ML20244D735
| ML20244D735 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 03/10/1986 |
| From: | Perrotti D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235S055 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-346 NUDOCS 8603140419 | |
| Download: ML20244D735 (11) | |
Text
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March 10,1986 MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Lazarus Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Region I FROM:
Donald J. Perrotti Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement
SUBJECT:
SEABROOK EXERCISE REPORT Enclosed is nty final report on the assigned activities at the operations support center during the Seabrook exercise on February 26, 1986. There are minor changes to the infonnation provided to you during the exercise.
The items regarding Team 9 dose estimate and use of respirators have been deleted. One item related to OSC staffing levels illustrated in the emergency plan and ER-3.5 has been added. This report has been sent electronically by 5520.
If you need additional information, please call me on 492-4865(FTS).
prisinal signea by:
Donald J. Perrotti Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosure:
Input to Seabrook Exercise Report DISTRIBUTION w/o enclosure:
DISTRIBTUION w/enclosuref:
RHVollmer, IE KEPerkins, IE DJPerrott IE JGPartlow, IE JAAxelrad, IE 6-BKGrimes, IE DBMatthews, IE arny,R1 ELJordan, IE CRVan Niel, IE VNerses NRR SASchwartz, IE DEPER R/F EPB R/F DCS EWBrach, EDO PB/IE rrotti:sc Pg/86
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ENCLOSURE Input to Seabrook Exercise Inspection Report Operations Support Center (OSC)
The OSC is located on the first floor of the Administration and Service Building.
The facility was laid out per Figure 6.6 of the enrargency plan. The OSC was activated and operational within 30 minutes of the declaration of the Alert condition. There was no evidence of pre-staging OSC personnel. There was no prompting by controllers observed during the exercise.
Plant status briefings to the OSC staff by the OSC Coordinator were timely, thorough and accurate. The intra-OSC public address syste:n was very effective in providing clear information to all areas of the OSC. The OSC Coordinator maintained continuous contact with the Site Emergency Director at the Technical Support Center (TSC) through a dedicated OSC Consnunicator.
Key personnel arriving at the OSC signed in on the OSC Tag Board.
It was noted subsequent to the exercise that the OSC Tag Board, Figure 8.5 of the emergency plan (Amendment 56) and Figure 5 of ER-3.5 (Rev. 01) are not consistent with regard to the OSC staffing levels.
OSC personnel used approved procedures.
The OSC Coordinator and Radiological Controls Coordinator (RCC) maintained logs. Status boards contained accurate infonnation and they were kept current.
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l l The OSC Coordinator was knowledgeable of his duites and maintained excellent enntrol of all OSC activities. Teams were thoroughly briefed and de-briefed I
for each activity. Approximately 18 teams were dispatched from the OSC.
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Observations were made of the fire brigade team, PASS team, CBS pump survey j
l team and containment air sampling team. All observed teams appeared to be knowledgeable of their duties and followed OSC procedures, except for one member of the CBS pump survey team (Team 2) who violated " Steps Off Pad" procedures.
The HP technician on the team provided corrective actions in this instance.
It was noted that ER-3.2 (Rev. 02) does not contain a current copy of ER-3.28,
" Emergency Team Briefing / Debriefing Fom." However, loose copies of the updated Form ER-3.2B were used during the exercise. Form ER-3.2B is discussed further below.
Personnel radiation exposure was controlled under ER-4.3.
Emergency dose limit extensions were obtained prior to the teams' departure from the OSC, as appro-priate. Accumulated radiation exposure was logged in on ER-4.3D, " Emergency Exposure Tracking Form." However, the dose of 10 mrem received by Team 2 was not logged in on ER-4.38.
ER-3.2 and -4.3 do not clearly specify how doses received by team members are to be transferred to Form ER-4.3B when radiation work permits (RWPs) are not used.
It was observed that extremity dosimetry was not considered for Team 9 even though the simulated sample dose rate was 40 R/hr on contact. The inspector noted that ER-3.28, " Emergency Team Briefing Fom",
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I does not have provisions for the RCC to specifically indicate extremity dosim-l etry. The form contains check off spaces for TLDs and SRPDs only.
It was also 1
rsted the ER-4.3, " Radiation Protection During Emergency Conditions", does not specifically address extremity dosimetry.
Habitability checks of the OSC were made frequently. Noise level was generally at a low level Correnunications between the OSC and the TSC and control room were satisfactory. The OSC appeared to be properly equipped to perform its functions during this scenario.
Just prior to the termination of the exercise 1
at 1545, the OSC Coordinator discussed long-term recovery actions with the OSC staff. About 15 minutes earlier, the OSC and TSC discussed shift relief for long-terin contingency.
Based on the above observations, the following items should be considered to improve the emergency preparedness program:
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Review Figure 8.5 (plan), Figure 5 (ER-3.5) and OSC Tag Board for consistency.
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I Stress to all OSC personnel the proper use of Step-Off Pads.
Incorporate the updatt d copy of Forin ER-3.2B into ER-3.2.
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. Provide specific instructions in ER-3.2 and -4.3 regarding transferring radiation doses received by the emergency teams to Forn ER-4.38.
Provide a check-off space for extremity dosimetry on Forn ER-3.28.
Also provide for consideration of extremity dosimetry in ER-4.3 (See ER-3.2 and -6.2, which both address' use of extremity TLDs).
Persons Contacted G. St. Pierre Unit Supervisor (OSC Coordinator)
W. Cash, HP Supervisor (Radiation Controls Coordinator)
T. Ferrando, Consultant, Power Mgt. Services (Lead OSC Controller) 27 Inspection Onsite Hours I
l Attached Chronology of Events
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. Chronology 0730 Arrived at OSC, controllers in place 0811 Exercise announcement, Alert declared,1st team response personnel directed to assigned area, non-assigned personnel to assembly area.
Message was repeated 0812 OSC personnel started checking in 0819 OSC Coordinator directed all incoming personnel to sign in on accountability listing 0824-Minimum staffing for OSC completed 0825 Plant Announcement (PA) concerning fire brigade to report to Chlorine Building 0828 PA - Message 1-1 0829 First habitability check made of OSC 0835 Plant update to OSC staff 0840 OSC completely operational 0848 Plant. update to OSC staff 0850 Noted that OSC 10g is being maintained per ER-3.2 0853 Plant update to OSC staff 0854 OSC Coordinator requested info from TSC on future needs 0855 TSC requested spare air bottles to be carried to Chlorine B1dg. - OSC l
Coordinator requested wind direction, health hazards, etc, i
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.. 0904 TSC cancelled its 0855 request 0907 Instruction from TSC - Chlorine Bldg. buttoned up, nobody allowed access 0908 Plant update to OSC staff 0914 Team 2 briefed by alternate Control Room Operator 0917 Followed Team 2 into plant to survey CBS pump 0921 Team 2 arrived at CBS pump room - HP tech checked direct rad and spreadable contamination levels 0924 Team 2 waiting on scenario catch-up 0928 Inspector checked cal sticker and source check tag on radiation survey meter - no anomalies 0930 Controller provided info to Team 2 on explosion of junction box and fire at CBS pump 0933 Team 2 contacted OSC, via radio, to relay info on radiation levels and fire conditions 0937 Team 2 arrived back at step off pad (SOP).
First maintenance person violated S0P procedure - HP tech corrected 0939 While at SOP, Site Area Emergency was declared 0940 Fire team arrived at S0P 0942.
Followed fire team into plant - noted that fire team was fully. suited up, including SCBA. Team checked operation of SCBAs l
0945 3 fire team members at top of stairvell, 2 other continue down to scene of fire L__-----_____-------..-
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v, 0948 Arrived at scene of fire 0953:
Fire out, fire team leader posted one member for firewatch for 30 minutes, others to return to OSC 0957 Relief fire watch arrived at scene - was briefed by fire team leader 1000 Fire team leader notified OSC of fire watch f
1014 Heard radio message - normal level in RHR vault; fire watch instructed to return to OSC 1026 Inspector arrived at OSC, observed OSC log being maintained 1026 Plant update to OSC staff 1027 RCC got met update from HP Coordinator at TSC 1029 PA - reactor trip 1031 Plant update to OSC staff 1032 NRC Region I representative arrived at OSC 1036 Observed OSC Coordinator planning to pre-stage teams to expedite repair / corrective actions 1042 Team 5 briefed to go to valve CBS-V-11 1043 RCC gives update to NRC - RI rep.
1043 General emergency declared 1043 Incoming info - main steam line increase to 10 R/hr 1047 RCC detemines to send monitoring team to site boundary for rad survey 1051 Team 5 dispatched to Vault A l
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1 '1058 Plant update to OSC staff J
i 1101 Some' confusion at OSC as to whether valve CBS-V-11 is to j
be opened or closed l
> 1102 Team 5 instructed to return to OSC j
1103 OSC habitability check performed 1108 OSC Coordinator gave instructions to Team 5 on valve ~ CBS-V-11 1111
_ OSC Coordinator gave update to NRC - RI rep 1113 Team 5 reported rad level of 10 R/hr on valve 1114 Team 5 instructed to leave the valve area, return to OSC staying _ clear of personnel access hatch q
1 1120 Inquiry about PASS sample - not available until RHR is operating j
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1121 Team 7 reports on status of switch gear - OSC Coordinator sends Team 7 to check on breaker for valve CBS-V-11 1121 Report from TSC - RHR in service i
1122 Plant update to OSC staff 1126 Further instructions to' Team 7 on breaker for valve CBS-V-11 1132 Team 6 returned to OSC 1137 Observed RCC considering rad hazards on containment air sample (Team 8) 1145 Team 8 briefed on cont. air sample hazards - avoid " West pipe chase".
Team 8 also received inst. on operation of explosive atmosphere monitor by fire team member due to potential presence of high hydrogen gas concentration in containment / air sample
.. 1150 Team 9 briefed and dispatched from OSC to attempt opening CBS-Y-11 1150 OSC habitability check completed 1153 Followed Team 8 - going to " East pipe chase" for containment air sample 1156 Arrived at sampling station, general area 100 mr/hr, contact reading 40 R/hr 1159 Team 8 in hydrogen analyzer room - general area 4 R/hr 1205 Sample obtained - Team 8 returned to Chem Lab 1238 PA on Train A, primary containment cooling water 1244 Plant update to OSC staff 1247 Reviewed Team 8 Emergency Team Briefing Form - no extremity dosimetry specified 1303 Reviewed ER-4.38, Emergency Exposure Tracking Form. Noted Team 2 had not logged in 10 mr dose 1316 Plant update to OSC staff 1306 PA - personnel stay clear of primary auxiliary building 1325 Plant update to OSC staff 1338 Followed Team 13 - PASS sample 1348 Arrived at PASS station, about 100 mr/hr general area 1403 PASS team checked rad levels 1404 Chem tech checked pocket dosimeter i
1410 Obtained10ccsample(simulated) 1430 Returned to OSC
.., + '. 1439 Plant update to OSC staff 1459 Team 18 preparing for survey of turbine hall 5
1501 Incoming info - cont. monitor down to 2x10 R/hr 1505 TSC &~ 0SC Coordinators discuss shift relief 1534 Plant update to OSC staff
-1544 Plant update to OSC staff, OSC Coordinator called key players to discuss recovery actions 1545 PA - exercise teminated 1552 OSC Coordinator continues to discuss long tem recovery with OSC staff
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