ML20244A645

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Requests Change to Tech Spec,App a to Ol,Modifying Surveillance Requirement 4.9.D Due to Incorporation of Redundant Breaker on Output of Reactor Protection Sys Motor Generator Sets
ML20244A645
Person / Time
Site: Hatch Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 05/22/1979
From: Whitmer C
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TAC-43083, TAC-43202, TAC-43282, NUDOCS 7905300006
Download: ML20244A645 (5)


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May 22, 1979 D ""ctor of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

1. . S . Nuclear Regulatory Corimission Washington, D. C. 20555 l

NRC DOCKET 50-321 OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57 l

l EDWIN I. MTCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 l REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) MOTOR GENERATOR SETS l

Gentlemen: i Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90 as required by 10 CFR 50.59(c)(1), Georgia Power Company hereby proposes a change in the Technical Specification l (Appendix A to the Operating License). The proposed change would modify j Surveillance Requirement 4.9.D due to the incorporation of redundant  ;

breakers on the output at the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor  !

Generctor Se ts. The surveillance frequency would be changed to once per operatia;; cycle. The installed breakers eliminate the nead for conitoring output voltage and f requency every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, since these breakers provide l

redundant over-voltage, under-voltage and under-frequency protection.

The change requested for Technical Specification 3.9.D adds o l specification which will limit the time that the RPS distribution panel l 1A and/or 1B can be fed from the alternate power supply.

The Planr Review Board and the Safety Review Board have reviewed and approved t.cese proposed changes to the Unit 1 Technica: Specifications and have determined that they do not involve an unreviewed safety question.

, These changes to the Technical specifications do not increase any existing ,

modes of failure because the breakers which were installed are redundant and seismically qualified and provide additional over-voltage, under-voltage and under-frequency protection to the RFS; therefore, the existing modes of failure have actually been decreased due to these changes. No 1 new modes of failure are 1itroduced from this change, just added protection.

No saf ety limits or setpoicts are being changed and the margin of safety has not been reduced. The addition of these breakers adds redundancy to the RPS protective instrumentation and additional assurance of safe operation.

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1 Director of !!velear Reactor Re;;ulation IJ. 5. Nuclear Regulatory Cor:nission May 22. 1979

,Page No l T.nclosed with the proposed changes are instruccietis f or the incorporation- . t9 of the proposed revision into the Technical Specifications.  ! . ']

Yours very truly, a

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. Chas. F. L'hitmer . .

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s Swrn to and subscribed before me this 22nd day of May,1979.

Notary Public, GeoriNotat"pt Entific My Commissic, E- . 29,1931 ec: Pr. Ruble A. Thomas a.

\ s' Geor;;e F. Trowbridge, Esquire -

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ATTACHMENT 1

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NRC DOCKET 50-321 1 OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57 EDWIN I. HATCH NCCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATI0hl Pursuant to 10 CFR 170.12 (c), Georgia Power / Company has evaluated the attached proposed amendment to Opera:ing License DPR-57 and have determined that: L k

a) The proposed amendment does not require the evaluation of a new Safety Analysis Report or rewrite of the facility license; b) The proposed amendment'does not contain several complex issues,.

does not involve ACRS review, or does not require an environmental impact statement;

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c) The proposed amendment does not involve a complex issue, an environ-mental issue or more than one safety issue; d) The preposed amendment does involve a single issue; namely, the Hatch-1 Technical Specification changes for surveillance requirements for Reactor ' Protection Systems Motor Generator Set instrumentation, e) the proposed amendment is therefore a Class III amendment.

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I ATTACFJfENT 2 NaC DOCKET 50-321 OPERATING LICINSE DPR-57 EDb'IN I.1MICH hTCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 PROPOSED CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The proposed change to Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Operating

1 License DPR-57) would be incorporated c.s follows:

Remove Page Insert Page 3.9-6a 3.9-6a l' .

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LIM 1 TING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.9.D , Reactor _ Protection System MG 4.9.D Reactor Protection System MG ggts Sets

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Applicability Applicability The limiting conditions for operation apply The surveillance requirements apply to the reactor protection system to the periodic testing requirements instrumentation, of the reactor protection system in-strumentation.

Objective: Objective:

2 The objective of the limiting condition The objective of the surveillance re-of operation is to assure that failure quirements is to verify that the RPS of the motor-generator set voltage instrumentation MG sets are within- )

regulating circuitry will not result their normal range to preclude )

in damage to the reactor protection sustainnd over-voltage or under- I system components with an attendant voltage conditions that might ccm-potential loss or capability to scram promise the capability of the RPS

the plant. from performing its intended safety ,

function, i

Specifications: Specifications:

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i If in service the RPS instrumentation MG The specified RPS instrumentation MG i set 1A and/or 1B voltage will be within sets lA and 1B shall be determined I the range of 108 to 132 VAC. operable:

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1. With . RPS instrumentation MG set 1A a. At least once per operating cycle l and/or 1B voltage outside the range and prior to resetting the i of 108 to 132 VAC, demonstrates Reactor Protection System Trips l the OPERABILITY of all equipment which following a seismic event of l

could have been subjected to the Operational Basis Earthquake l abnormal voltage for all Class IE intensity, by demonstrating the J

loads connected to the associated OPERABILITY of RPS instruments- i bus (es) by performance of a CHANNEL tion MG set.1A and 1B over-FUNCTIONAL TEST, as required, voltage, under-voltage and under-  !'

within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. f requency protective instruments-tion by performance of a CHANNEL

2. With RTS instrumentation MG set lA CALIBRATION including simulated l and/or IB inoperable, restore the autotatic actuation of the pro-inoperable MG set (s) to OPERABLE tective relays, tripping logic l status eithin 30 minutes or remove and output circuit breakers and the inoperable MG set (s) from service. verifying the following setpoints:
3. With the RPS MC set 1A and/or 13 1. Over-voltage < 132 VAC, inoperable, the RPS distribution panel 1A and/or 1B may be fed from 2. Under-voltage 1 108 VAC, and the alternate power supply for a peried not to exceed 30 days. Once 3. Under-frequency 1 57 Hz.

this period of 30 days is attained, restore the RPS distribution panel to normal power or manually scram that channel of RPS.

3.9-6a '

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