ML20238D300

Affidavit of Bs Norris.* Affidavit of Bs Norris Re Exams Administered to DW Held on 860729.DW Held Performance on Three Scenarios Demonstrated Insufficient Knowledge of Tech Specs & Proper Usage of Procedures.W/Certificate of Svc

ML20238D300
Person / Time
Site:	05560402
Issue date:	12/10/1987
From:	Norris B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20238D258	List: ML20238D256 ML20238D300
References
SP, NUDOCS 8801040191
Download: ML20238D300 (21)

Text

__ _

[NITED STATES OF /MERICA NUCLEAR REWLATCW COWISSION BEFORE THE NNINISTRATIVE JLOCE in the Matter of )

}

DAVID W. G i> ) Docket No. 55-60402

)

(Senior Operator License for )

Beaver Valley Nuclear Power )

Station, lhlt 1) )

AFFIDAVIT OF EMRFN S. NORRIS Barry S. Norris does depose and say:

1. I, Barry S, Norris, am a Senior Operations Engineer (Examiner / inspector),

in the Pressurized Water Reactor Section, Operations Branch, Division of Reactor Safety at the U11ted States Nuclear Regulatory Comnission, Region

1. At the time of the examination of David W. Held, my position was Reactor Engineer (Examiner) within Section 1C of the Division of Reactor Projects. My responsibilities relative to that examination were the administration of the simulator and oral examinations to Mr. Held. My professional quali fications are attached.

2. At the time of Mr. Held's examination (July 29, 1986), the process for tac examination of operator candidates under 10CFR Part 55 consisted of a written examination, a sinulator examination, and an orai examination.

The candidate was required to pass all three examinations in order to receive a license. The examinations were prepared and administered in accordance with MREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examiner Standards, 8801040191 871211 SECY LIC55 05560402f '

PDR

2 Revision 2. Mr. Held passed the written and oral examinations; therefore, only the sinulator examination portion of the process will be explained.

3. Simulator examinations are developed by the NRC in accordance with NLREG-1021, Standard ES-302, " Scope of Operating Examinations to Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators - Power Reactors." The examinations are designed to examine usually three or four candidates simultaneously on a plant specific sinulator during three or four different scenarios. We scenarios are developed by the examiners based I'

on information supplled by the facility Iicensee concerning the design of the plant, the procedures currently being used, as well as the capabilities of the simulatcr. The WC develops the scenarios to reflect actual or anticipated events. We scenarios are designed to last approximately one hour each. Each candidate is evaluated by a separate examiner.

4. The objective of the scenarios is to evaluate the canpetencies of the candidates during normal evolutions, instrument fai lures , canponent mal funct ions and major transients. The simulator examination is not designed on a point system with a predetermined percentage required to pass. Rather, the examiner nust make an objective and subjective evaluation as to whether or not the candidate demonstrates a responsible, safe attitude towards facility operation and demonstrates a sufficient level of knowledge of reactor systems and operations. The evaluation is based on observing the candidate's responses and actions during the scenarios, and follow-up discussion between the examiner and the

3 candidate. The candidate is evaluated on eight cepetencies, each of which is graded as either satisfactory, marginal or unsatisfactory. The cmpetency areas are: (1) Understanding / Interpretation of Annunciator / Alarm Signals, (2) Diagnosis of Events / Conditions Based on Signals / Readings, (3) Understanding of Instrtment/ System Response, (4) l Compliance /Use of Technical Specifications, (5) Cmpi lance /Use of l

Procedures, (6) Control Board Operations, (7) Supervisory Ability, and (8) Cormunicat ions / Crew Interaction. AlI rmrginal and unsatisfactory evaluations require written Just i fica tion. As stated in ES-302,

. paragraph F.3, an evaluation of unsatisfactory in any one competency rmy be considered an adequate basis for failure of the sinulator examination.

5. Mr. Held was licensed as a Reactor Operator at Beaver Valley Unit 1 at the tirm of the examination, thus he was administered an examination for an upgrade to a Senior Reactor Operator ilcense. It was not necessary that he be evaluated on the corrpetency of Control Board Operations. Of the seven remaining competencies, Mr. Held received an unsatisfactory evaluation in two of the competencies (Conpliance/Use of Procedures and Cmpliance/Use of Technical Specifications) and a trarginal evaluation in two other competencies (Supervisory Ability and Communications / Crew Interaction). The overall determination of a failing grade was based on the two unsatisfactory evaluations.

6. We Sinulator Examination:

The three scenarios on which Mr. Held, as a Senior Reactor Operator candidate, and three Reactor Operator candidates were tested were: (1) a fallure of the controlling turbine irrpuise pressure channeI foiiowed sequentially by a failure of the letdown backpressure regulating valve

4 (Oi-FCV-145), a load rejection, a steam generator tube leak (developing into a tube rupture), a failure of a steam generator level transmitter, and a loss of offsite electrical pontr; (2) a failure of a feedwater flow transmitter followed seque.ntially by a failure of a pressurizer pressure channel, an inadvertent boration, a gradual loss of condenser vacutm, a loss of coolant accident, and a loss of one of the energency electrical buses; and (3) a failure of one of the power range nuclear instruments followed sequentially by a lowering safety injection acctarulator level, a failure of the controlling turbine impulse pressure channel, a loss of one of the emergency electrical buses, and an atmospheric dtsrp valve on a stean generator faiiing partly open. The malfunctions are usually inserted one at a time with sufficient time given for the candidates to respond to each casualty and restore the plant to a stabic condition before the next mal function is inserted.

7. The two caripetencies in which V.r . Held received a rating of unsatisfactory are discussed as follows:

Compliance /Use of Procedures Examiner's Cerrment 1.a:

sop-4.VI .V, [ Revision 21] Adherence to Operating Procedures, Paragraph 5 states in part "When extensive operations, infrequent operations or any operations requiring documentation are to be performed, the operating procedure trust be present and followed." SAP-4.VI .V, Paragraph 7 states-I in part "Mhen an operator acknowledges an aIarm, he must determine if the 1

l. j l alarm is ... expected . . . I f not, then he trust proceed to the appropriate 1 alarm response procedure." The candidate consistently neglected to use

! i

4 x4 5

abnornal procedures and alarm response procedures during casualty conditions. Exmples are: Failure of the letdown backpressure regulator valve (PCV-145) caused alarm " Regen [crative] Heat Exchanger Relief Line Tap [erature] High." The Candidate should have tried to reestablish normal charging and letdom per OA-1. 7. 4. AF [ Operations Procedures Manual, Revision 29, Restoring Charging and Letdown), which required setting FCV-145; when this was not possible, he should have shifted to excess letdom (OA-1.7.4.H) [ Revision 29, Excess Letdovri Heat Exchanger Operation]. Contrary to this, the Candidate isolated FCV-145 and ordered that the backpressure be traintained by throttling on the manual bypass I

valve. This action necessitated entry into a radiation area by an I I

auxiliary operator and also caused the Reactor Operator to spend i cxcessive attention to the O CS sysicm [ Charging and W!um Control Systm]. (More sinply put, when the backpressure regulator valve failed i

and en alarm sounded at the control panel, Mr. Held directed one of the

]

auxiliary operators to ao to a radiation area to isolate the regulator valve. Use of the proper procedures by manipulation of the valves from the control board would have alIowed ccntinued plant operation. It was not necessary to manually isolate the valve. In addition, the Reactor Operator had dif ficulty in balancing charging and letdown flows because he had to coordinate his actions at the control board with those of the i 1

auxiliary operator at the bypass valve.) j l

8. Answer:

Mr. Held raises several issues with respect to this evolution, he states that: (a) It is a normal Duquesne Light practice to operate systes on l

l L

6 l

manual bypass valves (Mr. Held cites, as an exanple, a night shif t on Beaver Valley thit 2 when three systems were operated on the bypass valves); (b) the plant was stable and sufficient time was available for both troubleshooting and/or establishing excess letdom; and (c) there is nothing in the alarm response procedure that precludes the use of the manual bypass valves.

9. Mr. Held states ... the NSS [ Nuclear Shi f t Supervisor] (one of the simulator instructors) had approved his action." (Speci fication, . p 1)

Additionally, Mr. Held states "Had Mr. Norris discussed this evolution with me or the simulator staff following the scenario, it would have easily been explained to him."

10. Staf f Response:

Mr. Held referenced two Beaver Valley procedures to support his content ion - that it is normal practice to operste systens on a manual bypass valve. However, his claim that his action was consistent with alarm response procedures and abnonml operating procedures, has not been demonstrated by sutmittal of the procedures; nor could I find any such statements in the procedures during a subsequent review. Additionally, tc the best of my knowledge, there is no alternative method for correcting the Beaver Valley Unit 2 exmples that Mr. Held provides to support his claim.

11. Mr. Held contends that it is acceptable to use a method other than an approved procedure to correct a situation. This contention is contrary

-to the Site Administrative Procedure (SAP-4-VI .V) , cited above, which

(

required him to utilize the appropriate alarm procedure. Since the first alarm was " Regen Heat Exchanger Relief Line Tenp High," and since the  ;

1 l

1 1 _ . _ _ _ . _ _ - . .1

t 7

l alarm was not expected (as it would be during a test of the systen), he i n, was required to proceed to Od-1.7.4.Y. By his omi adnission (see -

Novenber 21, 1986 letter from Mr. Held to Mr. Russell, page 2) Mr. Held ,

states that the relief valve [which opened due to the failure of the regulator] was still open due to the pressure transient. Paragraph 5 of Od-1. 7. 4.Y states in part "If the letdown relief valve falls to rescat, secure normal charging and letdown and . . . Initiate excess letdown heat exchanger operation as per operating procedure 7.4.H." Thus, Mr. Held chose manual bypass operation rather than following procedures which specifically describe the means to mitigate the problem before him. His inproper action required unnecessary radiation exposure for another operator. Hir action also unnecessarily diverted the attention of the J,

Reactor Operator from monitoring of the entire control board. u,,

12. I f, es Mr. He ld cont erds , the plant was stable and he therefore made a y conscious decision to restore nonr.al charging and letdown (see Septenber A 16, 1986 letter from Mr. Held to Mr. Kister , page 3), instead of using an a! ann procedure, he was required by SAP-4.VI.V, paragraph 1, to implement the appropriate procedure (04-1. 7 . 4. AF, Restoprg 01argir.g ard Letdan) (

as written. When it was determined that he could not follow the procedure as written, the activity should not have continued.

OA-1.7.4.H, Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Operation, states in part "This procedure . . . can be arployed . . . when norma l letdcwn is temporarily out of service . . ." f irrespective of which path Mr. Held initially decided to follow, the end result should have been to initiate excess letdan.

13. With respect to Mr. Held's position that his actions were approved by the l

simulator instructor, the simulator instructors routinely asstme the role of personnel outside the control room, in this case the NSS (Nuclear Shift Supervisor). D e directions given to the instructors, and to the candidates during the pre-examination briefing, was that the NSS would agree to whatever action was recorrmenc'ed by the SFO caredida te. I l

Ecrefore, when Mr. Held states that his action was approved by the ,

l sinulator instructor, there should have been no other response expected from the instructor.

14. With regards to Mr. Heid's ccmrent about discussing the evolution with him after the scenario, no need for follow-up cruestioning was indicated as i had observed his perfonmnce and heard his decisions, in accordance wi th NUREG-1021, ES-302, paragraph E.2.a, ". . . - i f the candidate performs in a wey other than cxpected, the examiner should note d at the candidate did for did not do) ... These notes should provide sufficient infortnation f to allow the examiner to confidently Judge candidate ccrrpetence ..." j Similarly, there was no factual issue that needed c.lari fication via discussion concernirt] whether or not the apropriate alarm response procedure was followed. %e ccrrpetency being evaluated was adherence to procedures. Mr. Held did not comply with procedures.

15. In stsrmary, Mr. Held's argtsrent that use of a manual bypass valve is an j j

acceptable alternative is without basis because he, in fact, did not

] 1 operate the plant in accordance with approved procedures. I consider I this action to be unsatisfactory and significant because it was representative of Mr. Held's disregard for ccripliance with achijnistrative guidance which specifically directed the use of approved procedures.

1 1

T r 9 u

l

16. Examiner's Carment 1.b:

Failure of a pressurizer pressure ins trtment (PT-444 ) low caused all pressurizer heaters to energize and all spray valves to close. Candidate should have referred to AOP-13.B [ Revision 0], Decreasing Pressure or Low Pressure Transient or CF ,6.4.H [ Revision 38], Pressurizer Pressure Low for any recuired follow-up actions; instead, Candidate only referred to 04-1.1.5 -[ Reactor Protection Bistable Function and Location List] for tripping of the bistables.

17. Staff Pasponse:

Mr. Held did not contest this ccmrent in his Specification of Claims.

18. Examiner's Conment 1.c:

A sirrulator tralfunction caused an undervoltage cordition on the DF bus  ;

f causing the #2 Diese! Cenerator [DGi to auto-start and pickup the DF bus; st;bsequent ly, the LG breaker openec; when the Balance-of-Plant operator j

[Beavtr Valley calls this position ti,e T'innt Operator] incorrectly tried 1

to parallel with of fsite power. The Candidate proceeded to use the EOP's j q

{&rergcncy Operating Frwedures) for recovery of the bus vice the OA's  !

[Operatirg Precedures Wnnall; specifically, E.0 [ Revision 0, Reactor

)

, Trip or Safety injection] Attachrent 4 vice 0d-1.36.4.Q.8 [ Revision 30, I Transferring Brergency Busses 1AE and 1DF frcm Emergency Feed to Normal Feed]. When cuestioned af ter the scenario, the Candidate stated that there was not a procedure outside of the EDP's to cover this situation.

The OA gave step-by-step directions on how to return the bus to the normal power supply, this would have prevented the subsequent loss of the bus. (Sirrply put, insuf ficient power to the bus caused the diesel generator to start. Mr. Held ordered the plant operator to connect with

l l

10 of fsite poner but did not irquire about the operator's kncwledge nor did l

Mr. Held provide adequate guidance to the operator. Mr. Held did not l refer to the appropriate procedure which contained the infonmtion. Mr.

Held's failure to use the proper procedure caused a loss of power to the bus.)

19. Answer:

Mr. Held irdicates the DF bus problem was due to sinulator rmifunction and not due to any action on his part. Mr. Held conterds that the correct fac t ii ty procedure was found, reviewed and utiiIzed in the restoration of pcv.er to the DF bus. He supports his argtment wi th "My appeal ... and its reply ... established that we did follow OA 36.4.0.B."

(Specificatecn, p 3) Mr. Held further states "... hhen it was determined by Region 1 that GA 36 was used the contention was [charced] that breaker interlocks wert violated. Wntn pressed for specifics, none could be give, ... The discussion / debate on this issue should have trded in Novenber 1986 when Region 1 conceded that in fact I had obtainea and followed OA 36.4.Q.B procedure, contrary to the original danial letter."

(Specification, pp 3 and 4)

20. Staf f Response:

The cordition which caused the DF bus to beccme initially deenergized has always been understood by the examiners. Immediately after that specific scenario, the examiners discussed the problem with the sinulator instructors to determine what initially caused the DF bus to become

11 deenergized. At no tirm was it stated that the initial undervoltage condition on the DF bus was due to any action or inaction on the part of l

Mr. Held.

21. Mr. Held's staturent that Region I had established that OA-1.36.4.Q.B was in fact folicwed is not correct. The following is a quote from a letter to Mr. Held concerning the Pegion I review of his examination, dated Novenber 10, 1986, from Mr. Kane:

It is clear that the candidate started using the wrong orocTdure, E-0 (Reactor was not tripped, thus he should not have been in E-0). He then found the correct procedure (O.M.1.3.6.4.0). The examiner's report states that the candidate directed the Plant Opcrator (10) to parallel the diesel with offsite power. This resu'ted in deenergizing the bus. This demonstrated inadequate understanding of the bus intericcks. Although power was ultimately restored to the energency bus, the candidate's unwillingness or inability to use procedures appartntly resulted in the bus beity) deenergized for approximately 15 tr.inutes.

Mt . Hetd did eventually find the correct procedure. However, he opened the tranusi to the first page of the procedure and then ef t it layirn unused on a table in the middle of the control room. As stated above, I asked Mr. Held why he had used the EDPs for recovery of the DF Bus. His answer was that there was not a procedure outside of the EDPs to cover the situation. He did not provide the procedure to the FO for review as he stated in his initial appeal letter, but left it laying on the table.

22. Mr. Held's statenont that the Staf f changed the reason for failure is also not correct. My ccmrent above (paragraph 18) stated that the  ;

Balance of Plant operator (FO) incorrectly tried to parallel with offsite power. The breaker line-up for the DF bus af ter the initial loss of power was the F9 breaker shut (#2 diesel generator output breaker), the i

i I

I

12 F7 breaker shut (one of the two series breakers that connect the DF bus to the D bus), ard the D10 breaker open (the secord series breaker l

connecting the DF and D busses). % hen the FO first tried to parallel the 1

l DF bus to the rnain generator by closirg the D10 breaker, it did not ,

close, in fact, breaker F7 opened, because there is an interlock that requires breaker F7 to be open before breaker D10 can be closed. The FO then tried to shut breaker F7, but it would not stay shut because (twre -

is a secord Interlock that requires el'ther F9 to be open er the diesel-ge.neratcr synchronizing switch to be in the F7 pos i t ion. The procedure 04-1.36.4.0.8 specifically states that the synchronizing switch must be in the F7 position, and that breaker F7 is to be in the "af ter-open" position prior to closing breaker F7. The simulator instructor (as the NSS) had to ranind the candidates that the overcurrent trips also had to be ecst:t . These act icas demns trate that Mr. Held did not use CM-1. 3 0.Q. B.

23. In other words, Mr. Held attamted to use an _ermrgency operatiry pre edure (E-0) rather than a norTral operating procedure (041.36.0.8) .

The omrgency procedure did not cortain the detailed instructiorr for rccovery fran the situation. Because Mr. Held used the wrorg procedure, he created rnore probluns rather than correctirg the orirf inal one.

Fai fure to assure correct connection with offsite powr led to foss of the bus and loss of power to a second auxiliary feedwater punp. Mr.

Held's Specification does not contradict the fact that he inade a serious error in his choice e f procedures. This action convinced nu that his o.:

. - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ .__ h

l% :n iLMM)Mih2 M hERL NNEeM u <t ,

t,, , <

r .

y r

.N i  ;

1/ r ,:

l,

.f

,p ,

( ) ,

, i ;

p [ ,

13 <

s' ,-

r I F(o l<nowb.c.cd of when the mergency procedures could be used vos inadequate (t

t tobe[antedaSen/rReactorOperatorlicense.

24. Examiner's -- Cum. , nt 1.d:

> In addition to sttyi previous discursion about the. ,)ressurirer in.i, ctrnerit ,

u .( ,

i- i the sevne neglect was evidence with respect to a ta8,'u e high of o, steam I

genera *or level Indication and failure low steam enerator feec ficw

.i 1

8ndication. If the Cardidate had referenced the OA's , he ay have avertad the turbiq trip due t'o ICnh-figh steam generator,yal. r level, O&1.24.43 P speci fit ally cautioned about toe turbine trip.

25. 3 < s. t't, Pi s pciise:

Mr. Hi 6 Uli: not exntest this conment in his Specification of Clairo.

26. @jfy,1,1, p,,w,,,gv for,, the wipyncy of Ccmpliape/Use of Procedures: i

- 1 Mr .. held's act icru,! .w enfahed in parayaphs 7-25 above, clear)/

derrons tr a t ed tha t 'Ar. Epild s krowledcu of g procedures to ese ani gh_en to use those procedures was unsatisfactory. Mr. Held's 3ctions dispidyed a disregard for curpJ,ance with the acininistratite guidelines relative to which procedura rre to be used in vhich type of situation and to vhat extet the proci:tr6 ore to be DJhered to.

c

?7. Curpliance/dse of Technicaj_Spc fications

, Examiner's Conment 2.a:  ;

> 01 cmponen+ failures, the Catribl ate ru.6ected to refer tct the Tec!; ical y

Specifications for any fu h ow-up action and/or any' LID's 'Liml' ting (onditions for Operation, see paragraph 29 for a defini t ion gf '.00],

' i.lxamp hes are : On the loss of power to the DF bus the Candicfate $d not 7

refer to the Technical Jo.cifications for any Limiting Conditions for

/

h # , gp ,. )

3 14 s

@ Y!

.,. 9,ff , .

/

R j' 2/f an ,

e 01;j N lcl ll .,, 3g

~e , ss s a

. d kt rp ,

Operation (1I0). [ Note: '3A ARY pmp was rut-of-service at the beginning e <1 i

of the scenario.] Tha rmst restrictive LCD was 3.0.3 for exccedirr; the

.\

^

AFW LCD (3.7.1.2) of more than one AFV/ ptrrp inoperable; thtd. , the, Candidate was in a CNE Hour action statment and was / abrit of it.

(Sirrply put, during this scenario Mr. Held overlooked a Technical -

Specification requirement which required that steps be taken tovdrd a

l. , i:

plant shutdown.)

28. Answer:

j ( Mr. Held states that Technical Specification 3.0.3 was discussed by hirr. b, l 0 and explained to the examiner. He further states that the notes were '

t

, witnessed by him and that they c!%arly indicated that 3.M3 was discussed -

< e .b with respect to the r,txillar/ feed pmps. Mr.Heldcon@bdsthatheand  :'

the examiner had a very heated discussion with respect to the Technical M' Speci ficaticos.O He also contends that the examiner's notes 'have been "

y p

y y is , altered. Phially, Mr. Held states that he may not have consulted the Technical Specifications during the time when ,the event was occurring, but that his priorities were to recover the DF bus.

~

29. Staf f Response: i l

In accordance with 10Cm Part 50.36(c)(2), " Limiting conditions for operations are ethe lowest f unctional capability or perforrrance levels of equiprent required for safe operation of the facility. Yhen a limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not tret , the licensee I shMI shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitteci by l

the technical specification untii the condition can be met." The Ioss of t

t-the OF bv.g resulted in loss cI a second AFW purp since one was out of

,s:

m I

15 l service at the start of the scenarlo. The Technical Specifications do l- not' allow continued operation af ter the loss of two AFW ptnps.

30. The examiner's notes were not altered, as Mr. Held contends. Rather, during the original process of documenting the results of Mr. Held's examination, I made notes to tryself with regards to actions /statunents that I had expected but had not observed or heard. I expected Mr. Held to readily discuss the generic requirarent of Technical Specification 3.0.3 with respect to the auxiliary feedwater ptrips. Mhen he did not mention that specific section of the Technical Specification, I made a note to tryself so i muld not forget to doctment the deficiency on the Examination Report. Mr. Held states that he witnessed the notes of the examirer. Although, during the examination process, Mr. Held may have had occasion to see the taking of notes or even the actual notes thtmnives, all examiners take care to ensure that the observation of the ectual notes is minimized.

31. Mr. Held states that he did not have time to consult the Technical Speci fications during the time that the event was occurring. A review of the original denial shows that Mr. Held was never faulted for not looking at the Technical Specifications during the time that the DF bus was dcenergized. Mr. Held was specifically asked after the scenario to state

' what 1.fDs were in ef fect at the time the DF bus became deenergized the second time. As my notes indicated, he correctly listed the LCDs for the individual camponents; but did not state that the canbination of the DF bus and the 3A AFW purp made Technical Specification 3.0.3 the trost 11miting LCO. This is an exanple of a time when a follow-up discussion was warranted after the scenario was over.

16

32. Exaniner's Corrment 2.b:

On the failure of a steam generator level indication high, the Candidate tripped the appropriate bistables per OA-1.1.5. However, he did not refer to the Technical Specifications for any subsequent action; speci fical ly, that operation may continue only until performance of the next recuired channel functional test. By not referring to the Technical Specifications, the Candidate may have soon been in vloiation of an action statement and not been usare of it.

33. Staf f Response:

Mr. Held did not contest this cmment in his Specification of Claims.

34. Overall Stsmory for the cmpetency of Cmpliance/Use of Technical Speci fIcations:

Mr. Held's actions and discussions as described in paragraphs 27-33 precluded me from finding that Mr. Held's knowledge of the Technical i

Specifications was suf ficient for a Senior Practor Operator. The issues '

discussed above indicated that Mr. Held, in a supervisory position, could very likely place the plant in a condition which would be in violation of the requirements of the facility's license; that is, not operating in accordance with the limitations of their Technical Specifications.

35. Stnmary:

he following is a quote from the standard licende issued to a Senior Practor Operator: "in directing the licensed activities of licensed operators and in manipulating the controls of the above facility you shall observe the operating procedures and other conditions specified in the faciiity Iicense which authorizes operation of the facility."

DEC 10 '87 14:49 NRC. KING OF PRUSSIR P02

- 17 1

36. ' Mr. Held's performance i on the three scenarios demonstrated t hsuf ficient :

knowledge of < the Technical, Speciff cations and.in the . proper usage of procedures to allowilicensing as a Senior Reactor Operator. His. actions ,

and inactions resulted in or could: haves resulted in the facility violating several limitations of their license (Examiner's comments.1.a.

1.b, 1.c, 1.d'; 2.a. and 2.5), unnecessary tripping of the reactor plant (Examiner's comment 1.d), unwarranted exposure of . facility. personnel to e ionizing radiation (Examiner's comment 1.a).. and loss of the capability to safely shut down the plant 'in the event of an emergency (Examiner.'s commentsi1.c and 2.a) i

37. Based on the previous discussicn, and for the reasons explaineda I. have determined that Mr. Held's performan.ce on the simulator. examination was

'~

not adeque.te to receive a passing grade.

38. The foregoing and attached statement of professional . qualifications are s true and: correct to the best of my knowledge and' belief.

. A> ~

Subscribed.and sworn to before me this

/d M day of d v-e d 1987.'

Notary Publici h $. f h/ Commissioniexpires:. h~l 2.oj /Ps f .

_. _ _ _ _ _ __ -_ = ._ _ _ _ _ _

PARRY S. NORRIS Senior Operations Engineer (Examiner / Inspector)

EXPERIENT:

August 1987 - U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Present King Of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Senior Operations Engineer (Examiner / Inspector)

Coordination of alI activitles associated with the examination process for all Region i Babcock & Wilcox and Cantustion Engineering facilities and all non-power reactor faci l i ties. Certified as an l@C Examiner on Carrbustion Engineering technology in accordance with NUREG 1021.

May 1985 - Peactor Engineer (Examiner)

August 1987 Examination of applicants for Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator licenses in accordance with 10 CFR 55; process includes the preparation, administration and grading of written, sirrulator and oral examinations. Certified as an lit Examiner on Westinghouse, Babcock & Wilcox, and non-power technologies in accordance with NLIEC 1021.

Apust 1981 - Houston Llahting & Power, Co.

May 1985 South Texas Project, Bay City, Texas 77414 Senior Ouality Assurance Specialist - Systens Coordination of the client's Project 04 audit and training /

certification programs, including preparation and conduct of.

training classes. Assist in the development and review of HLSP's and contractors' OA programs and procedures.

Certified as Lead Auditor per ANSI N45.2.23/E 1.146.

June 1980 - Gl Ibert/Carmonweai th, Inc.

August 1981 Reading, Pennsylvania 19603 Quality Assurance Specialist - Electrical Develop and review procedures and technical specifications for instrumentation / control and fire signaling systems.

Coordination, preparation, and presentation of 04/QC courses for both internal training and client organizations -

Foundations of OA/QC, Basic RR/BWR Technology, Fire Protection, Auditor, and instructional Techniques.

Consulted with clients for establishment and implementation of quality assurance prograns. Certifled as Auditor per ANSI N45.2.23/ E 1.146 and Level li Electrical inspector per ANSI N45.2.6/fC 1.58.

t i

l l

4

._--_____--_-__-_--__J

i Earry S. Norris April 1977 - U. S. Navy Nuclear Power Training Unit May 1980 Ballston Epa, New York 12020 Training Coordinator-Manage the training of thirty students conmencing every three nonths; scheduling watches, maintenance of records and performance appraisals. As Engineering Watch Supervisor, directed propulsion plant watchstanders during all norTnal and casualty operations, znd radiological situations.

Practor Controls Leading Petty Officer  !

Supervised seven staff instructors in preventive and corrective maintenance of reactor controls and instrtmentat ion. Instructed students, both in the classroom and on an operating reactor plant, in reactor theory and operatlons. Directed the qualification efforts of reactor operator students. As a Reactor Operator, was directly responsible for safety of the reactor plant during operating and shutdown conditions.

f/ay 1974'- USS Sargo (SS(N) 583)

March 1977 Feari Harbor, Hawaii 96601 1 Reactor Operator /Enginecr's Administrative Assistant-Stood watch as Pcactor Operator during operating and shutdown conditions on a shipboard reactor plant.

Maintained training and technical records for engineering department. Engineer's assistant during a major shipyard overhaul, during which ntmerous technicai modifications and '

tests were performed and all watchstanders were trained and requalified.

August 1971 - Naval ibclear Program Trainee April 1974 ASSOCIATIONS S CERTIFICATIONS:

1986 ffC High Quality Certificate 1983 - Present American Nuclear Society (Munber) 1981 - 1985 American Society for Quality Control Trcasurer of local 01 apter Certifled Quality Engineer, #E-8575 1981 - Present U. S. Naval Reserve (Driiling)

Barry S. Norris FIUCATION & W AINIFC:

1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Conbustion Engineering Systems Technology (80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> classroom, 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> simulator)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Canmission.

Pre-Supervisory Orientation Course (40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> sel f-study,16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> classrocm)

U. S. Navy Leadership 6 Vanagement Training (80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> classroom) 1986 - 1987 U. S. Nuclear Pegulatory Canmission Babcock & %'ilcox System Technology (80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> classroom, 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> simulator) 1985 - 1986 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Westinghouse Systems TechnoIogy (160 hours0.00185 days <br />0.0444 hours <br />2.645503e-4 weeks <br />6.088e-5 months <br /> classroom, 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> sinulator)

"983 Houston Lighting & Power, Co.

South Texas Project Oral Presentation Skills (16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> classroom) 1982 - 1985 University of Houston at Victoria Pursuing course of study towards hEA 1982 Bechtel Energy Corporation South Texas Project Field Welding lbgrade Course (60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> classroom) 1981 GiIbert/Canmorwealth, Inc.

Lead Auditor Training Course (40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> classroom) 1971 - 1974 U. S. Navy Electronic Technician School (10 months classroom and hands-on) l Nuclear Power School i (6 months classroom)

Nuclear Power Prototype (6 rronths classroom and hands-on) l 1971 Ursinus ColIege, CoiIegeviile, Pennsylvania 1- BacheIor of Sclence, Major - Math .

1

D0f.KE rrti U%FC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '87 EC Jg p4 07 DEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OFFICE cf Sg gi,74,y DOCXEiiNG A SEi<vici BRANCH In the Matter of )

}

DAVID W. HELD ) Docket No. 55-60402

)

(Senior Operator License for )

Beaver Valley Nuclear Power )

Station, Unit 1) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO SPECIFICA-TION OF CLAIMS" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or as indi-cated by an asterisk through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion's internal mail system, or as indicated by a double asterisk by use of express mail service, this 11th day of December,1987:

l l Peter B. Bloch, Esq. David W. Held Administrative Judge RD 1 Box 353 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Hookstown, PA 15050 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555*

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Jay Gutierrez U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Counsel Washington, D.C. 20555* USNRC, Region 1 631 Park Avenue Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal King of Prussia, PA 19406*

Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docketing and Service Section Washington, D.C. 20555* Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission '

Washington, D.C. 20555*

b t Colleen P. Woodhead Counsel for NRC Staff

. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _