6, AD8 / 6-5, AD13 / 1-4 l
The following windows have been deleted by other modifications I
silice the time of the review:
AD3 / 1-6, AD8 / 6-7, AD13 / 1-6, 1-8, 3-8, 4-8, 5-8, 6-8 The following windows alert the operator to an abnormal level condition.
High and low levels cannot occur at the same time, therefore there is no need for the alarms to have reflash:
AD6 / 2-10, 6-7, AD12 / 5-2, 5-3, AD13 / 1-5, 2-5 AD7 / 4-2, 7-1, 7-2, 10-3, 11-3, SI2 / 4-1, 1-4, 2-4 AD9 / 2-5, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4 The following windows require and are confirmed to have reflash:
AD1 / 5-1, AD3 / 2-6, 3-6, AD8 / 5-5, 5-6, AD11 / 1-3, 1-6, 4-3, 4-6, 8-5, AD13 / 1-1, 1-2 i
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HEDs M-1-0495 & M-2-0333 These HEDs were written during a survey to determine Unit 1 versus Unit 2 differences.
The reviewer noted that the windows (listed below) were located on the Unit 1 Control Boards (Status Panel 1S117 on Control Board 1MC13).
No windows with equivalent messages were found on the Unit 2 Control Boards (Status Panel 2SIl7 on i
Control Board 2MC13).
l Status windows listed on the HED:
YM CELL A IN SERVICE YM CELL B IN SERVICE YM CELL A IN STANDBY YM CELL B IN STANDBY YM CELL A REGENERATING YM CELL B REGENERATING MAKEUP PUMPS LOW FLOW TRIP l
YM MAKEUP' PUMP A RUNN7NG YM MAKEUP PUMP B RUNNING 1
l JUSTIFICATION: The windows listed above are for the shared l
Demineralized, Water (YM) System, which supplies treated water for both plant units.
It is a plant convention for shared controls and
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i indications to be located on the Unit 1 control boards only.
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i dED M-2-0310 This HED was written during a survey to determine Unit 1 versus Unit 2 differences.
Status Panels 2SIl8 and 2SIl9 are L
" mirror-imaged" in location on Control Board 2MCl relative to the l
equivalent Unit 1 panels, ISI18 and 1SI19 on Control Board 1MCl.
JUSTIFICATION: The mirror-imaged location of these panels is necessary due to the control board shape in this area, and the size of the status panels.
The layout of the windows within the panels, however, is not mirror-imaged.
The difference in location does not constitute a difficulty for the operator because the windows within I
the panels are not mirror-imaged, and the panels themselves are easily identified by their size, shape, and labeling.
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HED M-2-0316 l
l This HED was written Curing a survey to determine Unit 1 versus l
1 Unit 2 differences.
It was noted that a status window for NR CHILLER COMP A LOCAL CTRL was on Unit 1 only (status panel 15I18, window 1-4).
JUSTIFICATION: The Boron Thermal Regeneration System (:NR) is a shared system.
As noted in the preceding discussion for PED M-1-0310, it is a plant convention for shared controls and indications to be located on the Unit 1 Control Boards only.
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HED SOLUTIONS COMPLETED l
Out of the 51 annunciator / status system HEDs, 33 have solutions that have already been implemented in the plant.
A brief summary of these HEDs and solutions are included below:
1 HEDs RESOLVED BY INSTALLATION OF RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS:
HEDs M-1-0046, M-1-0083, M-1-0084, M-1-0130, M-1-0485, M-2-0306 These HEDs involved wording discrepancies on various windows.
The windows were re-engraved to correct the discrepancies by NSMs MG-12126 and MG-22126, which were implemented during the 1988 refueling outages.
HEDs M-1-0252 and M-1-0304 These HEDs involved engraving size and readability discrepancies on various windows.
The windows were re-engraved to correct the discrepancies by NSMs MG-12126 and MG-22126, implemented during the 1988 refueling outages.
HEDs M-1-0437 and M-1-0442 l
These HEDs involved windows having non-standard abbreviations or non-standard engraving format.
The windows were re-engraved using standardized abbreviations (the same f
l abbreviations used for procedure writing) and standardized format (number of lines on the windows and characters per line).
NSMs MG-12126 and.MG-22126 were used to implement the HED solutions during the 1988 refueling outages.
l HEDs M-1-0251 and M-1-0569 These HEDs were concerned with the alarm prioritization scheiae installed during the earlier Preliminary Control Room Review.
The colcr-coded windows used provided poor contrast and were l
hard to read.
In addition, the prioritization was static l
rather than dynamic, and did not sufficiently aid the operators l
during changing plant conditions.
The color coding was removed l
under NSMs MG-12126 and MG-22126 during the 1988 refueling outages.
HED M-2-0312 This HED concerned differences in alarm wording between Unit 1 and Unit 2.
The differences were corrected by implementation of NSMs MG-12126 and MG-22126 during the 1988 refueling outages.
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4 HEDs M-1-0566 and M-1-0568 These HEDs involved alarms that at the time of the DCRDR, were constantly on when the plant was operating in the normal state, and were considered " nuisance" alarms by the operators.
Many of these problems were startup related, and have been resolved through field investigation, repair and/or modification as required. The alarms have been reviewed again, and it has been verified that the problems cited in the HED have been corrected, j
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HED M-1-590 l
This HED involved alarms that directed an operator to a plant location outsiae the Control Room to take corrective action.
The concern was that there may be insufficient time to respond l
l to the problem.
Action taken to solve this HED is summarized l
below:
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ALARM OR PANEL SOLUTION NC LOOP RTD BYPASS FLOW The method of measuring NC Loop temperatures has been changed.
The RTD Bypass loop and this alarm have been deleted.
Diesel Generator Panel The Diesel Generator alarms are now on the computer, but were not at the time of the DCRDR.
Fire Detection Panel The Fire Detection Panel has been moved to the Control Room since the DCRDR.
H2-KG Panel The H2-KG Panel is in the basement of the Turbine Building.
From plant operational experience, there has been no problems with response time for answering alarms on this panel.
VL Vibration Panel The VL Vibration Panels are located l
inside lower containment in the VL l
fan rooms.
Immediate access to these panels is not necessary.
Accelerometer readings can be made cutside of the Reactor Building.
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f HEDs RESOLVED BY PLANT PROCEDURE CHANGES:
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HED M-1-0426 This HED concerned HVAC status windows that were badly yellowed I
at the time of the DCRDR.
The yellowed windows have been l
replaced, and are changed as necessary during normal plant maintenance.
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HED M-1-0567 1
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This HED concerned operator comments that the annunciator alarm j
audible volume was too loud and that confusion could result 1
between units.
During the Preliminary Control Room Review, j
annunciator souad levels were set at 7 decibels above l
background, however, no uniform measuring criteria was established.
Station Directive 3.1.4 has been changed to i
i maintain the audible sound level of all Control Room l
annunciators at least 7 decibels above background sound level, j
measured at a distance of 5 feet from the annunciator.
The 3
distance criteria assures that the annunciator sound level i
requirements are met in a uniform and controlled fashion.
This l
change has satisfied the operator's concerns about annunciator l
volume level.
The potential confusion between units is lessened by the controlled volume level, because the sound is more directional.
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HEDs RESOLVED BY INSTALLATION OF ANOTHER HED SOLUTION:
HEDs M-1-0022 and M-1-0023 These HEDs concerned the MAIN STEAM ISOLATION controls that were located on Control Board MCll.
Associated indication is on Control Board MCl. The proposed solution for these HEDs l
called for the addition of status lights to the vertical panels l
behind benchboard MCll, where the controls were located. The controls were relocated to the Main Steam System, on Control a
Board MC2, by the implementation of the solution for HED l
M-1-0354 (implemented by NSMs MG-11544 and MG-20454).
Control Board MC2 is adjacent to and easily visible from Control Board MC1.
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HEDs M-1-0023 and M-1-0024 These HEDs concerned the CONTAINMENT SPRAY INITIATE controls i
that are located on Control Board MC11.
Associated indication is located on Control Board MCl.
The proposed solution for ther,e HEDs called for the ' addition of status lights to the vertical panel behind benchboard MC11, where the controls are located.
During the implementation of HED M-1-0354 (implemented by NSMs MG-11544 and MG-20454), indicator lights displaying the Containment Spray System status, were added to the CONTAINMENT SPRAY RESET controls.
The added indicator lights, located directly above the INITIATE controls on Control Board MCll, give the operator the necessary system status without relying on the MC1 indication, HEDs M-1-0098, M-1-0099, M-1-0100, M-1-0101 These HEDs involved the PRESSURIZER and STEAM LINE SAFETY INJECTION BLOCK controls, located on Control Board MC11.
l Associated indication is located on Control Board MCl.
The l
proposed solution for these HEDs called for the relocation of status lights from Control Board MC1 to the vertical panel behind benchboard MC11, where the controls are located.
During the implementation of HED M-1-0354 (implemented by NSMs MG-11544 and MG-20454), indicator lights giving the necessary status, were added directly to the controls.
HEDs M-1-0110, M-1-0120, M-1-0122, M-1-0125, M-1-00PS, M-1-0086 j
These HEDs involved the SAFETY INJECTION RESET, CONTAINMENT SPRAY RESET, PHASE A and B CONTAINMENT ISOLATION controls, located on control board MC11.
The proposed solutions for the HEDs called for relocating status or annunciator windows to the vertical panels behind benchboard MC11.
During the implementation of HED M-1-0354 (NSMs MG-11544 and MG-20454),
indicator lights giving the necessary status of the functions, were added directly to the controls.
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l HEDs REMAINING TO BE IPSLEMENTED Out of the 51 annunciator / status HEDs, 5 complete HED solutions and a minor portion of two other HED solutions remain to be implemented.
These HED solutions will be implemented in the plant by the end of the 1EOC6 refueling outage (approximately March, 1990).
A brief discussion of the HEDs and the proposed solutions are included below:
l HEDs M-1-0438 and M-2-0258 1
The alarms listed on these HEDs have two opposite conditions displayed on the same window (i.e. HI/LO, etc.).
There is a suall potential for confusion, with the opposite conditions displayed, although sufficient indication exists on the Control Boards to provide the operator with the necessary input for analyzing the alarms.
To avoid any confusion, however, the alarms will be re-engraved using " ABNORMAL", rather than "HI/LO".
HEDs M-1-0484 and M-2-0305 Two windows listed on each of these HEDs (4 windows total) will be re-engraved to clarify their nomenclature (refer to these HEDs in the section "HEDs CONSIDERED TO BE NON-DEFICIENCIES").
HED M-1-0019 This HED involves 6 Residual Heat Removal System windows.
Two of the windows are located on annunciator panels AD8, and 4 of the windows are located on the adjacent panel, AD9.
The 2 windows on AD8 will be relocated to AD9 so that all 6 alarms will be grouped together.
l HED M-1-0042 This HED involves 3 Pressurizer Relief Tank alarm windows that are not grouped together within panel AD6.
The annunciator windows l
will be re-located so that all 3 windows will be grouped together.
l HED M-2-0321 This HED was written during a survey to determine any Unit 1 versus Unit 2 differences.
The window arrangement for panels 2AD2 and 2AD13 differ slightly from 1AD2 and 1AD13.
These minor arrangement differences will be corrected.
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I MCGUIRE SIMULATOR CHANGE AND SCHEDULE The new McGuire Control Board Simulator, ordered several years ago, was supplied with the anticipated " clean sheet approach" to annunciator arrangement.
The decision to return to the original HED scope was made too late to prevent delivery with that arrangement of windows.
The simulator will be modified to agree with the window arrangement used in the plant and to include the HED modifications remaining to be implemented by the end of 1989.
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