ML20244D097

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Proposed Tech Spec Pages 1-2,3/4 6-1,3/4 6-23,3/4 6-22 & B 3/4 6-4
ML20244D097
Person / Time
Site: McGuire, Mcguire  
Issue date: 04/05/1989
From:
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20244D078 List:
References
NUDOCS 8904210145
Download: ML20244D097 (6)


Text

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e 1

l INDEX l'

I 1

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

SECTION PAGE 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT Containment Integrity.....................................

3/4 6-1 Containment Leakage.......................................

3/4 6-2 TABLE 3.6-1 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS.............

3/4 6-5 Containment Air Loc'ks.....................................

3/4 6-10 Internal Pressure................................

3/4 6-12 Air Temperature...........................................

3/4 6-13 Containment Vessel Structural Integrity...................

3/4 6-14 Reactor Building Structurai Integrity.....................

3/4 6-15

, Annulus Ventilation System................................

3/4 6-16

)

Containment Ventilation System...........................

3/4 6-18 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS Containment Spray System..................................

3/4 6-20 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES..............................

3/4 6-22 e

m?N.o 2 - CrT L;;n J n- - -_.i 2," M r 9

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL Hydrogen Monitors.........................................

3/4 6-31 Electric Hydrogen Recombiners.............................

3/4 6-32 Hydrogen Control Distributed Ignition System..............

3/4 6-33 l

-3/4.6.5 ICE CONDENSER Ice Bed...................................................

3/4 6-34 8904210145 890405

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DEFINITIONS CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY UAIdf8. M id).5 M N OWTRCLS AJR.S()N1l~

1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

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a.

All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions

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4 are either:

1)

Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic.

4 isolation valve system, or OPEFATo/t Ac,T/y/ Ad4/N6r #64/003 WHEN CWtntNt%NT* fSoOTTto/J VMts flRY 06 OPbVG 2)

Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves. secured in their closed positions, esusp>es.

p rided ia Teble 3.5-2 ;f S u iffcet1c. 3.S.3.

b.

All equipment hatches are closed and sealed, c.

Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3, d.

The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2, and The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, e.

bellows, or 0-rings) is OPERABLE.

CONTROLLED LEAKAGE

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1.8 : CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals.

CORE ALTERATION

' 1. 9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component

'within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement ~of a component to a safe conservative position.

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 1.10 -DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microcurie / gram) which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132. I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, " Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites."

E - AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY 1.11.I shall be the average (weighted in proportion to the concentration of each radionuclides in the sample) of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration (MeV/d) for the radionuclides in the sample.

n.d Amendment No.

(Unit 2) 1 McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 1-2 Amendment No.

(Unit 1) 4/13/83 l

(OR OPGRATott ACTiobl Am PERiobS c<J+1EA) cojyygINMf)77 i

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{4. 6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DER Ab yjgg 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT f

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

,,,) M LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

3 ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

9 a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations

  • not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions' e e u pc"id:d in tom ; 3.0 2 ef-

-SRci fieo Li c., 3. *h.

3 b.

By verifying that each. containment air lock is in compliance with Specification 3.6.1.3; and c.

After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except the containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seal with gas at P, 14.8 psig, and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for,these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2d.

for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than 0.60 L *a

  • Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and the annulus and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position.

These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN e> cept that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

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y.9 ff Amendment No..

(Unit 2)

McGUI E - LTf4 TS 1 db'/4 f4/-t/" 3/4 6-1 Amendment No 2,(Unit 1) 10/5/84

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~ CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS' 1 (see ) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

)

4.6.3.2 Each isol.ation valve -:pe:i'ied 4-T d e 2.E 0 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during'the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least'once.per.18 months by:

c-J

, c.3 s,

a.

Verifying'that on a Phase A Containment Isolation test signal, each Phase A isolation valve actuates to its isolation' position, b.

Verifying that on a Phase B Containment Isolation test signal, each Phase B isolation valve actuates.to its isolation position, and Verifying that on a Containment Radioactivity-High tes't signal, each c.

purge and exhaust valve actuates'to'its isolation position.

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power operated or. automatic valve et

a shall be determined to be within its limit.when tested pursuant to Speci ficationL.4. 0. 5.

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dO'NTAINMENTSYSTEMS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES k"""i k

L LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION u

Thecontainmentisolationvalves:pect:d'h.Tek3.02-shallbe v

3.6.3 OPERABLE with isolation times

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APPLICABILITY:n MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

TO $6 RE@l#4D ACTION 1 With one or more N isolation valve (s) ;ni'irKnb= 25-2 inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:

W a.

Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or b.

Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or s

c.

Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or

{ s d

Be in at least H0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS EncH 4.6.3.1 -The isolation valve / cp i# icd " T:b'- ?.6-2 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.

1 l

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 6-22 A/16A>UMEAIT (U/JIT I)

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS r

BASES 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT SPRAY 5(STEM The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capacility will be available in the event of a LOCA.

The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the i

event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 thru 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA. p

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3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL a

The PERABILITY of. the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammcble limit during post-LOCA conditions, Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with:

(1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment.

These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA", March 1971.

The OPERABILITY of at least 64 of 66 igniters ensures that the Distributed Ignition System will maintain an ef fective coverage throughot t the containment.

This system of igniters will initiate combustion of any significant amount of hydrogen released after a~ degraded core accident.

This system is to ensure burning in a controlled manner as the hydrogen is released instead of allowing f'

it to be ignited at nigh concentrations by a random ignition source.

I Containment isolation valves are listed in FSAR Table 6.2.4-1. Those valves with a required isolation time have a value given in the " MAX ISOLATION TIME (SEC)" column. Penetration test type (type B, type C, or None) is listed in the " TEST TYPE" column of the table for each containment penetration. Cgfgfg 7o 7gg g ACCoRMAJE G)/TH M 850 59, McGUIRE - UNITS i and 2 3 3/4 6-4 ggg gg }

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